


KENNETH M. SETTON

THE PAPACY  
AND  
THE LEVANT

(1204–1571)



VOLUME IV. The Sixteenth  
Century



This One



H30K-2SU-T6S1

**THE PAPACY AND THE LEVANT**  
(1204–1571)

MEMOIRS OF THE  
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY  
*Held at Philadelphia*  
*For Promoting Useful Knowledge*  
Volume 162

# THE PAPACY AND THE LEVANT

(1204–1571)

Volume IV

The Sixteenth Century  
from Julius III to Pius V

KENNETH M. SETTON

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

Independence Square • Philadelphia

1984

Copyright © 1984 by The American Philosophical Society  
for its *Memoirs* series, Volume 162

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 75-25476  
International Standard Book Number 0-87169-162-0  
US ISSN 0065-9738

To Margaret

Volumes III and IV together cover the Sixteenth Century through the period of Lepanto. Pages and Chapters are numbered continuously throughout both volumes. The Index is given at the end of Volume IV.



## CONTENTS

### Volume III

#### The Sixteenth Century to the Reign of Julius III

1. Pius III, Julius II, and the Romagna; Venice, the Soldan of Egypt, and the Turks (1503–1507) .....	1
2. The League of Cambrai, the Turks, and the Gallican Conciliarists (1507–1511) .....	51
3. The Council of Pisa-Milan and the Battle of Ravenna, the Fifth Lateran Council and Selim the Grim (1511–1513) .....	102
4. Leo X, the Lateran Council, and the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1513–1517) .....	142
5. Leo X and Plans for a Crusade against Selim the Grim (1517–1521) .....	172
6. Hadrian VI, the Fall of Rhodes, and Renewal of the War in Italy ..	198
7. Pavia and the League of Cognac, Mohács and the Turks in Hungary, Bourbon's March on Rome (1525–1527) .....	229
8. The Sack of Rome and the Siege of Naples (1527–1528) .....	269
9. Before and After the Turkish Siege of Vienna (1528–1529) .....	312
10. Clement VII, Francis I, and Hapsburg Opposition to the Turks (1530–1534) .....	346
11. Paul III, the Lutherans, Venice and the Turks (1534–1540) .....	394
12. Paul III, the Hapsburgs, and Francis I, the Turks and the Council of Trent (1540–1549) .....	450
13. The Election of Julius III, the Council of Trent, the Turks and the War of Parma (1549–1552) .....	505

### Volume IV

#### The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V

14. The Murder of Martinuzzi, the Turks on Land and at Sea, the War of Siena (1551–1555) .....	565
--	-----

15. The Reign of Paul IV to the Outbreak of the War with Spain . . . . .	616
16. Paul IV, the War with Spain, and Jean de la Vigne at the Porte . . .	659
17. The Election of Pius IV and the Fall of the Carafeschi, Cyprus and the Turkish Success at Jerba (1559-1560) . . . . .	721
18. The Third Period and Closure of the Council of Trent (1561-1563)	769
19. France, Venice, and the Porte—the Turkish Siege of Malta . . . . .	829
20. Pius V, Spain, and Venice; the Turks in Chios and the Adriatic; the Revolt of the Netherlands . . . . .	882
21. Venice, Cyprus, and the Porte in the Early Years of Selim II (1566-1570) . . . . .	923
22. The Failure of the Expedition of 1570 and Pius V's Attempts to Form the Anti-Turkish League . . . . .	974
23. The Holy League, the Continuing War with the Turks, and the Fall of Famagusta (1571) . . . . .	1004
24. The Road to Lepanto, the Battle, and a Glance at the Following Century . . . . .	1045
Index . . . . .	1105

#### 14. THE MURDER OF MARTINUZZI, THE TURKS ON LAND AND AT SEA, THE WAR OF SIENA (1551-1555)

THE SOCIAL UPHEAVALS of the Bauernkrieg, the Peasants' War of 1524-1525, had resulted in the brutal suppression of the rebels in wide areas of the German countryside. Luther's stand with the rulers against the ruled had soured the peasantry against Lutheranism, which to a large extent became the religion of the territorial princes, the local nobility, and the bourgeoisie. Along with Luther and Melancthon, Bucer, Jonas, and Bugenhagen, the spiritual and political unrest of the times had produced not only such aberrant moderates as Grebel, Hubmaier, Huter, and von Schwenckfeld, but also such violent revolutionaries as Thomas Müntzer, who achieved a sad prominence at Mühlhausen, and John of Leyden, who outdid him at Münster.

Radical Protestant groups seemed to spring up everywhere. Lutheranism reeled under the impact of Anabaptism. The new doctrines, often contradictory, caused widespread confusion. Religious books and broadsides rolled off the presses by the thousands. The near madness of many a starry-eyed preacher earned him the crown of martyrdom. The safest generalization one can make is that generalization is risky, but obsession with scriptural dogma and popular education does not appear to have raised the moral standards of the period. The visitation records of the Protestant states of Germany in the second half of the sixteenth century show no improvement over those of Catholic Normandy in the second half of the thirteenth.<sup>1</sup>

With England, France, and even Spain as models, the territorial princes in Germany were strengthening their own local position and centralizing their authority. The religious disunity helped them, shattering the claims to universality

of the papacy as well as of the empire. The emperor suffered almost as much as the pope. The rich rebelled against taxation, the poor against increasing hardship. There was a widespread revolt against the past, against tradition. Despite wars, plagues, and poor harvests, the population increased during the sixteenth century. The influx of Peruvian and Mexican silver helped launch the so-called price revolution. Prolonged inflation increased the costs of food, land, and labor, with unsettling effects, which played into the hands of princes, land-holding nobles, bourgeois merchants, and bankers. Wars and religious strife, however, took the heaviest toll. In some areas religious strife led to wars. Conditions were worrisome in central Europe and on the eastern front.

Bohemia was rife with the religious dissent of Ultraquists, the Unitas Fratrum, Lutherans, and Zwinglians. In Hungary and Transylvania there were many Germans who had quickly succumbed to the lure of Lutheranism under the guidance of the mettlesome Matthias (Mátyás) Dévai and his successors. Dévai had been Luther's student at Wittenberg (in 1529-1530), and his preaching soon got him into trouble with Thomas Zalaházy, bishop of Erlau (*Agria*, Eger), who had him arrested in early November, 1531. Experience of more than one prison in Upper Hungary, however, failed to dampen Dévai's ardor for the new faith; Zalaházy turned him over to Johann Faber (*Fabri*), bishop of Vienna, who could neither convince him nor outtalk him on the religious issue. Very likely, as has been suggested, martyrdom would have lain before him, had not his coreligionists in Kaschau (*Košice*) rescued him from his detention in the summer of 1533. Undaunted by the perils he had encountered in Ferdinand's realms, Dévai went on to Buda, where John Zápolya also imprisoned him. Set free in the spring of 1535, Dévai was able to advance the Lutheran cause under the protection of several families of Magyar magnates, especially that of Thomas Nádasdy.

The Hungarian nobles were interested in churchlands, some of the lower clergy in marriage or communion *sub utraque specie*. While Germans in the cities remained loyal to Lutheranism, the Magyars gradually turned to Calvinism, which had a strange "catholicity" of appeal from one end of Europe to the other. The Germans had long been

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Theodore Bonnin, ed., *Registrum visitationum Odonis Rigaldi, archiepiscopi Rothomagensis* [1248-1278], Rouen, 1852, trans. S. M. Brown and ed. J. F. O'Sullivan, *The Register of Eudes of Rouen*, New York and London, 1964, and Gerald Straus, "Success and Failure in the German Reformation," *Past and Present*, no. LXVII (May, 1975), 30-63, esp. pp. 41 ff., with good bibliographical guidance. Straus explores some of the German Protestant (and Catholic) visitation records of the later sixteenth century. The register or journal of Archbishop Eudes Rigaud's visitations in the archdiocese of Rouen [Bibliothèque Nationale, MS. lat. 1245] covers the years from 1248 to 1269. His suffragan sees included Avranches, Bayeux, Coutances, Évreux, Lisieux, and Sées.

unpopular in Hungary and Transylvania. The doctrinal confusion of the past, which caused the Tridentine fathers no end of difficulty, was increased and exacerbated by the host of confessions which now began to appear, and were to be revised or repudiated for decades to come. The Protestants had an easy time in the areas of Hungary under Turkish domination. The conversion of Turks was rare indeed, but Bucsay mentions a Turk who joined the Protestants, studied theology at Debrecen in eastern Hungary, and became a pastor in Szepsi (in 1563).

Although Matthias Dévai was imprisoned under Ferdinand and Zápolya, who were both opposed to Lutheranism, no would-be king of Hungary could afford to take very drastic steps against the Germans who had settled in the lands of S. Stephen. When Zápolya's son John Sigismund re-established himself in Transylvania, with Turkish support in 1556, both he and his mother's former right-hand man Peter Petrović became advocates of the Reformation. The Paulist monk, Brother George Martinuzzi, bishop of Grosswardein (Oradea, Nagyvárad), had been the chief defender of Catholicism. But however troublesome Lutherans, Calvinists, and other Protestants might be to Catholic rule in Hungary and Transylvania, the Turks were certainly a larger obstacle than the religious dissidents.<sup>2</sup>

Henry II had attributed the Turkish naval expedition of 1551 to Sultan Suleiman's anger at Charles V's occupation of Mahdia and Ferdinand's machinations with Brother George Martinuzzi in Transylvania.<sup>3</sup> To the Transylvanian-Hungarian question no one could find a peaceful answer. There was a strong separatist movement, reinforced by Protestantism, in both Moldavia and Transylvania, where many magnates and townsmen wanted to throw off the Hungarian yoke.<sup>4</sup> Factional strife was as much a part of the landscape as the lakes and rivers. Ferdinand of Hapsburg made little progress in asserting his claims to the

kingdom of Hungary. Sultan Suleiman was still the chief arbiter of the political fortunes of both the kingdom and its eastward dependencies.

Year after year Brother George Martinuzzi "the Treasurer" had worked in his peculiar way—by adhering to the Hapsburg cause—for the well-being of the land he had come to love. He preferred the Germans to the Turks as the lesser of two evils. Martinuzzi was understandably much concerned about the future of Transylvania, the Hungarians' first line of defense against the Turks. All through the year 1550, however, Ferdinand had failed to respond to Martinuzzi's dire warnings of imminent Turkish attack. The dowager Queen Isabella and her minister Peter Petrović remained thorns in Martinuzzi's flesh. Suleiman had ordered the pashas of Belgrade and Buda as well as the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia to render Isabella whatever assistance she might need. He had also ordered that Peter Petrović should take over the reins of Isabella's government in place of Martinuzzi, and that she herself should be answerable only to the Porte.

Isabella armed troops against Martinuzzi, and summoned the Turks to help her. Then in a sudden tremor of understanding she made an agreement with Martinuzzi, as she had done before, and wrote Kasim Beg, the pasha of Buda, that she no longer needed Turkish help. A few days later (by 16 October, 1550) she had changed her mind again, and was sending couriers to Kasim Beg and the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia to hasten their entry into Transylvania. When Kasim Beg appeared, however, he found that Martinuzzi had put so many men into the field there was no meeting them. The Turk assumed that Isabella had deceived him, and he took flight toward Buda with the loss of some three hundred horse. The Wallachian and Moldavian forces were easily driven back. It has been suggested that Martinuzzi might have destroyed the Turkish troops, had he chosen to pursue them, but he had apparently no desire to incur the sultan's vengeance. In any event before he could risk an outright break with the sultan—and he hoped that a complete rupture with the Porte would never be necessary—Martinuzzi had to be sure that the Hapsburgs could and would provide men and money enough to prevent the Turks from overrunning Transylvania.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. in general the brief monograph of Karl Reinert, *Die Reformation der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Kirche*, Gütersloh, 1956 (Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, no. 173), who gives a good deal of attention to Johannes Honter of Kronstadt (Rum. Braşov, Hung. Brassó), the humanist reformer of the Transylvanian-Saxon Church, and see the fact-laden work of Mihály Bucsay, *Der Protestantismus in Ungarn (1521–1978)*, I: *Im Zeitalter der Reformation, Gegenreformation und katholischen Reform*, Vienna, Cologne, Graz, 1977, esp. pp. 53 ff., 83 ff., with an extensive bibliography.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. above, Volume III, Chapter 13, p. 560b.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. above, Volume III, Chapter 12, p. 466.

<sup>5</sup> On the career of Brother George Martinuzzi, see in general the well-informed, almost contemporary account of Ascanio Centorio degli Hortensii, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania, . . . ne' quali si contengono tutte le cose che successero nell' Ungheria dalla rotta del Re Lodovico XII. sino all' anno MDLIII.*

Brother George Martinuzzi was convinced that unless Ferdinand moved decisively into Transylvania before the Turks did so, the sultan would soon add Hungary to the Ottoman domain. Exchanges of letters and of envoys brought Ferdinand and Martinuzzi close together through the early months of 1551, and in the late spring the treaty of Grosswardein of 1538 was renewed in principle. According to this treaty, as the reader will recall,<sup>6</sup> Ferdinand (or his heir) was supposed to succeed to the entire kingdom of Hungary upon the death of Zápolya (d. 1540), whether the latter had any children or not. The treaty of Grosswardein had been the work of Johann von Weeze, then archbishop-elect of Lund, and of Brother George, who was himself bishop-elect of Grosswardein at the time. Although he sometimes employed devious means, as he dealt with devious people, Martinuzzi had always stuck by the treaty of 1538, which had caused his estrangement from Isabella, who wanted some day to see her son John Sigismund on the throne of Hungary. Isabella had come to fear Martinuzzi and the Hapsburgs more than she did Suleiman and the Turks.

One morning in late April, 1551, Isabella granted an audience to a Hungarian patriot in the castle garden at Alba Iulia, in Transylvania on the Mures River. She complained bitterly of Martinuzzi's underhanded intrigues with the Germans, saying that he was all German himself (*totus Germanus*). He was trying to turn the kingdom over to the Germans, and was party to a plan to carry her son John Sigismund off to Spain.

Venice, 1566, bks. I-III, pp. 24 ff., 44 ff., et passim, which work was followed three years later by *La Seconda parte de' commentarii delle guerre, et de' successi più notabili, avvenuti così in Europa come in tutte le parti del mondo dall' anno MDLIII. fino à tutto il MDLX.*, Venice, 1569. Cf. Og. Utišeničević, *Lebensgeschichte des Cardinals Georg Utišeničević genant Martinusius*, Vienna, 1881, pp. 75-79. The brief monograph of Giuseppe Cons. Alačević, *Il Dalmatino Giorgio Utišeničević Martinusio*, Ragusa [Dubrovnik], 1882, is based almost entirely upon Utišeničević's valuable study.

The account of Martinuzzi's last year (1551) in Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 290-98, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (1836), 20-32, is quite inadequate and very prejudiced against the Frater. F. B. von Bucholz, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten*, 9 vols., Vienna, 1831-38, repr. Graz, 1968, VII, 251-92, is also ill-disposed toward Martinuzzi, but his detailed account retains its importance owing to the author's mastery of the sources.

Odet de Selve, the French ambassador in Venice, tried to keep Henry II informed on the fortunes of Martinuzzi in Hungary and Transylvania (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 126 ff., 136, 138, 151, 152-54, and note Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II [1666], 300-2, letter of the French secretary Phebus to Henry, dated at Istanbul on 3 August, 1551).

<sup>6</sup> Cf., above, Volume III, Chapter 11, p. 434.

"I do not see how," she said, "and I cannot believe that this kingdom will be preserved under the protection of the Germans."

"Your Majesty," she was told, "believes in the Turks, my most reverend lord [Martinuzzi] in the Germans."

"My lord treasurer," she replied, "will be sooner deceived in the Germans than I in the Turks!"<sup>7</sup>

Ferdinand not only lacked the means to furnish distant Transylvania with the protection against the Turks which Brother George Martinuzzi expected of him, but he was still bound by the five years' truce which Gerard Veltwyck had arranged between the Hapsburgs and the Porte in 1547. As long as Sultan Suleiman was willing to keep the peace, it was well to do so also. Martinuzzi in the meantime was making no secret of his attempts to pacify the sultan, who was now expressing a high regard for him.<sup>8</sup> Suleiman had apparently merely shrugged his shoulders at Isabella's recent antics and Kasim Beg's discomfiture (in 1550). By 25 June (1551) Martinuzzi had forced or persuaded Isabella to treat with Ferdinand's commissioners concerning the succession to the Hungarian throne in accord with the terms of Grosswardein.<sup>9</sup>

A few weeks later, by the treaty of Alba Iulia (of 19 July, 1551), Isabella surrendered Transylvania and Zápolya's share of the Hungarian kingdom to Ferdinand in return for the duchy of Opole (Opole) in Upper Silesia, on the road from Cracow (Kraków) to Breslau (Wrocław). Isabella acted in the name and on behalf of her son John Sigismund, who was assured an annual revenue of 25,000 Hungarian florins. She was to retain the possessions which Zápolya had bequeathed to her personally, and (among other considerations) to

<sup>7</sup> Árpád Károlyi, ed., *Frater György Leveléze (Codex epistolaris Fratrís Georgii Utišeničevići [Martinuzzi dicti], episcopi Magno-Varadiensis, S.R.E. cardinalis, etc., 1535-1551)*, Budapest, 1881, no. CXLVII, p. 225, Emeric Pesthy (Pesthiensis) to Martinuzzi, from Alba Iulia on 28 April, 1551. Alba Iulia is the German Karlsburg, previously Germ. Weissenburg, the Hungarian Gyulafehérvár, in central Rumania about 170 miles northwest of Bucharest.

<sup>8</sup> According to Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. II, pp. 57-58, Ferdinand sent Martinuzzi a thousand Hungarian horse, with their pay provided for four months, as well as some pieces of artillery to assist him in his defense against Isabella.

<sup>9</sup> Károlyi, *Codex epistolaris Fratrís Georgii* (1881), no. CL, p. 229.

<sup>10</sup> Károlyi, *ibid.*, no. CLIX, pp. 241-42, and cf. Utišeničević, *Lebensgeschichte d. Cardinals Georg Utišeničević*, pp. 81-82, 84-85, who did not have access to Károlyi's edition of Martinuzzi's correspondence. His biography of Brother George and Károlyi's edition of the letters both appeared in 1881.

receive back the full value of her dowry. Isabella made the pact with Giovan Battista Castaldo, the Hapsburgs' captain-general in Transylvania, to whom we shall come shortly, and with Ferdinand's commissioners Thomas Nádasdy and Andreas Báthory. Since Oppeln could not be given up immediately, owing to its encumbrance by a mortgage (*propter illam pignoris obligationem, in qua nunc est*), Ferdinand made Isabella and John Sigismund an interim grant of the Slovakian city of Košice (*Cassovia*), which they were to hold with full jurisdiction and all revenues until the duchy of Oppeln was made available to them.<sup>10</sup>

In one way or another Sultan Suleiman was kept well informed as to what went on in Hungary and Transylvania. Undoubtedly Martinuzzi was among those who sent him information. By an imperial rescript of 20 July (1551) Suleiman forbade Martinuzzi to allow the Germans to remove Queen Isabella and Zápolya's son "into another land." Martinuzzi and the Hungarians would pay with their heads if they dared disobey the sultan's command: "You have served our fortunate Porte from the beginning, and you are our slave. Take care that enemies do not remove the queen and the king's son from your side!"<sup>11</sup>

At the same time (on 21 July) Martinuzzi was writing Ferdinand that by divine clemency matters had been proceeding perfectly. Ferdinand's commissioners had just been given the crown of S. Stephen, six and one-half pounds of gold, jewels, and enamel, "the sacred crown with which the kings of Hungary have commonly been inaugurated into the authority [*imperium*] of this kingdom, and upon which in the opinion of our ancestors all the strength and all the liberty of the realm were based." A marriage was being talked about between one of Ferdinand's daughters, Joanna,

and Isabella's son John Sigismund. Martinuzzi undertook to sell the idea to the Turks.<sup>12</sup>

The Turks were not going to like the idea. They were well aware that Ferdinand's commissioners were in Transylvania. Mehmed Sokolli (Sokolović) Pasha, the beylerbey of Rumelia, was accusing Martinuzzi of a "mendaciosum factum."<sup>13</sup> Mehmed, the son of a Bosnian priest, had a great career ahead of him as one of the most notable grand vizirs of the century. Martinuzzi's own career had almost run its course. He was leading a dangerous life, in close and constant correspondence with both Suleiman and Ferdinand, assuring each that his relations with the other were but a well-weighted deception. It is not always clear to which one he is telling the truth. Doubtless he wished a plague on both their houses, but he lived between them, and he had to deal with them both. Certainly by the midsummer of 1551 he appeared finally to have negotiated that *concordia* between Isabella and Ferdinand which, the latter at least believed, entailed recognition of his claims to Transylvania. On 4 August Ferdinand wrote Pope Julius III that Martinuzzi was the author of this settlement which was not only a boon for the house of Hapsburg but also for Christendom, *non solum de nobis sed de tota Christianitate egregia illustris bene merita*. We have already noted the Hapsburgs' conviction that what was good for them was *eo ipso* good for Christendom. Assuring the pope that Martinuzzi was a model of the Christian virtues and an unyielding defender of apostolic authority, Ferdinand requested a cardinal's hat for him.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. 11, pp. 70, 73-81 and ff., in large detail; Utišenić, *Lebensgeschichte d. Cardinals Georg Utišenić*, pp. 94-95, and append., nos. VIII-IX, pp. 32-39; and see, below, the references in note 44. Košice, Germ. Kaschau, Hung. Kassa, is an artistically rich city, which has been occupied at one time or another by Hungarians, Austrians, Turks, and Russians. On the negotiations of Isabella with Castaldo, see Johann Karl Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551 und Martinuzzi's Ende*, Hermannstadt [Sibiu], 1862, with an appendix or "Urkundenbuch" of thirteen documents. Mühlbach or Mühlentbach is the present-day Sebeș in central Rumania. Cf. in general N. Jorga [Iorga], *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, III (1910), bk. 1, chaps. 1-3, who moves back and forth in time and space, going from the 1550's to the '60's and back again.

<sup>11</sup> Károlyi, *Codex epistolaris Fratris Georgii*, no. CLXV, pp. 256-57, contemporary Latin translation of the firman.

<sup>12</sup> Károlyi, *ibid.*, no. CLXVI, pp. 257-58, letter dated at Turda (Hung. Torda, Germ. Thorenburg, fifteen miles south-east of Cluj) on 21 July, 1551, and cf. J. K. Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551* (1862), pp. 32-33, and append., no. 6, pp. 66-67. On the so-called crown of S. Stephen, see Patrick J. Kelleher, *The Holy Crown of Hungary*, *Review: American Academy*, 1951. The crown consists of two parts—the upper hemisphere, possibly of Regensburger manufacture [made from a gold and jeweled book-cover?], and the lower diadem, which (as shown by an inscription on one of the two central, upper plaques of the diadem) was presented by the Byzantine Emperor Michael VII Ducas Parapinakes to Géza I, king of Hungary (1074-1077). The two elements, the upper hemisphere and the much more extensive lower diadem, appear to have been united into a crown between the years 1108 and 1116, in the time of Géza I's son Coloman I (d. 1116).

Obviously Pope Sylvester II could not have sent the crown to S. Stephen, but the well-known legend had a long life since scholars had no chance to examine the crown, and read the Greek inscriptions on the lower diadem, until the end of the eighteenth century.

<sup>13</sup> Károlyi, no. CLXXI, p. 265, letter dated 3 August, 1551.

<sup>14</sup> Károlyi, no. CLXXII, pp. 266-67, letter dated at Vienna on 4 August, 1551; Utišenić, *Lebensgeschichte d. Cardinals*

Martinuzzi himself wrote the Sacred College on 7 September (1551) that since proper provision had been made for Zápolya's widow Isabella and his son John Sigismund, Ferdinand was now taking possession of Transylvania and Zápolya's erstwhile portion of Hungary without tumult and bloodshed. Ferdinand was not strong enough to contend with the sultan, however, and Martinuzzi looked to the cardinals to appeal to the pope and the Christian princes for the aid which Ferdinand needed so desperately to defend the imperiled and, one hoped, reunited kingdom of Hungary.<sup>15</sup> The commander of Ferdinand's armed forces—some 7,400 Spanish, German, Hungarian, and Italian troops—was Giovan Battista Castaldo, marchese of Cassano, whose business was warfare.

An old campaigner, who had been serving Charles V, Castaldo had received detailed instructions from Ferdinand at Vienna on 27 April, 1551, when he was informed that Ferdinand was taking over Transylvania, "an important part of the Hungarian realm, . . . to protect and save it from invasion and occupation by the enemies of the Christian faith." And Ferdinand was doing so at the urgent request and petition of Brother George, bishop of Grosswardein. Upon entering Transylvania with his troops Castaldo was to take care, *severitatem etiam adhibendo*, that no harm should come to ecclesiastics, women, children, and the poor, nor in fact to those of any station, "sed eorum omnium, qui partes nostras amplexi sunt, amica et condigna ratio habeatur." In making important decisions Castaldo should have recourse to the bishop of Grosswardein, who knew the land and its people, and who was the author and the initiator of this entire undertaking.<sup>16</sup>

Although at their first personal encounter in late June (1551) Castaldo had explained to Brother George that he wished to honor him as a father, and that Ferdinand wanted the Frater to conduct matters as hitherto, they did not hit it off well at all. Castaldo was a blunt man-at-arms, outspoken and undiplomatic. The Hapsburgs appreciated his loyalty, but the Hungarians sometimes found him as irritating as his Spanish and German troops. They had no desire to see the sacrosanct kingdom of Hungary made a part of, or even dependent upon, the German empire. As early as 5 July Castaldo was writing Ferdinand in complaint and perplexity of Brother George's hour-to-hour *animi mutationes*, and requesting instructions as to how to deal with his maneuvers and evasions if one should detect in them *sinistri aliquid*.

As for the Frater, he was certainly more interested in his own well-being than in that of Ferdinand whom, however, he preferred to the Turk. Brother George was also interested in seeing that Zápolya's son, John Sigismund, received some adequate recompense for the loss of the kingdom which he had no means of defending. Brother George believed that the troops which Ferdinand had sent under Castaldo were inadequate. He trusted no one, not Castaldo, not Isabella, not the Transylvanians, and not the Hungarian nobility, of whom he often spoke in derogation. Isabella came to hate the Frater more than she did anyone. If she was relieved to surrender S. Stephen's crown to Castaldo and Ferdinand's commissioners, it was because thus she put it beyond Brother George's grasp, for she once suggested to Castaldo that the Frater might well have hoped to crown himself king of Hungary.<sup>17</sup>

When Gianmaria Malvezzi, Ferdinand's envoy on the Bosphorus, gave the Porte official notification of the treaty of Alba Iulia, Suleiman threw him into prison without more ado. To the Hapsburgs' remonstrance that this was contrary to the laws and practice of diplomacy, Suleiman returned an answer, which was (according to von Hammer-Purgstall) quite at variance with the Islamic tradition, "that ambassadors are responsible for the

<sup>15</sup> Georg Utiesenović, p. 101, and append., no. XIII, pp. 43–44; Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. II, p. 82, and bk. III, p. 101.

<sup>16</sup> Károlyi, no. CLXXX, pp. 279–81, letter dated at Alvincz on 7 September, 1551, and cf. Ferdinand's letter of 27 August to Duke Albrecht of Bavaria in August von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des XVI. Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Bayerns Fürstenhaus*, 4 vols., Munich, 1873–96, I, no. 727, pp. 720–21.

<sup>17</sup> Utiesenović, *Lebensgeschichte d. Cardinals Georg Utiesenović*, pp. 85 ff., and append., no. VII, pp. 24–32; Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. II, pp. 58–66, who says that Castaldo's army consisted of 5,700 foot and 1,700 horse, "e con questo esercito, dico picciolissimo, seguì il Castaldo il suo viaggio per andare a conquistare la provincia di Transilvania contra un tanto poderoso prencipe come è il Turco, di cui parmi si possa dire . . . che per ambasciatori erano troppi, e per combattere assai pochi . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 66).

On the long military career of Giovan Battista Castaldo (b. 1493), which included the capture of Francis I at Pavia in 1525,

see G. de Caro, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XXI (Rome, 1978), 562–66. The precise date of Castaldo's death is not known. It apparently came after the year 1565. Ascanio Centorio served as his secretary (from 1557) during a period of Castaldo's retirement in Milan.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Utiesenović, *Card. Georg*, pp. 89–91, 98–99, and J. K. Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551* (1862), p. 22. On the crown of Hungary, cf. Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. II, p. 88.

given word of their masters, and that as hostages they must make amends for the violation thereof."<sup>18</sup>

If Ferdinand had left the task of informing the Porte to Brother George Martinuzzi, he might have broken the news more gently. The whole purpose of the treaty of Alba Iulia was to be sure of Hapsburg protection against the Turks. If the Frater dealt deviously as well as dexterously with both the Hapsburgs and the Turks, he does seem to have had the interests of the Hungarians and Transylvanians at heart. His concern for the oppressed peasantry forms the subject of more than one of his letters. The Turks were luring from their Christian allegiance the Hungarians as well as the Serbs. Toward the end of the summer (of 1551) Brother George wrote Ferdinand that the feudality would have only themselves to blame for the continuance of such popular defections to the Turks, "since we keep the peasants in such dire subjection." Except for the fact that their wives and children were not taken from them, the poor wretches were shown no consideration at all. He urged Ferdinand to proclaim the peasants' emancipation by public proclamation, that they might know of his Majesty's concern for all the estates and classes of his realm. God would be pleased by the liberation of the peasantry.<sup>19</sup>

Brother George seems to have tried to deflect the Turks' anger from himself and to ward off, if possible, a Turkish invasion of Hungary or Transylvania. He apparently informed the Turks that Isabella was responsible for the treaty of Alba Iulia, because she wanted to see her son married to a daughter of Ferdinand. The Frater is even alleged to have assured the Porte that he would drive the Germans out of Transylvania. It is conceivable. He needed time. Ferdinand had sent a woefully insufficient force under Castaldo, and the Frater was appealing to both the Hapsburg brothers to send larger and stronger forces to help hold Hungary and Transylvania against the inevitable Turkish attacks. In the meantime, by the end of

August (1551), the Turks had assembled a large army at Slankamen, some eighteen miles north of Belgrade.

Mehmed Sokolli, the beylerbey of Rumelia, crossed the Danube at Peterwardein (Petrovaradin) on 7 September, and crossed the Theiss (Tisza) near the village of Titel in northern Serbia, making his way north to Becse (Bečej), where he seized the fortress on 18-19 September. The garrison of two hundred men was put to the sword. On the twenty-first Mehmed Sokolli took the fortress of Beckserek, which the garrison had abandoned, and continued on his way to the episcopal city of Csanád on the Mureş (Maros) River. The Serbian force which held Csanád gave it up (on the twenty-eighth) to the Turks, who then advanced upon the important town of Lipova (Lippa) on the left bank of the Mureş. Andreas Báthory surrendered Lipova without a struggle on 8 October, and the Turkish army moved southwest some thirty or more miles to Timişoara (Temesvár), which was put under siege on 16-17 October. Thus far the Turks had swept everything before them.<sup>20</sup>

After some weeks of inaction Ferdinand's commander Giovan Battista Castaldo wanted to attack the Turks. Martinuzzi cautioned against a large-scale encounter without adequate strength. Reinforcements were coming under Sforza Pallavicini, another of Ferdinand's condottieri. Martinuzzi produced 20,000 florins in gold and 10,000 in silver to help finance the defense against the Turks. Even Castaldo was impressed, as he wrote Ferdinand, with the Frater's showing himself "every day more ardent for your Majesty's service than one could possibly believe."

Castaldo's suspicions returned and increased, however, as the Frater kept sending messengers to the Turks, and receiving answers. Possibly he was trying to deceive the Turks as to the true state of affairs in Transylvania, but was he deceiving only the Turks? Levies of local troops lagged, and hopes of popular uprisings in defense of the country were disappointing. In fact little could have been expected of Transylvania, where the three privileged "nations" of Hungarians, Szeklers, and so-called Saxons were hostile to one another, and the native Rumanians had long had their fill of them all. In line with Castaldo's own suspicions of Martinuzzi, the latter's secretary was soon said to

<sup>18</sup> Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, 111 (Pest, 1828, repr. Graz, 1963), 291, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (Paris, 1836), 22, and cf. Utišeniović, *Card. Georg.*, pp. 103-4.

<sup>19</sup> Károlyi, no. CCIII, p. 315, and cf. no. CCXIII, p. 300, and Utišeniović, *Card. Georg.*, p. 109. On the "everlasting servitude" of the Hungarian peasantry after their suppression in 1514, see I. Sinkovics, "Le 'Servage héréditaire' en Hongrie aux 16-17<sup>e</sup> siècles," in Gy. Székely and E. Fügedi, eds., *La Renaissance et la Réformation en Pologne et en Hongrie (1450-1650)*, Budapest, 1963, pp. 47-89 (*Studia historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 53).

<sup>20</sup> F. B. von Bucholtz, *Gesch. d. Regierung Ferdinand d. Ersten*, VII, 261-62; Iorga, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, 111, 36 ff.; and note esp. Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. 111, pp. 98 ff., 102 ff.



be depicting the Frater as the near ally of the Turk. One charge led to another.

Martinuzzi was accused of throwing the commander at Csanád into irons to conceal his own treachery. His plan was allegedly to deliver Castaldo and Ferdinand's army over to the Turks. The treaty of Alba Iulia was presumably designed to rid the scene of Isabella and John Sigismund, because Martinuzzi's ambition was to have the sultan invest him with Transylvania, for which he would pay an annual tribute as a vassal of the Porte. There was no end to his perfidy. He had hindered Sforza Pallavicini's auxiliaries from joining Castaldo's army in Transylvania by requiring Pallavicini to stop at Grosswardein (Nagyvárad, now Oradea).<sup>21</sup> So it was said.

The author of these charges and calumnies was Castaldo himself. His purpose was to convince Ferdinand that the title of voivode, the office of treasurer, and a cardinal's hat were all trifles as far as Martinuzzi was concerned. The Frater wanted to rule Transylvania, like John Zápolya before him, under the protecting aegis of the Porte. Castaldo made these accusations against Martinuzzi in a letter of 16 October (1551) to Ferdinand on the alleged basis of information given him by an unnamed "secretary." If the secretary was not a product of Castaldo's imagination, as he probably was not, he was almost certainly Marc' Antonio Ferrari, who had left Castaldo's staff ostensibly to serve as the Frater's Italian-language secretary. Time would show, however, that he had not left Castaldo's employ.<sup>22</sup>

Whatever lay behind Castaldo's charges and his hatred of Martinuzzi, the fact remains that the latter's letters are filled with fear of the Turk. Four days before the date of Castaldo's letter to Ferdinand, Martinuzzi had written Charles V (on 12 October) that Ferdinand's claim to Transylvania had evoked the ire of the Turk, who had apparently kept Mehmed Sokolli Pasha in the field all winter as a threat to the Hungarians. The subjugation of Hungary would open up to the Turk a broad avenue of approach into the Christian commonwealth. Martinuzzi appealed to Charles to assist the Hungarians in what might otherwise be

the last winter of their resistance to the enemy.<sup>23</sup>

On that very day (the twelfth) Martinuzzi was created a cardinal at a secret consistory held at S. Peter's in Rome.<sup>24</sup> He was never assigned a titular church.<sup>25</sup> On the twentieth a courier brought the good news to the encampment where Martinuzzi and Castaldo were concentrating their forces for the recovery of Lipova (Lippa). Castaldo ordered a salvo of cannon fire in the middle of the night to commemorate the event, but the next day he sent off a dispatch to Vienna, stating that although Martinuzzi was highly gratified, and had richly rewarded those who had brought him the news, he had made no comment and given no outward sign of his satisfaction.<sup>26</sup>

On 30 October (1551) Martinuzzi wrote Charles V, thanking him for the great honor done him in his elevation to the cardinalate, which he knew he owed to Charles's intercession. For the rest the contest with the Turk went on, and four castles had just been recovered.<sup>27</sup> It was Ferdinand, as Martinuzzi knew, who had begged the pope to give him the red hat but, no matter, he had become a cardinal. Martinuzzi, however, was dealing with the Turk as well as fighting with him. His relations with Ferdinand were now deteriorating, owing especially to Castaldo's letter of 16 October. The Hapsburgs could not, understandably enough, remain content with the mere claim to a title or a territory. They had to press for recognition and the revenues that went with their claim. Since Ferdinand had sent an armed force into Transylvania, he was more than a little concerned as to whether the sultan would consider Veltwyck's five years'

<sup>23</sup> Károlyi, *Codex epistolaris Fratris Georgii*, no. CCV, pp. 317-18.

<sup>24</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fol. 108<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, entries for 12 and 16 October: ". . . Sanctitas sua creavit in Sancta Romana Ecclesia presbyterum cardinalem de fratrurn consilio Fratrem Gregorium [I], episcopum Waradiensem. . . Apud Sanctum Petrum Romae die Veneris XVI Octobris 1551 fuit consistorium in quo fuit decretum ut mitteretur per unum ex Sanctitatis suae camerarius biretum et pileus rubea reverendissimo D. Georgio noviter creato cum indulto si ei videbitur utendi vestibus rubicis et paonaceis ac aliis indumentis quibus cardinales qui tempore sue assumptionis ad cardinalatum presbyteri sui clerici saeculares erant unum dummodo tamen habitum suum regularem subter deferat." Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 165-66, and Gottfried Buschbell, ed., *Concilium Tridentinum*, XI (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1937), no. 495, p. 696, a letter of Cardinal Pedro Pacheco to Antoine de Granvelle, dated at Rome on 20 November, 1551.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III (1923), 32a.

<sup>26</sup> Utičenović, *Card. Georg.* p. 115; Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 111-12.

<sup>27</sup> Károlyi, no. CCVII, pp. 319-20.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Utičenović, *Card. Georg.* pp. 104-13. Concerning the charges of "unus secretarium ipsius fratris Georgii," see, *ibid.*, append., no. XV, pp. 54-55. Martinuzzi had apparently moved slowly to meet the Turkish invasion (Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551*, p. 47). On Sforza Pallavicini's arrival at Grosswardein (Varadino) with 3,000 German foot and 400 horse, note Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, p. 102, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Utičenović, *Card. Georg.* pp. 110-14.

truce (1547–1552) as having been broken. The sultan's imprisonment of Ferdinand's envoy Malvezzi, however, would seem to make it clear that the Porte did regard the truce as broken.

Ferdinand liked to think that Castaldo's entry into Transylvania was merely evidence of the final fulfillment of the treaty of Grosswardein (of 1538). When Ferdinand blithely informed the Porte, however, that he had now acquired peaceful possession of Transylvania with the agreement of Queen Isabella, Martinuzzi, and all the estates and orders of the realm, with the understanding of course that the customary tribute would be sent each year to Istanbul, Brother George was in trouble at the Porte. Sometimes it is hard to tell where self-righteousness ends and stupidity begins. The Hapsburgs usually addressed the sultan with the same pomposity they employed in writing to a German baron. In this case Ferdinand's letter to the sultan was tantamount to an accusation of treachery to the Porte against Martinuzzi, who (as Ferdinand knew well) was always trying to pacify the sultan by giving him vague assurances of loyalty and sending him various bits of information. (Mehmed Sokolli Pasha, the beylerbey of Rumelia, referred to Ferdinand's "accusation" of Martinuzzi.) Ferdinand wanted the sultan to understand that peace had finally been made in Transylvania, without prejudice to the Turkish tribute.<sup>28</sup>

Mehmed Sokolli's forces had taken Csanád, Lipova (Lippa), and more than a dozen Christian strongholds, but his siege of Timișoara (Temesvár) was not going well. On 2 November (1551) the Christian forces under Brother George Martinuzzi and Castaldo had finally advanced upon Turkish-held Lipova, where they arrived on the third. The next day they were building entrenchments, and on 5 November they began cannonading the walls of Lipova. After the failure of a foolhardy attempt of the Spanish soldiery to storm the ramparts, the general attack upon the town got under way. Brother George, having put aside the cardinal's robe for a soldier's cloak and the red biretta for a plumed helmet, was as conspicuous in the fray as Castaldo, Nádasdy, Pallavicini, and all the rest of the allied commanders.<sup>29</sup> When the smoke had cleared, and some 1,200 Turks had lost their lives, Brother George wrote Ferdinand (on 8 November) of the allies' successful attack upon Lipova

and the slaughter of the enemy within and without the town. Now the fortress alone remained to be taken, "and I do not doubt that with the aid of God we shall recover this too."<sup>30</sup>

Now the question was whether to try to take the fortress or to move on to Timișoara, where the brave commandant Stephen Losonczy had so far withstood the hardships of Mehmed Sokolli's siege. On or before 16 November, however, perhaps at the sultan's command, Sokolli had decided to raise the siege and withdraw across the Danube to Belgrade, owing to the lateness of the season and the proximity of the allied forces. On 16 November also, in a consistory at the Vatican, letters were read which Martinuzzi had written Julius III, describing the critical juncture of affairs in Hungary and Transylvania, and urging his Holiness to effect the return of the Christian princes to peace, so that their arms might in one way or another be employed against the Turks. Julius ordered the celebration of a special mass in S. Peter's "for peace and the preservation of Christendom from the infidels, with the usual indulgences and remissions."<sup>31</sup>

Meanwhile at Lipova, Castaldo and the Hapsburg generals wanted to storm the fortress or starve out the Turks, whose commander, the Persian Ulama Beg, was willing to give up the place in return for the assurance of his freedom and that of his troops. Castaldo wanted an unconditional

<sup>28</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXI, pp. 325–26. Martinuzzi's letter was written "ex castris ad Lypnam positis." On 21 November Ferdinand congratulated him on the victory at Lipova (*ibid.*, no. CCXII). It was later said that more than 5,000 Turks were killed in the final assault, and about 2,000 took refuge in the fortress of Lipova (Utišenović, *Card. Georg.* append., no. XV, p. 56).

According to Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 129–30, "... Si videro più di mille e dugento Turchi morti, e tutti i giannizzeri che erano stati gli ultimi a ritirarsi, e gli altri che rimasero vivi con Olinanno [Ulama Beg] cominciarono con tanto terrore e sì cecamente a fuggire nel castello che fu maravigliosa cosa a vedere. . . ."

<sup>31</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fol. 109<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration: "Apud Sanctum Petrum Romae die lune XVI Novembris 1551 fuit consistorium in quo fuerunt lecte littere reverendissimi D. Georgii cardinalis Transilvani date in castris quibus significabat res versari in maximo discrimine diemque fatalem publici conflictus adversus Turcas de proximo imminere, et propterea supplicabat Sanctitati suae ut procurarent [for procuraret] pacem fieri inter presbyteros [for principes] Christianos, unde Sanctitas sua decrevit ut celebraretur missa in basilica Sancti Petri die dedicationis eiusdem basilicæ pro pace et conservatione Christianitatis ab infidelibus cum indulgentiis et remissionibus consuetis." On Losonczy's defense of Timișoara, see Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 102–7, 109–11.

<sup>28</sup> Károlyi, no. CCIX, pp. 321–23, letter dated at Vienna on 5 November, 1551, and cf. Utišenović, *Card. Georg.* append., no. XV, pp. 48 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Utišenović, *Card. Georg.* pp. 115–17.

surrender. Martinuzzi cautioned them all against pressing the Turks too far. The sultan's wrath was terrible when aroused, for his hordes spared neither women nor children, houses or churches, trees, crops, or herds. Appeasement was the only practicable policy; keep the sultan calm, seek his benevolence. Pay the annual tribute, and be left in peace. Ulama and the Turkish force in the fortress of Lipova must be allowed to withdraw, unmolested and uninjured, so that they might give the sultan assurance of the Hapsburgs' and the Hungarians' good will. It would be well not to provoke the sultan to the exaction of vengeance for the losses he was sustaining in this war. Castaldo and the generals must not think that by killing Ulama and his men that they would have done with it all. Hardly!

The sultan would not lack for men if they took these few from him, for he already had in the field more than 40,000 men a mere 30 miles away. Lipova was (and is) in fact 32 miles northeast of Timișoara, where Mehmed Sokolli was then beginning to abandon the siege. Castaldo accused Martinuzzi of duplicity, and took gruff exception to his plea for kindness and moderation in dealing with the Turkish troopers caught in the fortress of Lipova. To deal with enemies of the faith as the lord cardinal advocated would be an outrage, a disgrace no soldier could face. What would the verdict of Christendom be if they took fright now when they had the Turks in their very grasp? According to the contemporary historian Ascanio Centorio, Castaldo also said that Mehmed Sokolli had already taken flight beyond the Danube, which was not the case. Martinuzzi answered angrily that he intended to let Ulama go free in order to help secure peace for Transylvania and the well-being of the people. Castaldo said nothing, according to Centorio, but became all the more determined to get rid of Brother George.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> On the events at Lipova (Lippa), see Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 111-41. Martinuzzi's appeal to the generals of the army to allow Ulama Beg and the Turks to leave Lipova without harm was given in Latin (*ibid.*, p. 134), but obviously Castaldo understood it, and his contemptuous answer easily won the generals to his point of view (pp. 135-37), "nel che vedendo Frate Giorgio che n[on] è in secreto n[on] è in aperto poteva fare cosa che volesse, e che non erano le sue ragioni ammesse, disse con grandissima colera al Castaldo che anco che egli non volesse, per la generale salute e tranquillità di Transilvania voleva liberare Olimanno, a che [Castaldo] non volse rispondere cosa alcuna, se non che accrescendo in se più l' odio et il desiderio di farlo morire più tosto che potesse, conobbe manifestamente quanto ei favoriva le cose del Turco e disfavoriva quelle di Ferdinando . . ." (p. 137). Cf. Utišeničević, *Card. Georg.* pp. 117-18.

Castaldo and Pallavicini had become Brother George's mortal enemies. Rumors were afloat in an atmosphere of hostility. The Frater was accused of encouraging Ulama Beg to hold out and of providing him with supplies. Castaldo had resumed the shelling of the fortress. On 16 November Ulama requested a twenty days' cease-fire, after which he would surrender the fortress provided he and his men were let go free. On the twenty-second he requested a meeting with Brother George, but agreed to send hostages to the allies, and two emissaries soon came to offer themselves as surety for the Turks' peaceful withdrawal with their arms and personal possessions. Castaldo rejected Ulama's proposal, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Mehmed Sokolli had begun his return to Belgrade by way of Beckserek, but on 25 November word reached the allied encampment at Lipova that Kasim Pasha, the governor of Buda, was hastening southward to cover Sokolli's retreat and to render his fellow Turks whatever assistance he could. The pasha had already reached Szeged.

There seems to be no evidence that Kasim Pasha had intended to attempt the relief of Lipova, where Ulama's garrison was badly off. The Christians' own supplies were running low. Utišeničević believes that Castaldo took the initiative, on 28 November, in accepting Ulama's proposal that the Turks should withdraw peacefully from the fortress. Castaldo would, presumably, have had to give a restraining order to his own troops lest they attack the departing Turks. Martinuzzi had wanted to get the Turks out with as little damage to the fortress as possible, *verum aliis tunc alterum visum est*, but the shelling of the walls had been such that the Christians would now have an expensive task of restoration.<sup>33</sup>

Although it is clear that Martinuzzi and Castaldo were hardly on speaking terms, it is inconceivable that the Frater should not have known of Castaldo's sudden willingness to set Ulama free, if such was really the case. In fact, on the very day in question (28 November), the Frater sent Ferdinand a sad account of conditions in the Christian encampment at Lipova. The fortress had not fallen; the siege had proved long and difficult. Mehmed Sokolli's army, having left Timișoara, was now a mere eleven miles away. The rains had come. The peasant soldiers from Transylvania and Hungary, as well as some of the nobles, were leav-

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Utišeničević, *Card. Georg.* pp. 119-20, and Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 169-70.

ing the scene and going home. The horsemen were so worn out that they could hardly stand up. Martinuzzi suggested that Ferdinand send fresh troops to strengthen the declining army and make possible the more effective defense of the land against the Turks. In the meantime the envoys whom Martinuzzi had sent to Istanbul with the tribute had returned safe and sound. He made an excuse for not sending them on to Ferdinand.<sup>34</sup>

It has been surmised that Ulama's proposal of a twenty days' cease-fire had originated with Martinuzzi. Three weeks would give the latter time enough to inform the pashas of the service he was trying to render the Porte by saving the lives of Ulama's men, and to receive in answer an assurance of the sultan's good will. However that may be, when Ulama withdrew from the fortress of Lipova (on 4-5 December), he is said to have sent Martinuzzi a gift of a gold lamp, two gilded tapers, a richly-embroidered Persian shawl, a jewelled dagger, and four war horses. Martinuzzi furnished him with supplies and a Serbian escort.<sup>35</sup> Ulama was glad to leave. His men had been living on horse meat and cats. The Serbian troops went with the Turks as far as Timișoara and beyond, but after the Serbs had bid them goodbye, Ulama and his men were attacked by a detachment of Castaldo's forces which had been lying in ambush to waylay them. The Turks gave a good account of themselves, although they lost heavily. Ulama was apparently wounded, but got back to Belgrade with at least three hundred men.<sup>36</sup>

Martinuzzi had been running with the hare and hunting with the hounds for years. The nature of the game is revealed by a letter which Mehmed Sokolli, the beylerbey of Rumelia, wrote him on 1 December (1551), complaining that Martinuzzi had failed to answer previous letters. But a time of reckoning was coming—"the sultan will not always believe your tricks and the flatteries by which we have been beguiled and deceived!"

<sup>34</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXIII, pp. 328-29, letter dated at Lipova on 28 November, 1551.

<sup>35</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 296, trans. J.-J. Hellert, VI (1836), 29, who says that Ulama and the Turkish garrison left the fortress of Lipova on Friday, 5 December, but in 1551 the fifth fell on a Saturday. On their withdrawal, cf. Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 137-38.

<sup>36</sup> The sources are at odds with one another, as shown in the differing accounts of von Hammer-Purgstall, III, 295-97, trans. Hellert, VI, 27-30, and Utišenić, *Card. Georg.*, pp. 119-20. On the Christians' attack upon Ulama Beg and his men, cf. Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 138-39.

When Sultan Suleiman had received the tribute (*census*), he had ordered Mehmed to cease hostilities. The beylerbey had, therefore, halted the siege of Timișoara, given up the city of Csanád, and pulled back to Becse, whereupon Martinuzzi had attacked Lipova (Lippa) with a motley force, "comitatus caterva Pharisæorum atque latronum." Mehmed even reminded Martinuzzi of Cicero's injunction that one should keep his pledge to an enemy; obviously a westerner had composed the (Latin) letter, to which a *tughra* was added. Martinuzzi would do well (as Mehmed was doing) to give some thought to the sultan's power and ferocity when aroused. Martinuzzi was requested this time to send an answer to these observations.<sup>37</sup>

The beylerbey's attitude toward Brother George Martinuzzi was apparently not very different from that of Ferdinand, who wrote Martinuzzi on the following day (2 December) in annoyance and perplexity that the allied forces should be leaving Lipova by desertion and otherwise just when they were winning. The Turks did not like to fight in the wintertime, while the Hungarians had done some of their noblest deeds against the Turks in the winter under the leadership of Matthias Corvinus (although Ferdinand had no intention of emulating Corvinus by taking the field himself). Ferdinand exhorted Martinuzzi to persist and to inspire his troops to the final effort needed to seize the fortress of Lipova. He also stated that he had just secured large subsidies from the archduchy of Austria and the duchy of Styria, "not for one year only but for an entire three years," for the defense and preservation of belabored Transylvania. He complained that, as was being reported to him, Martinuzzi was demanding payment for 1,000 horse and 500 foot. Ferdinand did not deny the debt, but insisted the understanding had been quite clear that the stipends for these troops were to be drawn from the Transylvanian revenues which Martinuzzi had in his own hands. Brother George was, therefore, directed to pay the troops.<sup>38</sup>

On 3 December (1551) Martinuzzi wrote Ferdinand again. The siege of Lipova was proving long and difficult. There is no word of his or of Castaldo's having promised or given Ulama Beg

<sup>37</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXIV, pp. 329-30, "datum in castro Pecia [Becse] . . ." on 1 December, 1551; G. C. Alačević, *Il dalmatino Giorgio Utišenović Martinusio* (1882), pp. 76-77; Utišenić, *Card. Georg.*, pp. 125-26; von Bucholtz, *Ferdinand I.*, VII, 276-77.

<sup>38</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXV, pp. 330-33, "datum Viennæ secunda Decembris, 1551," and cf. von Bucholtz, *Gesch. d. Regierung d. Ferdinand d. Ersten*, VII, 274.

a safe-conduct to extricate his men from the fortress and to bring the besieging Christians' discomfort to an end. The rain and mud and cold had exhausted the strength of the troops. No one could remember some of these people as ever having been under arms for so long a time. The Frater asked for more troops, and suggested that Ferdinand's own presence would rekindle the ardor of the besieging army. Ferdinand should convoke a diet in Hungary. If he attended it himself, many would respond to the call.<sup>39</sup>

Three days later (on 6 December) Martinuzzi wrote again, implying Castaldo agreed with him that the king should lose no time, "not even a single day," in convoking the diet. The affairs of Hungary were in such gross confusion that neither defense of the country nor peace was possible. The people were oppressed. There was much to correct at a diet. Martinuzzi announced that he was going into Transylvania, where he had summoned the local lords to a diet at which he would select certain of the more prominent among them and bring them back with him. In Hungary he would also summon a diet for the same purpose, "that your Majesty may have with him the more powerful persons from both kingdoms."

In the meantime the Turkish commander Ulama Beg had been allowed to withdraw from the encircled fortress at Lipova, "and of the reasons why we were induced to let him go your Majesty will learn in due time." (Ulama certainly owed his release to Martinuzzi.) Among the Frater's other concerns was the fact that there were many counterfeits in Hungary, some of whom had been caught. Persons of substance were among them, and the Frater wanted to know what to do with them. He also expressed the wish to come to see Ferdinand, and protested that the young John Sigismund, then in Ferdinand's charge, should be kept under proper and wholesome tutelage, as apparently was not being done.<sup>40</sup>

The enlightening and sometimes baffling correspondence of king and cardinal goes on a bit longer. On 9 December (1551) Ferdinand thanked Martinuzzi for his advice concerning the need to summon a general diet in the Hungarian kingdom

as well as for his desire to pay him a visit. In the meantime, however, he reminded Martinuzzi that the latter was committed to the discharge of certain military obligations which he should not give up at this time. As for the diet and Martinuzzi's visit, Ferdinand would give both matters his further consideration, and write again in a few days.<sup>41</sup>

Ferdinand did write a few days later, in restrained but amiable fashion, concerning the proposed Hungarian diet, Martinuzzi's expressed desire to visit him, the welfare of the young John Sigismund, and certain letters which Martinuzzi had just received from Turkish sources, and of which he had sent copies to Ferdinand. The letter, which was written on 14 December, closes with an expression of full confidence in Martinuzzi's loyalty,<sup>42</sup> a confidence which Ferdinand certainly did not have. Martinuzzi never received the letter. In the background of his relations with Vienna lay a tangle of misunderstanding, intrigue, distrust, and hostility.

Martinuzzi had acquired an evil reputation at the Viennese court during the latter part of the year 1551. Ferdinand wanted him out of the way and, as he soon acknowledged, he had authorized his "lieutenant" Giovan Battista Castaldo, marquis of Cassano, to have the Frater put to death if it proved to be necessary.<sup>43</sup> Ferdinand had sent Castaldo eastward, as we have seen, on 1 May (with detailed instructions dated 27 April) to ensure fulfillment of the agreement which Martinuzzi had wrung from Isabella, and which was given its final form on 19 July in the treaty of Alba Iulia. We have noted her discontent and her denunciation of Martinuzzi to Castaldo, the *bellicus locumtenens* for the conduct of military affairs and the protection of his Majesty's "faithful subjects" in Transylvania.<sup>44</sup>

Ferdinand had asked Martinuzzi to take particular pains to co-operate with Castaldo,<sup>45</sup> but while

<sup>39</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXX, pp. 338-39, "datum Viennae 9 Decembris, 1551," and cf. von Buchholtz, *Ferdinand I*, VII, 274-76.

<sup>40</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXXI, pp. 339-41, "datum Viennae 14 Decembris, 1551."

<sup>41</sup> Utičenović, *Card. Georg*, pp. 130-33, and note, *ibid.*, p. 136, note 1.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. above, pp. 567-68, and Károlyi, no. CXLIX, p. 228, letter of Ferdinand to Martinuzzi, dated at Vienna on 1 May, 1551. On the negotiations with Isabella, cf. *ibid.*, nos. CLVIII-CLIX, CLXVI, CLXIX, et alibi. Ferdinand's *instructio pro spectabili et magnifico Joanne Baptista Castaldo, marchione Cassani*, is given in Utičenović, *Card. Georg*, append., no. VII, pp. 24-32.

<sup>43</sup> Károlyi, no. CLV, p. 235, letter of Ferdinand to Martinuzzi, dated at Vienna on 25 May, 1551.

<sup>39</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXVI, pp. 333-34.

<sup>40</sup> Károlyi, no. CCXVII, pp. 334-35, letter dated at Lipova on 6 December, 1551, and note, *ibid.*, no. CCXIX, an odd letter from Mehmed Sokolli to Martinuzzi, dated at Belgrade on 8 December, written in friendly but admonitory tones: if Martinuzzi wanted the castle of Bese, let him ask the sultan for it, etc. Cf. Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551*, p. 50.

Martinuzzi believed Castaldo's bellicosity was not the way to deal with the Turks, his Majesty's lieutenant was convinced the Frater bore watching. Maybe he did. The Frater heartily resented Castaldo's surveillance and his reports to Vienna. In September Ferdinand had sent Sforza Pallavicini with further reinforcements for the protection of Transylvania against Mehmed Sokolli's incursion.<sup>46</sup> Although Castaldo had reluctantly (and treacherously) yielded to Martinuzzi's insistence that they let Ulama Beg go free from Lipova, this was apparently the event which finally tipped the balance in Castaldo's mind. He and Pallavicini now became convinced that Martinuzzi's frequent communications with the Turks were treacherous, designed less to forestall a large-scale invasion than to encourage one.

On 13 December (1551) Castaldo traveled with Martinuzzi in apparently amiable fashion eastward along the valley of the Mureş (Maros) River from the area of Lipova to the Frater's castle at the village of Vinţul de Jos (Alvincz), about seven miles southwest of Alba Iulia. Castaldo had instructed Pallavicini to kill the Frater, "praying to God that He might prevent the deed if it were not for the good of the sacred faith." They were keeping a small detachment of Spanish soldiery on hand in case of need, and had designated a half-dozen or more persons as assassins, especially the secretary Marc' Antonio Ferrari, who had easiest access to the Frater. On 16 December the unsuspecting Frater sent his two hundred guardsmen and all his cooks on to Alba Iulia, where an early breakfast was to be prepared for him and for Castaldo. That night there was a terrible storm, according to the contemporary account of Ascanio Centorio, with thunder and lightning such as no one could remember at that time of year. Pallavicini and Ferrari set about their task with some two dozen Spanish soldiers in one disguise or another. The historical record has preserved the names of the other would-be assassins—Andrea López, Lorenzo Campeggio, Giovanni Monino, Alfonso de Mercado, and a certain Scaramuccia.

Late that night Ferrari approached the door of Martinuzzi's chamber ostensibly with letters for him to sign. The pretext was that the Frater would be leaving early in the morning for Alba Iulia, and that Pallavicini, who had to get off to a good start for Vienna, would take the letters with him. More

accustomed to wielding a pen than a dagger, Ferrari hesitated at the door. Pallavicini quietly pushed him in, and drew the door to without shutting it. Martinuzzi was still up, clad in a fur-lined robe, leaning over a writing-table, on which stood a clock, a Roman breviary, a diary, and an inkstand. He nodded to Ferrari to come forward. The latter did so, saying that Pallavicini was going to Vienna, and before he left, he wished to kiss the cardinal's hand goodbye. Did his Eminence have any instructions for him? Ferrari put some papers before him on the table.

As Martinuzzi reached for his pen, Ferrari drew his dagger. He stabbed the old man twice, in the chest and in the neck. Martinuzzi cried, "O domine, quare hoc mihi?" He rose to his feet and, despite his seventy years, he seized Ferrari and threw him under the table. Pallavicini burst into the room, with drawn sword. He struck Martinuzzi on the head. Andrea Lopez also appeared with some of the Spanish soldiers, who finished the old man off with firearms. His last words were said to be, "Jesus, Maria!"

When Castaldo had been informed that the deed was done, he took possession of the castle at Alvincz, imprisoned an old retainer of the cardinal, and hurried on to Sebeş (Mühlbach), eight miles south of Alba Iulia. From Sebeş later in the day (on 17 December) he sent Ferdinand the pious news that "it has pleased God to remove Brother George from the world. . . ."<sup>47</sup> For seventy days

<sup>47</sup> On the journey of Martinuzzi and Castaldo to Alvincz, the plans for the murder, the stormy night of 16–17 December, the Spanish soldiery and the assassins, Ferrari's blundering role, and Pallavicini's delivery of the deathblow to the cardinal, see Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, pp. 141–49, who mistakenly dates the murder on 18 December (*ibid.*, p. 145), "e così hebbe fine il più superbo huomo del mondo, et il maggior occulto tiranno che mai visse . . ." (p. 146).

See also Utienseni, *Card. Georg.* pp. 133–38, and append., no. XIV, p. 45, Castaldo's letter of 17 December, 1551, to Ferdinand, and for the latter's answer, dated at Vienna on 27 December, see Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551* (1862), append., no. 12, pp. 72–73. Note also the letters of Odet de Selve, the French ambassador in Venice, to Henry II and Anne de Montmorency, in Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 172–73, 174, 175–78, 184–85. Cf. Iorga, *Gesch. d. asman. Reiches*, III, 39, and Michel François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon*, Paris, 1946, no. 430, p. 271.

News usually traveled slowly from Transylvania, and Martinuzzi's murder was not known in Rome until the evening of 14 January, 1552 (see below, in the text). Julius III spoke of the matter at the consistory of 18 January (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fol. 113<sup>v</sup> of mod. stamped enumeration): "Apud Sanctum Petrum Rome die lune XVIII Januarii 1552 fuit consistorium in quo sanctissimus dominus

<sup>46</sup> Károlyi, no. CXC, p. 296, letter of Ferdinand to Martinuzzi, dated at Vienna on 23 September, 1551, and cf., *ibid.*, nos. CXCIV, CC.

(from 17 December, 1551, until 25 February) the Frater's body lay frozen and unburied in the room where he had fallen. His friends and followers dared not touch it for fear of Castaldo, until at length with Ferdinand's permission it was removed to Alba Iulia, and buried in the cathedral church of S. Michael. On his tomb was inscribed the epitaph, "Omnibus moriendum est."<sup>48</sup>

As soon as the news reached Ferdinand's court, his advisors went to work preparing instructions for Diego Lasso, his ambassador in Rome, who with Paul Gregoriancz, bishop of Zagreb, was to try to justify Martinuzzi's murder to the pope and the Curia Romana. The text was dated at the king's castle in Prague on 2 January, 1552. According to these instructions, as soon as Gregoriancz reached Rome (which he did on 17 January), he was to seek with Lasso a "benigna audientia" with the pope to whom, first of all, they would declare Ferdinand's full obedience and filial devotion. They were to explain that Ferdinand wished, through them, to give the pope "briefly and summarily, but truthfully and unequivocally" the facts which lay behind the death of Brother George, bishop of Grosswardein, recently made a cardinal. The main fact was that Brother George's treachery with the Turks could no longer be tolerated, for it threatened the entire Christian commonwealth with irreparable loss and damage. Transylvania and part of Hungary were at stake; indeed, the entire kingdom of Hungary was in danger, as was Ferdinand's sovereignty elsewhere. When he was fully informed, his Holiness would not hold Ferdinand at fault nor those by whose advice and aid Brother George had been done away with in order to frustrate the infidels' designs upon the Christian lands in question.

Although Ferdinand did not wish to burden his Holiness with any account of Brother George's

devious conduct before the year 1549—Ferdinand had forgiven it all—he did wish to make clear that, when after King John Zápolya's death (in 1540) Isabella had decided to give up Buda to Ferdinand, Brother George intervened, and afterwards surrendered the city to the sultan. But he proved faithless also to the sultan, who sent the pasha of Buda against him with a force of some thousands of picked troops. Although the pasha achieved little or nothing, the sultan continued to try in various other ways to remove Brother George from control and to subject Transylvania to the Porte. This is what had led the Frater to turn to Ferdinand, to whom he had offered to "restore" (*restituere*) Transylvania and parts of Hungary under certain conditions and with certain concessions to the young John Sigismund and his mother Isabella. Believing in Brother George's sincerity, and acting in what he knew to be the best interests of Christendom, Ferdinand accepted the Frater's offer, his repeated offers, "grato et clementi animo."

From time to time Brother George said different things, and seemed to change his mind, asserting on occasion that because of his old age he was going to withdraw from governmental affairs and devote his life to God and the pursuit of his own interests. Ferdinand had hoped that the Frater was sincere in his offer to serve the crown "in illis partibus," and Ferdinand had made him sole voivode, lord lieutenant, and treasurer in Transylvania "with a much larger annual stipend than anyone else had ever had in these posts." Certainly after the duchy of Oppeln was settled on Isabella and John Sigismund, the Frater "had no reason for contriving any evil move against us" (*dictum fratrem Georgium . . . nullam habuisse causam aliquid sinistra contra nos machinandi*). He had done so, however, sending his agents to the sultan unbeknownst to Ferdinand and receiving Turkish agents from the Porte.

Despite the fact that the Turks had broken the truce [of 1547] by "open warfare" (*aperto Marte*), Brother George had not only played host to any number of *cha'ushes* and emissaries from Istanbul, but had negotiated with them, dispatching letters and messengers to Mehmed Sokolli, the beylerbey, as well as to the sultan. And so the instructions for Ferdinand's envoys in Rome, Lasso and Gregoriancz, went on and on, rehearsing Brother George's lies and treacheries and describing them as "clearer than the noonday sun." Despite the concord with Isabella and John Sigismund, for which Ferdinand had ceded them Oppeln and promised the boy his daughter in marriage, all with the apparent support

noster fecit verbum de morte violenta Georgii cardinalis Transilvanie, et de ea condolens memoravit infelicitates huius seculi et humane nature fragilitates ac sciaciorum infelices ausus admonuitque eosdem reverendissimos ut cogitarent quid in ea re agendum et quid respondendum videretur ei qui pro justificatione huiusmodi excessus ad urbem venerat [i.e., Paul Gregoriancz, bishop of Zagreb, who had arrived in Rome on 17 January, on which see the text below]. Insuper fecit verbum de classe et apparatu Turcarum versus Italiam et de inveniendis pecuniis ad resistendum illorum conatibus . . ." whereupon Julius appointed a commission of cardinals to find the money to protect the shores of Italy against the expected attacks of the Turks when the spring came.

<sup>48</sup> Von Bucholtz, *Ferdinand I*, VII, 283-84; Utičenović, *Card. Georg*, pp. 140-41.

and approval of Brother George, the latter had been entertaining closer and closer relations with the Porte, and was becoming ever colder and more remiss in Ferdinand's service.

Ferdinand's envoys at the Curia were to explain to the pope that Brother George's frequent dispatch of messengers "ad Portam principis Turcarum" was part of his tireless effort to win the favor (*gratia*) of the sultan and the vizirs. He blushed at nothing, offering to betray Ferdinand's troops to the Turks, as was known from a reliable source in Istanbul. Indeed, a Christian prince of great reputation had stated in writing, as Ferdinand knew, that Brother George had offered his obedience to the sultan again and again. This unnamed prince knew a good deal about Turkish affairs. A merchant had written from Venice on 16 October (1551) that he knew, also from a reliable source, "that a certain monk called Brother George was ready to deliver our subjects and soldiers into the hands of the Turks." Some of Brother George's own letters to Mehmed Sokolli, copies of which the Frater had actually had the effrontery to send to Ferdinand, were a further proof of his treachery. Perhaps he thought Ferdinand would not believe their outrageous declarations of fidelity to the Turk. Two examples of such letters were sent to Rome with the instructions for Lasso and Gregoriancz so that they might show them to the pope.

Since Ferdinand had understood the Frater's desire for honors no less than for money, he had succeeded in adding (as his Holiness could bear witness) a cardinal's hat to the more than 80,000 Hungarian florins which the Frater derived each year, as voivode and treasurer, "from our royal revenues of Transylvania" for the support of his servitors and soldiers. Ferdinand had held out to Brother George the hope of still further honors and still greater ecclesiastical revenues, although he was already garnering an annual harvest of more than 40,000 Hungarian florins from his ecclesiastical benefices.

Lasso and Gregoriancz must describe to the pope the Frater's double-dealing with Castaldo and his indifference to the defense of Lipova (Lippa) and various other places, when Mehmed Sokolli had crossed the Danube with the Turkish army. One accusation followed another, and Ferdinand sent the two envoys copies of several more letters as evidence against the terrible Frater, whose secretary bore witness to his treachery. Finally Ferdinand had been obliged to write Castaldo, his *locumtenens bellicus*, that when they had reached

the deadlock, if it was to be his life or Martinuzzi's, he should strike first!<sup>49</sup>

Ferdinand dilated on Brother George's alleged parley with Ulama Beg at night under the walls of Lipova, where he had surreptitiously helped feed the Turks and had contrived shortages in the Christian army, which had finally forced Castaldo and the other captains to yield to his demand that the Turks go free. His treachery was so blatant that he was called a traitor *publica voce et fama* throughout the army and throughout most of Hungary. He had wanted to keep Castaldo's troops from establishing winter quarters in Transylvania, trying to push them off into certain parts of Hungary. Brother George had removed the castellan of Deva, who had sworn loyalty to Ferdinand, and replaced him with one of his own men. When Castaldo had insisted upon wintering in Transylvania, the Frater wanted to keep his troops out of the cities and to scatter them "per multos pagos." And there were the Frater's "incessant" negotiations with the Turks. His acts of perfidy, his betrayal of Ferdinand, who was his sovereign, were plain as day, "luce meridiana clarius."

Having removed Isabella, John Sigismund, and Peter Petrović from the government of Transylvania and lower Hungary—as a consequence of Ferdinand's cession of Oppeln—Martinuzzi wanted also to deprive Ferdinand of his sovereignty in these areas. He was bent upon ruling Transylvania and Lower Hungary himself as a vassal of the Turk, paying the Porte an "annua pensio." He wanted to destroy Ferdinand's army and Castaldo too "or at least turn them over to the Turks." The fulfillment of his ambition would have been the utter ruin of Hungary, an irreparable loss to Christendom. Sultan Suleiman was planning a large expedition against Ferdinand for the coming summer. What disaster might have lain before the Christian commonwealth if the false Brother George had been able then to throw in his lot with the Turk!

Clearly Ferdinand, Castaldo, and their aides and counselors had no alternative to the removal

<sup>49</sup> Utiešenović, *Card. Georg.* append., no. xv, p. 56: "Si tamen [Castaldus] intelligeret rem aliter transigi non posse quam quod aut manum sibi inferri pateretur aut ipse fratri Georgio tam nepharia molienti manum inferret, tunc potius ipse eum preveniret et tolleret e medio quam quod primum ictum expectando ab ipso preveniretur, in nostrum et totius Christianitatis gravissimum prejudicium et detrimentum." In effect Ferdinand had signed Martinuzzi's death warrant with his own hand.



of Brother George. They had freed the Hapsburg domains and Christendom from the malignant, self-seeking ambition of an unconscionable traitor. Before God, the pope, and all the world they could not for this incur ecclesiastical censures and penalties. Rather they deserved praise and commendation! It would have been impracticable, impossible, to institute due process of law against him in the papal court. He was the ally of the Turk. One could never have removed him from Transylvania. His defense would not have been based upon canon law, but upon the flow of arms from Istanbul.

Therefore with the highest devotion again and again do we ask and humbly beseech his Holiness that he be willing to declare and pronounce that we and they, all and singly, who have served us by their counsel, assistance, and good will in the killing of the said Brother George, have incurred no censures or penalties. . . .<sup>50</sup>

Ferdinand's instructions to Lasso and Gregoriancz were soon followed by a statement of eighty-seven charges or assertions relative to the slaying of Martinuzzi (*Articuli super caede fratris Georgii*). The envoys were to use the document in their effort to secure absolution for the assassins. Martinuzzi was accused of surrendering Buda to the sultan, of being a tool of the Turks. Some of the charges were factual, some likely, others certainly untrue. A number were based on hearsay, each item in the indictment ending with the refrain "sicque fuit, et est verum, ac publica vox et fama."<sup>51</sup> The modern reader does not believe a good many of the eighty-seven *articuli*, and neither did Julius III who, well trained in the law, knew trumped-up evidence when he saw it.

The news of Martinuzzi's violent death reached Rome about 8:00 P.M. on 14 January, as we learn from a letter which Giulio de' Grandi, bishop of

Anglona and Tursi (and Ferrarese agent at the Holy See), sent Duke Ercole II d' Este.<sup>52</sup> It caused an enormous stir. Diego Lasso, who learned of the tragedy only during the late evening of the fifteenth, avoided the papal court for a day or two, so as not to face Julius III's indignation. The pope was quickly moved to anger, but he soon calmed down. Lasso did confer, however, with Cardinals Morone and Cervini, to whom he gave letters from Ferdinand. Cervini was cool, the pro-Hapsburg Morone more affable. Julius found it most strange that the very persons who had extolled Martinuzzi to the skies, and wanted to see him made a cardinal, had now done him to death. If Martinuzzi was pro-Turkish, they should not have sought a cardinal's hat for him. If he was a man of honor, he should not have been killed.

On 1 February Lasso wrote Ferdinand a long letter, explaining his difficulties. He feared the *affaire Martinuzzi* would be thrashed out in the consistory, where the pro-French cardinals would be more than troublesome. Although reluctantly, Julius granted Lasso and Gregoriancz a private audience, at which he listened to the charges against Martinuzzi that Ferdinand had sent in their instructions of 2 January (*Instructio ad pontificem in causa mortis quondam fratris Georgii*). He also looked at the letters and documents they showed him, observing that copies of texts did not constitute evidence. Julius had no doubt, however, that Ferdinand was the most religious prince in Christendom, bar none, but he must consult the cardinals as the most appropriate body to deal with the problem facing them.

<sup>52</sup> In a postscript dated 14 January, 1552, to a letter written at Rome on the thirteenth, Giulio de' Grandi wrote Ercole II: "Et questa sera a tre hore di notte [about 8:00 P.M. in January] che sono venute lettere de VIII. di Germania che dicono la morte de Fra Giorgio Cardinale in Trasilvania: dimostrano che sia stato per ordine del Castaldo amazzato, havendo esso frate maneggio de nuovo accordo col Turco et benchè vostra Eccellenza lo deve sapere a questa hora nondimeno ho voluto avisarglielo" (Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, agenti e corrispondenti Estensi, Roma, Busta 50, no. 283-VIII/4).

Two days later in the postscript to a letter dated the sixteenth Grandi added the news. "Qua si dice per imperiali chel Fra Giorgio havea intelgentia con Turchi de farsi re et tagliare apezzi leserico de Christiani; perciò scoperta la cosa, è stato expediente levarlo di luoco. Nondimeno il più ha opinione che sia altrimenti et che li suoi denari ne siano stato causa" (*ibid.*, no. 283-VIII/5). With regard to the last statement, Utišenić, *Card. Georg.*, pp. 143-44, has emphasized the fact that the extent of Martinuzzi's wealth had been greatly exaggerated, on which see Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. IV, pp. 154-55.

<sup>50</sup> Utišenić, *Card. Georg.*, append., no. xv, pp. 45-61, doc. dated at Prague on 2 January, 1552. When on 27 December Ferdinand had answered Castaldo's letter of the seventeenth, which had brought him the news of Brother George's removal from the scene, he had asked Castaldo to collect and send him the evidence of the Frater's treasonous activities to set before the pope. "ut a Sanctitate sua . . . pro nobis, te, et aliis, quorum consilio et opera hoc negotium [i.e., the assassination of Brother George] est confectum, absolutionem petere et accipere queamus, attento quod frater Georgius non solum in sacris sed etiam in episcopali et cardinalica dignitate constitutus fuerit" (Schuller, *Die Verhandlungen von Mühlbach im Jahre 1551*, append., no. 12, p. 72).

<sup>51</sup> Utišenić, *Card. Georg.*, pp. 146-49, and append., no. xvi, pp. 62-73. Ferdinand rewarded Castaldo and the Frater's assassins (Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* [1566], bk. IV, pp. 155-56).

The imperialists, including Reginald Pole, believed that Ferdinand had incurred no censures in Martinuzzi's death. Gian Pietro Carafa, in Lasso's opinion a *my rigoroso hipocrita*, was reserving judgment. Carafa was anti-Hapsburg, as was Domenico de Cupis, dean of the Sacred College. After much ado, by a papal brief of 30 January (1552), Ferdinand was absolved *ad cautelam*, but he must take an oath to Girolamo Martinengo, the nuncio at his court, to accept and obey the final decision of his Holiness and the Church.<sup>55</sup> The matter was far from ended.

The murder of Martinuzzi made as great an impact upon the sultan and the pashas in Istanbul as upon the pope and the cardinals in Rome. The Venetian Senate saw no need to send a detailed report to their baillie on the Bosphorus, for they knew that the Porte was quite as well informed as the Signoria.<sup>54</sup>

Quite properly the Frater bequeathed to Ferdinand and the assassins at least a bit of the gall

and wormwood they deserved, for the perpetrators were not quit of their crime for years. A papal commission examined 116 persons, listened to endless distorted (and often dishonest) testimony, and reported their findings back to Rome. The investigators connived at the acceptance of the Hapsburg calumnies. After all, Charles V and Ferdinand, emperor and king, were something to reckon with—*deos fortioribus adesse*—for theirs was a grandeur perhaps unequalled in Europe. There was no undoing the deed, no bringing Brother George back to life. At long last, on 14 February, 1555, shortly before Julius III's death, a papal verdict was pronounced to the effect that those who had killed Brother George "had incurred no censures and no penalties, and deserved none" (*nullas censuras nullasque poenas incurrisse neque mereri*).<sup>55</sup> They had incurred no censures, but the Frater's death did them no good. As Ascanio Centorio noted a decade later, after John Sigismund's successful assertion of independence in Transylvania, the murder of Martinuzzi certainly proved to be more of a loss than an advantage to Christendom.<sup>56</sup>

Nowhere in the correspondence published by Károlyi is there the slightest direct evidence that the Frater was planning to desert the Hapsburg camp for that of the Turks. Although more Castaldi and Pallavicini would be coming into Hungary and Transylvania if Ferdinand were to make good his claims, Martinuzzi was apparently prepared to accept them as the lesser of two evils. A Paulist monk and a cardinal, he had no use for the Turks, but he clearly believed that Castaldo's bull-headed aggressiveness did not bode well for the future of Hungary and Transylvania. When all is said and done, the Frater remains an intriguing and even mysterious figure. He was presumably more willing to accept Ferdinand's claims to sovereignty than his actual governance. Champion of the peasants, opponent of the Austrians as well as of the Turks, George Martinuzzi may well have

<sup>55</sup> August von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des XVI. Jahrhunderts* . . . , II (Munich, 1880), no. 959, pp. 86–92, Lasso's letter to Ferdinand, dated at Rome on 1 February, 1552, and note the letters of Odet de Selve, the French ambassador in Venice, to Henry II, dated 15 and 30 January (1552), in Guillaume Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat* . . . sous les régnes de François Premier, Henry II et François II, 2 vols., Paris, 1666, II, 369–76. De Selve had tried to keep Henry well informed on current events (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 164–80). The letters of the nuncio Martinengo from Prague, Vienna, and Pressburg in January, February, and March, 1552, are full of Martinuzzi's murder and its consequences (Helms, Goetz, ed., *Nuntiatursberichte aus Deutschland*, pt. 1, vol. 16; *Nuntiaturs des Girolamo Martinengo [1550–1554]*, Tübingen, 1965, nos. 45–53, pp. 85–109, et passim).

Ascanio Centorio dilates on the pope's anger and the cardinals' at the news of Martinuzzi's murder, "scomunicandogli tutti della maggiore scomunica che sia," although the pope finally yielded to the entreaties of Ferdinand's ambassadors, and appointed a commission of four cardinals, including Gian Domenico de Cupis, dean of the Sacred College, "che tre cardinali con il decano . . . intendessero questa causa, e vedessero se la morte di Frate Giorgio era giustamente a lui inferita o no . . ." (*Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* [1566], bk. IV, pp. 166–67, and cf., *ibid.*, bk. V, p. 219).

On 19 February Martinengo wrote Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte from Vienna: ". . . Il re giurò in mano mia d'obedire in genere a' mandati della Chiesa. . . . Mi disse che la difesa della Transilvania gli costa 300,000 fiorini l'anno, oltre l'entrate ordinarie della provincia, quali per gli registri del frate medesimo non sono più che 90,000 ducati, sebene ci diceva, quando negoziava l'accordo, che sarebbero 300,000 . . ." (Goetz, *Nuntiatursberichte*, I:16, no. 50, p. 100).

<sup>54</sup> On 26 January, 1552, the Senate wrote the Venetian baillie in Istanbul, "Della morte di Fra Zorzi cardinal amazzato in Transilvania non vi diremo altro, sapendo che a quella Excelsa Porta la se haverà intesa particolarmente" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 67, fol. 198' [218']).

<sup>55</sup> Utišćenović, *Card. Georg.* pp. 149 ff., and *append.*, no. XVII, pp. 73–75, and cf. Alačević, *Il Dalmatino Giorgio Utišćenović Martinuzzi*, pp. 82–85; von Bucholtz, *Gesch. d. Regierung Ferdinand d. Ersten*, VII, 287 ff.

<sup>56</sup> Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. III, p. 147: ". . . E la Transilvania non rimase troppo tempo sotto l'obbedienza di sua Maestà [Ferdinand], ch'è ritornò di fatto sotto quella del giovine Re Giovanni, a tale che la morte di Frate Giorgio fu più di danno che di utile a Christiani. . . ." Centorio also says, *ibid.*, that all those who took a direct part in the murder of Martinuzzi eventually suffered "diversi infortunii."

died a martyr to the cause of Hungarian and Transylvanian independence.

Returning now to the months that followed Martinuzzi's death, we recall that Julius III had his own problems. Much of the advice he received from the College and Curia was based upon political partisanship. Julius was still Charles V's ally in the war of Parma (as we have seen in the preceding volume), and as that war was coming to an end, Henry II's ally Maurice of Saxony successfully challenged Charles. Maurice seemed likely to alter the political structure of Germany. If he did so, what would be the effect upon Italy? In the meantime Ferdinand was making more progress in Hungary than at the Curia, for Giovan Battista Castaldo soon sent word that the royal forces had taken Szeged (on 25 February, 1552).<sup>57</sup> Unfortunately for the Christians most of the news from the eastern front was not good,<sup>58</sup> but with the aid of Castaldo and Sforza Pallavicini, Ferdinand was trying hard to assert his authority in Hungary and Transylvania against the Turks.

An imperial courier on his way to Rome from Charles V's court at Innsbruck had apparently stopped at Ferrara, where he had added to his mailbag letters from Duke Ercole to Giulio de' Grandi. They were dated 31 March (1552), and Grandi answered them on 3 April. He had been at the Vatican Palace that day from at least 12:00 noon (*XVI hora*) to about 2:00 P.M. Julius III was in bed with one of his frequent attacks of gout, but Grandi could give him all the information which Ercole had instructed him to pass on to his Holiness "sopra la venuta del signor Sforza Pallavicino a Ferrara." Pallavicini was trying to recruit 3,000 infantry in the states of the Church and in the area around Florence. He had requested permission to assemble the troops in Ferrarese territory, and thereafter take them northward through the duchy "al suo viaggio a quella impresa contro Turco." Pallavicini had been handicapped in the Romagna "per la disgratia in che si trova di sua Beatitudine per la morte de Fra Giorgio." When Grandi had let the pope know of Pallavicini's ac-

tivities, his Holiness expressed absolute astonishment that Pallavicini should have dared come into the Romagna and enter the states of the Church. He was under the ban of the Church, and did he think that Martinuzzi's murder was like killing a flea? (*essendo nel mancamento che è, et parendoli d' avere amazzato una pulce . . .*).

Julius was having no recruitment of troops in papal territory at this time. He knew, he told Grandi, that there were 40,000 men capable of bearing arms in the states of the Church, but he could not allow others to take them. The trouble was the able-bodied men would go, and those unfit for military service would be left behind. He could not strip the papal territories of manpower. The Turks were reported to have a great armada ready to sail. Julius was certain that they were not planning an attack upon Malta. Although Ferdinand's endeavors against the Turks were an "opera santissima," Italy needed defending, for the Turks would fall like a deluge upon the maritime provinces if they were disarmed and stripped of soldiers.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Roma, Busta 50, no. 283-VIII/27; cf. *ibid.*, no. 31, and Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, II, no. 1,083, p. 214. On 8 January, 1552, Pietro Bertano, bishop of Fano and papal nuncio at the imperial court in Innsbruck, wrote Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte (Georg Kupke, ed., *Nuntiatursberichte aus Deutschland*, I-12 [1901, repr. 1968], no. 51, pp. 138-39):

"Hoggi in questa hora del mezzo giorno è venuto nuova della morte del cardinal fra Giorgio, la cui tragedia è verissima, ma li particolari non si sanno anchor così minutamente. Dirò solo le cagioni della morte sua. Egli si mostrò fino nella presa del castel di Lippa esser turco, con mala soddisfazione di tutti quelli Ongari. In questo tempo fino alli 20 [sic] del passato che fu il giorno ultimo della sua vita, esso frate haveva intendimento co' l' Turco di farsi re di Ongaria et impadronirsi di tutto quel paese et di Transilvania. . . ."

See also the letter of Girolamo di Capodiferro, cardinal of S. Giorgio and Julius III's legate in the Romagna, to Innocenzo del Monte, in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XX, fol. 176, by mod. stamped enumeration, dated at Ravenna on 15 March, 1552: "È arrivato qui in Sant' Arcangelo il signor Sforza Pallavicino, il quale m' ha fatta domanda di due cose, l' una di poter cavar genti della provincia [di Romagna] per servizio del re de' Romani, et l' altra di far massa nella detta terra da condurla poi in Ongheria al medesimo servizio. Et perchè questa è materia d' importanza, non mi è parso venire a deliberatione alcuna senza farlo prima intendere a vostra signoria reverendissima, alla quale mando l' inclusa copia della risposta [which seems not to be in the present volume] che ho fatta al detto signore, perchè ella sia meglio informata di quello che passa. Vostra signoria reverendissima potrà (piacendole) farne parola con nostro Signore [Julius III], et quanto prima tenermi avisto di quanto sarà mente di sua Santità et sua, che si eseguisca per me sopra ciò . . ." and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 175, 177, 179, letters dated 14, 20, and 23 March (1552), and fol. 187, dated 27 April, also from Capodiferro to del Monte.

<sup>57</sup> Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, II, no. 1141, pp. 265-66, letter of Diego Lasso to Ferdinand, dated at Rome on 19 March, 1552; von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 298-99; von Bucholtz, *Ferdinand I.*, VII, 302-3.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, II, no. 1173, p. 295, a letter of Agostino Cocciano to Girolamo Seripando, dated at Rome on 26 March, 1552: "In Transilvania i Turchi han preso un loco, ma non so il nome, con molta occasione de nostri."

Subsequent events would soon show that the pope was not exaggerating the danger to which the Italian coastlands were exposed. The Venetians were also concerned, but they apparently thought that any pressure Ferdinand could apply to the Turks on the eastern front might possibly lighten the burden of Christian defense in Italian waters. The day before Grandi wrote the letter to Ercole d' Este, recounting the pope's unwillingness to allow anyone (especially Pallavicini) to hire soldiers in the states of the Church, the Venetian Senate (on 2 April) had given a favorable response to a secretary of Ferdinand, who was seeking the Republic's co-operation in the transport of Pallavicini's troops from the Romagna to Trieste and Fiume, and thence into Hungary.<sup>60</sup>

Julius III's apprehensions were justified. On 12 May (1552) Diego Lasso informed King Ferdinand from Rome that the Neapolitans were expecting the arrival of the Turkish armada and trying to make preparations against it.<sup>61</sup> About two weeks later (on 28 May) Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, the bishop of Arras, who had succeeded his father Nicholas as Charles V's chief counselor, wrote Queen Mary of Hungary from Villach that the Turkish armada was slow in coming. The French were asking for a quicker advance. Perrenot was hoping that the Turks would not get farther west than they had the year before, and that they would find Naples and Sicily better able to cope with them. It would help a good deal if one could make a truce with the sultan by land, i.e., on the eastern front. Undercover efforts were being made to do so. The sultan was being harassed by Tahmâsp, the sophi of Persia, which might help.<sup>62</sup>

Slow or not, the Turks were on their way. On 21 July the Venetian Senate notified Domenico Trevisan, their new baillie in Istanbul, that the Turkish armada had passed Zante, and had reached Corfiote waters by 26 June. It had passed Cape S. Maria di Leuca on 1 July,

and lately we have learned by letters from Rome, based upon *avvisi* from Naples, that passing by Reggio [Calabria], the armada has burned the place, and that having next passed the lighthouse [*farro*] of Messina, on the eighth of the present month, it went by the island of Lipari.

<sup>60</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 7<sup>r</sup>-8<sup>r</sup> [27<sup>r</sup>-28<sup>r</sup>]. On Ferdinand's dispatch of troops into Transylvania, note Kupke, *Nuntiaturberichte*, I-12, no. 59, p. 158, doc. dated at Innsbruck on 27 January, 1552.

<sup>61</sup> Druffel, *Briefve u. Akten*, II, no. 1397, p. 471.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, II, no. 1461, p. 522.

Other letters from Rome, with *avvisi* from Naples of 15 July, reported that the armada was "in sight of Naples." Venetian possessions had suffered from Turkish predation along much of the route of the armada.<sup>63</sup>

It was all quite true, for on 23 July the Turkish armada was reported to be off the island of Procida, near the northwest entrance to the bay of Naples. No one could tell where the armada would go next, "nè si sa che camino habbi da pigliare."<sup>64</sup> The imperial admiral, Prince Andrea Doria, now in his mid-eighties, appeared off Ostia and Nettuno, as was reported on 6 August, but the Turks made no move, allowed ships to pass undisturbed, and paid for their provisions. Panic reigned in Naples. Those who could leave the city or send their valuables to places of safety were doing so.<sup>65</sup> A Venetian dispatch of 13 August says that Doria had left Genoa with 40 galleys, and had gone to La Spezia to take on board about 3,000 German infantry to convey them to Naples. He had been attacked on 4 August by the Turkish armada, which had seized seven of his galleys with 700 Germans aboard. Of the seven galleys, two were Neapolitan, two Spanish, and three belonged to Doria, who was said to have sailed back toward Genoa. The Turkish armada had made a landing at Gaeta, and had ravaged to the very gates of the city.<sup>66</sup>

The news got worse and worse. On Wednesday morning, 10 August (1552), Giulio de' Grandi went to see the pope, who had just learned from Ascanio Colonna that there were 216 vessels (*vele*) in the Turkish armada, which was laying siege to

<sup>63</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 48<sup>r</sup> [68<sup>r</sup>], 56<sup>r</sup> [76<sup>r</sup>]; cf. also Max Lössen, ed., *Briefve von Andreas Masius und seinen Freunden (1538-1573)*, Leipzig, 1886, no. 98, p. 108, and Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 202-4, note, 209 ff.; Bartolomeo Capasso, ed., "Le Cronache di D. Gaspare Fuscolillo," *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, I-4 (1876), 627-28.

<sup>64</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Busta 50, no. 283-IX/26; Sebastian Merkle, ed., *Concilium Tridentinum*, II (1911), 445.

<sup>65</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Busta 50, no. 283-IX/31: "... havendo a vista loro una così grossa armada . . . chi può andare o mandare robbe in altri luoghi forti, lo fanno di continuo. . . ."

<sup>66</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fol. 55<sup>r</sup> [75<sup>r</sup>], and on the progress of the Turkish armada during the summer of 1552, see Heinrich Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*, pt. 1, vol. 13 (Tübingen, 1959), nos. 17, 28, 29, 36, 42, 44, 46, 50, pp. 27, 42, 45, 69, 79, 85, 90-91, 101, and Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II (1666), 402 ff., reports of 22 and 30 July (1552) of Gabriel d' Aramon, French ambassador to the Porte, who had accompanied the Turkish armada to the shores of Italy. On the Turks' maritime strength in the mid-sixteenth century, cf. C. H. Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 211-82.

Gaeta. The Turks had disembarked, and were pillaging the countryside in fearful fashion. They were battering the walls of Gaeta with artillery from the sea and on two sides by land. They were likely to take the city, for it was full of unarmed people who could not defend themselves (*per essere piena di gente disutile et non munita*). It was thought that there were so many vessels in the attack because the French had joined their fleet to that of the Turks. The news was not certain, however, but letters of the ninth, which had just reached Rome from Naples, reported Prince Doria's unfortunate encounter with the Turks and the loss of his seven galleys with 700 Germans aboard, including their commander, who was said to be a nephew of Cristoforo Madruzzo, the cardinal of Trent. One still did not know what had happened to the rest of the galleys and the men—whether they had sought safety in Calabria or had gone westward. The news had been brought to Naples by a Spaniard and a sailor who had been captured in the conflict, but had escaped above Gaeta, when the Turks had gone ashore for water. In Rome Camillo Orsini was taking steps to defend the city, where he was trying to keep 1,000 foot and 300 horse on pay, recruit local auxiliaries, and arrange for 4,000 others in the outlying districts, "who in any emergency might be in Rome in an instant."

.. . .<sup>67</sup>  
Ten days later (on 20 August) Giulio de' Grandi wrote the duke of Ferrara,

The ransom of the cardinal of Trent's nephew, who was captain of the Germans taken by the Turks on [Doria's] seven galleys these past days, has been set at 12,000 scudi, and one of Dragut's nephews, who is in Christian hands, is to be given back, but no carlini have been got in Naples from the merchants, because there are none, neither among the merchants nor among others, and here in Rome it has been just the same. The other Germans will be ransomed, at 20 scudi each. The money is being collected in almsgiving throughout Naples for the love of God. The Turkish armada went to Reggio [Calabria], where one had to arrange the ransom. Nothing else is known save that yesterday evening it was said the armada had returned to the gulf of Salerno, and that the Turks had taken Salerno, although we do not have this from a good source.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Roma, Busta 50, no. 283-IX/34, letter dated at Rome on 10 August, 1552; note also Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Maius*, no. 100, pp. 109-10, and Girolamo Seripando, *De Tridentino Concilio Commentarii*, in Sebastian Merkle, ed., *Concilium Tridentinum*, II (1911), 445.

<sup>68</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Roma, Busta 50, no. 283-IX/37. The captured Madruzzo

Grandi followed the progress of the Turkish armada with close attention.<sup>69</sup> By 3 September (1552) the Turks were on their way back to Istanbul.<sup>70</sup> After another two weeks (on 17 September) Grandi informed the duke of Ferrara that no other news of the sultan's armada had yet come to Rome. A Maltese *avviso*, however, which had come from Palermo, described an attack by the Hospitallers upon the Barbary coast on 25 August, by which time the Turks had begun their return voyage. The expedition was led by the prior [of Capua, Leone Strozzi], who had added his own galleys to those of the Order, making a total force of six galleys and seven galliots. Going ashore they took a village, and seized 2,500 "Moors," but returning to their vessels, the Hospitallers were pursued by a large number of local horse and foot, with whom they had been compelled to fight "valorosamente." They covered their withdrawal to the shoreline as best they could, using their Berber captives as a buffer. In their effort to get at the Hospitallers the local warriors had allegedly killed the greater part of the captives. Nevertheless, the Hospitallers did manage to get away with 250 prisoners, and killed 400 of the enemies' horse and foot. They lost, however, 80 Knights and 200 Christian foot, who were killed, among them being the natural son of the lord Pietro Strozzi, who had gone on the expedition as a skipper of one of the galleys. Everyone agreed that the unfortunate young man was as valiant as any soldier could be. The irrepressible prior had been wounded in the thigh by an arquebus shot, but not seriously, not enough to hold him back. Having returned to Malta and allowed the fleet a breathing spell, he was soon hastening after the Turks on their way back to the Levant.<sup>71</sup>

The Turks had left Italian waters just after the

was the "filz du cappitaine Nicolò Madruccio, frère du cardinal de Trente" (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 225).

<sup>69</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, *ibid.*, Busta 50, no. 283-IX/39.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, Busta 50, no. 283-X/2.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, Busta 50, no. 283-X/11. The prior in question is Leone Strozzi, prior of Capua (and brother of Pietro, the well-known Florentine exile). His attack upon "la coste de Barbarie" is described, with higher estimates of the Hospitallers' losses, in a letter of Odet de Selve to Henry II, dated at Venice on 23 September, 1552 (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 234-35). On Leone Strozzi, note Giuseppe Molini, *Documenti di storia italiana*, 2 vols., Florence, 1836-37, II, 447-48, a letter of Strozzi to Henry II, dated 16 September, 1551. Strozzi was then leaving Henry's service "ritirarmi a Malta a fare servizio a la mia Religione [i.e., the Hospitallers], dove io spero satisfare a quel debito che porta l'habito ch'io porto, et mi pare il tempo opportuno, ritrovandosi l'armata Turchesca in quelle bande."

middle of August (1552), making for the islands of S. Maura (Leucadia, Levkas), Cephalonia, and Zante, after which they sailed between Cerigo (Cythera) and Crete, and on through the Aegean to Istanbul. A Venetian dispatch to the bailie at the Porte puts the Turks under full sail, *navigando verso Levante*, on 26 August, while the anti-imperialist prince of Salerno, Ferrante di Sanseverino, made his way with the French fleet through the "channel of Corfu," the waterway between Corfu and the Albanian-Epirote mainland, on the twenty-eighth, on which day he went ashore to be "welcomed and embraced" by the Corfiote agents of the Republic. Sanseverino returned to his galley in the evening, and followed the Turkish armada southward, meeting up with it at S. Maura for some last farewells and the usual assurances of mutual support. On 24 September Grandi sent word to the duke of Ferrara that the prince of Salerno had returned "alone" with the French galleys to Capo d' Otranto, "perchè le turchesche erano andati a Costantinopoli."<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> On 14 September (1552) Grandi had written the duke of Ferrara, "De l'armata turchesca questi imperiali [a Roma] tengono avviso da Lecce come la era nel porto de Santa Maura e che spalmano a gran furia et con seco era il principe de Salerno, ma per anchora non haveano certezza che detta armata o parte ritornasse in queste bande et credevasi che più tosto andaria al suo viaggio di Levante, nondimeno non se ne poteva dar fermo raguglio per alhora, ma che tosto se ne vedria risoluzione vera" (Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Roma, Busta 50, no. 283-X/10).

On 22 September the Venetian Senate wrote Domenico Trevisan, the bailie in Istanbul, that "... havemo inteso che alli 26 del passato la [armata] era sopra l'isola della Cephalonia larga in mare, navigando verso Levante. Alli 28 passò per il canal de Corfu l'armata del re Christianissimo con il principe di Salerno, il quale il ditto nostro dismontò alla terra nostra di Corfu et da quelli agenti nostri fo ben veduto et accarezzato, ritornò la sera in galea, et con l'armata di soa Christianissima Maestà seguì quella di quel serenissimo Signor [Turco], et per quanto siamo hoi avvisati da Napoli per lettere de X dell' instante l' ha ritrovata a Santa Maura, di l' che se ben credemo che quella Excelsa Porta ne haverà habuto avvisi avanti il ricever delle presente, non habbiamo voluto manchar de scrivervi quello che è pervenuto a notizia nostra" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fol. 66 [86]).

On 24 September Grandi sent word to the duke of Ferrara that "se intende pur per avviso de Napoli che l' principe de Salerno era a Capo d' Otronto con le galere de Francia sole, perchè le turchesche erano andati a Costantinopoli" (Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Busta 50, no. 283-X/14, and cf. no. 17). Ferrante di Sanseverino was "rebells caesareae Maestatis" (Sebastian Merkle, ed., *Concilium Tridentinum*, II [1911], 310, line 39, and note, *ibid.*, p. 458, note 6, and p. 445). On his break with Pedro de Toledo, viceroy of Naples, and Charles V, see Scipione Miccio (*fl.* 1600), *Vita di Don Pietro di Toledo*, in Francesco Palermo, ed., *Narrazioni e documenti sulla storia del regno di Napoli dall' anno 1522 al 1567*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, IX (Florence, 1846), 64-74.

In Hungary the Christian forces under Giovan Battista Castaldo had resumed hostilities early in 1552. In late February, as we have noted, they had taken and sacked Szeged, but when attacked in their turn Ferdinand's troops—Germans, Spaniards, Hungarians, and Italians—had come off badly. In April and May the Turks besieged and took Veszprém in west central Hungary, on the southern slope of the Bakony Mountains, some sixty miles southwest of Buda (Ofen), known today (owing to its union with Pest in 1873) as Budapest. They were no less successful at Timişoara (Temesvár), which they finally occupied after a lengthy bombardment and two bloody assaults. Thereafter they reoccupied and destroyed Lipova (Lippa) and several important strongholds in the "Banat of Temesvár," which was to remain Turkish for more than a century and a half.<sup>73</sup>

There was no stopping the Turks that year. On 11 August they defeated the main body of Ferdinand's troops, some 7,000 strong, at Fil' akova (Hung. Fülekk), a village in southern Slovakia, just northwest of Budapest. The Christians were commanded by the Austrian soldier Erasmus Teufel, baron of Gundersdorf, who was captured along with 4,000 Hungarians, Spaniards, Italians, and Germans. The Turkish victor was the eunuch Ali Pasha, who had succeeded Kasim Pasha as governor of Buda, and who now re-entered his Danube base in flamboyant triumph. Sforza Pallavicini was also captured. The prisoners were sold for a song at auction, but not officers of rank. Teufel was sent with 40 Christian banners to the Porte, where he tried to conceal his identity in order to lower his ransom. Suleiman, indignant at the attempted fraud, is said to have had him sewn into a leather sack, and thrown into the sea. Pallavicini spent some time in a Turkish prison at Buda, but was ransomed for about 16,000 florins.<sup>74</sup> We shall soon encounter Pallavicini again.

In the spring of 1552 Sanseverino had been in Venice, trying to persuade the Signoria to join the French in the attack upon Charles V's kingdom of Naples "pour favoriser et aider la liberté dudit royaume" (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 378-80, letters of Odet de Selve, the French ambassador in Venice, to the Constable Anne de Montmorency and Henry II, dated 2 and 22 April, 1552).

<sup>73</sup> On the Turkish assaults and seizures of Timişoara and Lipova, see Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. IV, pp. 182-97, and cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 206-7, 224-25, on the Turkish seizures of Veszprém and Timişoara.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 301-5, and von Buchholtz, *Ferdinand I.*, VII, 302-12, both of whom set Pallavicini's ransom at 18,000 florins, which may be the correct figure, but see below Giulio de' Grandi's letter of 17 September, 1552, to the duke of Ferrara.

The Turkish campaign of 1552 was not over, however, for in the late summer the second vizir Ahmed Pasha, who had replaced Mehmed Sokolli as commander for the current year, joined forces with Ali Pasha of Buda, before the important fortress of Szolnok at the confluence of the Zagya and the Tisza (Theiss). As the garrison abandoned the fortress, the Turks moved in without a struggle at the beginning of September. Thereafter they went on to Eger (*Agria*, Erlau) in northern Hungary. Here they met the bold defiance of the defenders, Stefan Dobó of Russka, Stefan Metskei, and the learned Gregor Bornemisza, who made the siege of Eger (in von Hammer-Purgstall's words) "no less famous than that of Vienna and Güns." Ali Pasha arrived at Eger with Arslan Beg, the governor of Székesfehérvár (*Alba Regia*, Stuhlweissenburg), who opened fire upon the fortress of Eger about the end of the first week of September. A few days later Ahmed Pasha and Mehmed Sokolli arrived on the scene.

The walls of Eger, the cathedral, and the besieged were subjected to a ceaseless cannonading, but the Turks failed to take the city in three assaults on Michaelmas (29 September). During the

---

On 1 September Grandi wrote the duke (Arch. di Stato di Modena. Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Busta 50, no. 283-X/1): "Et che de Trasilvania ce sono lettere de Ragusa che Turchi havendo assediato il Castaldo con quelle gente che teneva in certo castello [Timișoara?], che è stato necessitato rendersi a patti, quali forno accettati da Turchi ma non osservati, perché uscito che fu con dette gente esso con tutti l'altri forno tagliati tutti a pezzi, il che è stato la ricompensa di quello che esso fece a loro in prese Lippa sotto le medesime conditioni che li trattò nel medesimo modo con che ne viene vendicato il sangue innocente de Fra Giorgio. . ."

Grandi next wrote the duke (on 10 September), "Nè ha altro di nuovo [il reverendissimo de Augusta, i.e., Otto von Truchsess], salvo che le cose del Castaldo non forno come per l'altre fece scrivere, anzi si è doppio inteso che fu altrimenti et che Turchi releverno grossamente et conosce sua signoria reverendissima quanto quella discorre bene la via del remedio a tanta rabbia de Turchi se questi principi non fossero similmente arabbati fra essi" (*ibid.*, Busta 50, no. 283-X/6).

With reference to Pallavicini's ransom, Grandi informed the duke on 17 September that "qua [i.e., in Rome] è nuova de Viena che 'l signor Sforza è vivo et sano, prigionie in Buda con taglia de XVI m. fiorini, quali ei re de Romani [Ferdinand] ha promesso pagarli. In quello conflitto ce restorno tutti i poveri Italiani fra morti et prigionii, nè se ne salvorno che da 250. Così tiene avviso il reverendissimo camerlengo suo cognato [Guido Ascanio Sforza, cardinal of S. Fiora], et che tutto questo danno [si] causò ch'è li Ungheri non combatterono, ma solo attesero a salvarsi" (*ibid.*, Busta 50, no. 283-X/11).

On the Turkish seizure of Timișoara and Lipova, see also Heinrich Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*, pt. I, vol. 13 (Tübingen, 1959), no. 43, p. 83; on the capture of Pallavicini, *ibid.*, nos. 47-48, pp. 93-94, 96-97; and on the return of the Turkish armada to the Levant, nos. 50, 55, pp. 101, 114, et *alibi*.

night of 4 October gunpowder, stored in an underground vault in the cathedral, caught fire; the church itself and two nearby mills were destroyed. The defenders are said to have had only twenty-four kegs of powder left, but the siege went on with no thought of surrender despite the generous terms the Turks were offering the besieged. The far-seeing Dobó had prepared for the advent of the Turks by stocking large quantities of sulphur and saltpeter (potassium nitrate) from which he made powder. Using the fallen stones of the two mills, Dobó had a third one built, which would grind grain enough to supply the garrison and the townsfolk with bread.

Assaults upon the walls were made again on 10 and 12 October, the latter being the greatest of all, but to no avail. On the eve of S. Luke (18 October, 1552) a cold rain came, mixed with snow. It would have been folly to continue. The Christians had won. The Turks had to abandon the siege. Ali Pasha, who had urged Ahmed Pasha to undertake the reduction of Eger, which he had wanted to add to his own domain of Buda, soon had to relinquish his command, falling into disgrace for a while. As they departed, the Turks are alleged to have promised the garrison and the inhabitants of Eger that they would return next year.<sup>75</sup> Despite the failure at Eger, the Turks had no reason to lament the campaign of 1552, for they had taken Veszprém, Timișoara, Szolnok, and Lipova as well as some twenty-five Hungarian strongholds.<sup>76</sup>

Pirates and Turks had made many a landing upon the south Italian and Sicilian shores. The attack upon Gaeta was terrifying. The Turks had occupied Otranto for a year in 1480-1481,<sup>77</sup> a fact which the Otrantini have never forgotten. In July, 1537, Khaireddin Barbarossa had landed at Castro in Apulia, just south of Otranto.<sup>78</sup> Sinan Pasha had sent a force ashore at Augusta in Sicily in mid-July, 1551, as we saw in Volume III. He left the town in ashes, the castello in ruins. There had been many other raids at other times, and the fearful inhabitants of the coast towns lived in the expectation of more to come. Watchtowers were built

---

<sup>75</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 305-12, trans. J.-J. Hellert, VI, 42-52, and F. B. von Buchholtz, *Ferdinand I*, VII, 312-18. On the Turkish success at Szolnok and failure at Eger, see de Selve's letters to Montmorency in Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 234, 235, 238, 239, where it is also stated that Rustem Pasha had left [Istanbul] for the war against Persia on 29 September (1552).

<sup>76</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, III, 313, trans. Hellert, VI, 53.

<sup>77</sup> See above, Volume II, esp. pp. 341-45, 370-72, 373-75.

<sup>78</sup> See above, Volume III, p. 431b.

along the south Italian shores, "Turkish towers," in Calabria and the Basilicata. We find them from the area near Rossano north to Trebisacce and Amendolara. The towers are much in evidence as one takes the road which runs parallel and close to the railroad tracks along the coast of the gulf of Taranto. The flat, low-lying beaches made landings a simple matter. It was an area easy of access to Turks or pirates, who could step ashore almost anywhere without being seen unless there were attentive watchmen in the Turkish towers. There were towers also along the shores of the Salentine peninsula, with a "casino dei Turchi" a few miles north of Otranto. Some of these towers have disappeared, the stones of which they were constructed having been used elsewhere for building materials. There are enough left, however, to remind one constantly of the perilous past.

The Venetians had followed, with understandable apprehension, the early stages of the Turkish naval expedition of 1552. It had soon become clear, however, that the Turks were confining their attacks to southern Italy. The Venetians had made a memorable and costly peace with the Porte in 1540, after which there had been as usual serious violations of the terms of agreement, especially at sea. Pirates were difficult to deal with; they caused the Republic much loss, and they were a major factor in the maritime life of the time. The Venetian sources attest to constant remonstrances against Turkish violations of the articles of peace. Sometimes the Venetians were at fault, although the Signoria tried hard to avoid trouble with the Turks. While Venetian commanders might on occasion yield to anger or exasperation, the government sought to maintain a vigilant discipline over its agents, and claimed to mete out severe punishments for offenses against the Turks. On the whole the Turks seem to have been less scrupulous in observing the peace, and the Senate was obliged from time to time to lodge complaints at the Porte, as in the spring of 1552 in the case of the Turkish "reis" (admiral) Sala Beg.

On 20 May (1552) the Senate wrote Sultan Suleiman in extreme annoyance and distress. The letter began with an expression of respect for the sultan's sense of justice, "which shines in your imperial Majesty, and makes him illustrious through all the world." But, alas, Sala Beg, one of his captains, had recently caused Venice foul injury and grievous loss "contrary to the desire and noble command of your imperial Majesty," so that the Senate was constrained to lodge a vigorous protest, "as we do with great and infinite displeasure."

On the way to Algiers, Sala Beg had recently landed at Crete and on the island of Cerigo, where he had seized much property as though it were the booty of war, taken Venetian subjects captive, and thrown them in irons aboard his galleys. He had also seized certain vessels in Venetian waters, removed the cargoes, and put the crews in chains. Coming upon a Venetian transport, the good ship *Barbara*, loaded with merchandise of the highest value, on its way to Alexandria, Sala Beg had treacherously made the usual *segno di segurtà*, to which the Venetian skipper had returned the customary *contrasegno*. Upon the friendly approach of the Venetians, Sala Beg had seized their transport, and taken it into a Cretan harbor, where he had plundered it of money and goods worth more than 60,000 ducats, to the total ruin of the Venetian nobles, citizens, and other subjects who had invested their resources in the cargo.

This was not the way Venice dealt with Turkish ships and subjects. The Senate appealed to the sultan to set Sala Beg's captives free, and to restore all the property he had seized in contravention of the peace between Venice and the Porte. They urged the sultan to make such a show of Sala Beg's punishment that hereafter neither Sala nor any other captain would venture to commit such atrocious acts at sea, "and the world will always know your Majesty's goodness and justice, and that you hold us for those true and sincere friends we are and always intend to be."<sup>79</sup>

A month before this (on 19 April, 1552) Domenico Trevisan had been appointed the Venetian bailie in Istanbul to replace Bernardo Navagero,<sup>80</sup> and the Senate now wrote them a joint letter. Although the Senate was sure that the rectors of Candia had already informed Navagero of Sala Beg's unconscionable acts of violence against the persons and possessions of Venetian citizens and subjects, and Navagero had doubtless already lodged a protest with Rustem Pasha, nevertheless when Trevisan reached the Bosphorus, they were both again to go to Rustem, "and make the greatest complaint you can . . . , [and] you will tell him that this offense has been committed not only against us, but also against his Majesty and the Sublime Porte."

When Trevisan was admitted into the imperial presence to kiss the sultan's hand, he was to give him the Senate's letter of remonstrance, "in order that his Majesty may understand from the said let-

<sup>79</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 24'-25' [44'-45'].

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fols. 12'-15' [32'-35']. On Navagero, see above, Chapter 13, note 156.



ter and from your living voice our indignation over this event, and our desire and expectation that he should take action on our behalf consistent with the justice, . . . which makes him famous." The Senate sent its own version in Turkish, prepared by one Michiel Membre, of the letter to be presented to the sultan, being apparently unwilling to risk either the distortion or the softening of a dragoman's translation.<sup>81</sup>

There was troubled discussion in the Senate of both the letter to the sultan and that to the bailies. It was decided, however, to send the letters to which the Senate added a further word. The mate (*scivanoello*) of the *Barbara* was said to have been frightened into the statement that there had been Genoese aboard [i.e., countrymen of the imperial admiral Andrea Doria], but Genoese were forbidden by law to trade or travel in Venetian ships. As far as anyone knew in Venice, aside from some Jewish subjects of the Porte there were only Venetian subjects aboard the *Barbara*. If mention should be made of one Marc' Antonio Fracassato, who might be regarded as a Bolognese, the bailies were to understand and to explain "that owing to his long residence in this city, he is a citizen, and enjoys the same privileges as other citizens." Sala Beg had had no reason beyond his own avarice for his acts of piracy in Cretan waters.<sup>82</sup>

Trevisan made the proper representations to the Porte, and in early July the sultan and Rustem Pasha promised the Venetian government full satisfaction if investigation substantiated the charges made against Sala Beg. The Signoria resented the delay involved, waiting expectantly for the punishment of the offender.<sup>83</sup>

In September (1552), at the request of Trevisan, the sultan issued special orders to the energetic Dragut Reis to treat the Venetians as friends and to respect their merchants and merchandise, subjects and shipping, for which consideration the Senate gave formal expression to their thanks on 29 October. They wrote Trevisan at the same time, commending his diligence and reiterating the ardent desire of the Venetian government to observe every iota of their treaty with the Porte. Venetian officers and officials who violated the articles of peace were promptly punished. The

Porte must be persuaded to deal similarly with Turkish offenders. Trevisan was to

complain of the many losses we have suffered from armed fuste at Valona and from diverse other fuste, which have regularly found a haven and sources of supply at Valona, Lepanto, Modon, and Coron, and particularly [to complain of the offenses] against so many poor natives of Chioggia [*Chiozoti*], seized with their possessions and boats, and taken to Valona, whereupon ninety of them were sent to the slave marts of Anatolia. . . .

Trevisan was also instructed to return to the case of Sala Beg and his plundering of the *Barbara*, which suggests that after three or four months no punishment had yet been meted out to Sala Beg.<sup>84</sup>

The Venetian senators often put in long hours. If it was not one thing, it was another. They would not see Sala Beg subjected to the punishment which they believed he deserved. Anyhow they had done their best, and they would persist to the extent discretion would allow. In the meantime another problem had arisen. In October (1552) the Republic's ambassador in Rome was startled to receive a request for 40,000 ducats which a legal instrument of 1511 showed Julius II to have loaned, for the brief space of one month, to the Venetian ambassador of some forty years before. He had quickly notified the home government. The Senate replied, on 4 November, with some astonishment that the matter had never been mentioned through so many years either to the Signoria or to a long succession of ambassadors to the Curia. The Senate was certain, however, that this request did not come from the pope, but from some curial busybody who was trying to show off his diligence.

If the matter of the forty-year-old debt came up again, the ambassador was to reply that the demand for payment after so long a time was quite beyond the realm of reason. The entire sum had unquestionably been paid when the debt fell due, although the documentary record was hard to establish, owing to the fact "that because of the fire, which occurred in our offices together with the whole square [*piazza*] of the Rialto, many of the account books of our Signoria and similar documents were burned up and destroyed. . . ." No one of the half-dozen popes from Julius II to Julius III had ever asked for the money, although the popes gave the most careful attention to their af-

<sup>81</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 25<sup>v</sup>-26<sup>r</sup> [45<sup>v</sup>-46<sup>r</sup>], also dated 20 May, 1552.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fol. 27<sup>r</sup> [47<sup>r</sup>], dated 20 May, 1552, and cf. fols. 31<sup>r</sup> [51<sup>r</sup>] and 39<sup>r</sup> [59<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fols. 59<sup>v</sup>-61<sup>r</sup> [79<sup>v</sup>-81<sup>r</sup>], letters to Trevisan and Rustem Pasha, dated 5 September, 1552.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fols. 73<sup>v</sup>-74<sup>r</sup> [93<sup>v</sup>-94<sup>r</sup>], letters of the Senate to the sultan and to Trevisan, dated 29 October, 1552.

fairs, and had sometimes been quite hard-pressed for funds (as indeed Julius III was as a consequence of the war of Parma). It would be best, the ambassador was told, to have nothing more to say about the matter,<sup>85</sup> which in view of the apparent state of the Venetian records was not without its embarrassing aspects.

From the Holy See the attention of the Senate soon turned back to the Turks. After receiving the news that the sultan's armada was being disarmed for the season, and that the French fleet under Ferrante di Sanseverino, prince of Salerno, was going to spend the winter at Chios (*Scio*), the Senate voted on 16 November (1552) to disarm most of their own galleys.<sup>86</sup> This would of course save the state a goodly sum of money. During the summer, however, complaints had poured into Venice of Turkish infractions of the peace as the armada had passed through Venetian waters. When the bailie Trevisan attempted to discuss the matter with the Turkish captain Sinan Pasha, the brother of Rustem Pasha, he was sharply rebuffed, "which shows in truth that he is of a very choleric and difficult nature," as the Senate wrote Trevisan. But one was treading on thin ice when he dealt with the Turks:

We tell you . . . that although we are well aware it is a hard thing to negotiate with people of such a nature, nevertheless we have so much confidence in your own quality and dexterity—as well as in the ways and means which you can see must be employed with such people—that we are ready to hope and expect that, up to the time you sent us your letters [dated 3 and 5 November, 1552], he has taken no step against us with the other magnificent pashas, so you will have gained time, temporizing with the complaints which touch his own person so that, with him quiet, you may still return to them with your usual skill and prudence. As for our complaints, however, about the losses sustained on the *Barbara*, and others which do not relate to this captain [Sinan Pasha], we cannot but believe that the most serene lord [Suleiman] with his sense of justice will give the order to make up these losses, in keeping with his greatness and the peace which exists between us. . . .<sup>87</sup>

Trevisan required neither sermons nor exhortations. He had his instructions; he was trying to follow them. On 10 February, 1553, the Senate expressed satisfaction in his progress. A gift of 500 ducats to Sinan Pasha had secured the release of seventeen persons. Rustem Pasha himself got thirty pieces of cloth, and the bailie began to find life at the Porte more tranquil. Although Rustem made bland noises about the case of Sala Beg, Trevisan had written that he would persist, as the Senate wanted him to do, in seeking restitution for the seizure of the *Barbara*. Sala Beg was still in Algiers,<sup>88</sup> and one probably wondered what havoc he might wreak in the course of his return to Istanbul.

The Venetians scanned the seas with the eyes of Argus. Relentless vigilance was the price of security for the Republic's ships and shipping. At the same time as the letter we have just mentioned (10 February) the Senate wrote Trevisan that as a result of the information he had sent to Venice that thirteen new galleys were under construction in the arsenal on the Bosphorus, "et che il presente anno quel serenissimo Signor [Turco] manderà fuori armada," they were ordering the rectors of Candia to arm ten galleys. The Senate also instructed Trevisan, however, to keep the rectors directly advised of Turkish preparations for the dispatch of the armada, because if in fact it did not set out on the Mediterranean, there would be no need of the state's undertaking the expense of arming any more than four of the ten Candiot galleys.<sup>89</sup>

By 27 February the Senate had learned from Trevisan that the sultan was not going to send out a large armada in 1553, but only forty to fifty galleys under the command of Dragut.<sup>90</sup> The Mediterranean fleets had been increasing in size and cost from one decade to the next. A century earlier a naval armament of forty to fifty galleys was something to reckon with but, despite Dra-

but Turkish corsairs were to be treated as corsairs (*ibid.*, fols. 89<sup>v</sup>-90<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>v</sup>-110<sup>r</sup>]).

In the opinion of the Venetian Senate the Hospitallers of Malta were as bad as the Turks (*ibid.*, fols. 105<sup>v</sup>-106<sup>r</sup> [125<sup>v</sup>-126<sup>r</sup>], 112<sup>r</sup> [132<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fol. 100 [120], letter of the Senate to Trevisan, dated 10 February, 1553.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fols. 99<sup>v</sup>-100<sup>r</sup> [119<sup>v</sup>-120<sup>r</sup>], and fols. 102<sup>v</sup>-103<sup>r</sup> [122<sup>v</sup>-123<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 15 February, 1553.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fol. 106<sup>r</sup> [126<sup>r</sup>], 108<sup>r</sup> [128<sup>r</sup>], 123 [143]. On 19 June (1553) Odet de Selve informed Henry II that twenty Turkish galleys had been scheduled to leave Istanbul on 1 June; Henry himself wrote Dragut on 6 June (*Charière, Négociations*, II, 256-57, 259-60, and cf. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 440-41).

<sup>85</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 76<sup>v</sup>-77<sup>r</sup> [96<sup>v</sup>-97<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 68, fols. 80<sup>v</sup>-81<sup>r</sup> [100<sup>v</sup>-101<sup>r</sup>], 82 ff. [102 ff.]. Later on, the Senate agreed (in May, 1553) to allow French money to be sent eastward aboard Venetian galleys to help support Henry II's fleet in the Levant (*ibid.*, fols. 125 [145], 129 [149]).

<sup>87</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 87<sup>v</sup>-88<sup>r</sup> [107<sup>v</sup>-108<sup>r</sup>], letter of the Senate to Trevisan, dated 15 December, 1552. On the same day, in the commission issued to Andrea Duodo as provveditore of the Venetian fleet, he was directed scrupulously to observe *tutti li capitoli della pace che havemo col serenissimo Signor Turco*,

gut's formidable reputation, it was clear that the Porte was planning no such large-scale enterprise as those of the past two summers.<sup>91</sup>

When the Turks moved westward by sea to attack the Hospitallers at Malta, or westward by land to attack the Hapsburgs in Hungary, the Venetians were but slightly distressed. They could contain their grief also when the Turks harassed the Hapsburg domains in southern Italy and Sicily. The advance of the Turks was certainly worrisome, especially when they landed on Italian soil, but the piratical ventures of the Hospitallers endeared them to the Venetians no more than did the Hapsburgs' pressure upon Friuli. The best news on the Rialto, however, was that the sultan and the Ottoman forces had gone eastward to attack the Shi'ite shah or "sophi" of Persia. While this gave the Hapsburgs time to rebuild their resources (against the next Turkish attacks), it also usually meant that the Turks limited their activities on the Mediterranean, and saved Venice the large expense of maintaining numerous armed galleys at sea.

Of late there had been several Persian incursions into Armenia and Kurdistan, to which the Porte would very likely be giving serious attention. Sultan Suleiman was now in his later fifties. He had led eleven campaigns, and was tiring. He decided to give the command of the army to march against Persia to the grand vizir Rustem Pasha. Ahmed Pasha was to guard the Hungarian frontier, and Mehmed Sokolli, the beylerbey of Rumelia, was ordered off to distant Tokat on the Yesil Irmak, the ancient Iris in northeastern Asia Minor, to take the offensive when the spring came. Rustem had established winter quarters at Aksaray in east central Asia Minor, from which he appealed to the sultan to come and take command of the army, for he feared that the restless janissaries might be on the point of proclaiming the popular Mustafa, Suleiman's eldest son, as sultan in his father's place. Rustem was close to the "sultana" Roxelana, whose daughter he had married. Roxelana was the mother of Suleiman's four younger

sons, but not of Mustafa, whom she wanted out of the way.<sup>92</sup>

Before setting out on the Persian campaign Suleiman confirmed (on 3 August, 1553) the terms of the current peace between Poland and the Porte. The Polish envoy Stanislaus Tenizyński (Tęczyński) had requested renewal in the name of King Sigismund II Augustus. The two powers were mutually to refrain from inflicting loss or damage upon each other, and the friends and enemies of the one were to be regarded also as the friends and enemies of the other. Those made captive in the past would be redeemed on the usual terms. Polish and Turkish merchants would be free to trade, each in the territory of the other, while in the event of the death of a merchant of one of the two states in the territory of the other, his property would be reserved for his legitimate heirs. In both states creditors were to be protected against bad debts. Various past losses were to be forgotten on both sides. Provision was made for the extradition of malefactors. Polish prisoners who had been sold in the Turkish slave marts were to be searched for and ransomed by agents of the king for the same amounts as their then owners had paid for them. Protection would be given the ambassadors of the two states according to the usual conventions of diplomatic exchange.<sup>93</sup> Only time would tell whether in a crisis a Polish ambassador would fare any better than Ferdinand's unfortunate envoy Malvezzi.

Suleiman naturally desired every possible assurance of security along his western frontier. He crossed the Bosphorus, to begin the Persian campaign, toward the end of August (1553). It was a late start. His third son, Bayazid, was to rule in his stead in Istanbul and at Adrianople. The eldest, the now suspect Mustafa, was summoned to the imperial presence, and in one of the more dismal and better-known scenes in Ottoman history was

<sup>91</sup> On the sons of Suleiman, see the Venetian dispatch, quoted above, Volume III, p. 530b, which means four sons. Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Ferdinand's ambassador to the Porte (1554-1562), gives the names of the five sons (*Augurii Gisleinii Busbequii opera omnia quae extant*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 112 ff.).

<sup>92</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Documenti turchi, according to the "Regesti Bombaci," where the copy of the treaty is dated 22 Sha'ban, A. H. 960, and note the Docc. turchi, a copy of the text with the same date, in Arabic script, accompanied by a contemporary Italian translation. On Poland, the Hapsburgs, and the Turks, cf. Felipe Ruiz Martín, "Carlos V y la confederación polaco-lituana," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, CXXXIII (1953), 440 ff.

<sup>91</sup> During the summer and fall of 1553 Giulio de' Grandi reported to the duke of Ferrara on the movements of the Turkish armada, now said to contain 110 sail, from Capo d' Otranto to Sicily and Corsica (Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Ambasciatori, etc., Busta 50, nos. 283-XI/41, 45-46, 49, and 283-XII/17, 20-21). Once again a French fleet was active at the same time. Letters from Rome to the nuncios at the imperial court abound in references to the Turkish armadas and the French co-operation with them in 1552 and 1553.

strangled (on 6 October) in his father's tent near Ereğli in Caramania.<sup>94</sup>

The janissaries not unjustly demanded the punishment of Rustem Pasha, whom they held accountable for Mustafa's death. Suleiman removed Rustem from the grand vizirate, very likely fearing a revolt on the road to Persia. Rustem returned to Istanbul, to be consoled by Roxelana, and the office of grand vizir was bestowed upon Ahmed Pasha, the conqueror of Timișoara (Temesvár), who kept it until his death in September, 1555, after his return and that of the sultan to Istanbul. Rustem was immediately restored to the rank of "first pasha" and the office of grand vizir.<sup>95</sup>

Suleiman spent the winter (of 1553–1554) at Aleppo, where he gave some attention to fiscal reform in the Ottoman empire. In the spring the army moved on to Diyarbakir (Amida) on the Tigris river in Kurdistan; here he summoned the vizirs, the defterdars, and all the officers of the janissaries and the army to a memorable "divan."

<sup>94</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 40–48. Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 317–18, seeks to shed doubt on Busbecq's account, because the latter puts the murder of Mustafa near Amasia in northeastern Asia Minor: "Profectus Amasia cui praerat, [Mustapha] venit ad patrem, cuius non longe castra erant. . . ." (Busbecq, *op. cit.*, p. 45). Von Hammer's account is, nevertheless, pretty much the same as Busbecq's.

<sup>95</sup> On 7 November, 1555, the Venetian Senate wrote the bailie in Istanbul, "Alii 28 del ditto mese [of October] recessimo le vostre [lettere] di 17, 23, et 30 Settembre con l' avviso della morte di Acmat e ritorno del Signor Rusten al loco di primo bassa. . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 156, and cf. fol. 157), and of course the bailie was to express the Senate's "molta allegrezza" in this return of Rustem Pasha to power. Ahmed Pasha had been put to death by the sultan's orders (Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 110, 125–26; von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 339–41). On Roxelana, Rustem Pasha, and the death of Mustafa, cf. Ascanio Centorio, *Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania* (1566), bk. vi, pp. 254–65, and see the well-informed letter of Odet de Selve to Henry II, dated 17 November, 1553, in Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 287–90, which gives the date of Mustafa's death, and note, *ibid.*, pp. 290–91.

On Ahmed Pasha's being put to death and Rustem Pasha's being restored to the grand vizirate, note the *avviso* given in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1038, fol. 97: "Per lettere da Constantinopoli di 30 di Settembre [1555] si dà avviso come il Turcho haveva fatto strangolare Aghemat Bascià. . . . Si crede sì è che habbi fatto morire per compiacere alla sultana sua dormitatrice, alla quale non niera qual si voglia gratia, et di ciò se n' è visto l' effetto, perchè il luogo suo del primo bascià l' ha dato a Rustan suo genero insieme con il suo suggello. Di tal morte ogni Cristiano se ne debbe rallegrare, perchè lui era il maggior lor' nemico che avesse il signore, come se è visto per l' ultima guerra d' Ungaria oltre alli molti cattivi officii che giornalmente se ingeniava fare contro il re di Romani per esser' lui Ungaro Cristiano rinnegato. . . ." and cf., *ibid.*, fol. 103.

He addressed them on the importance of this war against the Persians, the Shiite enemies of the Ottoman Sunnis. They responded with the expected enthusiasm, and the army went northward to Erzurum, the ancient Theodosiopolis, and thence to Kars, the ancient Chorsa, from which Suleiman sent the Shah Tahmāsp a declaration of war in accord with the dictates of Islam. The Ottoman forces devastated the area from Erivan (Yerevan) to Nakhichevan, the ancient Naxuana; at Erivan they destroyed the palaces of the shah and his sons (in mid-July, 1554). On or about 24 July they are said to have been in the region of Arpaçay, but on the following day the troops of Caramania were caught in ambush, and suffered heavy losses. The Turks plundered the area of the (modern) towns of Stepanakert and Shusha, the old Karabagh, burning what they could not carry off. Having been informed, however, that Tahmāsp had entrenched himself on a nearby mountain range, Suleiman ordered the withdrawal of his army. He was also fearful of running out of provisions in the regions that he had rendered desolate.

Tahmāsp sent a belated answer to Suleiman's declaration of war, vowing to avenge the devastation of his lands, and accusing the Turks of cowardice, for they were not warriors of the sword and lance, but fought from afar with guns and cannon. The shah indicated, however, that he was prepared to make peace. Thereafter the Turkish vizirs and the Persians traded insults in an exchange of rhetorical letters, each side accusing the other of being the first to suggest peace. The ever-fortunate Porte was always open to friends and foes alike, the Persians were told; if they really wanted peace, they must send an ambassador of rank, not some underling, to kiss the sultan's hand. If they did not do so, the Ottoman army would spend the winter in the borderlands, and the rulers would have to take responsibility for the ruination of their subjects. But the sultan would not withhold his grace and clemency—the Persians must know their plight, and where their welfare and refuge lay. Tabriz and the cities of northern Persia were in peril, but Tahmāsp is said to have gone into Georgia. When Ahmed Pasha moved against him, Tahmāsp made himself scarce. The Ottoman armies and raiding parties ranged widely in Kurdistan, spreading death and destruction.

At long last, on 26 September, 1554, a high Persian official, the commander of the shah's bodyguard, waited upon Suleiman at Erzurum. He came as the ambassador the Turks had demanded, and brought with him a conciliatory letter, requesting an end to hostilities, which Suleiman

granted for as long as the Persians themselves chose to observe the truce. Four days later Suleiman left Erzurum for Sivas, whence he went on to Amasya (Amasia), where in view of the lateness of the season he decided to spend the winter.

At Amasya on 10 May, 1555, Ferdinand's ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, who was on his own (rather unsatisfactory) mission to the sultan, watched the arrival of another Persian ambassador, who had brought *multa et praeclara munera*—carpets of the finest weave, "Babylonian" tents embroidered in different colors on the interior, harnesses and saddles of exquisite workmanship, Damascene blades adorned with gems, and shields of a wondrous elegance, "sed omnia superabat Akoranus." Busbecq could witness from his lodgings—across the river—a dinner which Ali Pasha, the second vizir, gave the Persians in a large garden, where the pashas reclined with the ambassador under an awning which shaded the table. A hundred young men, all dressed exactly alike, served the pashas and their guest by passing the dishes from hand to hand—from the barbecue (*culina*) to the chief servant (*architriclinus*), who put the dishes on the table. "In such fashion," says Busbecq, "a hundred or more plates flowed, so to say, onto the table without much ado." The ambassador's entourage also dined in state at a nearby table.

The Turco-Persian peace had been confirmed, *pace . . . cum Persis confirmata*. The best that Busbecq could manage was a six months' truce, while he returned to Ferdinand's court with a letter from Suleiman, and then came back with Ferdinand's answer. Busbecq left Amasya for Vienna on 2 June. Since the sultan had just ratified by a letter of 29 May to the shah what appears to be the first formal peace—put in writing, so to speak, rather than the usual suspension of arms—it might be that the Turks would lose interest in making peace also with the Hapsburgs.<sup>96</sup>

Suleiman is said to have left Amasya three weeks after his formal declaration of peace with Tahmâsp and the Persians. He arrived back on the Bosphorus on 1 August, 1555, and was doubtless pleased to inspect the new palace which had

just been built at Scutari (Üsküdar), the ancient Chrysopolis. He had, as usual, sent westward bulletins of his victories and conquests in the long campaign against the Persians. The Venetians had already sent him fulsome congratulations upon "le grande vittorie di sua Maestà et lo acquisto di molte città et provincie."<sup>97</sup> Before his return Suleiman had dispatched Mehmed Sokolli, now the third vizir, with 3,000 janissaries and 4,000 horse to Salonika (and perhaps farther south) to suppress the revolt of a pretender who claimed to be the late prince Mustafa. The extent of the following the pretender acquired was sad evidence of the popularity of the murdered prince. The insurgent was the third "Mustafa" unsuccessfully to claim the Ottoman throne, the first having been in 1415–1422 and the second in 1426. The impostor of 1555 made a poultry-dealer his vizir and two students "kaziascers" or vice-chancellors. The poultryer betrayed the rebel to the sanjakbey of Nicopolis, who sent him to the Porte for execution. For his double-dealing the poultryer received a lucrative fief.<sup>98</sup>

Busbecq, who locates the Pseudo-Mustafa's uprising in northern Thrace rather than in Macedonia, says that Bayazid, the younger of Suleiman's now surviving sons, lay behind the whole movement. Bayazid feared for his life, because when his aging father died, he could expect no mercy from his elder brother Selim. A new sultan always did away with his brothers. Owing to the "sultana" Roxelana's intercession, Suleiman spared Bayazid's life, but the young prince later took the field against Selim, who *paternis opibus munitus* defeated him at Konya in May, 1559. Bayazid fled from Konya, says Busbecq, to his "prefecture" at Amasya, where he waited for a while in the forlorn hope of receiving the paternal pardon once more. Quite rightly despairing of forgiveness, however,

<sup>96</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, III, 312–27, trans. Hellert, VI, 52–70; Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 90–93. Of Ali Pasha, the second vizir, Busbecq says, "Est vero Halli Bassa natione Dalmata, vir eleganti ingenio, et (quod in Turca mirandum) in quo nihil desideres humanitatis" (*ibid.*, p. 91). Busbecq's six months' truce with the Porte did not, however, end hostilities between the Austrians and the Turks in Hungary (von Bucholtz, *Ferdinand I*, VII, 320–21, 334–35).

<sup>97</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 70<sup>r</sup>, 73<sup>r</sup> ff., 84<sup>r</sup>–85<sup>r</sup>, docs. dated in December, 1554, and January, 1555 (Ven. style 1554), at which time "Ibraym Dragomano" came to Venice on an embassy from the Porte. Thereafter, on 28 August, the Senate voted to send an ambassador to Istanbul to congratulate Suleiman on his victories and to return the honor of Ibrahim's coming to Venice (*ibid.*, fols. 138<sup>r</sup>, 139<sup>r</sup>, 149<sup>r</sup>, 152<sup>r</sup>). Alvisé Renier was chosen for the mission; his commission is dated 15 November, 1555 (fols. 157 ff., and cf. fol. 161<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>98</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 336–37, trans. Hellert, VI, 82–83. On the first two Mustafas, cf. above, Volume II, pages 2, note; 12; 23–24, note; and 26. The failure of the third Pseudo-Mustafa's uprising (in 1554) was well known in Rome in May, 1555, from *avis*is dated at Istanbul on 8 April (1555), for which see Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XV, fol. 224<sup>r</sup>. The text is given in the following chapter, note 21.

Bayazid fled to Persia, where Tahmāsp persuaded him to disband his forces, imprisoned him, and for a price allowed an Ottoman agent to put him to death.<sup>99</sup> This left Selim II "the Sot" to succeed his father when the time came.

The war of Parma had hardly ended in the spring of 1552 when the war of Siena began, one more manifestation of the unrelenting hostility which made peace between Charles V and Henry II impossible. Pope Julius III had paid a heavy price for his unfortunate involvement in the war of Parma. He was resolved to remain neutral in the Siennese struggle. Although he veered toward the emperor, who had set Cosimo I de' Medici's mind at ease (in a secret accord of 25 November, 1551), Julius allowed French as well as Spanish troops to reach Siennese territory by going through the states of the Church. After the expulsion of the last of the Petrucci (late in the year 1524), the Siennese had deemed it advisable to place their city under the protection of the emperor. They feared domination by the Florentines and Clement VII, who had indeed tried unsuccessfully (in July, 1526) to subject Siena by force of arms.

The Siennese were an unruly lot. Violence had become a way of life. In 1530 the emperor had installed a Spanish garrison within the walls. It would be hard to say that it was not necessary, but it soon became highly offensive, and in Siena as elsewhere the Spanish became more unpopular with the years. Two decades of martial law were more than the city could stand. For some time Siennese exiles and citizens had been collecting men and money with French help for an attack upon Siena, where Charles V's envoy extraordinary Don Diego de Mendoza was governor, and was pressing forward with the construction of a fortress to hold in check the citizens' increasing love of liberty. The fortress was being built on the hill of S. Prospero just outside the city walls, between the Porta Camollia and the Porta Fontebranda, overlooking the Gothic church of S. Domenico. Don Diego had chosen the site where Cosimo I built the Fortezza Medicea some years later.<sup>100</sup>

On the night of 26 July, 1552, Don Diego, who had deeply offended the pope by assaulting the papal chief of police (*bargello nostro di campagna*), and breaking his nose "with much effusion of blood," had left Rome in a hurry to go to Perugia, from which he intended to hasten on to Siena. The pope thought good riddance to him; his arrogance had become insufferable. Julius had been disturbed, however, by the reports which he knew Don Diego had been receiving "che le cose de Siena fussero per tumultuare." The main road to Rome had been cut. Don Diego's dispatches had been intercepted. There had been a grave unease in Siena for weeks. Now it had all come to a head.

The day after Don Diego's hasty departure from Rome, Enea Piccolomini, captain of the embattled Siennese (*capitano delle battaglie de Siena*), marched up to the gates of his native city. A relative of Francesco Bandini de' Piccolomini, who was to sit on the archiepiscopal throne of Siena for sixty years (1529-1588), Enea was being supported by French funds as well as by those of his countrymen. As Enea waited outside the walls, the populace was stirred to action. There were the usual cries of *liberta! liberta!* to which were added *Francia! Francia!* They were loud and determined. The citizens were engaging in hand to hand combat with the Spaniards, who had spread throughout the city to guard the gates and the main streets. As the hours passed, however, the Spaniards began to concentrate their forces in the piazza. The citizens opened the gates to the lord Enea, who now entered Siena with about 3,000 men recruited from the city and the countryside. There were also "some few foreigners" led by Mario di S. Fiora, a brother of Guido Ascanio Sforza, cardinal of S. Fiora, and a cousin of the Farnesi. The Spaniards retreated into the citadel and the church of S. Domenico, and soon began to request terms for their withdrawal from the city. At first it was believed that their purpose was to gain time for Don Diego and the pope's nephew Ascanio della Corgna to come to their aid. Della Corgna had entered the emperor's service. He had offered to accompany Don Diego, "et per la via di Perugia condurlo salvo a Siena." Obviously he found the Spanish grandee less objectionable than did the pope.

All this was quickly reported to Pietro Camaiani, the papal nuncio to the imperial court, in a letter which Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte wrote (or rather had written for him) on 30 July

<sup>99</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia* (1740, repr. 1968), pp. 114-25, 209-26, 245-49, 251-60, 325, 329-32. In February, 1561, Jean Dolu, the French "agent" in Istanbul saw no hope for Bayazid, nor did he believe that Europe would gain any advantage from the shah's using him against the sultan, which Dolu quite rightly did not believe would be the case (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 648-50). On the execution of Bayazid and his sons, see von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 572-81, trans. Hellert, VI, 128-40.

<sup>100</sup> On the construction of Mendoza's fortress and the trouble it caused in Siena, see Giovanni Antonio Pecci (1693-1768),

*Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena*, 4 vols., Siena, 1755-60, III, 236 ff.

(1552). Charles V was in fact just then leaving Brixen (Bressanone) to return to Innsbruck, where he arrived on the evening of 1 August. The following day Camaiani wrote del Monte that the news of the plight of the Spanish in Siena had just reached Innsbruck. It was certainly a matter of great moment, "... di gran considerazione in questa corte."<sup>101</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberrichte*, I-13, nos. 36-37, pp. 65-71, letters of 30 July and 2 August, 1552, the first from Rome and the second from Innsbruck. On 17 July, Julius III had written Camaiani, absolutely outraged at Don Diego de Mendoza's attack upon the police chief Ventura (*ibid.*, no. 27, pp. 40-41, and *cf.* no. 45, p. 84). The Ventura affair attracted a good deal of attention. Cosimo I de' Medici wrote about it immediately (on 20 July) to Pierfilippo Pandolfini, his envoy to the imperial court, sending him at the same time *avvisi* on the progress of the Turkish armada (Abel Desjardins and Giuseppe Canestrini, eds., *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III [Paris, 1865], 317-18). Cosimo also notes that "la città di Siena si trova in mal termine, e facendo i Francesi quella impresa, non può essere che non molestino anco lo stato nostro."

Don Diego's ill-advised attack upon the pope's policeman was the end of his career in Rome and the beginning of the end of his employment as a trusted servant of the Hapsburgs (Angel González Palencia and Eugenio Mele, *Vida y obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza*, 3 vols., Madrid, 1941-43, II, 261-65).

One of the most important sources for the Senese revolt and its eventual failure is the detailed, eyewitness account of Alessandro Sozzini (1518-1608), edited by Gaetano Milanese, *Diario delle cose avvenute in Siena dai 20 luglio 1550 ai 28 giugno 1555 scritto da Alessandro [di Girolamo] Sozzini*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, II (Florence, 1842), 9-434, with an appendix of documents and some relevant poems. The same volume contains an account of *La Cacciata della guardia spagnola da Siena d'incerto autore* (1552), *ibid.*, pp. 479-524; *Racconti delle principali fazioni della guerra di Siena scritti da Girolamo Roffia* (1554), pp. 525-82; and *Notizie della vittoria riportata dagl' imperiali presso Marciano scritte da un anonimo* (1554), pp. 583-90, with an appendix of two documents. On the construction of Don Diego's fortress, see Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 38 ff., and on the events of 26-29 July, 1552, *ibid.*, pp. 73-84; his account differs from that which del Monte sent Camaiani.

Another major source for the Senese revolt (almost as valuable as Sozzini's *Diario*) is the third book of the memoirs of the Gascon soldier-adventurer Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires (1521-1576)*, now available in the excellent edition of Paul Courteault (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, vol. 174, Bruges, 1964). Parts of the third book of Monluc's *Commentaires* are translated in Ian Roy, ed., *Blaise de Monluc, The Huguenot, Valois Wars and the French Wars of Religion* [from the translation of Chas. Cotton, London, 1674], Hamden, Conn., 1972. Note also Courteault's *Blaise de Monluc, historien* . . . , Paris, 1907, and *Un Cadet de Gascogne au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, Blaise de Monluc*, Paris, 1909. Important, too, is the work attributed to Don Antonio de Montalvo (1527-1581), a Spanish courtier of Cosimo I de' Medici, edited by Cesare Riccomanni, Francesco Grottanelli, and Luciano Banchi, *Relazione della guerra di Siena di Don Antonio di Montalvo, tradotta dallo spagnolo da Don Garzia di Montalvo suo figlio*, Turin, 1863. This work was dedicated to Cosimo II, grand duke of Tuscany (1609-1621), in an undated preface written by Don Garzia, son of the alleged author. The old account of G. A. Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena*, III (1758), 261 ff., still retains some value.

The Senese had immediately sent an envoy to Rome to put their case before the pope and get him to intervene with Cosimo I, who clearly had every intention of meddling in their affairs as the military agent of Charles V. They did not want, they explained to the pope, "to fall from the frying-pan into the fire" (*che l'intention loro non è di voler', come si dice, uscir' della padella per cader' nella bragia*). They disavowed the French connection. Freedom was their sole objective. Cardinal Alessandro Farnese was thought to have had a hand in the whole business. Since the roads going southward from Siena had been cut, dispatches which Don Ferrante Gonzaga had sent to Pedro de Toledo, the viceroy of Naples, as well as to Diego de Mendoza had passed into French hands. Toward the end of his report of 30 July to Camaiani, del Monte noted that three days earlier the Turkish armada had returned to a position above Terracina. The Turks were heading for the shore, and would soon be at work on their "evil designs."<sup>102</sup> As we have already seen, their evil designs had included the bombardment and siege of Gaeta.

Being accorded a safe withdrawal, the Spaniards left Siena on 5 August (1552).<sup>103</sup> Although Julius III's nephew Ascanio della Corgna (his sister

See also Anton Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien* . . . , Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 43-49, and appendix., nos. 13a, 13b, 14-15, pp. 164-65, 169, 175, 180; G. de Leva, *Storia documentata di Carlo V*, V (1894), 441 ff.; Edm. G. Gardner, *Siena, London, 1902*, pp. 219-45; Ferd. Schevill, *Siena*, New York, 1909, repr. 1964, p. 404 ff.; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIII, 144-54, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 108-15; Erika Spivakovsky, *Son of the Alhambra: Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 1504-1575*, Austin and London, 1970, pp. 291-311. On Enea Piccolomini and the expulsion of the Spaniards from Siena, note especially *La Cacciata della guardia spagnola da Siena* [cited above], pp. 509-23; on Don Diego de Mendoza and the whole affair, Nerina Bartoli, "Le Congiure di Siena e la cacciata degli spagnoli nel 1552," *Bullettino senese di storia patria*, new ser., I (Siena, 1930), 361-421, 447-88, with three documents, and González Palencia and E. Mele, *Vida y obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza*, II (1942), 149-277. The fullest treatment of the Senese revolt is to be found in Roberto Cantagalli, *La guerra di Siena (1552-1559)*, Siena: Accademia Senese degli Intronati, 1962, with a good bibliography, *ibid.*, pp. xliii-lv.

<sup>102</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberrichte*, I-13, no. 36, p. 69, and *cf.* Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, II, no. 1688, p. 707, and note, *ibid.*, no. 1707, pp. 729-30. Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 6-7, 15, says the Turks ravaged the island of Elba.

<sup>103</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 88-89. The courteous and much-admired Spanish commandant, Don "Francesco," who had restrained his men, told a group of Senese youths who had bid him a fond farewell, "Voi Senesi valorosi avete fatto un bellissimo colpo, ma per l'avvenire state savii, perché avete offeso troppo grand' uomo." i.e., Charles V. On the Spanish commandant, Don Francisco or Francés de Álaba, and the events from 26-27 July to 5 August (1552), see Cantagalli, *La guerra di Siena*, pp. 20-33, with the notes on pp. 61-71.

Jacopa's son) was in the emperor's employ, his Holiness had no intention of allowing papal troops to be enrolled in the papal states for service under Ascanio in order to devastate Siennese territory.<sup>104</sup> Julius favored the independence of Siena, for if the city were in the hands of neither the Spanish nor the French, his own neutrality would be easier to maintain. Thus if Ascanio was not to attack

<sup>104</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-13, no. 55, pp. 113-14, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 42, pp. 79-80, et alibi. Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 15 ff., 22 ff., represents Julius III as neutral but sympathetic toward Cosimo de' Medici's objectives. Montalvo has a good deal to say of Julius's nephew Ascanio della Corgna, many of whose letters are to be found in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XXI, fols. 47 ff. On 1 December, 1551, Ascanio had written Julius from Scarperia, "Il Signor Don Diego [de Mendoza] m'ha mostrato in Siena una lettera de l'Imperator, nella qual gli scrive di voler servirse de me, et gli domanda, per modo di parere, quello che io potesse desiderar, sopra di che gli resposi ch' io non desideravo sinon d' esser' adoperato nella guerra in ogni luogo et in ogni modo che fusse servito di sua Maestà per poter' a un tempo medesimo mostrar' a lei l' animo mio, et far conoscer' a Francesi che havevano un soldato che non meritava esser trattato come loro hanno trattato me . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 49, and cf. fols. 57, 60 ff.).

Although I cannot here embark upon a survey of Ascanio della Corgna's career, I would note the first part of his letter of 8 August, 1552, to Julius III, the vagaries of whose policies caused his nephew bafflement as well as concern: "Conobbi la mia mala fortuna quando la Santità vostra hebbe occasione di congiungersi con l' Imperatore et intrare in guerra co' l' Re di Francia, ma molto più poichè nel medesimo di ch' ella fece l'accordo co' l' Re [i.e., of 29-30 April, 1552, terminating the war of Parma] mi venne il partito di sua Maestà cesarea et del Re de' Romani, ilqual vostra Beatitudine sa se io presi con licentia sua, et s' ella me lo persuase, et se io dipoi più d' una volta ho tentato di saper la sua mente per ritirarmi, temendo di quel ch' ora m' avviene, et se l' ho fatta tentare dalli reverendissimi signori Vitale et Dandino, et quello che lei ha sempre risposto a loro et a me, et finalmente quel che vostra Santità mi disse la notte ch' io le venni al letto [Julius being laid up with his usual gout] a domandar licentia di cavalcare con Don Diego, onde spero che vostra Beatitudine non possa nè debba havere alcuna mala satisfatione di me, se è possibile ch' io habbi acquistato odio delle genti per aver ben servito il padrone et haver fatte quelle demonstrationi che convengono a un buon servitore, me ne duole assai, et io tengo per una gran disgratia. Pur' eleggo più presto d' esser homo da bene odiato che un bene voluto tristo. Nella strada della violenza non posso continuare, non l' havendo mai presa, ch' io habbi conosciuto, et di questo chiamo per testimoni tutte le terre et paesi di Siena, dove io sono stato tanti di con quattro mila fanti—senza danari posso dir venturieri . . ." (Let. di prin., vol. XXI, fols. 58-59).

On the whole I have had a rather favorable impression of Ascanio from reading his letters. He was much concerned about the fountain (which needed repair) in the central square at Perugia (*ibid.*, fols. 103, 107). This volume contains letters (all originals) of Vincenzo de' Nobili, Ferrante Gonzaga, Camillo Orsini, Alessandro Vitelli, Giangiacomo de' Medici, the republican government of Siena, Pedro de Toledo, García and Luis de Toledo (sons of the foregoing Don Pedro), and others.

Siena with troops raised in the papal states, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese was not to be allowed to accept an invitation of the Siennese "per assistere alli consigli della loro reforma."<sup>105</sup>

The French soldier Paul de Termes, who had been Henry II's envoy at the Curia in 1551, had just been sent to Siena, where he was received "con grandissimo honore et júbilo." He had but recently been defending Parma for Ottavio Farnese. The Siennese had now elected four ambassadors to send to the French court, where Henry would give them a cordial reception, and indeed Enea Piccolomini, who had expelled the Spanish from the city, had already hurried off to France "alone and in disguise," and his three colleagues would soon be following him.<sup>106</sup> On 13 August (1552) the pope had sent the Siennese cardinal Fabio Mignanelli back to his native city to assist in the "reform" of the government, to maintain peace, and to help keep foreigners off the scene. His mission was hopeless. The French were already in the city; the Spanish planned to return. Mignanelli was recalled to Rome on 28 September,<sup>107</sup> but the pope persisted in his futile efforts somehow to bring the emperor and the king of France to an accord that would spare Italy the depredation of further warfare.

The pope's desire to remain neutral was clear enough. So was his desire to see the Siennese steer a course equidistant from both the French and the Spanish. When Don Diego de Mendoza put four hundred Spaniards in Orbetello on the Tyrrhenian coast, about midway between Siena and Rome, the Siennese became more firmly attached than ever to their new French alliance.<sup>108</sup> Paul de Termes

<sup>105</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-13, no. 50, p. 101, and cf. no. 55, pp. 112-13, and on Ascanio della Corgna, cf. Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena*, III, 273 ff.

<sup>106</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-13, nos. 42, 45-46, 50, 55, 65, 69, pp. 79-80, 87, 91-92, 101, 112, 137, 157; cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 108, and Desjardins and Canestrini, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III, 319-28, letters of Cosimo I de' Medici dated in August, 1552. Cosimo had just made and treacherously broken a treaty with Henry II, who regarded him as a "traître et marchand de foi" (Eletto Palandri, *Les Négociations politiques et religieuses entre la Toscane et la France à l'époque de Cosme I<sup>er</sup> et de Catherine de Médicis* . . . Paris, 1908, pp. 74-79).

<sup>107</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-13, nos. 42, 45-46, 50, 55, 65, 69, pp. 79-80, 87, 91-92, 101, 112, 137, 157; cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 108, and Desjardins and Canestrini, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III, 319-28, letters of Cosimo I de' Medici dated in August, 1552. Cosimo had just made and treacherously broken a treaty with Henry II, who regarded him as a "traître et marchand de foi" (Eletto Palandri, *Les Négociations politiques et religieuses entre la Toscane et la France à l'époque de Cosme I<sup>er</sup> et de Catherine de Médicis* . . . Paris, 1908, pp. 74-79).

<sup>108</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-13, no. 55, pp. 112-13, letter of del Monte to Camaianni dated at Rome on 13 September, 1552. On the Turks and Orbetello, note Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena*, IV (1760), 18-20, 63.



was all for attacking Orbetello.<sup>109</sup> As Cardinal del Monte wrote Camaiani, the nuncio to the imperial court (then at Speyer), the Siense in the excitement of their so-called liberty were closing their eyes to their servitude to France, which was increasing with each passing hour. Cardinal Ippolito d' Este had gone to Siena on 31 October (1552) to represent the French king.<sup>110</sup> He and Paul de Termes would only be removed from the city by force. In December the cardinal was informed that Charles V had ordered the massing of horse and foot in the kingdom of Naples "per venire ai danni della città di Siena e del suo dominio." The fortifications of Siena were strengthened, especially in the area of the Porta Camollia.<sup>111</sup>

The author of an early life of Don Pedro de Toledo, viceroy of Naples (1532-1553), says the Siense had taken advantage of the fact that the Turkish armada was on the very shores of Rome, *che era sulle piagge romane l'armata turchesca*.<sup>112</sup> And, as a matter of sober fact, we have already seen that on 15 July (1552) the Turkish armada was "in sight of Naples." On the twenty-third it was off the island of Procida, and by the end of the first week of August it had Gaeta under siege. The Siense had chosen well the hour to strike. Also Don Pedro was not a well man. He suffered constantly from "catarro e febbre," especially in the winter. Nevertheless, at the emperor's orders or at least with his permission, Don Pedro was

preparing to move against Siena. He made one son, García, his lieutenant-commander of (it is said) the 12,000 Spanish, Italian, and German troops being readied for the northward march. Another son, Luis, replaced his father in the government of Naples. García de Toledo went through the states of the Church—*passò per le terre di Santa Chiesa pacificamente*—very peacefully, indeed, because the worried Julius III gave his permission.

Turks and French and Spanish all together were too much for poor Julius, who was also beset with another attack of gout. According to the papal master of ceremonies, Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, called Firmanus, the pope received Don García on 15 January. In the meantime the viceroy himself, despite his illness, had loaded some two thousand Spanish troops aboard thirty galleys, and sailed for Gaeta, where he spent three days. He then went on to Civitavecchia. Here he was held up by a storm, which increased his "catarrh" but, with the return of a calm sea, he continued to Livorno, at which point the Spanish soldiery disembarked. The viceroy sent them on to the area of Siena, where García, "without losing any time, had taken many castles." Don Pedro, however, could not join the siege of Siena, *sforzato dal catarro e dalla febbre*. He went to Pisa, and thence to Florence, where his son-in-law Cosimo I received him with sumptuous hospitality, and agreed to help him reduce Siena in one way or another.<sup>113</sup>

In anticipation of the imperialists' passage through papal territory, the pope's right-hand man Camillo Orsini had been strengthening the fortifications of the Borgo. Tension was growing

<sup>109</sup> Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 102, a letter dated at Rome on 4 October, 1552.

<sup>110</sup> Lutz, *Nuntiaturreichte*, I-13, no. 69, p. 156, letter of del Monte to Camaiani dated at Rome on 2 November, 1552, according to which Cardinal d' Este had come to Siena "hier l'altro" (31 October); cf. Sozzini, *Diario*, p. 92, who puts his arrival on 1 November.

<sup>111</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 92-93.

<sup>112</sup> Scipione Miccio, *Vita di Don Pietro di Toledo*, ed. Francesco Palermo, *Narrazioni e documenti sulla storia del regno di Napoli dall'anno 1522 al 1667*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, IX (1846), 82. Miccio's life of Don Pedro was dedicated on 10 June, 1600, to Don Hernando de Castro, then Philip III's viceroy of Naples. Palermo's edition has an appendix of documents.

On the resources of the kingdom of Naples during the first half of the sixteenth century, see in general Giuseppe Coniglio, *Il Regno di Napoli al tempo di Carlo V: Amministrazione e vita economico-sociale*, Naples, 1951, esp. pp. 104 ff., 179 ff., and note Giuseppe Galasso, "Momenti e problemi di storia napoletana nell'età di Carlo V," *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, new ser., XLI (LXXX, 1961-62), 47-110. From the sixth decade of the century, especially the years 1554-1557, the Neapolitan kingdom had to bear especially heavy taxes and tolls, including export duties on saffron, oil, wine, soap, silk, and other things "for the needs of the court and to provide the fortresses of the kingdom with artillery and munitions" (Galasso, *op. cit.*, pp. 88 ff.).

<sup>113</sup> Miccio, *Vita di Don Pietro di Toledo*, pp. 82-85; Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 93-95; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Seb. Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II (1911), 499-500, entry for 15 January, 1553: "Illusterrimus Don Garzia a Toletio applicuit Urben ad osculandum pedes papae, comitatus a 400 nobilibus catafractis ex regno Neapolitano." According to Sozzini, Henry II had sent immediate help to Siena for defense against the coming siege. Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 110. Pedro de Toledo died in Florence. Cosimo I de' Medici had married his daughter Eleonora.

On the imperialists' depredation of the area south of Siena, see Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 96 ff. They took the largely abandoned "city" of Pienza, Pius II's hometown, on 26-27 February, 1553 (Siense site 1552), where "messero a sacco quelle robe che vi erano restate, che furno assai, ma non vi trovorno vino, perchè l'avevano versato" (*ibid.*, p. 100)—the wine of Montepulciano-Pienza was the "king of wines." According to Cosimo I, the Siense were well supplied with grain, wine, and even salt meat, but they had little oil; for conditions in the city, see his letter of 19 February (1553) to Pierfilippo Pandolfini, in Desjardins and Caestrini, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III, 333-36.

in the Curia. The Siense intercepted a letter addressed to Don Pedro de Toledo in March (1553), and turned it over to the pope, causing for whatever reason an unpleasant break between his Holiness and Don Pedro's brother, Juan Álvarez de Toledo, the cardinal of Burgos.<sup>114</sup> Abiding by his determination to remain neutral in the war of Siena, Julius III had been trying for months to make some kind of peace between Charles V and Henry II. As Diego Lasso had written King Ferdinand from Rome (on 24 September, 1552), his Holiness was fearful of the consequences of the unceasing wars and disturbances which had opened up Italy and Hungary to Turkish attack. He was thinking of sending legates to the French and imperial courts to seek peace.<sup>115</sup>

Nevertheless, it was not until 3 April (1553) that two legates were finally chosen in the consistory—Girolamo Dandino, known from his bishopric as the cardinal of Imola, and Girolamo Capodiferro, known from his titular church as the cardinal of S. Giorgio. Dandino was to go to the emperor, Capodiferro to the king of France.<sup>116</sup> In mid-April the pope notified various princes of the two forthcoming legations writing, for example, to Ercole II d'Este that Dandino would explain how great the papal desire was to see peace in Europe and an accord between Charles V and Henry II. If Ercole had any suggestions which might prove helpful to Dandino's mission, Julius asked him to give them to the legate.<sup>117</sup> Dandino left Rome in

state on 14 April to begin the long journey to Flanders, for Charles was then in Brussels.<sup>118</sup> Capodiferro took his departure on the sixteenth, met Dandino in Ferrara on the twenty-fourth, and went his way to Paris, where he was accorded a ceremonial welcome on 15 May, the same day that Dandino arrived in Brussels.

In league with Maurice of Saxony and certain other German princes, Henry II had taken Metz, Toul, and Verdun (in 1552). Although Charles had failed in a costly effort to recover Metz, he now held Théroouanne, just south of S. Omer, under siege. He was not ready to subscribe to the papal appeal for peace which Dandino had brought him. Théroouanne fell after a lengthy siege, and was almost wholly destroyed. Its historical importance was ended, and its bishopric was transferred to S. Omer. Charles told Dandino that negotiations with the king of France were useless, for like his father before him Henry was untrustworthy. While allegedly at peace Henry had invited Charles's own subjects to rebellion. He had summoned the Turks to his aid, this so-called "rex Christianissimus." The imperialists took Hesdin (on 18 July, 1553), and destroyed the town.<sup>119</sup> Charles's successes at Théroouanne and Hesdin increased his resolve to continue the war, as Pieper says, without lessening Henry's bellicosity. The latter received Capodiferro at S. Germain, but the legate was no more successful than his confrère in Brussels.

Dandino urged the pope to withdraw from these futile efforts to make peace between such

<sup>114</sup> Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 109, p. 121.

<sup>115</sup> Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, II, no. 1765, pp. 766-67: "... el consistorio pasado propuso su Santidad como ya se veyá las guerras y turbaciones en que estava la Christianidad, por la qual causa la Christianidad recebia inevitables daños de los Turcos, como este año se avia visto, así por mar en estas partes como por tierra en cosas de Ungría, y que le parecía mas que necesario poner en ello remedio, embiando legados para tratar la paz con el emperador y el rey de Francia o enbiar a pedirlos que ellos enbien personas que aquí con su Santidad traten dello—los votos y determinación desto se queda para otro consistorio." Cf. *ibid.*, nos. 1783, 1800, letters of Lasso to Ferdinand dated at Rome on 8 and 23 October, 1552, and Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1552, no. 44, who cites the Acta Consistorialia for 11 July (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscelanea, Reg. 33, fol. 120, by mod. stamped enumeration), on the Turkish fleet in the Tyrrenian Sea.

<sup>116</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 500, entry for 3 April; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1553, nos. 19-21, 22-27; Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien* (1897), pp. 49-51; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 111; and especially Lutz, *Nuntiaturberech.*, I-13, no. 92, pp. 229-32.

<sup>117</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Cart. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Busta 1299/14, no. 28, brief dated 12 April, 1553: "Ex dilecto filio nostro Hieronymo tituli Sancti Mathae Sanctae Ro-

mae Ecclesiae Cardinale Imolense nuncupato legato ad Caesarem de pace nostro nobilitas tua intelliget quantum nostrum sit pacis et concordiae inter ipsum Serenissimum Caesarem et Henricum Francorum regem Christianissimum conciliandae necnon quietis et tranquillitatis publicae constituendae desiderium et studium. Et nos cum istac transiurus esset, has ad nobilitatem tuam dare litteras voluimus quibus eam hortamur ut si qua illi pro sua prudentia venient in mentem ad hoc ipsum, quod molimur, publicum bonum pertinetia, ea cum illo communicet. . . Datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anno piscatoris die XII Aprilis MDLIII, pontificatus nostri anno quarto."

<sup>118</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 500. Andreas Masius traveled to Brussels in Dandino's suite (Lossen, *Briefe*, no. 110, pp. 122-24, an interesting letter from Brussels, dated 28 May, 1553).

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 264-65, 268-69, on the French loss of Théroouanne and Hesdin; Desjardins and Canestrini, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III, 330-31. Orazio Farnese was killed at Hesdin on 16 July (1553), on which note Cardinal Reginald Pole's letters to Orazio's brothers, Cardinals Alessandro and Ranuccio Farnese, in Rawdon Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers . . . Venice, V* (London, 1873), nos. 761-62, p. 379.

determined combatants. The dignity of the Holy See was at stake. Negotiations continued for another two months, however, and when Charles was pressed to state the terms under which he might accept peace, he demanded the return of every place the French had occupied since the beginning of the war, the withdrawal of their protection from Parma, and an end to their interference in Siena. He also demanded an end to their meddling in the affairs of the empire and compensation for the damage thus far done him. When Capodiferro presented the emperor's terms to Henry, he was abruptly dismissed. By a brief of 8 September (1553) the pope ordered the legates to come back to Rome, and in early October, they both began their return journeys to the Curia.<sup>120</sup>

In the meantime Edward VI had died in England. His sister Mary ascended the throne, and on 6 August (1553) the pope had appointed Cardinal Reginald Pole to the English legation, instructing him also to resume negotiations for peace between Charles and Henry, adding to the legation "la legatione della pace." Pole's return to England was delayed for a year, however, for various reasons, and his attempts to make peace were no more fruitful than those of Dandino and Capodiferro.<sup>121</sup>

Despite their ravages in the Val di Chiana and

the Val d' Orcia, the emperor's troops were no more successful in recovering Siena than the pope's legates were in making peace. Julius III had been leaving no stone unturned in the effort to find a way to end the war. Before the departure of the legates for the French and imperial courts he had sent Federigo Fantuccio to Siena, where the revolutionary authorities had referred him (on 4 April, 1553) to Paul de Termes and the cardinal of Ferrara, the "padri e protettori" of the republic. Fantuccio is alleged to have said that the pope had received imperial assurance (*commissione*) that the citizens of Siena could recover their old-time liberty, under the authority of the emperor, who would order the immediate withdrawal of his army from Siennese territory and restore the lands which had been taken from them. His imperial Majesty would not now or ever infringe upon that liberty, but would defend it against an aggressor. As reported by Sozzini, the imperial "commissione" is rather vague, but obviously the French would also have to leave the city "nella sua pristina libertà." Fantuccio urged in the pope's name acceptance of the emperor's offer. Solemnly deferring their answer to the following day, de Termes and the cardinal said they could not do the pope's bidding. The decision lay with the king of France, whose own honor was bound up with the protection of Siena.<sup>122</sup>

At the feast of Corpus Christi (1 June) the pope created Guidobaldo II della Rovere, duke of Ur-

<sup>120</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1553, nos. 29-31. A text of Charles's demands (misdated 1554) is given in Molini, *Documenti di storia italiana*, II, 449-51.

<sup>121</sup> Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien*, pp. 52-58; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 111-13. Chas. Weiss, *Papiers d' état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV (Paris, 1843), 70-71, gives Julius III's bull appointing Pole *legatus de latere* to England, with the date 5 August, 1553, *nonas Augusti*. Note also Pole's letters as summarized by Rawdon Brown, *Calendar of State Papers . . . Venice*, v, esp. nos. 764 ff., pp. 383 ff.

On 1 March, 1554, the Venetian Senate proposed to write Domenico Trevisan, the bailie in Istanbul (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 5): "Ch' era giunto in Bruxelles il reverendissimo Cardinal Polo, il qual va in Anglia a quella serenissima Regina [Mary], che li è stretto parente, ha habuto audientia da soa Cesarea Maestà, et se diceva che per nome del pontefice li ha proposto condition di pace con il re Christianissimo," and *cf. ibid.*, fol. 6, to the effect that on 7 March the Senate decided to omit this information in their letter to the bailie by a vote *de parte* 99, *de non* 3, *non sinceri* 7.

Edward VI had died on 6 July (1553). On the negotiations for the marriage of his half sister Mary with Philip of Spain, note Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 183, 188', 189-190', docs. dated from 21 December, 1553, to 8 February, 1554, and *cf. ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 4'-6', 27', relating to the uprisings of dissidents in Cornwall and Kent. "desiderando per suo re uno del regno et non forestiero," and note fols. 68 ff., "circa la conclusione fatta in quel magnifico Parlamento di ritornar all' obedientia della Sede Apostolica et riunire quella chiesa colla Romana et universale con così grande consenso. . . ."

On Edward VI, Mary, and Pole, *cf.* the papal letters in Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1553, nos. 1-16, 33, and note J. D. Mackie, *The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558*, Oxford, 1952, pp. 547 ff. On the uprisings in England, see Pole's letter to Cardinal Innocenzo (not to Cristoforo) del Monte, in *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, v, no. 851, p. 457, and on the difficulties which Pole faced throughout the year before his return to his homeland as legate, Charles V's interference with Pole's legation, Queen Mary's marriage to Philip [II], and the restoration of the English obedience to Rome, see esp. Dom René Ansel, O.S.B., "La Réconciliation de l' Angleterre avec le Saint-Siège sous Marie Tudor," *Revue d' histoire ecclésiastique*, X (1909), 521-36, 744-98. Actually Mary's marriage to Philip worked to the disadvantage of the Church, for the English quickly came to associate Roman Catholicism with Spanish domination.

Incidentally, the letter of Reginald Pole *al Cardinale de Monte*, in the *Bibl. Nazionale Marciana*, Cl. X, Cod. XXIV (6,527), fols. 78'-80', dated at Brussels on 5 February, 1554, was written (like all the other letters so addressed in this volume) to Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte, Julius III's so-called secretary of state, not to Cardinal Cristoforo, as stated by Rawdon Brown in the *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, v, no. 851, *et alibi*.

<sup>122</sup> Sozzini, *Diaria*, pp. 112-13, and append., no. XVI, pp. 458-59; on Julius's further attempts to arrange an armistice, see *ibid.*, pp. 133, 134, 135, 136-37; and on Fantuccio's mission to Siena, note Julius's letter of 29 March, 1553, to Cosimo I of Florence, in Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1553, no. 17.

bino, captain-general of the Church, bestowing upon him the *benedicta vexilla* in an appropriate ceremony.<sup>123</sup> Six days later (on 7 June) de Termes received a letter or letters "come l' armata Turchesca, con il principe di Salerno, era passata il faro di Messina, e veniva gagliarda alla volta di Regno:" the Turkish armada, with a French naval force under the anti-imperialist prince Ferrante di Sanseverino, had passed the lighthouse at Messina, and was heading boldly for Naples. Delighted by the news, de Termes gave the courier who had brought the letter fifty gold ducats, and hurried off to confer with Cardinal d' Este.<sup>124</sup>

De Termes' "buona nuova" was bad news to the Curia. On 8 June (1553) word came to Siena that Julius III was on his way to Viterbo, where he desired Cardinal Ippolito d' Este to meet with him. The pope implored Ippolito to come, and sent him a safe-conduct. On the ninth the cardinal consulted the revolutionary—or rather the republican—government of Siena at some length. "At his request," says Sozzini,

there were assigned to him four gentlemen of judgment, who were to go with him to negotiate the accord with his Holiness in the name of his imperial Majesty, in the event he should really decide to go.

Among the four *gentiluomini di giudizio* was Enea Piccolomini. Almost daily there were bloody skirmishes in the rolling hills around Siena and executions of alleged traitors in the piazze and cortili of the city. Sozzini obligingly gives us the names of those who were hanged, beheaded, or otherwise done away with.

Cardinal d' Este left Siena on 12 June

with all his court and carriages, and of the four deputies he took only the lord Enea, and they went off toward Viterbo, whither his Holiness, Pope Julius III, had come—that evening they were lodged at Monte S. Savino in the house of the lord Balduino, the nephew [brother?] of his Holiness.

The other three deputies or "ambassadors" left for Viterbo the following day, accompanied by a "conciliator" and a notary. It was generally believed that an accord might be made.

Suddenly, however, and unexpectedly on the morning of 15 June from the walls of Siena one could see, twenty miles to the southeast, vast clouds of smoke (*grandissimi fumi*) issuing from the imperialist encampment at Montalcino. Were Gar-

cía de Toledo's soldiers burning their barracks? Scouting parties were sent out from Siena to investigate. At Lucignano d' Arbia, a few miles southeast of Siena, they met an unnamed emissary, "who was coming to inform the city that the [imperialist] army, that morning at dawn, had marched off [westward] toward the Chianas to go over the bridge at Buterone." From the "Chianas" they would take the main road southward toward Rome and thence to Naples. Upon receiving this good news, as Sozzini tells us, the French soldiers in the scouting parties turned back, "and entered Siena with the greatest joy."

As soon as García de Toledo's army had left Montalcino, the elated inhabitants of the place mounted the walls with frying-pans and kettles, wash-basins and anything else that would make a racket. Men as well as women and children indulged to the full the Italian love of noise—and freedom—for although the imperialists had battered the walls of Montalcino (especially on Easter Sunday), they had never attempted a general assault. When the happy news of the withdrawal of the imperialist army from the Senese had been verified, "men were immediately sent off posthaste to the cardinal of Ferrara and to the four ambassadors who had gone to Viterbo to conclude the accord, advising them to do nothing, for the army was gone."

The Senese wondered whether a miracle had occurred. Rumors were quickly circulating in the city. Sozzini confines his attention to two of them: firstly, that Charles V "had passed from this to the other life," news of his illness having come a few weeks before;

secondly, and in my opinion this seems more likely, and was [generally] believed, that the Turkish armada, along with the prince of Salerno, had arrived at Naples, for which reason it became necessary [for the enemy] to avail himself of the cavalry around Montalcino, and because without the cavalry the army would not be able to defend itself, he was compelled to take away the infantry too.<sup>125</sup>

Although the Turks' naval venture into western waters in 1553 was on a smaller scale than it had been during the two previous years, they seemed—so far at least—to be as useful to the French at Siena as they had been at Parma.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 139, 141, 142–43, and on the imperialists' shelling Montalcino at Easter, *ibid.*, p. 111.

<sup>126</sup> On the co-operation of the French and Turkish fleets, see G. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II (1666), 440–55; Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 259–63, 271 ff.; Arch. di Stato di

<sup>123</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 500–1.

<sup>124</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 138–39.

Cardinal Ippolito d' Este and the four ambassadors, who had gone to Viterbo "to conclude the accord," returned to Siena on 23 June (1553). When the news of the imperialist army's abandonment of the so-called siege of Siena had reached Viterbo, Ippolito and the four representatives of the republic had merely "kissed the foot of his Holiness and come back."<sup>127</sup> The entries in Sozzini's diary now become sparser and less exciting, but on 8 August he notes that definite news had come to Siena of "how the Turkish armada had arrived at our ports, and there were 130 sail." On 10 August Paul de Termes, eager to see the prince of Salerno, hastened from Siena, and went to Port' Ercole, near Orbetello on the coast, at the foot of the island-mountain of Argentario. The old road still runs south to Grosseto and thence to Orbetello. A number of young gentlemen went along with de Termes, "to keep him company, to see the armada, and to go on an outing" (*per fargli compagnia, per veder l' armata, e per andare a spasso*). On the fourteenth, however, the now-famous Sansaverino, prince of Salerno, rode into Siena, having missed de Termes along the way. He dismounted at Cardinal Ippolito's palace, and was later presented by the republic with a suitable gift. Sansaverino left Siena on the seventeenth, attended by a dozen companies of foot.<sup>128</sup>

The Senese now knew three quiet months—*non occorre cosa degna d' esser notata*—and there are no entries in Sozzini's diary from late September (1553) to early January (1554). Trouble lay ahead. Pietro Strozzi, the Florentine exile and archenemy of Cosimo I de' Medici, arrived in Siena on 2 January, with letters patent from Henry II appointing him "viceroy and general in Italy in all the wars to be waged on behalf of his most Christian Majesty." Most of the Senese rejoiced in his coming. He was lodged in Ambrogio Spannocchi's palace beside the customhouse. The older and wiser heads, however, nodded in sad agreement that now Duke Cosimo would not keep the shaky "confederation" he had with them, because one article in the convention stated explicitly "che la città di Siena non dovesse ricettare nè favorire alcuni delli suoi ribelli e nemici." Strozzi was a rebel and an

enemy. Cosimo had not, to be sure, moved against Siena, and neither had the emperor's army been able to do the city much damage, but the wisecracks were worried. Since Siena was an imperial city, at least in the emperor's opinion, if and when Cosimo attacked the city or put it under siege, it would certainly be as an imperial lieutenant that he would do so.

Pietro Strozzi rode out of the city on 18 January to make the rounds of the countryside and to decide what lands were to be fortified and held. Enea Piccolomini went with him. Strozzi was attended by the various detachments of French cavalry stationed throughout the strongholds and villages of the Senese. When Strozzi left Siena, the trouble came.<sup>129</sup>

On Friday, 26 January (1554), which Sozzini mistakenly calls a Saturday, the woolworkers in Siena waited in vain for the delivery from Florence of the yarn with which to dress their looms. Sozzini himself had expected more than seventy *lire* worth. He did not get an ounce. It had been known for some days that Cosimo de' Medici had assembled a large force which had moved up to the confines of the Senese, causing obvious apprehension. As evening came on, it seemed clear that Cosimo was going to make a drive toward Siena that night with all the horse and foot he had massed along the border. Pietro Strozzi was still absent. Cardinal Ippolito was consulted, but he informed the republican government that Cosimo had given his word there would be no attack upon Siena during February, and Ippolito had so notified the king of France. Not wanting to hear the matter argued, says Sozzini, the cardinal returned to his palace. About 7:00 P.M. (*alle 2 ore di notte*) word was spreading abroad that the Florentine army was coming. When Claudio Zuccantini, one of the most prominent of the revolutionaries, went to appeal to the cardinal, he was thrown into prison. The Senese leaders became gravely concerned. The cardinal should be taking action.

At 8:00 P.M. there came confirmation of the fact Cosimo's troops had crossed the border, and

Venezia, Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 151-52, 172'-173', 176'; Reg. 69, fol. 129', docs. dated from 19 August, 1553, and thereafter; also see Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena*, IV, 86-87, 101, and Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena (1552-1559)*, Siena, 1962, pp. 142-45, 166-69.

<sup>127</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, p. 148.

<sup>128</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 155-56; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 95-96.

<sup>129</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 157-58; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 103 ff., 109 ff. Pietro Strozzi was the son of Filippo and Clarice de' Medici, and a cousin of Catherine de' Medici, queen of France (Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 16-18). Note in general Serristori's reports to Cosimo from Siena on 11 and 23 December, 1553, in Canestrini, *Legazioni di Averardo Serristori . . .* (1853), pp. 324-29, and cf. Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 156-61, 178 ff., who says (note 110) that Sozzini's date of 7 January (1554) for Strozzi's arrival in Siena is a copyist's error. He entered the city on 2 January.

were entering the Senese. Scouts were sent out. Alarms were sounded throughout the city. The citizens stood guard on the walls and at the gates. Fearing possible treachery within the city, the cardinal forbade a sortie without the walls. At 11:00 P.M. the entire citizenry responded to the call to arms as the great bell sounded in the Torre di Piazza. Since there were only six companies of soldiers in Siena, it was not possible to defend both the city and the fortified "outposts" (*forti*) beyond the walls. The outposts were left unguarded.

At midnight the enemy arrived, and occupied the so-called forts outside the Porta Camollia (at the northern end of the city), where they also seized the hospital of S. Croce, the oratory of S. Sepolero, and the Osteria del Sole—all outside the walls near the Porta Camollia. There were said to be 6,000 Italian foot, 500 Spanish, and 200 horse. Early in the morning of the twenty-seventh the Senese mounted artillery atop the citadel to shoot at the Florentine mercenaries in the "forti." There were sorties now, and skirmishes; 300 Senese arquebusiers recovered S. Croce, S. Sepolero, and the Sole. More officers were appointed. The armed forces were reorganized. At midnight on 29 January, after three frightening days, the stalwart Pietro Strozzi came back into the city, having rounded up as many soldiers as he could. Sozzini's "second war" of Siena had begun in earnest.<sup>150</sup>

Day after day Sozzini recorded in his diary the horrors of a war fought without forbearance on either side. Enea Piccolomini was sent on a secret mission to Henry II (on 14 February, 1554), and for what other purpose than to ask for more help against the Florentines and the imperialists? On the eighteenth a Spanish soldier was drawn and quartered in the Florentine camp, his entrails being hung on a column in the meadow outside the Porta Camollia. His sole offense seems to have been his saying that if Giangiacomo de' Medici, the imperialist marquis of Marignano and Cosimo's commander in the renewed siege of Siena, "did not fight a good war with the Senese, the Spaniards would abandon him, and go back to

Spain." A week later (on 26 February) Alessandro Piccolomini, bishop of Pienza and Montalcino, set out for Rome as "oratore della repubblica a Papa Giulio III." His purpose was apparently to enlist the pope's sympathy for the efforts of the cardinal of Ferrara and Pietro Strozzi to defend Siena against the now unrelenting attacks of Cosimo de' Medici.<sup>151</sup> On 19 March there arrived in Siena one Nichetto,

a courier of his most Christian Majesty, with four horses loaded with money, and [he said] that he had not been able to go through Acquapendente, for the gates were closed, owing to the fact that Pope Julius III lay ill in peril of his life.<sup>152</sup>

Good Friday (the twenty-third) brought the Senese the joyous news that Ascanio della Corgna, the pope's imperialist nephew, had been captured at Chiusi. Ascanio was brought to Siena on the twenty-seventh, "blind in one eye," along with his brother-in-law Count Ercole della Penna. They dismounted at the customs-house, where a room had been prepared for them, adorned with beautiful hangings and equipped with curtained couches. Other prisoners of note were put in cellar rooms, with iron gratings, close to the street in the adjoining Palazzo Spannocchi.<sup>153</sup> It was something to be a pope's nephew.

It was also something to be a cardinal, especially of the Casa d' Este. Despite the widespread imperial domination, the high nobility still formed an interlocking directorate of Italian affairs. Thus on 8 March (1554), since Cardinal Ippolito rightly

<sup>151</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 171, 174, 176. Henry II promised men and money "for the security of the Senese and their state" (*ibid.*, p. 183, and cf. p. 217). Giangiacomo de' Medici was the brother of Cardinal Giannangelo (later Pius IV); they came from the Milanese, and were not related to the Florentine Medici.

<sup>152</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, p. 189.

<sup>153</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 192-94, 197-98; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 129-32. The Senese chose to regard the pope's nephew Ascanio as Henry II's prisoner (Sozzini, p. 210). On 3 May Ascanio made an unsuccessful effort to escape from his imprisonment (*ibid.*, pp. 222 ff.), and was sent for safer keeping to Port' Ercole (p. 228). Cf. Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 25 ff., 36. His imprisonment did not last unduly long, however, and at the pope's death some ten months later Ascanio was made *electus urbis* by the Sacred College until a new pope could be elected.

Ascanio had in fact been released by order of Henry II himself, to whom on 28 October, 1554, Julius III sent an effusive letter of thanks (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 8<sup>r</sup>-9<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration). On the same day Julius wrote also to Charles de Guise of Lorraine, cardinal priest of S. Caecilia, and to Anne de Montmorency, constable of France (*ibid.*, fols. 9-10<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>150</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 158-65; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 111-22; Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 185 ff. Like Sozzini, Pecci dates his narrative in the "Senese style," on which see below, note 134. Cosimo declared his purpose was to protect the independence of Siena against the French! Cf. Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 9 ff., 14-15, 19 ff. The Florentine ambassador in Rome, Averardo Serristori, had written Cosimo on 24 January, 1555, that conditions in Siena had become desperate (Desjardins and Canestrini, *Négociations diplomatiques*, III, 350).

suspected that a long siege lay ahead, he decided to send to Ferrara the greater part of his servitors (*paggi*) to reduce expenses. He also proposed to send home part of his "cortigiani e cavalli." To avoid their having to take a long, roundabout route, Ippolito secured a safe-conduct from his enemy Cosimo de' Medici (who did what he could to thwart Ippolito's papal ambitions a year later) so that his numerous retainers might pass unmolested through the very midst of the Florentine forces, which caused no little "ammirazione" in Siena.<sup>134</sup> Rightly or wrongly Ippolito became suspect to the Siense, and so Henry II wrote him to leave the city, return to Ferrara, and attend to some "other matters even more important" than the services he was rendering the French crown in Siena.<sup>135</sup>

Julius III sent Sebastiano Gualterio (Gualtieri), bishop of Viterbo, as nuncio to the French court in May (1554), always looking for ways to terminate the Siense war. It had cost Julius 150,000 scudi to improve the fortifications of Rome and various places in the states of the Church. He was paying Guidobaldo II della Rovere 30,000 scudi a year as captain-general of the Church. Trade and travel were being terribly disrupted in central Italy.<sup>136</sup> On 12 May Cosimo wrote Averardo Serristori, his ambassador at the Curia, that his purpose in the war of Siena was "to liberate that state from the oppression of the French," to restore its former independence, and thereby to preserve that of Florence. It grieved him to see the ruin of the countryside. Cosimo was writing to Serristori, "perchè siate alli piedi della Santità di Nostro Signore [the pope]:" being on hand at the Curia, Serristori could explain directly to his Holiness the noble purpose which Cosimo was pursuing. If depredation and death were the consequence of the war, the fault lay with the Siense, who were being deluded by the French.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 183-84. Incidentally, in dating the entries in his diary Sozzini employs—as the Siense usually did—the "stile dell' Incarnazione," i.e., he began the new year on 25 March.

<sup>135</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 226-27. Ippolito d' Este left Siena on 5 June, 1554 (*ibid.*, p. 239).

<sup>136</sup> Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 438, p. 465; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 114; and esp. Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten u. Nuntien*, pp. 176-81: ". . . Il danno che riceveva sua Beatitudine per questa guerra di Siena et di Corsica è infinito. Si spero al tempo del vicere 150 mila scudi per conservation di Roma et del stato ecclesiastico; fu condotto il duca di Urbino con spesa ordinaria di 30 mila scudi l' anno, il quale altramente non saria bisognato di condurre" (*ibid.*, p. 179).

<sup>137</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, *append.*, no. XVII, pp. 460-61, and *cf.* Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 14-15.

As reinforcements were on their way by land and sea to Siena to aid Pietro Strozzi in the defense of the city—Swiss, Gascon, German, and Italian mercenaries—Strozzi had even thought of a surprise attack upon Florence. He had left Siena secretly on 11 June (1554) and gone northward, crossing the Arno at Pontedera, to meet up at Lucca with the French troops who were moving south along the coast road. To enter the Fiorentino with any chance of success, he needed a much larger army than his opponent, the marquis of Marignano, could assemble on two or three days' notice. The Swiss and Gascons arrived in the Lucchese in good time, but Strozzi also needed the troops coming by sea. The possibility of a surprise attack had passed, however, well before the arrival of the French fleet. Toward the end of June Strozzi returned to the area around Siena, and on 8 July came the news "come era arrivata ai nostri porti l' armata del re Cristianissimo."

The Siense were much encouraged. Excitement was running high. Sozzini was jotting down the news every day. On 9 July (1554) word came "that the lord Pietro Strozzi had arrived at Montalcino with the army which he had in the Maremma [the swampy coastal area watered by the Ombrone], and with all the cavalry which he had left between Buonconvento and Torrenieri. . . ." The town of Buonconvento is fifteen miles southeast of Siena; Torrenieri is farther south; both are on the main road from Siena to Viterbo. Two days later Sozzini recorded the return of Enea Piccolomini, "who had gone as the ambassador of the republic to the court of the most Christian king, and had disembarked at our ports with the armada from Marseille and Algiers." Strozzi re-entered Siena on 12 July, and the French soldier Blaise de Monluc, brother of the diplomat Jean, probably accompanied him. Strozzi returned to Buonconvento that evening.

Since Monluc was in Siena a few days later, he presumably remained in the city. By now there were 6,000 infantry at Monte Antico (northeast of Grosseto), 4,000 Gascons and 2,000 German mercenaries, "quali erano venuti con l' armata del re." Henry II had kept his promise to send men and money to Siena. The French infantry filed into Siena in two divisions on 15 July, "ed era la più bella gente che fusse mai vista." The men were tall, handsome, well armed, and they had brought their women with them. Women camp followers formed a sort of brigade of nurses. They cared for the sick and wounded. As for Monluc, Sozzini first notes his presence in the city on 17 July. He calls him an "uomo del re, e di grande ingegno,

ed esperto nell' arme," and says that Strozzi left him to govern Siena as viceroy in his stead, providing him with 2,000 foot and a hundred horse "per guardia della città."<sup>138</sup>

Pietro Strozzi and the marquis of Marignano had been moving their troops back and forth long enough. The chess game was over; a clash of arms was next. It came on 2 August (1554) at Marciano in the Val di Chiana, east of Siena. Strozzi's forces were crushed. Badly wounded, he escaped to Lucignano, and then sought refuge in the anti-Medicean town of Montalcino, taking with him (according to Sozzini) 250,000 gold scudi. His losses in dead and wounded were decisive. Remnants of his forces, German and French, straggled back to Siena. The roads were full of frightened, beaten men, asking for something to drink and salt for their wounds. The Siensese gave them salt, bread, and wine, helping them as much as they could, "and I bear witness," says Sozzini, "that I saw more than a hundred men bracing themselves against a wall, moved to tears in pity for the poor soldiers brought to such calamity."<sup>139</sup> Unless Henry II now sent huge reinforcements (and he did not), Siena seemed almost certain again to fall under the domination of Charles V or under that of Cosimo de' Medici.

Throughout the fall and winter of 1554–1555 Julius III was harassed by the fear of war and depressed by the constant flow of cheerless news. On

25 October he wrote Ercole II d' Este of Ferrara, brother of the pro-French Cardinal Ippolito,

We do declare and assure your Excellency that if God does not allow another impediment to befall us as before, [and] we shall have some light and clarity as to the fact that the emperor does really and truly wish that an accord should be attempted, we shall more than willingly come to Perugia to confer with you, for we see no more likely and expeditious way to bring to the desired conclusion this sacred work [of peace], upon which depends the salvation or destruction of this beautiful part of Italy, as we have written to the . . . duke of Florence, also telling him that with the emperor in Flanders, the king in France, he at Florence, your Excellency at Ferrara, and we here in Rome, while the armies are face to face, we see neither how nor with whom, nor by whom, this accord can be negotiated and the difficulties cut down which will presumably arise in the effort to settle things.<sup>140</sup>

To the end of his days Julius did his best to make peace between Charles V and Henry II. Constant illness must have made him realize that the end of his days could not be far off. On 10 January (1555) we find him negotiating with Cosimo I of Florence, with whom he was at odds, and with Ercole II of Ferrara, trying to replace warfare with reason in the Siensese contest. Cosimo had written Julius, urging upon him acceptance of a proposed accord, and suggesting that he should be showing more alacrity in concluding the agreement than in disputing its terms. With a heavy sigh over the difficulty of negotiation "in tanta distantia d' i luoghi et delle persone," Julius agreed "per esoneratione della coscienza et per non mancare del debito d' un buon pontefice." In his letter (of 10 January) to Ercole, however, he enclosed a statement of "some points which have seemed to us more substantial, and the resolution of which, we think, can open the way to settle the other difficulties." He sent a similar statement to Cosimo, asking him to share it with Don Juan Manrique and Don Francisco de Toledo, the representatives of Charles V.

Julius wanted to assure the freedom and security of Siena. The opposing forces should both

<sup>138</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 244–45, 253–55, 258–59, 260–62, 265; Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 48 ff.; Paul Courteault, ed., *Blaise de Monluc, Commentaires*, Bruges, 1964, bk. III, pp. 256 ff., and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 1027 ff., the editor's notes; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 147 ff.; Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 244 ff., 283 ff., with notes at the end of each chapter.

<sup>139</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, II (1842), 270–72; Girolamo Roffia, *Racconti*, *ibid.*, pp. 573–82; *Notizie della vittoria riportata dagl' imperiali presso Marciano scritte da un anonimo (1554)*, *ibid.*, pp. 583–90; Blaise de Monluc [who was not present at Strozzi's defeat at Marciano, *estant malade d' une fièvre continue et d' une dysenterie*], *Commentaires*, ed. P. Courteault (1964), bk. III, pp. 263–66, 270–72. See also Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 94–115, detailed and well informed, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 171 ff.; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 160 ff.; Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 298 ff. There are texts of numerous letters concerning the war of Siena from early December, 1552, to the defeat of Pietro Strozzi on 2 August, 1554, in the *Arch. Segr. Vaticano*, *Lettere di principi*, vol. XIV, esp. fols. 27–53, 306 ff., by mod. stamped enumeration.

Various *avvisi* relating to the war of Siena may be found in the *Bibl. Apost. Vaticana*, *Cod. Urb. lat.* 1038, and on Strozzi's encounter with Marignano in the Val di Chiana see, *ibid.*, fols. 25–30. *Narazione della gran scaramuzza fatta tra l' illustre Signore Pietro Strozzi et l' illustre signor Marchese di Marignano, con il numero dell' colonelli, signori et capitani, luocotenenti, et altri fatti pregoni con il numero delle genti morte da piedi et da cavalli de l' una et l' altra parte*. . . text dated at Florence on 4 August, 1554, and cf. fols. 32 ff., 58–59, 66<sup>r</sup>, 67, 71 ff., 80 ff.

<sup>140</sup> *Arch. di Stato di Modena*, *Canc. ducale*, *Catt. di principi esteri*, Busta 1299/14, no. 30. The letter was written by Giulio Canano, who was named bishop of Adria in the northeast of Italy a month later (on 26 November, 1554, according to Van Gulick, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III [1923], 95), and on his nomination to the see, note the pope's letter to Francesco Venier, the doge of Venice, dated 8 December, 1554 (*Arch. Segr. Vaticano*, *Arm.* XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 18<sup>r</sup>–19<sup>r</sup>). Canano was the pope's secretary. His consecration in *episcopum Adriensem* took place at the Vatican on 30 December, 1554 (Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Canc. Trident.*, II, 505).



withdraw from the Senese, giving up the places which they then held. He offered 10,000 foot, then in Umbria, the Patrimony, and the March of Ancona, for the defense of Sienese liberty. The papal troops would join another 10,000 foot which the duke of Urbino could recruit from his own state and the Romagna.<sup>141</sup> Julius's proposal meant that while Charles V's troops would not re-enter Siena, at least Monluc and the French would have to leave. Cosimo, who as an agent of the emperor hoped ultimately to receive Siena, found it easy to restrain his enthusiasm for the pope's idea of how to end the war in Tuscany.

Always in search of peace, in early February (1555) Julius sent the learned jurist Antonio Agostino, auditor of the Rota, on yet another mission of peace to Charles. The ostensible reason for Agostino's going was to be the delivery of the golden rose to Queen Mary of England and the honorific sword and hat to her husband Philip [II] of Spain, Charles's only legitimate son. The papal brief for Philip and Mary is dated 27 January, Agostino's instructions on the thirty-first. The jurist was to remind Charles of the necessity of peace between him and Henry, for apart from the futile costs and destructiveness of war, peace would assist the return of England to the Church. And it was the only means of stopping the advance of the Turks by land and sea as well as of suppressing the spread of heresy in Germany. Julius was also sending Cardinal Giovanni Morone to the Reichstag at Augsburg. From the beginning of his pontificate he had been striving, he said, to effect the needed and desired reform in the Church. His efforts had been impeded, however, not only because of the taint of the times, but because of the conduct and attitude of worldly rulers. Agostino reached Brussels on 8 March; Charles received him on the fifteenth. He arrived in London with the rose for Mary and the sword and hat for Philip on 23 March (1555), the day of Julius III's death. Morone had arrived in Augsburg on 24 March, but the momentous news brought about his immediate departure for Rome. On 31 March he set out on the return journey with Otto von Truchsess, cardinal archbishop of Augsburg, hoping to take part in the conclave which was to elect Julius's successor.<sup>142</sup>

The freedom of Siena survived Julius III by less than a month. After Pietro Strozzi's defeat at

Marciano (on 2 August, 1554), Giangiacomo de' Medici, marquis of Marignano, had executed the Florentine exiles he had captured, and tightened the siege of Siena. On 4 August the Sienese gov-

1555, nos. 1-5; Brown, *Calendar of State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1 (1877), no. 37, p. 32; Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten u. Nuntien*, pp. 67-70. On the golden rose and the sword and hat, see Anna Hedwig Benna, "Zur kirchlichen Symbolik: Goldene Rose, Schwert und Hut," *Mitteilungen d. Österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, IV (Vienna, 1951), 54-62. When Mary and Philip inquired of Reginald Pole the significance of the papal gifts, they got a lecture on the rose, the sword, and the hat (*Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 66, p. 56).

Morone was named legate to Ferdinand on 7 January, 1555 (*Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Consistorialia*, in *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 33, fol. 180<sup>v</sup> by mod. stamped enumeration); he received the legate cross on 13 February (*ibid.*, fol. 183<sup>v</sup>; Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-70, note; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1555, nos. 3-4; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 505). Morone's safe-conduct, *proficiens in Germaniam*, is dated 17 February, 1555 (*Arm. XLIV*, tom. 4, fol. 40<sup>v</sup>), by mod. stamped enumeration, and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 41-44, letters relating to Morone's mission to Cardinals Madruzzo and von Truchsess; King Ferdinand; Duke Albrecht V of Bavaria; the archbishops of Mainz and Cologne; King Maximilian of Bohemia; Duke Augustus of Saxony; Friedrich, count palatine of the Rhine; and Joachim, margrave of Brandenburg). *Cf. also* Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV (1896), nos. 542, 548, 569, and esp. no. 592, pp. 629-30, on Morone's mission to Augsburg and his hasty departure.

Johann Visbroc (Vischbroek), Morone's secretary, wrote Andreas Masius a chatty letter from Augsburg on 31 March (1555), informing him of Morone's itinerary from Rome. The cardinal and his suite had been splendidly received and entertained all along the way—especially by Cosimo I in Florence, the citizens of Bologna, Ercole II d'Este of Ferrara, Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga in Mantua, and Cardinal Madruzzo in Trent—and they had reached Augsburg on 24 March. A few days later came word that Julius III was perilously ill, and two days thereafter the news of his death. Morone had left early that morning; Visbroc would follow about midday on 1 February. The prospect of a papal election and a new pontiff was indeed stirring but, as usual, the future was not without its dangers (M. Lossen, ed., *Briefe von Andreas Masius u. seinen Freunden* [1886], no. 159, pp. 197-98): ". . . Hodie bene mane abiit herus [Morone], adjunctis 10 aut 11 equitibus, crastino die circa meridiem ipse abibo. . . . Nos, id est mea turba, audacter pericula quaevis adimus, tantus est amor videndi sedem vacantem et novum pontificem. Hic est status rerum praesentium, praeteritarum, et futurarum. . . ."

On Julius's last illness and death, see esp. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 247-48, and the papal master of ceremonies, Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, pp. 505-6; ". . . Magister vero ceremoniarum fregit anulum piscatoris, illum accipiens e manibus illustrissimi camerarii [i.e., Guido Ascanio Sforza]. . . . Postea fregit bullas plumbi, quae prius et postea ostendebantur cardinalibus, qui diligenter respiciabant." *Cf. Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 9 (from the Archivum Consistoriale), fol. 363<sup>v</sup>: "Die Sabbati XXIII mensis Martii 1555 inter horam 19 vel 20 seu circa obit Julius Papa III in palatio Sancti Petri et aedibus suae solitae habitations." The obsequies began on 26 March (*ibid.*, fol. 365<sup>v</sup>). The same entries occur also in the *Acta Vicecancellarii*, Reg. 7, fols. 242<sup>v</sup>, 244<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>141</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Busta 1299/14, no. 31, letter of Julius III to Ercole II d'Este, dated 10 January, 1555.

<sup>142</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, *Arm. XLIV*, tom. 4, fols. 26<sup>v</sup>-35<sup>v</sup>, briefs dated 27 January, 1555; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann.

ernment created an emergency *magistrato* to clear the city of "all the useless mouths," and an edict was cried aloud throughout the streets that all refugees, *tanto contadini come forestieri*, must depart with their families under penalty of two lashes. On that day, therefore, Francesco Bandini de' Piccolomini, the archbishop, left the city "with his carriages, and with him many gentlemen, and he went to Crevole and thence to Montalcino," causing vociferous complaints, for many said that, as the spiritual head and as a Sieneese, he should never have left.<sup>143</sup>

As Strozzi languished, wounded, in Montalcino, attributing his defeat to treachery, the defense of Siena fell to the French soldier Blaise de Monluc, whose *Commentaires* is one of the literary classics of the century. Both Monluc and Sozzini tell almost incredible tales of the heroisms and the hardships of the siege, which lasted for almost nine months. According to the chivalric *courtoisie* of the times, Marignano sent Monluc choice foods and wine on Christmas eve, and then made a grand but unsuccessful assault upon the gates and walls.<sup>144</sup> Monluc was ill, but carried on week after week. He later recalled the siege quite rightly as lasting nine or ten months, after which he had had to yield to famine. From such a situation, he says, a soldier can draw no profit—only the historian can.<sup>145</sup>

As the men kept watch on the walls and fought, well-born women worked with picks and shovels, baskets and bundles of brushwood. Monluc's tribute to them is famous: "Il ne sera jamais, dames siennoises, que je n' immortalize vostre nom tant que le livre de Montalcino vivra—car, à la vérité, vous estes dignes d' immortelle louange, si jamais femmes le furent!"<sup>146</sup>

When Marignano decided that starvation within the walls would be more effective than assaults upon them, he left the Sieneese "in peace" until there should be no longer a crust of bread in the city. From mid-February there was not a drop of wine to be had. "We had eaten," says Monluc,

all the horses, donkeys, mules, cats, and rats in the city. Cats were selling for three or four écus, rats for one écu. . . . Neither the city nor we ever ate but once a day from the end of February to the twenty-second of April [1555]. . . .<sup>147</sup>

For miles around Siena the countryside was reduced to a wasteland. The infirm, the elderly, and the poor, both men and women—and children too—*le bocche disutili*, were expelled from the city several times. "I tell you that the roster of the 'useless mouths,'" says Monluc, "amounted to four thousand four hundred or more, which was the worst of all the pitiful and grievous things that I have seen or, in my opinion, shall ever see in time to come."<sup>148</sup> On one occasion two hundred and fifty children from six to ten years of age were taken from the Ospedale Grande, and led out of the city by the Porta Fontebranda. Falling into a detachment of the enemy, some of the children were killed, others fled back to the gate from which they had issued. Many of the women accompanying them were also killed. Lying on the ground outside the Porta Fontebranda, *a dove si fa l' anno il mercato de' porci*, they raised their voices in terrified shrieks and screams. Their lives undone, wounded and beaten, they would have made a Nero weep, "ed io averei pagati venticinque scudi a non gli aver visti, chè per tre giorni non possevo mangiare nè bere che pro' mi facesse." Sozzini would have paid twenty-five scudi to avoid the woeful sight, and he could hardly eat or drink for three days after it.<sup>149</sup>

There was no hope. The city was doomed. At the beginning of March (1555) the Sieneese Otto della Guerra sent Messer Ambrogio Nuti, with a safe-conduct from Giangiacomo di Marignano, on an embassy to Pietro Strozzi at Montalcino, to Marignano himself, to the French agents in Rome, and to Julius III. It was Nuti's second mission to Rome. He now explained the plight of the city to Strozzi, the pope, and the French. The cost of

On 3 April the papal nuncio in Venice appeared before the Collegio to read the official notification he had received from the Sacred College of the vacancy in S. Peter's see, and on the following day the Senate wrote the cardinals of the great grief which the pope's unexpected death had caused them (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 107-108, docs. dated 4 April, 1555).

<sup>143</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 274-75.

<sup>144</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault (1964), bk. III, pp. 281-90; Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 129, 143.

<sup>145</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, p. 302.

<sup>146</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, pp. 306-7.

<sup>147</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, pp. 327, 329. Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 379-80, entry for 5 March, 1555, lists the high prices for wine, oil, capons, hens, salted meat, cheese, pigeons, and eggs, "e di tutte queste cose non se ne trovava se non poche, e quelle di sogguantoni." Sozzini gives no prices for cats and rats. Cf. also Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 184.

<sup>148</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, pp. 317-18.

<sup>149</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 306-7, entry for 5 October, 1554, and see the request for a safe-conduct addressed to Marignano by Scipione Venturi, rector of the Spedale di S. Maria della Scala, on 3 October to take the children "in luogo dove possono più comodamente vivere" (Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, appendix, no. v, pp. 229-30).

food was sky-high; there was no money to pay the troops. The "Eight" asked that M. de Monluc, the royal governor of Siena, be empowered by the king's agents to negotiate directly with Marignano the end of the war. Nuti was back in Siena on 9 March, and on the following evening, a Sunday, he addressed the Council of Siena. In short order 519 councilors assembled to hear him. From Nuti's account it was clear, as Sozzini informs us,

that the pope was quite against us, having replied to our ambassador that he could in no wise help the city of Siena, nor did he know of a good way of being able to get the imperialists to reach an agreement, because he had tried to do so many times. The imperialists took a lofty view of things, and did not want the city of Siena except on terms of unconditional surrender. The said Messer Ambrogio, having seen that his Holiness was unwilling to help our city, sought his counsel on how the city should manage. His Holiness answered that for the present he could think of no other way than to see whether one could appease the agents of his imperial Majesty by throwing off restraint and signing and sending them a blank sheet, accepting in advance the accord which they would write on the sheet.<sup>150</sup>

Monluc strikes a harsher note in alluding to Ambrogio Nuti's audience with Julius III:

The Siense sent an envoy also to the pope, Pope Julius, who died two or three days later [he died a full two weeks after Nuti's return to Siena], from whom they got a wretched response, reproaching them for their obstinacy and [telling] them to submit to the duke of Florence and give him a blank check. He was a terrible pope! The duke [Cosimo] showed greater honesty and was more courteous, as a prince must do, who desires to attract and win the affection of a people.<sup>151</sup>

It is perhaps surprising that Julius III received Nuti at all. Angelo Massarelli begins his seventh (and last) diary with an account of the pope's last illness, which began on 12 February (1555). From the time of his election to the pontificate Julius's health had been uncertain, *cum podagra et chiragra persaepe laboraret*. For some days he had seemed to show improvement—during which period he had given Nuti an audience—but on 18 March he lapsed into a fever, and five days later he was

dead.<sup>152</sup> Monluc's dictum (*c'estoit un terrible pape*) reflects to some extent the anti-Julian feeling of the French which dated from the war of Parma.

The Turkish armada had played a part in the war of Siena as well as in that of Parma and, as we shall see, it was to return to Italian waters in the summer of 1555. The Turks had in fact been coming every year, and each time the French had joined them. Julius III had lost the war of Parma. He had remained neutral in that of Siena, but his reputation had suffered, as shown by Monluc's attack upon him in the *Commentaires* and by Ambrogio Nuti's report to the Siense Council. The Turks had also been active on land during his reign. Cardinal Martinuzzi had been murdered. The papal treasury was at a low ebb. The Sacred College was divided into Hapsburg and Valois factions. Julius had faced trials beyond his capacity to deal with them. In his way he had tried, but his way had proved inadequate. He died unpopular and unlamented.<sup>153</sup>

On 11 April (1555) the Siense Otto della Guerra chose four ambassadors to go to Florence "per stipular li capitoli fatti dell' accordo con sua Maestà cesarea."<sup>154</sup> According to Sozzini, on 18 April Monluc, Cornelio Bentivoglio, and other captains of the Siense defense foregathered at S. Lazzaro, a suburb of Siena, with Marignano and the imperialist colonels and captains. Marignano told them

that the Siense envoys would return within two days, that the accord had been concluded and drawn up in Florence, and that it was of such a sort that all the city would be quite content with it—and after the observance of the usual ceremonies held among the great, each one returned to his own residence.<sup>155</sup>

<sup>152</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 247-48.

<sup>153</sup> On the extent to which Julius was unlamented, especially in the Sacred College, note Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 252, entry for 6 April, 1555.

<sup>154</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, p. 415; cf. Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 228 ff. Other Siense envoys had already been sent to Marignano and Cosimo I (Sozzini, pp. 384, 386 ff., 406 ff.), and the latter, as the representative of Charles V, had made clear the terms "nel modo che voleva capitulare con la città a nome di sua Maestà cesarea, dalla quale disse aveva ampio e pieno mandato . . . , il tenor del quale non piacque molto" (p. 411), which had required further negotiation. Cf. Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, pp. 328 ff. Siense negotiations with Cosimo had been going on for two months (Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 370 ff., and see in general Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 394 ff.).

<sup>155</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, p. 419. Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, p. 330, says that the accord or "capitulation"

<sup>150</sup> Sozzini, *Diario*, pp. 383-84; cf. Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 1076-77, note 10; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 201 ff. On Ambrogio Nuti's two missions—to the Curia in Rome, Strozzi in Montalcino, and Cosimo I in Florence during February (1555) and then to Strozzi and Julius III in early March—see Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena*, pp. 383-88.

<sup>151</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, p. 330.

Monluc and his troops withdrew from the city on 21 April, with full military honors, and as he says, "Voylà la fin du siège."<sup>156</sup>

was brought to Siena on Monday, 15 April, and that on the sixteenth Marignano asked him to send to S. Lazzaro two gentlemen "en qui j' eusse fiancee." Monluc sent Bentivoglio and Jacques Prévost, sieur de Charry, but indicates that he did not go himself. Sozzini's diary was done on a day-to-day basis (with slight retouching later). Monluc wrote years after the events he describes, i.e., for the most part in 1570-1571. In any event since I think Monluc makes a better story of the sequel by not attending the colloquy at S. Lazzaro (*ibid.*, pp. 330-32) than might otherwise have been the case, I am not sure that Sozzini is inaccurate. However, Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 148-49, who also puts the colloquy on 18 April, says that Monluc had requested it, but apparently did not attend it.

<sup>156</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, bk. III, pp. 335-39; Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 232-35; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 258-59. The "Capitolazioni," drafted in the name of Charles V and providing for the reception of Siena under imperial protection, "lasciando la libertà e di nuovo concedendola alla città e repubblica [di Siena]," are dated 2 April, 1555, and were supposed to be accepted by the Siennese within eight days. All the citizens and residents of Siena were pardoned "except the rebels of the kingdoms and states of his Majesty [Charles V], as also of the Majesty of the most serene king of England [Philip II], and of the most illustrious and most excellent lord duke of Florence . . ." (Montalvo, *Guerra di Siena*, pp. 147-48). On the surrender of Siena, note also the briefs of Julius III's successor Marcellus II, dated 19 April, 1555, in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 50-51.

Sozzini, Montalvo, and Monluc all mention the generous availability of provisions after Monluc's departure from the city—"Le strade fuori della città venivano cariche di some di vettaglie, si dello stato del papa come fiorentino, la qual cosa rallegrava tutta la città . . ." (Montalvo, *op. cit.*, p. 149).

Cosimo de' Medici and Marignano had won the "second war of Siena," as agents of Charles V, who was determined to hold on to Siena, and granted it as an imperial fief to his son Philip II. For two years Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, now known as the cardinal of Burgos (d. 1566), ruled the city in complete violation of the "libertà" guaranteed by the Capitulations (Pecci, *Memorie storico-critiche*, IV, 272 ff.). Fearing to lose Cosimo de' Medici's support in Italy, however, on 3 July, 1557, Philip bestowed the city on him as a fief to be held of the Spanish monarchy: "Le obbligazioni e capitoli conchiusi e stipulati furono che si stabilisse perpetua lega e inviolabile confederazione tra il Re Filippo e il duca di Firenze, e con dichiarazione che il medesimo duca s' obbligava rendersi vassallo della monarchia di Spagna. . . ." Cosimo was also bound to assist, when necessary, in the defense of Naples and Milan (Pecci, *ibid.*, IV, 305 ff.). After the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (in 1559), by which the French gave up their Italian claims, Cosimo also acquired Montalcino, where undaunted patriots had for four years maintained their republic of Siena in exile (Pecci, IV, 318 ff.). Florence, Siena, etc., were on the road to becoming the Medicean grand duchy of Tuscany. On the end of the "republic" of Siena at Montalcino, cf. Cantagalli, *La Guerra di Siena (1552-1559)*, Siena, 1962, pp. 523-28, 557 ff., and note Leonardo Rombai, *I Medici e lo stato senese (1555-1609)*, storia e territorio, Rome, 1980.

While Julius III had fastened his attention upon the war of Siena, the Venetian government was looking toward Istanbul. Domenico Trevisan, the bailie on the Bosphorus, had written the Signoria on 3 April, 1554, that the redoubtable Dragut Reis was scheduled to sail for the Adriatic on 15 May with fifty-five galleys. The Senate was confident, however, that the Turkish armada would undertake no hostile move against Venetian shipping or against the islands of the Republic. Nevertheless, on 11 May they cautioned the provveditore of the Venetian fleet to remain on the alert. In the unlikely event of some aggressive action on the part of the Turks, he was to employ his experience and prudence to their best effect.<sup>157</sup>

For generations, whenever the Turks planned to send out a naval expedition, the Venetian ambassador in Rome had solemnly reminded the pope of the "great expense" to which his government was continually put to maintain a fleet on the Adriatic or the Aegean "for the protection of our state and for the benefit of all Christendom." The ambassador therefore usually requested "that [his Holiness] should be willing to grant us two tithes for the present year, to be collected from all the reverend clergy of our state." And this the ambassador was duly instructed to do on 5 July.<sup>158</sup> Although the Senate expected no attack by Dragut's armada, as they had informed the provveditore, some serious cause for irritation could be expected,<sup>159</sup> because one could never be certain of the Turks.

Trevisan had, to be sure, received full assurance at the Porte, and even from Rustem Pasha himself, of "good treatment for our ships, subjects, and possessions."<sup>160</sup> Nevertheless, caution remained

<sup>157</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 21'. The bailie's letter of 3 April had been received in Venice on 2 May (*ibid.*, fol. 26'). Dragut's name often appears as Drogut in the sources. Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 306, 309, 313-14, 316 ff.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 29'. In the spring of 1556 the Senate again wrote the Republic's ambassador in Rome, "Per gli avis delle lettere havute ultimamente da Constantinopoli . . . vedete la nova non solamente della preparazione che fa quest' anno il Signor Turco di grossa armata, ma della certa uscita sua da Constantinopoli," and so the inevitable request was made for "doe decime per l' anno presente da esser scosse da tutto il reverendo clero del stato nostro" (*ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 12'-13', doc. dated 18 April, 1556, and cf. fols. 13'-ff.). On this occasion, as often, the double tithe was granted.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 30, 78, 103 ff., 106.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 31', letter of the Senate dated 9 July, 1554, to the now two bailies in Istanbul, Trevisan and his successor-to-be, Antonio Erizzo, whose commission is dated 13 April (*ibid.*, fols. 14' ff.).

the Venetian order of the day. If things went smoothly, the double tithe would be useful for the following year. It was an era of inflation, and the resources of Venice were not what they had been a century before. As the Turkish armada got closer, being sighted in Ragusan waters on 17 July, an uneasiness pervaded the Rialto and the Piazza S. Marco. The Senate's demand for the double tithe became more insistent.<sup>161</sup>

The Turkish armada made its way through the Strait of Otranto, sacked and burned the castle town of Vieste on the east coast of the promontory of Gargano, and then came back across the Adriatic to the Turkish station of Valona (Vlorë) in Albania. It did no end of damage to Venetian shipping along the way. The Senate instructed the provveditore of their fleet to make a formal protest to Dragut Reis. In the meantime the loading of the mercantile galleys for Beirut and Alexandria, already overdue, was being delayed still further, for the shippers remembered all too well the Turkish seizure of the merchantman *Barbara*, "dalla qual molti sono romasi ruinati."<sup>162</sup> On 1

September the motion was made in the Senate, but not carried, "that by the authority of this Council . . . the present *muda* of the Alexandria and Beirut galleys should be entirely given up. . . ."<sup>163</sup> A week later (on 7 September), however, the Senate informed the bailie in Istanbul that the Beirut and Alexandria galleys were then on the verge of departure, *in ponto per partir*, for their long voyages to the Levant.<sup>164</sup>

The skippers of the galleys were to make every effort to avoid coming in sight of Dragut's armada. This proved indeed to be a wise precaution since, as the Senate later learned, Dragut lay in wait for them in the channel of Corfu. He had obviously planned to seize them if he could. The following January the Senate wrote Sultan Suleiman in protest against his captain's treacherous and predatory intentions.<sup>165</sup> Upon his return to the Bosphorus, Dragut received a warm welcome from Ahmed Pasha, who had become (as we have seen) the grand vizir. Obviously the Venetians had small hope of ever securing satisfaction for the losses Dragut had caused them.<sup>166</sup>

The Venetians found it hard to live with the Turks, but the continuance of their profitable Levantine trade depended upon their managing to do so. Every dispatch from Istanbul revealed a new problem. On 4 August, 1554, the bailie wrote that Ahmed Pasha wished to sell the Venetians grain, but everyone in the Senate remembered the Vallarea affair of almost twenty years before. Doing business with the pashas could too

One may find in the Arch. di Stato di Venezia a miscellany of letters of the Venetian bailies and ambassadors from Constantinople to the doge and Senate from 1484 to 1558 in a busta identified as *Secreta: Dispacii* (da) *Costantinopoli*, F. 1A. The busta contains some thirty letters of the secretary Giovanni Dario from the years 1484-1485, a score or so of Pietro Bembo from the same years, two of Antonio Ferro from the year 1487, two of the bailie Girolamo Marcello dated 3 and 18 June, 1492, and three of the ambassador and vicebailie Pietro Zen [he called himself Zen] dated 7 May, 1523, 1 August, 1526, and 2 October, 1527, as well as four letters from Alvise Gritti to his father, the Doge Andrea, all from the year 1525.

For the rest this important busta contains the dispatches of the bailies Domenico Trevisan and Antonio Erizzo (with whom we are here concerned), the ambassador Alvise Renier [Rhenier], and the bailie Antonio Barbarigo, covering in some detail, with extensive passages in cipher, the years from October, 1552 (but mostly from March, 1554) to February, 1558 (Ven. style 1557).

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 33<sup>v</sup>, 36<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>162</sup> Sen. *Secreta*, Reg. 69, fols. 36<sup>v</sup>-38<sup>r</sup>, letters of the Senate to the bailie in Istanbul, dated 11 and 16 August, 1554, and *cf.* Seripando, *De Tridentino Concilio Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 447, entry for July, 1554. On 12 August Dragut's fleet, having left Valona, passed by Corfu on the way to S. Maura and Preveza (*ibid.*, fol. 42<sup>r</sup>). On Venetian efforts to recover the men and goods seized aboard the *Barbara* by Sala Reis, see *ibid.*, fols. 80, 159<sup>v</sup>, 161, and Reg. 70, fol. 33<sup>v</sup>. The goods alone were said to have been worth more than 60,000 ducats (Reg. 69, fols. 85<sup>v</sup>, 101 ff.). We have already noted Sala's plundering of the *Barbara*.

Sala Beg (or "Reis") had been on his way to Algiers as the Turkish beylerbey. He died in Algiers shortly after the episode of the *Barbara*, which complicated the Venetian Senate's prob-

lem of securing "justice and the observance of the articles of peace which we have [with the Porte]" (Reg. 70, fol. 33<sup>v</sup>). Venice was trying to recover the losses of the *Barbara* from Sala's estate, to which of course his heirs objected.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 40: ". . . che per autorità di questo consiglio sii preso et deliberato che la presente muda delle galie di Alessandria et Baruto sii del tutto suspesa et tagliato l'incanto loro, tal che non habbiano a far più ditti viaggi come si non fossero stata incantate et deliruate, et quanto all' interesse che potessero pretendere li patroni che hanno tolto ditte galie, sii data libertà al collegio nostro di poter far quello che li parerà esser giusto et conveniente."

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 43<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 84<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 29 January, 1555 (Ven. style 1554): ". . . Essendo esso Dragut alla Preveza havendo habuto avviso dell' andar delle nostre galee di mercantia a Baruto et in Alessandria, hebbe volontà ferma di prenderle et per eseguiria venne con l' armata in canal di Corphu alla posta verso ponente, dove le espetò per alcuni giorni senza far alcun altro effetto, il che lo segno manifesto del mal animo suo, ma li capitanei delle nostre galeeze avvertiti che li aspettava con l' armata tenero il suo camino de fuori l' insula di Corphu, et andorono al suo viazo. . . ."

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 99<sup>v</sup> ff., 113<sup>v</sup>, 124<sup>r</sup>.

easily give rise to the most burdensome hardships. The Senate replied on 7 September that if the matter came up again, the bailie should explain that there were regularized procedures under which the Republic imported grain from Turkish territories. If Ahmed's agents did not broach the subject again, however, the bailie must let well enough alone, and not allude to it himself.<sup>167</sup>

While the Signoria was at peace (such as it was) with the Porte, the greatest trial of the Venetians was with the ubiquitous corsairs, with the Uskoks, and with the Martellosi. The Turkish conquests of Bosnia (in 1463) and of the Hercegovina (in 1483) had driven large numbers of South-Slavic Christians to seek refuge in the high fortress-town of Clissa (Klis), about five miles northeast of Venetian-held Spalato (Split). These refugees or Uskoks (from the Serbocroatian *uskočiti*, "to jump into") also settled in Segna (Senj, Germ. Zengg) on the Adriatic coast thirty miles southeast of Fiume (Rijeka) as well as in the region of Bencovazzo (Benkovac) in the saltflats and lowlands of Ravni Kotari. They were soon joined by other refugees from Novi in northwestern Croatia opposite the island of Veglia (Krk), from Otočac on the Gacka River, and from other Croatian towns and villages. We have already noted the Turkish seizure of Clissa in 1537, after which Segna became the main center of the Uskoks. Encouraged by Ferdinand I, the Uskoks made Segna, well protected by the surrounding mountains and forests, an Austrian "march" (*Mark*) against the Turks. Despite superficially cordial diplomatic exchanges between Vienna and Venice, there was no love lost between the Hapsburgs and the Venetians. The Martellosi were employed by the Porte to discourage Uskok penetration of Turkish territory, which was not very profitable anyhow, and the Uskoks turned to piracy. They preyed upon both Venetian and Turkish towns and merchants. Ferdinand and his successors tended to overlook their infractions of the peace. The Venetian documents are loaded with references to the continual attacks of corsairs, Uskoks, and Martellosi.<sup>168</sup>

Although the Uskoks were Christians, there was nothing surprising about their attacks upon Venetian shipping. One might have assumed, however, that Venetian relations with the Hospitallers would have been much better. Such was not the case. On 8 August, 1554, for example, the Hospitallers removed from a ship belonging to the Venetian noble Gianbattista Donado and his partners "sixteen persons—Turks, Moors, and Jews—subjects of the lord Turk, with their money and goods," which they confiscated for their own use. The result was that on 12 October the Senate voted the seizure of all Hospitaller property and revenues within the grasp of the Republic both on land and at sea. They were to be held until the Grand Master Claude de la Sengle (1553–1557) or the Convent at Malta set free the Turks, Moors, and Jews, and restored all their money and goods.<sup>169</sup> On 29 October the Senate wrote the bailie in Istanbul, outlining the steps they had taken and directing him to inform the Porte.<sup>170</sup>

Despite the Senate's oft-repeated expression of friendship and admiration for the Knights, relations between the Republic and the "Religion" had rarely been friendly. The Knights' dedication to unrelenting warfare with Islam included, as we have already seen, attacks upon Christian vessels carrying Moslem goods and merchants, while for obvious commercial reasons the Venetians always tried to maintain peace with the Porte. Also, for fear of offending the sultan and the pashas, the Venetians sometimes carried aboard their vessels Moslem merchants and Turkish subjects, with whom of course they did business. Hospitaller aggression had been especially irritating since 1552. The Venetians, therefore, felt fully justified in sequestrating the income which the Convent derived from the Veneto, knowing full well (as soon proved to be the case) that their action would not be well received at the Curia Romana.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 50<sup>v</sup>–51<sup>r</sup>, 66<sup>v</sup>–67<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 58.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 117, 119, 128, 133<sup>v</sup>–135<sup>v</sup>, 137<sup>v</sup>–138<sup>r</sup>, 144: When in 1536 Venice had similarly sequestrated the Hospitaller revenues because of piratical aggression, Paul III had not opposed the steps taken. The same thing had happened in 1552 under Julius III. In each case the Hospitallers had been obliged to come to terms. Every state had to preserve its dignity, protect its subjects, and meet its obligations. Venice was required by her "capitulation" with the Porte to treat Turkish subjects as her own when they traded in Venetian territory or were carried aboard Venetian vessels. The sequestrated funds were handled by the Camerlenghi di Comun. On the "controversia" between the Venetians and the Hospitallers, see also the brief of the new pope, Paul IV Carafa, to the Doge Fran-

<sup>167</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 43<sup>v</sup>. On the Venetian grain trade with the Turks, note, *ibid.*, Reg. 68, fol. 116<sup>v</sup>, doc. dated 22 April, 1553. Buying grain from the pashas, who had large estates, easily resulted in difficulties for Venice (*ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 139<sup>v</sup>, 147, docs. dated 30 August and 18 September, 1555, and *cf.* fols. 152<sup>v</sup>, 162).

<sup>168</sup> *Cf.* Sen. Secreta, Reg. 68, fols. 110, 118<sup>v</sup>, 130<sup>v</sup> ff.; Reg. 69, fols. 3<sup>v</sup>, 58<sup>v</sup>, 76<sup>v</sup>–77<sup>v</sup>, 82<sup>v</sup>–83<sup>v</sup>, 87<sup>v</sup>–88<sup>v</sup>, 95<sup>v</sup>, 116<sup>v</sup>, 170<sup>v</sup>–171<sup>v</sup>; and Reg. 70, fols. 59<sup>v</sup>, 92<sup>v</sup>–93<sup>v</sup>, 96<sup>v</sup>–97<sup>v</sup>, 98<sup>v</sup>, 100<sup>v</sup> ff., *et alibi*.

After almost two years of negotiations and bickering, the grand master finally agreed to the release of the prisoners and three-quarters of the goods which had been seized from the *Donada*. On 20 June, 1556, the Senate agreed to revoke the sequestration of the Hospitallers' revenues, provided the prisoners and goods were in fact released, and the investors in the *Donada* were agreeable to the terms.<sup>172</sup> The prisoners were released the following January, their goods restored or restitution made, and finally on 24 July, 1557, the Senate lifted the ban on the Hospitallers' access to their resources in the Veneto and elsewhere in Venetian territory.<sup>173</sup>

The Hospitallers and the Holy See were the Turks' most persistent enemies. The Holy See was the spiritual bastion of Christendom; the Hospitallers justified their existence and their wealth (to the extent they were wealthy) by fighting the so-called infidels. Both the Holy See and the Hospitallers felt, and indeed were, imperiled by the Turks' annual naval expeditions into the western Mediterranean and by their destructive attacks upon the south Italian and Sicilian coastlands. Ferdinand might find himself at war with the Turks in Hungary and Transylvania, Charles V in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy, but the Hapsburgs were usually ready to abide by any reasonable peace which the Turks would accept. Charles's health was failing. In 1555–1556 he would give his son and his brother the broad lands and many titles he had held for some forty years. He had had to use a large part of his resources against the French and the Lutherans. The past had been difficult. The future was uncertain. The Venetians felt the need of strengthening their defenses.

cresco Venier, dated 29 June, 1555, in Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 82–83'.

On 11 September, 1555, to placate the insistent Paul IV, the Senate voted to release the revenues of individual Knights, but to retain those of the Hospital until restitution had been made for the losses which the Knights' piracy had caused. The Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero was instructed to suggest to Paul IV "che soa Sanctità dia ordine alli agenti de ditta Religione che li schiavi et robbe tolte sopra la nave *Donada* che sono nelle mani sue siano liberate . . . acciochè si metta fine a questa materia" (Reg. 69, fol. 144'), but the affair still dragged on (*ibid.*, fol. 160', doc. dated 23 November, 1555, and *cf.* fol. 168').

Bernardo Navagero (Navagier) served as the Venetian ambassador in Rome until his replacement by Alvise Mocenigo, whose commission is dated 26 February, 1558 [Ven. style 1557] (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 144'–146').

<sup>172</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 18'.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 109'.

In a letter of 18 September, 1554, the Senate referred to a report which they had received from their ambassador to Ferdinand's court some six months before (of 6 March) concerning Sforza Pallavicini "et il valor et esperienza ch' egli ha nella professione militare." Although he had been in bad odor for the murder of George Martinuzzi, the ban was being lifted, and Pallavicini's reputation as a soldier recommended him to the Signoria. Venice wanted to hire him. The ambassador was, therefore, instructed to sound him out with the usual care and caution as to his conceivable willingness to enter the service of the Republic. The ambassador did so, and Pallavicini replied that although the idea appealed to him, he regarded the time as inopportune.<sup>174</sup> Fifteen months later the Senate repeated the offer (on 12 December, 1555), and finally in October, 1556, Pallavicini informed the ambassador that he was now ready to enter the employ of the Signoria. On 13 November the Senate indicated their agreement, subject to mutually satisfactory terms, and inquired of the ambassador the terms under which Pallavicini had been serving the king of the Romans.<sup>175</sup>

Pallavicini said that he had received 3,000 scudi a year from Ferdinand in time of peace and 4,800 in time of war. The Venetian rectors of Verona had been drawn into the negotiations, and were instructed to tell Pallavicini's envoy that, esteeming his valor and military experience, Venice would pay him 2,000 ducats a year, which was 500 more than captains of infantry had received for some time in the service of the Republic.<sup>176</sup> Further parleys led the Senate to inform the rectors that if necessary they might add another 500 ducats to Pallavicini's stipend, which *con le taxe per la sua stalla* would amount to more than 2,800 ducats a year. Pallavicini wished his contract (*condotta*) with Venice to be kept secret until February, 1557, and the Senate was quite content that his service should begin in March. On 19 December (1556) the articles were agreed upon in Verona, and on the twenty-second the Senate congratulated the rectors upon the enlistment of Pallavi-

<sup>174</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 45', letter of the Senate to the Venetian ambassador to Ferdinand, king of the Romans, dated 18 September, 1554.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 163, doc. dated 12 December, 1555; Reg. 70, fol. 51, dated 13 November, 1556, and note fols. 52'–53'.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 57'–58', doc. dated 11 December, 1556.

cini's talents on behalf of the Republic.<sup>177</sup> Henceforth, for years to come, Sforza Pallavicini was to help make Venetian history. His name will figure prominently in the events of the fateful years 1570–1571, which saw the loss of Cyprus to the Turks and their defeat at Lepanto.

From Rome on 27 March (1555) the Roman protonotary Agostino Cocciano wrote Girolamo Seripando, archbishop of Salerno, concerning Julius III's death and the "papabili" most likely to succeed him:

I wrote your most reverend lordship by the regular post that the pope's physicians were despairing of his life. Later I wrote you on Saturday [23 March] that he had departed this life on that very day at 2:00 P.M. [a hora 19]. As for the news of today, which is Wednesday, I can tell you that the obsequies began yesterday. They

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 60'–61', and cf. fols. 128'–129'. In the years that followed, the Venetian Signoria was to retain its well-justified confidence in Sforza Pallavicini. His commission as "capitano nostro general della fantaria" was discussed and approved in the Senate on 4–7 September, 1559, his first duty being the inspection (and strengthening) of the defenses of the fortress and island of Corfu (*ibid.*, Reg. 71, fols. 113'–116' [131'–134'], and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 111 [129]). During the week of 13–16 December (1559) Pallavicini was raised in rank to "governator general delle genti nostre da guerra." He was to serve Venice with 100 men-at-arms and 100 light horse, and was to be paid 5,000 ducats a year (*ibid.*, fols. 128–130').

On 27 June, 1560, the Senate voted, although with some reluctance (105–62-9), "che sia data libertà al Collegio nostro di spender fino a ducati cinquemille per el fabricar de un palazzo nel luogo di Desenzano per l' habitazione del predetto Signor Sforza, nell'quali sia anco compreso el fondo sopra el quale si haverà a fabricare . . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fols. 14'–15' [35'–36'], docs. dated 27 June and 6 July, concerning Pallavicini's status as *governator general delle genti nostre da guerra*, and cf. fols. 58' [79'], 62'–63' [83'–84'], 64–65 [85–86], 110' [131']; cf. also Sen. Mar, Reg. 38, fols. 90 [116], 95'–96' [121'–122'], and Reg. 39, fols. 125' [170'], 126' [171'], et *alibi*).

The Signoria came to rely heavily on Pallavicini, and usually liked to have him on hand (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 75' [96']), doc. dated 29 July, 1566: "Non essendo a proposito nell' occasioni presenti che l' illustrissimo Signor Sforza, governator nostro generale, s' allontanati da questa città, l' anderà parte che sia scritto a sua Eccellenza che debba ritornar de qui. De parte 187, de non 9, non sinceri 10."

For reasons of health or for some assignment, Pallavicini might be allowed or required to leave Venice, as when on 10 August, 1566, he wanted "a far la sua purga" (*ibid.*, Reg. 74, fol. 77' [98']): "Essendosi lassato intendere l' illustrissimo Signor Sforza, governator nostro general, che quando fuse con bona gratia nostra, esso anderia al presente a purgarsi secondo il bisogno che ne ha, per esser poi libero alli 8 over 10 del mese che viene per andar over da noi le sarà ordinato," to which the Senate agreed *de parte* 143, *de non* 0, *non sinceri* 1. Faithful servitor of Venice, Pallavicini continued year after year in the employ of the state. On 22 March, 1572, he was granted another *licenza* to return home for a month (*ibid.*, Reg. 78, fol. 76' [98']).

will last for nine days, and on the ninth the cardinals will enter the conclave, unless something untoward happens. The most reverend dean [Gianpietro Carafa] is pressing forward vigorously. He would not want their entry [into the conclave] and the election of the pope to be delayed. I understand he is uttering strong reproofs against the clandestine meetings and cliques and secret negotiations, making clear reference to Ferrara [Ippolito d' Este], who is boldly campaigning for himself, but I do not know that he is playing about with bribery. I think he is going to get stuck. . . .

In the betting at the banks the most reverend cardinal of S. Croce [Marcello Cervini] is running ahead of all. The betting started at 25 to a 100 that he will emerge from this conclave as pope. Then it came down, and is now at 15. With all this there is no one [else] who attains these odds, because there is no one who gets beyond 12. But what goes on at the banks is a very tricky business, and is all for merchants. It goes along with certain very artful dodges at which they play safely. I am not at all up to it, as it is a matter that I have never had anything to do with. Much less do I believe that your most reverend lordship seeks to understand the business.

In my opinion the proper prospects for the papacy [i *papabili*] are few. The aspirants [i *papeggianti*] are many. I call *papabili* those persons lustrous and illustrious for the virtues that are in them, such as S. Croce, Pole, and Morone—*papeggianti* those who have aspirations, and I see that those are few who do not aspire—Nobili, Simoncello, Cornaro, Monte, Urbino, Sermoneta, Imola, and Cicada. I do not even know whether I do well to put Cicada among the non-aspirants. I believe that all the others are giving either some thought to themselves [as pope] or a good deal. Some of the French who are not here [in Rome] can put in the category of non-aspirants, but I do indeed think that Tournon, Bourbon, Bellay, and some others will give it serious thought if there is time. . . .<sup>178</sup>

<sup>178</sup> Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 587, pp. 624–25. Both Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 248, and Firmianus, *Diaria carromonialia*, *ibid.*, p. 505, give the nineteenth hour (2:00 P.M. in March) as the time of Julius III's death. Cocciano's non-aspirants were Roberto de' Nobili (d. 1559), a nephew of Julius III; Girolamo de' Simoncelli (d. 1605); Alvise Corner (d. 1584); Innocenzo del Monte (d. 1577); Julius's favorite and nephew by adoption; Giulio della Rovere (d. 1578), cardinal of Urbino; Niccolò Gaetano di Sermoneta (d. 1585); Girolamo Dandino (d. 1559), cardinal of Imola; and Gianbatista Cicada (d. 1570). The French cardinals to whom Cocciano refers by name were François de Tournon (d. 1562), François Louis de Bourbon (d. 1557), and Jean du Bellay (d. 1560).

In a postscript to his letter Cocciano added (*ibid.*, p. 626) that Alessandro Farnese was thought to be in Avignon, and would probably come by post-horses, *in posta*, traveling from one relay station to the next. Pole was in England, and would not come. Morone and von Truchsess, Madruzzo and Ercole Gonzaga would be able to come, *chi in posta et chi a mezza posta*. Durante de' Duranti, bishop of the city of Brescia, would



On 24 March, despite the objections of certain Roman barons, Ascanio della Corgna, the late pope's nephew, was declared the *custos urbis* by the assembled cardinals, who also recruited 2,000 foot to assure the safety of the city. The novena of mourning began on 26 March, but to Massarelli's disgust hardly a penny was spent on Julius's obsequies, although 33,000 ducats were found in the Castel S. Angelo. The novena should have ended on 3 April, the ninth day, but it was a Sunday, and there was no observance "ob reverentiam festi illius." The obsequies ended, therefore, on the fourth, and the cardinals should have entered the conclave. Contention arose among them, however, for the French faction claimed that the imperialists were trying to act with undue haste, being unwilling to await the arrival of at least some French or pro-French cardinals. They did enter the conclave on 5 April, nevertheless, and there was further dispute as to whether they should abide by Julius's bull "super reformatione conclavis." Some of the cardinals declared that the bull had not been properly published, since the text had never been posted in the Campo de' Fiori and on the portals of the basilicas in the city.

Others indignantly asserted that the bull had indeed been published, for it had been read and approved by all the cardinals in consistory, and had been subscribed to by the pope as well as by all the cardinals, "et sigillo denique signata." The auditors of the Rota were consulted. They declared the question beyond their competence. The next pope would have to settle the issue. "Hence the matter remained unresolved," says Massarelli, "and so it was decided that the bull should not be observed." Massarelli was almost outraged. The bull had not been posted for the people to read, but what did the reform of the conclave have to do with the populace? The cardinals were the sub-

ject of the bull, the contents of which they knew full well. They had all affixed their signatures to it. What could be invalid about the renewal of an old law which sought to do away with the abuses, frauds, plots, intrigues, dishonesties, avarice, and simony which had disturbed and degraded papal elections for years? *Quae omnia in ipsa bulla reformationis conclavis continentur.*<sup>179</sup>

There were fifty-seven members of the Sacred College at the time of Julius's death. Thirty of them were in Rome. Seven of them, all Italians, reached the city before the conclave began—Tiberio Crispi, Jacopo Savelli, Marcello Cervini, Ranuccio Farnese, Ercole Gonzaga, Cristoforo Madruzzo, and Francesco Pisani. Crispi had hurried in from Bolsena, Cervini from Gubbio, Gonzaga from Mantua, Madruzzo from Trent, and Pisani from Venice. Maybe one should not call Madruzzo an Italian; he was bilingual, and sometimes referred to himself as a German. And he was certainly a loyal imperialist. Ten or a dozen French cardinals had no way of reaching the conclave in time to take part in the coming election. Massarelli furnishes us with the names of the thirty-seven "cardinales intrantes pro creatione Marcelli II.," and the twenty who were "absentes ab Urbe." We have a detailed description of the conclave from the pen of the contemporary historian Onofrio Panvino, who informs us that Henry II's first choice for the papacy was the wealthy cardinal Ippolito d' Este, the brother of Duke Ercole II of Ferrara, and that the leaders of the imperialist faction were the camerlengo Guido Ascanio Sforza of S. Fiora and Cardinal Madruzzo.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>179</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 248-50. Gianpietro Carafa had asked Julius (on 22 March), when the latter was on his deathbed "an vellet quod bulla a Sanctitate sua super reformatione conclavis decreta publicetur et quod publicata observetur," to which (as to two other important questions) the pope returned no answer: "not even a word" (*ibid.*, p. 247, lines 19 ff.).

On Julius III's bull providing for the reform of the conclave, see J. B. Sägmüller, *Die Papstwahlbulden und das staatliche Recht der Exklusive*, Tübingen, 1892, pp. 25-31, 34-35, and for the text, *ibid.*, append., no. 111, pp. 291-98, dated 12 November, 1554, from the Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fols. 272 ff.

<sup>180</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 250-52. Merkle, *ibid.*, pp. 253-56, note 3, also gives Panvino's account, taken from the Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fols. 282-287. Note the letter of Juan Antonio de Taxis, the imperial postmaster in Rome, written to his friend Masius on 6 April, 1555: ". . . Cardinales nocte praeterita abdidierunt sese unde religio erit egredi nisi prius pontificem creaverint, qui de illis supplicium aliquando sumat ob scelerata Tuus Cervinus habet spem pontificatus, et apud vulgus est maxima opinio illum fu-

come, in Cocciano's opinion, in a litter. He was seventy-one. In the last conclave Durante had been three years older than Julius, who had just died at sixty-eight. Cocciano expected Durante to arrive at Easter (14 April). Pietro Tagliavia d' Aragona, the cardinal archbishop of Palermo, would come by land or sea, depending upon which seemed to him the more comfortable. The conclave would certainly begin before Palm Sunday (7 April). Gianbattista Cicada, cardinal of S. Clemente, had thought, possibly, one, two, or three days before.

The news of Julius III's death was known in Brussels before 31 March, and Charles V immediately began consultations with Queen Mary of Hungary, governess of the Netherlands, and Antoine Perrenot, bishop of Arras, "both with regard to the creation of the new pope and the preservation of the imperial dominion in Italy" (*Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 41, pp. 34-35).

It was to be a short conclave, more orderly than that of 1549–1550, for interlopers were not allowed into the locked halls. According to Panvinio, besides Jean du Bellay and Georges d'Armagnac, Pisani, Sermoneta, Capodiferro, della Rovere, and most of the Julian cardinals favored the election of the pro-French Ippolito d'Este, whose brother Ercole had won him also the vote of the so-called imperialist Gonzaga. There were those who thought that maybe even Madruzzo was wavering in his allegiance to imperialist interests. D'Este's chief competitor was the austere Marcello Cervini. Although at Trent Madruzzo had certainly got along better with Cervini than with del Monte, he disliked him, and would have much preferred to see a strong imperialist pitted against d'Este. The choice, however, seemed clearly to lie between Cervini and d'Este.

The desire for reform in the Church had grown remarkably in five years. Gianpietro Carafa, dean of the Sacred College, was an ardent reformer. So was Cervini. Carafa was also anti-imperialist, but he could not abide the thought of the worldly d'Este as pope. An abrasive personality, Carafa was himself a candidate for the tiara, but he was much less appealing to the reformers, the neutral cardinals, and the anti-French than was Cervini, who had consequently pulled ahead of him in the contest.

As Panvinio says, the imperialists, the neutralists, and the anti-Ferrarese had many candidates, especially Carafa, Rodolfo Pio of Carpi, Giovanni Morone, Cervini, and Pietro Bertano. They were bound to have too many "as long as each one regarded himself as the most worthy [contender] for the supreme pastorate." Ranuccio Farnese had put forward Cervini's name, being fearful that Ferrara (his absent brother Alessandro's rival) might acquire the necessary two thirds' majority (of twenty-six votes). Ferrara had in fact drummed up so many votes that if "accessits" were to be permitted after the first scrutiny, he would almost certainly be elected pope. An electoral tradition, how-

ever, had allowed "accessions" only after the second scrutiny. Along with Jacopo Savelli, Ranuccio now joined his cousin Guido Ascanio Sforza and the imperialists, hoping that they (as well as the neutralists and the "Ferrariensi abhorrentes") would all fall in behind Cervini. Guido Ascanio and Ranuccio approached Ercole Gonzaga, "who said that he would not break faith with the duke of Ferrara, to whom he had given the promise to vote for his brother." Madruzzo "appeared nonplussed" (*titubare videbatur*) when asked to support Cervini. Many of the Tridentine bore no love for one another; they had lived too close together for too long in political and doctrinal disagreement. The first scrutiny was held on 9 April (*V Idus Aprilis*). As was to be expected, when the voting statements were read (*syngraphis lectis*), Ferrara had not reached a two thirds' majority:

Immediately the dean [Carafa] said, turning to the fathers, "In accord with the old custom, accessions are not to be given on the first scrutiny." Since no one dared to disagree with him, Ferrara was beaten as far as the first day was concerned. The assembly [of cardinals] broke up.

The first scrutiny moved the anti-Ferrarese cardinals to renewed action. The first ballot drawn from the urn had been Ercole Gonzaga's. Brother of Ferrante, once the archimperialist (but now in disfavor at the imperial court),<sup>181</sup> Ercole had found no difficulty in voting for the French candidate (and for Pietro Bertano). To be sure, he had said he would do so, but many members of the conclave had doubted it because of his past political differences with Ferrara. Also, despite the elections of Leo X and Clement VII which had taken place within recent memory, many cardinals—especially the imperialists—doubted the advisability of elevating to the papacy a scion of one of the great seigniorial families of Italy. Charles V did not want a powerful pope. The fact that Gonzaga had actually voted for Ferrara in the first scrutiny aroused the fears of Guido Ascanio and Ranuccio, for after various cardinals had made the expected gestures of courtesy by voting for their friends, they could change their votes by "acceding" to Ferrara.

turum pontificem. Ego audio aliquot cardinales ab illo abhorrere. Sunt inclusi 37 cardinales . . ." (Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 160, p. 199).

Incidentally, Juan Antonio de Taxis later became involved in a minor episode which helped carry the impetuous Paul IV into his war with the Hapsburgs (*Cal. State Papers* . . . Venice, VI-1, nos. 540–41, 543–44, 546–47, 549–51, pp. 512–50, docs. dated 9–18 July, 1556; Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, nos. 200, 212–13, pp. 277, 290–91; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Pöpstz.*, VI [repr. 1957], 410 ff.). De Taxis suffered a broken arm and endless anguish when subjected to torture on the rack, on which see below, Chapter 15, pp. 652–53.

<sup>181</sup> Ferrante Gonzaga had been removed as governor of Milan; he had had many detractors, Charles V's son Philip [II] among them; but Ferrante had served Charles faithfully for some thirty-three years. Ferrante's emotional leave-taking of Charles at Brussels at the beginning of April, 1555, is well known (Brown, *Cal. State Papers* . . . Venice, VI-1, no. 45, pp. 39–41, doc. dated 6 April). The Spaniards hated Ferrante (*ibid.*, no. 49, p. 44, and cf. nos. 55–56).

Guido Ascanio, Ranuccio, and Jacopo Savelli now embarked on a vigorous electioneering campaign, and soon gained for Cervini (says Panvinio) the support of Rodolfo Pio of Carpi, Juan Álvarez de Toledo, Miguel de Silva of Viséu, Bartolomé de la Cueva, Gianangelo de' Medici (later Pius IV), Tiberio Crispi, and Fulvio della Corgna, brother of Cervini and nephew of the late pope. Gianpietro Carafa, who had ambitions of his own, was disappointed (*id admodum aegre ferente Teatino*), but he soon joined the anti-Ferrarese cardinals, who presently enlisted on Cervini's behalf the promised votes of another thirteen members of the conclave—Federico de' Cesi, Girolamo Verallo, Gian Michele de' Saraceni, Giovanni Ricci, Giannandrea Mercurio, Jacopo Puteo, Fabio Mignanelli, Giovanni Poggio, Gianbattista Cicada, Girolamo Dandino, Francesco Pisani, Alvise Corner, and Roberto de' Nobili, also a nephew of the late pope. Cervini was thus sure of twenty-four votes. He needed only twenty-six.

De la Cueva invited Cristoforo Madruzzo to join the growing ranks of the Cerviniani. Mindful of the hostility born of an old encounter at Trent (*veteris cuiusdam in concilio Tridentino similitatis memor*), Madruzzo was at first little inclined to do so. He had pledged his vote to Ferrara, who (it would now appear) no longer had a chance. Letting bygones be bygones, therefore, Madruzzo agreed to go along with the Farnesiani and the Julian cardinals. He even accompanied Guido Ascanio to Cervini's cell to lead him into the Cappella Paolina, where Cervini's partisans were beginning to gather, as Panvinio puts it, "to hail him as pontiff on that very day."

Ferrara's supporters awakened too late to what was happening. Almost sure of victory only hours before, Ferrara now tried in vain to turn the tide. Thirteen contrary votes would effect Cervini's "exclusion," and Ferrara could rely on du Bellay, Armagnac, Gonzaga, Bertano, Sermoneta, Capodiferno, della Rovere, and Innocenzo del Monte. Verallo seems to have been won over to the Ferrarese side in du Bellay's cell. Capodiferno is said to have added Cristoforo del Monte and Girolamo de' Simoncelli. While Ranuccio Farnese was trying to rewin Verallo's vote, and Fulvio della Corgna was trying to convince his uncle Cristoforo del Monte and his cousin Simoncelli to enter the Cervini camp, the rest of the cardinals had assembled in the Cappella Paolina. They were numerous enough to elect Cervini, who now entered the Paolina with Guido Ascanio and Madruzzo. The pro-Cervini cardinals were only awaiting the return of Ranuccio Farnese and Fulvio della Corgna

before proceeding to the election. Ranuccio and Fulvio, "who were trying to detach three cardinals from Ferrara's coterie," hurried into the chapel when they heard that the gathering was going to declare Cervini pope without them. The pro-Ferrarese cardinals followed, "qui id prohibere iam non poterant."

When all the cardinals were seated, Cervini "by a memorable error, having not yet been elected, and being only a cardinal before the voting began," mounted the dais to take the papal throne. He was admonished that this was improper, and so removed himself, whereupon he was acclaimed pope by a voice vote (*omnium suffragiis*). The bronze bell in the chapel was rung. On bended knees Cervini recited the Ave Maria by himself, after which he said, "We accept," *statimque ab omnibus summus pontifex renunciatus est*. It was 7:00 P.M. On the following day, 10 April, at dawn a formal scrutiny was held, the voting statements were read, and Cervini donned the pontifical pallium. He took the name Marcellus II. The cardinals all gave him the kiss of peace and of obedience. Thereafter he was borne into S. Peter's, where he received the "insignia of coronation." Panvinio was himself present in the church, an interested witness and a reporter of it all.<sup>182</sup>

<sup>182</sup> Panvinio, in Merkle, II, 253-55; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, *ibid.*, II, 252-53; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialis*, *ibid.*, II, 507-8; J. B. Sigmüller, *Die Papstwahlen und die Staaten von 1447 bis 1555* (Nikolaus V. bis Paul IV.), Tübingen, 1890, repr. Aalen, 1967, pp. 200-10; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 317-24, and append., nos. 29-35, pp. 649-52. On Marcellus II's election, note also the briefs in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 47-49, 52 ff., by mod. stamped enumeration.

Juan Antonio de Taxis wasted no words in his letter to Masius, dated at Rome on 10 April: "Cardinales Caesariani aperte videntes Cardinalem Ferrarensem magno studio et variis artibus, multis comparatis suffragiis, conventibus cardinalibus magna auctoritate, usi praesenti consilio, existimantes id rebus Caesaris convenire, creaverunt Cardinalem tituli Sanctae Crucis [i.e., Cervini] heri sub noctem adorando. Natus est in statu ducis Florentiae [at Montefano] humilis familia, vi eruditus, bonae vitae et boni exempli. Habet sexaginta tres annos [actually Cervini was fifty-four years old, having been born on 6 May, 1501]. . . . Hodie est coronatus et vocatur Marcellus II. . . ." (Lösen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, addend. to no. 160, p. 199). Cf. the letter of Juan Manrique from Rome to Charles V, dated 11 April, in Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 609, pp. 652-53.

The conclave and coronation are described with equal brevity in Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 9 (from the Archivum Consistoriale), fol. 370r: "Apud Sanctum Petrum Rome die Martis nona Aprilis 1555 hora XXIII [7:00 P.M. in April] aut circa fuit publica vox quod reverendissimus dominus Marcellus tituli Sanctae Crucis in Hierusalem esset creatus pontifex, et continuavit usque in diem crastinum qui fuit dies Mercurii decima eiusdem, in qua fuit ostensa crux et publicatus

On 9 April, while the cardinals were locked in the conclave, the master of ceremonies Firmanus was told that the "prophetae moderni" were predicting the election of Cervini, "who will live but a short time, and there will be a quick return to the conclave." Cervini had hastened his coronation, eliminating both ceremony and celebration, because Easter was coming on 14 April, and he wanted not to interfere with the observance of Holy Week, in which he participated beyond his failing strength.<sup>183</sup> Sickly as a child, Cervini had been beset with ill health through most of his life. He had always worked hard, too hard; he had carried much of the presidential load throughout the first period of the Council of Trent. As Massarelli says, and as everyone knew, Cervini's heart's desire as pope was to root out the evils which had grown up in the Church and to restore it to its former splendor and purity (. . . *ut abusus in ecclesia Dei subortos evelleret ipsamque ecclesiam ab omni contagione morum purgaret atque in pristinum candorem et pietatem restitueret*).

Massarelli states that on Maundy Thursday, 11 April,

which was the first day after his assumption of the pontificate, [Marcellus II] summoned me, Angelo Massarelli . . . , who had worked long and hard on that very matter of reform under Julius III of sacred memory, and had kept in my possession all the [late] pontiff's own papers concerning reform. [Marcellus] directed me to resume work on the papers concerning reform, and especially the bull which Julius III had himself prepared for publication on the reform of the conclave. . . .

Massarelli was instructed to give Cardinal Jacopo Puteo, for study, a copy of the bull which had been a bone of contention at the beginning of the conclave. Marcellus wished to "check, examine, discuss, and weigh" every detail of the text before confirming the bull and authorizing its publication. Puteo promised to help to the fullest extent

pontifex idem Marcellus et nominatus Marcellus II, et deinde exiverunt ex conclavi prefati reverendissimi versus Sanctum Petrum, et idem Marcellus cruce et cantioribus hymnos cantantibus precedentibus fuit deatus in sede pontificali ad Sanctum Petrum, ubi coram altari ubi iacet sacrosancta eucharistia humi positus genibus flexis oravit et successive in eadem sede in capella Sancti Petri perlatum inibi missam celebravit, qua finita statim nullis adhibitis ceremoniis de more observari solitis coronatus fuit . . ." (also in the *Acta Vicecancellerarii*, Reg. 7, fol. 251r).

<sup>183</sup> Cf. the letter of 13 April (1555) from Jean d'Avanson, the French ambassador in Rome, to Henry II, given in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 606, quoted in the first footnote in the following chapter.

of his ability. On Good Friday, 12 April, Marcellus expressed dissatisfaction with the singers in the papal choir, whose performance lacked the reverence which the occasion required. He also wanted their words to be understood as well as heard (*audiri atque percipi*). A reform of the choir would follow that of the conclave. Marcellus was tireless in his devotions and in the discharge of his duties. By 20 April he had become ill "ob continuos . . . et maximos labores," laid low with the common complaint of the time, "fever and catarrh."

There was, nevertheless, but slight letup in Pope Marcellus's activities. Guidobaldo II della Rovere, the duke of Urbino, arrived in Rome on Tuesday, 23 April, to present himself to the pope as a "vassallus ecclesiae," and render the customary obedience. He entered the city quietly, even secretly, to avoid pomp and ceremony because of the pope's illness. On Sunday, the twenty-eighth, however, Ercole II d'Este, duke of Ferrara, came to Rome "ut summo pontifici uti feudatarius et vassallus ecclesiae obedientiam praestet." He was met by the official households of the pope and the cardinals before he entered the city by the Porta Flaminia. Ercole lodged with his brother, Cardinal Ippolito, in the latter's palace at Monte Giordano. On the same day five cardinals also arrived in the city—Morone and von Truchsess from Augsburg, Duranti from Brixen, Alessandro Farnese and Louis de Guise from France. Farnese, a loyal advocate of the French king, was the legate in the papal city of Avignon. Louis de Guise had been a conclave member of his brother Charles at the time of Julius III's election, and this was his first visit to Rome since his own elevation to the cardinalate. Marcellus received the two dukes the following day (29 April) and thereafter Farnese, Guise, and Guido Ascanio Sforza, who had been largely instrumental in his election. It was too much, but Marcellus was also preparing to reform the Penitentiary, and had instructed Massarelli to gather together the relevant documents. Massarelli had recently discussed them with the pope, but the latter's laudable plans for reform were now destined to be unfulfilled.

At 9:00 A.M. (*hora 13*) on Tuesday, 30 April, according to the papal secretary and diarist Massarelli, Marcellus II lapsed into unconsciousness (*in apoplexiam incidit*). He had eaten little, but had not seemed too badly off, when he had fallen into a deep sleep. He had been accustomed to an hour's nap *post prandium*, but this time he seemed to be sleeping unduly long. The chamberlains tried to awaken him, at first gently and then by any strange

device that occurred to them. He lay in a coma all day, although he is said to have regained his speech for a while. He died at about 3:30 A.M. (*hora circiter 7 cum dimidia*) on 1 May in the same room in the Vatican Palace, and in the same bed, in which Julius III had died six weeks before. He had occupied the papal throne for twenty-one days, during which time he was well for ten days and sick for eleven. Massarelli sadly recalled the brief reigns of Celestine IV (in 1241) and of Pius III (in 1503). "Infelix pontifex, qui vix pontificatum tetigit . . . , infelices omnes Christiani . . . , infelix saeculum, cui tanto pastore nedum frui, sed ne ipsum videre quidem licuit!" Such was Massarelli's lament. Marcellus II's body was exposed to public viewing in S. Peter's basilica for two days, after which he was buried near the tomb of Paul II.<sup>184</sup> Today he seems chiefly to be re-

membered for Palestrina's *Missae Papae Marcelli*, the "Mass of Pope Marcellus," which in its solemn, polyphonic beauty brought liturgical music to a height—and to a dignity—of which even the austere pontiff must certainly have approved.<sup>185</sup>

Reg. 7, fols. 251<sup>r</sup>, 253<sup>r</sup>, and the Acta Consistorialia, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fol. 190).

The Venetian Senate had written Marcellus on 19 April of the "magna sane laetitia incredibilisque voluptas" they had taken in his election. On 3 May they had learned of his death (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 111<sup>r</sup>-113<sup>r</sup>), and on the seventh of the month they summarized his brief papacy in a letter to the baillie in Istanbul (*ibid.*, fol. 115): "Da poi che vi significassimo l'ultimi avvisi fo eletto pontefice a 9 Aprile il reverendissimo cardinale di Santa Croce con consentimento de tutti li reverendissimi cardinali. Il giorno seguente fo coronato et fo nominato del suo primo nome Papa Marcello Secondo di nation toscana della terra dita Montepulciano. Pochi giorni da poi sopraggiunto dal male all'ultimo del passato oppresso da accidente apoplectico e mancato di questa vita." Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 12-55, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 325-56, has summarized Marcellus's career.

Despite the conspicuous part played by Marcello Cervini (as second president of the first period of the Council at Trent) in formulating the anti-Lutheran decree on justification, to which Reginald Pole had been much opposed, the latter as a reformer was apparently highly pleased with the prospect of Marcellus II's reign (Brown, *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 59, 65-66, 70, pp. 52 ff.). The election of Marcellus's successor was to be one of the hardest misfortunes of Pole's career.

<sup>185</sup> Knud Jeppesen, "Marcellus-Probleme: Einige Bemerkungen über die Missa Papae Marcelli des Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina," *Acta musicologica*, XVI-XVII (1944-45), 11-38, esp. pp. 27 ff., 38, seems to have shown that the Mass of Pope Marcellus was composed in 1562-1563 during the third period of the Council of Trent. For a brief account of Palestrina's life, led largely under the shelter of the Holy See, cf. H. C. Colles and W. S. Pratt, eds., *Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 3rd ed., 5 vols. in six, New York, 1935, IV, 16-33.

It can be shown that the Missa Papae Marcelli was written after 1554 and before 1563. Karl Weinmann, "Zur Geschichte von Palestrinas Missa Papae Marcelli," *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters*, XXIII (Leipzig, 1916), 23-42, esp. pp. 34 ff., thinks Marcellus's regnal year 1555 as the most likely period to which to assign its composition, which is disputed by Lino Bianchi and Karl Gustav Fellerer, *Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina*, Turin, 1971, esp. pp. 1524-26, who (like Jeppesen) date the Mass of Pope Marcellus to the years 1562-1563, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 58 ff., 88-91, 106-8, 361-62, 375. On the dating of the Mass, note also Fellerer, *Palestrina: Leben und Werk*, Düsseldorf, 1960, p. 72.

<sup>184</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimoniae*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 507-8; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, *ibid.*, pp. 254-60; Pannino, in the Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fol. 291<sup>r</sup>, also given in Merkle, II, 260, notes 2-3; Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 621, pp. 668-69, a letter of Agostino Cocciano to Girolamo Seripando, dated at Rome on 30 April, 1555: "Hoggi sua Santità alle 19 hore [3:00 P.M.] a hauto un nuovo svenimento per lo quale ha perduto la parola, et questo è stato di spatio di un' hora; poi è rivenuto et ha recuperata la parola. Ma i giudicii se fanno molto tristi per sua Santità, anzi pur per la Christianità e per la religione, se perde questo santissimo et prudentissimo homo. . . ." Cf. *ibid.*, no. 622, pp. 669-70, a letter of Seripando to Cocciano, dated at Salerno on 9 May: ". . . Quanto al publico non posso cedere a persona che senta questa perdita [i.e., the death of Marcellus II] più di me, perchè io ne vedo un troppo aperto sdegno dell'ira di Dio contra di noi. . ."

As the French ambassador in Rome, Jean d'Avanson, wrote Henry II on 4 May (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 609): "Sire, la Chrestienté a fait une grande perte au feu Pape Marcel, et par conséquent vostre Majesté y a pareillement perdu. . . ." D'Avanson's letters are very informative. Note also the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 9, fol. 370<sup>r</sup>: "Apud Sanctum Petrum Rome die Martis ultima Aprilis 1555 sanctissimus dominus noster, dominus Marcellus Paps II, antea infirmus hora XXIII [7:00 P.M.] vel circa graviori infirmitate correptus amicit loquelam, et nocte sequenti hora septima aut circa viam universae carnis ingressus est et in suo pontificatu vixit per duos et viginti dies tantum—dico per viginti duos dies!" Marcellus's reign is often reckoned as lasting twenty-two rather than twenty-one days. His obsequies began on 5 or 6 May (*ibid.*, fol. 371<sup>r</sup>), entries also in the Acta Vicecanceriali,

## 15. THE REIGN OF PAUL IV TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN

AT ABOUT 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday, 1 May, 1555, the thirty-nine cardinals in Rome gathered in the Vatican Palace to deal with the state of emergency which the death of a pope always produced. The cardinals designated Guidobaldo II della Rovere, duke of Urbino, as protector of the city and the conclave. They also authorized the recruitment of two thousand foot. Girolamo de' Federici, bishop of Sagona in Corsica, was confirmed as governor of Rome *ultra pontem*, and Annibale Bozzuto, archbishop of Avignon, as governor *infra pontem*. Almost immediately upon Pope Marcellus's death, to Angelo Massarelli's extreme annoyance, the papal household had its food supply cut off, "ingrate iniusteque quidem," because although Marcellus had reigned for only twenty-one days, he had saved the Holy See a good deal by avoiding all pomp at his coronation and by giving his relatives nothing. He had spent a minimum on food for his household as well as on his own table. Julius III's coronation had cost 15,000 gold scudi. It should not have seemed any great matter to the College of Cardinals, in Massarelli's opinion, to feed the late pope's *familiares* in accordance with the old and laudable custom (as had just been done at Julius's death) until the election of the new pope or at least until the cardinals entered the conclave. It was a wretched business, "nam, ut leges testantur, alimenta negare est necare."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, ed. Sebastian Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II (1911), 262. As for the money saved by Marcellus II's immediate and simple coronation, note the French ambassador Jean d'Avanson's letter of 13 April, 1555, from Rome to Henry II (in Guillaume Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, 2 vols., Paris, 1666, II, 606).

"Sire, Mardy dernier Mr. le Cardinal de Sainte Croix a esté fait Pape; hier matin il voulut estre couronné avec les cérémonies acoustumées; et au retour de son couronnement porté dans sa chaire sur les épaules de douze estafiers, il les fit arrester, mettre sa chaire bas, appella l'ambassadeur de l'empereur [Juan Manrique, on whom cf. Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, nos. 609, 626, pp. 652 ff.] et moy; et après nous avoir remercié de la compagnie et assistance que nous avions faite à son couronnement, il nous pria d'advertir chacun son prince du succès de son eslection, et comme il avoit voulu estre couronné ce matin pour deux raisons: la première desquelles il estimoit l'épargne de vingt-cinq ou trente mil écus qu'on a accoustumé de dépenser en semblables occasions—la moitié de laquelle dépense il vouloit qu'elle revint aux pauvres, l'autre au profit du S. Siège Apostolique qu'il disoit estre grandement appauvry.

One may assume, however, that Massarelli knew where his next meal was coming from. Marcellus II's obsequies began on 6 May; as usual the novena of mourning would follow. Marcellus had lived simply; he was being buried simply. No wooden catafalque or *castrum doloris* had been constructed in S. Peter's. There were some hangings in the church, some candles aglow in the area of his interment. Every day some cardinal or other celebrated mass, but the Sacred College was concerned to the point of controversy about the method of electing a pope by "adoration," i.e., *per Spiritum Sanctum*. When the cardinals in conclave were unable to elect a pope by balloting, *per scrutinium*, which balloting was supposed to take place only in the morning after mass, it had become the custom for the majority necessary to elect a pope to gather together at any hour of the day or night and (under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit) to declare some cardinal pope, "eumque uti pontificem salutant, venerantur, et adorant." The election was confirmed—or rather completed—the next morning by balloting. Nevertheless, from the moment of "adoration" that cardinal became and remained pope on whom emotion (and political maneuvering) had fastened. This was in effect the way both Julius III and Marcellus II had been elected. Reginald Pole had refused, in December, 1549, to allow his supporters to try to put him on S. Peter's throne by adoration, preferring (as he said) to enter by the door than by the window.

The "scrutiny" or balloting followed the adoration since it was the customary form of election. This always brought forth protest, however, since no mere balloting by cardinals should appear to pass judgment on a decision of the Holy Spirit. On the other hand there were those who assailed this form of election

as one which gave occasion to election by discord and tumult, for those who do not have the proper number of votes either for themselves or for their friends, and so distrust the "scrutiny," usually try [to achieve their end] by this means.

La seconde raison estoit pour avoir moyen de faire l'office pontifical ces saints iours et festes de Pasques, nous disant après cela que le plus grand désir qu'il eust au monde estoit de voir vostre Majesté et celle de l'empereur en paix. . . ."

So-called election by adoration at any time of the day or night produced hopeless disorder, almost a stampede; one hardly knew who was voting for whom or who was "acceding" to whom. There was a fearful confusion, "since no one wants to be the last to salute the [new] pontiff and enter his good graces." Some detested this method of election, therefore, as "without law and reason." Others defended it as a legitimate mode of election by the Holy Spirit, "which provides inspiration when and where it wishes, and is subject neither to time nor to circumstance." The intervention of the Holy Spirit could also hasten an election and prevent a long-drawn-out conclave. "But since the fathers could not reach agreement," says Massarelli, "the matter remained to be decided at another time."<sup>2</sup>

The nine days of funeral rites and mourning for Marcellus II ended on 14 May (1555) and the next day, after the celebration of a solemn mass of the Holy Spirit by Rodolfo Pio di Carpi and a sermon by the scholarly Uberto Foglietta, forty-two cardinals entered the conclave in the Vatican Palace. Ercole Gonzaga came from Mantua on 16 May, and Pedro Pacheco from Naples on the seventeenth. When Robert de Lenoncourt arrived at about 10:00 P.M. on 22 May, there were forty-five cardinals with cells in the Cappella Sistina, the Sala Regia, the two parts of the Sala Ducale, and the two smaller halls of the Concistoro Segreto. Massarelli gives us the names of those who participated in the conclave and of the "cardinales absentes tempore conclavis Pauli IV," for indeed Gianpietro Carafa was presently to be elected and take the name Paul IV.<sup>3</sup>

This time Alessandro Farnese was present at the conclave, about to prove even more effective

<sup>2</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 263-64.

<sup>3</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 264-65, who says the conclave began on "Friday, 15 May:" the day was Wednesday. Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, pp. 508-9, puts Carpi's celebration of the mass, Foglietta's discourse, and the cardinals' entrance into the conclave on 14 May, which is apparently wrong.

The French ambassador d'Avanson proved to be a prophet. On 4 May he had written Henry II from Rome (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 609): ". . . ie crois qu'en débattant d'un costé et d'autre le sort est pour tomber à la fin sur le Cardinal Theatin [i.e., Carafa, cardinal of Chieti, although he was usually known as the cardinal of Naples], doyen du Collège, parce qu'estant les Impériaux du tout résolus de contredire à Mr. le Cardinal de Ferrare [Ippolito d'Este], et nombre suffisant pour empêcher sa promotion, il se faudra enfin résoudre à celui qui semblera plus approchant en mérites du Papat, qui paroyt bien estre celuy-cy pour estre le plus vieil du Collège, et estimé de bonne et sainte vie. . . ."

as a pope-maker than he had been in the election of Julius III. A quick mind, a ready tongue, a commanding presence, at thirty-five years of age he was a force to reckon with. Not surprisingly, perhaps, a rumor of unknown origin had been afloat the afternoon of 17 May that Alessandro had been elected pope. As Massarelli states, such was Alessandro's prudence, experience, and knowledge "that it was not difficult to believe the report," which gained such wide currency that Alessandro's palace was invaded and his property plundered. A placard bearing the Farnese arms and a papal tiara was affixed to the doors of the palace. The populace was receiving the news with joy; Alessandro's *familiars* were being congratulated; couriers were getting ready to take word to the outer world. Rumors often die as quickly as they are born, however, and after three hours of jubilation "when the truth became known, at 7:00 P.M. [hora 22], everything became quiet."<sup>4</sup>

Panvinio, historian of the conclaves, anticipates his detailed account with a brief summary of what happened:

Giovanni Pietro Carafa . . . bishop of Ostia and Velletri, commonly called the cardinal of Naples, dean of the College, although an old man—very aged, for he was seventy-nine years of age—was elected pope largely by the effort of a single cardinal, Farnese, as I shall describe below, after rather short but extremely contentious proceedings. Some cardinals in the College were bitterly opposed. [Carafa,] upon being elected and, at the time, mindful of the benefits he had received from the Farnesi, decided to be called Paul IV in remembrance of Paul III Farnese.

There were three easily identifiable groups in the conclave. Panvinio calls them *factiones*. The imperialist or Spanish party, numbering about twenty cardinals, was led by the camerlengo Guido Ascanio Sforza and Cristoforo Madruzzo. The French party, now allied with the Farnesiani, followed the lead of Ferrara and Alessandro Farnese. The French and Farnesiani together numbered about fifteen. The remaining ten or so cardinals, *plerique seniores*, remained neutral, several of them entertaining their own papal aspirations. Although a minority, the neutralists might cast the deciding votes by throwing in their lot with either of the two contending parties. In the Julian conclave of five years before, Farnese had sided with the imperialists, but the war of Parma had driven him

<sup>4</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 266, and see Giulio Coggola, "I Farnesi ed il conclave di Paolo IV," in the Pisan journal *Studi storici*, IX (1900), 457-59.

into the arms of Henry II. He and Ferrara had now become rivals for the attention and support of the French. Ferrara, having failed of election to the papacy in April, was leaving no stone unturned (*omnem, ut dicitur, lapidem movebat*) to achieve success in May. It was soon clear, however, that he had no chance, for the twenty Spanish and imperialist cardinals were opposed to him, and Farnese and his followers could not be induced to assist him.

Reginald Pole had been Farnese's candidate for the tiara at the Julian conclave, and although Farnese had lost his imperialist sympathies, he still adhered to Pole, "quem tanto sacerdotio dignissimum semper existimaverat." Farnese thought that Pole, although absent in England, had a chance. The neutralists and the imperialists, especially Madruzzo, might very well vote for Pole, upon whom both Charles V and Philip [II] still looked favorably. Before leaving France for the Marcellan conclave Farnese had prevailed upon Henry II and even the Constable Anne de Montmorency, "qui Anglis infensissimus erat," to declare Pole acceptable, but the French preferred Ferrara or François de Tournon as prior choices. Henry also favored Carafa, who was adequately anti-Hapsburg to please him. It was a tribute to Pole that Valois as well as Hapsburg could consider his elevation to St. Peter's throne without protest. Madruzzo, however, distrusted Farnese's advocacy of Pole; he feared a ruse, and seemed to believe that Farnese was preparing to join the French in support of Ferrara. Actually Pole proved to have hardly more chance of election than Ferrara, once his opponents had lined up. His absence was an obstacle to his election. Still remembering Hadrian VI, some of the Italians were doubtful about a "foreign" pope. Carafa and Juan Álvarez de Toledo found Pole's orthodox suspect. He never lived down the apparent reluctance and the obvious delay with which he had accepted the Tridentine decree on justification.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, in the first "scrutiny" (held during the morning

of 18 May) Pole received thirteen votes, his total being exceeded only by that of Juan Álvarez, who received fourteen votes. For the rest Carafa also managed to get thirteen votes, Morone twelve, and Carpi eleven. As in the preceding conclave, no "accessions" were allowed to follow the first scrutiny,<sup>6</sup> after which Pole's name ceases to figure prominently among the likely candidates.

Alessandro Farnese was also amiably disposed toward Carafa, "familiae suae cliens," who had helped him a good deal in the difficulties he had faced under Julius III. Alessandro might have espoused the cause of Rodolfo Pio di Carpi or of Giovanni Morone, but his French allies would have none of them, and they were at odds with each other. In the meantime Guido Ascanio Sforza, Madruzzo, and the imperialists had fastened upon Jacopo Puteo as their candidate. The neutralists seemed ready to join them, and they could see no reason for the French to reject Puteo. Farnese, however, as well as the French knew nothing of the imperialists' maneuvers. On 22 May Farnese and his friend Jacopo Savelli had a long conference with Carafa on the need of secret balloting since everything that went on in the conclave immediately became known throughout the city. As they stepped out of Carafa's cell they ran into Sforza and Madruzzo, who had been waiting for Farnese for some time. They drew him toward the altar in the Sistina, and Madruzzo informed him of the plan to rally around Puteo to frustrate Ferrara, "who believed," said Madruzzo, "that he held the papacy in his hands." It is hard to believe that Ferrara could have been misleading himself to any such extent, but Madruzzo appealed to Farnese to support Puteo, for "although he had not been made a cardinal by his grandfather [Paul III], he was nevertheless a client of his family." All the Spaniards and the "seniores neutrales,"

<sup>5</sup> See the report of Onofrio (Nofri) Camaiani, a Medicean agent, whom the Florentine ambassador Averardo Serristori had succeeded in working into the conclave, which report was written at 7:00 P.M. (*ad hora XXI*) on 18 May, and is given in Coggiola, "I Farnesi ed il conclave di Paolo IV," *Studi storici*, IX, 455-56, note 1. Both Morone and Carpi had a good deal of imperialist support, but they were in each other's way, and the French were opposed to them. According to a letter of one Lucrezio Tassoni, written from Rome on 26 May, 1555, to Sigismondo d'Este, lord of S. Martino, "Gli imperiali subito entrati nel conclave han fatto sempre ogni sforzo possibile per far papa o Morone o Carpi, et sino al VII giorno persistettero con 26 o 27 voti in questa lor opinione . . ." after which they concentrated their support on Jacopo Puteo (Emilio Motta, "Otto pontificati del Cinquecento [1555-1591] illustrati da corrispondenze trivulziane," *Archivio storico lombardo*, XIX [ann. XXX, 1903], 348).

<sup>6</sup> Concerning Pole, d'Avanson wrote Henry II from Rome on 8 May (1555) that aside from Pole's absence in England and concern with English affairs, ". . . il semblé mesme qu' il sera pour y avoir plus de difficulté que l' autre fois, sous ombre de quelque proces d' hérésie, qui a esté formé à l' encontre de luy, et qui encores de présent se trouve entre les mains des Cardinaux de l' Inquisition, chacun desquels aspirant au Papat [especially Carafa, Carpi, and Álvarez de Toledo], ils ne manqueront pas à s' en ayder contre luy" (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' estat*, II, 610). Note also the valuable article of G. Coggiola, "I Farnesi ed il conclave di Paolo IV," *Studi storici*, IX (1900), 72, 212-14.



according to Madruzzo, were ready to vote for Puteo. Farnese expressed a high regard for the latter, but said he could not commit himself without consulting Cardinal Charles de Bourbon, who was apparently being expected shortly.

Doubting the sincerity of Farnese's reply, Sforza and Madruzzo rejoined their confrères in the Sala del Concistoro Segreto. All told there were twenty-five of them. Panvinio says the imperialists and the Spaniards were confident that willy-nilly Farnese and the French would have to come around, for their opponents "lacked only three or four votes." They lacked at least five, but they seemed close enough to victory to throw Ferrara and the French party into utter consternation. The latter had gathered in the Cappella Paolina, quite defeated, and remained as dead as doornails, *mortuis similes*, especially when word reached them "that Farnese had also acceded to the Spaniards." It looked as though Puteo was going to become pope, although his followers had not yet begun to take him to the Paolina, where the voting should take place. Farnese was still unaware of the gravity of the situation, not realizing how far Sforza and Madruzzo had advanced with their plans. In fact Farnese was looking for a barber. He wanted a shampoo (*caput lavaturus*). He could not find a barber, however, and made his way through the Sistina, heading for the Paolina. As he went along, he was told "that we now have a pope." His answer was, "Hoc fieri non potest." After a few more steps he met Giovanni Ricci of Montepulciano, who also told him, "Pontificem nos habemus Puteum."

Farnese hurried into the Paolina, where he found Ferrara and the French party. They seemed stunned. Farnese was angry. He felt betrayed. Sforza was his cousin; some of the imperialists were old friends. They were trying to make a pope without him. Ferrara lamented that they were going to have a pope "non solum inscii sed inviti." They had been taken quite by surprise. Farnese said that their only chance of defeating Puteo was for Ferrara to "give up all hope of the papacy." They could put up another candidate who would have a better chance. Ferrara agreed. According to Panvinio, Farnese suggested his friend Pietro Bertano, cardinal bishop of Fano. It is most unlikely; Bertano was one of the imperialists.<sup>7</sup> If

Farnese did put forward Bertano's name, it must have been a feint. Conceivably he knew what Girolamo Capodiferro was going to say, that Bertano "was a wise man, and would not accept the maneuver." Very well then, Farnese went on, "Let us rather choose the dean, a man revered, dignified, the oldest of all, and worthy of so high a charge as the papacy." The fifteen cardinals who were present gave their immediate consent. Carafa was now their candidate. They were slowly joined by a few others. Farnese sent the Neapolitan cardinal Gianmichele Saraceni to Carafa to get the old man's approval. He placed himself in their hands, provided everything was done honorably "sine rumore et strepitu." Ferrara himself went with Ranuccio Farnese to Carafa's cell to conduct him into the Paolina.

The boldness with which Alessandro Farnese met the crisis in the conclave apprised the cardinals once more of the uncertainty of fact and the caprice of fortune. It was no longer a fact "that we now have Puteo as pope." The startled imperialists withdrew to Bertano's cell, from which they addressed a letter to Carafa not to dishonor the righteous renown of his past by appearing to seek the papacy "almost by force" (*vi paene*). He should leave the Paolina. Their remonstrance did no good. While they tarried in confused agitation, Carafa remained in the Paolina. "In the meantime," says Panvinio, "[Alessandro] Farnese, who had begun all this, was not sleeping, but [had] set out to cull a crop of cardinals. . . ." *ad cardinales carpandos*. He eventually gathered twenty-eight votes for Carafa, including those of Morone and Truchsess. Panvinio gives the names of the cardinals now assembled in the Paolina. There were (he says) twenty-nine, including Carafa. Farnese needed only two more votes. His imperialist opponents had reassembled in the Sala del Concistoro Segreto. Panvinio says there were seventeen of them, which would put forty-six in the conclave (but he assigns Girolamo Simoncelli to both sides!). He names all the imperialists. They included Puteo, Madruzzo, Pacheco, Ricci, Bertano, Gonzaga, and Guido Ascanio Sforza. "And all this happened on the eleventh day before the Kalends of June,"

<sup>7</sup> According to a letter of 13 May of Averardo Serristori, Cosimo I's ambassador in Rome, ". . . Iersera S. Clemente [Gianbattista Cicada] mi disse essersi inteso come il card. camarlingo [Sforza], Trento [Madruzzo], et Mantova [Gonzaga] volevano far papa il card. di Fano, il che dispiaceva sopra modo a S. Agnolo [Ranuccio Farnese] et Farnese. . . ." (Coggiola,

"I Farnesi ed il conclave di Paolo IV." *Studi storici*, IX [1900], 220, note 1). Nofri Camaiani, brother of Pietro Camaiani (whom we have met as papal nuncio at the imperial court), wrote Cosimo from Rome on 24 May that the imperialists turned to Puteo, "desperati di poter far Fano, al qual non volevano acconsentir molti di loro et Montepulciano et molti altri, oltre la guerra che li faceva Farnese. . . ." (Antonio Santosussio, "An Account of the Election of Paul IV to the Pontificate," *Renaissance Quarterly*, XXXI [1978], 488-89, 493).

i.e., on 22 May,<sup>8</sup> at least according to Panvinio, who says a sleepless night lay ahead.

Both sides kept at it hour after hour, the French party to name Carafa pope, the imperialists to exclude him. Puteo did not emerge from the Sala del Concistoro Segreto nor Carafa from the Paolina all night. Their followers stayed with them. Now that Puteo's chance of election seemed at an end, Ferrara's hopes rose again. He sent Giulio della Rovere to the imperialists, urging them to hold out against Carafa. Most of them needed little urging. When Madruzzo encountered Jacopo Savelli and Ranuccio Farnese, he beseeched them with tears in his eyes not to give their consent to Carafa, "an old man of inveterate evil, an enemy of the human race, a hypocrite, who had once dared [to try] to persuade Paul III to get the Turkish fleet called out and take the kingdom of Naples away from the emperor." The imperialists sent Alvisio Corner and Giovanni Ricci to Alessandro Farnese to implore him to abandon Carafa and accept their votes for himself. He could undoubtedly be elected pope, they told him, and just remember that Leo X was about his age when he became pope. Having got nowhere, they assured Farnese that they could garner all the votes necessary to elect Pole. Farnese stood firm.

Dawn came. It was 23 May, Ascension Day. The twenty-eight supporters of Carafa sent Alessandro Farnese and Morone to the seventeen embattled imperialists in the Sala del Concistoro Segreto to request them "not to impede by their obstinacy the old man's election since they were but three votes short." The imperialists had locked themselves in the hall. Farnese and Morone banged on the door, at first to no avail, but the door was

opened when Farnese shouted that the imperialists' conduct was beyond the canonical pale. The majority could only proceed with Carafa's election. Morone tried to persuade the imperialists to yield. Farnese spoke highly of Puteo. The latter was much younger than Carafa; God might see to his election at another time. Fulvio della Corgna and Gianbattista Cicada yelled at him their disapproval of these proceedings. Farnese answered them with contempt, and turning to his cousin Sforza, he hid him and Madruzzo for their underhanded effort to make Puteo pope. They may have been less than candid when they talked with him at the altar of the Sistina.

Failing to convince the imperialists to accept the dictum of the majority, Farnese and Morone returned to the Paolina to report to their fellows. It seemed best to work on individuals. Farnese undertook to win over Giovanni Poggio; Ferrara, having again abandoned his papal ambition, Pietro Bertano; and Francesco Pisani, his nephew Alvisio Corner. Bertano and Corner gave way in order to break the deadlock; Farnese had a harder time with Poggio, but he finally won. The French party now had the required two-thirds, "sed Farnesius omnes adesse desiderabat." Farnese wanted every member of the conclave to acquiesce in Carafa's elevation. He talked to Ricci about it, pointing out that Carafa was as good as elected. Why should the imperialists hold out now? It was better to have the pope as a friend than as an enemy. Farnese took Ricci into the Paolina, and asked Carafa to pardon Sforza and the rest of his opponents, "which he promised most readily to do." Farnese then returned to the imperialists. He requested an end to their resistance; Carafa's thirty-one supporters were wholly within their rights in declaring him the pope. He urged them all, not some, now to come to the Paolina lest they sow the seeds of dissension between themselves and the pope. Sforza asked for an hour to consider the matter. Farnese declined, "asserting there was peril in delay."

The imperialists gave way. Shortly after noon (on 23 May) the forty-five cardinals all came together in the Paolina, and "venerated" Giovanni Pietro Carafa as pope. They gave him the three-fold kiss, on foot and hand and mouth. Carafa had donned pontifical garb. He was borne on the *sedia gestatoria* into the Vatican Basilica. He was enthroned before the high altar of S. Peter's, laughing and weeping for joy. In memory of Paul III, who had made him a cardinal (in 1536), and in gratitude to Alessandro Farnese, who had just

<sup>8</sup> As usual the sources are at odds in detail. Panvinio was in Rome during the conclave; he assembled his material at leisure from the participants. Nofri Camaiani was an eyewitness of rapidly-moving, confusing events. In any event Camaiani gives Carafa twenty-seven votes, not twenty-eight; and Puteo, eighteen, not seventeen. Camaiani also states that the imperialists ". . . stettero dal mercoledì a 18 hore sino a giovedì a vespro [i.e., from 3:00 P.M. on Wednesday, 22 May, until the afternoon of the following day] in ostinatione di non vi concorrere, nel qual tempo non si fece altro che adoprarsi di guadagnare di voti l'una parte dell'altra: Il giovedì Morone et Augusta [Truchsess] se risolvono di accostarsi alli 27 voti et, essendo la cosa redutta a un voto, finalmente feciono una congregatione et mandorno tre cardinali . . . al Cardinale di Napoli, che di già in Capella [Paolina] era tenuto dalli altri per Papa . . ." (Santosuosso, "An Account of the Election of Paul IV . . ." *Renaissance Quarterly*, XXXI [1978], 496, from Camaiani's letter to Cosimo I, dated 24 May, the day after the election). In other words, Morone and Truchsess did not give their votes to Carafa until 23 May.

made him pope, Carafa took the name Paul IV.<sup>9</sup> Thereafter the *sedari* carried him back into the Vatican Palace, where he gave a public audience. On the following Sunday, 26 May, his coronation took place (*Romani pontificis insignia suscepit*).<sup>10</sup> De-

<sup>9</sup> Carafa was also related to the Farnese brothers, whose mother Girolama was the daughter of Luigi Orsini, count of Pitigliano, and of Vittoria della Tolfa, née Elisabetta Carafa, the sister of Paul IV (Coggiola, in *Studi storici*, IX [1900], 215, note 1). Panvinio, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 267b, refers to Carafa's relationship to Alessandro (*affinitate sibi coniunctus*).

<sup>10</sup> Panvinio, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 267-70, from the Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fols. 294'-300'; cf. Massarelli, *ibid.*, and Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialis*, *ibid.*, pp. 509-11, who gives an account of the formal, "unanimous" vote (*scrutinium*), which Panvinio does not mention. Firmanus's brief, personal narrative is very interesting. Cf. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 612, hasty notes of Cardinal Georges d'Armagnac and d'Avanson to Henry II, dated at Rome on 23 May, 1555, and note the briefs dated 24 and 26-27 May (1555) in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 60 ff.

On the election, see in general Sägmüller, *Die Papsstwahl* (1890, repr. 1967), pp. 210-19; the important article, already referred to, of Giulio Coggiola, "I Farnesi ed il conclave di Paolo IV," *Studi storici*, IX (Pisa, 1900), 61-91, 203-27, 449-79, with the texts of five documents and extensive use of the Archives of Parma and Florence; Emilio Motta, "Otto pontificati del Cinquecento (1555-1591) illustrati da corrispondenze trivulziane," *Arch. storico lombardo*, 3rd ser., XIX (ann. XXX, 1903), 348-52; Lucrezio Tassoni's letter to Sigismondo d'Este, lord of S. Martino, dated at Rome on 26 May, 1555; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 56-64, 73, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 357-63, 369-70; and Antonio Santuosso, "An Account of the Election of Paul IV . . ." *Renaissance Quarterly*, XXXI (1978), 486-97.

On 24 May, the day after the election, Paul IV gave Cardinal Pedro Pacheco fulsome assurance of his friendship for Charles V, to whom he wished Pacheco to write, "and because I told him that I would write to your Majesty, I do so, but I do not believe him, and he wanted to deceive me. Those who have caused us the greatest loss have been Morone and Augsburg [von Truchsess], Santiago [Álvarez de Toledo], and Carpi . . ." (Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 629, pp. 677-78). Pacheco listed the prominent imperialists who had gone over to Carafa. Siripando professed to be delighted with the latter's election, ". . . un tal papa che non se si fusse possuto desiderar meglio" (*ibid.*, IV, no. 630, p. 678).

We may forego reference to further sources relating to Paul IV's election, and conclude with the Arch. Segreto Vaticano, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 9 (from the Archivum Consistoriale), fols. 371'-372': "Apud Sanctum Petrum Rome die Iovis XXIII Maii 1555, qua celebratur festus Ascensionis domini nostri Jesu Christi, hora XX aut circa [about 5:00 P.M.] fuit publicatus pontifex reverendissimus dominus Ioannes Petrus cardinalis Ostiensis et nominatus Paulus IIII, et delatus est in sede pontificali ad Sanctum Petrum, cruce et cantioribus hymnos de more cantari solitos cantantibus precedentibus, et apud altare ubi iacet sacrosancta eucharistia humi positus genibus flexis oravit, et deinde perlatas ad maius altare Sancti Petri ubi iterum oravit, quo facto reportatus ad palatium et solitas stationes pontificis nonnullis reverendissimis hucusque associantibus, aliis vero capta prius in porta Sancti Petri a Sanctiatus sua licentia ad suas domus divertentibus, et ista die nihil aliud actum est" (also in the Acta Vicecancellarii, Reg. 7, fol. 255').

spite the perfunctory vote which had followed Paul's "election," the fact was that another pope had been chosen by "adoration."<sup>11</sup> And, incidentally, another turbulent reign had now begun.

The Signoria of Venice, like the government of every Catholic state in Europe, had awaited the result of the conclave with more than passing interest. As soon as Paul IV's election was known, the Venetian ambassador in Rome, Domenico Morosini, had written the Doge Francesco Venier (1554-1556) and the Senate on 23 May to give them the news. Two days later, at midnight on the twenty-fifth, his letter reached the lagoon. The Senate answered him on 27 May,<sup>12</sup> at which time they also sent their congratulations to Paul upon his elevation to the papal throne "miro reverendissimum patrum consensu totisque Romani populi applausu,"<sup>13</sup> which was hardly the case, but the courtesy of the times as well as obvious political considerations required some such statement. The Senate then set about the selection of four nobles to go to Rome on an embassy of obedience. Morosini was to be replaced at this time by Bernardo Navagero as ambassador at the Curia, and so counting the two ambassadors and the other four nobles, Venice would have six representatives at

<sup>11</sup> Cf. the observations of the Venetian statesman and diplomat Bernardo Navagero, "Relazione di Roma [1558]." in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. II, vol. III (Florence, 1846), pp. 372-73: "Per adorazione si elegge il pontefice, quando li cardinali (com' essi dicono) tratti dallo Spirito Santo, al quale non si può resistere, vanno ad adorare per papa quello che a loro pare. Questa sorta di creazione potrà essere che alcune volte fusse stata buona, quando gli uomini erano migliori; ma al presente essendo guidata da cardinali giovani e parziali, si crede che abbia del violento assai; perché i più deboli sono tirati dai più potenti, e i più timidi dai più animosi. . . . A questa adorazione fece resistenza il cardinal Polo, al quale mancava un sol voto per avere i due terzi dei cardinali; e se si lasciava adorare, tutti sariano concordi. . . . Diceva sua signoria reverendissima [Polo] che voleva *ingredire per ostium et non per fenestram*. Segui poi quello che si sa, che fu eletto dopo tanti giorni Giulio III. Per questa via d'adorazione sono stati fatti i due ultimi pontefici, Marcello II e Paolo IV, Marcello con universale consenso di tutti, il presente pontefice [Paolo IV] con divisione e quasi scisma tra' cardinali, perché diciassette si erano ritirati col reverendissimo Puteo, ed esso con il resto nella Cappella [Paolina], ove sogliono ridursi i pontefici da poi che sono stati eletti."

<sup>12</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 118', letter of the Senate to Morosini, dated 27 May, 1555: "Sabbato XXV dell' instante alle tre hore di notte [which is midnight in Rome] ricevemmo le vostre de 23 [on the two days' courier's route from Rome to Venice, cf. above, Volume III, p. 267a], per le quali havemo inteso l' electione del reverendissimo cardinale decano in summo pontifice, la qual . . . n' è stata di grandissima satisfatione et conforme al desiderio nostro. . . ." (and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 124').

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 119' ff.

the Curia to make obeisance to the new pope.<sup>14</sup> One usually gave things time to settle, however, and it was September before the four envoys were chosen, and Navagero received his commission. The embassy was well received in Rome.<sup>15</sup>

At the time of Paul IV's election—in May, 1555—Sultan Suleiman was at Amasya in the far northeast of Asia Minor. Suleiman's absence, however, relieved neither the Venetian Senate nor the Curia Romana from the fear of Turkish attack, for almost as regularly as the rotation of the seasons the arsenal at Istanbul seemed to prepare a fleet for action in Italian waters. Letters from the baillie in Istanbul had warned the Signoria that the Turks were preparing an armada of sixty or more galleys. When the armada set out under the high command of a newly-appointed admiral, Dragut Beg was expected to be one of the four sanjakbeys serving the admiral and sharing responsibility for the forthcoming Turkish expedition.<sup>16</sup> There were sighs of relief in the Senate when it was learned that once more the baillie had secured from the Porte assurance of "good treatment" (*bon trattamento*) for Venetian ships and subjects,<sup>17</sup> which proved to be the case when, later on, the Turkish armada passed by Corfu, and made a landing in Calabria in late June and early July, at which time five French galleys came by way of

Malta to meet the Turks.<sup>18</sup> And now the Senate undertook to provide Rustem Pasha with the cloth "per le sei veste rechiede da soa signoria" (he had sent a sample of the cloth he wanted) as well as an "horologio de cristal" (if indeed one could get a clock of crystal-ware).<sup>19</sup>

In Rome one received frequent news of the Turks, from Venice. Officials at the Curia were usually well informed. A secretary at the Vatican had just summarized or copied a report from Istanbul dated 23 March (1555), the very day of Julius III's death, concerning the progress being made on the Turkish galleys at the arsenal in Istanbul. Sixty or seventy galleys were being armed. They would leave the Bosphorus when the oarsmen (*galeotti*) had arrived from Anatolia. The Turkish armada would come westward under the command of the Ottoman admiral or of Dragut "or of both." The word from Amasya was that Suleiman had gone hunting with two pashas on a nine days' trip toward Ankara, where he would spend a month. Mehmed, the third pasha, had been left in charge of the encampment at Amasya, where the ambassador of the Shah Tahmâsp, the "Sophi," had not yet arrived, which was leading to speculation as to whether he would really come. (He did come, as we have seen in the preceding chapter; he was well received, and a Turco-Persian peace was made.) Three envoys of Ferdinand, king of the Romans, who had reached Istanbul by 10 March, had left with an escort "per andare alla Porta," i.e., to go to the sultan's encampment at Amasya,<sup>20</sup> where on 10 May Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq had (as we know) witnessed the arrival and grand reception of the Persian ambassador.

About the time of Paul IV's election a papal secretary was copying other *avvisi* from Istanbul, dated 8 April (1555), concerning the Turkish armada, Dragut's command, the plague in Istanbul, the Sophi's mission to Amasya, Sultan Suleiman's alleged grief at his son Mustafâ's death, the failure of the (third) Pseudo-Mustafâ's uprising against Suleiman, and the seizure of his chief followers, whose fate awaited the sultan's orders.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 121'.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 141'–143', 150'–151'.

<sup>16</sup> On 21 May, 1555, the Senate had considered the proposed text of a dispatch to be sent to the provveditore of the Venetian fleet, informing him that letters from the baillie in Istanbul (up to 23 April) had indicated "che ivi si continuava con diligentia a preparar l'armata di quel serenissimo Signor [Suleiman], la qual saria di galie 60 in su, et usciria sotto 'l governo del magnifico capitaneo del mare ultimamente creato con quattro sanzaccas, fra li quali vi è il magnifico Drogout Bey, et con mille janizzari oltra un buon numero de spachi et altri scapoli. . . ." But perhaps the Turks would prove friendly when they were finally at sea (more so than Dragut had been the previous year), but if not the provveditore must be ready to defend the interests of the Republic (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 117'–118').

This dispatch, however, was apparently not sent, for whatever reason, and when on 30 May (1555) Cristoforo da Canale received his commission as the new provveditore, he was instructed to observe every article of the peace between Venice and the Porte, which did provide for action against Moslem corsairs. Canale was, to be sure, to maintain the honor of the state, which might in an emergency mean standing up to the Turks (*ibid.*, fols. 121' ff.). The newly-appointed admiral (*il magnifico capitaneo del mare*) was a favorite of the so-called sultan, Roxelana, and he would need Dragut's experience "per essere giovane inesperto" (see below, note 21).

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fols. 124'–125'.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 129', doc. dated 11 July, 1555.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 130'.

<sup>20</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XV, fol. 162, by mod. stamped enumeration, "di Costantinopoli de XXIII Marzo [1555]. . . ."

<sup>21</sup> The gossip text of the *avvisi* of 8 April, 1555, seems worth giving (Lettere di principi, vol. XV, fol. 224, "da Costantinopoli di VIII Aprile"): "Che l'armata si metteva all'ordine lentamente, et che usciranno 70 galere o poco più, et al più presto dopo mezo Maggio. Che sarà capitano dell'armata Dra-

The Turkish naval expedition of 1555 has left no small impression upon the contemporary sources. On 2 August the doge and Senate sent the baillie in Istanbul news of the sultan's armada,

guth Rays et quello Pialagà, che già fu designato capitano del mare, ma hora sarà solo con titolo di compagno con Draguth per essere giovane inesperto, et portandosi bene haurà più nome di generale per essere molto favorito dalla soltana [Khâssêki Khurrâm, known as 'Roxelana'] et da Amath Bassà, et si disegna dargli per moglie una figlia di Rusten Bassà, genero del Gran Turco. Che in Constantinopoli et in Pera vi è la peste assai grande.

"Per lettere di Amasia scritte al clarissimo baillo in Constantinopoli da Zanesino, interprete di questi illustrissimi signori, si avisa che il Turco era per andare in Allepo et non per venire a Constantinopoli. Che gli ambasciatori del Sophi erano lontani sei giornate d' Amasia, et venivano per trattar pace o tregua, et portavano honorato presente al Turco, et tra l' altre cose cinquanta donzelle et altrettanti giovani bellissimi et un padiglione da campagna di 50 alloggiamenti di inestimabili maestria. Item un tappeto con opera di tempo di sette anni.

"Per mezo d' uno amico quale ha buona intelligenza in Constantinopoli anchora sono avisto in questo modo: Che per lettere di sei d' Aprile uscirà l' armata di Constantinopoli al numero di 60 gallerie presso le quali saranno le fuste che rimasero fuori questa invernata al numero di 40 in circa. Che del tempo che hauranno a uscire non si può affermare, ma per quello che si può vedere non saranno così presto. Che della venuta del Turco non si può affermare quello habbia da essere, perchè nessuno lo sa, nè lo può sapere lui anchora. Che alcune persone pratiche per via di conietture credono che il Turco sia assai alienato della mente per i molti dolori della morte del figlio et altri inconvenienti suoi, et che poco sia disposto alle negotii.

"Di più nelle suddette lettere di VIII [Aprile] si contiene che era stato condotto in Constantinopoli uno che nelle parti di Bursia fingeva di essere Mustafa già figlio del Gran Turco, dando ad intendere al vulgo che quello che era stato morto sotto suo nome fu mandato da lui per dubio di suo padre, ma che lui era il vero Mustafa, et aveva compagni di questa fraude, alli quali soli si lasciava vedere, et molti lo seguivano. Hora è stato giustiziato in Constantinopoli, et delli compagni, che sono prigioni, si aspetta ordine dal detto Gran Turco."

On Piali Agà, "che già fu designato capitano del mare" (as noted in the *avvisi* of 8 April, 1555, given above), Dragut Reis, and further news from Istanbul, see the long letter of 20 May (1555) from M. de Codignac, the French ambassador at the Porte, to Henry II, in E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols., Paris, 1848-60, repr. New York, 1965, II, 329-46. Immediately upon receiving Codignac's letter, with the news that the Turkish armada had left the Bosphorus on 18 May, Henry II wrote a letter of profuse thanks to Sultan Sulaiman, outlining plans for the joint Franco-Turkish naval operations "faire exécuter les entreprises qui s' offrent . . . au dommage du commun ennemy et de ses adhérens." By intercepted letters which had come into French hands from the Hapsburg ministries "in Italy, Naples, Sicily, the Spains, Flanders, and [the enemy's] other states, and even from those which he holds in the Indies," the French had learned that the imperialist forces lacked funds, the Hapsburgs' subjects were discontented, and their troops mutinous. It was obviously a fine time for a joint Turkish and French expedition to strike at the common enemy (*ibid.*, II, 346-51, "excerpt à St.-Germain en Laye, le VIII<sup>e</sup> jour de juillet MV<sup>le</sup>LV").

which had gone through the strait of Messina, passed the Punta del Faro (at the northeastern tip of Sicily), sailed up the Tyrrhenian coast to Civitavecchia, and gone on to Porto S. Stefano, at the northern foot of Monte Argentario, "in la marena di Siena." From there it had continued to Piombino,

and some of the galliots went to a town called Popolonia [just north of Piombino] in the aforesaid marea, guarded by men of the area, and they seized it. At Piombino the armada put ashore some Moslems, who skirmished with the German infantry [stationed] in the region, and thereafter the Moslems went aboard their galleys. They weighed anchor, and proceeded to the island of Elba, to Porto Longone [now called Porto Azzurro], to await the galleys of the most Christian king [Henry II], which according to the reports from Rome came from Marseille to the number of twenty-three. On the twenty-fifth of the past month [25 July] they joined with the armada of that most serene lord [the sultan] at Elba. It was said that another eleven galleys of his most Christian Majesty have remained at Marseille with milord [Paul] de Termes to take on a load of ship's biscuit [*panatico*]. They were supposed to come as soon as possible to meet up with the armada. It was also said that two to three thousand infantry had come aboard the French galleys and other ships, and that the armada would make an attempt on Portoferrajo [i.e., Portoferraio], which is on the island of Elba.

A good many infantry were also raised, in the name of the most Christian king, in the region of Siena to assist in the venture. The five French galleys which went out to meet the armada, as we wrote you in our last letter [of 11 July], had to go too far out to sea because of the emperor's galleys, and so failed to get together with the armada. The French galleys put in at Corfu, where our rettori welcomed them and took care of their needs. Then they had to leave Corfu to go after the armada. Reports from Genoa of 17 July indicate that thirty of the emperor's galleys were at Genoa, that Prince [Andrea] Doria was at Naples with another thirty-three galleys, and that they have provided infantry to protect Savona and Arbenga [i.e., Albenga] on the Genoa coast.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 136, and cf. Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Nuntiaturlberichte*, I-14 (Tübingen, 1971), nos. 114, 120, pp. 280, 294-97, letters of the papal nuncio Girolamo Muzzarelli, dated at Brussels 21 July and 26 August, 1555; see in general Cesare Riccomanni, Francesco Grotanelli, and Luciano Bianchi, *Relazione della Guerra di Siena di Don Antonio di Montalto, tradotta dallo spagnolo da Don Garzia di Montalto suo figlio*, Turin, 1863, pp. 169, 178-82, and esp. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 351 ff.

Vasari has depicted the defeat of the Turks at Piombino in 1555, in the Sala del Cinquecento in the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence (T.S.R. Boase, *Giorgio Vasari, the Man and the Book*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1979, p. 303, fig. 198 [Bollingen Series, XXXV]), and dwells on the event in his *Ragionamenti* (Gaetano

Sultan Suleiman returned to Istanbul on 1 August (1555), after two years' absence on the Persian campaign, and he was doubtless interested to learn how his galleys had been faring. On 30 August the doge and Senate wrote the bailie of the further movements of the Turks off the Italian shores:

We have since learned that the armada of that most serene lord [Suleiman] has left the isle of Elba. They thought it best not to try to take Portoferagio [Portoferraio]. The armada went on to Corsica, and along with the galleys of the most Christian king they have landed troops and artillery. They have attacked Calvi, a fortress maintained and garrisoned by the Genoese, upon which they made a vigorous assault. Finding the enterprise difficult and doubtful, they weighed anchor, left Calvi, and went to Bastia, a town on the said island of Corsica. They disembarked men and artillery to make an attempt upon the town. Of the emperor's galleys we know nothing but the fact that twelve galleys have been sent from Naples to Port' Ercole [on the southeast of Monte Argentario] to see to the needs and defense of that place. Letters have been written to us from Genoa to the effect that the galleys which were there have gone to Naples. . . .<sup>25</sup>

Thereafter, as usual, the doge and Senate sent the bailie the news from Brussels of the Hapsburg-Valois military moves in Flanders, Picardy, Piedmont, and elsewhere. On 18 September (1555)

Milanesi, *Le Opere di Giorgio Vasari*, 9 vols., Florence, 1875-85, VIII, 196, 218, refs. from my friend Rensselaer W. Lee.

We find the Turks at Piombino on 12 July (1555), and according to letters from Rome of 13 July. "l'armata Turchesca lunedì notte alle 4 hore passò da Ostia senza alcuna lesione di quelle riviere . . ." (Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1038 [1554-1558], fols. 76-77", and note fols. 78, 82", 85, 85'-86", 88").

On 26 July (1555) Cardinal Jean du Bellay wrote Anne de Montmorency from Rome that while the pro-French were more than happy at the thought that the Turks might winter off the coasts of Italy, Paul IV would protest, but if du Bellay and the French ambassador were notified in time, they could take care of the matter: "Il est vray que si au partir de là, l'armée Turquesque vient hyverner en ces mers, comme tous ceux qui aiment la grandeur certaine du Roy et la ruine infaillible de l'Empereur, en prient Dieu à coudes et à genoux, sa Sainteté crieria, mais si de cette délibération nous sommes advertis à bonne heure, il se remediera à tout . . ." (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II [1666], 613).

Since 1949 Porto Longone has been called Porto Azzurro.

<sup>25</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 139r. Calvi, on the northwest coast of Corsica, was probably the chief Genoese fortress on the island; Bastia, on the northeast coast (at the base of Cape Corse), was and still remains the most important place on Corsica. A German report from Rome, dated 10 August (1555), had stated, "Utraque classis [i.e., Turcorum et Gallorum] in Corsica oppugnat oppidum Calva, quod si expugnaverint, nihil reliquum est Genuensibus in illa insula" (August von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des XVI. Jahrhunderts* . . . , IV [Munich, 1896], no. 659, p. 705).

the Senate reported that the Turkish and French galleys had found the attempt to take Bastia also too difficult, and gave up their bombardment of the town on 23 August,<sup>24</sup> after which the naval campaign of 1555 was all over. On 1 October the provveditore of the Venetian fleet wrote the Senate of the Turks' departure eastward, "l'armata Turchesca esser passata verso il Levante,"<sup>25</sup> sailing directly from Corsica.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, in the wake of the Turkish withdrawal "many fuste were remained in Corfiote waters, where they have done quite enough damage," and so the bailie was to lodge the usual protest with the pashas to take appropriate action against those who accorded a reception to corsairs.<sup>27</sup>

In the years that lay just ahead Pope Paul IV would worry more about heresies than crusades, more about Lutherans than Turks. According to Panvino, Paul's forebears were said to have been of German origin. Upon entering Italy, they had settled first at Pisa and later at Naples, where they had established themselves among the first families of the nobility. Paul's father, Gian Antonio Carafa, had received the county of Montorio as part of his wife's dowry, and Paul's elder brother, Gian Alfonso, had become in his turn count of Montorio. Gian Alfonso had died some time before Paul's elevation to the papal throne, leaving three sons, Giovanni, Antonio, and Carlo. Giovanni had succeeded his father as count of Montorio; Antonio became marquis of Montebello; and on 7 June (1555) Paul made his nephew Carlo cardinal-deacon of SS. Vito e Modesto.<sup>28</sup> It was a mistake. As

<sup>24</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 147r.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 149r, doc. dated 7 October, 1555. On 22 September it had already been reported from Corfu "che l'armata Turchesca l'istesso giorno passò fuori di quell' isola per ritornare in Constantinopoli, la quale aveva abbrucciato 5 gallere nel mare per mancomento d' huomini che non potevano seguitare l'armata, et havevano cavato fuori l'artiglieria, et quelle poche gente che v' erano et interzate sopra l'altre galere, che detta armata era molto ruinata et priva di gente per essere morti molti Turchi et in particolare da 1,000 gianicieri, che da 700 ne morirono sotto Piombino et da 300 sotto Calvi" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1038, fol. 91r).

<sup>26</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 152r, doc. dated 19 October.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 156r, doc. dated 7 November, 1555, and note fols. 158r, 164r.

<sup>28</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fol. 195r. By a bull of 13 June (1555) Carafa was given absolution for the crimes he had committed during a rather unsavory military past; there is an excellent brief account of his career by A. Prosperi, "Carlo Carafa," in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XIX (1976), 497-509. Among the various charges brought against Carafa at his trial, under Pius IV, was that of blasphemous heresy (Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Nuntiatenberichte*, 1-14 [Tübingen, 1971], append., no. 13, pp. 420-21).

Massarelli says, Carlo Carafa had been a Hospitalier, a soldier all his life (*miles Hierosolymitanus ac toto vitae suae tempore in seculari militia*). He had most recently fought on the French side in the war of Siena, having abandoned a possible career under Charles V,<sup>29</sup> who had shown no interest in the advancement of a Carafa.<sup>30</sup>

Old Gian Pietro, now Paul IV, and Charles V had been enemies for years. When the news of Paul's election had reached Charles at Brussels (on the evening of 31 May), as Federico Badoer, the Venetian ambassador to the imperial court, wrote the doge and Senate,

It has not proved agreeable, both because well nigh all the Pope's relatives have been considered ill disposed towards the Emperor by reason of the affairs of the kingdom of Naples, and also on account of his Majesty's having been so opposed to him with regard to his archbishopric of that city.<sup>31</sup>

Gian Pietro had been named archbishop of Naples a half dozen years before (on 22 February, 1549), but had been excluded from his see by the hostility of the imperial viceroy, Don Pedro de Toledo, until September, 1551. The new pope had long been pro-French, and not without reason.<sup>32</sup>

Paul IV had two major ambitions, to defend

and extend Catholic orthodoxy and to diminish the power and prestige of the Hapsburgs. The Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero, who knew him well, speaks of Paul's overriding concern for the affairs of the Inquisition: consistories were usually held three days a week—Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; two days were given over to the Segnatura—Tuesdays and Saturdays. Paul often missed these meetings (*ne lascia molti*). The Inquisition met on Thursdays, and nothing could prevent his attendance (*non lascia per alcuno accidente che possa occorrere*).<sup>33</sup>

1882, was a good book in its day, providing the reader with more than a hundred excerpts from manuscript sources.

The most valuable studies on Paul IV, however, are by the Benedictine scholar Dom René AnceI, the most important for our present purpose being: "La Question de Sienne et la politique du Cardinal Carlo Carafa (1556-1557)," *Revue Bénédicte*, XXII (1905), 15-49, 206-31, 398-428, and "La Disgrâce et le procès des Carafa," *ibid.*, XXII (1905), 225-35; XXIV (1907), 224-53, 479-509; XXV (1908), 194-224; and XXVI (1909), 52-80, 189-220, and 301-24, the title of this latter work being altered to "Le Procès et la disgrâce des Carafa" in the last three instalments (in the *Revue Bénédicte*, vol. XXVI). Note also AnceI, *Nonciatures de France: Nonciatures de Paul IV (avec la dernière année de Jules III et Marcel II)*, I. *Nonciatures de Sebastiano Guallero et de Cesare Brancaccio*, pts. 1-2, Paris, 1909-11; "Paul IV et le Concile," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, VIII (1907), 716-41; "Le Vatican sous Paul IV: Contribution à l'histoire du palais pontifical," *Revue Bénédicte*, XXV (1908), 48-71; and "Notes à propos d'études sur la diplomatie pontificale au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," *ibid.*, XXIV (1907), 411-14. The last piece is slight, to be sure, but interesting. And mention should be made of two other works of AnceI, "La Secrétairerie pontificale sous Paul IV," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXXIX (new ser. XXXV, 1906), 408-70, and "L'Activité réformatrice de Paul IV: Le Choix des cardinaux," *ibid.*, LXXXVI (new ser. XLII, 1909), 67-103.

AnceI's studies rendered George Duruy's book somewhat antiquated. Ludwig Riess's lengthy monograph *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten: Eine weltgeschichtliche Krisis des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1909, has proved useful although, oddly enough, he failed to use any of AnceI's studies. For Paul IV (as for other popes) the reader may turn with confidence to Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, chaps. III-XV, pp. 56-424, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), bk. II, chaps. II-VI, pp. 357-626. Pastor relies a good deal on AnceI.

The period of Henry II's reign (1547-1559), which includes that of Paul IV (1555-1559), is admirably covered by Lucien Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols., Paris, 1913-14. Also relevant is Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli (1540-1565)*, Città del Vaticano, 1961, a life of Paul IV's grandnephew, the son of Antonio Carafa, marchese di Montebello. Antonio Veneri Ballester, *Paulo IV, esufondatore della clericali religioza (1476-1559)*, Palma de Mallorca, 1976, is concerned chiefly with the religiosity of the pope and the Theatines, to which he adds little or nothing new. Of general interest for the history of the papacy from the 1550's is the well-known work of Jean Delumeau, *Vie économique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 2 vols., Paris, 1957-59.

<sup>33</sup> Navagero, "Relazione di Roma [1558]," in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. III (1846), p. 382.

<sup>29</sup> Panvino, in Merkle, *Com. Trident.*, II, 271a, from the Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fol. 300, and Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, *ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>30</sup> In November, 1555, Cardinal Carlo Carafa had occasion to tell the Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero that the Spaniards had just offered him a pension of 4,000 ducats "that I might serve the Emperor and the King of England [Philip] in their need." Carafa declined the offer with some indignation (he said), "for after having served the Emperor during seventeen years, and well, . . . I have been ill recompensed" (Rawdon Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1 [London, 1877], no. 279, p. 249).

<sup>31</sup> Rawdon Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1 (1877), no. 117, p. 94.

<sup>32</sup> The earliest important "secondary" work on the troubled reign of Paul IV is Pietro Nares, *Storia della guerra di Paolo IV, sommo pontefice, contro gli spagnuoli*, ed. Luciano Scarabelli, in the *Archivio storico italiano*, XII (Florence, 1847), on which cf. below, note 63. After Nares comes Carlo Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV, Pontefice Massimo*, 12 vols. in 2 vols., Ravenna: Antonmaria Landi, 1748-1753, bks. IX-XII, II, 215 ff., covering the years of Paul's papacy. Carlo Bromato is a nom de guerre for Bartolomeo Carrara, a Theatine; his work is detailed and on the whole reliable; but he is unduly defensive of Paul IV, one of the founders of the Theatine Order. See in general Luigi Volpicella, "Della Guerra Carafesca di Roma sotto Paolo IV e del suo esito infelice," *Arch. stor. per le province napoletane*, XXXV (1910), 553-83, I, 23-30, 193-256; II, 47-63, 170-206, 257-65, 302-21. The work of George Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa (1519-1561), Étude sur le pontificat de Paul IV*, Paris,

Any deviation into heresy, any suggestion of simony, any evidence of immorality during Paul's reign might well bring a poor wretch before the dread tribunal of the Holy Office. If found guilty of heresy, and especially of a relapse into heresy, he was likely to be condemned to death at the stake or to a lifetime in the galleys. Harsh measures were taken against the Jews as punishment perhaps for the crucifixion as well as for the purpose of preserving the purity of the Catholic faith, and from 1555 they were confined in Rome to the walled Ghetto which ran along the Tiber from the Theater of Marcellus to the Portico of Octavia and the hillock on which the church of the Cenci stands. The first "Indices librorum prohibitorum" were to be prepared under the auspices of the Inquisition, and the sweeping range of their condemnations worried booksellers who feared the widespread destruction of their current book stock. As Navagero wrote the doge and Senate from Rome (on 7 September, 1557),

At these last congregations of the Inquisition, certain friars who sit there as counsellors (*consultori*) proposed to the Pope a very long list of books which they say are heretical, and are to be burned. His Holiness gave orders accordingly, but little by little so as not to do so much injury to the booksellers all at once. Those which are to be burned now are all the works of Erasmus, Boccaccio, Machiavelli, Corio's Chronicles, Poggio's *Facetiae*, and those of the *piovano* [parish priest] Arlotto. The booksellers are recommended to present a petition in defence of their interests, with a demand for the matter to be referred to two cardinals, but they have little hope, the intimation to present the said books having been already made to them.<sup>34</sup>

Navagero's description, *ibid.*, pp. 377 ff., of Paul IV's career, character, personality, and appearance is well known. Paul was a nephew of Cardinal Oliviero Carafa (on whom see Volume II of the present work, pp. 316-18, *et alibi*), with whom he lived for a while in Rome from the year 1496. Paul had served the Holy See as nuncio in both England and Spain.

"La complessione di questo pontefice è colericca e adusta; ha una gravità incredibile e grandezza in tutte le sue azioni, e veramente par nato a signoreggiare. È molto sano e robusto; cammina che non pare che tocchi terra; è tutto nervo con poca carne. . . ." Paul was learned and a linguist: "È letterato in ogni sorta di lettere: parla italiano, latino, greco, e spagnuolo ancora, così propriamente che par nato in mezzo di Grecia, in mezzo di Spagna; e chi intende quelle lingue, confessa che non si può desiderar meglio. Ha una memoria così tenace che si ricorda quanto ha letto, che è quasi ogni cosa. Ha tutta la Scrittura Sacra a mente, e gl' interpreti ancora, ma principalmente S. Tommaso. . . ." La vita sua, per quello che si sa e si vede, è netta d' ogni macchia ed è stata sempre tale. . . ." He did business in a vehement fashion, and prized the papacy as the most exalted office in the world, ". . . oltre il grado del pontificato che dice essere per mettere i re e gl' imperatori sotto i piedi. . ." (Albèri, *op. cit.*, pp. 479-80).

<sup>34</sup> Brown, *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2 (London, 1881), no. 1024, p. 1299.

By this time the Pauline Inquisition was going full force, and some two months before (on 16 July, 1557) the pope had extolled its merits to Navagero:

. . . We are of opinion that no tribunal acts with more sincerity, nor more with a view to the honor of God, than this one of the Inquisition. We have proposed to ourselves to assign to it whatever depends on the articles of faith or can be made to approach them. Profane swearing, which we assigned them heretofore, is a species of infidelity, as it attributes to God what is not His, depriving Him of what He has. We assign to them the heinous crime against nature, from its enormity [i.e., sodomy]; and yesterday we assigned to them, besides, the simoniacal heresy, forbidding all the other tribunals . . . to interfere with those matters for the future. . . .

We shall thus abolish the sale of the sacraments, the ordination of lads, as any beast could be ordained, for money, the sale of benefices, and all the other illicit contracts, which have caused all possible mischief and scandal. . . .<sup>35</sup>

Paul IV gave ample evidence of his sincerity during the five years or so of his pontificate. The austere Augustinian, Girolamo Seripando, however, who became a cardinal and legate to the Council of Trent in 1561, entertained a different view of Paul IV's Inquisition, as he recalled its performance after some years:

[Paul III] in order, to some extent, to guard against the new and noxious beliefs which were springing up daily, like wild and woody weeds in an unkempt and abandoned field, established the tribunal of the Inquisition in Rome [by the bull *Licet ab initio* on 21 July, 1542] at the behest and the instigation of Gian Pietro Carafa, the cardinal of Chieti. In charge of it he put Gian Pietro himself and another Gian, the then cardinal of Burgos [i.e., Juan Álvarez de Toledo]. At first the tribunal was restrained and merciful as, to be sure, Paul [III]'s own temperament always was. But thereafter the number of cardinals in charge was increased, and every day the jurisdiction of the judges was more and more strengthened and reasserted, above all because of Gian Pietro's severity which was relieved by no feeling of humanity, [and this tribunal] loomed so grimly large [*in eam crevit magnitudinem*] that nowhere in all the world were judgments thought to be more horrible and more dreadful, judgments which should have been considered just and proper if they were based upon that charitable love which Christ Jesus, whom God the Father made the judge of all mankind, both taught and practiced.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 966, pp. 1219-20.

<sup>36</sup> Seripando, *De Tridentino Concilio commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 405. Neither Leopold von Ranke nor Henry Chas. Lea has delivered a more sweeping indictment of the Roman Inquisition.



In his first secret consistory, held on 29 May, 1555, Paul had announced that the prime purpose of his pontificate would lie "in cleansing and reforming corrupt practices in the church" (*in expurgandis et reformandis corruptis Ecclesiae moribus*),<sup>37</sup> and there was apparent agreement in the consistory that peace must be achieved in Europe.<sup>38</sup> Paul was sure of himself as well as of the cause he proclaimed. He had been elected pope against the wishes of almost everyone in the conclave and contrary to his own expectation. He had never granted favors; he had never sought to please anyone. Shortly before his death he was to tell Alvise Mocenigo, Navagero's successor as the Venetian ambassador to the Holy See, "I do not know how they came to elect me pope, and I always assume that it is not the cardinals but God who makes the pontiffs."<sup>39</sup>

In notifying Charles V and Ferdinand I of his election in briefs of 24 and 26 May (1555) Paul emphasized, as his prime objectives, the need of achieving peace among the Christian princes as well as the need of bringing about reform in the Church.<sup>40</sup> As he approached the age of eighty, he would have done well to abide by his declaration of peace. Although Navagero described him as "all sinews with little flesh," and as one who seemed not to touch the ground as he walked (*cammina che non pare che tocchi terra*), Massarelli informs us that of the meeting of the Segnatura on 15 June

(1555) Paul could hardly sign petitions with his own hand "because of the decrepitude of old age" (*ob aetatem iam decrepitam*), which led him to assign the subscription of petitions to the Neapolitan cardinal Gianmichele Saraceni.<sup>41</sup>

Paul's character and personality intrigued the Venetian ambassadors Navagero and Mocenigo. According to Navagero, at the beginning of his reign Paul liked to give sumptuous dinners. Twenty-five courses were hardly enough. He usually ate twice a day, but he drank much more than he ate (*beve molto più di quello che mangia*). His favorite beverage was the strong and heady, black wine called "mangiaguerra" which he got from Naples. It was so thick one could almost cut it. After a meal he always drank malmsey, which his household called "cleaning his teeth." Malmsey was a Greek wine; Paul seems to have been fond of it; and he apparently liked French wines.<sup>42</sup> Sometimes three hours elapsed from the time he sat down to dinner to the time he rose. He talked freely, often giving away secrets of importance. After a serious illness, however, he usually dined alone, although sometimes cardinals who wished to do so might join him. "It was regarded as a great favor," says Navagero, "that his Holiness had me dine with him twice, for in my time [in Rome] he did not do so with any other ambassador except at formal banquets."

Paul paid no attention to the hours of day or night. Dinner had to be served whenever he chose to eat. He might read or write half the night, sleep half the day, and no one dared to enter his chamber until he had rung a bedside bell. It was difficult to arrange for audiences, and Paul gave far fewer than his predecessors. Always aware of the dignity of his exalted office, he dressed with pontifical care. One required patience, dexterity, prudence, and good judgment in dealing with him. It was well not to approach him with the resolve to get something done, but if one got him in a good hu-

<sup>37</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 272.

<sup>38</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Consistorialia coram Iulio III . . . Marcello II . . . Paulo IV [1550-1559], in Acta Miscelanea, Reg. 33, fol. 191<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration: "Apud Sanctum Petrum Romae die Mercurii XXIX Maii 1555 fuit primum consistorium in quo sanctissimus dominus noster Paulus Papa IV habuit orationem qua egit gratias reverendissimis dominis de eius electione et deputavit nonnullos reverendissimos qui antea a felicis recordationis Marcello Papa II ad id deputati fuerant super reformatione facienda, et successive fuit factum verbum de pace procuranda inter Christianos principes," and cf. Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1555, no. 22, and Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, p. 224.

<sup>39</sup> Alvise (Luigi) Mocenigo, "Relazione di Roma [1560]" in Eugenio Alberi, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV (Florence, 1857), pp. 46-47: "[Paolo IV] era però riputato uomo d' intelletto, di dottrina e di bontà, di modo che giunto all' età grave di quasi 80 anni, pervenuto al decanato del Collegio de' Cardinali, fu dappoi eletto antico Pontefice contra il parere e credere d' ognuno, e forse anco di sè stesso, siccome Sua Santità propria mi disse poco innanzi che morisse che non aveva mai compiaciuto ad alcuno, e che se un cardinale gli aveva dimandata qualche grazia, gli aveva sempre risposto alla rovescia, nè mai compiaciuto, onde disse: 'Io non so come m' abbiano eletto Papa; e sempre concludo che non li cardinali, ma Iddio faccia li pontefici.'"

<sup>40</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1555, no. 24.

<sup>41</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 275.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. the brief of 21 July, 1555, to Bernardino de Mendoza, in *regno Neapolitano regio locumtenens*. "Mittimus dilectum filium Franciscum Sangalietum Florentinum, qui has ad nobilitatem tuam literas pertulit, ut emat in regno isto pro domus et familiae nostrae usu dolia CCL vini graeci eius generis quod ab eo cognoscas. . . ." Paul wanted the wine shipped quickly, freely, "et sine ullo impedimento." On 29 November we find him arranging for the shipment of about one hundred dolia of wine from France "huc in aliam Urbem" (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fol. 158<sup>v</sup>). Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 364, note 4, denies that Paul was "ein starker Trinker," and he may of course be right. Cf. also Carlo Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (Ravenna, 1753), bk. x, pp. 414-17.

mor, he found it hard to say no, *perchè, addolcito, poi difficilmente le [cose] niega*.<sup>43</sup>

Paul's reign began with the usual ceremonies of obedience. Already on 30 May (1555) Ercole II d' Este, the duke of Ferrara, had made his "publica obedientia" to the pope, who had given him a most honorable reception. Guidobaldo II della Rovere was made prefect of Rome in a ceremony held just before the celebration of mass, in the Cappella Sistina (on 9 June), and on the following day in the Sala Regia an English embassy of obedience [sent to Julius III or to Pope Marcellus] signalized England's return to the Church under Mary Tudor and her husband Philip [II]. Ottavio Farnese arrived in Rome on 11 June. Two days later an envoy of Ferdinand I, who liked to avoid "inane pomp," made his Majesty's obedience to the new pope in a private audience. Ottavio Farnese also rendered his "debita obedientia" as a vassal and feudatory of the Church (on 27 June). And so it went.<sup>44</sup> If Paul's reign as pope was beginning like that of any of his predecessors, his troubles were worse than those which most of them had faced or at least he made them worse. He was, to be sure, a learned man, a very model of Catholic orthodoxy. No breath of scandal had ever touched his long life. He was, moreover, a patriot, for he loved Italy almost as much as he did the divinely-ordained Church over which (he believed) God had set him. Both the Church and Italy had fearful problems, however, and Paul was not the man to lessen them.

Catholicism was imperiled throughout northern Europe, and there were audible voices of dissent in Italy. Scandinavia was lost to the Church. Although England appeared to have returned to the apostolic fold, thoughtful observers knew that the future there was as doubtful as it was in the Netherlands. The Huguenots were strong in France. Hungary, as we have noted, was proving hospitable to Lutherans and especially to Calvinists. The Church seemed in danger of losing Poland, where the easy-going Sigismund II Augustus

was unequal to the tasks and trials which lay before him. In the summer of 1555 Paul sent Alvisio Lippomano, the accomplished bishop of Verona, to the fateful diet at Augsburg and thence to Poland,<sup>45</sup> where his mission of more than a year ended in utter frustration.<sup>46</sup>

The crux of the Reformation was Germany. Energetic and powerful, but politically and culturally divided, the Germans were at odds with and within themselves. To many of them it was unclear whether they were on the road to salvation or disaster. In a letter of 6 June, 1555, to the Sacred College, expressing sorrow at the death of Marcellus II and satisfaction with the election of Paul IV, Adolf von Schauenburg, the archbishop and elector of Cologne, dwelt on the ecclesiastical and social upheavals of the time. The electoral see of Mainz was a case in point. For years the ravages of war had been emptying farmlands and villages, towns and monasteries, fortresses and archiepiscopal dwellings.

Along with plunder and pillage had gone endless financial levies "both against the Turks and for other purposes," as well as the heavy costs of diets, councils, colloquia, and all kinds of assemblies. Mainz seemed to have suffered almost every sort of calamity, and hardly had the resources to assure its own survival. When the electoral see of Mainz was so badly off—even allowing for the usual exaggeration—what of the rest of the German churches on the roadways of religious and political warfare? Schauenburg's letter was written as a consequence of the death of Sebastian von Heusenstamm (on 18 March, 1555), archbishop and elector of Mainz, and the recent election of Schauenburg's friend Daniel Brendel von Homburg to succeed him.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Navagero, *Relazione [1558]*, in Albèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. III, pp. 380-82.

<sup>44</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 272-76. On the English embassy of obedience, note the letter of Giovanni Michiel, the Venetian ambassador in England, to the doge and Senate, dated 6 May, 1555, in Brown, *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1 (1877), no. 72, p. 62; on that of Ercole d' Este, the Acta Consistorialia, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 33, fols. 192'-193'; and concerning the request of Philip II and Mary that Paul IV should elevate the island of Hibernia (Ireland) to the rank of a kingdom, *ibid.*, fols. 194'-195', and Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, 224-25.

<sup>45</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann., nos. 56 ff., with Paul IV's brief of 13 June, 1555, to Alvisio Lippomano, and esp. Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 89'-96'; briefs dated 6-10 July (1555); fols. 113-124'; briefs dated 14 August; fols. 145-147, briefs dated 8 October; fols. 176'-177', brief dated 23 December, on the alleged lapse into heresy of John Drohojowski (d. 1557), bishop of Włocławek (*Wladislaviensis*, Leslau); and fols. 192'-195', briefs dated 19 February, 1556.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 327-37, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 555-63, with the older bibliography. Lippomano left Poland early in the year 1557, and was back in his see (Verona) by the beginning of March. After some months Camillo Mentuato was appointed his successor as nuncio to Poland. Mentuato's mission was hardly more successful. On Lippomano's career and his experience in Augsburg, see Helmut Goetz, ed., *Nuntiatursberichte*, 1-17 (Tübingen, 1970), pp. XXIII-XLI, and nos. 46-85, pp. 95-177.

<sup>47</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XV, fols. 260, 265', by mod. stamped enumeration, text divided by the

The hardships of Catholics and the problems of the Church in Germany—and in Hungary—were well known at the Curia Romana. On 19 June (1555) Paul IV wrote King Ferdinand, thanking him for the gracious response to the brief Paul had sent the Austrian court, announcing his election to the papacy. Paul hated Charles V, the brother of Ferdinand, and he entertained no affection for the latter. He expressed, however, the hope and the alleged conviction that Ferdinand would watch over the Christian commonwealth, and that by his efforts Hungary would be freed from injury by the Turks and Germany from the taint of heresy.<sup>48</sup>

The Turks were as much feared in Venice as the Lutherans in Rome. On 6 July (1555) Filippo Archinto, the bishop of Saluzzo and papal nuncio in Venice, wrote the pope's nephew Giovanni Carafa, count of Montorio, that the news from Istanbul suggested that not only was Hapsburg-held Hungary in danger, but so was Vienna, the gateway into the heartland of Christendom. According to "informatio vera" which Archinto had just received, Vienna was like a "villa aperta," for the old walls had been demolished, and as yet the new ones were hardly in evidence, for work on them had been proceeding at a snail's pace. "Il Signor Iddio sia quello ch' habbia misericordia di noi! . . ."<sup>49</sup>

The Venetians depended to no small extent upon the tithe levied on the clergy in Venice itself and in the Veneto for the support of their fleet, always their mainstay against the Turks. As we have seen, the popes had for years been authorizing the state's collection of the clerical tithe. The nuncio Archinto now reported (on 13 July, 1555)

binder: ". . . Hic tamen inter alias multum afflictas ecclesias non possumus non apud dominationes vestras Moguntinae vices commiserari: Eius enim ecclesiae ditiosiores res non solum in proximis bellorum tumultibus, verum etiam aliis annis recedentibus ita rapinis, incendiis, expilationibus, agrorum depopulationibus, monasteriorum, ecclesiarum, oppidorum villarumque, atque etiam ipsarum archiepiscopalis residentiae mansionum, arcium ac fortalitorum devastationibus, frequentibus imperii tam contra Turcas quam in alios fines collectionibus, visendorum conciliorum, comitorum, ac reliquarum conventionum, quarum Germania nostro tempore est feracissima, impendit et denique omni calamitatum genere sunt comminatae ut praesidi sustentando parum superstit. . . ."

<sup>48</sup> Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 76<sup>v</sup>-77<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enunciation: ". . . [Serenitatem tuam] . . . in ea semper procuracione eaque opera esse permansuram, a qua nunquam discessit et quam tuae ipsae litterae videntur polliceri, ut afflictas Christianae republicae tandem consulatur tuaque imprimis et a Turcarum iniuriis Pannonia et Germania ab haereticis liberetur. . . ."

<sup>49</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 31<sup>r</sup>, letter of Archinto to the count of Montorio, dated at Venice on 6 July, 1555.

to the count of Montorio an interesting exchange between the Doge Francesco Venier and himself concerning the tithe, which the Signoria was again requesting.

The last time Archinto had been received in the Collegio, Venier had recalled an occasion (when he was the Republic's ambassador in Rome), on which the cardinals in consistory had discussed "le nostre decime." Paul IV, then Cardinal Gian Pietro Carafa, had silenced opposition to the grant by saying, "Look out that by denying the tithes to them you don't give them the opportunity to take them by themselves!" Archinto had replied that very likely Paul had spoken as he did, knowing full well that the Venetians would never take the tithes from the clergy without papal sanction. Oh, never, never, agreed the doge, for the Signoria could not possibly fail in obedience to the Apostolic See, especially during Paul's reign. Certainly there were undertones of warning in the doge's overtones of courtesy. Why else should he have told the story? In any event Archinto passed the word on to Montorio, who would tell the pope.<sup>50</sup>

Nuncios commonly addressed their letters to the papal secretary of state rather than to the pope. By the time autumn had come Archinto was writing for the most part to Cardinal Carlo Carafa, who had displaced his elder brother Giovanni Carafa di Montorio as the pope's advisor and administrator in secular affairs. Montorio had also been obliged to give up the Borgia apartments, into which Carlo now moved. Of the pope's three nephews—Giovanni, Antonio, and Carlo—the last was by far the ablest. In a secret consistory of 30 August (1555) the pope recalled all the papal legates who had been appointed by his predeces-

<sup>50</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fols. 32-34<sup>v</sup>, esp. fol. 32<sup>r</sup>, letter dated at Venice on 13 July, 1555: ". . . Questi signori illustrissimi stimano molto questa cosa de le decime per suffragio de la loro armata, . . . et l'ultima volta ch'io sono stato in Collegio il serenissimo [Francesco Venier] disse queste parole: Noi siamo certi di havere miglior conditione da la Santità di Nostro Signore presente che da nessun altro mai, perchè ci ricordiamo (essendo noi ambasciatore a Roma) trattarsi in Consistoro de le nostre decime, et Nostro Signore presente pose silenzio a tutti gli contradicenti con dire a la felice memoria di Papa Paolo: Mirate bene che denegandolo voi non gli diate occasione di pigliarle per se stessi. Al che risposi io: Potria essere che sua Santità lo dicesse come certissimo che per causa alcuna non lo farebbono mai. Replicò all' hora sua Serenità così essere il vero, et che in eterno questo Dominio non declinerà da l'ubbidienza de la Sede Apostolica et specialmente di sua Beatitudine. So ben che hora questo discorso non fa proposito alcuno, ma così è mio costume di riferire a gli padroni ancho le parole soprabondante quando provenghino di bocca de principi . . . [and details relating to the tithe follow]."

sors, and bestowed the lucrative legation of Bologna upon Carlo. It had previously been held by the unable and unworthy Innocenzo del Monte. Carlo was equally unworthy, but no one in Rome or in Europe could long doubt the ability of the ex-soldier turned cardinal, whose capacity for intrigue and whose resentment of the Spaniards were almost disastrously to reinforce the old pontiff's anti-Spanish policy.

The six months' truce which Ferdinand's ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq had negotiated with the Turks at Amasya had not brought peace to Hungary, where border warfare was a way of life. During the year 1555, however, the Turks confined their large-scale operations to the naval expedition which (as we have seen) landed men and artillery at Populonia and Piombino on the Tyrrhenian coast and on the islands of Elba and Corsica. The nuncio Archinto concluded a letter to Cardinal Carafa from Venice on 5 October, 1555 (which was received in Rome on the ninth), with the statement that the news from Istanbul would accompany his letter. It came from a good source, although the Signoria had decided not to make it known for the time being.<sup>51</sup>

Surprisingly enough, the news is still extant, which is not usually the case with the *lettere alligate*, which tended to become detached and to disappear. Archinto's *avvisi*, however, of *Constantinopoli de III et IIII settembre, MDLV*, were to the effect that Sultan Suleiman [who had returned from the Persian campaign a month before] was feeling pretty well despite his sore leg. He was in fact planning to cross over to Anatolia to hunt wild boars and deer "in a place called in their language Isgnich [Iznik] and in ours Nicaea." There were those who believed that the chase would provide Suleiman with the opportunity to do away with another son, the "hunchbacked philosopher," whom Busbecq knew as Giangir, and describes as Suleiman's youngest son.<sup>52</sup> The reason given for the sultan's alleged desire to kill a second son was that Jahångir was suspected of complicity in the Pseudo-Mustafa's revolt. By now it was clear, however, that Suleiman was quite reconciled with Jahångir [who had been fond of Mustafa, and was much distressed by his death], and had freed him of all suspicion. Rustem Pasha had been in Gran (Esz-

tergom), but was returning to the Bosphorus. The peace or truce with the Sophi was being observed. Suleiman had ordered that every vessel loading grain without a license and guarantee of its shipment to Venice must convey the grain to Istanbul.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 52': "Che il Turco stava assai bene dell' indisposizione de la sua gamba. Che havea dato ordine di andar alla caccia de cinghieri et de cervi nella Natolia in un luogo detto in lingua loro Isgnich et in lingua nostra Nicaea, lontano da Constantinopoli circa X miglia per mare. Che alcuni credevano che questa caccia fosse ordinata a effetto di dar la morte al suo figlio maggiore, cioè il gobbo filosofo, per sospitione ch' egli habbia tenuta mano alla seditione di colui che si fingeva Mustafa, ma che per verità il Turco si era conciliato con detto figliuolo et chiaritosi detta sospitione essere stata vana. Che Rustem Bassà era tornato in Gran.

"Che la pace o tregua, che sia, col Sofi era del tutto stabilita et perfettamente conclusa. Che di ordine del Turco era stato mandato per tutte le scaloisier overo caricadori commandamento espresso che ogni navilio che avesse carico o volesse caricare di frumenti, non dando sicurtà di condurgli a Venetia fusse forzato condurgli a Constantinopoli. Che questo anno in quei paesi è stato honesto ricolto di biade" (*ibid.*, fol. 52'). On Rustem Pasha's return to Istanbul, see Chapter 14, note 95.

As the year 1555 drew to a close, the plague descended upon Venice. For safety and "per maggior servizio di sua Sanità," Archinto moved to the island of Murano, which (he wrote Carafa on 7 December) was almost as close to the doges' palace as the house he had been occupying in Venice. In this letter he says that he is including news from Istanbul (Leti. di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 97'), which appears to be lost because, as stated in an annotation on the back of his letter, *ibid.*, fol. 100', "Gli avvisi [da Constantinopoli] sono restati in mano del cardinale."

In a later dispatch of 28 December (*ibid.*, fols. 107, 117, divided by the binder), Archinto notes again that he is including news from Istanbul (fol. 117'), which *avvisi* also survive. They are dated 16 November (1555), and are said to have been "raccolti da lettere di particolari et poco importanti" (fol. 116'). Although they were looked upon as of "small importance" at the time, they are of considerable historical interest today (fol. 108').

"Di Constantinopoli sono più lettere de diverse date del mese passato: le ultime sono de 16 [novembre] et in tutta somma non gli è cosa di molto momento. Questo poco si può notare: Che si soleva di far cento galere, parte nell' Arsenal de Constantinopoli et parte in le comendie [?] per commodità de boschi. Che si vociferava detta armata con la passata dover ritornare a tempo nuovo in questi mari, ma non si crede da le persone di giudicio. Che lo agà de gianicieri era stato creato quarto bassà. Che vi è carestia di formento [although, as stated above in the *avvisi* of 3-4 September, there had been an 'honesto ricolto di biade'] et sono molto cari, et era fatta prohibitione che in nessun modo se ne lasciasse estrarre: tuttavia che gli sangiaci [the sanjakbeys] de le provincie per lor particular guadagno mostravano in parte di non vedere, et così se ne caricava qualche poco per ponente [a fact of interest in Venice, which got much grain from Turkey].

"De l' impresa di Transilvania overo Ongheria non si vede movimento di rilievo, pur molti vogliono che il Turco non la possa lasciare di fare, vedendo che alla partita del Re Stefano [?] non si dà risposta, et che le genti de li sangiacati portano poco tempo ad expedirle quando il Turco vuole. Basta che di presente la cosa passa in silentio."

<sup>51</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 51', by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>52</sup> Busbecq, *Ep. II*, in *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 112-13: "Giangir natu minimus . . . adolescens nec animo nec corpore satis validus, nam gibbo deformabatur. . . ."

During these years, although the Italian coastlands of the Hapsburg and Genoese possessions were harried by the Turks, the relations of Venice with the Porte were peaceful. The Venetian bailie was almost a resident ambassador. To deal effectively with the Turks, although excellent dragomans were usually available, it was desirable to know Turkish. By action of the Senate on 21 February, 1551, it had been agreed that the Collegio should choose two (young) notaries of the Chancery or two other citizens of at least twenty years of age who should be sent to Istanbul to learn Turkish. They were to live in the house of the bailie, who was to find a suitable teacher for them. The two young men chosen would remain in continuous residence at the Turkish capital for five years. Their meals would be provided by the bailie's household, even as the Signoria paid for the meals of the two local dragomans who were then in the service of Venice.

By way of salary and further maintenance each of the two young men was to be paid fifty ducats a year, receiving the funds from the bailie in suitable instalments. The bailie was to send to the Signoria a written report of their progress. It was important to know whether they were succeeding in their linguistic endeavor, for if not, the Senate must consider the next step. After five years' study, when they had learned how to speak and write Turkish, they were to be replaced by another two holders of the Turkish bursary, so there would always be two young Venetian *ciudadini originari* on the Bosphorus, studying Turkish. Eventually they would serve the Republic well, and in the meantime they were not to engage in any form of trade either on their own account or on behalf of others.<sup>54</sup>

In the context of these references to Archinto, on whom see G. Alberigo, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, III (1961), 761-64, we may note that his portrait, apparently painted in the mid-1550's and allegedly by Titian, may be found in the Metropolitan Museum in New York—Archinto was stout, bald, and bearded.

<sup>54</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Sen. Mar., Reg. 31, fol. 74' [93'], resolution of the Senate dated 21 February, 1551 (Ven. style 1550), passed by a vote of *parte* 123, *de non* 25, *non sinceri* 3, requiring "... che per ballotationi del Collegio nostro siano eletti dui nodari de la Cancelleria nostra ovvero dui altri cittadini nostri, non essendo di essi nodari, che vogliono tale carico, iquali siano di etade di anni vinti et da li in su, iquali siano mandati a Costantinopoli in casa del baylo nostro con obligatione d' imparare la lingua Turca legger et scriver in quell' idioma, per loqual effetto debba esso baylo provedergli di uno maestro sufficiente da esser pagato de i danari de cottimi et baylazzi et prestargli in ciò ogni favor possibile. Star debbano in quel luogo anni cinque continui et haver le spese di bocca a la tavola del predetto baylo, lequali poner debba a conto de

We shall return to the Turkish bursary. In the meantime we may note that two young men were indeed sent to Istanbul to learn to read, write, and speak Turkish—and also (we are told) to achieve a proper command of the Italian vernacular—so that they might later serve the state by making accurate and elegant translations of the letters and documents assigned to them for the purpose. One of these young men was apparently the Raffaello Corner who in September, 1555, returned to Venice in a grain transport belonging to Rustem Pasha. If so, he was duly replaced, for a year later there were still *doi giovani* in the bailie's household. Appointment to the *baylazzo* now carried with it, among more arduous duties, supervision of the young men's Turkish studies and reports to the Senate on their progress "in order that we may be able to provide, as becomes necessary, for our proper service."<sup>55</sup>

In earlier times Jews had served the Venetian Signoria on occasion as unofficial translators as well as diplomats, but after their confinement in the Ghetto in the area of Cannaregio they moved less easily about the city, and popular prejudice weighed them down. With less need of translators of Turkish and Arabic the Curia Romana could always find some among the mendicant friars who traveled about the Levant. Thus Archinto wrote Cardinal Carlo Carafa from Venice (on 14 December, 1555) of a "certain bishop," a Dominican, who knew Arabic well, and had written the pope from Aleppo. (The bishop may have been there during Sultan Suleiman's stay in the city.) Ar-

la Signoria nostra, secondo che si fanno quelle de i dui dragomani nostri che servono de li.

"Et per suo salario et intertenimento gli siano costituiti ducati cinquanta a l' anno per ciascuno, iquali siano loro pagati di tempo in tempo per lo baylo predetto de i danari di cottimi et baylazzi che si scuodono de li, iqual baylo in capo d' anni dui sia tenuto di avisar per lettere con sagramento la Signoria nostra del frutto che havranno fatto in tal essercitio et se saranno atti a riuscire ovvero non, accioche si possa deliberar quello sarà più expediente. Finiti li anni cinque et vedendosi che habbiano fatto profitto et imparato si che sappiano parlar et scrivere in Turco, ne siano eletti et mandati altri dui con i modi, ordini, et obligationi sopradette per lo tempo degli anni cinque, et così si debba osservare di tempo in tempo si che sempre se ne ritrovino dui di li che imparino et s' essercitino in questa professione, et che da loro si possa ricevere quel fruttuoso servitio che si desidera, iquali non possano essercitare la mercantia per conto loro nè per conto d' altri. . . ."

<sup>55</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 35', doc. dated 19 September, 1556, referring to the senatorial resolution of 22 (sic) February, 1551 (Ven. style 1550), and note, *ibid.*, Reg. 69, fol. 17', doc. dated 13 April, 1554, on the two young men studying Turkish in the bailie's household, and, *ibid.*, fol. 146', for the return of Raffaello Corner to Venice.

chinto had known the bishop in Rome. The wandering friar had written the pope again, and now proposed to go to the island of Ormuz, which had been a commercial station from the fourteenth century, and had now come under Portuguese domination.<sup>56</sup>

As always the political scene in Europe was changing. Henry VIII, Francis I, and Paul III, who had loomed large in their day, were dead. Charles V, who had resisted change, finally broke with the past himself. After giving up his primacy in the Order of the Golden Fleece, Charles resigned the principality of the Netherlands to his son Philip, king of England and of Naples, in an emotional ceremony in the assembly hall of the castle at Brussels (on 25 October, 1555),<sup>57</sup> where forty years before he had been declared of age to rule the inheritance of his Burgundian forebears. Cares of state and the needs of the dynasty had taken him ten times to the Netherlands, nine to Germany, seven to Italy, six to Spain, four to France, and twice each to England and to Africa. He had loved peace and found war. He had lived with a cold compassion for mankind and with an exemplary correctness, generous only to his family but just to all men or almost all. On 16 January, 1556, he was to surrender to Philip his far-flung domains of Castile and León, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, the Islands, and Sicily, together with the Indies and the grand magistracies of the military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcántara.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 98: "... Altre volte mandai lettere di un certo vescovo, quale ho già conosciuto in Roma, frate Dominicano, peritissimo de la lengua arabica, il quale scriveva di Aleppo al Sommo Pontifice. Hora scrive di Babilonia, et dice voler andar in Ormus, isola nel seno persico. Non so quello che scriva a sua Santità, ma non resterò di dire che a me par bene di dar urecchio a questi elevati ingegni et agiutarli quanto si può et per aviso, rescrivendoli in Ormus, sarà più opportuna la via di Ponente, col viaggio di Portogallo, d' il che sono informati li reverendi sacerdoti di Gesù. . . ."

<sup>57</sup> The act of abdication may be found in Rawdon Brown, ed., *Calendar of State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1 (1877), no. 255, pp. 220-21.

<sup>58</sup> On 15 February, 1556 (Ven. style 1555) the Venetian Senate wrote to their envoy at the imperial court, "Dalle lettere vostre de 16 del mese passato intendessimo che la Maestà cesarea aveva rinunciato al serenissimo re suo figliuolo li regni et signorie della Corona di Castiglia et d' Aragon oltre le renuntie per inanti fatte degli altri regni et stati suoi. Ultimamente poi venuto a noi questo magnifico ambasciator cesareo [Francisco de Vargas] ne presentò lettere credentiali di sua regia Maestà et disse che tenendo essa la signoria nostra tra li principali et veri amici suoi l'era parso conveniente de farne comunicar la renuntia fattale dal serenissimo imperator suo padre degli regni soprascritti. . . . Noi ringratiassemo affettuosamente la Maestà sua di questa amorevole dimostrazione, et ne congra-

Charles V's abdications, almost without precedent, fascinated Europe. There was one more to come, to which Paul IV would take strong exception. He took exception in fact to almost everything Charles did. The years had made him pro-French, for he had seen more than enough of the Spanish in Italy. He blamed Charles for allowing, even encouraging, the spread of Lutheranism as a means of reducing papal authority and maintaining the imperialists' power in the peninsula.<sup>59</sup> Quite understandably Paul always held Charles basically responsible for the concessions made to the Lutherans in the religious peace of Augsburg. The peace was, however, a confirmation of the Lutheran success, and was bound to come sooner or later.

Charles had not attended the long diet, which lasted from February to September, 1555, but his brother Ferdinand did so, and acted under his authority. The cardinal legate Giovanni Morone had arrived in Augsburg on 24 March (1555), as we have seen,<sup>60</sup> and had left the city one week later, recalled to Rome by the death of Julius III. Thereafter Marcellus II had been elected pope—and died—and now Gian Pietro himself had ascended the papal throne as Paul IV.

Catholic interests had been represented at Augsburg by the nuncio Zaccaria Delfino and, after him, by Alvise Lippomano, neither of whom could prevail upon Ferdinand or Albrecht V of Bavaria seriously to oppose the Protestant demands. Very likely Cardinal Morone could have done no better. The three councils—of the electors, the princes, and the cities—had agreed at Augsburg to keep the peace in Germany. The

tulassimo altratanto della grande heredità da lei conseguita de tanti regni et stati . . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fol. 171).

The Senate then set about electing an ambassador to King Philip, and the person chosen (it proved to be Michele Suriani) could not refuse the assignment without incurring the heavy penalties provided for by action of the Maggior Consiglio in 1536 "against those refusing embassies to crowned heads" (*ibid.*, fol. 172). Letters of 15 February were also sent to Philip, who was king of England, and to the Venetian ambassador in England. On the twenty-first the Senate wrote King Henry II as well as their ambassador to the French court, expressing pleasure at being included in the five years' "truce" (*trégua*) which had just been concluded between the Valois and the Hapsburgs (fols. 172<sup>v</sup>-73<sup>r</sup>), to which we shall come later in its chronological context.

<sup>59</sup> Navagero, *Relazione* [1558], in Albèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. III, p. 388, who says Paul IV had told him that the reason for his animus against Charles V was "... ch' [l'imperatore] abbia accresciuto gli errori di Martin Lutero per estinguere l' autorità del pontefice e per questa via acquistare quel che avanzava d' Italia. . . ."

<sup>60</sup> Cf. above, Chapter 14, note 142.

Lutherans were to retain the church lands they had taken and still held before the peace of Passau (which had been negotiated between the Hapsburgs and Maurice of Saxony in August, 1552), but the higher Catholic clergy who had become Protestant were supposed to give up their lands and offices.

Acting for the emperor as well as for himself, Ferdinand had yielded to the demand that the local authorities, whether prince or town council, should determine the official religion of their subjects, although recusants were to be allowed to sell their property and leave the state if they so wished. The religious peace was restricted to the adherents of Catholicism on the one hand and of the Augsburg Confession on the other.<sup>61</sup> Later on, the apt expression *cuius regio, eius religio* was devised to explain the agreement. While England, France, and Spain could now continue their different de-

velopments as so-called national states, Germany would henceforth lie divided religiously as well as politically under the rule of the free cities and especially of the territorial princes.

It would not take much to push the hot-headed Paul IV into armed conflict with his *bêtes noires*, Charles V and Philip [II], the first of whom had been, and now the second had become, duke of Milan and king of Naples. As Navagero reminds us, Paul relied upon the staff of Sieneze and Florentine exiles whom Cardinal Carlo Carafa had gathered around him, all anti-Hapsburg and anti-Medicean. Until his death in November, 1556, the Florentine Giovanni della Casa was the most prominent among them. Paul was not fond of della Casa, who had been papal nuncio in Venice. Well known as a humanist, however, and the author of *Il Galateo*, della Casa was the secretary and confidant of Carlo Carafa. Also on hand were the Florentine Silvestro Aldobrandini and the Neapolitan Annibale Bozzuto, *fuorusciti appassionati*, who longed for the end of Medici rule in Florence and the end of Hapsburg rule in Naples.<sup>62</sup>

Silvestro was the father of a son, Ippolito, now about twenty years of age, who always remembered the events he was about to witness. In after years Ippolito would be elected Pope Clement VIII Aldobrandini. While trying to lessen the Spanish influence on the Holy See, and assisting Henry IV of France after the latter's conversion (in 1593), Clement VIII was to maintain a careful neutrality, and eventually he assisted in the Franco-Spanish peace of Vervins (in 1598).<sup>63</sup> In the mean-

<sup>61</sup> For the articles of the religious peace, as given in the German text of the recess of 25 September (1555) of the diet of Augsburg, see August von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des XVI. Jahrhunderts*. . . . I (Munich, 1896), no. 671, pp. 722-44, and note the restrictive clause in art. 5: "Doch sollen alle andere, so obgemelten bed[e]n[en] Religionen mit anhengig, in diesem Frieden mit gemeint sondern genzlich ausgeschlossen sein," i.e., Anabaptists, Zwinglians, Calvinists, *et al.* were excluded.

On Paul IV's abiding resentment of the diet of Augsburg (and of the participants therein), cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. ix, pp. 267-71. Although for doctrinal reasons Paul would never concede the point, Charles and Ferdinand faced a desperate situation. Concerning one Hapsburg domain, for example, the Venetian ambassador wrote his government (on 1 March, 1556) that the president of the Council of Brussels claimed "that in Holland, according to the list received by him, the number of persons condemned to death for similar opinions [i.e., similar to Anabaptism] and for Lutheranism in 18 months, and who had been either burned, hanged, or drowned amounted to 1,800 [!], and that for the avoidance of greater cruelty the execrable intentions of these sectarians must be tolerated as much as possible, they being in too great number" (*Gal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, no. 416, p. 363, a letter of Federico Badoer to the doge and Senate).

For Delfino's nunciature, Morone's brief legation, and Lippomano's letters from Augsburg see Helmut Goetz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-17 (Tübingen, 1971), *passim*, covering the years 1554-1556, and note Goetz, "Die Vertreter der Kurie am Augsburger Reichstag (1555)," in *Die Festgabe Leonhard von Muralt*, Zürich, 1970, pp. 197-208, based chiefly on his edition of the *Nuntiaturberichte*, vol. 17. The dispatches, especially those of Delfino from Vienna, attest to the fear of the Turks in Hungary and Transylvania and to the costs of defense against the constant, destructive Turkish incursions (*Nuntiaturberichte*, 1-17, nos. 55, 66, 92, 110, 115, 117, 127, 129-31, 133, 135-37, 140-45, *et alibi*). Cf. also the brief summary of events (from 1547 to 1555) in Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, "The Turkish Question and the Religious Peace of Augsburg," *Südostforschungen*, XV (1956), 290-311, and cf. Fischer-Galati, *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1553*, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 97 ff.

<sup>62</sup> Navagero, *Relazione* [1558], p. 391, and cf. *ibid.*, p. 405.  
<sup>63</sup> On Clement VIII, the Casa Aldobrandini, and papal neutrality as between France and Spain, note the remarks of Pietro Nores, commenting on the reasons for his (Nores's) delay in writing the *Storia della guerra di Paolo IV, sommo pontefice, contro gli spagnuoli*, ed. Luciano Scarabelli, in the *Archivio storico italiano*, XII (Florence, 1847), pref., pp. xxii-xxiii. Nores began his history during the early years of Clement VIII's pontificate (1592-1605). He wrote most of it between 1640 and 1644. It also bears the title *Storia della guerra degli spagnuoli contro Papa Paolo IV*.

On the administrative personnel (or secretaries of state and of briefs) of the Holy See during the reign of Paul IV; the central role of Cardinal Carlo Carafa; the importance of the Florentine exiles Giovanni della Casa and Silvestro Aldobrandini, see the enlightening article of René Ancel, "La Secrétairerie pontificale sous Paul IV," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXXIX (new ser. XXXV, 1906), 408-70, who also deals with the curial duties of Annibale Rucellai, Carafa's envoy to Henry II in September, 1555 (on whom see below); Alvise Lippomano, bishop of Verona; Gian Francesco Commendone, bishop of Zante; and Antonio Elio, bishop of Pola (Pala, Pula); as well as with the secretarial functions of Angelo Massarelli, Alessandro Martio, Francesco Spini, Giovanni Barengo, Gian Francesco Bini, Antonio Fioridibello, and numerous others.

time, although Paul IV had begun his reign with the affirmation of pacific intentions, peace did not lie ahead.

The trouble had started about the beginning of August, 1555, when two of the six Sforzas of S. Fiora (of whom the best known was Cardinal Guido Ascanio) repossessed two of the galleys belonging to their brother Carlo, the prior of Lombardy. Carlo had been serving the French for several years with three of his own galleys. Since the other brothers had become imperialists, however, King Henry had grown suspicious of Carlo, and was taking steps to detain him in France. Carlo got wind of the fact and fled.

Henry sequestered Carlo's galleys in Marseille. Some time thereafter two of these galleys put into port at Civitavecchia. Alessandro and Mario Sforza, Carlo's brothers, saw the chance to recover them. Descending upon Civitavecchia with armed men, Alessandro and Mario went aboard the galleys. Niccolò Alamanni, the French king's commander, received them amicably. When they tried to seize the galleys and get out of the harbor, however, they were stopped by Pietro Capuano, the castellan of Civitavecchia. When Guido Ascanio, the cardinal camerlengo, learned of the impasse into which they had fallen, he managed through his resourceful secretary Gian Francesco Lottini to get the amiable Giovanni Carafa, count of Montorio, to write a letter to the castellan, ordering the release of the galleys, which sailed on to Gaeta and thence to Naples.

The Sforzas were the sons of Paul III's daughter Costanza Farnese. Darlings of the Farnese reign, three of the brothers had been useful to Julius III in the war of Parma. The French protested the lack of security in the papal domain, and demanded the return of the galleys as though they were the king's property, says Massarelli, *ac propterea ipsas trirèmes uti ad regem spectantes repetebant*. Paul IV needed no urging. He was furious, and ordered the Sforzeschi to bring the two galleys back to Civitavecchia. Alessandro, who was a clerk of the Camera Apostolica, excused himself, saying that he had acted quite legally. The galleys belonged to his family.

Pope Paul declared he would help decide the question of ownership when the galleys had been returned to Civitavecchia. When his orders were disregarded, the pope began proceedings against Alessandro, and arrested the cardinal of S. Fiora's secretary, Lottini, who had got the letter out of the count of Montorio, *contra mentem et iussa pon-*

*tificis*, the letter which had caused the castellan to release the galleys at Civitavecchia. Paul then warned Guido Ascanio, the cardinal of S. Fiora, to see to the galleys' dispatch to Civitavecchia. Guido Ascanio replied there was nothing he could do. According to Massarelli, since the affair of the galleys had been banded about for a long while, and the pope had got nowhere, "today, on Saturday, the last day of August, 1555, the cardinal of S. Fiora himself is being arrested and detained by order of the pope in a place of confinement in the Castel S. Angelo."<sup>64</sup>

On 30 August Camillo Colonna, a staunch imperialist, was also arrested and imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo. On this day, too, Ascanio della Corgna, nephew of Julius III, and the Roman noble Giuliano Cesarini, brother of the late Cardinal Alessandro Cesarini (d. 1542), received orders not to leave the city without papal permission, for Paul feared some violence on their part because of the imprisonment of Camillo Colonna and the cardinal of S. Fiora. Della Corgna and Cesarini were ordered to furnish the "most ample surety" of their good behavior. Paul had embarked, as Massarelli assures us, on a perilous course—*rem difficilem atque arduam magnique momenti aggressus est pontifex*—in his peremptory demand for the return of the Sforza galleys to Civitavecchia and in his dauntless action against the servitors and retainers of Charles V and his son Philip [II], *Angliae et Neapolis rex*. Realizing that he had now cast the die, Paul began the conscription of 3,000 foot and 300 horse.

Paul also issued an edict that all possessors of weapons of warfare (except swords, rapiers, and

<sup>64</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 279–80, Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1555, no. 72; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (1753), bk. IX, pp. 241 ff., 257–58; and esp. Pietro Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, in *Arch. stor. italiano*, XII (1847), 12–20, in detail, with some telling observations on the persons involved and their purposes. Note also, *ibid.*, doc. II, pp. 372–75, the *Relazione della ritenzione delle galere di Carlo Sforza*, condemning the twenty-one-year-old Alessandro Sforza's display of violence at Civitavecchia.

Furthermore, see the report of the French envoy in Rome, Louis de Lansac, dated 28 August, 1555, in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II (1666), esp. p. 617. Giovanni Carafa's desire to please made him an easy mark for the shrewd Lottini: Cf. Navagero's assessment of Giovanni's character, "Il duca è molto modesto e gentile, et nel maneggio suo procede di modo che ognuno rimane soddisfatto," etc. (*Relazione [1558]*, p. 385). His brother Antonio, marchese di Montebello, was quite different: "Il marchese è colterico in modo che diventa insopportabile a tutti" (*ibid.*, p. 386). On the "incident of the galleys" and the consequences thereof, cf. G. Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 36–47, his chief source being Pietro Nores.



poniards), whatever the said possessors' rank or dignity, must within three days surrender such weapons to Scipione Rebiba, bishop of Mottola and governor of Rome. The severest penalties would be leveled against those who failed to do so. Rebiba would store and guard the weapons in the Castel S. Angelo. All the cardinals as well as the prelates, barons, and ambassadors in the city did as they were ordered except for Fernando Ruiz de Castro, the marquis of Sarria, Charles V's ambassador, who regarded it as a slight to the emperor,

as if the pope had no faith in him and his ministers, and although the pope had resolved that he should certainly do this also, lest a still greater commotion should be raised (and because the one already raised was calming down little by little), the pope was unwilling to use force against him.<sup>65</sup>

It is small wonder that Pietro Nores, who knew so well the history of Paul IV's reign, could write,

Almost all the cardinals hated the pope, and not only the imperialists, but also those who had borne him aloft to the pontificate. No sooner did they see him seated on S. Peter's throne than they repented of what they had done, and began to detest the effects of his altogether too rigid and harsh nature.<sup>66</sup>

A few days before the arrest of the cardinal of S. Fiora, Paul IV had received the French envoy Louis de Lansac, to whom he dilated on his desire to reform the Church, punish ecclesiastical offenders, and show himself as an impartial father to all good Christians. He wanted (he said) to reconcile Charles V and Henry II, "et donner paix à la Chrestienté." He did not want to go the way of warfare, which was unbecoming to the papal office (*ny user de voyes d' armes, ne luy semblant convenable à son estat*), but the very devil seemed to be frustrating his high intentions. His subjects were being aroused against him. There was no lack of evidence of the emperor's ill will and that of his ministers. Paul said that he had thus been forced to arm himself. He was too weak to resist the imperialists, but he put his confidence in God, who had made him pope, and in Henry II, of whose help he felt assured, "tant pour sa bonté que pour l' exemple de ses prédécesseurs." The kings of France had always been the defenders of the Holy See.

Paul went on to tell de Lansac that he desired mightily to see his most Christian Majesty "quit of that Turkish armada" (*déliurée de cette armée Turquesque*) which, as we have seen, had just attacked the Italian islands of Elba and Corsica. The peace-loving pope made clear that he much approved of the plans being discussed to get the Venetians to enter a league with France, "and that one might offer them a good part of the conquests which would be made in the common war, such as the kingdom of Sicily which they greatly desire, and with these forces [one could] put into effect some worthwhile enterprise for the liberty and security of this poor Italy. . . ." To all this de Lansac, Henry II's special envoy, made reassuring noises in answer. Henry would not fail the pope either in good will or in the use of force.

As for the Turks, de Lansac said that his Majesty had no less displeasure than did his Holiness in the fact that the French had been constrained to seek Turkish assistance. Henry had to defend himself against the emperor's ambition. He had had to avail himself of the Turkish armada, "which was, however, doing no damage to Christendom. . . ." The Turks had not taken anything so far. One had to be sure of the freedom of the sea. If the Venetians would enter such a league as the pope had spoken of, there would be no need of looking to the Turks. De Lansac assured the pope that Henry II had no other ambition than to gain the glory and honor of delivering Italy as well as Christendom from the tyranny of Charles V.

Paul IV was delighted with what he heard, and thereafter he and de Lansac went on to the outrages which both pope and papacy had suffered at the hands of the Sforza brothers of S. Fiora, in which discussion of course the seizure of the galleys at Civitavecchia loomed large. The cardinal of S. Fiora had opposed Paul's election in the conclave, and had since then sent envoys to the emperor and the king of England [Philip] to conspire against him and the Holy See. De Lansac praised Paul's modesty and patience. He had advised him to arrest both the cardinal of S. Fiora (which was done three days later) and Marc' Antonio Colonna (who was to get away safely). He also advised Paul to attack various neighboring strongholds belonging to S. Fiora; they were worth about three or four thousand *écus* a year. Paul could give them to his relatives. His Holiness was much encouraged by his talk with de Lansac, whom he asked to talk over these matters with his nephew, Cardinal Carafa. De Lansac did so, find-

<sup>65</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 280.

<sup>66</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 18.

ing the cardinal most receptive, for Carafa had become entirely anti-Hapsburg and hence entirely pro-French. Together they plotted the arrest of Marc' Antonio Colonna, who was still in the environs of Rome with his family.<sup>67</sup>

Paul IV had reappointed Guidobaldo della Rovere captain-general of the papal forces (on 20 June, 1555).<sup>68</sup> By mid-August it appeared that Guidobaldo's services as a soldier would be needed, for Paul and Cardinal Carafa directed him to hold in readiness five to six thousand foot and three hundred horse. In the meantime they set about recruiting another three thousand troops for the protection of Rome.<sup>69</sup>

Papal troops occupied various Orsini castles to the northwest of Rome and the Colonna castles to the southeast. Always the moralist, in early September Paul ordered Cardinal Ippolito d' Este, Lucrezia Borgia's son, to absent himself from the papal states. Ippolito, who was no moralist himself, had entertained papal ambitions at the last three conclaves, and was apparently taking steps to build up support for the conclave which would follow Paul's own death. He was said to have sought 16,000 ducats from Henry II to distribute among a half-dozen or so cardinals who might be useful. At the risk of offending the pro-French duke of Ferrara, Ercole II, Paul finally expelled the licentious and intriguing Ippolito,<sup>70</sup> who did not enjoy his removal from Rome.

In early September Paul dismissed eight chamberlains of the papal court, all nobles with Neapolitan connections, an evidence of distrust which caused widespread comment, says Pietro Nores, "e diedero manifesto presagio delle future turbolenze." Charles V tried, however, to ward off the turbulence. The Spanish ambassador in Rome, the marquis of Sarria, had written Charles on 19

August and on 4 September (1555) of the pope's bitterness over Alessandro Sforza's seizure of the two galleys from Civitavecchia. Paul had declared the action, as we know from Massarelli and from other sources, to be "contra libertatem ecclesiasticam et auctoritatem suae Sanctitatis et Apostolicae Sedis." Charles thought two galleys were not worth a war, however, and in answer to Sarria's appeal for a decision Charles ordered the return of the galleys to Civitavecchia, which was done on Sunday, 15 September (1555).<sup>71</sup> If the imperialists really believed that this was a step towards peace, they were mistaken. Cardinal Carafa and the pro-French faction at the Curia kept dinning the misdeeds of the emperor and his ministers into the old pope's ears.

On 14 September (1555), the very day before the restoration of the galleys, Cardinal Carlo Carafa had dispatched Annibale Rucellai, a member of his household and a nephew of Giovanni della Casa, on a mission to King Henry II in France. In this connection Pietro Nores speaks of "la determinata volontà del Papa di rompere con gl' Imperiali." Rucellai's instructions are worth a careful study. Despite Nores's statement it is not clear how fully the pope was informed as to the purpose of Rucellai's trip to France, but in any event the latter's instructions reveal the nature of Carafa's anti-Hapsburg objectives. Rucellai was to explain to the king that all the Carafeschi had for years suffered injury and insult at the hands of the emperor, his ministers, and the imperialist cardinals.

The incident of the galleys had shown the S. Fioras' hostility to Henry; the pope had responded vigorously to their offense to the king's dignity. In fact the cardinal of S. Fiora was now being kept in papal custody. Paul IV also had at heart the interests of Italy, and Henry could be sure that as pope he would never form an alliance or entente with the emperor, *nè unione nè corrispondenza alcuna*, that he would always be the emperor's enemy. Paul's forces were inadequate to meet the emperor's military challenge. Without the example of a great sovereign to encourage them, other princes would be unlikely to aid the pope against the emperor.

Rucellai must appeal to Henry to take the pope and the Holy See under his protection, as his royal predecessors had done, "to defend the reputation of that saintly old man, who has always loved his

<sup>67</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Etat*, II (1666), 615-18, report of Louis de Lansac, dated at Rome on 28 August, 1555, referred to above in note 64.

<sup>68</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 77-78", by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>69</sup> Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. ix, p. 246, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 387.

<sup>70</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 280-81, and on the papal troops taking over the outlying fortresses of the Colonna (esp. Paliano) and of the Orsini (esp. Bracciano), note Pietro Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 21-22, on which see below. Within a month of Ippolito d' Este's expulsion from Rome, Carlo Carafa was trying to get the pope to allow his return. Nores, *ibid.*, p. 28, says that "il cardinal Caraffa era tutto intento a procurare con ogni studio di rimettere nella grazia del Papa il cardinale Ippolito d' Este, come una mese prima s'era, per comandamento ed ordine suo, ritirato a Ferrara."

<sup>71</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 281; Druffel, *Briefe u. Akten*, IV, no. 662, pp. 707-8, esp. p. 708, note 2; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 23, 26-27.

Majesty with such great devotion." Henry should also take care of Cardinal Carlo Carafa if for no other reason than to be sure of his services. If Henry abandoned Carlo, the latter would have to seek refuge outside Italy. One could well pin his hopes, as Rucellai would say, on the goodness of a king whose altruism had moved him to rescue Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma, from the imperial clutches. That had been all well and good. Now, however, the appeal of the Carafeschi to France carried with it the "most obvious and certain hope of regaining the kingdom of Naples and giving Siena that freedom it could expect in no other way than at [the king's] hands." (Actually Carafa was eager to get Siena into his family's possession.) Rucellai was to urge Henry to confirm the many promises which the French ambassador Jean d'Avanson and Cardinal Georges d'Armagnac had made the pope. There must be no delay. Henry should send to d'Avanson or to whomever else he wished a "facoltà autentica per poter capitulare e stabilir lega offensiva e defensiva col Papa." The terms of this alliance between France and the Holy See should bind both the king and the pope to the fulfillment of their every obligation as defined in the concordat.

Rucellai was, furthermore, to tell the king that Cardinal Carafa had such a following and an espionage system in the Abruzzi that his Majesty could soon be made master of that province. The Carafeschi had many relatives and an infinite number of friends in Naples and elsewhere in the kingdom who would take up arms when the time came. Henry should send a prince of the blood to Rome as soon as possible with full authority to act and with money enough to do so. Both king and pope should try to bring Ercole II, duke of Ferrara, into their alliance, and above all the Republic of Venice. They must promise the Venetians a good deal and try for once to move them to avenge themselves on the Hapsburgs (who trespassed upon Venetian claims in Friuli).

The Carafeschi had already done more than a little, and were still at work. The duke of Urbino had been ordered to stand by with six thousand foot and three hundred horse. Another 10,000 foot and 300 horse could be recruited and got ready in the papal states, with all the artillery and munitions they would require. Rucellai would thank the king for the 50,000 scudi which his ministers in Rome had already given the Holy See, and urge him in no way to be discouraged. It was true the Carafeschi had not yet raised enough money, because the pope had not wanted to overburden the people too soon. Also he had not wanted to reveal his intentions, but when the time

came, there would be no lack of funds and no lack of ways to get more.

Henry must excuse Cardinal Carafa for not having taken up these matters with Cardinal Jean du Bellay, but the latter had become so intimate with Cardinal Rodolfo Pio of Carpi, "tutto imperiale," that one could not confide in him. Indeed, Rucellai might hint that, under the pretext of allowing du Bellay again to enjoy residence in his native land, his Majesty might recall him from Rome. The ambassador Jean d'Avanson (Alanzon), however, was to be praised for his fortitude and for the satisfaction he afforded the Curia Romana. The Carafeschi would now leave the next move up to Henry. If he sent Cardinal François de Tournon, as one said he planned to do, Henry could be assured that the Carafeschi could deal with him in full confidence.<sup>72</sup>

It would later be revealed, when Carlo Carafa was brought to trial in the late summer of 1560 during the reign of Pius IV, that one of the chief purposes of Rucellai's mission to France was to see whether a combination of the French and Turkish fleets might not attack the Spanish in the Neapolitan kingdom and in Sicily if and when a break came between the Hapsburgs and the Holy See.<sup>73</sup>

Three days after Rucellai's departure for France the six Venetian envoys chosen to render the Signoria's obedience to the recently-elected pontiff made their solemn entrance into Rome (on Tuesday, 17 September, 1555). On the following day an envoy of the Hospitallers tendered the Order's obedience, excusing his late arrival, for the Knights had been engaged in a maritime expedition against the Turks. In fact they had captured a Turkish ship on the very day they had first learned of his Holiness's election, which they took as a good auspice for the future. The envoy of the Knights dwelt on the Order's toilsome and costly struggle

<sup>72</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 23-26; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 255 ff.; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 57 ff.; and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), p. 391, with further indication of the sources. Four days before Rucellai left for France, Carafa had dispatched Giovanni Andrea da Gubbio to Ferrara to express his distress at Cardinal Ippolito's exile and to seek Duke Ercole's adherence to an alliance of France with the Holy See. Carafa succeeded in winning Ercole over to the papal side (Nores, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31).

<sup>73</sup> *Processo de' Caraffi, seu delicta super quibus processatus fuit Illustrissimus et reverendissimus D. Cardinalis Carolus Carafa*, ed. Luciano Scarabelli, in Nores's *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. XLIV, pp. 493, 495, 502, 503, 506, and cf., below, Chapter 16, note 84, and Chapter 17, note 100.

on behalf of Christendom, taking care also to praise the learning and piety of the new pope, who made the expected courteous rejoinder to the envoy's rhetorical effort.

The Romans were much more interested in the release on Thursday, 19 September, of the cardinal of S. Fiora, Guido Ascanio Sforza. Before leaving the Castel S. Angelo, however, Guido Ascanio had been obliged to put up a large sum—Massarelli says 150,000 scudi, while Nores says 300,000—as surety that he would not leave Rome without the pope's written permission to do so. He was to be absolutely obedient. Otherwise he stood to lose not only his financial pledge, but all his offices, benefices, and dignities, including even that of cardinal.

Guido Ascanio was given to understand that he owed his freedom entirely to the pope's benign generosity, not to the request of any prince, i.e., not to Charles V's intercession. Actually those who had tried to help him had merely put him in greater danger. At least so Guido Ascanio was told. At the consistory held on 20 September the pope assailed him again "con parole aspre e severe," warning him to walk a straight and narrow path, abandon his political partisanship, and lead the life of a good ecclesiastic. The least infraction of his orders, the pope told Guido Ascanio, would lead him to take such action against the cardinal as to leave him quite without hope of pardon. On 22 September Camillo Colonna was also released from the Castel S. Angelo.<sup>74</sup>

The Venetian embassy of obedience was received at a public consistory held on Tuesday, 24 September (1555), in the royal-reception hall of the Palazzo S. Marco, now the Palazzo Venezia. Bernardo Navagero, who was to remain in Rome as the Signoria's ambassador, delivered a "luculentissima oratio" full of the Venetians' joy to learn of Paul's elevation to the papal throne and no less full of admiration for his piety, learning, and character, to all of which Paul had a hard time replying. He was so hoarse he could hardly speak, but he managed to pay honor to the Venetians' loyalty to the Holy See and their meritorious dedication to the faith. Twice he received the six envoys in most pleasant and benevolent fashion "ad osculum pedis et oris." An exceptionally large crowd had gathered in the hall to witness the occasion, according to Massarelli, for the envoys were all men of appropriate age, nobility, and dig-

nity. Also they were handsomely and expensively dressed.

Massarelli notes that Paul tried to show his esteem and affection for the Republic in many ways, especially in his benevolence towards the envoys, to whom he gave a splendid, "truly pontifical" dinner (on 26 September) in the great hall of the Palazzo S. Marco. To this dinner Paul had also invited Cardinals Francesco Pisani, Ranuccio Farnese, Gianmichele Saraceni, Alessandro Farnese, Niccolò Gaetano di Sermoneta, Jacopo Savelli, and Carlo Carafa. When the dinner was over they talked, all in secret, and the pope heard what they had to say.<sup>75</sup>

Paul IV was in a belligerent mood when he called together a consistory for 2 October. According to a letter of Bernardo Navagero to the Doge Francesco Venier and the Senate, the pope had intended to tell the cardinals that now he was going to strike first, in anticipation of an imperialist move against the Holy See. Cardinal Giannangelo de' Medici remonstrated with him, however, pointing out that as the universal father Paul was the only person who could make peace between Charles V and Henry II. If he struck at one of them as the partisan of the other, they would all find themselves in desperate straits.

The pope yielded to Medici's plea "for the benefit of this See Apostolic and of Italy," and appointed a commission of seven cardinals. Navagero notes that six of the seven were imperialists—Juan Álvarez de Toledo, Ridolfo Pio of Carpi, Otto von Truchsess, Giovanni Morone, Bartolomé de la Cueva, and Giannangelo de' Medici himself. The seventh was Carlo Carafa, who could keep an eye on the others. The commission took its responsibility seriously, meeting on occasion with Don Fernando Ruiz de Castro, the marquis of Sarria, Charles V's ambassador to the Curia Romana. Sarria was especially annoyed because papal agents had been intercepting imperialist dispatches between Rome and Naples.<sup>76</sup>

Angelo Massarelli, who was a papal secretary, gives the membership of the papal-imperial commission somewhat differently. He also emphasizes the pope's sincere desire to avoid conflict:

The pope neglected no means to bring about peace between himself and the imperialists. For this reason,

<sup>75</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 282-83.

<sup>76</sup> Brown, *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 235, pp. 202-5, letter dated 4 October, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 392-93, where by a slip the consistory is dated 20 (instead of 2) October, 1555.

<sup>74</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 282; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 27.

besides many other gestures, he also chose six cardinals—and these almost all of the imperial party in order to make clear that he did not at all distrust them [!—assigning them the task of finding a way to make sure of peace and concord between his Holiness and Caesar. These cardinals were Carpi, Santiago, Morone, de la Cueva, Saraceni, and Carafa. Meeting daily among themselves [and] even adding the imperial ambassador [Sarría], they discussed the problem in great detail, and finally reduced matters to certain conditions.<sup>77</sup>

The aged pontiff, who seems to have fallen almost completely under the cardinal-nephew's influence, was being tossed to and fro. On 4 October Guidobaldo della Rovere, the duke of Urbino, spent a long time with the pope, as he informed Navagero the next day, warning his Holiness of "all the misadventures which might result from the war." Paul seemed impressed and grateful for della Rovere's frankness. Navagero immediately wrote the doge and the Council of Ten that

the Duke says he does not know how much he can promise himself from the Pope in this matter, as although he saw his Holiness inclined toward peace, he on the other hand perceived Cardinal Caraffa quite bent on war, and performing every possible office to draw the Pope into it, because his right reverend lordship has assured the King of France of his hope that the Pope will league and ally himself with his most Christian Majesty.

The duke of Urbino also told Navagero that he would let it be clearly understood he would risk his life and his state for the pope in a defensive war. If the Carafeschi were going to embark on an offensive war, however, invading imperialist territory, the duke would not take the field with "raw and disorderly Italian troops, at the risk of losing repute." Under such circumstances he would serve the pope, but his Holiness would have to give the command to someone else. With proper forces—which he apparently did not see forthcoming—della Rovere would do his duty.<sup>78</sup> In other words, if he could help it, Guidobaldo della Rovere was not going to war with the emperor.

On the morning of 8 October (1555) Cardinal

Carlo Carafa sent word to Navagero, asking him to come to the Vatican Palace about 4:00 P.M., for the pope wished to see him. At the appointed hour Navagero found Cardinals Carpi, Mignaneli, Saraceni, and Giannangelo de' Medici in the papal presence. The English ambassador, Sir Edward Carne, soon appeared also, and thereafter, one by one, came Cardinals de la Cueva, Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, Juan Álvarez de Toledo, von Truchsess, Puteo, and Carafa. Surrounded by imperialists, Paul IV declared that plots against his life and the lives of his relatives were forcing him to take up arms,

nor shall words persuade us to disarm, for we very well remember what befell Pope Clement, who having received fair words from the ministers of the present Emperor, had scarcely dismissed his soldiers ere there took place that horrible capture of Rome and that fatal and frightful sack, than which there was perhaps never one more cruel nor more iniquitous. . . . This unhappy and miserable city was sacked for ten consecutive months, during which Rome endured every sort of tyrannical violence. . . . We well know that our forces are feeble, but our cause is that of God, who founded this see, and will defend it. . . . Our mind being entirely bent on peace, we will not make war, unless provoked and induced by necessity. . . .

The pope told the ambassadors—of England and of Venice—that he had chosen to be outspoken in their presence "that you might communicate to your princes what is aforesaid." The cardinals turned to Sir Edward Carne, the ambassador of the "most serene king of England," i.e., Philip [II]. Carne said he would write the king. Navagero, when the cardinals looked to him, "thanked his Holiness for this confidential communication." The ambassadors were dismissed. Cardinal Morone had arrived in time to hear at least part of the papal diatribe.<sup>79</sup> Cardinal Carafa was getting his way. Paul IV was moving on toward war.

<sup>77</sup> Brown, *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, no. 242, pp. 209-10, letter dated 8 October, 1555. Although Navagero does not mention him, the Portuguese ambassador was also present (cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI [repr. 1957], 393-94). Concerning the alleged plots against the lives of Paul IV and his relatives, see Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 31-32. The imperialists were said to have hired a certain abate named Nani to poison Cardinal Carafa and a Calabrian assassin named Cesare Spina to murder him. One could wish the facts were clearer, but Nores, *loc. cit.*, does state that "molti hanno creduto e scritto che queste erano tutte arti e invenzioni del cardinal Carafa per tener sempre l'animo del Papa commosso e insospettito, e verso gli Spagnuoli mal disposto." If the plots were an invention of Carafa to keep the pope worked up, it was indeed a sad affair for, according to Nores, Nani was beheaded.

<sup>77</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 283. The cardinal of Santiago (*S. Jacob*) was Juan Álvarez de Toledo, archbishop of Santiago de Compostela from June, 1550, until his death on 15 September, 1557. Massarelli lists neither von Truchsess nor Medici, names Saraceni (who is not mentioned by Navagero), and obviously puts only six cardinals on the commission.

<sup>78</sup> Brown, *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, no. 236, p. 205, letter dated 5 October, 1555. Although I have employed the spelling Carafa, I have usually retained Caraffa in quotations in which the two f's are used.

The arrests of Guido Ascanio Sforza and Camillo Colonna had aroused intense resentment at the imperial court at Brussels. The seizure of Marc' Antonio's lands, especially Paliano, had added fuel to the flame. Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, the bishop of Arras, Charles V's chief counselor, was also believed to be advocating war against the pope and the seizure of the papal states (*e far ogni sforzo per levargli lo stato*), according to Pietro Nores, for Granvelle asserted that as long as the pope exercised temporal power, neither the emperor nor his son would ever be without trouble. In any event such were the reports reaching Rome. On the evening of 30 September the pope summoned Cardinal Alessandro Farnese and the French ambassador d' Avanson. He told them he was going "to break with the imperialists" to protect his own life and the lives of his nephews Carlo, Giovanni, and Antonio Carafa. The imperialists were laying one poisonous snare for them after another.

The French ambassador d' Avanson was full of reassurance. His noble sovereign Henry II was ready to stand by the threatened pope, "e ad esporre lo stato, le forze, e la propria vita per lui." In thanking d' Avanson, Paul IV stated that the time for action had come. The French should delay no longer the aid they had promised him. Paul added that he hoped soon to see one of Henry's sons the king of Naples and another the duke of Milan. Nores's account is confirmed by the letter which d' Avanson wrote Henry II on 1 October (1555), the day after his memorable audience with the pope.<sup>80</sup>

After this session with the pope Cardinals Carafa and Farnese and the ambassador d' Avanson were joined by Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma, in the apartment of the papal *maestro di camera*. They talked, as d' Avanson informed Henry II, until about 10:00 P.M. (*jusques à quatre heures de nuit*). The ambassador also stated that the pope trusted the duke of Parma "as much as or more than anyone else," owing to Parma's devotion to France. The decision was made to send the duke of Urbino, who was expected in Rome the next day (1 October), to the frontier of the Regno (according to Nores with nine thousand foot and the requisite horse). Parma was to go to Pitigliano to recruit troops both in his own name and in that of the Church. D' Avanson says Parma was to raise four or five thousand troops. Nores, who is singularly well informed

but does sometimes deviate into error, says forty thousand, which is clearly a *lapsus calami vel mentis*. All told, the forces to be raised immediately by Parma and by d' Avanson, according to the latter, were supposed to number eighteen thousand foot and twelve hundred horse. Finally d' Avanson and Giovanni della Casa were to get together every day and to prepare as rapidly as possible the draft of a treaty of alliance, *i capitoli della lega*, between France and the Holy See.

By this time plans were going forward with more rapidity than reason. The articles of alliance were ready in a few days, and on 13 October (1555) Paul IV and Jean d' Avanson signed them at a meeting in the Palazzo S. Marco. A league and confederation were thus being formed between the Apostolic See and the most Christian king, for d' Avanson promised that his Majesty would subscribe to the articles of agreement within the prescribed period of forty days. On Monday, 14 October, a trusted member of d' Avanson's staff set out posthaste for the French court with texts of the treaty for Henry II's signature.<sup>81</sup>

It is unlikely that Massarelli knew what was going on. There is no mention of the agreement of 13 October in his diary, but he does say that "it was the pope's intention to try to injure no one and to live at peace with all men so that even if he has been provoked in many ways, he has nevertheless always made an all-out effort for peace." Such is Massarelli's entry for Saturday, 15 October, on which day he states that "peace is being made between his Holiness and the imperialists by the removal of all those obstacles which seemed in any way to impede it."<sup>82</sup> The commission of cardinals had apparently succeeded in sweeping under the rug the differences dividing the imperialists from the Carafeschi.

Paul IV had delayed the usual grandiose ceremony of "taking possession" of the Lateran until Monday, 28 October, when

he set out from the Palazzo S. Marco, in which he spent the summer, to the Lateran Church in the usual solemn procession, accompanied by the cardinals and all the curial officials as well as by the soldiery of the Populus Romanus of the thirteen regions of the City. When a prayer had been said in the church itself, [the pope]

<sup>80</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 32-35, and see d' Avanson's letter of 1 October, 1555, in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II (1666), 618-20.

<sup>81</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 35-36; d' Avanson's letter of 1 October, in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 619-20; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. ix, pp. 263-66; cf. Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>82</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 284.

went up to the chapel which is called the Sancta Sanctorum [now at the head of the Scala Santa], and blessed all the people together from the archway which Boniface VIII had built facing the piazza. Then, in the same order [of procession], he returned home to S. Marco.<sup>83</sup>

A dispatch of the Florentine envoy Averardo Serristori informs us that after Paul got back to the Palazzo S. Marco, he gave a grand banquet to the cardinals and the ambassadors. After the dinner he called to the imperial ambassador, the marquis of Sarria, and told him that on that day or the next his nephew Don Antonio Carafa would leave to withdraw the papal troops from the Neapolitan frontier. Yes, Sarria could depend on it. Furthermore, his Holiness was about to send a brief to Ottavio Farnese not to recruit any more soldiers from the papal states or from Castro and not to round up any more provisions. The news made Sarria think he had lived "the most beautiful day in the world," *la più bella giornata del mondo*, and he was filled with an "infinite pleasure."<sup>84</sup>

A new chapter in papal-imperial relations might have begun with the arrival in Rome of Don Garcilasso de la Vega on 31 October (1555). Garcilasso came as a special envoy of Charles V and Philip [II]; he was met by the marquis of Sarria and Giovanni Carafa di Montorio. Navagero believed that the envoy had come to demand the reinstatement of Marc' Antonio Colonna as well as the release of the cardinal of S. Fiora and Camillo Colonna from the heavy financial sureties they had had to furnish the pope for their deliverance from the Castel S. Angelo. Two days later, however, Paul IV told Navagero that although he had not yet received Don Garcilasso, he understood the envoy's instructions were "very bland" (*molto dolci*).<sup>85</sup> Garcilasso was formally to announce Charles's surrender of the Netherlands to his son Philip, and since they had both heard of the pope's enlisting troops, Garcilasso was to assure his Holiness of the Hapsburgs' specific intentions and their devotion to the Holy See.

In Rome, as in other places and at other times, the ambassadors went to see one another. There was a special bond between Don Garcilasso de la Vega and the Florentine envoy Averardo Serristori, for the obvious reason the Hapsburgs and the

Medici were good friends. Garcilasso told Serristori (on 8 November) that his first audience with the pope could not possibly have gone more smoothly, *con tanta dolcezza e con parole così amorevoli*. When Garcilasso expressed wonderment that the pope had been adding to his military forces, the latter told him he was merely trying to preserve what little remained of the papal states, "seeing that his vassals and feudatories were following a course of trying all too hard to make themselves masters [of those states], which was an affront to his Holiness and hardly of advantage to the people."<sup>86</sup>

On 12 November the Venetian ambassador Navagero paid Don Garcilasso a visit. The Spanish government in Naples had shown no little restraint in dealing with the irascible pontiff. Garcilasso delivered himself of a lengthy discourse to Navagero on the friendly purposes of his mission to Rome. In the course of it he said, "This good old man does not perceive that whilst he was having the drums beat and mustering troops, the Emperor's forces in the kingdom of Naples and in Tuscany might have employed something more than words."<sup>87</sup> On the following day Garcilasso had a somewhat unpleasant meeting with Cardinal Carafa, who turned down the Spanish offer of a pension of 4,000 ducats, and made it clear that Marc' Antonio Colonna was not going to be restored to his *status quo ante*, nor would there be any reduction or removal of the heavy sureties which had given S. Fiora and some other imperialists the freedom at least to move about the city of Rome.<sup>88</sup> Although Garcilasso's soft-spoken charm made a favorable impression on the pope, the Spaniards got nowhere either with the pope or with Carafa.

By this time Paul IV and the cardinal-nephew had waited more than a month for Henry II's response to the proffered alliance with the Holy See. Finally on 21 and 22 November (1555) Cardinals Charles de Guise and François de Tournon came to Rome as Henry's envoys. Charles was called the cardinal of Lorraine, his younger brother Louis being known as the cardinal of Guise. They were the sons of Claude of Lorraine (d. 1550), the first

<sup>83</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 284; Max Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Mastius und seinen Freunden*, Leipzig, 1886, no. 177, p. 232.

<sup>84</sup> Giuseppe Canestrini, ed., *Legazioni di Averardo Serristori* . . . , Florence, 1853, pp. 377-78.

<sup>85</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 265-66, p. 237, and cf. no. 271.

<sup>86</sup> Canestrini, *Legazioni di Averardo Serristori*, pp. 379-80, letter dated 9 November, 1555.

<sup>87</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 278, p. 248, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 12 November, 1555.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, VI-1, no. 279, pp. 249-50, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 13 November, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 280-81, 290.

duke of Guise, and brothers of Marie, the mother of Mary, queen of Scots. They were also brothers of François, second duke of Guise, who had defended Metz against Charles V (in 1552). François had married Anna d' Este, daughter of Duke Ercole II of Ferrara and Renée de France, the Calvinist daughter of Louis XII.

Before the arrival of Charles de Guise and Tournon in Rome, there had been some discussion of where to find an apartment for Guise, to whom presumably some special honor should be paid. The imperialist Cardinal Carpi, who was at the time one of three or four cardinal-inquisitors, sarcastically suggested that the Inquisition would always provide lodging for him, thus trying to cast doubt on the orthodoxy of the most reverend cardinal of Lorraine. The remark enraged Guise and the French ambassador Jean d' Avanson. It embarrassed and annoyed Paul IV, who was apparently more willing to find heresy in imperialist cardinals like Pole and Morone.<sup>89</sup>

The pope and the Carafeschi gave Guise and Tournon an almost royal welcome in Rome. Some days were spent in receptions and dinners as well as in reviewing and discussing the articles of alli-

ance to which the pope and d' Avanson had agreed on 13 October. With some few alterations in the text (*alterate alcune poche cose*), which Nores carefully notes, the pope and the two French cardinals formally signed (on 15 December, 1555) the "capitulazioni" which were to have sad consequences.

According to the terms of the treaty Henry II should become the defender of Paul IV and the Church against all opponents of whatever rank or condition, although in December (as opposed to the text of October) Henry need no longer take action on the pope's behalf if his own kingdom was invaded. The French crown, however, should maintain a "perpetua protezione" over the three papal nephews and their descendants, giving them lands and possessions in France or in Italy for those they would lose in the kingdom of Naples. The third "capitulation" provided for the offensive as well as defensive league, "and this for warfare in Italy only, Piedmont not being included herewith."

The fourth article or capitulation required the establishment of a wartime fund. An initial deposit of 50,000 scudi was (jointly?) to be made in Rome or Venice, after which Henry II was to put up 350,000 scudi and Paul IV 150,000 within three months. Other articles raised the French force which Henry was to send into Italy from 8,000 to 12,000 foot, together with the 1,200 light horse which had already been agreed on in October. The pope was to put into the field 10,000 foot and 100 horse. He would also supply food, artillery, and munitions from the papal states to the fullest extent he could, all at the expense of the league.

The war might begin against the kingdom of Naples or against the duchy of Florence, according to the pope's decision. If Siena were taken, the city would become part of the states of the Church although, *contentandosene il popolo*, Paul might bestow it on Giovanni Carafa di Montorio or on whomever else he chose. One of Henry's sons was to receive the kingdom of Naples as a papal investiture, and another would get the duchy of Milan, but neither of these Italian states would go to the dauphin. Taxes were to be reduced in both Naples and Milan.

The princes to whom the two states were assigned must take up residence in them as soon as they could, *perchè v' abitassero di continuo*, "and during their minority the governors of the said states should be elected by the pope." A place was left in the league for the Signoria of Venice and for the duke of Ferrara. The Republic was to receive the kingdom of Sicily, at least according to

<sup>89</sup> Rawdon Brown, ed., *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-3 (1884), append., nos. 134-35, pp. 1646-47; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 85-92; Dom René Ancel, *Nonciatures de France*, I (Paris, 1909), introd., p. LXXIV; Ludwig Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten*, Berlin, 1909, pp. 72-75. Rawdon Brown, Riess, Pastor, and others have mistakenly assumed that the "cardinal of Lorraine" in question was Charles's younger brother Louis de Guise (*cf.* their indices when the proper name Louis does not appear in the text). On Charles de Guise's mission to Rome (and to Ferrara, Urbino, and Venice), *cf.* Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 279-80, and see esp. Lucien Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols., Paris, 1913-14, II, 29-43. On the titles of the two cardinal brothers, Charles de Lorraine and Louis de Guise, *cf.* Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 265, lines 14 and 38-39: *Ludovicus Lothoringus de Guisa . . . dictus de Guisa et Carolus de Lothoringa de Guisa . . . dictus Lothoringus*. In an entry in his diary for 27 December, 1555, however, Massarelli, *op. cit.*, II, 286, lines 11-12, writes, "In festo vero divi Ioannis celebravit card. Guisius." Does he not mean Lothoringus?

The arrival of the cardinals of Lorraine and Tournon had been delayed by the latter's illness in Lyon (Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 40). On their mission to Rome, see in general Michel François, ed., *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon (1521-1562)*, Paris, 1946, nos. 476-93, pp. 298-306, letters of Tournon and Guise dated from 27 November, 1555, to 6 January, 1556, and François, "Le Rôle du Cardinal François de Tournon dans la politique française en Italie de janvier à juillet 1556," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, L (1933), 293-333, with an appendix of four documents. Tournon was an advocate of peace between France and Spain, but he could only do as Henry II directed him.



the October convention. Suitable provision would be made for Ferrara. The French king was not to interfere in ecclesiastical matters nor to receive the enemies or rebels of the Church. He was not to try to raise troops in the papal states without the pope's permission, although he must provide the pope with 400 lancers and two armed galleys every time his Holiness requested them. In the modifications of the treaty in December the papal states were much enlarged. The pope was to receive Benevento, the city and fortress of Gaeta, and a good deal more. There were twenty-five articles in the treaty,<sup>90</sup> and once more the (later) curial adage came true, *Historia concordatorum est historia dolorum*.

It was easy for the enemies of the Hapsburgs to make treaties. Paper and parchment, time and talk were cheap, but putting into effect the current plans of the high contracting parties was going to be a costly business. Anne de Montmorency, constable of France, much preferred to pursue the Hapsburg-Valois peace negotiations, which he had been promoting (along with Queen Mary Tudor and Cardinal Pole) since the early spring.<sup>91</sup> Montmorency tried to dissuade Henry II from the papal alliance on the grounds that peace with the emperor was essential to the well-being of France.

Little could be expected of union with an eighty-year-old pontiff, who had no money, was the enemy of the duke of Florence, had no bond with the Venetians, and had alienated the duke of Ferrara by the expulsion of his brother from Rome. If the pope died, Henry would have to carry the full weight of the conflict, and if Henry withdrew from it, he would suffer a loss of reputation. If he did not withdraw, the intolerable ex-

pense would have a deleterious effect upon the kingdom. Montmorency disliked and distrusted the Guises, who were promoting the papal alliance as a prelude to the war in which François de Guise would assume command of the French forces. The growing power and influence of the Guises were an obvious threat to the future of Montmorency's own family.

Charles de Guise's cardinal companion to Rome, François de Tournon, also disapproved of the costly pact with the papacy. Tournon, moreover, had been loath to return to the Tiber, for his younger colleague Jean du Bellay had become cardinal-bishop of Ostia and Velletri and dean of the Sacred College some six or so months before (on 29 May, 1555). Tournon had been a cardinal since 1530, du Bellay since 1535, and the older man believed he had been discriminated against.<sup>92</sup>

Montmorency and Tournon were far from the only ones fearful of loss or disaster as a result of the new league. Guidobaldo della Rovere, duke of Urbino, gave up his charge as captain-general of the Church, and Paul IV appointed his affable and incompetent nephew Giovanni Carafa di Montorio as Urbino's successor (on 29 December, 1555).<sup>93</sup> Papal nephews had often been captains-general of the Church; experienced soldiers were expected to plan any campaign in the offing and to take command in the field.

Of larger popular interest (although of little political importance) was Paul IV's creation of seven cardinals on 20 December (1555). In a truculent, indeed violent, mood two days before, Paul had told the Sacred College, as Navagero wrote the doge and Senate (on 18 December), "that he was compelled by necessity to make cardinals, as in the College he did not see persons of whom he could make use, all having their faction and de-

<sup>90</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 35-43, who gives also the provisions made for Ercole II of Ferrara. The latter was to have the "name and dignity" of general of the army of the league, receive 2,000 scudi a month from France as well as the protection of Henry II, who was to maintain in the duchy of Ferrara at his own expense 100 men-at-arms, *secondo l'uso di Francia*, and 200 light horse. When the kingdom of Naples was taken, Ercole would receive therefrom an income of 20,000 scudi. When Tuscany was in the hands of the league, Ercole would get 15,000 scudi, "but with the acquisition of Milan also, 50,000, and Cremona would be entrusted to him as surety." Cf. *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, no. 343, pp. 309-10; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 263-67, 279-80. Paul IV was finding the financing difficult (M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* [1946], no. 478, p. 299).

<sup>91</sup> Cf. *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, nos. 55, 58, 60-62, 71-72, 76-77 ff., esp. nos. 112 ff., pp. 48 ff., 90 ff., and cf. nos. 322-25, p. 288, et alibi.

<sup>92</sup> On the disfavor with which both Montmorency and Tournon viewed the pact with the papacy, see Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 39, 40. When Jean du Bellay died (on 16 February, 1560), Tournon succeeded him as cardinal-bishop of Ostia and Velletri and dean of the Sacred College (on 13 March, 1560). Cf. in general L. Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 17 ff., 28-29, 33 ff., et alibi. As Carafa had wished, Jean du Bellay had indeed been summoned back to France. Charles de Guise had brought him the letter of recall which, as du Bellay wrote Henry II on 24 December, 1555, he declined to accept (*ibid.*, II, 47).

<sup>93</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fols. 180<sup>r</sup>-183<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, a brief of appointment addressed to Giovanni Carafa, *comes Montorii*: ". . . Te nostrum et eiusdem S.R.E. capitaneum generalem vigore harum litterarum facimus, constituimus, et declaramus cum omnibus honoribus, dignitatibus, privilegiis, titulis, insignibus quae antehac generalis nostri et eiusdem Ecclesiae capitanei uti, frui, et de iure vel consuetudine soliti sunt. . . ." (from fols. 181<sup>r</sup>-182<sup>r</sup>).

pendency."<sup>94</sup> He had angrily rejected the requests of Juan Álvarez de Toledo, von Truchsess, Morone, and the imperial ambassador Don Fernando Ruiz de Castro, marquis of Sarria, that he give a red hat to one or more of the imperialist nominees. He disregarded Carlo Carafa's efforts to have his friend and advisor Giovanni della Casa made a cardinal. According to Guise and Tournon, however, Paul had promised to make cardinals of certain pro-French nominees,

but the impotency of the imperialists has compelled him to change his mind, so that instead of ten [cardinals] he has made only seven: those whom he has elected are of his own choice, men without any other recommendation than their virtue, doctrine, and goodness of life.<sup>95</sup>

Paul's additions to the Sacred College, which clearly failed to win the unrestrained enthusiasm of Guise and Tournon, did include a Spaniard, chosen (as they wrote Henry II) to offset criticism by the imperialists and to show that Paul wished ostensibly "demeurer en neutralité avec l'Empereur." The Spaniard in question was Juan Siliceo, archbishop of Toledo, who was said to be eighty-three or -four years of age, and unlikely ever to come to Rome. If by some chance he should wish to do so, he would never travel by sea, and presumably the French would refuse to give him a safe-conduct.

Scipione Rebiba, who had been bishop of Motola (just northwest of Taranto) since 1551, was also made a cardinal. A Sicilian, he had long been a faithful servitor of the pope. A Frenchman known at the Curia as Giovanni Suriano Reumano (Guise and Tournon call him *Reomanus*) was appointed as a counterweight to Siliceo. Reumano, who had been a *causarum palatii apostolici auditor*, became bishop of Mirepoix on the same day. Johannes Gropper, a well-known German theologian and dean of the cathedral church of Cologne, was a distinguished appointee. Gropper had defended the Church and Catholicism for years with learning and dignity. Finally, three Italians completed the roster of seven new cardinals—Gian Bernardino Scotti, who was also made archbishop of Trani, an old friend of the pope; Diomede Carafa,

who had long been bishop of Ariano (near Eboli), a nephew of the pope; and Giannangelo Capizucchi, who was a native of Rome and an auditor of the Rota.<sup>96</sup> Although disappointed in this new creation of cardinals, Guise and Tournon were at least sure of the pope's pro-French stance.

At least Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, was satisfied with the papal alliance he had signed along with the reluctant Tournon on behalf of Henry II. Now Guise's elder brother Duke François was, as the cardinal knew well, to be appointed the French commander against the imperialists in Italy. There was reason for Henry II's anti-Hapsburg policy. The betrothal of Charles V's son Philip, king of Naples, duke of Milan, heir to Spain, the Netherlands, and half the New World, to Queen Mary Tudor of England in a ceremony at Winchester on 25 July, 1554, had meant the complete encirclement of France. The union of England and the Netherlands with Spain, Milan, and the German empire could gradually (one might assume) effect the political and economic strangulation of France, already cut off from the New World by the Spanish and Portuguese monopolies which the papacy had itself confirmed in 1493.

Paul IV also felt the tight constriction of Hapsburg power and policy. In fact he had felt and feared it for years. Like Clement VII before him, Paul aimed (but, alas, blindly and violently) at the liberation of Italy, and as Julius II turned over in his grave, Paul was planning the renewal of French intervention in Italy. The French would regain Naples and Milan, under the conditions we have just noted, while the Venetians (if they joined the league) would receive Sicily, which would keep them in the anti-Hapsburg camp and do something to compensate for their losses in the Levant. We are not concerned with England, but poor Mary Tudor, who had married Philip partly to help re-establish papal authority in the kingdom,<sup>97</sup>

<sup>94</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 319, pp. 286-87, describing a meeting of the consistory held "last Wednesday," i.e., 11 December, but Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 285, clearly places the consistory in question on 18 December (1555).

<sup>95</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 620, a letter from "C. cardinal de Lorraine, F. cardinal de Tournon," dated at Rome on 21 December, 1555.

<sup>96</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 620-23; *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 325, pp. 290-91, a letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 20 December, 1555; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 285; Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 44; Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III (1923), 34-35; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. ix, pp. 281-84; M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), no. 485, p. 302, summary of the letter published by Ribier; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 448-50.

<sup>97</sup> At a general congregation of cardinals and ambassadors held in the presence of Paul IV, as war between the Holy See and Spain darkened the horizon in Italy, the imperialist Cardinal Giovanni Morone defended Philip II, "whose marriage

now found that the pope, as the ally of France, was declaring war on her husband. Eventually Philip managed to bring England into the war, as a result of which France (after more than two centuries) finally recovered Calais.

In Italy, in the meantime, the imperialists were making a larger effort to preserve the peace than was Paul IV. On Tuesday, 24 December, after services in S. Peter's and in the Sistine Chapel the imperial ambassador Sarria presented Paul with a white horse and 7,000 scudi, the feudal assessment for the kingdom of Naples (*pro censu regni Siciliae citra Pharum*). On the other hand, on 1 January (1556), before the celebration of mass in the Sistine the pope formally invested Giovanni Carafa with the office of *capitaneus generalis Ecclesiae*, after which the papal nephew rode in a solemn procession from the Vatican Palace to the Campidoglio, where he was honored by a delegation of the Roman municipality. According to the Venetian ambassador Navagero, who was a witness to all this, Giovanni Carafa now received (as a quarterly payment) the sum of 9,060 ducats, i.e., 3,000 as his salary; 4,270 for 200 light horse; 600 for sixty halberdiers; and 1,190 "per li colonnelli e capitani." Nores says that Giovanni might have been appointed captain-general at an earlier date (obviously instead of della Rovere) if the pope had not entertained the suspicion that Giovanni was an imperialist at heart, but Carlo Carafa vouched for his brother, who (Carlo assured the pope) would always remain a good Frenchman and a faithful servitor of his Holiness.<sup>98</sup>

Paul IV's chief love, after the Church, was Italy. He was eager to free the papacy from the heavy weight of Spanish influence, and Naples and Milan from the heavier weight of Spanish rule. Several times, in talking with Navagero, Paul had compared Italy to a musical instrument with four strings—the Church, Venice, the kingdom of Naples, and the duchy of Milan. He chose to forget the Medici and Florence, and held Alfonso II and Lodovico il Moro up to opprobrium for introducing the alien armies into Italy, thus breaking this "si nobile strumento d' Italia." Liberty had been

lost, along with the "antica armonia."<sup>99</sup> Paul's youth had been spent during that period of relative stability which had followed the peace of Lodi (in 1454), and had come to an end with the French expedition of 1494.<sup>100</sup>

While Paul professed to want peace between the Valois and the Hapsburgs, Cardinal Pole was doing his best to bring it about, having sent his secretary Vincenzo Parpaglia, the abbot of S. Saluto, to Brussels. Parpaglia had come with a long list of French proposals which Montmorency had furnished. Philip seemed much more inclined toward peace with the French than did the gout-ridden emperor, who was concerned with his coming relinquishment of Spain, Sicily, and Burgundy to Philip (on 16 January, 1556). Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, bishop of Arras, representing the emperor, would hear no discussion—not even a mention—of Milan. Parpaglia, however, had told Granvelle that no peace could conceivably be arrived at without the Hapsburgs' giving up Milan "not indeed to the king of France, but to an Italian prince."

The abbot of S. Saluto had been finding it hard going, for obviously the emperor's views were those being expressed by Granvelle,

whom the abbot threatened with more sinister events than had hitherto occurred, as owing to the peace made with the Sophy, the Turk was better able to perform great exploits both with the army in Hungary and with the fleet in Italy, and perhaps in Africa, owing to the disturbances in those parts. . . .<sup>101</sup>

After the peace with ʿTahmāsp, the sophi of Persia, Suleiman was quiet for some time. He could watch at leisure, and he did, the completion of his mosque, the Süleymaniye Camii, to which the faithful were admitted in mid-August of 1556. Despite Busbecq's six months' truce and a subse-

<sup>99</sup> Navagero, *Relazione* [1558], p. 389, and cf. Ancel, "La Question de Sienna," pp. 40-43.

<sup>100</sup> Although Paul proposed the establishment of French princes in both Naples and Milan, he wanted to keep all the "barbarians" out of Italy, French as well as Spanish, "admitting them solely as stable grooms and cooks or at the utmost as merchants; nor can this be expected from the Spaniards, as they insist on universal monarchy, though it might indeed be hoped for from the French, who have moreover hereditary claims [in Italy]" (*Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 813, p. 950, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 12 February, 1557).

<sup>101</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 335, pp. 301-2, a letter of Federico Badoer, Venetian ambassador in Brussels, to the doge and Senate, dated 1 January, 1556, and note, *ibid.*, no. 545, pp. 519-20, a letter of Giacomo Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador in France, dated 12 July, 1556.

with the Queen of England [he said] was made solely for the purpose of bringing back that kingdom to its devotion and obedience to the See Apostolic" (*Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 543, p. 518, doc. dated 11 July, 1556).

<sup>98</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 286; Navagero, *Relazione* [1558], p. 385; Lossen, *Briefve von Andreas Masius*, p. 233; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 44: ". . . che il fratello si sarebbe conservato sempre buon francese e fedeli ministro ed esecutore della mente del Papa. . . ."

quent suspension of arms, there had been a ceaseless round of plunder and pillage along the eastern front in Hungary.<sup>102</sup> Transylvania was the chief bone of contention.<sup>103</sup> Paul IV was no fonder of Ferdinand than of the latter's brother Charles V. He held them both responsible for the concessions made to the Lutherans in the recent peace of Augsburg.

Paul had known Charles, as he told Navagero (on 11 April, 1556), since the year 1513, and had always found in him

a thirst for domination, an insufferable pride, a contempt for religion, for we will ask you, What other emperor but Charles would have held councils and so many diets with the intervention of heretics and Lutherans? . . . Who but he sacked this city, and perpetrated that horrible impiety? for, although absent, he ordained and was gratified by those misfortunes of this Holy See and of all Italy. . . .<sup>104</sup>

If the Hapsburgs had trouble with the Turks, presumably they deserved it. On the whole the sources suggest that Paul was far more distressed by the activities of Charles, Ferdinand, and Philip than by those of Suleiman, who was the near ally of his own ally, Henry II.

As the storm clouds were gathering over Rome, the wife of Ascanio Colonna, Donna Giovanna d' Aragona, had escaped from the Palazzo Colonna (next to the church of the SS. Apostoli) with her daughters and daughter-in-law, Donna Felice, the wife of Marc' Antonio Colonna. This was on 1 January (1556). Paul IV had forbidden Giovanna and Felice to leave the city "sotto grossissima sicurtà" in early September (1555), after the arrest of the Cardinal of S. Fiora and Camillo Colonna.<sup>105</sup> Felice was S. Fiora's niece. The ladies had gone through the Porta S. Lorenzo at the east end of the city. On 11 January (1556) Navagero wrote the doge and Senate that "the corporal of the gate of

S. Lorenzo has been hanged for allowing the Lady Donna Giovanna to pass through it."

On Tuesday evening, 7 January, the imperial ambassador Sarria and the emperor's special envoy Don Garcilasso de la Vega had waited on the pope, seeking replies to the questions and requests which Garcilasso had been addressing to his Holiness. Anxious to avoid making definite statements to the imperialists, as Navagero soon learned, Paul "turned the conversation to the affairs of Germany and Hungary, saying he was troubled because the Lutherans increased in Germany, and that on the other hand it was said the Turks would invade Transylvania."

When Sarria advanced an appeal for the restoration of Marc' Antonio Colonna's lands, Paul flew into a rage, assailing Charles V and Philip for infringing upon the rights of the pope and the independence of the Holy See. The Colonnese were not only rebellious vassals; they were enemies of the papacy. They had always been so. Just remember Sciarra Colonna's dastardly attack upon Boniface VIII. (They were not unlike, Boniface and Paul.) Sarria then insisted, "in a haughtier tone than hitherto," upon some straightforward answers, "as until now each of their sovereigns [Charles and Philip] and they themselves had received fair words, but very much at variance with the deeds witnessed by them daily." It looked as though the die were being cast. The next morning the pope directed his nephew Giovanni Carafa di Montorio to see to the recruitment of another 3,000 infantry in Città di Castello, Perugia, Viterbo and Tivoli.<sup>106</sup>

Charles V had been dismayed by Paul's election, but Charles was now taking his leave of this world to prepare himself for the next, in which connection Paul had no intention of assisting him. When Charles had removed himself from his several kingdoms and from the empire, what would come next? The question was being asked in every chancery in Europe. Would the French attack the young, inexperienced Philip II? The Venetian Senate knew that Sultan Suleiman, who had recently returned from the Persian expedition, would wish to know what was going on in Europe. And, indeed, there had just been an unexpected

<sup>102</sup> Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 341-45, 354 ff., trans. with altered text by J.-J. Hellert, *Hist.de l'empire ottoman*, VI (1836), 88-93, 105 ff.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 366-370, esp. the texts cited in the notes.

<sup>104</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 453, p. 406, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 11 April, 1556.

<sup>105</sup> Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 22; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 246, 252, and esp. p. 286. On Giovanna d' Aragona's escape from Rome with her daughter-in-law Felice, cf. Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1038, fol. 119r, and "il capitano della Porta di San Lorenzo, di dove uscì la suddetta signora, è stato appiccato et tutti i soldati mandati in galea" (*ibid.*, fol. 121r).

<sup>106</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 347, pp. 312-13, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 11 January, 1556, and cf. Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Mastus*, no. 178, p. 253, with the date of Giovanna d' Aragona's escape from Rome.

development, certainly unexpected in Rome. On 21 February, 1556, the Venetian Senate approved a letter which the Doge Francesco Venier was to send to the baillie and to an envoy in Istanbul to the effect

that the emperor has renounced to the king of England, his son [Philip, the husband of Mary Tudor], the kingdoms of Spain and of Sicily besides the renunciation previously made to him of the states of Italy [the duchy of Milan and the kingdom of Naples] and of Flanders . . . so that his imperial Majesty has been left with only the state of Burgundy and the dignity of the empire, and now the son dubs himself also king of Spain. He has gone from Brussels to Antwerp to pay a visit to the people. . . . During these days there have come together in Cambrai, a town on the borders of Flanders, the commissioners of the emperor and of the most Christian king [Henry II] to deal with the exchange of prisoners being held by the one side and the other.

With this opportunity they have concluded a general truce between the emperor, the king his son, and the most Christian king for five years beginning on the fifth of the present month [5 February, 1556]. So we have been advised by letters from our envoy in France, which were received the day before yesterday, and [which are] in agreement [with those] from our envoy to the emperor at Brussels, the latter's letters having been received yesterday evening. . . . As to the conclusion of this [truce] we have wished to send you immediate word, and with the Senate we instruct you that you must give this information as usual [to the Porte]. . . .<sup>107</sup>

The Signoria was not misleading the Turkish government. Anne de Montmorency, the constable of France, had been working long and hard to achieve peace with the Hapsburgs. It seemed, however, to be almost by chance that the imperialist and French commissioners, who had met at the abbey of Vaucelles near Cambrai to effect a proposed exchange of prisoners, had indeed arranged a truce for five years. As Charles V was giving up his various crowns, he wished to see his subjects and his son at peace. The terms of the agreement were most favorable to France, for they left to each of the high contracting parties his current territorial possessions without challenging either hereditary or acquired claims. Acceptance of the *status quo nunc* thus left Henry II in undisturbed possession of a large part of the duchy of

Savoy and in continued occupation of the French conquests along the disputed border, notably Metz, Toul, and Verdun.<sup>108</sup>

As soon as he had learned of the truce of Vaucelles, the papal nuncio at the French court, Sebastiano Gualterio, bishop of Viterbo, immediately wrote the surprising news to Cardinal Carlo Carafa (on 6 February, 1556). A courier reached Rome with his letter on Friday night, 14 February. Carafa was appalled, his papal uncle stunned. Only a few days before, they had received word of Henry II's confirmation (on 18 January) of the offensive and defensive league, in which France and the Holy See would be partners in the liquidation of the Spanish regime in Italy. According to the agreement, as we have seen, French princes (but not the dauphin) would acquire Naples and Milan, and (the cardinal-nephew had hoped) the Carafeschi would eventually receive Siena. Although Henry II was putting a good face on his five years' truce with the Hapsburgs—after all, he was still the pope's loyal ally—Carafa's well-built plans now seemed to lie in ruins.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>108</sup> As Henry II wrote his ambassador to the Holy See, Jean d'Avanson (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II [1666], 625), "Monsieur . . . voicy que les nouvelles me sont venues . . . touchant la conclusion de la trêve faite et passée entre l'empereur, le roy d'Angleterre son fils, et moy pour cinq ans, commençant le 5. iour de ce présent mois, avec toutes les avantages conditions pour moi que j'eusse sçeu désirer, et mesmes pour la compréhension de tous mes amis, allies, et conféderez, sans qu'au moyen de ladite trêve je sois tenu faire restitution des places, ny aucunes choses dépendantes de mes conquestes, ainsi que vous pouvez voir plus amplement par le traité que ie vous envoie. . . ." The treaty was enclosed with Henry's letter (*ibid.*, II, 626-31). . . . au lieu de Vaucelles, le cinquième iour de Fevrier, 1555" (O.S., i.e., 1556).

On the negotiations as seen from the Spanish standpoint, note Chas. Weiss, ed., *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV (1843), 513-45, 547 ff. From Cambrai on 5 February the agents of Philip II wrote the latter (*ibid.*, p. 539):

"Quant à l'article du Turcq, ilz n'ont aucunement voulu consentir qu'en termes spéciaux en soit faite mention par escript [!], promectans néanmoins que ledict Seigneur roy [Henry II] fera son mieulx pour assister la Chrestienté et le Seigneur roy des Romains, et luy donnera toutes lettres favorables; que ce point touche trop à la réputation du roy leur maistre, qu'il n'est confédéré ni allié avec le Turcq, qui ne le favorisera autrement s'il entreprend contre la Chrestienté, soit par mer ou terre. . . ."

The sultan and the pashas would like to have known this. Did the Venetians have any inkling of it? It does not appear that they passed any such information on to the Porte. Since Henry II had recently been seeking aid of the Turks, the sultan and Rustem Pasha were indignant enough as it was when they were informed of the truce of Vaucelles. Cf. in general Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 363 ff., esp. the texts cited in the notes.

<sup>109</sup> On Paul IV and the history of the Holy See during the years 1556-1557, see Dom René Ansel, "La Question de

<sup>107</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 69, fols. 173<sup>v</sup>-174<sup>r</sup>, letter dated 21 February, 1556 (Ven. style 1555). Alvise Renier (Rhenier) had recently been sent as a special envoy to the Porte. Antonio Erizzo was still the baillie in Istanbul, Alvise Mocenigo having succeeded in getting his own election to the post annulled by a vote of the Senate on 13 January, 1556 (*ibid.*, fol. 168<sup>v</sup>), after which Mocenigo was sent to replace Bernardo Navagero as the Republic's ambassador in Rome.

Paul IV was also putting a good face on the predicament in which the Carafeschi now found themselves. Having weighed the pros and cons of the situation for two or three days, on the evening of 17 February he summoned to the Vatican Palace the emperor's ambassador Don Fernando Ruiz de Castro, the marquis of Sarria. Choosing to forget their unpleasant exchange of the month before, Paul embraced Sarria two or three times in the presence of the other ambassadors, and gave ardent expression to his pleasure in learning of the five years' truce between Henry II and Charles V and Philip II. He gave Sarria much of the credit for this assurance of a Valois-Hapsburg peace, and was unstinting in his praise. Undoubtedly surprised, the ambassador observed that henceforth there was an open road to other negotiations which could lead to a universal and honorable peace and the opportunity to serve God.

Paul now launched into a eulogy of the French ambassador Jean d'Avanson, who (it was reported) looked embarrassed. Sir Edward Carne, the ambassador of Philip as king of England, must have been taken aback by the abundant compliments which the pope paid Philip. Of all those present, however, Guido Ascanio Sforza, cardinal of S. Fiora, must have been the most astonished by the gestures of friendship and cordiality which both the pope and Cardinal Carafa made in his direction. Bongianini Gianfigliuzzi, the Florentine ambassador, wrote Duke Cosimo I that it all certainly looked like peace.<sup>110</sup>

In France there was fear for a time that the imperialists might lure the aggrieved pope into the Hapsburg camp by offering him appropriate terms.

Sienna et la politique du Cardinal Carlo Carafa." *Revue Bénédictine*, XXII (1905), 15-49, 206-31, 398-428. Incidentally, Ancel, *ibid.*, p. 16, forgetting that 1556 was a leap year, has erroneously identified 14 February as a Saturday. In mid-February also Massarelli learned of the "induciae quinquennales," of which he entered a note in his *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 288. Cf. M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), no. 500, pp. 309-10; *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 391-93, 405, 415, 419, pp. 345 ff.; Navagero, *Relazione [1558]*, pp. 391-92; Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Marnus*, nos. 179-80, pp. 234-36; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 50-54, who is singularly well informed; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 289-94; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 109 ff.; Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 44-46, 49 ff.

<sup>110</sup> Ancel, "La Question de Sienna," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXII, 16-17, who cites a letter of Gianfigliuzzi to Cosimo I, dated at Rome on 18 February, 1556: "Con queste et altre dimostrazioni la cosa si può tenere per ferma, aggiuntovi le carezze straordinarie fatte hieri da sua Beatitudine et dal Cardinal Caraffa al Cardinal Camerlengo, col quale dissero molto bene dell'Imperatore[!]."

Even before the final ratification of the truce the Venetian ambassador to the French court, Giacomo Soranzo, wrote the doge and Senate (on 28 February, 1556) that Henry II was giving "every assurance to his Holiness that his Majesty will never fail in the protection promised by him to the Pope and all his family and relations. . . ." <sup>111</sup>

The league of France with the Holy See still existed. It was merely that the truce of Vaucelles appeared to render it of no importance. Nevertheless, on 26 February (1556) the pope appointed Ercole d'Este, duke of Ferrara, papal captain-general of the league.<sup>112</sup> On 14 March he confirmed the stipend, emoluments, and other grants which Ercole was to receive in the service of the Holy See and France.<sup>113</sup>

Carafa retired with his wily friend Giovanni della Casa to consider the change in policy which the truce of Vaucelles had made necessary. Their objective was the acquisition of Siena by the Carafeschi. The imperialists were set in their ways, however, and would always consider Paul IV and Carafa their enemies. Neither Charles V nor Philip would ever willingly make a grant of Siena to the Carafa family. They had, of course, accepted the truce of Vaucelles with alacrity, the terms of which Henry II and Montmorency had found too advantageous to reject. Therefore, as della Casa set forth in a memorandum (*discorso*) which he prepared for Carafa on how "to request of his Majesty, the Emperor Charles V, the state and dominion of Siena," a personage of great authority must be sent to the French court. Also this important person should be accompanied by envoys of Ercole II, duke of Ferrara, as well as by exiles from Florence, Siena, and Naples. All together they should protest the recent armistice, pointing out that Henry's abandonment of his allies would redound to his disadvantage no less than to his discredit. If he gave up the truce, he could still destroy his enemies.

<sup>111</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 414, p. 360.

<sup>112</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Busta 1300/15, nos. 34-35, and note the later copy in no. 33.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 38, with later copy in no. 33. On 27 June, 1556, the pope provided Camillo Orsini with the *licentia et facultas* of taking service under Ercole. As time goes on, the papal letters more than once state that Paul's efforts were directed "to the preparation of peace by war" (*ut bello pacem pararemus*), as in the brief of 15 September (1556), which set Ercole's annual stipend at 12,000 ducats (beginning with 1 September), assigned him a body-guard of 50 foot, and provided for 350 foot and 150 horse "ad tuas civitates tuosque fines ab hostium incursionibus tutandos" (*ibid.*, no. 42).

If Henry chose to abide by the terms of Vaucelles, the negotiations should be dexterously prolonged, so as to excite the suspicions of Charles V and Philip. It would be necessary to keep in close touch with the Guises, Catherine de' Medici, the king's mistress Diane de Poitiers, and all the opponents of Montmorency, who had been the prime mover in the truce of Vaucelles. When the emperor and the imperialists had become sufficiently alarmed, someone might go to them—perhaps Cardinal Giovanni Ricci of Montepulciano—and suggest that the best way to separate the Carafeschi from Henry, and the Holy See from France, would be to give the Carafeschi some state, especially Siena.<sup>114</sup>

The personage of great authority who would undertake the mission to France was to be none other than Cardinal Carlo Carafa himself. At 4:00 P.M. (*hora 20*) on Friday, 10 April (1556), at a general congregation of the cardinals two legates were chosen. Scipione Rebiba was to go to Charles V and Carafa to Henry II "pro pace inter eos procuranda," as Massarelli puts it,<sup>115</sup> but that was certainly not the cardinal-nephew's purpose in undertaking the long journey to the French court. Twelve days later (on the twenty-second) a letter was prepared in the pope's name, addressed to Carafa, *de latere legatus*, to the effect that his Holiness was bestowing the honorific sword and hat on Henry II and the golden rose on Queen Catherine de' Medici. Carafa was to make the formal presentations "cum solitis ceremoniis."<sup>116</sup> During this period the arrogant comportment of the imperial ambassador Sarria and his suite had thrown the pope into a fury,<sup>117</sup> playing very nicely into Carafa's hands.

Weeks before the nomination of the two legates Navagero had written Venice (on 28 February,

1556) that there was open dissatisfaction in the papal household on the score of the truce of Vaucelles, "which cannot be dissembled on the part of Cardinal Caraffa, and it is heard that the Imperialists are in greater force than ever on the borders of the kingdom of Naples." Paul IV was again inveighing against the Spanish, "saying that God of his goodness does not choose them any longer to remain in Italy. . . ."<sup>118</sup>

The Carafeschi had been following with concern the imperialist activities of Marc' Antonio Colonna. On Monday, 4 May, Paul IV declared Ascanio Colonna and the latter's son Marc' Antonio to have forfeited the fiefs they held of the Holy See in the Campagna, "namely Paliano, Marino, Nettuno, and other places," putting both Colonnas under the ban of excommunication and declaring them to be rebels. A week or so later (on Sunday, 10 May), at a "congregation" of cardinals in the Vatican Palace, Paul launched into an attack upon the Colonnese, and thanked the Almighty that he had such a nephew as Giovanni Carafa, count of Montorio, on whom he might bestow the expropriated lands of Ascanio and Marc' Antonio. He said he had not assembled the cardinals to consult them. If they wished to speak in agreement with him, they might do so, to which words "nothing whatever was said, but all the cardinals openly evinced dissatisfaction." Thereafter, as the congregation moved into the Sistine Chapel, Giovanni appeared in a ducal mantle of cloth of gold, and in an elaborate ceremony (described by Navagero) Paul made his nephew the duke of Paliano, after which mass was celebrated, and the new duke rode in state to the Campidoglio.<sup>119</sup>

Paul IV also despoiled Gian Francesco Guidi da Bagno of his lands (on 27 June, 1556), which were given to Giovanni Carafa's brother Antonio, who thus became the marquis of Montebello.<sup>120</sup> From the papal point of view the lords Colonna and da Bagno had something to answer for, but (as Bromato emphasizes) the Carafeschi had lost their lands in the kingdom of Naples, for which Henry II was supposed to compensate them. The extent to which the Carafeschi could rely on Henry was

<sup>114</sup> Ancel, "La Question de Sienna," pp. 17-19; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 25-27; and note Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>115</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 290; *Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 452-53, pp. 405-6; Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, nos. 187, 190, pp. 250, 256-57; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1556, nos. 2-3; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 297-300; Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 62 ff.

<sup>116</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fol. 213<sup>r</sup>; note, *ibid.*, fols. 214 ff., letters also dated 22 April addressed to Henry and Catherine; and cf. Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 37, by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>117</sup> *Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 437, 447, 475, pp. 388, 396-97, 438, letters of Navagero to the Venetian doge and Senate, dated 28 March, 4 April, and 5 May, 1556; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 55-57; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 295-97; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 121 ff.; Ancel, "La Question de Sienna," p. 38.

<sup>118</sup> *Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 415, pp. 360-61.

<sup>119</sup> *Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 484, pp. 449-51, a letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 16 May, 1556, and see Navagero, *Relazione [1558]*, pp. 385-86; Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 191, pp. 258-59; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 290-91; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 21-22; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, ix, pp. 300-2.

<sup>120</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 292.

starkly illustrated by his confirmation of the anti-Hapsburg league with the Holy See on 18 January (1556) and his virtual annulment of the league by his acceptance of the truce with the Hapsburgs at Vaucelles (on 5 February), less than three weeks later.

The castle and town of Paliano, where the tombs of the Colonnas are still to be seen in the church of S. Andrea, crowns a hilltop some miles to the southeast of Rome, between Genazzano and Anagni. The family had been Ghibellines since the days of old Cardinal Giovanni Colonna in the earlier thirteenth century. Marc' Antonio's father Ascanio—with whom the son did not get along—had been declared a rebel in Paul III's time. Such was the seessaw politics of the papacy, however, that the kindly Julius III had restored Ascanio to his lands and titles (on 17 February, 1550).<sup>121</sup> Now the Colonnese were again at odds with a pope. The years would show, and the Carafeschi (like the Turks) would learn, that Marc' Antonio was a considerable opponent with whom to contend.

In a secret consistory of 11 May (1556) the pope gave the legate cross to Carafa and to Scipione Rebiba, now called the cardinal of Pisa since his translation on 13 April from the paltry see of Mottola (*Motula*) to that of Pisa. On the eighteenth or nineteenth Carafa left Rome headed for the court of Henry II "ad procurandum pacem inter eum et Carolum V Imperatorem."<sup>122</sup> Among the 250 persons who comprised Carafa's suite were various Florentine and Neapolitan exiles, including Pietro Strozzi. Ugo Boncompagni, later Gregory XIII, also went along as an advisor. Despite Massarelli's discretion, it was no secret at the Curia that Carafa's purpose was probably to undo the truce of Vaucelles and to reassert the papal-French league. It has been alleged that Carafa set out from Rome with two sets of instructions, one to work for peace (if the pope and the Carafeschi could find security and advantage therein), the other to work for the resumption of war between France and Spain (if his family's security and advantage were not to be guaranteed).<sup>123</sup> In any event Carafa was the spokes-

man of Paul IV, who regarded himself as the divinely-ordained arbiter of peace in Europe.

Henry II was at Fontainebleau. Carafa arrived there on 16 June. Ten days before this a report was current in Rome, based on letters from Istanbul of 2 May, that on or about 4 May a Turkish armada of thirty galleys would leave the Bosphorus for the Barbary coast. Sultan Suleiman had decided not to send out a larger number of galleys since he had been informed of the truce of Vaucelles.<sup>124</sup> This information had gone to the Porte, as we have noted, in a Venetian dispatch of 21 February, which the doge and Senate had sent to the baillie and envoy in Istanbul.

As disturbing to the Turks as Henry's truce with the Hapsburgs, must have been the earthquake which struck Istanbul shortly before daybreak on 10 May. As Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq wrote his friend Andreas Masius from the Turkish capital (on 28 May), many public and private buildings were badly damaged. Some collapsed completely. Many persons were killed. The earthquake was said to be worse [in other parts of the Ottoman empire], however, for some towns were reported to have been completely destroyed and thousands

---

duke of Paliano) to strive for peace and a *registro di lettere e scritture segrete* (also prepared in Paliano's name) to try for renewal of the Valois-Hapsburg war if it suited the interests of the Carafeschi. Cf. the extraordinary report of Carafa's alleged intentions when he reached the French court, as given by Cardinal Alvisé Corner to Navagero, who relayed it to the doge and Council of Ten on 30 May, 1556, in *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 500, p. 468. Note also the warning which Simon Renard, the Hapsburg ambassador to the French court, sent Philip II on 25 May, 1556, to the effect "que ledict cardinal Caraffe venoit par deçà pour dresser entreprise de grande conséquence contre vostre Majesté et ses estatz, souz couleur de parler de paix" (Weiss, *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV, 567-68, and see, *ibid.*, pp. 569 ff.).

<sup>124</sup> The *avviso* from Rome of 6 June, 1556, is preserved in the Vatican *Lettere di principi*, vol. XXII, fol. 111', to the effect that "di Constantinopoli con lettere di 2 del passato [2 May] s'è inteso che fra dui giorni sarebbe uscita l'armata Turchesca al numero di 30 galere che andranno in Barberia, non avendo sua Altezza voluto ch'essi maggior numero di questo dopo havere havuto l'avviso della triega."

Masius had picked up the Turkish rumor a month earlier, as he wrote his friend Gerwick Blarer, the Benedictine abbot of Weingarten, "Classis Turcica nunciatur certo ventura cum 130 [!] triremibus" (Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 189, p. 255). Simon Renard had also got the news that the sultan was sending out "armée formelle" for the year 1556, neither on land nor by sea. The truce of Vaucelles had changed his plans. Thirty Turkish galleys would set sail for the Barbary coast. And Renard had learned "que ledit Turcq entent retenir la Transylvanie pour luy, non pour le filz du vaivode," i.e., John Sigismund, son of John Zápolya (Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, IV, 589, doc. dated 31 May, 1556).

<sup>121</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium sextum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 155.

<sup>122</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 291, and cf. *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 494, p. 459; it is hardly a matter of importance, but Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 406, note 4, insists that Carafa left Rome on 19, not 18, May.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 58-59, who also says that secretaries kept two registers, a *registro di lettere pubbliche* containing Carafa's instructions (written in the name of the



of their inhabitants to have perished.<sup>125</sup> When he read Busbecq's letter, Masius undoubtedly assumed that there would be no large-scale Turkish expedition into the western Mediterranean during the summer of 1556, and he was right.

In the meantime Carafa's first letters from Fontainebleau to Rome were concerned with his negotiations for peace—his apparent desire to see the truce maintained but modified—although the news soon reached him that the Colonnese were making extensive preparations for the recovery of Paliano. Since the imperialists were aiding and abetting these rebels against papal authority, it was clear that the imperialists were not seeking peace, whatever they said. So at least Carafa could and did explain to Henry II, who promptly declared himself not only an advocate of peace but also the defender of his Holiness.

On 21 June (1556) Silvestro Aldobrandini wrote Carafa from Rome that Marc' Antonio Colonna was raising troops, which was forcing Paul IV to do likewise. Aldobrandini urged Carafa to enlist the armed support of the French, which (many persons at the Curia thought) had always been the purpose of his mission. News of the Colonnese's militancy followed so closely upon Carafa's arrival in Fontainebleau that it is hard to believe he and his brother Giovanni had not had forewarning of Marc' Antonio's mustering of troops to regain Paliano. Had Carafa gone to the French court as a champion of peace, knowing he could soon tell Henry and the world that Colonna aggression had made the Carafeschi change their minds?

Whether war or peace lay ahead, the acquisition of Siena was certainly one of the cardinal-nephew's main objectives in going to France. Was this plan a secret shared by Carafa and della Casa? Did Paul IV know of their designs upon Siena? It remains uncertain. As early as 23 June (1556) Carafa wrote the pope that his brother Giovanni, the duke of Paliano, had informed him of all the trouble the "rebels" were trying to cause. Henry II was quite disposed toward peace, but when he had been apprised of the news from Rome (news that Carafa had always known was coming?), he had promised to protect the pope and preserve his dignity. Two days later, in an optimistic mood, Carafa wrote that he would soon be returning to Rome with thirty galleys and three thousand foot. On 29 June Henry himself wrote Ottavio Farnese, the duke

of Parma, asking him to send the pope immediate aid, for at that time Henry could make available only moderate assistance, ". . . aultant que . . . je ne veux faillir de maintenir et observer à nostre dit Saint Père la protection que je lui ay promise pour luy et les siens."<sup>126</sup>

When Navagero went to the Vatican Palace for an audience on 20 June, the pope took him into the privacy of Julius III's library, and unburdened himself of some of his hatred of "that schismatic and heretical Emperor," who (he told Navagero) "has proposed three things in his council: first, to wage war on us openly; secondly, to withdraw the obedience from us; thirdly, clandestinely to reinstate these Colonnas."<sup>127</sup> In a brief dispatch of the same day Navagero informed the Capi of the Council of Ten that a gentleman in the service of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alva (Alba), had just come from Naples "to tell the Cardinal San Giacomo [i.e., Alva's uncle Juan Álvarez] and the Emperor's ambassador [Sarría] that they would do well to leave Rome."<sup>128</sup>

A week later (on 27 June) Navagero sent word to the doge and Senate that

as an attack from the Imperialists is expected here [in Rome], they are reinforcing the infantry and cavalry on the borders, and bringing fresh troops into Rome . . . , and (which is considered an important circumstance) the Duke of Alva has had the posts stationed from the Abruzzi to the borders of Paliano. The Duke of Alva's agent told one of his confidants that he believed the Spaniards would assist Marc' Antonio Colonna to recover his territory. . . .<sup>129</sup>

<sup>126</sup> For an account of Carafa's mission to France and for the sources relating to it, see Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," pp. 28-37, and cf. Anton Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien* . . . , Münster i. W., 1897, pp. 82 ff., and Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 64 ff. Philip II's ambassador to the French court was keeping an eye on Carafa, with whom he met and talked shortly after Carafa's arrival at the court (Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, IV, 600 ff., 614-15, 618-20, 624, 628 ff.).

<sup>127</sup> For Paul IV's remarkable diatribe against Charles V—one of many—see *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 518, p. 489, a letter of Navagero to the Council of Ten, and cf. *ibid.*, esp. no. 534. As for Navagero's reference to Julius III's library, we may note that his dispatches and those of the Florentine ambassador Gianfigliuzzi add something to our knowledge of the Vatican Palace in the sixth decade of the century although, to be sure, they are not major sources for the construction and reconstruction (especially the latter) that took place during this period, on which see René Ancel, "Le Vatican sous Paul IV: Contribution à l'histoire du palais pontifical," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV (1908), 48-71.

<sup>128</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 520, p. 491, dated 20 June.

<sup>129</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 529, p. 499.

<sup>125</sup> Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 192, p. 262. At the time of his letter to Masius, Busbecq was doing his second term as Ferdinand's ambassador to the Porte.

It was of no political significance, but the doge to whom Navagero was now writing was no longer Francesco Venier, who had died on 2 June (1556), but Lorenzo Priuli, to whom Paul IV had just written, congratulating him upon his recent election.<sup>130</sup> In Venice the succession from doge to doge had been peaceful. In Rome the atmosphere was otherwise. Navagero sent his secretary to consult Cardinal François de Tournon, who declared that if the imperialists attacked the pope, "his most Christian Majesty should not consider himself a Christian were he to fail assisting him." If the Spanish feared "lest Paliano with the assistance of the King of France become another Parma," their support of Marc' Antonio Colonna, which would lead to warfare, would be a certain way to make it so: if the pope requested a French garrison for Paliano, Henry II would provide it.

Navagero's secretary also called on Cardinal Giannangelo de' Medici, who had adopted a neutral stance between the imperialist and French factions. Medici said that he had warned Giovanni Carafa that one must find the means of checking the growing tensions. The pope should soften the extreme harshness of his language to the imperialist ministers. The too swift flow of events might "produce infinite mischief, as for instance to render the King of England [Philip II] master of what little remains of Italy, it being but too manifest that he may be said to surround all the States of the Church with the forces of the kingdom of Naples, of Tuscany, of the Milanese, and of Liguria. . . ." Italy was full of mercenaries in Spanish employ. One should always consider the possibility of a repetition of the sad events of 1527. Medici told Navagero's secretary that Giovanni Carafa seemed to understand the dangers which threatened them all. Medici also said that he intended to repeat his warnings to the pope, "should he choose to listen to me without anger."<sup>131</sup>

Cardinal de' Medici was not mistaken. The situation was getting quite out of hand. On 5 July (1556) Paul IV was said to have deposited 70,000 ducats of gold in the Castel S. Angelo, and some three weeks later (on the twenty-seventh) another 30,000. According to Navagero, "On Sunday [19 July], as said by the cashiers of the banks who carried the money, the Pope deposited in the castle 300,000 crowns." Whatever the dates of deposit

and whatever the actual amounts, Paul was obviously adding to the sinews of war. "It is certainly extraordinary that the pontiff can lay aside so much money," Massarelli noted in his diary,

because he is burdened with so many expenses, especially the wages for 10,000 foot and 500 horse, whom he has been supporting for many months now, ever since he had them recruited to defend himself against the imperialists, who are threatening an invasion of the city [of Rome] from the kingdom of Naples.<sup>132</sup>

The fat fell in the fire the night of 7-8 July, when Juan Antonio de Taxis, the imperial postmaster in Rome, was arrested along with all his servants and employees. A dispatch case with outgoing letters was seized. The marquis of Sarria, the Spanish ambassador, and Don Garcilasso de la Vega, the Hapsburgs' special envoy, hurried to the Vatican Palace on Thursday, 9 July. So did Navagero. The Spaniards had come to protest the arrest of de Taxis. Don Garcilasso was highly indignant. Paul IV refused to see him, and the envoy was arrested as he was leaving the palace with Sarria. Garcilasso was imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo. Giovanni Carafa, the duke of Paliano, explained to Navagero that

one Franzozin, the Imperial postmaster's servant, was found near Terracina on foot without either sword or travelling dress [to identify him as a courier], which causing suspicion he was arrested, and on his person three letters were found, one from the postmaster [de Taxis] without any signature requesting the Duke of Alva's secretary to obtain for him the agency [*la commissaria*] between Terracina and Velletri, and two from Garcilasso, one in cipher and the other without, which was so clear as not to need the ciphered one, telling the Duke that [the] Marquis [of] Sarria, the ambassador, was a simpleton, and that nothing good must be expected from him, as two good words from the Pope blinded him to the honour and advantage of his Princes, and that the way to do deeds was to push forward with the cavalry and come double quick time with 4,000 Spaniards and 8,000 Italians to Rome, taking what could be got on the march, and sending the galleys to Nettuno and Civitavecchia.

Under torture the postmaster de Taxis revealed other recommendations being made by the imperialists to the duke of Alva to advance upon Rome. On the other hand Giovanni Carafa informed Navagero that letters had come from Henry II and Montmorency, "promising to assist

<sup>130</sup> Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 162, by mod. stamped enumeration, doc. dated 27 June, 1556.

<sup>131</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 535, pp. 504-5, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 4 July, 1556.

<sup>132</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 292; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 558, p. 542, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 25 July, 1556.

the Pope on every occasion." Giovanni also stated that Henry "had already remitted 60,000 crowns, which are here in a bank, and that he would give orders for the Pope to be assisted with 6,000 French infantry, of whom 1,500 may now be at Civitavecchia. . . . So here the war is supposed to have commenced."<sup>133</sup> The postmaster's disclosures added appreciably to Paul IV's belligerency and anti-Hapsburg sentiments. We shall return shortly to de Taxis and to what he had to say under torture.

Don Garcilasso de la Vega would remain a papal prisoner throughout the dismal year of warfare that now lay ahead, not securing his release in fact until fourteen months had passed (on 20 September, 1557).<sup>134</sup> In the meantime Paul IV was gathering the winds into a tempest. On 13 July (1556) he told Navagero:

We have it almost within our reach to free the kingdom of Naples; the opportunity must not be neglected, to speak to you more clearly than we ever have done. The King of France is so obedient a son to us, and so anxious to do us pleasure, that he lately commissioned Cardinal Tournon and his ambassador here [d'Avanson] to assist us, not with a limited supply of money and troops, but with as much as we please, and as shall be needed, and in truth without his aid we should also have fared badly before now. Should the opportunity present itself we also believe that the most illustrious Signory will not fail [non mancherà]. . . . on perceiving matters so well arranged that they can take part in them gladly; and as it might be asked what benefit Venice is to derive from this undertaking we, to speak freely with you, purpose making you masters of Sicily which, if obtained, would be of more importance than the whole of the territory between your city and Constantinople. . . .

Paul threatened to deprive Charles V and Philip II, "as our vassals who have perpetrated felony and rebellion," of all their kingdoms, proposing to give part of the lands in question to those who occupied them, especially Henry II and the Venetian Signoria. Venice would get back the ports and coastlands of Apulia which she had held between

Charles VIII's withdrawal from Naples and the war of the League of Cambrai (1495-1509), "and the kingdom of Sicily besides." Navagero wrote his dispatch relating to Henry II's so-called commission to Tournon and the pope's offer to Venice on Monday evening (13 July). As he wrote the doge, Navagero gave the Venetian courier Zuan Ponchino eighteen gold crowns, and asked that he be given another ten if he arrived in Venice by Thursday morning.<sup>135</sup>

On the following day (14 July) Navagero, along with other ambassadors, attended a meeting of cardinals at the house of Jean du Bellay, dean of the Sacred College. The cardinals, a half dozen of them, were members of a commission which the pope had appointed "to discuss the peace" (in which his Holiness seems to have had little interest). Du Bellay began his discourse by referring to

the fatal consequences of the war evidently in preparation between the Pope on one side and the Emperor and his son on the other, and which if once commenced would involve not only the princes of Italy, but all the Christian powers besides, and perhaps Sultan Soliman, who would not allow this opportunity to escape him.

When those present had all expressed themselves in favor of peace, the marquis of Sarria suggested that if Garcilasso de la Vega were removed from the Castel S. Angelo and allowed to reside with him (the Spanish would provide surety of course), a move would be made in the right direction. Also the poor postmaster Juan Antonio de Taxis should either be set free or at least held in less strict confinement (presumably Sarria did not yet know that de Taxis had been subjected to torture). This would be a second step toward peace, said Sarria, "whereas, to say the truth, the rejection of these two demands would be interpreted in a very sinister form, both at the court of his Princes and by the Duke of Alva."<sup>136</sup>

The French were not seeking peace any more diligently than was the pope. A papal brief of 17 July (1556) informs us that Cardinal de Tournon was getting ready to go on a mission to Venice "pro nonnullis et privatis suis et publicis negotiis, etiam ad Sanctam Romanam Ecclesiam et nos per-

<sup>133</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 540, pp. 512-14, a letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 9 July, 1556; see also, *ibid.*, nos. 541-46, et *passim* (on Montmorency's attitude, note no. 545, pp. 519-20). Cf. Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, no. 200, p. 277; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 292-93; M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), no. 522, pp. 321-22; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 70-73; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1556, no. 5, whose sparse account would have been much enriched by access to the Venetian sources.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2 (1881), no. 1039, p. 1320.

<sup>135</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 546, pp. 520-22.

<sup>136</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 547, pp. 522-25, a letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 14 July, 1556. The commission of six cardinals had been chosen by the pope on 11 July "ne . . . pacis tractatus omittetur" (Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 292-93). On the torture of de Taxis, cf. the preceding chapter, note 180, and the footnote in Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 72.

inentibus,"<sup>137</sup> to sound out the Signoria and to enlist the Republic's support of the league of the Holy See with France. The Venetians had, however, no intention of entering the coming conflict. Navagero's almost daily dispatches—one of our best sources for this period of Paul IV's reign—had told the doge, the Senate, and the Ten more than perhaps they wished to know of the pope's near madness.

Tournon was glad to escape the heat of Rome in mid-July and the insults which the pope leveled at him in every audience. On 28 July Tournon wrote Montmorency that he would go wherever the king wished, but he would not return to Rome. Some two weeks later (on 10 August) Tournon wrote Henry II himself that he could be of no more use to him in Venice than he had been in Rome.<sup>138</sup> Like Montmorency, Tournon saw only disaster in the papal alliance and a war with Spain.

Directly and indirectly Paul IV had told his good friend Navagero dozens of times that he looked to Venice to support him when the time for action came, for (in his opinion) the interests of the Republic coincided with those of the Holy See. On 10 July Paul had stated,

That tyrant [Charles V] has no one in greater detestation than you [Venetians] and us; your freedom and this See Apostolic agitate him, and are the furies by whom he is driven wild. Should matters advance, we have determined to form an understanding with the most illustrious Signory, and almost to protest against losing this opportunity for freeing Italy, and as there is no one whom we love better than our nephew the Marquis [of Montebello], he will be the person to make known this our intention.<sup>139</sup>

Two weeks later (on 24 July, 1556) Antonio Carafa, marquis of Montebello, was indeed in Venice, whither the pope had sent him posthaste. The Senate had been deliberating his message and the pope's appeal. There was some indecision in the Senate as to the form their answer should take. Fifty-one senators were prepared, however, to remind Montebello that wars were easy to start but hard to stop. Poor, innocent people paid a heavy price for the unwise decisions of their rulers. Of course these senators were well aware that his Holiness would look toward peace and concord in Christendom, toward the general well-being of

Europe. Paul wanted the Venetians to bar the entry of the Germans into Italy, but short of peace there was no way to do so.

The Venetians, therefore, wanted peace between the Hapsburgs and the Valois for otherwise, as long experience had shown, it was not only difficult, it was utterly impossible to keep the Germans out of the peninsula. In olden times as in their own day, whenever the Germans made the descent (and, incidentally, pillaged in the Veneto), it had been necessary to fight with them in Italy itself, not at the mountain passes, which simply could not be guarded. Whole armies would not suffice to fulfill the pope's request, for there were too many ways to enter Italy. Thus a week later (on 30 July), when the Senate finally agreed on an answer to Montebello, they emphasized the Venetian intention to preserve a strict neutrality, although on the following day they voted to make a large amount of saltpeter (for gunpowder), *miagliara 30 de salnitrio*, available to the Holy See at the pope's request (and they were to do so again on 6 February, 1557).<sup>140</sup>

Each day was bringing Paul IV closer to a state of war with Charles V and Philip II. In his condemnation of the Colonnas, Paul had forbidden anyone to receive, encourage, or assist Ascanio or Marc' Antonio "under the gravest penalties, namely excommunication and the loss of their feudal holdings." Marc' Antonio had been welcomed in Naples, however, where the ministers of Charles

<sup>140</sup> The fifty-one members of the Venetian Senate voted that Montebello be told, ". . . alle guerre facilmente si può dare principio, ma è poi molto difficile imponer fine, si come è il più delle volte desiderato per li travagli, danni, et pericoli di stato et ruine che ne seguono di poveri popoli innocenti. . . ." Of course his Holiness ". . . haverà l'occhio alla pace et concordia di tutta la Christianitate . . . et il beneficio universale, col qual modo sarà levata la occasione et serato il passo ad Alemanni di descendere in Italia che altramente saria non solamente difficile ma impossibile il farlo, non manco di quello che sia stato nei tempi antichi quando la Italia è stata invasa da oltramontani e nei tempi nostri quando discendendo gente alemana a danni del stato nostro si ha guergoggiato con loro in Italia et non alli passi, li quali non si possono guardare, imperochè sono molte le vie da venire sì che molti esserciti et grossissimi non sariano bastanti a vedarli. . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 21). This motion did not pass, however, and the Senate's or rather the doge's reply to Montebello was postponed.

On 30 July, 1556, the Senate voted that Montebello be told Venice would adhere to a policy of strict neutrality, but the next day they did vote to make the saltpeter available to the pope's forces (*ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 22), as indicated above in the text, and on 6 February, 1557, they repeated the helpful gesture of making the saltpeter more easily obtainable (*ibid.*, fol. 66<sup>v</sup>-67<sup>r</sup>). This was as far as Venice would go. Cf. Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 69-70, note, where the first date 25 July, 1556, is an obvious error for 1556.

<sup>137</sup> Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 71, brief of Paul IV to the papal commissioner Antonio de Saluto, dated 17 July, 1556.

<sup>138</sup> M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), nos. 523-24, pp. 322-23.

<sup>139</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 541, p. 515.

and Philip were giving him "omne auxilium" to recover Paliano. These ministers were in fact said to have recruited troops to help him. On 27 July (1556), therefore, the pope's fiscal advocate or attorney general Alessandro Pallantieri appeared with Silvestro Aldobrandini at a secret consistory held in the Sala di Costantino in the Vatican Palace.

Pallantieri read a legal opinion to the emphatic effect that both the Emperor Charles and King Philip had incurred the censures and penalties aforesaid. The advocate (*procurator*) then requested authorization to take appropriate action, placing the widespread domains of emperor and king under the interdict, absolving their subjects from the oath of fealty, and summoning the higher clergy of their realms to Rome. Massarelli was present at the consistory, a witness to the advocate's reading the text of the *protestatio* against Charles and Philip. The pope asserted that he would not fail in his duty, and would do what the law required.<sup>141</sup>

When Navagero reported to the Venetian Signoria on the memorable consistory of 27 July, he stated that in the opinion of both the *fiscale* Pallantieri and Aldobrandini

the Emperor and the King of England [Philip] had incurred the penalties contained in the sentence, that they had forfeited all the rights of their fiefs, and that as an example to others they ought to be punished and chastised. The Pope replied that the fiscal advocate and his colleague, having performed their office so freely, he was pleased with them; that this was a thing of importance, that he would think about it, and not form any decision without the counsel of his right reverend brothers [the cardinals].

Paul IV, however, as everyone knew, was not likely to be guided by the cardinals' advice. He had pretty much made up his mind. As Navagero notes at the beginning of this same dispatch, the pope had flown into one of his daily, sometimes hourly, rages when the Portuguese ambassador had expressed the hope of his Holiness's being reconciled with the Hapsburgs. "Lord ambassador," he cried, "let there be no more talk of peace, but of war!"<sup>142</sup>

The papal legations, supposedly to make peace between the Hapsburgs and the Valois, had not been succeeding very well. Perhaps they were not

intended to do so. Cardinal Scipione Rebiba, who had left Rome for the imperial court at Brussels on 30 May (1556),<sup>143</sup> was recalled from his slow journey by a letter of Giovanni Carafa, the new duke of Paliano. The letter is dated 12 July. Twelve days later, on the twenty-fourth, it was received at Maastricht, seventy miles or so east of Brussels. It was held for or forwarded to Rebiba, who had not yet reached Maastricht, but according to the news reaching Brussels on the morning of 26 July the cardinal legate "had just arrived within three leagues of that city [Maastricht], travelling incognito from fear of the Lutherans."<sup>144</sup>

Although cardinals usually traveled in some state, apparently Rebiba was not doing so. Nevertheless, it had taken him almost eight weeks to reach Maastricht. A courier, who may not have left Rome until a day or two after the date of Giovanni Carafa's letter (12 July), had obviously made the trip in not more and perhaps less than twelve days. It is quite likely that Rebiba had been instructed at the time of his departure to move slowly, very slowly. That he had received some such orders was, indeed, being asserted at the Hapsburg court in Brussels.<sup>145</sup>

It might take Carlo Carafa some time to convert his mission (to the French court) for peace into an alliance with Henry II for war against the Hapsburgs. Carafa, however, did not want war. He merely wanted to intimidate the Hapsburgs into detaching the Carafeschi from France by granting them Siena. In any event Carafa had broken the truce of Vaucelles, and Rebiba was recalled to Rome (to Philip II's annoyance) before he had even got to the Hapsburg court at Brussels.

In his letter of 12 July Giovanni Carafa gave Rebiba the recent news from Rome, especially the revelations which had come of the postmaster Juan Antonio de Taxis's interrogation. According to Giovanni's letter which, incidentally, had required deciphering, de Taxis "upon being questioned" had stated that Marc' Antonio Colonna, who had been in Venice, had now returned to Naples with

<sup>143</sup> Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, p. 263.

<sup>144</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 560, p. 545, letter of Federico Badoer to the doge and Senate, dated at Brussels on 26 July, 1556.

<sup>145</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 522, p. 492, letter of Badoer, dated 21 June, 1556, and on Rebiba's odd legation, cf. *ibid.*, nos. 533, 556-57, 559, 563 [on the report of Rebiba's arrival in Maastricht], 564 [Rebiba at Mézières on 2 August], and 570. Cf. Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien* (1897), pp. 88-89; Ancel, *Nunciatures de France*, I (1909), introd., p. xC; "La Question de Sienne," pp. 34-35; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1956), 407-8.

<sup>141</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in *Conc. Trident.*, II, 293; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 109 ff.; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1556, no. 5; Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten* (1909), pp. 132-33.

<sup>142</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 561, pp. 546-47.

every intention of trying to recover Paliano. The duke of Alva had set aside 600,000 scudi, obviously for the recruitment of troops and the costs of war. Alva had received half this sum from Bona Sforza, dowager queen of Poland and last duchess of Bari (d. 1557). The other half he had taken from the merchants of Naples.

The imperialists in Rome had promised to make de Taxis, in recompense for his services as a spy, the *commissario* of Terracina, Velletri, and Piperno (now called Priverno) when they should succeed in occupying these places. Garcilasso de la Vega had already written Alva to this effect. De Taxis had been told that Alva would soon be moving ten thousand foot into the Roman Campagna, and he would send three or four thousand foot into the Abruzzi. Thirty-five to forty imperialist galleys were supposed to reach Nettuno by 10 July. Some of Alva's troops would head for Marino (on Lago Albano) and the surrounding towns. They would try to take Paliano—all this according to de Taxis's disclosures under torture—and come up to the gates of Rome. They would enter the city if they could. Alva also had at his disposal a thousand light horse and three hundred and fifty men-at-arms.

A break with the Holy See was clearly coming, for Alva had written Sarria, Garcilasso, Cardinal Juan Álvarez, and others "che si partissero di Roma in quel modo che potevano, perchè non si poteva mancare di rompere con il Papa!" They should get out of Rome as soon as possible. Alva had also advised Cosimo de' Medici, duke of Florence, to remain on the alert. He had written to Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, cardinal of Burgos, the Hapsburg governor of Siena. The Carafeschi had learned all this from poor, battered de Taxis. Giovanni informed Rebiba that Garcilasso and Ippolito Capilupi, an agent of the Gonzagas of Mantua, had been imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo, "ma non sono ancora essaminati."

So much then for the news, but "conoscendo nostro Signore [the pope] il mal animo de gl' Imperiali, et vedendo che vostra Signoria illustrissima non potrà far frutto alcuno a cotesta corte [in Brussels], sua Santità vuole che se ne torni a Roma subito." The testimony which the postmaster had given on the rack had revealed the evil intentions of Alva and the imperialists—and in fact by 1 September his testimony was to prove entirely accurate—and so Paul IV now directed Rebiba to return to the Curia at once, for no peace was to be found at Brussels.<sup>146</sup>

Quite apart from the "mal animo" of the imperialists, Carafa's activities at Fontainebleau were rendering Rebiba's mission irrelevant. Carafa left the French court on 17 August. If he could flatter himself that he had won the confidence of Henry II (as Ance! says), he had not succeeded in overcoming the enmity of the court faction headed by Montmorency. Henry had ordered that Carafa should be given some 1,200 or 2,000 infantry, but when he reached Toulon, he found neither the men nor the galleys to convey them to the Italian coast.

If Carafa's mission was merely to alarm the Spanish, it was successful, for he had upset the truce of Vaucelles. As the ailing Charles was turning over the governance of his disparate realms to the young Philip, the Spanish did not want armed conflict in Italy. Carafa may have thought that he had given effect to the plans which he and della Casa had discussed, and which the latter had outlined in his *Discorso . . . per impetrare dalla Maestà dell' Imperator Carlo V lo stato et dominio di Siena*. Paul IV was, alas, moving on toward war in a reckless rage, but Carafa's policy was apparently to break the Hapsburg-Valois truce without provoking another Hapsburg-Valois war.<sup>147</sup>

If war lay ahead, the pope and his nephews were going to need all-out assistance from the French. Commanders would be required as well as troops. The military posturings of such soldiers as the dukes of Urbino and Ferrara would not go far against the cruel prowess of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, the duke of Alva, whose grim half-dozen years of command in the Netherlands (1567–1573) and rapacious conquest of Portugal (in 1581) would soon attach a sinister memory to his name. Since Paul IV had appointed his nephew Giovanni Carafa captain-general of the Church

fifteen years of age Bona Sforza, daughter of Duke Gian Galeazzo Sforza and Isabella of Aragon, had married the fifty-year-old Sigismund I of Poland, and reigned with him for thirty years. She was the mother of Sigismund II Augustus of Poland. Becoming unpopular in Poland during her later years, she withdrew from the kingdom to Bari, the scene of her youth. Bona Sforza died in late November, 1557, having designated Philip II her sole heir. Today she lies buried in the apse of the historic church of S. Nicola di Bari. The town of Piperno, northwest of Terracina, has been called Priverno since 1928. On Ippolito Capilupi's arrest, cf. *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 544, p. 518, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 11 July, 1556.

<sup>147</sup> Ance!, "La Question de Sienne," pp. 35–37. Carlo's negotiations apparently got somewhat out of hand, and on 1 August, 1556, he wrote from Paris to his brother, the duke of Paliano, ". . . Si fa similmente che io son qui per trattar guerra et non pace . . ." (Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 12,986, fol. 246).

<sup>146</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 150, letter of Giovanni Carafa to Rebiba, dated 12 July. At

(on 1 January, 1556), obviously one must look elsewhere for leadership against the Spanish.

On the French side one soldier loomed above his military countrymen. This was François de Guise, who had successfully defended Metz against Alva and Charles V in 1552. Brother of the two cardinals of Lorraine, Charles and Louis, François had married Anna d' Este (in 1548), the daughter of Ercole II of Ferrara. Ferrara, like Urbino, was remaining faithful to the Holy See. In fact Ercole hoped to profit from the papal-French alliance, for the Estensi had driven a hard bargain with Charles de Guise when the latter was on his way to Rome in mid-November (1555).<sup>148</sup>

Despite the appeal which the pope had made to Venice (in July, 1556) to keep the Germans out of Italy, a month later (on 25 August) the Senate granted the request which Don Francisco de Vargas, the imperial ambassador to the Signoria, had made in Philip II's name to allow free passage through Venetian territory to 4,000 German infantry. (Philip was obviously going to employ these troops for service in the peninsula.) The Senate notified the Venetian rectors of Verona to this effect, so that commissioners might be chosen to deal with the German command, and so that the necessary food supplies might be made available to the troops. Three days later the Senate voted to inform Navagero, their ambassador in Rome, of the action thus taken. He would let the pope know.<sup>149</sup>

Navagero performed the unenviable task with his usual dexterity, although Paul IV "displayed evident dissatisfaction at this passage-permit."<sup>150</sup> He never vented his rage, however, on Navagero. The Signoria's relations with the Hapsburgs no less than with the pope clearly illustrate the strong desire of the Venetians, who were caught in the middle, to see peace maintained between Spain

and the Holy See.<sup>151</sup> If it came to war, how could one conceive of Paul as emerging victorious, with his slender resources? If French aid came, how extensive would it be? The Spanish were already rulers of Milan and Naples; having defeated the pope in open warfare, they would become wholly the masters of Italy. Where then would Venice stand? What would happen to the Holy See?

It is small wonder that Paul's unbalanced bellicosity troubled the Venetians. In a dispatch of 22 August (1556) to the doge and Senate, Navagero gave a detailed account of an extraordinary exchange between the pope and Cardinal Gianangelo de' Medici which had occurred at a recent consistory:

... When the Pope said that he had a number of soldiers and good troops, the Cardinal replied that his Holiness must neither rely on them nor allow them to take the field, as they would be routed by the mere sight of the enemy, for . . . since the coming of Charles [VIII] into Italy, never had an army, composed exclusively of Italians, been seen to gain one single battle, because they know not how to use the pike; and as the Imperialists have much foreign infantry, both German and Spanish, and 800 men-at-arms, and 2,000 light horse, whilst his Holiness has a bare 500 very sorry jades, he therefore lacked the means for resisting the enemy in the field. . . .

To this the Pope said, "What would you have me do if these heretical tyrants compel me to act thus?" The Cardinal rejoined, "Holy Father, I would that an agreement were negotiated. . . . I should indeed regret to have it recorded by historians that in the reign of your Holiness, a Pope of such exemplary life, a war and schism broke out, such as had not happened in the time of popes who, to say the truth, led foul and evil lives."

On hearing this his Holiness could no longer contain himself, and said, "You have this day caused me dissatisfaction, but these words do not proceed from you; the tyrants are those who make you utter them; but we will deprive them of their realms and empires as schismatics." Cardinal Medici made answer that he would neither affirm nor deny that the Emperor was schismatic, though he indeed would say that this privation might bring it to pass that instead of one schismatic kingdom, all the Emperor's realms might become so, they forming two thirds of Christendom, and that it does not suffice to deprive, as in the next place force is required to effect the privation. The Pope in a great rage then said, "You also are schismatic. . . .!"

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 35-36.

<sup>149</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 27-28\*, 30, 65\*. The Senate wished to preserve [as they had told Antonio Carafa] "la nostra neutralitate con tutti." Vargas represented both Charles V and Philip II in Venice. Recalled by the latter for consultation, Vargas returned to Venice after an absence of several months on S. George's day (23 April, 1557), when he and the French ambassador engaged in the usual contest for precedence, which proved embarrassing to the Venetians as they approached the ceremonies attending the feast of S. Mark on 25 April (*ibid.*, fols. 81-82\*). Vargas claimed the status of imperial ambassador, "chè sua Maestà [Charles V] non havea rennotiato all' imperio nè revocato lui da questa legatione. . . ." (fol. 81\*).

<sup>150</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 596, 600, pp. 592, 598-99, letters of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 4 and 5 September, 1556.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 36\*-38. As the Senate informed Navagero in Rome in September (1556) when Philip recalled Vargas, they were making every effort "prima con lettere et poi con la viva voce pregar affettuosamente la Maestà sua [Philip II] ad esser contenta d' attendere allo accordo con sua Sanctità per non accender maggior foco et maggior disturbo nella Christianitate" (*ibid.*, fol. 38\*), for war would bring disaster and ruination on all sides.

Medici then replied that he would say no more. If Paul were willing to listen, he would tell him the truth in the privacy of the papal chamber. And as Navagero reported to Venice, "He then went and sat down, and says he fully expected to be sent to the Castle [S. Angelo], as the pope never took his eyes off him."<sup>152</sup>

On 21 August the duke of Alva had written the pope a letter which a special envoy, Don Pirro dell' Offredo, delivered on Thursday, the twenty-seventh. Such a scene of angry shouting accompanied the pope's reception of the envoy that the *maestro di camera* discreetly closed the wooden doors. In his letter Alva declared that Charles V and King Philip, *obedientissimi e veri difensori della Santa Sede Apostolica*, had up to then disregarded many offensive and injurious acts on the part of his Holiness, who from the very beginning of his reign had oppressed and persecuted the servitors, vassals, and friends of their Majesties. He had been trying to form a league against Charles and Philip, seizing their couriers and ministers and intercepting their dispatches. His Holiness had also been recruiting troops with hostile intent. He had imprisoned and tortured Juan Antonio de Taxis, *maestro delle poste*; he had even arrested and maltreated Garcilasso de la Vega, the Hapsburgs' envoy.

In order to effect the aggrandizement of his own family, Alva went on, Paul IV was trying to disrupt the peace of Christendom, imperiling the Holy See, "especially in these times, so full of heresies and condemned beliefs." Alva also charged, referring to the consistory of 27 July, . . . your Holiness has allowed that in his presence the attorney and fiscal advocate of the Holy See should have made in consistory such an iniquitous, unjust, and reckless judgment and demand as that the Regno should be taken from the king, my lord, with your Holiness agreeing and consenting thereto.

After rehearsing some of the pope's other misdeeds, Alva observed that after such mistreatment even the most obedient son must defend himself against his own father, and take from the father the weapons with which the latter wants to attack him. Alva closed his letter with assurance of the "respect and reverence" which the Hapsburgs had always had for the Holy See, and with what

sounded like a last appeal to reason and for peace.<sup>153</sup>

Giannangelo de' Medici's warning to the irascible pontiff was certainly well taken. Although his Holiness lacked the power to give effect to his threatened deprivation of the Hapsburgs, any effort to do so might well drive into schism "two thirds of Christendom." As Charles V passed on the vast Hapsburg inheritance to Philip II, the latter became the central figure in Europe, bestriding the narrow world like a Colossus. Philip had got almost everything except the imperial title and Austria with its dependencies. At this time, in late August and early September of 1556, Charles finally surrendered the imperial authority by a documentary cession to his brother Ferdinand, king of the Romans.<sup>154</sup> Ferdinand was eventually crowned as emperor at Frankfurt on 14 March, 1558, by Joachim II of Brandenburg in the presence of three Lutheran electors, to the usual horror of Paul IV.

Having done at last with the Lutheran problem, Charles V retired to a small villa hard by the monastery of S. Jerónimo de Yuste in the mountainous country to the west of Toledo. He died on 21 September, 1558, amid the luxuries of beautiful statuary and jewelled crucifixes, Flemish tapestries and embroideries, books, and fine furniture, mechanical clocks, astronomical instruments, and maps of his erstwhile dominions. The last weeks of his life, gloomy and gout-ridden, were enlivened by the bright face and gladsome manner of a small boy, his son by Barbara Blomberg, conceived at Regensburg in the spring of 1546, when he was seeking distraction from theological dissonance in the excitements of the hunt and the festivities of the court. This boy would be known as Don John of Austria.

<sup>153</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., ed. Luciano Scaramelli, doc. no. XIX, pp. 400-3, and note Aldobrandini's vitriolic reaction to this letter, as reported by Navagero on 4 September, 1556, in *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 596, p. 593. On the scene which followed when Don Pirro dell' Offredo, Alva's Neapolitan envoy, delivered the letter to the pope, see, *ibid.*, no. 589, p. 585.

Alva wrote more briefly but in the same vein to the Sacred College, protesting against Paul IV's manifestations of ill-will against the Hapsburgs "del principio de su pontificado hasta al dia presente" (Spanish text in Nores, *op. cit.*, append., no. XX, pp. 403-4). Cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 317-19, and note Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV.*, pp. 138-39, note 73, for refs. to the Spanish, French, Italian, and English versions of Alva's letter to the pope, including Weiss, *Papiers d'etat*, IV, 666-75; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II, 653-56; and cf. Masarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Conc.*, II, 294.

<sup>154</sup> Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V.*, I, III (1846, repr. 1966), nos. 1008-9, pp. 707-12, letters of Charles V to his brother Ferdinand, dated 8 August and 12 September, 1556.

<sup>152</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-1, no. 582, pp. 572-73, and note Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV.* (1909), pp. 137-38. On the pope's awareness of the Turkish danger, see Navagero's second dispatch of 22 August, *op. cit.*, VI-1, no. 583, p. 575, and cf. 600, p. 598. Cardinal de' Medici continued to warn the pope that his war with Spain was threatening the Holy See with disaster (*Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2 [1881], no. 781, p. 897, doc. dated 2 January, 1557).



## 16. PAUL IV, THE WAR WITH SPAIN, AND JEAN DE LA VIGNE AT THE PORTE

WHILE CHARLES V was contemplating the last letters and documents relating to his imperial resignation, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, the duke of Alva, set out from Naples on 1 September, 1556. He headed for S. Germano (now Cassino) with 12,000 foot and 1,500 horse. Of these forces 4,000 foot were Spanish veterans under the command of Don García de Toledo. The other 8,000 were Italians, recruited for the most part in the Regno, under Vespasiano Gonzaga. Marc' Antonio Colonna led 300 men-at-arms, and Julius III's adventurous nephew Ascanio della Corgna was also with Alva's army. In late July Ascanio had escaped the clutches of Pope Paul, who had promptly arrested his brother, Cardinal Fulvio della Corgna.<sup>1</sup>

"Pushing ahead with this army," says Nores,

the duke took Pontecorvo, now a little place on the Garigliano [actually on the Liri], called "Fregellae" in antiquity, famous for having stopped the advance of Hannibal's army. . . . The duke encountered no resistance there, and could lay waste the countryside without opposition, carrying off a huge number of herds of sheep, which subjects of the Holy See were keeping in the pastures in those areas.

On 5 September, as Massarelli tells us, the news reached Rome that Alva had seized not only Pontecorvo, but also Frosinone—both papal cities—the latter being only fifty miles southeast of Rome. According to Massarelli, Alva's troops had rounded up more than 40,000 sheep. "And all these things were done," says Massarelli piously, "while peace

and concord were under discussion on this side and that, and while a five years' truce obtained among Henry, the French king; Philip, king of Naples and of England; the Emperor Charles V; and also the pope himself."

At a general congregation of all the cardinals, which was held on the following day, a Sunday (6 September), Paul IV accused the duke of Alva and the imperialists of treachery. Paul said that Pirro dell' Offredo had come from Alva *pro concordia tractanda*, and while the conditions of this peace were being considered by the cardinals, Alva had broken faith, seized Pontecorvo and Frosinone, killed soldiers of the Church, and seized property as though it were the prize of war. Don Pirro was himself brought into the congregation. Massarelli was a witness to the scene. Paul demanded to know the reason for Pirro's coming to the Curia. The latter replied that the duke of Alva had sent him to Rome "to negotiate a peace with his Holiness and to ask him (as he did ask him) to find the means whereby both that peace and the kingdom of Naples might be kept securely and safely."

Paul thereupon informed Pirro that, while this "pretense of peace" was being pursued, Alva had invaded the papal states *contra fidem et ius gentium*. Pirro had probably not known of Alva's intention to invade the Stato Ecclesiastico, but (according to Nores) Pirro's failure to obey Alva's instructions to deliver his letter and leave, "either with a reply or without," cost him dear, for Pirro was arrested that same Sunday, and imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo, where he was to remain until the end of the war.<sup>2</sup> A week after the general congregation of cardinals Giovanni Carafa wrote Ottavio Farnese, the duke of Parma, complaining that an ambassador of the duke of Alva, referring to Pirro, had come to Rome seeking an accord at the

<sup>1</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 293. The news of Alva's invasion of the papal states was quite disconcerting to the French, who had been urging Paul IV to "temporize" until the spring of 1557. As Simon Renard, the Hapsburg ambassador to Henry II, wrote about mid-September, 1556, "Le duc d'Albe et le duc de Florence sont en campagne avec seize ou dix-huit mil hommes de pied et trois mil chevaux pour le secours des Colonnoys [the Colonnese] et remédier l'insolence du pape, dont les François sont estonné[s], pour ce qu'ilz ont toujours escript au pape qui deust temporizer jusques au printemps de l'année que vient. . ." (Chas. Weiss, ed., *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV [Paris, 1843], 701). The French would have liked by some means or other to postpone the renewal of war with the Hapsburgs, "craignant que les forces du pape ne soient souffisantes pour résister, combien qu'il y a jà de six à septz enseignes de gens de pied françois à Rome, et environ six mil italiens." Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 704 ff., 712 ff., 724 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 122–24, who obviously had access to MSS. of Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 295–96, for he not only quotes Massarelli's text but translates it; *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-1, nos. 603, 607–8, pp. 601–2, 605–9, letters of Navagero to the duke and Senate dated 6 and 11 September, 1556. Cf. also Carlo Bromato [Bartolommeo Carrara], *Storia di Paolo IV*, 2 vols., Ravenna, 1748–53, II, bk. ix, pp. 319–21. Incidentally, the ancient Fregellae seems to have been nearby Ceprano, and not Pontecorvo.

same time that Alva was taking by force the towns of Frosinone and Veroli, and had even laid siege to Anagni. The pope's patience, said Giovanni, was being strained.<sup>3</sup>

In the midst of this excitement Cardinal Carlo Carafa landed in a French galley at Civitavecchia on Monday, 7 September (1556). Departing immediately for Rome, he reached the city about 7:00 P.M. (*hora 24*), and hastened into the papal presence with his boots on. "His Holiness evinced very great satisfaction," Navagero wrote his government, "and embraced and kissed him a thousand times." Pietro Strozzi had arrived at the same time. So had Louis de Lansac and Blaise de Monluc of Siensese fame. Carafa had been accompanied by twenty galleys from France, and indeed from time to time Henry II had sent troops, especially unruly Gascons.<sup>4</sup>

In fact Carafa now brought with him another 1,500 Gascons, who were at first lodged near the Borgo, and then divided among various quarters in the city. Other troops in papal employ were sent out to add to the garrisons of the more important and more vulnerable towns. According to Massarelli, Paul IV had raised 15,000 foot by the first week in August. With the wisdom of hindsight Nores did not think highly of the papal forces.

The best horses were taken from the inhabitants of Rome to form a company of 200 lancers which were to serve under Matteo Stendardo. The horses were supposed eventually to be returned to their owners or paid for, "il che però non fu osservato." A certain Bartolommeo da Benevento hit on the device (*invenzione*) of taking all the grains then available for sale in the city, for which the dealers were given camera receipts, whereupon the grain was sold, and the proceeds applied to the current military expenditures. Nores does not mention whether the Camera ever redeemed these receipts.

Since the Porta del Popolo was regarded as an area especially vulnerable to attack, the Augustinian convent (where Martin Luther had stayed in

1510–1511) was demolished, and the destruction even of the church of S. Maria del Popolo was considered advisable. At first Carlo Carafa, having just got back to Rome, had halted plans to tear down both the convent and the church, but thereafter he approved the removal of the convent. At any rate the church, a treasury of Renaissance art, was spared. The duke of Alva wrote the pope that if he came to Rome with his army, he would never assail the walls of the city at the Porta and the church of S. Maria del Popolo.

A hundred houses in the area were torn down. Massarelli says that those who knew about building costs in Rome set the value of the convent and the church at 200,000 scudi. Nores, who may have read Massarelli too rapidly, says the houses were worth this amount. Whatever their value, it seemed almost meaningless in comparison with Alva's conquests, for to Pontecorvo and Frosinone he had quickly added, aside from some villages of the Colonnese (who yielded them willingly), Anagni, Veroli, Valmontone, Piperno [Priverno], Terracina, Acuto, Fumone, Ferentino, and Alatri, all places in the Stato Ecclesiastico. Alva occupied them in the name of the Sacred College, asserting his intention of restoring them to the cardinals or to a future pope.<sup>5</sup>

On 12 September (1556) the indefatigable Navagero wrote the doge and Senate that

such a panic prevails in this city that everybody is endeavouring to escape, but great vigilance is used at the gates to prevent the departure of anyone. Besides the soldiers, artisans likewise are sent to work at the bastions; the monastery del Popolo is tottering, and the poor friars are also in fear of the church.

<sup>3</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, II, 297, who says concerning the buildings at the Porta del Popolo (or Flaminia), "Hodie 9 dicti mensis Septembris 1556 [o]jeptum est demoliri monasterium et ecclesia [sic] b. Mariae de Populo prope portam Flamineam parte sinistra in ingressu Urbis. . . . Prope dictum monasterium demolitur ultra 100 domus. Idaeificium monasterii et ecclesiae iudicio peritorum ad 200 millia aureorum pensum est."

On Alva's capture of the papal towns and territory, cf. Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 124–28, with note on p. 125, and on the destruction of the 100 houses: ". . . si demolirono appresso intorno a cento case contigue: danno stimato più di dugentomila scudi" (also on p. 125). As always the Venetian ambassador Navagero's reports to his government are invaluable for the first years of Paul IV's reign; in the present context see *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, nos. 609, 616, 620–22, 626, pp. 609 ff., et alibi; and cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. ix, pp. 321 ff. Concerning the weakness of the walls at the Porta del Popolo, note *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, no. 621, p. 630.

<sup>4</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 163, letter dated at Rome on 13 September, 1556.

<sup>5</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 296. Cardinal Rebiba also returned to Civitavecchia in the French galleys, and reached Rome on 9 September. Note *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 577, p. 565, on the arrival of French troops—Gascons—who had done "very great mischief." On Carafa's return to Rome, cf. also, *ibid.*, no. 607, p. 606. For Monluc's arrival in Rome and his view of conditions in the city, see his own account in the *Commentaires*, ed. Paul Courteault, Bruges, 1964, bk. iv, pp. 369 ff.

In addition to requisitioning horses and taxing meat, the hard-pressed officials in the Curia and the municipal government of Rome were selling knightships and collecting enforced loans. "Here they are paying many more soldiers . . . than those really in existence." Cardinal Carafa, his brother Giovanni, Marshal Pietro Strozzi, Jean d'Avanson, and Louis de Lansac conferred frequently in the cardinal's apartments, in Strozzi's rooms, for the marshal's "double tertian ague continues."

Navagero understood, however,

that the French ministers here exhort the Pope and Cardinal Caraffa [to make peace], pointing out the forces of the enemy, their own scanty provisions, and the delay of the assistance of the men-at-arms to be expected from France, concerning which matter I will also mention that today Cardinal [Pedro] Pacheco was with Cardinal Caraffa about this matter of peace, and told a person very much in his confidence, who repeated it to me, that contrary to Caraffa's wont and to his own expectation, he found him much disposed towards peace. . . .<sup>6</sup>

Carafa was certainly more interested in finding some way to acquire Siena for his family than in continuing the war with Spain. But the Carafeschi now received another setback, for Ottavio Farnese had in effect just broken his alliance with France (although he spoke as softly as he could), and had acquired an allegiance to Spain by accepting Piacenza from Philip II.<sup>7</sup> Throughout the century the Farnesi showed a capacity for survival and success, advancement and self-glorification.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 609, pp. 609-11.

<sup>7</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 611, pp. 613-14, 616, a letter of Federico Badoer, Venetian ambassador at the Hapsburg court (then at Ghent), dated 14 September, 1556, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 618-19, 621, esp. 625; Weiss, *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV, 622, 684-85, letters of Simon Renard to Philip II, dated at Paris on 7 July and at Moret on 6 September, 1556. Finally, on 19 October, Ottavio Farnese entered Piacenza, which Cardinal Cristoforo Madruzzo, *produs* of Milan, restored to him in Philip's name (Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 299; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 143-44; Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," p. 44).

<sup>8</sup> On the so-called political ideology and historical importance of the Farnese family, as depicted in the heroized scenes in the Sala di Fasti Farnese in the villa at Caprarola, see L. W. Partridge, "Divinity and Dynasty at Caprarola . . .," *The Art Bulletin*, LX-3 (1978), 494-550. The decoration on the walls and ceiling was done by Taddeo Zuccaro in 1562-1563 according to an outline largely devised by the papal historian Onofrio Panvino and approved by Cardinal Alessandro. On such "halls of princely virtue," note Jonathan Brown and J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King*, New Haven and London, 1980, pp. 147 ff.

As Paul IV and Carafa were trying to win over the Venetians, so was Philip II. Since the latter had now no claim to the empire and Austria, the Tyrol and Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, Venice did not fear his moving into Friuli. A prominent figure at Philip's court, Don Ruy Gómez, duke of Pastrana and prince of Melito, told the Venetian ambassador Federico Badoer that the Signoria obviously saw four of the leading powers—Philip himself, Henry II, Paul IV, and Sultán Suleiman—at perilous odds with one another, and wished to stand in well with each one of them. He understood the reasons; it was a prudent policy. Don Ruy observed, however, that Philip II was inevitably cast in the role of "the perpetual enemy of the Turk," from whom the Venetians had more to fear than from any other power. They might thus have Philip as their ally in case of need. No reliance could be placed in the popes, for the Holy See was subject to too many political vagaries. Also the king of France was unreliable for many reasons,

principally for this, that in like manner as the kings of Spain are under the necessity of defending themselves against the Moors and of obtaining provinces (if possible) both in Africa and [in] the Indies, so must the kings of France to gratify their wish for aggrandizement penetrate farther into the states of Italy or of Spain.<sup>9</sup>

Don Ruy made some sense, and within a dozen years or more Spain and the Signoria would, as allies, proceed against the Turks.

For the present, however, and for some years to come the Venetians were playing it safe. One after another, adroit diplomats were sent as bailies to Istanbul. Antonio Erizzo was succeeded as bailie by Antonio Barbarigo, whose commission was drafted on 19 September (1556). Upon his arrival at the Porte, Barbarigo was to meet with Erizzo, who would provide him with certain necessary information (especially relating to events of recent occurrence), after which Barbarigo was to call first upon Rustem Pasha, the grand vizir (*primo visir*), to whom he would show his letters of credence, present him with the expected gifts, and give voice to the usual expressions of esteem and friendship. Then Barbarigo was to pay official visits to the other pashas and to arrange for his reception by Sultán Suleiman, in whose good health and continued successes he was to express the Signoria's great pleasure, extolling the advantages of the current peace. He would assure Suleiman that Venice

<sup>9</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 611, pp. 614-15.

would always observe the terms of the peace invariably, as she was sure the sultan's Porte would do so also.

If during his tenure as baile Barbarigo should learn of negotiations for a peace or truce between the Porte and the Hapsburgs [Ferdinand's envoy Busbecq had gone to Istanbul in 1554], he was to try with all diligence to learn the terms and to see to it that the Turks included Venice in the agreement. Barbarigo was also to bring up such matters as restitution for Sala Beg's seizure of the *Barbara* and the suppression of piracy in the Adriatic and elsewhere. Drafts for the purchase of grain at the Porte were to be drawn up only in the name of the Signoria, not in that of any individual [a practice carefully observed since the defalcations of Pietro Vallaresso in 1536].

Barbarigo was to pay the Turks, from the sums consigned to him for the purpose, the 8,000 ducats annual tribute (*pensione*) for Cyprus and 500 for Zante. Also, like his predecessor, he must watch over and report on the progress of the two young men whom the Signoria maintained in the baile's household for the purpose of learning Turkish.<sup>10</sup>

When Antonio Barbarigo reached the Bosphorus, the first questions Rustem Pasha would ask him would almost surely concern the affairs of Italy, where Paul IV appeared already to have lost the ill-advised war with Spain. The imperialists had overrun the open country. If the peasants and freeholders could not sow grain and plant their crops in due time, there would be a serious scarcity in Rome when the next year came. In mid-September (1556) Navagero learned that Gian Francesco Commendone, the bishop of Zante, to whom we shall return shortly, was being sent to Urbino and Ferrara, Parma and Venice to justify the pope's cause and to throw blame for the war on the Spanish.<sup>11</sup>

From day to day well-meaning cardinals, ambassadors, and others did what they could to re-

store peace, the Florentine ambassador Bongianni Gianfigliuzzi having been authorized to inform the pope "that the Emperor and his son do not wish for any territory belonging to the Church, but merely to hold their own."<sup>12</sup> Fear and confusion accompanied each day's news. On 22 September Navagero closed a letter to the doge and Senate with the statement that

the gossips here believe that should any agreement be made, Cardinal Caraffa and all his family will declare themselves imperialists, which they say might easily come to pass, as they have been deceived in the high hopes entertained by them of assistance and favour from the most Christian King.<sup>13</sup>

Carlo Carafa would doubtless have made peace for a principality, preferably Siena, but he had to move cautiously, for his papal uncle was often unpredictable and always hard to handle.

The duke of Alva had offered Paul IV unacceptable terms of peace: His Holiness should receive King Philip as a son (as the current parlance went), behaving toward him as a father and dealing with him as he did with other kings. Paul must not wage war against Philip or the latter's dominions at any time, nor join as an ally anyone at war with Philip. The pope should free all captives, release certain imperialists from the heavy sureties they had had to pay, and restore all the goods that had been confiscated. He should also receive back into favor both Marc' Antonio Colonna and Ascanio della Corgna, restoring Paliano and other places to the first and all his property to the second. Finally, his Holiness must not fortify any place along the borders of the Holy See and the Regno, and should himself provide the imperialists with a proper surety (*cautio seu fideiussio*) to make sure that all these terms were observed.<sup>14</sup> As Navagero noted in his letter of 22 September (to which we have just referred), "I understand that, on hearing the terms, the Pope got into a rage, saying they could not ask more were he their prisoner in the Castle at Naples."

Carlo Carafa was bearing the full brunt of the war. He went everywhere about Rome, encour-

<sup>10</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 32<sup>v</sup>-35<sup>v</sup>, Barbarigo's commission, dated 19 September, 1556, by which time the envoy Alvisé Renier [Rhenier] had already returned from his special mission to Istanbul (*ibid.*, fol. 32<sup>v</sup>). Every year, as the summer approached, there came "il tempo de mandar a Constantinopoli li 8,500 cechi per le pension de Cypro et Zanthe" (*ibid.*, Reg. 71, fol. 88<sup>v</sup> [108<sup>v</sup>], doc. dated 22 April, 1559). Elsewhere we have taken note of the "doi giovani mandati ivi [a Constantinopoli] da noi per imparare la lingua Turca" (*ibid.*, Reg. 71, fol. 40<sup>v</sup> [60<sup>v</sup>], doc. dated 4 June, 1558). As we have seen, holders of the Venetian bursary lived in the baile's house.

<sup>11</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 616, p. 622, dispatch dated 16 September, 1556; on Commendone's mission, cf. Ancel, "La Question de Siene," pp. 45-47.

<sup>12</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 620, p. 628, letter of Navagero dated 19 September, 1556. Gianfigliuzzi succeeded Averardo Serristori as Cosimo de' Medici's ambassador in Rome. He served from 1556 to 1560, when Serristori returned to the Holy See.

<sup>13</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1, no. 626, p. 638. On the plans which fell through for negotiation of a truce, in late September, 1556, see, *ibid.*, nos. 630-31, pp. 644 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 297-98.

aging the frightened people, trying to maintain law and even order. He had met with the municipal government in their council hall on the Campidoglio on Thursday, 19 September, trying to assure them of their own safety and that of the populace. The town fathers claimed an abundance of courage, but suggested that the people would take heart if Carafa gave up his residence in the Vatican Palace [with its easy access to the Castel S. Angelo] and moved into the Palazzo S. Marco [on the present Piazza Venezia], dwelling thus in the very midst of the people. Within the week Carafa had done so.<sup>15</sup>

Priests and friars were set to work on the walls and bastions of the city. Camillo Orsini was in charge of the defenses; he was an exacting taskmaster. Failure to do one's share of work on the bastions could lead to the galleys. Some thought was given to pulling down the churches of S. Paolo fuori le Mura and S. Croce in Gerusalemme.<sup>16</sup> All the news was bad. Although 300 German foot in French employ entered Rome (on 25 September, 1556), having been sent from Montalcino "to help the pope," they were mostly Lutherans, concerning whom the Romans would long tell dreadful tales that went back to 1527. On 26 September the imperialists seized Tivoli, and five days later they took Vicovaro. Only Paliano and Velletri now remained *sub fide Ecclesiae* in the entire Campagna, as Massarelli wrote in his diary, and the imperialist horse were ravaging the countryside to the very walls of Rome. At this point the duke of Alva's forces occupied Palombara Sabina, a Savelli town, and Nettuno (just east of Anzio), a coastal stronghold which Paul IV had taken from the Colonnesi.<sup>17</sup>

At the beginning of October (1556) the Venetian Senate, viewing with justified alarm the war between Paul IV and Philip II, sent their secretary Febo Capella on a mission to Fernando Álvarez, duke of Alva and viceroy of Naples, to propose *condizioni che siano honeste et convenienti* to guarantee peace in Europe and especially in Italy. Thereafter Capella was to proceed to Rome, where he should inform the Venetian ambassador Navagero of his discussions with Alva. Then Navagero and Capella were both to wait upon Paul IV, to whom they

were to give a full account of Capella's mission to Alva and to implore his Holiness to accept the honorable and appropriate terms of peace which Capella would be bringing to Rome.

Philip II had recently expressed great good will toward Venice, and the Senate informed Federico Badoer, their ambassador at Philip's court in Ghent, that Gian Francesco Commendone, the bishop of Zante, had just come to Venice as the papal nuncio. Commendone had assured the Signoria that the pope would find an *honesto accordo* quite acceptable, "considering in his wisdom that nothing can be more useful to Christendom than tranquillity and peace." The king of France had undertaken the protection of the pope "and of all his house." It was therefore likely that he would regard this war between the pope and the king of Spain as a breach of the five years' truce [of Vauclles]. The consequence of all this might be a conflict from which no one could extricate himself, however much he might wish to do so.<sup>18</sup>

While the Venetians were hoping by Febo Capella's mediation to see peace restored in the Roman Campagna, Carlo Carafa wrote Commendone (on 3 October, 1556) an anxious letter concerning the Carafeschi's need of help from Venice, "cotesta città, ne la quale reputo che consista la gloria di tutta Italia." Alva's troops were scouring the countryside. Rome would soon lack basic necessities, "so that if we remain alone, we shall be beaten." Commendone must convince the Venetians not to abandon the Holy See. The future of Venice was also at stake, for (as the old adage went) when a neighbor's house is on fire, one's own is in danger.<sup>19</sup>

A few days later (on 7 October) Carafa sent off another letter to Commendone, damning the hy-

<sup>15</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 620, p. 628; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 150, 135.

<sup>16</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-1, no. 631, p. 646.

<sup>17</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 298-299; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 139-43; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. IX, pp. 332-35.

<sup>18</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 39<sup>r</sup>-45<sup>r</sup>, docs. dated from 2 to 9 October, 1556. Commendone was a Venetian. In July, 1555, he had been named, along with Angelo Massarelli, as one of Paul IV's six *secretarii a litteris italicis* (Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 276, lines 34 ff.). Commendone had a notable career ahead of him. He was to be one of the twenty-three cardinals created by Pius IV on 12 March, 1565 (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, pp. 40 ff., no. 43), and was to achieve distinction as papal legate in Germany and Poland. His correspondence occupies several volumes in the Vatican Lettere di principi. On the career of Commendone, note Aemilius Springhetti, S. J., "Ioannes Franciscus Commendone (1524-84), legatus pontificiae et cardinalis, poeta latinus," in *Archivum historiae pontificiae*, VIII (1970), 215-37, who depends to a large extent on Antonmaria Graziani's *De vita Joannis Francisci Commendonis Cardinalis libri IV*, Paris, 1669.

<sup>19</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fols. 174, 178<sup>r</sup>, divided by the binder, letter dated 3 October, 1556.

poetry of the imperialists, who always had peace in their mouths and war in their hearts. Look at the falsehood and treachery they had shown in the past in dealing with the Florentines and the Siense, the lord of Piombino, the duke of Parma and Piacenza, and the duchy of Milan. The imperialists had even tried to poison the pope as well as Carafa himself. The Holy See needed Venetian intervention to help bring about a decent accord with the duke of Alva, and when the Venetians stepped forward, every effort would be made to persuade the pope to authorize the Signoria to levy tithes upon the Venetian clergy.<sup>20</sup>

Commendone did not have to wait long for the next letter (dated 18 October), in which Carafa told him that Henry II had resolved to help the pope and the Carafeschi. Henry was preparing for offensive warfare, not merely for the defense of the Holy See. Commendone might remind the Venetians of the advantages of growing grain in territories of their own—it would be a bulwark against famine and pestilence—and of course the pope had offered them Apulia [and Sicily] a number of times. Venice need not fear the king of France, for when the allies had conquered the kingdom of Naples, it would not come under the French crown. Naples would be given to one of the king's sons, who would become an Italian in a little while. Carafa suggested that Commendone and the resident nuncio Antonio Trivulzio in Venice soft-pedal everything, however, merely dropping hints and quiet assurances into senatorial ears whenever the opportunity arose.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. XXII, fols. 176–177, letter dated 7 October, 1556. We have had occasion, in the previous volume, to note the relations of the “imperialists,” i.e., of Charles V, with the Florentines, Siense, and Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma. Carafa's reference to the injustice done to the lord of Piombino is not entirely amiss.

Fearing that the French occupation of Piombino would constitute a threat to Naples and Sicily, Charles V had deprived Jacopo VI d'Appiano, “lord of Piombino,” of his heritage, pledging the town to the duke of Florence (on 10 August, 1546) in return for a loan of 150,000 *écus*. As he was surrendering his domains, however, before his retirement into Spain, Charles instructed his son Philip II (on 14 January, 1556) either to restore Piombino to Jacopo VI and repay the said loan to Cosimo I or to give Jacopo a [territorial] indemnity equal in value to Piombino, “comme telle a toujours été nostre intention” (Chas. Weiss, ed., *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, IV [1843], 502–9).

<sup>21</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fol. 186, letter dated 18 October, 1556. Another screed went off to Commendone on 7 November (*ibid.*, fols. 197–199), dilating yet again on the untrustworthiness of the imperialists and of Philip II: The king of France had become so indignant, according to Carafa, that he was getting ready to throw all the strength of his kingdom

Navagero and the secretary Capella performed their duties with all expedition, and on 16 October the Senate expressed full satisfaction with their efforts, and gave them further instructions.<sup>22</sup> In letters, however, which they addressed to the doge and Senate between 20 and 24 October (which we shall look at in a moment), they stated that, in commenting on the terms which Capella had brought back from Alva, the pope had expressed suspicion of Venetian efforts to secure peace. In fact Paul IV had accused the Republic of acting in collusion with Philip II, to which the Senate replied (on the twenty-eighth) “with astonishment and the greatest chagrin:” His Holiness had been grossly misinformed.

The Signoria had no undisclosed entente with Philip, and had always desired the well-being of the Holy See no less than that of Venice herself. Nevertheless, the Venetian envoys in Rome were instructed to thank Paul for the frankness with which he spoke. Capella, who had gone back and forth between Alva and the pope, was to ask the latter whether he should return again to Alva

to advise his Excellency in our name to agree to propose another outline of terms which should be more honorably in accord with the dignity of the Holy See, [and] to inform him that otherwise it will not be possible to induce his Holiness to accept the agreement.<sup>23</sup>

into the fray. He was sending men-at-arms and light horse, Swiss and French, “in gran numero.”

The duke of Guise was coming, among the commanders of the French forces, and so was his brother, the duke of Aumale, and also the duke of Nemours. Carafa returned to the treachery the imperialists had used against the Florentines, the Siense, and all who had trusted them. Henry II was a different sort. Look at the expense he had gone to in order to defend Mirandola, Parma, and Siena against the imperialists “senza nessun suo utile.” Venice should join the Holy See and France to oppose the evil designs of the imperialists. Remember, too, the French connection with the sultan, “atteso che la intelligenza del re co' l' Turco potrà esser sempre a vantaggio di quella Signoria s' ella vorrà.”

<sup>22</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 45<sup>v</sup>–46<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 16 October, 1556.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 47<sup>v</sup>–48<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 28 October, 1556. As shown by another letter of the same date, the Senate suspected that secret diplomacy was being carried on by Zaccaria Delfino, bishop of the island see of Lesina (Hvar, on the Dalmatian coast), the papal nuncio to the court of Ferdinand, king of the Romans. The bishop had hurriedly returned to Rome, and the Senate understood (*ibid.*), “il detto esser venuto per trattare una secreta intelligenza tra la Santità del Pontifice, il serenissimo Re de' Romani, et il Re Christianissimo, et . . . per praticare questo negotio con quella maggior secretezze. . . .” When peace was made, Venice wanted credit for it. Delfino (Dolfin) had arrived in Rome on 26 October, conferred at length with Cardinal Carafa, spent an hour with the pope, and saw Navagero briefly. He was anxious for the res-

The several letters which Navagero and Capella sent the doge and Senate from 20 to 24 October are worth more than a glance. They reported the pope as unyielding, forever inveighing against Charles V, who was "diabolical, soulless, thirsting for the blood of Christians, schismatic, born to destroy the world." Paul IV's capacity for invective was not his least noteworthy gift. He blamed Charles for what he described to the Venetian envoys as the sad state of Flanders, Spain, the Milanese, and the kingdom of Naples, "which," he said, "was in such distress that it would give itself to the Turks, but that God assists us, so that they do not think of it, although they have the convenience of a short passage [across the Adriatic], such as that of Valona to Puglia." When these terrible Hapsburgs had devoured the Holy See, Venice would comprise the next course in their feast of conquest, "nor will it be," he told the envoys, "of any use for you to call Sultan Soliman to your assistance!"<sup>24</sup>

Capella went to Grottaferrata (on 21 October), as he wrote the doge and Senate on the following day, "ten miles hence, where I found the Duke of Alva with the whole army." Alva declared to Capella that Philip II was most desirous of peace, and as for Alva himself, he told the Venetian secretary that peace would be dearer to him "than were he to take Rome, and the Pope, and the whole of the Papal States." But Alva was thoroughly exasperated by the entire affair,

and he proceeded to say that these priests are of such a sort that towards those who humble themselves before them they evince such haughtiness that there is no living with them, . . . whilst on the other hand to those who show them their teeth they are no less servile. . . .

Despite Alva's "every demonstration of humility and submission" (at least according to Alva) ce-

clesiastical arrogance had brought "matters to their present pass."

As for better terms, more in keeping with the pope's dignity, Alva claimed that he had had little regard for Philip II's dignity and for his own. His proposed articles of peace were minimal, the *sine quibus non* of security and tranquility in the peninsula. Let the Venetian Signoria modify his terms, "as I shall always be disposed," he said, "to do what they shall choose." Alva was, however, most suspicious of those "who rule the Pope," and were ready to turn over certain fortresses to the French, including Corneto [now Tarquinia] near Civitavecchia. According to Capella, Alva's army consisted of 20,000 infantry, including 3,000 Spaniards, 21 squadrons of light horse, almost 500 men-at-arms, and some 2,000 sappers (*guastadori*). They were awaiting the arrival of more German mercenaries and 800 Spaniards, after which they would occupy Ostia, take control of the Tiber, and perhaps attack Civitavecchia.<sup>25</sup>

When Navagero and Capella next saw Paul IV (on 23 October), his Holiness was more than usually eloquent in his condemnation of Charles V and Philip:

We will deprive them of their kingdoms and empires; we will proclaim them excommunicated and accursed . . . ; we will make a crusade against them, because both father and son are heretics; and we will extirpate that accursed race. . . . This scum of the earth has, alas, commanded us [Italians], owing to our cowardice, ever since those wretched souls Lodovico [il] Moro and Alfonso [II] placed the neck of Italy under the yoke of the barbarians, our capital enemies. . . . You will soon see all Italy in arms, and a war the greatest and most important that ever was—even the Turks will come. . . .

Paul also returned to his old themes of making one French prince the king of Naples, another the duke of Milan, and of assigning Sicily to Venice. Charles V's desire to give Philip the empire as well as all his kingdoms had alienated (he said) Ferdinand, king of the Romans, and the latter's son Maximilian.<sup>26</sup>

rotation of peace in Italy (*Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 684, pp. 751-52).

Perhaps the best evidence of the Venetians' straightforwardness in these proceedings may be found in a letter of 30 October to their ambassador at Philip's court, also requesting that "siano proposte conditioni più honeste di quelle che sono state fin hora proposte, et che siano de dignità della Santa Sede Apostolica et della persona di sua Beatitude, perciò che non dandosi capitoli più honesti, non vedemo come possi succedere questo accordo, et procedendo la guerra innanzi, non si può aspettare senon danni et ruine grandissime non solamente all'Italia ma alla Christianità tutta . . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 48<sup>r</sup>-49<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>24</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2 (1881), no. 669, p. 721, letter of Navagero and Capella, dated 20 October, 1556.

<sup>25</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 672, pp. 726-29, letter of Febo Capella to Venice, dated at Rome on 22 October, 1556. Conditions in Rome were beginning to deteriorate (*cf.* Navagero's letter of the same date, *ibid.*, no. 673).

<sup>26</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 674, pp. 732-35, Navagero and Capella to the doge and Senate, letter dated 23 October, 1556; *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 675, Navagero's second letter of the day, and no. 714, pp. 800-1; note also Ancel, "La Question de Siennec," pp. 48-49.

When Navagero returned home from the Vatican Palace, he found Camillo Orsini waiting for him, anxious to share his apprehensions in confidence. Orsini said that ever since the pope had summoned him to look to the defenses of Rome, he had urged peace upon his Holiness, "seeing that by war one of two evils was unavoidable, either to lose this State [i.e., the papal states] or with the assistance of others to put the whole world to fire and sword, and that he spoke so freely as to enrage the Pope. . . ."

As Navagero and Orsini talked further, the latter wondered what the king of France would do now: he thought that Henry II would attack the Hapsburg domains on a broad front, in defense of the pope. Furthermore, Orsini

suspected that the Pope, under compulsion, would give the French such part of St. Peter's patrimony [*del Stato della Chiesa*—together with the fortresses—as the Imperialists may be unable to get possession of, which partition being effected, the state of Italy would be too horrible to think of, because in addition to the Germans, the Spaniards, the Switzers, and the French, there would be the Turk with a fleet in the Adriatic, and the Algerine fleet in the Mediterranean, so that our ruin would be inevitable. . . .<sup>27</sup>

Camillo Orsini's fear of a spreading conflagration, which might bring about the destruction of Italy, was not unjustified. Giacomo Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, wrote his government (on 23 October) that he had just been informed by Montmorency and by Henry II himself that the French were about to take action. Henry declared that very shortly he was sending François, duke of Guise, into Italy with a number of French lords of lofty station. Guise would have 9,000 Swiss mercenaries, 500 men-at-arms (Montmorency had said 1000), 600 light horse, and the French infantry (which Montmorency had set at 10,000).<sup>28</sup>

The next day Navagero sent the same news to Venice. His informant had given him smaller figures as to the size of the French forces than those

which Montmorency and Henry had stated to Soranzo, but no matter. Navagero knew "that M. de Guise, the Duke of Ferrara's son-in-law, would be commander-in-chief, and M. [Paul] de Termes lieutenant-general." He also added, rightly or wrongly, "that at the latest the main body of this army would muster at Casale [just north of Ivrea] by Martinmas [11 November]."<sup>29</sup>

Despite the increasing likelihood of sizable aid from France, Cardinal Carafa was obviously worried by the rapid flow of events which were proving so costly to both his family and the Holy See. Navagero, always on the alert, wrote the doge and Senate (on 28 October) that Carafa had held two private meetings with Guido Ascanio Sforza, the cardinal of S. Fiora, searching for a way out of the military quandary into which Alva's rapid advance had driven the Carafeschi. Navagero's "great secret" was that Carafa had hinted to S. Fiora that Marc' Antonio Colonna's possessions and titles might be restored, for Carafa's brother Giovanni, now known as the duke of Paliano, "showed so little ambition and such anxiety for quiet."

One of Navagero's two informants had also suggested that while Henry II's offers of assistance to the Holy See were in fact as had been reported, the French might have as their chief objective the acquisition of various papal towns as well as the creation of a "great number" of pro-French cardinals. Since this seemed to be just too much to Carafa and his advisors, they were apparently prepared in their stealthy fashion to negotiate an agreement with Alva. On the other hand, of course, if the negotiations were prolonged, they would gain the time necessary for French aid to come, and then they might re-assess the situation.<sup>30</sup> At the same time Navagero learned that Philip II had written Cardinal Pedro Pacheco to try to make some sort of reasonable peace with the pope and not to hold the latter accountable for his every rash act and statement. Philip was also said to have written Cardinal Carafa a letter "so bland and loving that he hopes to win and make him his own."<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2, no. 676, pp. 737-38, Navagero's third letter of 23 October. Orsini explained to Navagero that if Venice would make a great show of recruiting troops, both the pope and Alva would become alarmed, each fearful that the Signoria might support his opponent—which might well lead (according to Orsini) the Holy See and Spain to make peace. A good Italian, Orsini feared that, the war continuing, the Holy See and Italy would both lose—which ever side won—"as we may be sure of Spanish arrogance and of French insolence" (*ibid.*, no. 742, pp. 830-31).

<sup>28</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2, no. 677, pp. 739-41.

<sup>29</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2, no. 679, pp. 744-45, letter dated 24 October, 1556.

<sup>30</sup> On the vagaries of Carafa's policy, see Dom René Ancel, "La Question de Sienna et la politique du Cardinal Carlo Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXII (1905), 206 ff.

<sup>31</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2, no. 684, p. 751-52. Navagero, *ibid.*, p. 753, notes that Jean d'Avanson was now leaving Rome, and Odet de Selve was succeeding him as Henry II's resident ambassador at the Curia.



The duke of Alva had invaded the Stato Ecclesiastico without a formal declaration of war. He had been concerned by the pope's fulminations against Charles V and Philip II and by his obvious military preparations. Alva always claimed, however, to have been reluctant to make the first move, but was ordered to do so by Philip, who wished to see Paul IV reduce his forces and to reestablish Marc' Antonio Colonna in Paliano.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, Alva had doubtless intended not to await the advent of a French army. It would be better to strike first, to negotiate later.

From the end of November (1556) Cardinal Carafa was busy encouraging the Spanish overtures for peace, trying to hasten the arrival of the French troops, and seeking to draw Venice into the contest as an ally of the Holy See. It was not duplicity, as Carafa saw it all; it was merely diplomacy. While trying to soften Paul IV's intense hostility to the Hapsburgs, Carafa did what he could to arouse the Venetians and frighten them into taking a stand against Spain, for when Philip II added dominance over the Holy See to his possession of Milan and the kingdom of Naples, where was Venice? What else was left of Italy? The duchy of Florence? Cosimo I was the ally, even the tool, of Philip II.

In this vein Carafa wrote again to Gian Francesco Commendone, his special nuncio in Venice, on 21 November (1556). If the lords of the lagoon thought they could withdraw from the political scene because Rome was really in no danger, they were wrong. The bastions of Rome could not protect other places in the papal states, places from which the Holy See derived food as well as the revenues with which to pay the troops then being employed against Alva. Without Venetian support Rome would inevitably fall to the Spanish. Commendone must make the Signoria understand that this would be the ruin of all Italy. Apparently the interception of certain letters had not been enough to convince the Venetian ambassador Navagero of Philip II's hostility toward Venice. The Holy See and the Republic were the only obstacles to Philip's complete control of the peninsula. He was going to take them on one at a time. Now it was the pope whom Philip was attacking. The Signoria's turn would come.

There were various problems and complications. Philip II's cousin Maximilian [II], king of

Bohemia, although he resented Philip, would not like to see the destruction of Spanish power in Italy, for it would leave him caught between France and the Turk, but being well-advised, he would be able to protect himself against both the one and the other. Carafa was glad to learn that the Venetians intended to arm, "and to stand by" (*et starsi*), but he believed that the first effect of their arming would lead them to perceive that this was not the time merely to stand by (*non è da starsi*). In any event the idea of the French asking the Turks to "persuade" the Venetians to join the anti-Spanish league was unacceptable to the pope. When the Venetians sought some favor of the sultan, however, the French would be in a position to do anything that might be wanted.

Commendone should remind the Signoria that when the Turkish armada came westward, it did not usually pass the Faro [di S. Eufemia?], i.e., the Turks did not enter the more northerly reaches of the Adriatic, unless the Venetians gave them cause to do so. But the armada would soon come westward again. What would its objective be?<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Carafa's letter to Commendone of 21 November (1556) is especially intriguing in that Ostia had just fallen to Alva (on 18 November, on which see below), and a ten days' truce had been arranged with Alva. Now in control of the Tiber as well as of the Roman Campagna, the Spanish commander could easily cut off the food supply to Rome. Carafa's policy was certainly characterized by duplicity if not by duplicity. His rather illiterate letter may be found in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XXI, fol. 208:

"... Se quei signori hanno oppenione che Roma non porti pericolo, et che per questa causa si sieno ritirati alla lor neutralità, hanno gran torto, . . . restando tutto il resto dello stato in pericolo, perchè li bastioni di Roma non guardan gl' altri luoghi sudditi, da quali è necessario cavare non solo i viveri, ma il sussidio per pagare le genti, però bisogna che costei signori si risolvino che non pensando di difendere lo ecclesiastico [stato] Roma per se alla fine sarebbe forzata a cadere, del che ne nascerebbe la rovina di tutta Italia, et per questo è offitio di vostra signoria reverenda farli conoscere quanto inganno sia sotto questa oppenione.

"Non accade far vedere lettere intercette all' oratore veneto per farlo capace del mal animo che ha il Re Filippo contro a cotesto stato, perchè l' avviso che [sic] medesimo che lor signorie hanno fa lor chiaro che non gli pare havere altri ostaculi in Italia che lo stato della Chiesa o di Venetia, i quali pare potere urtare insieme, ma pensa prima levarsi dinanzi lo stato ecclesiastico, confidando che questi signori sieno per stare a vedere, et fatto questo volgersi contra di loro, il che gli riuscirebbe facilmente.

"Crediamo che il Re di Boemia non vorria vedere rovinare il Re Filippo per non rimanere nel mezzo di Francia et del Turco, ma quanto sia ben consigliato, s' assicurerà del uno et del altro al ceto.

"Piacemi che la mente di questi signori sia d' armarsi et starsi, ma fatto che sarà il primo effetto del armare conosceranno che questo tempo non è da starsi. La persuasione che potessin

<sup>33</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 742, pp. 832-33, letter of Navagero and Capella to the doge and Senate, dated 1 December, 1556, and note, *ibid.*, no. 758.

Presumably the pope's ally, Henry II, could persuade the Turks not to move into the Adriatic (and so not to attack the Venetian stations along the Dalmatian coast), which Henry would certainly want to do if Venice joined the pope and him against Spain.

Despite the problems and complications and Commendone's insistent presence in Venice, the Senate regarded the negotiations for peace now under way as on the whole satisfactory.<sup>34</sup> There was more satisfaction in Venice, however, than in Rome when a ten days' truce was arranged, for (as one could see from Carafa's letter to Commendone) things had not been going well for the pope's forces.<sup>35</sup>

The duke of Alva had decided to take Ostia and the Castello Ostiense, which Baccio Pontelli had built (in 1483-1486) for Cardinal Giuliano della Rovere (later Julius II). On 1 November Alva had left Grottaferrata, and in two days' march established his army in the woods close to Pratica di Mare, near the coast some miles southeast of Ostia. Another three days' march carried his army to Ostia, where the papal troops were unprepared for action. Provisions and munitions were lacking; pieces of artillery borrowed for use elsewhere had not been returned. Marshal Pietro Strozzi, to whom the Carafeschi now turned, sought to allay the fear which pervaded Rome. With perhaps three thousand foot and three hundred light horse, Strozzi moved along the north (right) bank of the Tiber to Fiumicino, where he encamped himself and waited for a chance to strike at Alva.

Massarelli says that the papal forces, which he estimates as five thousand foot and five hundred horse [under Strozzi], went out from Rome on Sunday, 8 November, taking along six cannon (*tormenta bellica*). The imperialists, however, seized the Isola Sacra between the mouths of the Tiber, and laid siege to Ostia, beginning their bombard-

ment of the place on 14 November. Navagero reported Strozzi's troops at not more than twenty-three hundred foot and two hundred horse. He also wrote the doge and Senate, who were exploring every avenue of approach to peace, that Carafa's negotiations with S. Fiora were cooling, because the pope would not hear of peace. Carafa, on the other hand, says Navagero, "has evinced and continues evincing to the Imperialists how dissatisfied he is with the French. . . ."

Marshal Strozzi's troops proved no match for those of Alva, and Carafa declined to send him reinforcements "so as not to endanger Rome." The result was to be expected. On 18 November Alva took the town and castello of Ostia. That evening the pope gave Carafa permission to accept Alva's offer, and on the following day at about noon Carafa signed the truce, asserting (says Navagero) "that nothing was more desired by him than peace," for the achievement of which he had gone to France the preceding May.<sup>36</sup>

Pope Paul continued to revile the Spanish, whom he liked to call "Marani," and to hold up to opprobrium the memory of Lodovico il Moro and Alfonso II of Naples. Paul's historical recollections (of events which had occurred in his lifetime) were as spellbinding as they were inaccurate. When the ten days' truce went into effect, Navagero and Febo Capella hastened to the Vatican Palace, where Paul received them in an audience of almost three hours (on 20 November), and rehearsed again and again the failings of il Moro and Alfonso II, while extolling the virtues (*mirabile dictu*) of the French king Charles VIII.

When Navagero could interrupt the flow of papal eloquence, he said, "Holy Father, this truce, having for object an interview between Cardinal Carafa and the Duke of Alva, gives everybody

fare i Franzesi per mezzo del Turco a questi signori, perchè si congliegnano non conviene a Nostro Signore, ma quando loro si volessero far grado che [sic] questa cosa con quel principe crederemo che i Franzesi fustin per fare ogni cosa.

"Potrete assicurar li predetti signori che quando l'armata Turchesca uscirà che ella non passerà il faro ogni volta, però che non sia dato causa da quel serenissimo dominio di farla venire in costesi mari, ma siamo ben certi che uscirà. . . ."

<sup>34</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 51<sup>v</sup>-52<sup>r</sup>. In November, Michiel Surian was sent to Philip II's court as the Venetian ambassador to replace Federico Badoer (*ibid.*, fols. 53<sup>v</sup>-54<sup>r</sup>, 55<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>35</sup> Carafa had not informed the French envoys Odet de Selve and Louis de Lansac of the ten days' truce until the morning of the day it was to take effect (19 November), on which see their letter to Henry II in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 668-69.

<sup>36</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 144-54, who gives an account of the unrest in Rome and of the fighting at Ostia. The text of the truce is provided by Nores's editor Luciano Scarabelli, *ibid.*, pp. 410-12. On 19 November (1556) Pietro Strozzi, *ibid.*, p. 409, wrote Henry II that he had gone out from Rome with four thousand foot "mal completi" to hinder Alva and to protect papal territory "quanto fusse possibile." See also Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 299-300; Navagero's dispatches in *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2, nos. 695, 699, 701, 711, 713, pp. 774 ff., dated 7, 11, 14, 18, and 19 November; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 663-69, reports of the French envoys Odet de Selve and Louis de Lansac, dated at Rome on 14 and 19 November; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (1753), bk. ix, pp. 338-40; Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," pp. 210 ff. Cf. Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Paul Courteault, Bruges, 1964, bk. iv, pp. 384-86. Monluc's son Marc-Antoine was killed at Alva's siege of Ostia.

hope of soon witnessing the peace and enjoying it. . . ." When a few days' peace caused such widespread relief and happiness, how wonderful it would be, said Navagero, when the pope's piety and prudence confirmed and extended this peace to Italy and to all Europe. But the pope said nothing would come of the truce because of the territorial ambitions of that "little beast" Philip, son of the diabolical father, and the Venetians had best beware, for when the little beast had crushed the Holy See, he would also destroy Venice.<sup>37</sup>

Cardinal Carafa left Rome on 22 November (1556), headed for the papal hunting lodge at La Magliana, and thence to Fiumicino and the Isola Sacra, where he was to meet Fernando Álvarez, the duke of Alva. Carafa had wanted to take Guido Ascanio Sforza, the cardinal of S. Fiora, with him, but Paul IV would not release the imperialist cardinal from the surety of 100,000 scudi (the figure, as we have seen, was variously given), which he had been obliged to post as a guarantee that he would not leave Rome. As Navagero wrote (on 25 November),

The hope of any good result from the interview [of Carafa with Alva] was thus the more diminished, as it transpired that Cardinal Carafa had not received any positive authority from the Pope to conclude, his commission being limited to listening. . . .

Carafa and Alva met under a tent on the Isola Sacra, "equidistant from the two armies," from Tuesday through Friday, on 24, 25, and 27 November, 1556. Inevitably Paliano and the restoration of Marc' Antonio Colonna loomed large in the discussions, which Alva duly reported to Philip II at Brussels. Carafa declared that his brother Giovanni, whom Alva calls the count of Montorio, would make a better vassal for King Philip than the Colonnas (but Paliano was a papal fief). Alva then asked whether Paul IV had granted Montorio the full proprietary right to Paliano. Carafa said, Yes. In that event, declared Alva, Carafa would have to take up the question of Paliano directly with Philip II. He added, however, that the king was ready to give Giovanni Carafa a duchy in the kingdom of Naples, which would have a much more certain future than Paliano, for some later pope might well reverse Paul IV's decision.

At their second meeting (on 25 November) Cardinal Carafa began with the statement that he

desired to remain on friendly terms with the French, who had supported him and given him money. He did not, however, want them to be informed of any part of the current negotiations. Alva was agreeable to both Carafa's wishes. The cardinal then declared that he had sent a trusted person to Paul IV, who had become agitated at the suggestion of some "equivalent" grant in return for Paliano. Paul would not hear of it (he had no intention of restoring the Colonnese). He was willing, however, that Carafa himself should go to King Philip. Alva made the point that his king felt Naples was threatened as long as Marc' Antonio was robbed of his possessions. But how could one get the pope to agree to the restitution of Paliano? By means of compensation, said Alva, and produced Philip's proposals for peace.

When Alva began to read Philip II's wishes concerning Paliano, Carafa is said to have turned pale, and remonstrated that the king was giving away the lands of the Holy See. If he returned to Rome with any such conditions to lay before the pope (i.e., the restoration of Marc' Antonio to Paliano), Carafa said that all he could expect would be a harsh rebuke. Alva noted, however, that Philip would pay Carafa himself a large pension, give Giovanni Carafa a fief equivalent to Paliano, withdraw his army from Rome, and restore the conquered papal cities and towns. But Paliano must be returned to Marc' Antonio. Carafa went back to Rome early on Thursday, 26 November, to consult with the pope, with his brother Giovanni, and with the French. In the early evening Carafa also gave Navagero and the Venetian secretary Febo Capella an account of his first two days' meetings with Alva, an account somewhat at variance with Alva's report to King Philip.<sup>38</sup>

When Alva and Carafa met for the third time on Friday (27 November), the cardinal told of his papal uncle's rage when he had spoken of giving up Paliano to some third person (he had not dared to mention Marc' Antonio). The pope had sprung up from his chair, called Carafa a liar and an in-

<sup>37</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 714, pp. 800-2. Paul IV was wearisome in the repetition of his attacks upon Charles V and Philip II (*ibid.*, no. 746, pp. 838-39, *et alibi*).

<sup>38</sup> Ludwig Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten* (1909), pp. 176-78, and esp. pp. 446-50, a German translation of excerpts from a summary of Alva's report to Philip II; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 726, 728, pp. 811 ff., dispatches of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 25 and 26 November, 1556. Navagero says, *ibid.*, no. 726, p. 812, that Alva and Carafa had met on the twenty-fourth from 12:00 o'clock to 4:00 P.M., which Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 300, confirms: "a 19 usque ad 23 horam." And this shows, incidentally, that Navagero's editor, old Rawdon Brown, knew how to tell Italian time.

triguer, and forbidden him to speak to him or to call himself his nephew, for he was unworthy of the cardinal's hat, which would soon be taken away from him. All Carafa could do, he said, was humbly to kiss the pope's feet, and plead that to a man like the duke of Alva one must give an answer. The pope replied that all Alva had to do was what was right. Carafa said that he was forbidden to sleep that night in the Vatican Palace (but he must have spent the night of 26 November in his Vatican apartment, for Navagero's secretary found him there on the morning of the twenty-seventh "before sunrise," as he was getting ready, "booted and spurred," to return to Isola Sacra).<sup>39</sup> In any event Carafa added that the pope later sent a chamberlain to him with a note to the effect that his Holiness would consider any reasonable terms, but obviously restoration of Paliano to the Colonnae did not, in the pope's view, lie within the realm of reason.

Carafa wanted Alva to make a few *ad hoc* concessions to provide some basis for further negotiations. He could not induce the hot-tempered pope to accept an agreement over night. It would be necessary to win him over gradually. If no accord between the Holy See and Spain was in the offing, Carafa declared, then for his own safety he must seek an alliance with the French, which (he claimed) he had not yet done, for how would he have been able otherwise to deal in this fashion with Alva?

Alva indicated that he was willing to make a few *pro forma* concessions. He warned Carafa, however, that if King Philip was not as violent as the pope, he could nevertheless become angry. There followed a detailed and somewhat unsatisfactory discussion concerning which of the pope's imperial prisoners must be released. In this connection Alva noted that certain papalists like the count of Montorio, Matteo Stendardo, Antonio Carafa, and others were rebels against the crown of Naples. Philip was willing to pardon these rebels against his royal authority, but the pope had refused to do the same for "his rebels." If we want peace, said Carafa, we must not anger the pope.

Carafa now came back to the vexed question of Paliano, stating that the pope regarded secret treaties as dishonorable. Also his Holiness could not accept the accord which Alva had proposed. Alva said that Philip must be asked whether he would agree to the grant of Paliano to a third, a neutral person. Carafa promised to do his best to

gain the pope's assent to some form of compensation for the surrender of Paliano, "and again he spoke of Siena." That, said Alva, must await King Philip's decision. It was therefore agreed that two persons, one chosen by Alva, the other by Carafa, should go to the king's court at Brussels to seek his answer to this important question. On the following day, 28 November, an armistice of forty days—to last until 8 January (1557)—was duly subscribed by the contending parties, after which Alva returned to Ostia and Carafa to Rome.<sup>40</sup>

Bernardo Navagero's close friendship with Paul IV, who seems to have told him everything, made him the best-informed ambassador in Rome. The fullness of his information and the frequency of his reports to Venice make the reader of his correspondence almost a member of the ruling circle at the Curia Romana. The desire of the pope and of the cardinal-nephew to enlist the support of the Signoria meant that Navagero was given especial consideration. On 28 November (1556) Navagero wrote the doge and Senate,

This morning at daybreak Cardinal Caraffa's secretary [Antonio] Sachetti brought me the enclosed letter containing the stipulation of the truce for 40 days . . . , the only two difficulties here being the security for the kingdom of Naples and Paliano. . . .

Giovanni Carafa had offered more than once to surrender Paliano without more ado and without compensation. Maybe the war between Spain and the Holy See was over. Maybe not. In his dispatch of 28 November, Navagero further stated that

a person of authority conversant with these matters informs me that he believes the peace is concluded in *pectore*, and that the delay is for the sake of giving a *sop [pasta]* to the French, and not leaving them utterly dissatisfied.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten*, pp. 450–53; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Com. Trident.*, II, 300; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 732, pp. 819–21, dispatch of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated at Rome on 27 November, 1556; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV.*, II (1753), bk. IX, pp. 342–43. Now there was widespread hope of peace, says Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV.*, p. 154: "E la speranza non era vana, perchè il Cardinale andò con animo di stabilirla [i.e., la pace], ed aveva seco un breve del Papa, col quale gli dava ampia facoltà di poterlo fare; ma la condizione proposta era troppo difficile a mettersi in esecuzione: ed era di ceder Paliano, e ricevere in ricompensa Siena; il che non si poteva fare senza espresso torto del duca di Firenze, che n'era quasi in possesso, ed aveva prestat i tanti aiuti al Re per sottemetterla alle sue forze."

<sup>41</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 735, p. 823. The Venetian secretary Febo Capella had managed to get to Isola

<sup>39</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 732, p. 819, dispatch of 27 November, 1556.

To the French, the duke of Ferrara, and the Venetian Signoria, Cardinal Carafa explained that the sole purpose of arranging the forty days' armistice with Alva was to gain time enough for Henry II's troops to reach the theater of war. Although becoming somewhat suspicious, the French envoys, de Selve and de Lansac, and Ferrara's agent in Rome, Giulio de' Grandi, bishop of S. Maria d' Anglona and Tursi, apparently believed Carafa. So did the pope, although he was surrounded by advocates of peace.<sup>42</sup> As for the Venetians, their sole concern was to end the war.

When Navagero's dispatch of 28 November reached Venice, there was noticeable relief in the Senate. A forty days' suspension of arms seemed to be an excellent first step toward the badly-needed peace.<sup>43</sup> The future, however, was certainly in doubt. On 12 December Navagero informed the doge and Senate that Carafa was sending Giulio Orsini to Henry II, "not merely to ascertain the King's intention, but to let him know through an eye-witness what preparation and provision have been made, and thereby determine on war or peace." Orsini had left for France on Thursday morning, 10 December. Carafa, in accord with the terms of the armistice, sent Federigo Fantuccio (Fantuzzi) to Philip II in Brussels. Fantuccio left Rome during the evening of 11 December.

Orsini would reassure Henry II concerning the Carafeschi's warlike intentions—if the French were prepared to send sufficient forces into Italy—and he would try to find out what Henry thought of the Carafeschi's acquiring Siena in compensation for Paliano. Fantuccio was ostensibly to learn whether Philip was now ready to submit to the Holy See, ask for pardon, and restore the papal towns and fortresses which Alva had seized. All this of course was ceremonial window-dressing (in case it should be advisable to show Fantuccio's instructions to the French). Actually Fantuccio was

to learn whether the Carafeschi, Giovanni in fact, might acquire Siena, which (as we have seen) Cosimo I of Florence had won for Charles V, and which Cosimo was now most anxious to receive from Philip.<sup>44</sup> As agreed at Isola Sacra, Alva sent his secretary Francisco Pacheco to Brussels to be sure that his own views were presented to Philip. Alva did not want Philip to alternate Cosimo by ceding Siena to the Carafeschi.<sup>45</sup>

Alva was well aware that in the vagaries of Italian politics almost anything was possible. It was alleged that, in order to acquire Siena, Cosimo was prepared to abandon his understanding with Spain and to accept a matrimonial alliance with France: Cosimo would seize Siena, and Henry II would bestow it on him. So the Venetian ambassador in France, Giacomo Soranzo, informed his government in a dispatch of 9 February, 1557.<sup>46</sup> Rumors to this effect were spreading throughout Europe. If the French and papal forces in Italy had been much stronger, it is conceivable that Cosimo might have come out against Philip. But Cosimo and Henry II were not friends—Alva and Cosimo were—and it was becoming clear that the French and papal armies were not likely to oust Alva from Naples. Cosimo would remain on the side of Spain.<sup>47</sup>

Nothing was quite as it seemed. Some four years or more later, when Fantuccio was called upon to give testimony at Cardinal Carafa's trial (in the time of Pius IV), he confessed that the instructions he took to Brussels were fictitious:

The true, the sole purpose of my mission was to learn whether King Philip was prepared to give the state of Siena to the cardinal's brother in exchange for Paliano. If the answer was favorable, the cardinal, with all his family, had decided to enter the king's service. Otherwise he would be neither friend nor servitor.

When asked about this, Carafa acknowledged:

Sacra on Friday, 27 November, before Carafa's arrival to plead with Alva for peace and for leniency with the pope. He left the duke as Carafa came into sight: ". . . And having taken leave I went towards Ostia, as it was too late to return to Rome." Capella wrote the doge and Senate on 29 November, "the distance being 18 miles, my horses tired, and the road a bad one, with the intention of returning to him, if from what I might hear about the day's conference it should seem necessary to me" (*ibid.*, no. 739, p. 825). Alva told Capella that he could, if he wished, take Rome, but he chose not to do so (pp. 826–27). On Carafa's hopes and the extent of his treachery toward his French allies, *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 875, pp. 1029–32, doc. dated 6 May, 1557.

<sup>42</sup> *Cf.* Ancel, "La Question de Siennec," pp. 212–14.

<sup>43</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 54<sup>v</sup>–55<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 5 December, 1556, and note, *ibid.*, fols. 55<sup>v</sup>, 57<sup>r</sup>, 61<sup>r</sup> ff.

<sup>44</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 758, pp. 858–59, Navagero's letter of 12 December, 1556, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 742, 749, pp. 834, 844; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. XXVI, pp. 412–13, Carafa's instructions to Fantuccio; Ancel, "La Question de Siennec," pp. 215–21, Giulio Orsini reached the French court at Poissy on 2 January, 1557; on his mission and the drift of France toward war with Spain, allegedly on the pope's behalf, note *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 786, p. 901, letter of Giacomo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador in France, to the doge and Senate, dated at Poissy on 5 January.

<sup>45</sup> *Cf.* Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 166–67.

<sup>46</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 812, p. 946; *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 823, p. 963, a letter of Navagero dated 27 February, 1557, and no. 824.

<sup>47</sup> *Cf.* Ancel, "La Question de Siennec," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXII (1905), 404–8.

Monsignor Fantuccio had orders not to conduct his negotiations according to these instructions, but to take into consideration only what I had told him by word of mouth. We prepared these instructions for the sole purpose of showing them to the French!<sup>48</sup>

Fantuccio had traveled slowly to Philip II's court, not reaching Brussels until 12 January (1557), three days or so after the expiration of the forty days' armistice. His mission, to put it briefly, was not a success; the fine Italian hand had slipped; the chicanery showed through. Some days after his arrival Fantuccio told Federico Badoer, the Venetian ambassador, "that he was to let the King [Philip] know that the Pope's just and intense anger must be appeased by all possible means, nothing being said about the restitution of Paliano. . . ." Philip could, if he chose, make Cardinal Carafa his friend and servitor.

Some special regard should be shown to Giovanni, duke of Paliano, who was a fervent imperialist. (Giovanni did in fact veer toward the imperialists rather than the French.) Fantuccio apparently did not mention Siena to Badoer. He did acknowledge, to be sure,

that by the King and Don Ruy Gómez he was answered in language no less bland and gracious than that of all the rest of the Court was lofty and sour, owing to a variety of bad opinions entertained by them, they in particular choosing to believe that the sole cause for which the said Cardinal [Carafa] went to your Serenity [Lorenzo Priuli, elected doge of Venice on 14 June, 1556] was to induce you to act injuriously against his Majesty.<sup>49</sup>

Philip II was willing to make generous concessions to the Carafeschi to preserve peace with the Holy See and the truce of Vaucelles with France. The French were evincing a marked hostility along the frontiers. Cardinal Carafa, however, did not want peace so much as he wanted Siena, which Philip quite rightly felt he could not give him.<sup>50</sup>

When Fantuccio left Brussels in mid-April, therefore, he had in effect accomplished little or nothing.<sup>51</sup> As Badoer had noted (in his letter of 17 January), Carafa had in the meantime gone to Venice, where he had been no more successful than Fantuccio was proving to be in Brussels.

Carlo Carafa had left Rome for Venice on Tuesday morning, 15 December. Navagero wrote the doge and Senate two days later,

. . . Some say that he will go from Venice to the King of Spain to make the agreement; others that he will urge your Serenity to declare war; but all are agreed in believing that you will do him all possible honour. . . .<sup>52</sup>

The papal secretary Angelo Massarelli was under no illusion as to the purpose of Carafa's mission. The entry in his diary (under 15 December) states simply that

the most reverend lord Carlo Cardinal Carafa has gone from the city on his way to Venice, Ferrara, and Bologna in order to negotiate with the rulers of Venice and the duke of Ferrara concerning their furnishing aid to the Holy See in the war against [Philip] the king of Naples.<sup>53</sup>

The duke of Alva had returned to Naples, apparently hopeful that the forty days' armistice might be the prelude to peace. Carafa had gone to Venice in a mood of opportunism. If he could get the public assurance of Venetian support, perhaps Philip II would become willing to cede Siena to Giovanni Carafa, who would then give up Paliano (but presumably not to the Colonnese, whom

kingdom of Naples he would wish some person in his confidence to be placed in Paliano with a suitable garrison, and should this proposal be rejected, that the place be held neither for the Duke nor by Marc' Antonio Colonna; and from what has been hinted to me they discussed together I know not what project about the state of Siena. The third thing is about gratifying Cardinal Carafa; that his Majesty is of opinion he should come to this court, promising by an autograph letter which he is now writing to him that he will do such things for his right reverend lordship that he will remain quite content, and that otherwise the King will be always suspicious of him. . . ." (*Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 797, pp. 920-21, and note Ancel, "La Question de Siemie," pp. 229-31).

<sup>48</sup> Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten*, append., no. IV A, pp. 454-63, with the text of a lengthy letter from Fantuccio to Carafa, "di Bruxelles li 13 di febraro 1557," and cf. Pieper, *Die päpstlichen Legaten und Nuntien* (1897), pp. 89-93.

<sup>49</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 766, pp. 869-70, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 763, 767.

<sup>50</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 301, who also notes that on 30 November, the feast of St. Andrew, Paul IV had "published a jubilee and a plenary indulgence for those who prayed for peace among the Christian princes."

<sup>48</sup> Ancel, "La Question de Siemie," pp. 220-21.

<sup>49</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 793, pp. 912-13, letter of Badoer to the doge and Senate, dated at Brussels on 17 January, 1557.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Badoer's letter to the doge and Senate from Brussels on 20 January (1557): "Monsignor Fantuccio is despatching his secretary postwise today to go and give account to Cardinal Carafa of the matters treated with his Majesty and Don Ruy Gómez, conveying an offer of three things: the one, that with regard to appeasing the Pope's anger, the King will charge the Duke of Alva to go in person to his feet, and ask pardon in his Majesty's name for what has been done, restoring to him in their original state the places taken from the Church in papal territory; the other, that his Majesty is content to leave the Duke of Paliano in possession of what he holds, but that for the security of the

the pope hated). The politicians of all ages have tended to say one thing and do another. *Aliter dicunt homines ac faciunt*. Although Giovanni Carafa was deathly afraid of his papal uncle, who breathed hell-fire and damnation every time he spoke of Charles V and Philip II, it does seem clear that the amiable Giovanni always meant it when he said he wanted peace.

Three days after Carlo Carafa's departure for Venice, Giovanni told the Republic's secretary Febo Capella,

For the love of God let this agreement [for peace] be made speedily, for I see the world going upside down. The Duke de Guise writes from Lyons on the 6th [of December] that he had arrived there on that day, and that the men-at-arms were already in Piedmont, the infantry also arriving by degrees, and that he himself should be there in a few days, and in marching order by the 20th, the necessary consequence of which would be that King Philip will send Germans across the Alps, Italy being thus filled with barbarians. . . .

After talking with Giovanni, who had a good deal to say, Capella called on the third brother, Antonio Carafa, the marquis of Montebello, who evinced great sorrow for this war, saying that the sudden departure of his brother the Cardinal for Venice had caused him great suspicion, but that he was subsequently comforted, his lordship having told him he was going to promote the negotiation for the agreement.<sup>54</sup>

If Paul IV's hostility to the Hapsburgs was extreme, his indignation was understandable. The fact was that, as the lord of Paliano, Marc' Antonio Colonna was a papal vassal, and so was Philip II as the king of Naples. Both were in revolt against their suzerain. Philip was well aware of the fact. He was willing to make an apology for Alva's invasion of papal territory, but he had no intention of risking in any way the security of Naples. He was apprehensive of the pope's league with France, and suspicious of the pope's well-known desire to form an offensive alliance with Venice.<sup>55</sup>

Cardinal Carafa arrived in Venice on 21 December (1556). The pope had informed the consistory that he was seeking peace through the intermediation of the Signoria. Not everyone shared the rising hopes of the populace in Rome, for Navagero had written his government (on the nineteenth) that

Cardinal [Niccolò Gaetano di] Sermoneta has told my secretary that the Pope in fact wished for war, and that he desired Mons. de Morette, who left for France some days ago, to let the most Christian King know that he was not to take any heed for the truce; that he, the Pope, was determined not to make any sort of agreement, and that he was to urge the Duke de Guise to advance in double quick time. . . . The Cardinal added that the design is to invade the kingdom of Naples by way of the Abruzzi. . . .

Another informant, Pietro Strozzi's brother-in-law Flaminio di Stabio, told Navagero that Carafa had gone off happily to Venice, because when the pope became convinced "that France cannot, and that Venice will not, he will give ear to the peace."<sup>56</sup> Obviously there was a wide spectrum of opinion, at least of expressed opinion, concerning Carafa's aims in Venice.

The day before Carafa reached the lagoon he had been confirmed in consistory as papal legate throughout Italy.<sup>57</sup> In Venice his reverend lordship was given a princely reception by the Signoria, which imposed the greatest secrecy (*strettissima credenza*) upon what was to be said and done (or rather upon what was to be said, for nothing was to be done). The Capi of the Council of Ten heard him out on 23 and 26 December and on 2 January (1557). After recounting Paul IV's difficulties with Philip II from the beginning of his pontificate, Carafa proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Republic "in case the peace should not be made." With their customary courtesy and verbosity, however, the Senate declined to accept Carafa's proposal, affirmed Venetian neutrality, extolled the importance of peace, and expressed the hope that Italy might "avoid the detriment, perils, and desolation to which countries are subjected by war." On 12 January Carafa left Venice as empty-handed as he had come. A month later he had still not returned to Rome, being obliged (as the pope told Navagero on 12 February) "to confer with M. de Guise and the Duke of Ferrara."<sup>58</sup>

During his sojourn in Venice, Cardinal Carafa had been in close touch with Dominique Dugabre, bishop of Lodève (1547-1559), the French ambassador in Venice. On 5 January (1557) Dugabre wrote Henry II that Carafa had offered the Si-

<sup>54</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 767, p. 873, letter of Navagero and Capella to the doge and Senate, dated 18 December, 1556, and on Guise *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 768, 774, 775.

<sup>55</sup> See esp. *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 755, pp. 851-55.

<sup>56</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 768, pp. 874-76.

<sup>57</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 769, pp. 876-77.

<sup>58</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 778, 784, 785, 791-92, 813, pp. 891ff.; Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 156-57; Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," pp. 221-25; Rieß, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten*, pp. 189-95, 198 ff.

gnoria both Ravenna and Cervia (once bones of contention between the Republic and the Holy See) as guarantees for a loan of 300,000 écus. When the league of the Holy See, France, and Venice (if the Signoria would join them) had conquered Apulia, the latter province would belong to Venice. If the allies failed to take Apulia, Venice would keep Ravenna until the Curia Romana had repaid the loan in full. The duke of Ferrara was offering the required sum for Ravenna; in the event of Venetian failure to accept this offer, the duke would get the city. If the Signoria would not enter the proposed anti-Spanish alliance with Paul IV, the Carafeschi would be forced to bring so many Frenchmen into Italy that it would not be easy ever to effect their withdrawal.

Also if Venice did not enter the league, his Holiness would lack a naval force equal to that of Spain, and he would have no alternative but to avail himself of the Turkish armada which, Carafa said, would be a mixed blessing and fraught with danger (*sa Sainteté estoit forcée de se servir des Turcs, qui estoit un mélange fort dangereux, et luy déplaisoit*). Having recourse to the Turks would certainly distress the pope, but he could hardly do less, seeing the way Philip II and Alva were trying to lord it over him (*mais qu' il ne pouvoit faire de moins, voyant la façon dont on luy vouloit commander et tyranniser*). The Venetian fleet could spare the Holy See and Christendom the evil consequences of a papal appeal to the Turks (. . . *que ces Seigneurs avec leurs armées de mer pouvoient remédier à cet inconvenient*). And the good bishop of Lodève assured the Signoria that Carafa's every proposal had been made with Henry II's "bonne participation et consentement."<sup>59</sup>

It is hard to believe Cardinal Carafa would ever have dared to tell the Signoria, without Paul IV's permission, that if Venice failed to join the Carafeschi against the Spanish, they would turn to the Turks. The fact is that Carlo Carafa dared a great

deal, as Paul was to find out two years later, and when he did find out (as we shall note again), he completely ruined both Carlo and the latter's two brothers. Paul, however, had been well aware since September (1556) of Carlo's desire to use the Turkish armada against Philip II's regime in southern Italy and in Sicily.<sup>60</sup>

In writing to the doge and Senate on 16 January, 1557, Navagero reported a recent conversation of Paul IV with Cardinal Giovanni Morone. When the aged pontiff said that he would receive assistance against the dreadful Hapsburgs "even from Germany" in the just war he was carrying on with Philip, Morone cautioned him that the Germans hated no one more than they did the pope. To this Paul replied, "The Turks will not fail us!" Undoubtedly shocked, although he had presumably heard such remarks before, Morone remonstrated, "Holy Father! I believe your Holiness to be of such great goodness as not to choose to have recourse to these infamous aids, and that you will provide in such a way as not to require them! . . ."<sup>61</sup>

The contemporary Venetian references to Carlo Carafa are embedded in honeycombs, "by reason of his most illustrious lordship's singular virtues and rare qualities,"<sup>62</sup> but one wonders what the Capi of the Council of Ten had to say among themselves. The Signoria certainly had no intention of moving against Philip II either by land or by sea. The Venetians were not much reassured when word now reached them that Philip had expressed a desire for peace, and had affirmed his devotion to the Holy See.<sup>63</sup>

Having heard Carafa, they could find little to be reassured about. Indeed, on 19 January (1557) the Senate felt obliged to grant Philip's request to allow 8,000 German foot and 1,200 horse to pass through the Veneto for service in the duchy of Milan, and another request from Cosimo I of Florence for the passage of 3,000 foot and 400 men-at-arms "ch' el leva di Allemagna et conduce nel suo stato," providing adequate food and lodging for them all.<sup>64</sup> It is small wonder, therefore, that the Senate now set about increasing the number

<sup>59</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 673-75. According to Antonio Babbi, secretary of Bongiovanni Gianfigliuzzi, the Florentine ambassador in Rome (1556-1560), although Carafa left Venice without concluding anything, he received gifts and money worth some 10,000 ducats (*Summarii delle cose notabili successe dal principio d' aprile 1556 a tutto giugno 1557*, in L. Scarabelli, ed., *Nores's Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. 1, p. 371). On Carafa's offer of Ravenna and Cervia to Venice, note also *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 841, p. 984. Dugabre's official correspondence has been published by Alexandre Vitalis, *Correspondance politique de Dominique du Gabre (évêque de Lodève, trésorier des armées à Ferrare (1552-1554), ambassadeur de France à Venise (1554-1557)*, Paris, 1903: his dispatches from Venice on Carafa's mission to the lagoon may be found, *ibid.*, nos. 158 ff., pp. 203 ff.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Pöpstes*, VI (repr. 1957), 420, note 2.

<sup>61</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 792, p. 910.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 791, pp. 907-8.

<sup>63</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 63'-64', letter of the Senate to Navagero in Rome, dated 16 January, 1557 (Ven. style 1556). On Philip II's desire for peace with the Holy See, cf. *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 798, pp. 921, 923.

<sup>64</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 66, to the rectors of Verona, and see, *ibid.*, fols. 67 ff.



of men-at-arms in Venetian employ and improving their fortifications on *terra ferma*.<sup>65</sup>

At the same time the Venetians felt under constraint to supply Paul IV with thirty *migliara* of gunpowder, although they claimed to be in short supply themselves.<sup>66</sup> Now the news came that Henry II's troops were on their way into Italy, and would have to go south by the road through the Val Camonica, the valley of the upper Oglio, then as now one of the major routes from Germany into the Lombard plain. Obviously Henry's troops were German or Swiss mercenaries. If they were to go peaceably, as the Senate wrote the rectors of Brescia and Verona, they too would have to be given supplies.<sup>67</sup> Presently the papal nuncio in Venice was requesting saltpeter for gunpowder, which the Senate regretted exceedingly they could not provide because of their own pressing needs both on land and at sea.<sup>68</sup>

Giulio Orsini had reached the French court, then at Poissy, on 2 January (1557), and was quickly received by Henry II and the Constable de Montmorency. Choosing to forget his own subscription to the truce of Vaucelles, Henry was chagrined by Carafa's forty-day armistice with Alva. He had become somewhat suspicious of the Carafeschi. Nevertheless, "so many [French] lords and gentlemen are going into Italy," the Venetian ambassador Giacomo Soranzo wrote his government (on 5 January), "that it is a marvel, the King paying the greater part of them, at least their travelling expenses." Duke François de Guise had arrived at Turin, and was going on to inspect the fortifications at Casale.<sup>69</sup> A few days later (on the ninth) Navagero notified the Doge Lorenzo Priuli he had picked up word in Rome

that the French have let the Pope know that should they come into these parts, it is necessary for them to have strongholds belonging to the Church, into which to retreat in case an overwhelming mass of the enemy's troops come upon them unexpectedly, or else they must be assured that your Serenity has joined the League.<sup>70</sup>

Navagero had a good deal more to say. His dispatches are extraordinarily well informed, irre-

sistently interesting. He went on to tell the doge (and Senate) that he had been told by a person, "who says he heard it from Marshal Strozzi," that all the loans being negotiated for Henry II were carrying an interest charge of 23 percent—"16 for the usual rate of interest, 4 for the exchange at Venice, and 3 for the depreciation of the coinage." The Italian merchants involved in these loans were seeking "certain German names of importance for their greater security." In the Curia Romana there were apparently those who advocated drawing upon the money collected and set aside for the building of S. Peter's, "which a person in charge of that fund assures me amounts to upwards of 9,000 crowns." Work on S. Peter's had, in fact, been suspended.<sup>71</sup>

Marshal Pietro Strozzi, after having conveyed food and munitions to the papal garrisons at Velletri and Paliano, laid siege to Ostia on 8 January (1557), for (as Massarelli and Navagero state) on that day Carafa's armistice with Alva had expired. The Spanish commander had gone back to Naples, leaving only a hundred of his countrymen to hold Ostia, which Strozzi took on Sunday, 10 January. Strozzi had been accompanied by Giovanni Carafa. According to Nores, Strozzi had 6,000 foot, 800 horse, and six pieces of artillery; the recovery of the river fortress was a boon to Rome, which was beginning to suffer from a "grandissima carestia."

Nores thought the Spanish surrender of Ostia, although it fell easily to "our men," quite scandalous, for the defenders of the fortress had the "greatest quantity of wine and other munitions." A month later (on 14 February) Vicovaro fell to the papal troops, and Palestrina, the town of Castel S. Angelo (near Vicovaro), Frascati, Grottaferrata, Marino, and Castel Gandolfo all returned to obedience to the Holy See, as did Tivoli, S. Polo, and the Marittima.<sup>72</sup>

The Venetian Signoria's unwillingness to grant the papal nuncio's request for saltpeter did not please Paul IV, who was now refusing to receive Navagero despite more than one request for an audience. The Senate rightly assumed the reason was the Venetian acquiescence in Philip II's request for the passage of German mercenaries through the Veneto. But as Navagero was told to remind his Holiness once more, when the oppor-

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 64, 65<sup>r</sup>, 66<sup>r</sup>, 72<sup>r</sup> ff.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 66<sup>r</sup>-67<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 6 February, 1557, and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 22, on which note *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 813, p. 947, a letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 12 February, 1557.

<sup>67</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 68.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 70, letter of the Senate to Navagero in Rome, dated 27 February, 1557 (Ven. supp. 1556).

<sup>69</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 786, p. 901, and note Ancel. "La Question de Sienne," pp. 217-19, 226.

<sup>70</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 788, p. 904.

<sup>71</sup> *Cal. State Papers, ibid.*, p. 904.

<sup>72</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 302, 303; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 788, 792, 799, 800, 807, 809, 811, 816, 820, 828, 841, pp. 903 ff.; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 169-70; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 345-46.

tunity should present itself, "Our state borders upon others in so many areas, and is so open, that to try to prohibit these passages would require several armies," which would obviously be beyond the resources of the Republic to maintain. A sizable number of French horse had also passed through the Veneto recently, and all these troops, French as well as German, had to be supplied with provisions. Otherwise they would plunder the countryside, not finding "da viver per li sui danari."<sup>73</sup>

Encouraged by the recovery of Ostia and by the expectation of further successes, on Friday, 12 February (1557), Paul IV appointed a commission

to institute a process of excommunication and deprivation against Charles V, the emperor, and his son Philip, king of England and Naples, because of the felony they have committed and the rebellion they have undertaken against the pontiff and the Apostolic See in making war upon him. . . .<sup>74</sup>

Henry II was sending François de Guise into Italy, says Nores, with no other apparent purpose "than to aid the pope and to defend the Stato Ecclesiastico from the arms and insolence of the duke of Alva."

Guise's army was said to number 12,000 foot—7,000 French plus 5,000 Swiss and Gascons—as well as 400 men-at-arms and 800 light horse. The French were in control of most of Piedmont and, despite some resistance, Guise swept south and eastward from Turin through the Piacentino and the Parmigiano to Reggio, where on 16 February Guise presented Ercole II d'Este, duke of Ferrara, with the baton of command, the "usual ensign of the general." Cardinal Carafa was also in Reggio, a witness to the French-Ferrarese alliance, which had been formed ostensibly for the protection of the Holy See. After seeking to play the French off against the Spanish, with a view to becoming Philip II's "friend and servitor" in return for Siena, Ca-

rafa had finally been forced to affirm his alliance with Henry II.<sup>75</sup>

Despite Carafa's now apparently firm adherence to the league with France and Ferrara against Spain, the allies were hardly in accord at Reggio. François de Guise and his French advisors wanted to assail the imperialists in Lombardy and to attack Milan. Cardinal Cristoforo Madruzzo, always in the service of the Hapsburgs, later stated that he had feared no plan of action upon which the allies might embark so much as their campaigning in Lombardy and against Milan. His prayers had been answered, he said, when to his astonishment the allied forces began to move south, "e lasciar libera la Lombardia e lo stato di Milano." Ercole d'Este agreed with Guise. They considered moving against Parma and Piacenza since Ottavio Farnese had virtually joined the imperialists, but Ottavio still professed his friendship for Henry II, and he still wore the neck-chain of the French Order of S. Michel.

Guise was willing to take the field against Cosimo de' Medici, for if Siena were freed and Cosimo weakened, the allies could attack the Neapolitan kingdom and free the Roman Campagna without leaving so powerful a foe in their rear. Knowing the pope's often-expressed desire, however, Carlo Carafa could only insist that they should attack the Regno immediately, that this was the best way to free Rome and the pope from the imperialist menace. Henry II had instructed Guise to obey the pope and to do everything in strict accord with papal interests. D'Este lost such enthusiasm as he had for the league when he perceived that his allies were deciding to leave the lands of Ferrara exposed to attack by the imperialists in the Milanese and by Ottavio Farnese, who had him hemmed in on the west. D'Este turned for advice and support to Venice.

The duke of Alva, in "friendship and union with Duke Cosimo," was organizing the defenses

<sup>73</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 71, letter of the doge and Senate to Navagero in Rome, dated 6 March, 1557. Before this letter could be sent, the papal nuncio Trivulzio and Commendone, the bishop of Zante, had made a formal protest to the Venetian government "circa il passar di questi Alemani." On Paul IV's refusal to receive his friend Navagero, see *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 819, 821-23, 827, 829 [a summary of the Senate's letter of 6 March, to which reference has just been made], pp. 957 ff. Navagero was, however, finally granted an audience on 11 March, and found the pope most friendly (*ibid.*, no. 832, pp. 972-73).

<sup>74</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 303; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 171-72.

<sup>75</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 161-63; M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), no. 530, p. 329, letter of Tournon to Henry II, dated at Fossombrone on 27 February, 1557; Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," *Revue Benedictine*, XXII (1905), 398-401, who mistakenly calls François de Guise the brother-in-law (*beau-frère*) of Ercole II (François had married Ercole's daughter Anna d'Este in 1548); Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 427.

According to Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 304, Henry II sent Guise into Italy "cum 12 millibus peditum, 6 Helvetiorum et 6 Vasconum, et 450 gravis et 1500 levis armaturae equitibus." Cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 346-47.

of the kingdom of Naples against the likelihood of a French invasion and the possibility of coastal attacks by the Turks, "dei quali il timore era grande." Alva was enlisting large numbers of German mercenaries—4,000 foot from among those in Lombardy, 6,000 in Germany under the colonel Hans Walter, and another 3,000 under the baron Gaspary von Fels. Alva and the Spaniards in Naples were collecting money wherever they could find it, and especially from ecclesiastical sources.<sup>76</sup>

As François de Guise's army moved southward through the Romagna into the Marches and Umbria, along the eastern borders of Tuscany, it was obvious that either Florence or Naples would be the allies' objective. This was the period during which Cosimo was negotiating with the French, and professing devotion to the pope and the Holy See. Ercole d' Este, complaining that the French and the papalists had abandoned him, remained within his own territories for the rest of the war. Carlo Carafa wanted to attack Cosimo in Florence as a first step toward the acquisition of Siena. The pope intended to invade the Neapolitan kingdom as a first step toward humbling the Hapsburgs. Whichever target was chosen, however, it was becoming clear that Cosimo and Alva would stand together.

Carlo Carafa returned to Rome, after an absence of eleven weeks, on Shrove Tuesday, 2 March. François de Guise came with him. The cardinal and the duke were received "maximo cum honore," the princes and nobles of the city having gone out to meet them beyond the Porta del Popolo, accompanied by various members of the papal and cardinals' households. Carafa and Guise entered the city in state. As they passed under the Castel S. Angelo, they were greeted by a salvo of cannon fire, and hastened on to the Vatican Palace, where the pope awaited them in the audience hall.<sup>77</sup> Carafa was of two minds about the French army in Italy and about Guise's presence in Rome. He had hoped that the twin threats of the French entry into Italy and of the pope's alliance with Henry II might persuade Philip II to yield Siena to the Carafeschi, who would then con-

vince their papal uncle that the Holy See had a greater need of peace than of the French.

Carafa's eleven weeks away from the Curia, however, had made a difference in his relations with the pope, over whom he seemed largely to have lost his influence. Carafa's friend and secretary Silvestro Aldobrandini, who was accused of sowing discord between Carafa and the latter's brother Giovanni, duke of Paliano, was placed under house arrest. Carafa and Marshal Strozzi had all they could do to save him from the Castel S. Angelo "and perhaps from something worse." Aldobrandini was able to retire "into the house where his sons live," a sick and broken man. With Aldobrandini's alleged failings in mind, the pope turned on Carafa in anger at a conference attended by Guise, Strozzi, the French ambassador de Selve, and others a week or so after the cardinal's return to Rome. Very likely Aldobrandini had nothing to do with it, but it was true that Carafa and his brother Giovanni entertained a hearty dislike for each other.<sup>78</sup>

Giovanni wanted to have done with Siena. He was afraid—and he proved to be right—that Carlo's machinations were going to ruin their family. Giovanni's wife Violante Garlonia d' Alife, the duchess of Paliano, was a staunch imperialist, and was reduced to tears when her husband was enrolled in the Order of S. Michel, "it seeming to

<sup>76</sup> Cf. *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 827, 831, pp. 966 ff., letters of Navagero to Venice, dated 6 and 12 March, 1557. The three brothers Giovanni, Antonio, and Carlo had apparently always been at odds with one another. The elder two, Giovanni and Antonio, resented the greater ability and feared the political ambition of the cardinal. Also, "il duca ed il marchese, come vassalli del re Cattolico, hanno sempre atteso alla pace . . ." (Navagero, *Relazione* [1558], in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, II, vol. III [1846], pp. 386-87).

On Aldobrandini's removal from the papal court, note the deposition of a witness at the trial of the Carafeschi under Pius IV, in Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XI, tom. 114, fol. 20<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, to the effect "che il Cardinale havea alli serviti suoi Silvestro Aldobrandino, il quale io intendo che era grande inimico del duca de Fiorenza, et intesi ancora che Monsignor della Casa era alli serviti del Papa, ma io non so che ce lo mettesse. Il Papa se mise un dì in una grande collera contra il Cardinale Caraffa talmente che tutti noi, cioè il duca de Guisa, Pietro Strozzi, Benevento, il duca di Paliano restassimo sbigottiti, non sapendo de che volesse intendere, et disse verso il cardinale, 'Levate denanti costui . . .' et restassimo che non ci fu altro che collera del Papa et esclamazione, et non sapevo quanto a me de che parlasse, senon che io lo vedevo molto infiammato contra al cardinale, et dipoi la mattina intesi che tutto questo era stato contra Silvestro Aldobrandino, et il cardinale stette un giorno o doi senza andare a visitar' il Papa, et poi intesi dire che Silvestro Aldobrandino era stato cacciato dal Palazzo, et andò a casa sua. . . ."

<sup>76</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 163-69; Ancel, "La Question de Siennne," pp. 402-3.

<sup>77</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 303-4; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 825-26, pp. 964-66, letters of Navagero dated 3 and 6 March, 1557; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 173-74; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 679-81; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, p. 352.

her that her husband was compelled to be on the French side."<sup>79</sup>

The alliance of France and the Holy See seemed likely to fall apart. There was a lack of money, and François de Guise refused to allow the Carafeschi to draw on their common war chest. Paul IV could not find the funds to pay his share of the troops' wages for February and March (1557). While in France Carlo Carafa had assured Henry II and his advisors that as soon as the French army entered Italy, the pope would create a number of pro-French cardinals.<sup>80</sup> Paul's third promotion of cardinals came on Monday, 15 March; from the long list of possible candidates proposed by Henry only two were chosen, Antonio Trivulzio and Lorenzo Strozzi. There was one Frenchman, the aged Jean Bertrand, archbishop of Sens. Of the ten cardinals created, only the inquisitor Michele Ghislieri (later Pope Pius V) was well known and a person of some importance. Except for the eighteen-year-old Alfonso Carafa, son of the pope's nephew Antonio, marquis of Montebello, they were on the whole reformers and scholars.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 834, pp. 975-76, letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 13 March, 1557. Giovanni's wife Violante Garlonia d'Alife was later (in August, 1559) adjudged guilty of adultery with Marcello Capece, whom Giovanni killed, or rather murdered, with his own hands after wringing a confession from him. (Marcello was Giovanni's own nephew.) Poor Violante was strangled, to preserve the "honor" of the families d'Alife and Carafa, by her brother Ferrante Garlonio, count d'Alife, and her uncle-by-marriage Leonardo de Cardena (a *Cardine*).

In Pius IV's first year Giovanni, Ferrante Garlonio, and Leonardo were arrested and consigned to the Castel S. Angelo on 7 June, 1560 (Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 346). They were all put to death, along with Carlo Carafa, in early March, 1561 (*ibid.*, II, 352).

On the "execution" of Violante Garlonia, see Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 279-82; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 315-18, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, append., doc. no. 101, p. 413; Alphonse de Ruble, *Le Traité de Catau-Cambrévis (2 et 3 avril 1559)*, Paris, 1889, pp. 94-99; Ancel, "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa . . .," *Revue Benedictine*, XXIV (1907), 497-502. And for the whole, sad story, see Domenico Gnoli, "Violante Caraffa," in the *Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti*, XIX (Florence, 1872), 341-57, 538-55, 799-829.

<sup>80</sup> Ancel, "La Question de Sienne," p. 409.

<sup>81</sup> Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III (1923), 35-36, on which note Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 199-202, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 462-64; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 305. On the short-lived career of Alfonso Carafa, see the learned study of Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli (1540-1565)*, Città del Vaticano, 1961 (Studi e testi, no. 210), with appendices containing some 150 documents, and the biographical sketch by A. Prosperi, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XIX (1976), 473-76. *Cf.* Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 353-55.

The French ambassador Odet de Selve wrote the Constable Anne de Montmorency as soon as the names of the pope's nominees were announced. De Selve expressed both his own disapproval and that of Guise and of Charles de Marillac, archbishop of Vienne, who was then in Rome intent upon securing the nomination of the cardinals Henry II wanted.<sup>82</sup> Clearly the French could not deal with the old pope, for all his "beau langage," nor (it would now appear) could Cardinal Carafa, whose two brothers were constantly undercutting him.

For better or worse Carafa seemed to have thrown his family's lot in with the French who were, however, doing rather worse than better. The military commitment to France made inconceivable Philip II's grant of Siena to the Carafeschi. The allies of the league needed help against the duke of Alva, and Carafa decided to approach Sultan Suleiman directly. On 18 March (1557) he wrote or caused to be written a letter to the Gran Turco, urging him to give up his endless, indecisive harassment of the Hungarians, and concentrate his resources upon a great armada with which to attack the Neapolitan kingdom and Sicily.

Carafa was to acknowledge this letter some four years later as well as the fact that he had offered church lands to other princes if only they would provide money to help pay for the war against Philip, "but all this," he said, "the pope ordered me to do!"<sup>83</sup> Whether or not the pope had ordered

<sup>82</sup> Odet de Selve wrote Montmorency on 15 March (1557), "Monseigneur de Guise, Monsieur de Vienne et moi n'avons failly de tenir roide et faire tous offices possibles pour les autres nommez par le Roy, mais il n'y a eu moyen, et le Pape et les siens en ont voulu user à leur volonté. . . . Ils afferment que toute cette promotion est toute à la dévotion du Roy, et qu' il s' en peut promettre et tenir comme de chose sienne; et peut-estre sera-t' il ainsi, mais le n' en voudrois pas estre garant, ni de ceux qui font la promesse, quelque beau langage qu' ils tiennent!" (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' estat*, II, 684-85). On Charles de Marillac's activities in Rome, note *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, nos. 810, 828, pp. 943, 968, and on the creation of cardinals, *ibid.*, nos. 835, 837, pp. 976-79. Lorenzo Strozzi was the brother of Marshal Pietro Strozzi. The French were most dissatisfied with the choice of cardinals (*ibid.*, nos. 837, 843, 850).

<sup>83</sup> In February, 1561, shortly before he was put to death in the Castel S. Angelo, Carlo Carafa wrote Pius IV, ". . . Fu vero che in Costantinopoli, come appare da una lettera del [15]57 sotto il 18 Marzo in Roma, si scrisse al Turco che lasciasse l' impresa dell' Ungheria, e tenesse con grossa armata alla volta delle due Cicilie [i.e., to the 'Two Sicilies,' which meant against the kingdom of Naples and the island of Sicily]. . . . E fu vero che sotto la mia fede ad altri principi si saria dato terre della Chiesa, ed accresciuto il loro imperio, perchè avessero dato soldo alle nostre imprese. Ma tutto questo mi fu co-

Carafa to write directly to the Porte, it was certainly not the first time he had sought Turkish assistance against Alva and the latter's Spanish forces.<sup>84</sup>

mandato dal Papa" (Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II [1753], bk. x, p. 369, note).

On the Austro-Turkish strife in Hungary in 1556-1557, especially over the fortress town of Sziget (Szigetvár), see von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 354-62, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (1836), 105-14. Incidentally, Suleiman died a decade later (on the night of 5-6 September, 1566) during the final and successful Turkish siege of Sziget. The defender of Sziget, Nicholas Zrinyi, died on the eighth, as the fortress fell to the Turks (von Hammer, III, 447-53, trans. Hellert, VI, 227-37).

<sup>84</sup> Paul IV had granted Carafa a brief of absolution for all crimes he had committed before his elevation to the cardinalate (on 7 June, 1555). According to the capitulations of the conclave of 1559, sworn to by all the cardinals and ratified by Pius IV after his election, members of the Sacred College could only be prosecuted for heresy, schism, or treason. Carafa had a very difficult time at his interrogation, which lasted from early July until the end of September, 1560. Despite his scandalous career, his trial was something less than fair: on 22 July Pius IV declared the abrogation of Paul's protective brief and denied the application of the capitulations to Carafa, who was, however, charged with heresy and, vis-à-vis the Turks, with treason.

Carafa was accused of having made a contemptuous display of his heretical disbelief in the sacrament of the altar (cf. Chapter 17, note 98). The episode, which took place in Venice, was noted at his trial (*Processo de' Caraffi, seu delicta super quibus processatus fuit illustrissimus et reverendissimus D. Cardinalis Carolus Caraffa*, ed. L. Scarabelli, in Nores's *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. XLIV, p. 481). He was also accused of friendly relations and of intrigue with the Lutherans. His interrogators were hostile, but his testimony was marked by lies, evasions, and pretended failures of memory.

As for the Turks, Carafa was charged with soliciting their aid while in France and again in Venice, as he certainly did from Rome. In the course of his interrogation he spoke of "... come molte volte in publico sua Beatitude ha detto che chiamava il Turco per la difesa della Santa Sede quanto bisognasse, e se bene questo per indurre quei Signori [the Venetians] alla difesa et ajuto di questa Santa Sede fu detto, per quanto mi serve la memoria, questa cosa non andò più innanzi, perchè non fu fatta ad altro effetto se non per vedere di tirare quei Signori [i.e., to draw Venice into the papal-French league against Spain]" (*ibid.*, p. 491, and cf. pp. 491-92).

Carafa's testimony and the evidence brought against him are as interesting as they are repetitious (*ibid.*, pp. 483-507): One should put to advantage Henry II's entente with Suleiman while there was a chance, for the latter was old and sick; he could die at any time, and he might go off in some other direction (pp. 487, 502, 504). As for the breaking of the truce of Vaucelles, Carafa declared, "Ciò che io feci intorno alla rottura della tregua, lo feci per ordine di sua Beatitude, e quanto al desiderio che l'armata del Turco venisse coi Francesi (a cui erano stati sempre uniti li Turchi), e per li discorsi fatti della guerra, come si vede, da essi Francesi, commetteva più per discorrere che per altro, non che io li desiderassi o procurassi" (also p. 487).

The Pope had never spoken of the Turkish armada with him, Carafa said, until after his return from the French legation (pp. 487, 490, 502). He had never discussed the said armada

When on 19 March (1557) Navagero had gone to see Paul IV to give him the most recent *avvisi* from the Turkish court at Adrianople, the loquacious pontiff kept him for two hours:

He made many inquiries of me about that city [Adrianople], asking how large it was, if it was near the sea, and if it had rivers, and I being sufficiently informed about those matters to answer him, he commenced discoursing about the Sultan's forces by land and sea, about his janissaries and his revenues, and then said, "These are in truth great forces, and our sins allowed them to multiply. . . ."

Later on in the audience Paul referred to Henry II and Suleiman as being "one and the same thing" and as having "a very good mutual understanding."<sup>85</sup>

As we shall observe presently, however, a letter of Jean de la Vigne, the French envoy at the Porte, makes clear that at this time there was no understanding at all between Henry and Suleiman. It is interesting, nevertheless, to note that his Holiness did not seem to be disturbed by the fact that "our good son the King of France" was "one and the same thing" as the Turk. He was pleased with the presence of the duke of Guise's army in Italy, with

with anyone without the pope's knowledge (p. 492). It was not Carafa but the French king's ministers who had first proposed to the pope the employment of the armada against their Spanish enemy (also p. 492). One witness at the trial, however, testified that Carafa had received letters from the sultan, which he had read along with the young Alfonso Carafa and Giovanni, duke of Paliano (p. 499, and cf. p. 500).

Embarrassing questions were no aid to Carafa's memory which was, however, restored when he was shown incriminating evidence: "Adesso che ho visto queste lettere, mi sono ricordato e ridotto a memoria che io ho procurato e sollecitato che l'armata Turchesca venisse per castigare i nemici di Nostro Signore di quel tempo, per commissione del Papa, come ho detto di sopra. Il marchese di Brandeburgo [Albrecht, a Lutheran] lo disse al Papa, cioè, che si poteva far venire l'armata turca et incorporarla con l'armata di Francia, perchè tale unione sarebbe stata acconcia a' bisogni che v'erano. Il Papa alla fine me lo motivò, e mi disse che questa armata era valevole per castigare i suoi nemici, et io gli dissi al Papa che sì, e che la Francia l'aveva detto più volte e l'aveva mandato a dire per il marchese di Brandeburgo" (*ibid.*, p. 493). Annibale Rucellai had been sent to France as early as mid-September, 1555, to seek a Franco-Turkish naval expedition against the Spanish in southern Italy if Paul IV should find it necessary to sever relations with them.

<sup>85</sup> *Cal. State Papers*: . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 838, pp. 979-80, 981, letter dated 20 March, 1557. Navagero was "sufficiently informed" about Turkish affairs inasmuch as he had been bailie in Istanbul, having been elected on 21 September, 1549. He had presented his report to the Senate in February, 1553 (for the text, see Albers, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. III, vol. I [1840], 33-110, and for a list of sixteenth-century bailies, see, *ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III [1855], p. xxiii).

the reserves of French troops in Piedmont, and with Henry's attacks upon Philip II in Flanders.

Whatever the activity in Flanders, the "war" in Italy was going slowly. François de Guise wanted to invade Tuscany and remove Cosimo I as a dangerous enemy lurking in the rear of the projected papal and French expedition against Alva in the Neapolitan kingdom. The pope would be content with "a mere verbal agreement whereby to bind the duke of Florence," but Guise was not. Diplomatic verbiage had caused a serious loss of time, "the army having already halted for many days."<sup>86</sup>

The allies were becoming dissatisfied with one another. The pope had expected a larger French army. Guise had been promised more money and supplies than were being provided. The duke of Ferrara feared that the continuance of the war would lead to his ruination. The Spanish forces were larger than had been anticipated, and there was some suspicion that either the king of France or the pope might make a separate peace with Philip.<sup>87</sup>

The Venetian ambassador in France, Giacomo Soranzo, wrote the Doge Lorenzo Priuli (on 13 April, 1557) that he had just received an unfriendly welcome from the Constable Anne de Montmorency. The constable had charged, according to Soranzo, "that your Serenity [i.e., the

doge] had taken to favouring . . . King Philip, as you had also done by his father, and had exceeded the terms of neutrality."<sup>88</sup> Although Soranzo managed to soften the irritation to which the constable had given vent, the latter could not have been pleased by the news which came from Venice some three weeks later. On 27 April the Senate voted to allow *il transito per la via ordinaria del Veronese* to another 6,000 infantry who had been recruited in Germany for the duke of Alva.<sup>89</sup>

In the meantime François de Guise had invaded the northern reaches of the kingdom of Naples, laying siege to the town of Civitella del Tronto. Antonio Carafa, marquis of Montebello, had joined him, recommending an assault upon Atri, which (he said) could not have made an adequate defense, whereas Civitella was very strong. Guise disregarded his advice, and apparently treated the tempery Montebello with contempt. He was also alleged to have seized most of the plunder for his own forces, not paying Montebello's Italian troops, and even removing them from their encampments to put his own troops in their lodgings.

Montebello raced back to Rome in a fury. His brothers Carlo and Giovanni, according to Navagero, "resent his departure, especially the Cardinal, as they would have wished him to show more patience and greater dissimulation." Guise sent an agent to Rome to deny the charges of Montebello, who reported that Alva had already reached Pescara with 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse. Montebello wanted to have done with Guise and with his Swiss and Gascon soldiery, advising the pope to make peace.<sup>90</sup>

For some time now Paul IV had again been welcoming Bernardo Navagero to frequent audiences, and as usual the old man talked and talked. Navagero informed the Senate that he had received his Holiness's own assurance of his "bon animo . . . alla pace."<sup>91</sup> It must be admitted that Paul

<sup>86</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 842, p. 986. The pope was making scant effort to please his French allies (cf. *ibid.*, nos. 843, 854, 862, 875). On Guise's expedition and the frustrations he faced, cf. in general M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* (1946), esp. nos. 534-46, pp. 331-38, letters dated from 9 April to 18 September, 1557.

<sup>87</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 844, pp. 988-89, et alibi, esp. nos. 854, 886. The pope was insisting upon the Neapolitan expedition, but Guise was able to add Henry II's recalcitrance to his own, for under the circumstances the venture would be foolhardy (*ibid.*, no. 850). On 13 April (1557), however, Henry II told Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador in France, "that the Pope, together with the Duke of Guise, had at length determined to invade the kingdom of Naples, and that the army had already commenced marching towards the Abruzzi." Soranzo also reported "that the army having gone to serve the Pope, his Majesty was well pleased that his Holiness should be completely satisfied with the expedition, regardless of anything else" (*ibid.*, no. 858, p. 1014, and cf. p. 1016).

Cardinal François de Tournon, however, who was strongly opposed to French involvement in Paul IV's war with Spain, was far from satisfied. On 9 April (1557) he wrote the duke of Guise from Pesaro that [he had left Rome, because] "je ne scaurois endurer ce que je verrois desraisonnable contre mon maistre, et c' est un crime capital en ce pays là où on ne veut ouyr parler de ce qui est raisonnable outre qu' ils ne sont pas chiches d' injures et que je ne suis pas assez sage pour les endurer, de sorte que je serois en danger . . . d' aller bientost au chasteau Saint-Ange" (M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* [1946], no. 534, p. 331).

<sup>88</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 858, p. 1012.

<sup>89</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 80<sup>v</sup>. In July another 600 cavalry on their way to Milan received permission to traverse Venetian territory (*ibid.*, fols. 107<sup>v</sup>-108<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>90</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 878, pp. 1035-36, letter of Navagero dated 8 May, 1557. Some two weeks later, however, we find Cardinal Carlo defending Montebello to Navagero (*ibid.*, no. 894). Montebello was destined long to outlive his two brothers, but his career was a sad business of unrelieved failure and frustration (cf. the brief account by M. G. Cruciani Troncarelli, "Antonio Carafa," in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XIX [1976], 479-82).

<sup>91</sup> *Cf. Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, nos. 880, 889, pp. 1038, 1091; note also, *ibid.*, no. 841, pp. 985-86, and esp. no. 890, pp. 1093-94.

had shown little or no willingness to compromise with Philip II, but he did say "that we should prefer peace to war. . . ." Of this happy fact the Senate had promptly informed Francisco de Vargas, Philip's ambassador in Venice. Vargas would transmit word of the pope's allegedly peaceable inclination to Philip,<sup>92</sup> who was himself always reported to entertain a "bona dispositione. . . alla pace."<sup>93</sup>

François de Guise had left Rome on Monday, 5 April (1557), taking the road toward Ascoli Piceno to lead the army, "qui nunc est in illo agro," into the Abruzzi. He was captain-general of the papal as well as of the French forces. On the ninth Montebello had also departed, "iturus ad exercitum regium et pontificum." At a consistory held as Montebello was leaving, Paul IV recalled all legates, nuncios, and others from their current assignments in the various dominions of Charles V and Philip II. Massarelli quite rightly notes that this meant the annulment of Reginald Pole's legation in England.<sup>94</sup> Massarelli was well aware that this was the beginning of trouble, but the Holy See faced trouble on all fronts.

Guise had been forced into the Neapolitan campaign. He could not take Civitella del Tronto. In Rome Cardinal Pedro Pacheco discussed the need for peace for almost four hours with Paul IV, who listened in such fashion that Pacheco felt he had got through to him. At a congregation of all the cardinals then in Rome on 18 May, however, Paul presented the text of a bull imposing a one-percent tax on all real property (Navagero refers to *tutti*

*li stabili*) exceeding 500 crowns in value, the purpose being to maintain the army and continue the war. Cardinal Jean du Bellay spoke in favor of the impost. Cardinal Rodolfo Pio of Carpi objected to the tax; although he spoke with almost infinite care and courtesy, Paul cut him short "in a rage." When Cardinal Juan Álvarez de Toledo sided with Rodolfo Pio, he drove Paul into a fury, "his whole frame quivering with passion." The other cardinals, "terrified by the example of these two," exercised no end of discretion.

A majority of the Sacred College confirmed the tax, with Cardinals Pietro Bertano, Fabio Mignaneli, and Girolamo Dandino speaking in favor of it. When on the following day (19 May) the bull was sent to the cardinals for their signatures of approval, Rodolfo Pio refused to sign it. As Navagero informed the doge and Senate, it was believed that if this levy on real or "immovable" property could be collected in full in Rome and throughout the papal states, it would yield about 2,000,000 gold crowns. But the pope's subjects had seen more taxes than they wanted of late, and "its exaction is deemed difficult."<sup>95</sup>

According to Pietro Nores, Paul IV's tax of *un scudo per cento* applied to fiefs held of the Holy See as well as to all "real property" (*tutti i beni stabili*) throughout all the papal dominions, in which he included the states of Ferrara, Parma, Urbino, and even the kingdom of Naples! Papal officials, says Nores, then set about collecting the tax "with extraordinary diligence and rigor." Paul needed the money to pay the Swiss mercenaries he had hired, for they were on their way to Rome, and should arrive shortly.<sup>96</sup> One can imagine how much money was forthcoming from Naples.

On 21 April (1557) Jean de la Vigne, the French ambassador in Istanbul, wrote Henry II a

<sup>92</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 83'-84', letter of the doge and Senate to Navagero, dated 14 May, 1557.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 84', letter of the doge and Senate to Michiel Surian, the Venetian ambassador to Philip II, dated 14 May, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fols. 85'-86', 95'-96', 102'-103', 115'-117' [dated from 26 to 29 August, relating to the Spanish victory at S. Quentin, which was a great blow to Paul IV as well as to Henry II].

On Philip's predisposition toward peace, see the report which Giovanni Michiel, the Venetian ambassador to Philip and Queen Mary of England, made to the Senate on 13 May, 1557, in *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 884, pp. 1062-64. Michiel had arrived in England, as Rawdon Brown notes, *ibid.*, p. 1043, on 22 May, 1554, and his last extant letter from Mary's court is dated at London on 26 January, 1557.

<sup>94</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 306, and as for Pole, his remonstrance, addressed to Paul IV on 25 May (1557), may be found in the *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 899, pp. 1111-15, and note, *ibid.*, nos. 928, 937-39, pp. 1152, 1166 ff. Paul would not reconfirm Pole's legation, for (he said) that would be beneath the papal dignity, but he had other reasons "which for the present we conceal" (no. 938, p. 1171), i.e., he intended to charge Pole, as he had Morone, with heresy.

<sup>95</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, nos. 888-89, 893, 907, 932, pp. 1088 ff., 1097-99, 1124, 1160. According to Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 309, "Quod si ad rigorum (uti petierit) exigitur [haec impositio], adscendet communi omnium iudicio ad quinque miliones auro-rum," i.e., 5,000,000 crowns or ducats.

On 19 June, 1557, Navagero notified the doge and Senate that the municipal government of Rome had settled for 130,000 crowns in lieu of the real estate tax, and that the Bolognese were complaining (*Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 941, p. 1175; Massarelli, *op. cit.*, II, 311). In his bull of 18 May (XV Kal. Junii), 1557, Paul IV stated, "We believe it is well known . . . everywhere in the world how impiously and violently last year enemies of the Roman Church, who profess to be Christians, but in fact are more inhuman and savage than the Turks, invaded the very state[s] of the Church" (cited by Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI[repr. 1957], 433-34, note 4).

<sup>96</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 195.

letter to which we have already referred, and to which we shall return presently. De la Vigne's letter shows that Sultan Suleiman had no intention of pulling French chestnuts out of the Italian fire, but it is surprising that the Turks did not indulge their predilection for pillage by making landings on the coasts of the Regno while Alva was engaged with Guise. At an audience on 21 May Navagero read the pope the most recent *avvisi* from Adrianople. Fifty Turkish galleys were putting out to sea. The pope thought they would not come into Italian waters, and that was just as well. They never did anything but mischief. The king of France had never derived any real benefit from the appearance of a Turkish armada in the western Mediterranean, "as the Turks choose to command and to be masters of the undertaking." Nevertheless, the pope continued, the king had been compelled to turn to the Turks for help because of the Hapsburgs' superior naval strength. Now Henry II could avail himself of the Algerian fleet, "which will serve the same purpose, and he will be its commander, and that when joined with the king's 40 galleys, his Holiness's four, and some others, he will be master of the sea." So Navagero reported the pope's discourse, with obvious disbelief.<sup>97</sup>

The "invasion" of the Neapolitan kingdom came to a dismal close on 15 May (1557) when, on the advice of Marshal Strozzi, Guise gave up the futile siege of Civitella del Tronto, and retreated toward Ascoli Piceno. Alva had reached the Adriatic port of Giulianova, "distant some twelve miles from Civitella." He had planned to skirt the Adriatic coast as far north as Grottomare, presumably to impede Guise's further retreat northward as well as to cut off the delivery of supplies. Alva had appeared on the scene with his entire army, which Navagero reported as consisting of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse.

Montebello was now saying that the pope was finally aware of what he had been trying to tell him about Guise's mismanagement of the whole campaign, and Bongiani Gianfigliuzzi, the Florentine ambassador in Rome, believed that at long last Paul IV was ready to make peace, provided he could save face. The pope's good friend and confidant, Cardinal Scipione Rebiba, had stated Philip II must acknowledge that his ministers had done wrong, and that the Spanish must return to the Holy See the towns they had occupied since

Alva had first entered the states of the Church (in September, 1556).<sup>98</sup>

The war went on, and if Philip II could secure permission to move mercenaries through Venetian territory, the Senate could hardly deny the same privilege to the Holy See, especially in view of Paul IV's genuine affection for Venice. Paul now asked Bernardo Navagero (in May, 1557) "to request our Signoria to grant the right of passage [*il transito*] to 4,000 Swiss, whom [his Holiness] has lately decided to recruit for his service," and on the morning of 28 May Gian Francesco Commendone, the Venetian bishop of Zante and special nuncio of the pope, renewed the request before the Collegio. The Senate immediately found it "convenient to satisfy this desire and request, as in similar cases has been done at the instance of other princes," and informed the rectors of Brescia and Bergamo to see to the provision of foodstuffs and other necessities.<sup>99</sup>

When, however, Paul IV, like his predecessor Clement VII (in 1530), wished to establish a cardinal legate in Venice, the Senate once more declined, "not because we do not esteem the aforesaid most reverend cardinal [Antonio Trivulzio], but because a cardinal legate could not maintain residence here without grave inconvenience and disturbance to us." Navagero was, therefore, to make clear to his Holiness, "with that skill and prudence which you will know how to employ," that in fact the Signoria would not admit the legation, and so the brief nominating Trivulzio should not be sent to Venice.<sup>100</sup> The Venetians tried to exercise ultimate control over their own ecclesiastical affairs. They were going to preserve their neutrality in the ongoing war and, as it was, they found Commendone's presence a nuisance.

During these weeks there was never a dull moment at the Curia Romana, nor was there ever a peaceful one. On 31 May (1557) Giovanni Morone, cardinal-priest of S. Maria in Trastevere, was arrested for heresy, along with Tommaso Sanfelice, bishop of La Cava, whose Lutheran-like indiscretions had got him into trouble at Trent in

<sup>98</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 898, pp. 1109-11, a letter of Navagero, dated 22 May, 1557; *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 905-6, 932, and Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. X, pp. 361-68. Guise was said to want "not only to retreat but to abandon the Pope and depart entirely" (*Cal. State Papers*, vol. cited, no. 907, p. 1122). Philip was willing, for the sake of peace, "to humble himself to the Pope" (no. 923, pp. 1143-44).

<sup>99</sup> *Sen. Secreta*, Reg. 70, fol. 88r.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 94<sup>v</sup>-95<sup>r</sup>, letter of the Senate to Navagero in Rome, dated 7 June, 1557, and note, *ibid.*, fol. 97.

<sup>97</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 895, p. 1104.



the mid-summer of 1546.<sup>101</sup> Poor Sanfelice's difficulties had been bruited about for a decade, but the arrest of one of the most distinguished members of the Sacred College, who was known as an upright imperialist (a statesman, not a theologian), caused a disagreeable sensation.

Paul IV's reign was a boon to the gossips and newsmongers. Tall tales were told far and wide, and some of the taller tales were true. The pope's French allies were hardly happier than his Spanish enemies. No one knew where he stood, nor did he know where the pope stood. The report of Montebello's altercation with Guise had deepened Henry II's suspicion of all the Carafeschi, including the pope, and Guise received royal authorization to retreat northward from the Neapolitan kingdom. If Henry could have read Navagero's letter of 4 June to the doge and Senate, he would at least have seen how untrustworthy Cardinal Carlo Carafa was.<sup>102</sup>

As for Montebello, he told Navagero that rather than ever serve the French again, "he would fight for the Turks."<sup>103</sup> On the other hand Montebello's papal uncle had now decided (on 18 June) to take his prodigal son Philip into favor, or so he said, and reconcile him to Henry "lest through the war between these two they play the game of Sultan Soliman, and give him the opportunity by means of his great power . . . to swallow up all of us alive. . . ."<sup>104</sup>

If the pope and the Carafeschi accepted peace with Philip II, it would be clear they had not won the war, and they could hardly expect to receive Siena. If they continued the war, it was equally clear that they were going to be defeated. The pope was preaching peace one minute, and denouncing Philip as a dethroned heretic the next. Henry II, caught in the war with Philip in Artois, Flanders, and Hainaut, was justifiably suspicious

of the pope and his nephews. He had ordered 6,000 German mercenaries to join Guise's forces in Italy, but their southward march was being delayed. If Henry became more certain of the pope's intention to carry on the war, the Germans would be put into the field against Alva, and a fresh levy of Swiss would also be sought. So at least the Venetian ambassador Soranzo was given to understand, although a week later Henry told Soranzo that the 6,000 Germans "were no longer to be sent."<sup>105</sup> Nevertheless, the French demanded a hostage of the Carafeschi as a protection to Guise's troops in Italy and as a hold upon the papal nephews, two of whom, Giovanni and Antonio, were advocates of peace.

Marshal Pietro Strozzi set out from Rome for France on Tuesday, 15 June (1557), taking with him Giovanni Carafa's little son Diomede, the marquis of Cave, "the tears or rather cries and howls of the lady duchess [of Paliano] his mother and of the child being most grievous."<sup>106</sup> As Paul IV wavered between war and peace, even the boldest soothsayers must have become restrained in their predictions of the future.

While Paul was reproaching Guise for the latter's retreat from the kingdom of Naples, Guise reminded his Holiness that Rome had produced neither the troops nor the money which had been promised. Also Paul had failed to "deprive" Philip of the kingdom of Naples, an acknowledged fief of the Holy See. Henry was said to be "so greatly dissatisfied with the Pope that he will no longer believe anything but deeds," and again "that the Pope's designs were not the kingdom of Naples, but that his whole intention always had been to get Siena. . . ."<sup>107</sup>

Now, however, the Carafeschi would never get Siena. As Navagero informed the Venetian government, "On Tuesday [29 June] the ambassador from Florence [Gianfigliuzzi] had a courier from his Duke with the news of his having received Siena in fief from King Philip. . . ." Philip had also instructed Duke Cosimo to urge the pope to make peace "on such terms as he [the pope] himself shall demand." If he chose to wage war, how-

<sup>101</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 310, and on Morone's arrest, see *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 913, pp. 1131-33, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 915, pp. 1135-56. On Tommaso Sanfelice, his views on justification by faith alone, and his sad encounter with Dionisio de Zanettini, "il Grechetto," see Hubert Jedin, *Gesch. d. Konzils von Trient*, II (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1957), 159-62, and *A History of the Council of Trent*, II (London and Edinburgh, 1961), 190-93; the background of Morone's doctrinal difficulties is well described in Massimo Firpo and Dario Marcatto, "Il Primo Processo contro il Cardinal Giovanni Morone (1552-53)," in *Rivista storica italiana*, XCIII (1981), 71-142.

<sup>102</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 916, 919, pp. 1137 ff., letters of Soranzo from the French court and of Navagero from Rome, dated 2 and 4 June, 1557, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 921, 930-31.

<sup>103</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 932, p. 1161.

<sup>104</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 938, p. 1170.

<sup>105</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 916, 929, pp. 1137-38, 1154, letters of Giacomo Soranzo to Venice, dated 2 and 10 June, 1557.

<sup>106</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 941, p. 1175, letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 19 June, 1557.

<sup>107</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 948-49, pp. 1185-88, letters of Michiel Surian, Venetian ambassador in England, and of Giacomo Soranzo, the Republic's ambassador in France, dated at London on 27 June and at Compiègne on 29 June, 1557.

ever, "he might have too much of it." On 3 July the obligations and articles establishing a "perpetual league and inviolable confederation" between Philip and Cosimo de' Medici received final recognition. The Florentine became a "vassal of the monarchy of Spain," and was bound, when called upon, to defend both Naples and Milan. The props had been knocked out from under Carlo Carafa's tortuous and duplicitous foreign policy.

Marc' Antonio Colonna had just taken Valmontone, and advanced upon Palestrina, where he occupied the lower town. His forces being now encamped twenty miles from Rome, his cavalry had ridden to "within a mile of Longezza, a place belonging to the Strozzi family," a mere eight miles from the city. Cardinal Pedro Pacheco had spent a long while with Paul IV on Sunday (27 June), pointing out the danger. Marc' Antonio's forces could assemble under the walls of Rome in a matter of hours. The duke of Alva had seventy galleys at his disposal. Within two days he could move his troops to any part of the papal states he chose.

Paul IV was always vague when it came to discussing peace, but he did tell Pacheco "that were his own restored to him, he would make peace." According to the marquis of Montebello, the French army was almost entirely disbanded, Guise having sent some 2,000 foot to Ferrara, "and a great part of the nobility having departed." Montebello, who had it in for Guise, declared "that . . . it will be necessary for the Pope either to make terms with the Imperialists, or that within a month from this time he must flee from Rome to Venice or Avignon. . . ." <sup>108</sup>

Whatever the pope chose to do, and he seemed to have little choice, Henry II was at war with Philip along the borders of northern France as well as in Italy. The Venetians, caught in the middle of the contest in Italy, were determined to remain neutral, come what might. Scores of documents show they were trying to make peace between the two all-powerful combatants. On the

morning of 3 July (1557), however, the French ambassador in Venice, Dominique Dugabre, appeared before the Collegio to explain that Henry had hired 6,000 Swiss mercenaries, whom he was sending into the duchy of Ferrara (to reinforce Guise's inadequate forces). Dugabre requested leave for them to pass through the districts of Bergamo and Brescia. Later the same day the Senate conceded the right of *transit* to Henry's mercenaries, directing the rectors to make food and supplies available for purchase. <sup>109</sup>

Henry would try to take care of the duke of Guise and his Gascon and other mercenaries in and around the duchy of Ferrara, but what would he do for Rome? Marc' Antonio Colonna appeared to have an army of his own—2,500 Germans, "good troops and very well armed," 1,500 Calabresi, 1,000 peasants, and 500 horse. He professed to want peace, and would not (he said) impede the current negotiations in progress toward that end. During the late afternoon of 30 June, however, "his cavalry carried off a great number of cattle within a mile of Rome." Carlo Carafa was suspicious of the attempted mediation of Cosimo de' Medici, for he knew that Cosimo wanted to clear the French out of Tuscany. To make peace Carlo wanted a specific statement from the imperialists of the concessions they were willing to make the pope.

Montebello was becoming almost frantic as he feared that his two brothers as well as the pope failed to see the disaster which might be lying ahead, "with Marc' Antonio at the gates of Rome, and the Duke of Alva in such force on the confines of the March of Ancona." Nevertheless, the Florentine ambassador Gianfigliuzzi informed Navagero's secretary in the strictest confidence that he expected Duke Cosimo soon to receive from King Philip full authority to make peace with the pope and Cardinal Carafa, who (Gianfigliuzzi believed) had become ready to call a halt to the war, although "everything depends on disentangling this old man from the French." <sup>110</sup>

Marshal Strozzi had arrived in Paris on 2 July (1557), apparently bringing the French every assurance of Paul IV's desire and even determination to continue the war against the Spanish. The pope's only failures had been caused by his lack of men and money, it was claimed, but through Strozzi he now offered to add 6,000 infantry to the army of the league plus the Swiss mercenaries

<sup>108</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 950, pp. 1188-90, a letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 30 June, 1557. On the grant of Siena as a fief to Cosimo de' Medici, see the preceding chapter, note 156, *ad finem*. Cf. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 512: "Die Martii 6 [Tuesday, 6 July, 1557] . . . milites Caesarei depraedantur et depopulantur agrum Romanum ad 5 miliaria ab Urbe, ducunturque captivi ex nostris 60 equites levis armaturae." By a letter dated 5 July the Venetian Signoria informed Antonio Barbarigo, the baillie in Istanbul, of the imperialists' seventy galleys (*Cal. State Papers*, vol. cited, no. 957, p. 1202).

<sup>109</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 101'.

<sup>110</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 951, pp. 1191-92, a letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 1 July, 1557.

he hoped and expected soon to find in the employ of the Holy See. He had sent the duke of Paliano's little son Diomede as a hostage to the French court and as a guarantee of the good faith of the Carafa family. In the pope's name Strozzi was said to have begged Henry II not to remove either Guise or the French troops from the Italian front. Despite grave misgivings Henry II and his advisors agreed to carry on as they had been doing, leaving Guise in Italy and trying to add more Swiss mercenaries to their forces.<sup>111</sup>

While Strozzi was seeking to ensure the continuance of French help for the pope, Marc' Antonio Colonna was ravaging the Roman Campagna, "carrying away and burning the grain." Papal-held Paliano and Velletri were in danger of falling to Colonna; their garrisons were small, the men disoriented and unlikely to put up a fight. The imperialist cardinals, the ambassadors Gianfigliuzzi and Navagero, and others kept up their ineffectual negotiations to make peace. The pope would take no positive step to end the war, leaving everything to Cardinal Carafa, whom no one trusted.

On the other hand the pope and Carafa distrusted the intentions of Alva and Colonna as well as those of Cosimo de' Medici.<sup>112</sup> The pope's alleged desire for peace was hardly increased when during the early afternoon of 19 July some 2,000 Swiss mercenaries entered Rome. The pope hailed them as "angels sent by God to defend His cause," and they were soon hastened off, along with 2,000 Italian troops, to the defense of Paliano.<sup>113</sup>

As the papal troops were on their way to Paliano, word came to Rome of Cosimo I de' Medici's occupation of Siena. The Siennese men in Montalcino were in tears. Cosimo was trying to help Alva make peace with the pope, for Philip II wanted it thus. The pope and Cardinal Carafa were waiting for Strozzi's return and for his report

on what Henry II was now prepared to do. Henry was also facing a crisis, for Philip was assembling huge forces on the far-northern borderlands of France.<sup>114</sup> As the Carafeschi waited hopefully for good news, a heavy blow fell on them. At 10:00 A.M. on 28 July (1557) a courier arrived in Rome with the news of the complete rout of the Swiss and Italian troops sent to the relief of Paliano.

"Owing to this most important defeat," as Navagero hastened to inform the Venetian government,

Paliano and Velletri may be considered as lost, and Rome is placed in very great danger, as there is no one here to defend it, nor has any distressed city in the world a more disaffected population. . . . Cardinal Carafa has given the Romans to understand that as they do not disburse the 130,000 crowns promised by them in lieu of the one percent [tax on "real property"], they must prepare to pay this last tax. . . .

Again Philip II's generous offer of peace was considered. This time the terms were discussed in detail, but the pope and Carafa reached no final decision.<sup>115</sup>

Strozzi returned to Rome on 30 July, stating that Henry II would continue to support the pope, and that Guise was to remain in Italy as long as the pope wished. Three days later Cardinal Carafa and his brother Giovanni had a terrible quarrel in Strozzi's presence at the family's garden in Trastevere. But for Strozzi's intervention they would have come to blows. Giovanni accused the cardinal of betraying everyone, ruining Christendom, laying waste to Italy, and destroying their family.<sup>116</sup> Except for the ruin of Christendom it would be hard to accuse Giovanni of undue exaggeration.<sup>117</sup>

A worse blow was yet to fall. On 10 August (1557) a mismanaged French army under the Con-

<sup>111</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 956, pp. 1199-1200, letter of Soranzo to Venice, dated at Compiègne on 4 July, 1557, and see, *ibid.*, nos. 960, 965, 980, pp. 1208 ff., 1215, 1238-39.

<sup>112</sup> *Cf. Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 958, 961-62, 966-69, pp. 1202 ff.

<sup>113</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 969, p. 1225, letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 20 July. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 312, says that 3,000 Swiss mercenaries arrived in Rome (on 20 July), and that on Thursday, the twenty-second, ". . . dicti 3 millia pedites Helvetii et 2 millia Itali, ducentes secum 10 tormenta minora bellica [ten pieces of field artillery], . . . recesserunt ex Urbe ituri Palianum. . . ." Paul gave knighthoods and gold chains to the 11 commanders of the Swiss, on whose numbers note Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 434-35, note 5.

<sup>114</sup> *Cf. Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 971-72, 977, pp. 1228 ff. By the beginning of August there were serious skirmishes between the French and Spanish forces at S. Quentin (*ibid.*, nos. 979, 984, 987).

<sup>115</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 976, pp. 1232-34; note also, *ibid.*, no. 978; see also Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 200 ff., and on the war in the Roman Campagna as well as the defeat of the papal forces sent to relieve Paliano, esp. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 371-77 and ff.

<sup>116</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 980, pp. 1239-40; Ancel, "La Question de Siennese," pp. 421-24, and *of Nonciatures de France*, introd., pp. CVI-CVII; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 435-36. As Ancel suggests, since Catherine de' Medici hated Cosimo I almost as much as Strozzi did, Philip II's cession of Siena to Cosimo probably helped persuade Henry II to keep on with his aid to the pope.

<sup>117</sup> On the feckless career of Giovanni Carafa, duke of Paliano, cf. M. Raffaelli Cammarota, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XIX (1976), 556-59.

stable Anne de Montmorency was badly defeated under the walls of S. Quentin. According to Soranzo's report to Venice, "the whole French army was routed, some 12,000 persons being killed, and with but very little loss to the enemy."<sup>118</sup> Henry II summoned François de Guise home, although he did allow some troops in French employ to remain in the pope's service. He also suggested that the pope try to arrange peace with the Spanish through Venetian mediation.<sup>119</sup>

During the mid-afternoon of 23 August (1557) a courier arrived from Venice with letters from Francisco de Vargas for Cardinal Pacheco, "announcing the rout of the Constable in France." Some hours thereafter Pacheco conferred with Paul IV, urging him to make peace with Alva while he still had a chance. The old man told Pacheco that Philip II, by making peace after his victory at S. Quentin, "will by so much the more evince his obedience and goodwill towards this Holy Sec." Two couriers arrived from François de Guise, whom Henry II had summoned back to France. Everyone now agreed that Paul must make peace. His alternative was disaster for the papacy as well as for the Carafeschi. Strozzi conferred with Cardinal Carafa and Giovanni di Palliano throughout the night of 23-24 August until 4:00 A.M., observing "that for centuries the world has not witnessed greater confusion than at present. . . ."<sup>120</sup>

On the night of 26-27 August a large part of Alva's army—15,000 foot and 2,000 horse, according to Massarelli—with scaling ladders and field artillery came up to the very walls of Rome. Only the vigilance of the inhabitants and especially that of Cardinal Carafa saved the city from capture, plunder, and devastation.<sup>121</sup> Soranzo reported from Paris that the Parisians "by abusive words and by placards at the corners of the streets" were holding Anne de Montmorency up to opprobrium for his incompetence as a soldier; nor were they sparing his rivals, the Guises, both the cardinal who had negotiated the league with Paul IV and the duke who had carried the war into Italy.<sup>122</sup>

Clearly peace was the great need of "this poor and troubled Italy."<sup>123</sup> Despite his signal victory at S. Quentin on 10 August and the capture of the town by his forces on the twenty-seventh, Philip II was said to be "more ready and inclined than he has ever been to the accord, and to being reconciled with his Holiness." Venice, therefore, sent another envoy posthaste to Rome, and redoubled her efforts to help Paul IV reach an understanding with Alva. The Venetian envoy in question was Marc' Antonio di Franceschi, a secretary of the Signoria, whose commission is dated 30 August.<sup>124</sup>

Lacking troops and money, foodstuffs and munitions, the pope was still reluctant to make peace except on his own terms, and the backtracking of Cardinal Carafa (who was still smarting over his failure to get Siena) was most annoying to the duke of Alva. Antonio Carafa, the marquis of Montebello, thought it likely, since Paul would not make an unfavorable peace, that in effect his papal uncle might have to "escape from hence to Avignon or to Venice, and because at Avignon he would be

<sup>118</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 990, pp. 1246-48, letter of Soranzo to the doge and Senate, dated at Paris on 13 August, 1557, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 993-94. The armor taken from Montmorency, when he was captured at S. Quentin, may now be seen at the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

<sup>119</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 995, p. 1254. After a well-known siege of seventeen days Philip II's forces captured the town of S. Quentin itself (*ibid.*, nos. 997, 1000-1, 1004-5, 1008-9). Cf. Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault (1964), bk. iv, pp. 412-13, and Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II (1914), 178-86. Note also the letters relating to S. Quentin of Dominique Dugabre, the French ambassador in Venice, in Alex. Vitis, ed., *Correspondance politique de Dom. du Gabre*, Paris, 1903, nos. 204 ff., pp. 260 ff.

<sup>120</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 999, pp. 1259-60, a letter of Navagero to Venice, dated at Rome on 24 August, 1557. Cf. Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 209; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 385 ff.; and esp. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 313: "Die lunae 23 dicti mensis Augusti allatus est nuncius Romae quod die Martis 10 huius mensis exercitus Philippi, Angliae, Neapolis et Hispaniarum regis, conflixit cum exercitu Henrici II Gallorum regis apud S. Quintinum in finibus Galliae et Flandriae, exercitusque Philippi victor evaserit, profugatis Gallis 20 milibus circiter peditum et 6 milibus equitum, captisque quamplurimis nobilibus [including Anne de Montmorency himself]. . . ."

"Magnum divini iudicii testimonium, cum rex ipse Gallorum anno praeterito quinquennales inducias paulo ante inter cum et dictum Philippum constitutas atque firmatas fregisset ac violasset, Turcamaque ad Christianos fines diripiendos (Christi nomine postergato) sollicitasset, iuvisset, socios sibi acvisset."

<sup>121</sup> Obviously the papal secretary Massarelli did not approve of the alliance of Paul IV and Cardinal Carafa with France, nor of their being willing to use the Turkish armada against the Spanish in the kingdom of Naples and Sicily.

<sup>122</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 313, and note Nares, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 210-12.

<sup>123</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 1005, p. 1267, a letter of Soranzo to Venice, dated at Paris on 30 August, 1557.

<sup>124</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 95<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>125</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 118<sup>r</sup> ff. Both the pope and Cardinal Carafa expressed their gratitude to Navagero for the Signoria's sending Franceschi to Alva (*Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 1015-16, pp. 1279, 1281).

amongst barbarians, who bear him scanty friendship, he believes he [the pope] will choose Venice." Cardinal Carafa, condemning both the Spanish and the French as barbarians, told Navagero "that the Pope is in despair" (*ch' el Papa si truova disperato*), and that indeed he might have to retire to Venice or to France.<sup>125</sup>

On 3 September the garrulous pontiff, giving Navagero an audience before he gave one to Cardinal Pacheco, expressed regret for the French disaster at S. Quentin. His Holiness had a good deal to say, noting that

it would have been lawful and indeed praiseworthy for us to call the Turks, Moors, and Jews for our defense, being invaded by those Imperialists without any cause, save because we did not choose by trusting them to render ourselves their prey, remembering what they did 30 years ago to Clement, . . . and we were present at the sack of this city.<sup>126</sup>

On the following day Navagero and the Venetian secretary Marc' Antonio di Franceschi had a long conference with Cardinal Carafa and an equally long audience with the pope. Carafa was defensive, seeking to justify his activities from the time of his mission to France, and claiming (contrary to the evidence) always to have been an advocate of peace. The pope spent his time regaling Franceschi with the evil ways of Alva, the Colonnese, and all the so-called imperialists.<sup>127</sup>

Day after day there were conferences and audiences, letters to and from Alva, the Venetian Signoria, and Cosimo de' Medici. The Venetian secretary Franceschi conferred at length with Alva at Genazzano on 6 September (1557), a prelude to Alva's three-hour meeting on the ninth at Cave (between Palestrina and Genazzano) with Cardinals Guido Ascanio Sforza, Carlo Carafa, and Vitellozzo Vitelli. Antonio Carafa di Montebello had come to Cave with the cardinals, but Alva excluded him from the negotiations.

Peace was finally agreed to on 11 or 12 September. François de Guise and Pietro Strozzi, after a last visit to the pope, embarked at Civitavecchia for Marseille. The chief difficulty encountered by the participants in the "congresso" had been the future of Marc' Antonio Colonna, to whom as a

"rebel" the pope absolutely refused to restore Paliano. Who, then, was to hold the so-called duchy? Alva and Carafa had made a secret agreement concerning Paliano, to which we shall come in a moment.

The general peace, signed on 12 September, was to have received official proclamation at a consistory called for the fifteenth. The consistory could not be held, however, for during the night of the fourteenth and throughout the next day the Tiber overflowed its banks, reaching the same disastrous heights as in mid-October of 1530. In some streets the water rose to six feet, destroying grain, contaminating wine, and soaking wood. "Many bridge piles have been rent by the sheer force of the torrent," as Navagero informed his government in a letter of 17 September. Two of the arches of the Ponte S. Maria, the ancient Pons Aemilius, were now swept away. They were to be replaced by Gregory XIII for the jubilee of 1575. The strength of the current at the bend of the Tiber just below the Isola Tiberina had required several reconstructions of the bridge since the thirteenth century. Finally, however, on 14 December, 1598, another great flood caused the collapse of the whole eastern half of the majestic span, and henceforth the bridge was known (as it still is) as the Ponte Rotto.<sup>128</sup>

In the flood of September, 1557, as in that of October, 1530, many persons were found drowned in their own houses. Dead animals littered the streets. Navagero barely managed to save his horses by dispatching them to a vineyard on high ground. Various buildings had suffered severe damage, and were expected to collapse. The whole façade of Cardinal Sermoneta's palace, which faced the Tiber, fell on 17 September.<sup>129</sup> An in-

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Giuseppe Lugli, *I Monumenti antichi di Roma e suburbio*, 4 vols., Rome, 1930-40, II, 298-303; Ernest Nash, *Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Rom*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1961-62, II, 182; also Nash, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, 2 vols., New York, 1961-62, II, 182. In 1853 the three surviving arches of the Ponte Rotto, extending from the right (west) bank of the Tiber, were connected with the left bank by an unsightly iron suspension bridge (see, *ibid.*, II, 183), which remained in use until the construction of the Ponte Palatino. In 1885 the iron bridge was removed, and so were the two ancient arches which emerged from the right bank. Today the Ponte Rotto is a single arch standing in the middle of the Tiber.

<sup>129</sup> On the negotiations and the peace of Cave, see *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, nos. 1021-23, 1025, 1028-34, 1036-39, pp. 1289-1320, letters of Navagero and Franceschi to Venice, dated 5 to 21 September, 1557, and on the flood, *ibid.*, VI-2, nos. 1036, 1042, pp. 1315-16, 1323-24, letters dated 17 and 25 September.

See also Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 386-89,

<sup>125</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, nos. 1006-7, 1011-12, pp. 1268 ff., letters of Navagero to Venice, dated at Rome from 30 August to 2 September, 1557.

<sup>126</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 1015, p. 1279.

<sup>127</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 1017, pp. 1283-86, letter of Navagero and Franceschi to Venice, dated 4 September, 1557.

scription on the façade of the church of S. Maria sopra Minerva still records the awful level to which this flood, like others, had reached, destroying works of art as well as the lives and hopes of so many of the inhabitants of the city.

The good news of the peace of Cave reached Venice at 5:00 P.M. on 17 September, in a hasty note which Navagero had written at midnight on the twelfth.<sup>150</sup> According to the capitulations of Cave, the duke of Alva, *come devoto e ubbidiente figliuolo*, was to go through an act of public obeisance to the pope on behalf of Philip II to secure "pardon and grace" from his Holiness. Paul IV would receive Philip as a good son of the Holy See; he would also withdraw from the league with Henry II, and henceforth remain neutral. Alva or rather Philip would return to the Holy See all cities, towns, and territories occupied up to 12 September. Each side would give back the pieces of field artillery seized from the other.

All punishments, temporal as well as spiritual, were to be remitted, and all goods, titles, and privileges were to be restored, except that as rebels against the Holy See, Marc' Antonio Colonna, Ascanio della Corgna, and Gian Francesco Guidi di Bagno were not to receive either pardon or their property from the pope. Paliano was to be turned over to Bernardino Carbone, whom both the pope and Alva trusted. Carbone would swear fealty to both sides, and hold Paliano with a force of eight hundred foot at the shared expense of the contracting parties, "and he will observe those conventions which have been agreed upon by the

lord Cardinal Carafa and the lord duke of Alva on behalf of their princes."

The conventions in question were a secret agreement that Philip II might purchase from Giovanni Carafa, if he wished, the duchy of Paliano, naming a duke thereto who should not be an enemy of the Holy See (thus excluding Marc' Antonio). If Philip did not exercise this option and make payment within six months, Paliano would revert to Giovanni. Henceforth, however, the town on its rocky hilltop was supposed to remain unfortified. Venice would arbitrate any "difficulty or contradiction" which might arise between the two parties, and the decision of the Serenissima was to be accepted "senza replica alcuna."<sup>151</sup>

At about 8:00 P.M. on 19 September Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alva, viceroy of Naples, governor of Milan, and captain-general of the Spanish-Neapolitan army, made his entry into Rome. He was attended by "many princes and nobles both Spanish and Italian" as well as by Cardinal Carlo Carafa, the duke of Paliano, and the marquis of Montebello. The papal secretary Marsarelli says that Alva was received "maxima populi laetitia ac gratulatione." As he passed under the Castel S. Angelo, Alva was greeted by a salvo of cannon fire; he made straight for the Vatican Palace, where Paul IV awaited him with some twenty cardinals. Upon his arrival in the audience hall Alva was graciously received by the pope, "whose feet he kissed with the greatest reverence and hu-

and Marsarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 315: "Die Mercurii 15 dicti mensis Septembris flumen Tyberis supra omnem hominum memoriam excrevit totamque Urbem non solum inundavit, sed navigabilem fecit usque adeo ut meis oculis naves in platea S. Petri in Vaticano viderim. Auctus est per 24 horas, scilicet a quinta [i.e., midnight in September] noctis praecedentis usque ad quintam subsequentis. . . ."

"Maximum incommodum atque damnum Urbi intulit tum publice, tum privatim, inter quae duos archus pontis Iulii sive S. Mariae vulgariter nuncupati, qui est ultimus ad radices Capitolii, deiecit, partem pontis Fabricii dirupit ac insulam [Tyberinam] valde laceravit, disiecta fere tota ecclesia S. Bartholomaei una cum eius monasterio. M[on]enia civitatis Leoninae ea parte, qua ex Vaticano in molem Hadriani [i.e., the Castel S. Angelo] secreto itur. . . . multasque domos privatorum misere a fundamentis delevit. . . ."

<sup>150</sup> *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VI-2, no. 1032, pp. 1308-9, and Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 120", letter of the doge and Senate to Navagero in Rome, dated 17 September: "Hoggi circa le XXII hore havemo ricevute le vostre de XII del mese presente et per esse havemo inteso la conclusione della pace tra sua Beatitudine et il serenissimo Re Catholicò. . . ." and cf., *ibid.*, fol. 122".

<sup>151</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 215-19, 293, 423; Brocato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. X, pp. 387-88; and for the official (i.e., public) texts, see Augustin Theiner, *Codex diplomaticus dominii temporalis S. Sedis*, 3 vols., Rome, 1861-62, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1964, III, 539-41; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1557, nos. 14-16; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 438-39. On the secret agreement which Carafa and Alva made at Cave (and which Paul IV accepted on 14 September, 1557) concerning the future of Paliano, see Giulio Coggiola, *Paolo IV e la capitolazione segreta di Cavi (con documenti inediti)*, Pistoia, 1900, who carries his account down to the fall of the Carafeschi in January, 1559, and notes also Fabio Gori, "Papa Paolo IV ed i Carafa," in the *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, I (1875), 236-42.

Coggiola shows, as Pietro Nores (*loc. cit.*) and Cardinal Sforza Pallavicini (in the *Storia del Concilio di Trento* [1656-57], bk. XIV, chap. 4) had already affirmed, that Paul IV was fully informed concerning the "secret capitulation" of Cave, contrary to the view upheld by Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 245 ff., esp. the note on pp. 246-47.

Details of the various political, military, and diplomatic maneuvers during the whole course of Paul IV's war with the Spanish "imperialists" may be followed in the *avvisi* to be found in the *Bibl. Apost. Vaticana*, Cod. Urb. lat. 1038, fols. 158-267, covering the period from September, 1556, to September, 1557, and for the negotiations at Cave and the end of the war see, *ibid.*, fols. 261, 263, 265.

mility," says Massarelli, "asking pardon for the crimes he had committed in the past war against the Apostolic See and his Holiness, offering himself as the most obedient son and servant both of the See and of his Holiness." It was all wormwood and gall to the proud Castilian, but he was doing as his king had ordered him.

"He was lovingly received by his Holiness," Massarelli continues, "like the prodigal son having returned to his father, heard with mercy and given the paternal benediction." Paul then made his erstwhile enemy rise, embraced him, and (according to Navagero) talked with him for nearly half an hour. On the following day (20 September) Paul "published" his peace with Philip II in a secret consistory, and announced the appointment of two legates "ut pacem etiam generalem inter principes Christianos procuraret."

Now that Italy was at peace Paul wanted to bring the blessing also to Flanders and northern France. His choice of cardinal legates was Carlo Carafa to Philip II and Antonio Trivulzio, a pro-French Milanese, to Henry II. On the same day the pope's prisoners were released from the Castello—the imperial ambassador Garcilasso de la Vega; the envoy Pirro dell' Offredo; the postmaster Juan Antonio de Taxis; the nobles Camillo Orsini and Giuliano Cesarini; Ippolito Capilupi, the secretary of Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga; and others. There was a profound feeling of relief, and not only in Rome but throughout Italy.

The duke of Alva left Rome to return to Naples on Wednesday, 22 September (1557). A week later the pope dispatched a nuncio to Naples to take the golden rose to Alva's wife, the Duchess Maria Enriquez. Carlo Carafa received the legate cross in a secret consistory (on 6 October), and left Rome for the court of Philip II (on 22 October), accompanied by his brother Antonio, "cardinalis legatus pro pace, et alter scoticus itineris." Trivulzio, returning hastily from Venice (where he had been serving first as nuncio and then apparently as legate), had also received the cross, and set out for the French court ten days or so before Carafa. High hopes went with the legates.<sup>152</sup> They achieved nothing. Carafa's efforts at

the Hapsburg court in Brussels were to prove especially disappointing.

Paul IV had accepted peace reluctantly, almost making the worst of a good bargain. Actually the Spanish terms had been generous. Paul was fortunate. On 19 November (1557), however, he wrote Henry II that he had been "forced to make peace with Philip," encouraged thereto both by Henry himself and by François de Guise, since the French could not send the Holy See the help which Henry had wanted to send and which the peril had required. Paul had, therefore, not made the peace he wanted, but that which adverse circumstance had dictated. Now Paul wished to see Henry and Philip at peace, to achieve which end *pro pastoralis officio nostro* he was sending two cardinals as legates of *latere* to Henry and to Philip, "qui de concordia et pace inter vos agant," trusting in the Almighty that the fact of peace would come of the desire thereof.<sup>153</sup>

To the end of his days Paul remained, on the whole, pro-French and anti-Hapsburg. His mind, however, wavered with the winds of chance, and as he turned against Ferdinand, king of the Romans (and now becoming emperor), he found warm words of praise for Philip, "as great a King as any other that ever reigned in Christendom, and

Brussels on 12 December (1557), and left in mid-March. Massarelli, *op. cit.*, p. 322, recorded Carafa's return on 23 April (1558); on the futile mission, see Coggiola, *Paolo IV e la capitolazione segreta di Cavi* (1900), pp. 39-103, and *cf.* Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 470-73.

After the death of Bona Sforza (in November, 1557) Carafa was trying to get the duchy of Bari for his brother Giovanni, to which the duke of Alva objected. Philip II would not go beyond a grant of Rossano to Giovanni, which the Carafeschi regarded as quite inadequate. *Cf.* in general Bromato, *op. cit.*, II, bks. IX-X, pp. 358-59, 397 ff., 425-30.

<sup>152</sup> As Paul IV wrote Henry II, ". . . Scis enim, charissime fili, superioribus diebus coactos nos fuisse pacem facere cum Philippo, Hispaniarum rege Catholico, etiam hortatu Serenitatis tuae et dilecti filii nobilissimi Francisci, ducis Guisidae, auxiliolorum tuorum praefecti, cum opem nobis ferre non posses, sicuti quidem ipse voluisses, quantum rerum nostrorum et Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae eo tempore periculi magnitudinem postulabat. Itaque fecimus eam [pacem], non quibus conditionibus voluissimus, sed quibus eo rerum statu licuit. Eo autem consilio bellum omisimus ut, cum neutri vestrum adversus alterum foredere ac societate iuncti essemus, pacem inter vos quidem pro pastoralis officio nostro conciliare possemus. Quod quidem consilium nostrum Christianae reipublicae salutare exequi cupientes, misimus duos ex venerabilibus fratribus nostris, Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae cardinales, nostros de latere legatos, qui de concordia et pace inter vos agant, confisi Dei omnipotentis auxilio rem ex contenta procuraram . . ." (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fols. 101-102, by mod. stamped enumeration, and *cf.* Paul's letter of 14 November to Ferdinand, king of the Romans, *ibid.*, fols. 107-108\*).

<sup>153</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 315-18; *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, nos. 1039, 1041-45, pp. 1318-20, 1323-28; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. x, pp. 394-96; Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 125\*, 129\*-130\*, docs. dated 16 October and 20 November, 1557, on the legations of Carafa and Trivulzio, and note, *ibid.*, fol. 132\*.

Carafa was absent from Rome for six months; he arrived in

. . . he will soon be even greater!"<sup>134</sup> They were a shifty lot, the Carafeschi. The Venetian ambassador to Philip's court, Michiel Surian, wrote from Brussels (on 14 January, 1558), "The general opinion here is that Cardinal Caraffa has not the peace so much at heart, but is thinking about his own private matters."<sup>135</sup>

The new French ambassador in Rome, Philibert Babou, bishop of Angoulême (and later cardinal), wrote Henry II on 11 June, 1558, of a recent audience with Paul IV, who told him of the assurance he felt in the French king's friendship, "which he knew well that it was not within the power of living man to alter or diminish." Paul's own affection for Henry was so great that no one, not even the king himself, could change it, desiring (as he did) "vostre grandeur et la prospérité de vos affaires." The French misfortune at S. Quentin had brought Paul incredible anguish and grief, for otherwise he would have abandoned Rome and gone to Avignon, "et essayé toute autre fortune que de condescendre jamais à un tel accord que celuy qu' il fist." But for Henry's own need of the duke of Guise and the French army Paul would never have succumbed to "la loi de l' enemy." Henry had not, however, fallen below the level of his predecessors, who had always been the "conservateurs et defenseurs de ce Saint Siège, comme au contraire que le Roy Philippe tenoit de race de le vouloir ruiner et confondre entièrement."

Paul also told Babou that both Charles V's resignation of the imperial title and Ferdinand's election thereto were "toutes deux nulles," the election having been celebrated not only by heretics but even by heresiarchs, i.e., Lutherans. Ferdinand's son Maximilian, king of Bohemia, was a factor of heretics. Ferdinand's ambassador [Martin Guzman] had come to Rome at night [on 12-13 May, 1558]; he could go back to Ferdinand at night; the pope would not see him. From the heretics Paul passed on, in the audience with Babou, to the infidels, for the advent of a Turkish army or armada, *l'armée turquesque*, could be a grave danger to Christendom.

The Turks claimed to be Henry's friends, but one could put no faith in the infidels. They pillaged and plundered wherever they landed on Christian soil, carrying off souls, even little children, to perdition. There was always the danger

that they might seize and hold some fortified town [as they had Otranto in 1480-1481], which would indeed be a disaster. Babou in response laid the blame for the unrest in Europe upon Charles V and Philip II. Henry had been prepared to submit his differences with the Hapsburgs to the pope himself; if they had been willing to do likewise, a settlement might have been achieved without recourse to arms.

Charles V had, however, tried to oppress and to make subject to his authority all the princes and states of Europe, and his son was following "l' exemple et les vestiges de son père." The pope had just witnessed the injustice of the son in the latter's attack upon the Holy See. Anyhow he could rest assured that Henry was managing his affairs so prudently that the Turks would not land on Christian soil as a result of any move made or any measure taken by the French. The audience and Babou's letter closed with Paul's finding in Philip "quelque bon naturel," and making a plea for peace.<sup>136</sup>

Be all this as it might, only a few months before Babou's letter to Henry II, as acute an observer as Cardinal Pietro Bertano believed that the pope was praising Philip II to the skies (as we have noted) because he was planning to break with France, and perhaps to plunge Italy and the Holy See into another ruinous war, this time with France! All this led Bertano to comment on the naval preparations which Sultan Suleiman was said to be making for yet another Turkish venture westward.

Bertano feared, as Navagero wrote the Capi of the Council of Ten on 15 January, 1558, that

the Lord God will prosper him [Suleiman] for our sins, and that the Papal States will run very great danger, should the Pope break with the French, because their fleet will join the Turkish one, and they knowing, as they do, the necessities of our fortresses and in what condition they are, most especially Civitavecchia, which they garrisoned for so long a while, making those bastions, we should soon be deprived by them of some important place. . . .

Cardinal Bertano had even more to say,

<sup>134</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3 (1883), nos. 1144-45, pp. 1428-30, letters of Navagero to Venice, dated 15 January, 1558.

<sup>135</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3, no. 1140, p. 1425.

<sup>136</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 744-47. Philibert Babou de la Bourdaisière had replaced Odet de Selve as the French resident ambassador in Rome in mid-May, 1558. At this time France was indifferently, even weakly, represented at the Curia Romana. Cardinal François de Tournon had withdrawn from Rome; Georges d' Armagnac had returned to France; poor, old Jean du Bellay carried no weight, and sought solace in the bottle (Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, II [1914], 195-99).



I will never counsel King Philip to make the Pope break with France, because such a rupture could not yield him any profit, his Holiness not having the means to give his Catholic Majesty either money, victuals, troops, or ammunition. It suffices King Philip to have the Pope for his friend, as also to give him repute and, moreover, to obtain some favour in his own territories, and facility for raising money there; but should the King intend otherwise, he will never have my vote, as I am not so much his servant as to forget that I am a Christian, an Italian, and a Cardinal. I will not witness the ruin of this See through its losing France. Pacheco is a Spaniard, and has little love for Rome. I do not know what he is negotiating. . . .<sup>137</sup>

Pacheco had been spending long hours with Paul IV, as we have seen, but one may well doubt that either he or the pope wanted a renewal of strife in Italy. The war in the peninsula had lasted an entire year, from September to September (1556–1557), impoverishing and degrading the Holy See and making Paul a fit subject for the psycho-historian. The war in northern France and Flanders was still going on, however, and Cardinal Carafa was still fishing in troubled waters. Once more the Turks were emerging as a danger on the Italian horizon. Paul said he was about to make provision for the defense of Civitavecchia and Ancona, but it was unclear what he thought he could accomplish "without money, without troops, without ammunition, and without bread." In Naples and Sicily the so-called imperialists were putting their defenses in order against possible Turkish attacks.<sup>138</sup>

On 7–8 January, 1558, Philip II's wife and ally, Mary of England, lost Calais to the French, after a week's siege and bombardment of the sparsely-defended town. Both Paul IV and Giovanni Carafa, who was beginning to waver in his Hapsburg preference, expressed pleasure in the French victory—François de Guise's victory—as helping to reassert a balance of power after the recent successes of Philip's forces.<sup>139</sup> The evenly matched

and equally exhausted powers would presumably have to come to terms, and so they did, but it was still to require many long months of warfare and pillage. Peace of some sort seemed inevitable, however, when on 13 July (1558) Paul de Termes, marshal of France, was defeated and captured by Lamoral, count of Egmont, by the seashore near Gravelines at the mouth of the river Aa, a dozen miles east of Calais. A decade later Egmont was to pay with his head for his service to Spain, but the encounter at Gravelines was as decisive as that at S. Quentin.<sup>140</sup> Unless the Turks were prepared to render substantial financial or naval aid to Henry II, the French would have to drop out of the exhausting, decades-long contest with Spain.

Toward the end of the year 1556 Jean de la Vigne had been sent to the Porte as Henry II's ambassador to seek Turkish aid against Alva's Spanish troops. Henry was trying to press forward with the war in Italy, while maintaining his defenses along the borderlands of Flanders, Artois, and Picardy. Philip II was apparently letting Alva worry about the war in Italy while he sought to break Henry's northern defenses. If the French were to get anywhere in the peninsular war, it seemed pretty clear that they were going to require some help from the Turks.

Henry II's instructions to the Sieur de la Vigne are dated 13 November, 1556.<sup>141</sup> French representation at the Porte had lapsed of late, and de la Vigne was being sent partly at the behest of Cardinal Carlo Carafa. Later on, assertions at the latter's trial were untruly made to the effect that Paul IV knew nothing of this Christian approach to the Porte.<sup>142</sup>

Traveling eastward from Spalato, delayed by huge snowstorms and fearful of the ubiquitous banditry, de la Vigne arrived on 5 February (1557) at Adrianople (Edirne). He was annoyed that Michel de Codignac, d' Aramon's successor as the French ambassador to the Turks, was not there to meet him. Having absented himself from the Turkish court for a while, Codignac seemed to have neither an agent nor a dragoman available

<sup>137</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3, no. 1145, pp. 1429–31. As Bertano had stated, the French had built the extensive fortifications at Civitavecchia for the pope (cf. *ibid.*, no. 1148, p. 1434).

<sup>138</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3, no. 1148, pp. 1434–35, letter of Navagero to Venice, dated 22 January, 1558.

<sup>139</sup> On the French recovery of Calais (after more than two centuries of English occupation), see *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3, nos. 1129–31, 1133, 1137–39, 1142, 1146–48, 1153, pp. 1415 ff., Giovanni Carafa's view being given, *ibid.*, p. 1436, and the pope's on p. 1439. Cf. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 722–23, 725, and René Anceel, "La Nouvelle de la prise de Calais à Rome," *Annales de Saint Louis des Français*, IX-3 (1905), 247–66, esp. pp. 261 ff.

<sup>140</sup> On the French defeat at Gravelines, note *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3, nos. 1250–52, 1254, pp. 1517 ff., letters of Surian to Venice, dated at Brussels and La Ferté-Milon from 14 to 19 July, 1558.

<sup>141</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II (1666), 659–63.

<sup>142</sup> *Processo de Caraffi, seu delicta super quibus processatus fuit illustrissimus et reverendissimus D. Cardinalis Carolus Caraffa*, ed. L. Scarabelli, in Noreas's *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. XLIV, pp. 483, 501–2, 505.

in Adrianople. Nevertheless, de la Vigne managed to get along, and on 8 February he could write Dominique Dugabre, bishop of Lodève and Henry II's ambassador in Venice, that "next Sunday, the fourteenth of the present month, I hope to kiss the hand of the Grand Seigneur and to have the answer to my proposals, as the pasha has promised me today. . . ."

De la Vigne had summoned Codignac, whom he was succeeding at the Porte, so as to send back with him to the French the decision of the Turks, "which I pray God to be such as His Majesty desires and his service requires." As for other news of importance, de la Vigne noted that John Sigismund, *le petit roy de l' Hongrie*, had undoubtedly been reinstated "in his kingdom of Transylvania," and that "the sultana, her daughter (who is the wife of Rustem Pasha), and the said Rustem are in control of everything."<sup>143</sup>

Codignac soon joined the testy de la Vigne at Adrianople, where the truce of Vaucelles (of 5 February, 1556) had long since been confirmed,

<sup>143</sup> E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, II (1850, repr. 1965), 374-77, de la Vigne's letter to the bishop of Lodève. Gabriel de Luetz, baron d' Aramon, had preceded Codignac as Henry II's ambassador to the Porte. Codignac had followed Sultan Suleiman on the recent expedition against Persia, and had sailed westward with the sultan's fleet in 1555 when the Turks had attacked Piombino, Elba, and Corsica (*ibid.*, II, 285, 299 ff., 310, 318, 329 ff., 351 ff.).

Preparing to return to France, Codignac had of late had a hard time as French ambassador at the Porte, where in earlier years he had assisted d' Aramon. He was being subjected to a great deal of criticism in Turkey as well as in France, partly because of his marriage to the heiress of one of the Latin principalities in the Aegean. He had been avoiding the Turkish court for the past four months or so because of Rustem Pasha's anger at the French for their failure to pay debts they had contracted at the Porte, ". . . et aussi que le pauvre homme [Codignac] n' avait pas un sol pour pouvoir suivre" (Charrière, II, 385).

Although de la Vigne later became one of Codignac's chief enemies, he was defending him at this time (as in a letter to Henry II, dated at Adrianople on 22 April, 1557): the sultan had found Codignac "plus agréable de tous ses prédécesseurs," and he had been a "bon serviteur de votre Majesté" (*ibid.*, II, 382-83, note). By 2 March, 1558, however, de la Vigne had changed his mind (or been otherwise informed), for Codignac was now said to want not to return to France and to be "en la disgrâce dudit Grand Seigneur et dudit Rustan-Bassa" (*ibid.*, p. 451, note).

In any event Codignac passed through Venice in late July, 1558 (supposedly on his way back to France), as de la Vigne was informed from Venice on 13 August (*ibid.*, pp. 494-95), allegedly leaving debts behind him in Istanbul (*ibid.*, pp. 460-61, note). Codignac, however, almost immediately entered the service of Philip II (*ibid.*, pp. 533-38, 553-56, 558, 560 ff.), earning thereby the hatred of his countrymen.

and was still rankling the Turks.<sup>144</sup> Early in their association de la Vigne joined Codignac in the latter's final efforts to explain the truce away. It was hard going. Rustem Pasha was not an easy man to deal with, but as time went on he was to find that he had met his match in the blunt and overbearing de la Vigne.

Early in the new ambassador's mission to Adrianople, Rustem Pasha had told him all the things being said about the chief actors in the western drama—Henry II, Paul IV, and Philip II—"which only tended to dissuade the Grand Seigneur from lending the support of his fleet [to the French]." The pope, declared Rustem, was a tyrant and a fool (and certainly a Turk in Suleiman's day knew a tyrant when he saw one). Philip was quite right in going to war to defend his vassal, in which context Rustem was presumably referring to Marc' Antonio Colonna who, however, was a papal vassal for the disputed fief of Paliano (as Philip was for the kingdom of Naples). Nevertheless, Rustem went on to observe that it would be ill-advised, even dangerous, to give assistance to so powerful a prince as the king of France, who might later make war on the Turks themselves. Henry could be a worse menace than Charles V had been, for he was young, the valiant ruler of a warlike people. No, it was better to let the Christians in the West exhaust themselves in their own internecine strife.

De la Vigne took up the cudgels. All the nonsense being bruited about at the Turkish court—and Rustem Pasha's repetition of it—was merely born of the envy and resentment which Suleiman's friendship for Henry II caused in some quarters. Then de la Vigne bore down upon Rustem. If the Turkish fleet did not assist the French during the summer of 1557, it would be so much the worse for the sultan's affairs. De la Vigne kept after Rustem for days, as he wrote Dominique Dugabre (on 1 April, 1557), until he had made him "easier to handle" (*plus maniable*), and the vizir promised to take up again with the sultan the matter of helping the French. De la Vigne began to hope for the best.<sup>145</sup>

The French government had not kept Codignac well informed as to its plans. A year had elapsed

<sup>144</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 378, 380, a letter of Codignac to the bishop of Lodève in Venice, dated at Adrianople on 15 March, 1557, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, II, 383 ff.

<sup>145</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 383-89, esp. 386-87, a letter of de la Vigne to Dugabre, bishop of Lodève (in Venice), dated at Adrianople on 1 April, 1557: ". . . c' est à sçavoir que le pape estoit un tyran et un fol, et que justement Philippe luy faisoit la guerre pour defendre son vassal. . . ."

after the truce of Vaucelles before the army under François de Guise was ready to move from Piedmont into Italy. Despite reports and rumors the French ambassador at the Porte could not be sure whether in fact Henry II was eventually going to abide by the truce or to resume the war with Philip II. This lack of certainty lasted into March (1557), as shown by the letter which Jean de la Vigne sent Dominique Dugabre from Adrianople on 1 April.<sup>146</sup>

When Dugabre had finally written de la Vigne from Venice, however, "que Monseigneur de Guise estoit bien avant en Italie," de la Vigne addressed a most informative letter to Henry on 21 April. He had just explained in writing to Sultan Suleiman and by word of mouth to Rustem Pasha that, if Henry had so wished, he might in all honor have enjoyed the peace which the truce of Vaucelles had assured him.

Henry had been most disturbed, however, by the displeasure which the truce had caused the sultan. He had also come to realize that the pope was in danger of losing Rome and all the papal states, as Spanish power became ever greater in the Italian peninsula. Without waiting for word from the sultan, therefore, Henry had broken the truce. He was thus at war with Philip II, confident that his Turkish friend would not fail to help him in such a time of crisis for, after all, in this war with Spain Henry and his forces were fighting for the security of Turkish possessions no less than for their own well-being and that of the Holy See.

Henry's movements against the Hapsburgs had been of large assistance to the sultan when the latter was in Persia, and when at other times he had gone into Hungary. His Majesty had always refused to join a Christian "assemblée" against the Turks, and now he had gone to war more for the advantage of his friends and allies than for his own. De la Vigne's entreaty that the Grand Seigneur should send the Ottoman "armée de mer" into Italian waters was refused, whereupon he asked for twenty-five galleys, which along with the corsairs and a French fleet of forty galleys would give Henry "une petite armée" sufficient to be of some use against the Spanish. With this force, as de la Vigne said, the French could protect the African coast and the Turkish ports in the Archipelago. The grand vizir refused this also, "saying that for this year the Grand Seigneur is neither willing nor

able to put more than forty galleys to sea to guard his lands."

De la Vigne had done his best. From the time of his arrival at the court to the time he was now writing his Majesty he had argued and pleaded with Rustem Pasha twenty-five times. As de la Vigne could see, however, the sultan had been deeply offended by Henry's seeking naval assistance of the Turks and then subscribing to the truce of Vaucelles without even bothering to inform the Porte. Furthermore, Henry had failed to reply to four or five letters which Suleiman had sent him. The sultan felt slighted, even disdained (*et qu' il se pense estre dédaigné de vous*), and de la Vigne had appeared at the Porte without bringing the sultan a present, "comme ont accoustumé tous les nouveaux ambassadeurs." Well, that was that. There was no changing the sultan's mind, "car il est barbarement opiniastre, comme sont commencement tous les ignorans."

In the ambassador's opinion it was going henceforth to be much more difficult to get anything worthwhile from Suleiman, who was now sixty-nine years old [he was probably about sixty-one] and riddled with gout. His illness made him suspicious and apprehensive of his ministers. The sultans lived in perennial fear of enemies, of their sons as well as of their slaves. The grand vizir Rustem Pasha, his wife, and his mother [i.e., his mother-in-law Khâşşeki Khurram, known as Roxelana] lived with the worrisome thought that the sultan might die elsewhere than at Istanbul, for they wanted a Grand Seigneur of their own choice. Members of the inner circle at the Porte were trying in all ways to maintain peace with Hungary and with other states, so that the sultan would not feel constrained to take the field in person for without him, as they knew, no military venture proved worthwhile. They would prefer that Henry II make peace, but in any event he must get along without the Turkish armada (*armée*), "qu' ils estiment la plus grande force qu' ils ayent." Their great concern was that they might lose the armada if the sultan should die while it was at sea. Also for a year or so they had become more concerned about Henry's growing power than they ever had been about Charles V's military strength:

Seeing you thus prosper and always victorious, they are also afraid that in giving you the help of their armada, you might easily make yourself the master of Italy, and you would be too close a neighbor. This they would not want at all, for their prophecies and books tell them of nothing else except their certain ruin when the lands of France border upon their own frontiers.

<sup>146</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 383-84, 387.

You must believe, Sire, that they do not love you, nor will they ever love you except for their own profit.

There is a waspish quality to de la Vigne's letter. At the time he wrote he seemed not only to have failed in his mission to get Turkish aid for Henry II, but to have involved the French government in a petty hassle with Venice. Ever since Antonio Barbarigo had gone to Istanbul as baillie, the preceding fall, no startling news had come from the Porte. Turkish affairs appear not to have loomed very large in meetings of the Collegio and the Senate. In mid-March (1557), however, the doge and Senate had warned Giacomo Soranzo, their ambassador at Henry's court, that the French ambassador at the Turkish court [apparently de la Vigne rather than Codignac] had taken the baillie to task for informing Rustem Pasha that the pope had made peace with Philip II, whereas he had merely reported that on 28 November, 1556, Cardinal Carafa and the duke of Alva had extended the ten days' truce into one of forty days. Nevertheless, the baillie would never make any communication to the Porte without orders from the Senate, "and we gave him no order to communicate that which was not true."<sup>148</sup>

The French ambassador in Venice, Dominique Dubagre, bishop of Lodève, said that he had re-

ceived no word of this matter, which was quite disturbing to the Senate. He would, however, write both to Henry II and to his confrère at the Porte, who persisted in charging the baillie with this breach of diplomatic etiquette.<sup>149</sup> We shall return to M. de la Vigne presently, for as the summer approached, and as he managed to mollify the sultan, his mission took a marked turn for the better, at least from the French standpoint if not from that of Christendom at large.

Although squabbles such as that involving Barbarigo were unsettling (for one could never be sure of their consequences), the Senate found the report of his predecessor Antonio Erizzo most reassuring when he returned from the difficult post of baillie in Istanbul. There had been, to be sure, and there still was some trouble between the Republic's subjects in the district of Sebenico (Šibenik) and those of the Porte in the same area. The sanjakbey of Clissa (Klis), whose hilltop stronghold commanded the inland road from Venetian-held Spalato (Split), was apparently disposed to deal with the issues amicably, having been so instructed by the sultan or the pashas in Istanbul. On 9 April (1557), therefore, the Senate had decided to send their faithful notary of the Chancery, Marc' Antonio Donino, who had served Erizzo as secretary at the Porte, to the sanjakbey to settle matters. Donino was to be accompanied by one Cristoforo de Nassi, an interpreter, and was to receive two ducats a day for the expenses of his mission.<sup>150</sup>

The Senate followed Donino's activities with more than passing attention, for Malkos Beg, the sanjakbey of Clissa, was said to be unwilling to abide by the commitment he had made to Erizzo as to certain landed properties or villages in the

<sup>147</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 685-87, "d' Andrinopoli 21 Avril, 1556," but of course the letter belongs to the year 1557. According to Ribier's introductory summary of this letter, de la Vigne also wrote Henry II "qu'il est besoin que les Papes ayent quelque'un à la Porte pour les défendre contre ceux qui taschent de les rendre odieux aux Turcs, et d'exciter guerre contr'eux," but no statement to this effect appears in the published text of the letter. De la Vigne, who sent off some lively letters from the Turkish court (see Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 383 ff., 411, 452 ff.), had trouble with almost everyone in sight, including Antonio Erizzo, the Venetian baillie at the Porte (*Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 858, pp. 1011-14).

When in June (1557) the Venetian ambassador Giacomo Soranzo gave Henry II recent news from the Porte, the king remarked "that Sultan Soliman was now reduced to such a state by age and infirmities that he could not live long, and that on his death there would be no lack of . . . dissension amongst his sons." There was "much conversation on this topic," after which the talk turned to the duke of Guise and the French army in Italy (*Cal. State Papers*, . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 942, p. 1176).

At Carlo Carafa's trial the fact was brought out that "il Turco è vecchio, e se morisse, Iddio sa se ci è il successore, e se sarà amico di sua Maestà Christianissima" (*Processo de' Caraffi*, ed. cit., p. 504, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 487, 502) i.e., in view of the possibility of Suleiman's death, the sooner one got aid from the Turks, the better.

<sup>148</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fols. 74<sup>v</sup>-75<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 18 March, 1557, and note, *ibid.*, fol. 77<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 77<sup>v</sup>-78<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 31 March, 1557. As for poor Barbarigo, who doubtless found the whole affair most embarrassing, "esso baylo ne affirma non haver nè detto nè mai pensato de dire."

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 84<sup>v</sup>, and cf. fols. 93<sup>v</sup>, 94<sup>r</sup>, 96<sup>v</sup>-97<sup>r</sup>, 105. Summaries of the reports (*relazioni*) of Antonio Erizzo and of his successor Antonio Barbarigo, which were presented to the Senate in 1557 and in 1558, may be found in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Le Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, . . . , ser. III, vol. III (Florence, 1855), pp. 123-60.

Barbarigo states that in 1558 Sultan Suleiman was sixty-six years of age, and (like de la Vigne) believes that in his old age Suleiman had come much to prefer peace to war: ". . . e se bene essendo giovine fu bellicoso ed amator di guerra, si comprende però che ora, che è vecchio, desidera la pace con ogni principe, nè mai romperà guerra ad alcuno se non sforzato o da quelli con chi guerreggia o da false persuasioni de' suoi ministri" (*ibid.*, p. 148). On Marc' Antonio Donino (or Donini), see, *ibid.*, p. 174.

area of Sebenico.<sup>151</sup> The sanjakbey was, however, quite co-operative later on, when it came to the mills and lands which Rustem Pasha possessed on the borders of Spalato in the region of his own fortress town of Clissa. Indeed, Malkos had told a Venetian emissary

that when we [the Venetians] wish, he will make an offer to the magnificent Rustem Pasha—inasmuch as the Moslems are continually complaining of having to pay his Magnificence too large a rent for the mills and lands which he owns on those borders—and advise him to give them to the Spalatini, from whom he would draw a larger profit. Having given due consideration to what he has had to say, and deeming it likely that if those faithful subjects of ours [in Spalato] . . . should take over by rent or lease these mills and lands, it would put an end to the many disputes which take place every day along those borders, [we are agreed to the proposal].<sup>152</sup>

The Senate, therefore, cautiously set about seeing whether the Spalatini might not rent or lease Rustem Pasha's mills to his greater profit and to their own. (Rustem was notorious for his interest in profit.) The rental or leasehold should be for as long as possible, and at least for two or three years. Negotiations should be conducted in the names of two or three appropriate Spalatini on the basis of an annual payment of fifty to sixty thousand aspers at the most. Neither Venice nor the local administration of Spalato should be directly mentioned in the instruments of rental or leasehold.

The Venetian count of Spalato could promise, however, that the baillie in Istanbul would see to it that the payments were properly made to Rustem Pasha. Suitable bribes would be dangled before the Turkish officials involved so that the final agreement might assure "our faithful subjects"

<sup>151</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 105, letter of the Senate to Domino, dated 10 July, 1557: "Havemo inteso . . . che il magnifico sanzecco di Clissa non vuole far l'arz [a Turkish word meaning 'offer'] delle ville di Sibenco in quel modo che sua Magnificencia promise al dilettissimo nobel nostro Antonio Erizzo ritornato ultimamente baillo da Constantinopoli, la qual cosa essendone summamente dispiaciuta. . . ." The sanjakbey of Clissa was Malkos Beg, who later became sanjakbey of Bosnia (*ibid.*, fols. 141', 142').

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 141' (and cf. fol. 142'). Malkos Beg being quoted as saying "che quando noi voremo, farà arz al magnifico Rustem Bassa, chè mussulmani continuamente si dogliono di convenir pagar alla Magnificencia sua troppo affitto per li molini et terreni ch'ella possede a quelli confini, consigliandola a darli a Spalatini, dalli quali ne traria maggior utile, sopra le quali parole havendo noi havuta quella consideratione che si deve, et giudicando che se quelli fidelissimi nostri . . . tolleresso ad affitto overa a livello essi molini et terreni, se metteria fine alle molte differentie che ogni giorno succedono a quelli confini. . . ."

the safe tenure and quiet operation of the mills without further disturbance during the period called for by the instruments of rental or leasehold.<sup>153</sup> The matter dragged on for some time. Apparently the Spalatini never did rent or lease the mills and lands, for a year later the doge and Senate informed the count of Spalato that Rustem had declined the Venetian proposal.<sup>154</sup>

Presumably Rustem had not seen profit enough in the rental or lease of the mills and lands in question. Since the merchants of Venice usually paid their bills on time, they found it necessary to exercise caution in the extent of the obligations they incurred. The French nobles who went to Istanbul as ambassadors were less prudent. Antoine des Escalins, also known as Captain Polin and more recently as the baron de la Garde, had succeeded the well-known Spanish expatriate Antonio Rincón as the French representative at the Porte. De la Garde had borrowed 10,000 *écus* from Rustem Pasha, promising to pay him 5,000 *écus*' interest on the loan, which was still unpaid when Jean de la Vigne had arrived at the Turkish court. Wisely or unwisely, de la Vigne assured Rustem that the 5,000 *écus*' interest would now be paid "in French cloth which he loves exceedingly," and that he would receive an extra 5,000 *écus*, "que . . . je luy ay promis affin de tenir la main à disposer ce Grand Seigneur à nous donner l'armée."<sup>155</sup>

Although corsairs beset the Adriatic as well as the Mediterranean, there were no large-scale armaments at sea. Some months before this, however, when Malkos Beg was going back on his commitment to Erizzo, a Turkish armada had appeared quite suddenly on the eastern horizon. De la Vigne's letters sketch the background of events. Sultan Suleiman had apparently been ill. As soon as he had recovered sufficiently to ride a horse, he had returned to Istanbul with great pomp (on 3 June, 1557), "faysant la meilleure mine et le meilleur visage qu' il pouvoit." He was putting the

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fols. 141–44, docs. dated 29 February, 1558 (Ven. style 1557).

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 71, fol. 96' [114'], doc. dated 20 May, 1559: "Dal baylo nostro in Constantinopoli n'è stato scritto che havendo in execution delli ordini nostri rechioito il magnifico signor Rustem Bassa à dar in livello overo in affitto li sui molini et terreni che ha de li a quelli fidelissimi nostri, sua Magnificencia non l'ha voluto far. . . ."

<sup>155</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 387, a letter of de la Vigne to Dugabre, dated at Adrianople on 1 April, 1557. Six weeks later (on 15 May) 12,000 *écus* were still owing on the loan to de la Garde (*ibid.*, II, 392).

best face on his every move, as de la Vigne wrote Dugabre from the Turkish capital (on 8 June), so that the janissaries and all his enemies might understand they were not about to achieve their wishes. On the very day that he had taken the road from Adrianople to the Bosphorus he had ordered, in a sudden "fury," that another twenty-five galleys be sent out to join the forty which had already sailed "pour la garde de l'Archipelago." The command was considered as odd as it was peremptory.

De la Vigne thought it likely that Suleiman was taking a leaf from Louis XI's book, for when Louis was ill and believed himself at death's door, he used to send out presents "par tout le monde." Suleiman's theatrical gesture was designed, in de la Vigne's opinion, "faire entendre qu'il est fort sain et prospère." There were some who said that the enlarged armada would not go beyond Prevesa. Others considered it probable that there might be a landing in Apulia. In any event de la Vigne was spreading word abroad that the whole business had been undertaken at his request. Suleiman was rendering assistance to the king of France.

As usual, however, the French court was missive in dealing with the Turks. The sultan's letters to the king had gone unanswered. De la Vigne had had no news or instructions from the court for six months. Rustem Pasha was offended, and reminded de la Vigne of the Turkish proverb to the effect that one who had no money in his purse should keep honey in his mouth, ". . . le proverbe de leur país dict que qui n' a argent à la bourse, doit avoir du miel à la bouche."<sup>156</sup>

De la Vigne's report from Istanbul is borne out by the Venetian sources. On 5 July (1557) the doge and Senate notified the provveditore of their fleet that letters from the bailie Antonio Barbarigo (of 8 June) had stated that more than forty galleys had already sailed from Istanbul. According to Barbarigo, the pashas had decided to arm another

twenty-five galleys as soon as possible, and the captain-general of the armada would sail with these to join the forty already at sea. The Senate understood that Barbarigo had promptly notified the provveditore as well as the colonial governments of Corfu and Candia. With the usual exhortations to exercise prudence and to have regard for the reputation of the Republic, the Senate directed the provveditore to sail north from Corfu, leaving behind one or more "frigates" (*frigate*) to bring word from time to time of the Turkish operations.

The ship *Contarina* would be sailing from Venice shortly. The Senate would put aboard two hundred infantry to strengthen the garrison at Corfu, where (the Senate finally decided) the provveditore was also to leave three galleys.<sup>157</sup> Under such conditions one moved galleys and *fuste*, money and munitions from one place to another to assure defense and communication. One usually sought to do things quietly, inconspicuously, so as not to make it appear there was any suspicion that the Turks might conceivably break the peace. But it was well to be prepared—with money as well as with honey.

The Turkish armada sailed past Modon early in September, 1557,<sup>158</sup> but Venice had nothing to fear from its uneventful course. The following January and February (1558), however, dispatches from Adrianople brought disturbing news of "la preparation che fa quest' anno il Signor Turco di grossa armata," possibly in fulfillment of the assurance of help which Suleiman had finally given Henry II through de la Vigne. Large Turkish armadas always produced jitters in the doges' palace and on the Rialto. The Senate instructed their ambassador Navagero in Rome to ask Paul IV "to concede to us two tithes for the present year to be collected from all the reverend clergy of our state."<sup>159</sup>

If in the diplomacy of the time an ambassador was sometimes an "honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country," it could also be useful to send abroad a battler who would call a spade a spade. Jean de la Vigne was such a battler. Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Ferdinand's ambassador to

<sup>156</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 394–97. Despite de la Vigne's complaint, Henry II did write him at length from Compiègne on 24 June, 1557 (*ibid.*, II, 398–404), dwelling on the common interests and the common enemies of France and Turkey, which required the co-operation of king and sultan: France needed the Turkish armada in Italian waters, but Henry's friendship was an advantage, not a burden, to the Turks. The French had done their part, at sea as well as on land.

François de Noailles, bishop of Dax (formerly D'Acqs, in the far southwest of France), replaced Dominique Dugabre as the French ambassador in Venice toward the end of the summer of 1557. In 1801 the bishopric of Dax was joined with that of Aire-sur-l'Adour, which also ceased to be an episcopal see in 1933.

<sup>157</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 70, fol. 104. The *Contarina* was carrying gifts of clothing and other things for presentation to the captain of the Turkish armada (fol. 106).

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 123', doc. dated 29 September, 1557.  
<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 70, fol. 140. Bernardo Navagero's successor as the Venetian ambassador to the Holy See, Alvise Mocenigo, arrived in Rome on Monday, 14 March, 1558 (*Cal. State Papers . . .*, Venice, VI-3[1884], no. 1197, p. 1471), and took over the Republic's "embassy" shortly thereafter.

the Porte, knew de la Vigne well, and had found him *multis modis mihi molestus*. According to the learned and gentlemanly Busbecq, de la Vigne's freedom of speech was "wild and frightful," *asperae cuiusdam et horridae libertatis*. He saw no need of keeping quiet or dissembling; he gave vent to whatever was on his mind, however offensive it might be to others. Even Rustem Pasha shrank from direct contact with him, although the rest of the court shied away from Rustem because of his own "acerbity of speech."

De la Vigne used to send his dragomans (*interpretes*) to request an audience, and Rustem would try to avoid meeting him: De la Vigne should tell the dragomans what he wanted, and spare himself the trouble, for they could convey his wishes to the grand vizir. But not so. When de la Vigne asked for an audience, he intended to have one. If Rustem tried to put him off, he would barge into the vizir's presence, giving expression to opinions "quae raro sine offensione a Rustano audiebantur!"

Once it happened, says Busbecq, that when de la Vigne was protesting to Rustem Pasha that his master Henry II was not being given due attention or respect, he blurted out what was on his mind in no uncertain terms: "Come now," he asked Rustem,

can it be that you think Buda, Gran, and Stuhlweissenburg as well as the other towns in Hungary were perhaps captured by your martial prowess? Do you really think so? Well, you're mistaken! You have these places because of us. Had it not been for the dissension and unending war between our kings and those of Spain, so far would you have been from being able to take possession of these places that you would hardly have been safe in Charles V's time even in Constantinople!

It is small wonder that Rustem Pasha "caught fire with anger," *exandescens*, and cried out that if all the Christian princes joined arms against his master, the latter "would not care a whit" (*non flocci faciat*). He would easily crush them all! Thereupon Rustem withdrew into his chamber, ordering de la Vigne to leave at once.<sup>160</sup> However

impolitic de la Vigne's display of annoyance may have been, his statement as to the Turkish conquests in Hungary was not unfounded. Although he had not mentioned the Lutherans, he was of course quite aware that they had been as great an impediment to the Hapsburgs' efforts against the Turks as ever the French had been.

Jean de la Vigne had returned to Paris on 2 September, 1557, as Giacomo Soranzo informed the Venetian government. He had come by order of the sultan, who wanted him to come back to the Porte quickly. De la Vigne reported, as he had already written (on 21 April), that Suleiman had been angered by Henry II's requesting the assistance of the Turkish armada and negotiating the truce of Vaulcelles at the same time.<sup>161</sup> It had taken persistence, but de la Vigne had finally succeeded in mollifying the sultan, who now

consented to offer his most Christian Majesty his very powerful fleet for next year [1558], when he himself in person with an immense army will move towards Hungary on his march to Germany, provided King Henry assures him that he will neither make peace nor a truce with his enemies next year. . . .

Soranzo had not yet been able (as of 3 September) to learn how Henry would answer this proposal, "though I have indeed been told that these present troubles may easily compel him to accept the bargain."<sup>162</sup> Henry's "troubles" had mounted three or four weeks before, when on 10 August the French had been defeated at S. Quentin.<sup>163</sup>

Toward the end of the month (on 27 September) Soranzo wrote the doge and Senate that Suleiman's offer seemed to Henry II's counselors of rather limited advantage to France. A large-scale Turkish attack upon Hungary, "with the intention of entering Germany," would be a blow to Ferdinand, but of course Philip II (unlike his father

which is on the Danube about 25 miles northwest of Buda[pest]. The Latin *Alba Regia* is the German Stuhlweissenburg, Hungarian Székesfehérvár, in west central Hungary about 35 miles southwest of Budapest.

<sup>160</sup> At any rate Henry II had written directly to Suleiman on 8 July, 1555, expressing thanks for the westward departure (on 18 May) of the Turkish armada, which would be joined by at least some French naval forces in Italian waters (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 346 ff.). Henry's letter might not have reached the Porte until October or thereabouts, which would be only a few months before the agreement at Vaulcelles (on 5 February, 1556).

<sup>161</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, V1-2, no. 1014, pp. 1277-78, and cf., *ibid.*, nos. 1035, 1040, 1046.

<sup>162</sup> The French disaster at S. Quentin was known in Istanbul before the middle of October (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 405 ff.). Bad news often traveled fast.

<sup>160</sup> Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 301-3: ". . . Nam quid vos, inquietat [Lavinius], arbitramini Budam, Strigonium, Albam Regiam, ac reliqua Hungariae oppida fortasse vestro Marte capta? Existimatis? sed fallimini. Vos ea per nos habetis. Nam nisi fuissent discordiae et continua bella, quae inter nostros et Hispaniae reges intercesserunt, tantum abfuisset ut illis [locis] potiori poteritis ut per Carolum Quintum vix Constantinopoli tuti futuri fueritis!"

As has been noted several times in the preceding pages, the Latin *Strigonium* is the German Gran, Hungarian Esztergom,

Charles) did not have the responsibility of defending the empire. Besides, Henry had allies in Germany, and these he did not wish to offend or injure. Henry therefore wished his friend Suleiman to embark on an expedition against Naples, i.e., to send the Turkish army to Valona, on the Albanian coast, "and to have it ferried thence by his fleet to the kingdom of Naples."

The French king wanted also to borrow money from the Turks, "as being a loser, he found his kingdom exhausted." Should de la Vigne not be able to convince Suleiman to direct both his army and his armada against Alva and the Spaniards in Naples, "he is to accept what he can get, it being thought that to make Sultan Soliman take the field cannot but prove very advantageous for King Henry, whether he continue the war or negotiate an agreement. . . ."<sup>164</sup>

The adventurous de la Vigne took leave of Henry II at Paris on 26 September (1557), and two days later he was on his way, a long way, to Adrianople to urge Suleiman to attack not only the coasts of the Neapolitan kingdom and Sicily but also those of Spain.<sup>165</sup> Furthermore, he had been instructed to ask for a loan of two million ducats, although the French had not repaid the

Turks for previous commitments to share the costs of the sultan's armada in western waters.<sup>166</sup>

From Istanbul on 24 May (1558) de la Vigne addressed a lengthy letter to Henry, indicating that for one reason or another the Grand Seigneur had only recently made up his mind on the extent to which he would assist the French. De la Vigne could not, therefore, relay the Turks' answer to his Majesty "iusques aujourd' huy." Suleiman would send his armada westward either to co-operate with the French fleet or to operate independently against the Spanish, "comme vous adviserez pour le mieux." The armada would not spend the winter in any French or western port, however, for reasons which the sultan had already made clear in his direct correspondence with Henry.

As for Ferdinand, king of the Romans, the *nouvel empereur*, Suleiman was prepared to offer him peace if by August (1558) he had sent the four years' tribute he had promised, and had surrendered and razed certain places [along the Hungarian-Transylvanian frontier], as demanded by the Turks. (Peace would not be made at this time, however, between Austria and the Porte.) Sulei-

<sup>164</sup> *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VI-2, no. 1047, pp. 1330-31. De la Vigne was supposed to set out on his return journey to Istanbul on 28 September (1557). Cf. *ibid.*, no. 1055, and esp. no. 1065, p. 1346, a letter of Soranzo to Venice, dated 18 October (1557):

"Advices seem to have arrived here [in Poissy] that Sultan Soliman was about to make a fresh agreement with the King of the Romans [Ferdinand], the reason being that he has discovered a plot formed by his younger son [Bayazid] against the life of the elder one [Selim], so that very great enmity had arisen between them, and the Sultan being in ill health, he thinks it for his advantage not to commence a fresh war at a time when, in the event of his death, his sons might revolt one against the other, in which case it is thought here that the embassy of M. de la Vigne will prove fruitless, as the Sultan [will] not [be] sending forth an army, neither will his fleet put to sea."

On the two surviving sons of Suleiman at this time, note Antonio Barbarigo's *Relazione [1558]*, pp. 148-49; on their war with each other, cf. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 780, and Charrière, II, 550-51; 565, note; 569-70, note; 572, note; esp. pp. 574-78, notes, and pp. 596 ff., note, all being extracts from dispatches of de la Vigne.

<sup>165</sup> After making his way to Venice, de la Vigne arrived at Ragusa on 15 November, and wrote François de Noailles, now Henry II's ambassador in Venice, "Je suis arrivé le VI<sup>e</sup> de décembre en ceste ville [Adrianople], aussi sain et délibéré que je fus oncq en ma vie" (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 408, 411, letters dated at Ragusa on 15 November and at Adrianople on 15 December, 1557).

<sup>166</sup> The Venetian bailie Antonio Barbarigo informed the Senate that the French carried less weight at the Porte than was commonly supposed, and described Rustem Pasha's annoyance at de la Vigne's request for a loan of two million ducats: ". . . Sebbene li Francesi si vantano e si presumono di aver molta autorità con Turchi, affermo alle Signorie vostre illustrissime che ne hanno assai meno di quello che si crede, ed io so che quando il re di Francia li mandò a dimandare ad imprevisto due milioni d' oro, li basciò mi disse: 'Guarda, questi vogliono far guerra, e non hanno danari, e mentre non hanno pagato quel che devono dare per la spesa dell' armata, anco ne dimandano due milioni d' oro!' (*Relazione [1558]*, pp. 158-59).

As stated in the preceding note, de la Vigne arrived at the Turkish court, then at Adrianople, on 6 December (1557). He sent an account of his efforts to Henry II on the twenty-eighth: De la Vigne had been told that it was contrary to the Islamic religion to loan money to Christians. He had indeed requested two million ducats: ". . . Sa Hautesse ne vous peut accommoder des deux millions d' or que ce lui ay demandez, ny d' autre moindre somme, pource que iusques icy telle ouverture ne fut jamais faite, et qu' il leur est defendu par leur religion de prester argent aux Chrestiens ou autres ennemis de leur loy. Et que les Ottomans ont plustost accoustumé d' aider et secourir leurs amis et alliez de leurs forces et propres personnes que de leurs finances. . . ."

In Francis I's time his agents Antonio Rincón and Captain Polin, who had also asked for loans, had received the same answer (Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 711 ff.). Polin, alias the baron de la Garde, had borrowed money from Rustem Pasha. After S. Quentin, however, the French need for assistance became greater than ever. On 30 December (1557) Henry wrote Suleiman, requesting money, saltpeter, and 150 galleys [!] (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 421-25). Henry also wanted the Turkish galleys to winter in the West.



man could do no less, wrote de la Vigne, for he had agreed to bring the war with Ferdinand to an end under these conditions, "since you had made the truce [of Vaucelles] with King Philip." If peace with the Austrian Hapsburgs was now to be forthcoming, Suleiman would certainly include Henry in its terms, which would not do the latter much good.<sup>167</sup>

The French envoy tried to bring Henry II up to date on the Ottoman news. Rustem Pasha had been fearfully upset by the recent death [in April] of his wife's mother, the "Sultana" Roxelana. Suleiman would not go far afield this year. In mid-October he might go back to Adrianople. Troops had been sent to the Hungarian frontier, including two or three squadrons of janissaries. De la Vigne was busy trying to create distrust of Ferdinand at the Porte, where Rustem and the pashas (as de la Vigne had already explained) lived with the ceaseless worry about what might follow the death of Suleiman, who was not well. They feared the sultan's sons as well as the Hapsburgs; they feared anyone who might successfully take advantage of their ailing lord. The pashas wanted peace with Ferdinand, which he would not give them if he was wise and well-advised, "car de sa vie il n'aura si bon marché d'eux qu'à présent. . . ."

Most of the pashas, who wanted to live out their lives in peace and grandeur, owed their rise to "Hassaqui," i.e., Khāṣṣeki Khurram (Roxelana), who had favored the younger son Bayazid, and so had earned the hatred of the elder son Selim. If by some happy chance Henry could make a good peace or truce with Philip, he should notify the sultan immediately. If the war in Europe was to continue, de la Vigne would do his best to move the Turks effectively against Philip. Residence at the Porte, however, had certainly not endeared the Turks to de la Vigne, who hoped that peace might be possible, "et que pour l'honneur de nostre Seigneur Jesus-Christ tous les Chrestiens ensemblement voudront entreprendre une si

bonne oeuvre que de chasser cette maudite et infidèle nation de l'Europe!"

With other pieces of advice and caution, and with a special warning as to the trouble ill-informed and partisan dragomans could cause by erroneous or deceptive translations, de la Vigne suggests that Henry make clear to Suleiman the bad faith and disorder which attended his attempts to negotiate at the Porte. Rustem Pasha had assured de la Vigne that he would "chastise" any dragoman who had produced a false translation. De la Vigne asked that Henry send him certain letters signed by one Ibrahim Beg, "because I suspect that the said Ibrahim Beg, in order to conceal his ignorance, has added thereto without the command of his Highness [Suleiman] that you ought henceforth to write in Italian," which language obviously Ibrahim knew better than French. The chastisement of a dragoman or two, in de la Vigne's opinion, would not only improve the quality of translation, an important matter, but make them fearful of selling secrets, a no less important matter.<sup>168</sup>

Less than a month later de la Vigne wrote Henry II (on 18 June, 1558) that the latter must have been informed of the Turks' recent seizure of Ferdinand's fortress town of Tata in northwestern Hungary, "lieu de grandissime importance en Hongrie." Now, obviously, Ferdinand would be in no position to send troops or money to assist Philip II against the French. Rustem Pasha had summoned the envoy to tell him that he must make Henry understand that Suleiman had broken the suspension of arms for his love of the French king. De la Vigne had remarked dryly that

<sup>168</sup> De la Vigne's letter "de Constantinople, 24 May [1558]" is given in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 749-52, and see that of 23 January, 1558, from Adrianople (*ibid.*, II, 725-28). On de la Vigne's anti-Hapsburg activities at the Porte, see Busbecq, *Opera omnia* (1740, repr. 1968), pp. 301-2, who says de la Vigne claimed that he (Busbecq) bought secrets from Ibrahim, "primarius Turcae interpretes," i.e., the sultan's chief dragoman.

De la Vigne pursued Ibrahim with unrelenting hostility, denouncing him to the pashas *tertio quoque verbo*, finally causing his downfall. Busbecq managed gradually to effect Ibrahim's reinstatement, however, and thereby gained his wholehearted devotion (Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 320-25, 339). Indeed, in August, 1562, at the conclusion of Busbecq's eight years' mission to the Porte, Ibrahim accompanied Busbecq to the imperial court at Frankfurt am Main, where the dragoman was honorably received by the Emperor Ferdinand, "quem Imperator pace confirmata [cum Turcis] amplissimis auctum donis ad Suleimannum remisit" (*ibid.*, pp. 342-54, with the quotation on the last page).

<sup>167</sup> On the failure to negotiate peace between Austria and the Porte in 1558-1559, see Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 362-63, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (1836), 115-17. Ferdinand owed the Porte 120,000 écus in tribute by 1558. . . . *à trente mille écus par chacun an* (Ribier, II, 711). Suleiman had no intention of allowing the Turkish armada to spend the winter in the West, remembering the grim time the Turks had had in 1543-1544 when the French had failed properly to supply Khairreddin Barbarossa's fleet at Toulon (*ibid.*, II, 712-13, and see, above, Volume III, Chapter 12, note 90).

the Turks had seemed so eager for peace with the "nouvel empereur" Ferdinand that he had been thinking it must have been the imperialists who had resumed the war. But no, now it was certain the Turks had made the first move, "et par exprès commandement du Grand Seigneur."

Rustem Pasha had wanted very much to see the continuance of peace with Ferdinand, and his relations with de la Vigne had become rather less friendly. The Muscovites and the Poles had descended upon the "Tauric Chersonese" (the Crimea), an area tributary to the Porte. There was the worrisome possibility that the Muscovites might take Caffa (now Feodosiya). Rustem feared lest they should form a league with Ferdinand during the coming year, which could well prove ruinous to the Turks, especially if the Moldavians and the Vlachs also joined these northern hordes, whom de la Vigne believed to have vast numbers of horsemen to put into the field.

In the face of such an alliance the Turks would have a hard time unless the sultan took command against the opposing forces, for the janissaries and the sipahis rendered but scant obedience to anyone else. In the sultan's presence the sipahis would perform well "pour l'espérance que leur timar ou entretenement annuel leur soit augmenté." Rustem and others of the court clique were afraid, however, that if the sultan went off on a time-consuming campaign, one of his sons might gain entry into Istanbul, seize the treasury, and deprive him of the empire. That would be the end of Rustem. It was small wonder that he wanted peace on all fronts.

Rustem Pasha would be much hampered making peace, in de la Vigne's opinion for, as emperor, Ferdinand could not afford to accept the loss of Tata. The Turks were, in fact, also demanding the cession of Sziget (Szigetvár) in south-western Hungary, to which Ferdinand could not possibly agree. Furthermore, Suleiman was said still to aspire to the taking of Vienna, and it was believed at the Turkish court that in 1559 he was going to try again, with the largest army he had ever assembled, "disant qu'il est plus honneste à un grand empereur comme luy, suivant la coustume de ses ancestres, de mourir sur son chemin que sur son lit."<sup>169</sup> If it was Suleiman's wish not to die

"in bed," the wish was to be granted for, as is well known, death was to carry him off (in 1566) at the siege of Sziget.

News of Turkish preparations for an extensive naval campaign in 1558 had spread abroad early in the year. Obviously there had been a good deal of activity in and around the arsenal at Istanbul. As early as 6 March the doge and Senate were informing the provveditore of the Venetian fleet, the colonial governments of Cyprus, Crete, and Corfu as well as the captain of Famagusta and other officials that they must remain on guard, but secretly and discreetly so as not to attract the attention of the Turks. It would not do to let the pashas think that Venice was taking defensive measures against the Turks, with whom the Republic was at peace.

It was sound policy to profess confidence in the Turks' peaceful intentions when a large armada was being put together at Istanbul, but also to distrust them, "perchè non siamo senza qualche sospitione che l'armata Turchesca, la qual si dice che quest'anno è per escir molto potente, sia per andar sopra alcun luogo nostro. . . ." The Venetians feared an attack upon Cyprus,<sup>170</sup> but that was not in the offing, at least not yet.

The Turkish armada had sailed through the Dardanelles into the northern Aegean as early as 14 April (1558).<sup>171</sup> On 4 June François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax and French ambassador in Venice, wrote de la Vigne that the sultan's armada had arrived at Castel Tornese (Clermont) on the Moreote coast, opposite the island of Zante, two days from Corfu.<sup>172</sup> Obviously it had been moving

on 26 May (1558). "Quant à la victoire que les Moscovieux ont eue sur les Turcs, il n'y a rien plus certain, et le debvez ainsy dire et assurer au Grand Seigneur et son bassa que le roy Philippez luy a suscité cest ennemy . . ." (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 449-50): Noailles said he well remembered that when he was Henry II's ambassador in England, a few years before, a Muscovite envoy had come to the island to establish trade relations with the English. The envoy had received valuable presents from both Philip and Queen Mary who, "soubz couleur desdites marchandises," had sent him back home with all sorts of arms, artillery, and artisans to help the Muscovites wage war on the Turks. And de la Vigne was so to inform the sultan.

On the early history of the so-called Turkish "fief" or *timar*, to which de la Vigne refers in his letter to Henry II, note Nicora Beldiceanu, *Le Timar dans l'état ottoman (début XIV<sup>e</sup>-début XV<sup>e</sup> siècle)*, Wiesbaden, 1980.

<sup>170</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71 [1558-1559], fols. 2-4 [22-24].

<sup>171</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 462, a letter of de la Vigne to Henry II, dated at Istanbul on 10 May, 1558.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 472-73. On the castle of Chloumoutsy, which the French knew as Clermont and the Italians as Castel Tornese, see D. J. Wallace and T. S. R. Boase, in Setton and Hazard, eds., *A History of the Crusades*, IV (1977), 217-18.

<sup>169</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 752-54, letter of de la Vigne to Henry II. "de Constantinople, 18 [or 28?] Juin [1558]," and note, *ibid.*, pp. 756-57, and von Hammer-Purgstall, III, 361-62, trans. Hellert, II, 114-15.

François de Noailles had written de la Vigne from Venice

slowly; in the west one wondered why. Girolamo Seripando, archbishop of Salerno, soon noted in his *Commentarii*, however, that word had just come from Otranto on 8 June that the armada had been sighted off Capo S. Maria di Leuca, and on the evening of the same day it was reported to be at Capo Colonna near Crotona.<sup>173</sup> Now it was making more rapid progress. On 28 June Noailles informed de la Vigne that, two weeks before, the armada had been sighted at Gaeta. There was a report that in skirting the bay of Naples "ladite armée turquesque . . . elle s' estoit amuzée au port de Surante." In fact the Turks had stopped at Sorrento long enough to sack the town and carry off (according to Noailles) 3,000 persons, but they had wasted a good deal of time "to the prejudice of the affairs of his Majesty," Henry II.<sup>174</sup>

From the sack of Sorrento the Turkish armada sailed northward along the coast, passing the states of the Church "sans faire aucune violence," although it did stop at the little fortress town of S. Severa, "thirty miles from Rome," on the coast below Civitavecchia. At S. Severa the Turks took only some cheeses, mattresses, cheap furniture, and household goods.<sup>175</sup> Towards the end of July Noailles was sending de la Vigne other complaints concerning the slow progress of the armada which, instead of meeting with the French fleet in an anchorage at Corsica, had allegedly wasted an entire month at Minorca. Noailles wrote that they must remonstrate with the sultan.<sup>176</sup>

By mid-August (1558) François de Noailles' disappointment in the Turkish armada had mounted into bitterness. The commander of the armada, the beylerbey, had been more of a problem to the French than to the Spanish and their Genoese allies. De la Vigne had expressed confidence in the beylerbey. Noailles wrote his French

colleague at the Porte (on 18 and 27 August) in indignation of the damage which the Turkish commander, "vostre beau beglierbey," had done the French cause. From the very beginning his intention had been to deceive the French. But would he have dared to do this himself? Rustem Pasha must lie behind it all. The beylerbey had actually been working hand in glove with the Genoese. Now all the petty dukes and lordlings of Italy, including the pope and the Carafeschi, would band together against Henry II and try to chase the French from Tuscany.

Seeing that the Turkish armada was going to be of little or no danger to the Hapsburg possessions in Italy, the Spanish had reinforced their troops in the area of Picardy. Henry II had been obliged to withdraw both horse and foot from Piedmont, leaving Marshal Charles de Brissac in a serious plight. When the Turkish armada returned eastward, the Spanish reduced their garrisons (according to Noailles) in Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Genoa, Savona, Villefranche-sur-Mer, Nice, "and other places." Now the Spanish forces in Milan were far stronger than those of the French in Piedmont.<sup>177</sup> Nothing but grief had come of the Turkish expedition as far as the French were concerned.

As we have just noted, the Venetians had viewed the Turkish expedition, as it was getting under way, "not without some suspicion." Although Henry II had sought naval help of the Porte, he also seems to have been doubtful. Quite in agreement with Noailles, Henry wrote his envoy in Istanbul (on 24 August), "Monsieur de la Vigne, you have seen from my last dispatch how I suspected what has come of the Turkish armada . . ." which had gone back without intending or attempting to assist the French. The beylerbey in command, "of whom you entertained such great hope," and his fellow officers had pillaged and carried off property wherever they had landed, making mock of the splendid gifts they had received "in gold, silver, and other things."

The Turks had returned "par la route de Gènes," and the Genoese had feted them. At Genoa, too, the Turkish commanders had met and conversed for some time "with the chief ministers of the king of Spain, our common enemy." Genoese and Spanish galleys had intermingled with those of the Turkish armada, "so that by such demonstrations it is now assumed throughout Christendom that the friendship and understand-

<sup>173</sup> Seripando, *De Tridentino Concilio commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 455.

<sup>174</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 476, and see Bartolomeo Capasso, ed., "Le Cronache di D. Gaspare Fuscolillo," *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, I-4 (1876), 644-45.

<sup>175</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 479, a letter of Noailles to de la Vigne, dated at Venice on 5 July, 1558.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 485, letters dated at Venice on 23 and 30 July, 1558; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 487-88, 490 ff., and esp. pp. 508-24, a letter of Henry II to de la Vigne dated 3 August, 1558, with the text of a *Discours et rapport du voyage de l'armée de mer turquesque* which Charrière gives, *ibid.*, in the notes. The Turks sacked and burned Mahón, the chief town on the island of Minorca (Menorca). The conduct of the Turkish commander was, to say the least, very strange, as shown by the *Discours* and by Henry's letter of 3 August.

<sup>177</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 496-99.

ing between the Grand Seigneur and our chief enemies is greater than it ever was between the two of us," i.e., between Henry II and Suleiman. Instead of the Turks' having assisted the French, they had acted contrary to French interests and to those of Christendom, injuring Henry's friends and damaging his reputation. Everything had proved to be the reverse of Henry's hopes.

Despite the Turkish officers' "mauvais offices," Henry was nevertheless certain their evil deeds had been done without the knowledge and consent of Sultan Suleiman:

Thus I ought to believe, as I certainly do, in his letters and promises, together with the honorable and gracious assurance he has always maintained with you and with your predecessors, my ambassadors, of the continuance and steadiness of his friendship for me. . . .

Suleiman had been generous in aiding the French with Ottoman arms at sea. The whole trouble lay in the avarice of the sultan's ministers, "who have always preferred their own benefits to the honor and grandeur of their master, and to the obedience they owe to his commands." The sultan's ministers deserved "une rigoureuse réprimande et punition." If French officers had acted toward the least of Henry's friends as the Turks had done toward Henry, they would pay for their conduct with their very lives.

Henry assumed that the Grand Seigneur would deal no less summarily with the offending Turkish officers of the recent armada "pour satisfaire au devoir de nostre parfaite amitié réciproque, laquelle autrement se trouveroit offensée et mal satisfaite." With his letter to de la Vigne, Henry included a *mémoire*, a true account of everything that had happened up to the very hour of the armada's departure. De la Vigne was to present this account to the sultan. It would carry more weight than a verbal remonstrance. The envoy would then inform Henry as to Suleiman's reaction to this expression of justified grievance, for this would make clear the extent of the sultan's friendship for Henry. It would also determine the policy the French should pursue henceforth vis-à-vis the Turks.<sup>178</sup> We shall return in a moment to this letter of Henry's, of 24 August, 1558.

The Venetians had established their policy vis-à-vis the Turks decades, even generations, before the 1550's. It was to avoid all hostile encounters with them, give no cause for offense, send presents to the sultan and the pashas, pay all required commercial imposts, and protect all Ottoman subjects at sea. According to dispatches of 15 July and 27 September (1558) which Alvise Mocenigo, Navagero's successor, had sent the Signoria, four galleys of Giovanni Carafa had left Ostia. They were papal galleys which Giovanni was using as his own property. They might be headed for the Barbary coast; they might also be on their way to the Levant. Consequently on 15 October the doge and Senate instructed Mocenigo to caution Giovanni, the lord duke of Paliano, to warn the commanders of his galleys not to interfere in any way with Venetian shipping, which meant to have due regard for the cargoes and vessels of Venetian subjects as well as citizens. Also there must be no interference with any person or persons "of whatsoever state, nation, or condition" who might be traveling with their goods on any ship sailing under the standard of S. Mark.

When Paliano's galley commanders had identified a vessel as Venetian, they were not to go aboard "per levar tutte l'occasioni de disturbi et scandali che potriano nacer da queste galee di sua Eccellentia quando venissero nelli mari di Levante." Furthermore, Paliano's galleys must steer clear of Venetian ports and islands, for shippers would not convey food and merchandise into ports which appeared to be menaced by his armed galleys.<sup>179</sup>

The Signoria had had some intimation of what was afoot, for Alvise Mocenigo and the provveditore of the Venetian fleet learned in detail from letters of the doge and Senate dated 28 and 29 October (1558) that two of Paliano's galleys had seized a Venetian galleon, the *Briconi*, on its way from Alexandria to Venice. The galleon was taking the usual route, north toward the Gulf of Antalya (Satalia), when it was taken by the two galleys of Paliano, commanded by Flaminio dall' Anguil-

<sup>178</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Etat*, II, 757-58. On Turkish depredations in Croatia, note, *ibid.*, II, 783-84, doc. dated at Venice on 11 February, 1559. The Turks' rapport with the Genoese was especially galling to Henry II, for Genoa was the Hapsburgs' staunchest ally and in large measure responsible for the greatness of both Charles V and his son Philip II, at least according to François de Noailles (Charrière, *Négociations*,

II, 426, a letter to de la Vigne, dated at Venice on 16 January, 1558). On the Genoese rapport with (i.e., bribery of) the Turks, of which Henry II complained, see, *ibid.*, II, 490 ff.; on French efforts to secure the "chastisement" of the Turkish commander, *ibid.*, II, 507-8, 524 ff. On 11 February, 1559, de la Vigne wrote Henry II that the Turkish commander, *le beglierbey de la mer*, had fallen into disgrace at the Porte, would lead no more fleets, "et sera à la fin traité selon ses mérites" (Ribier, II, 780).

<sup>179</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fol. 53[73], letter of the doge and Senate to Mocenigo, dated 15 October, 1558.

lara, hauled toward the coast of "Caramania," and robbed of some of its cargo. All the Jews aboard were taken captive. The Signoria could not and would not tolerate such an outrage.

The provveditore was ordered to take a squadron of seven or eight good galleys, and leaving the rest of the fleet under the command of the captain of the Gulf (the Adriatic) to take off as soon as possible after all Paliano's galleys, not merely the two of which Anguillara was the skipper. He was to take the galley commanders into safe custody, disarm the galleys, and await further orders. If the galleys showed any resistance, the provveditore was to treat them like corsairs, and thereafter with all diligence send to Venice a full account of what had happened. Aside from the righteous indignation of the Signoria at Anguillara's boarding a Venetian ship, not the least touchy aspect of the whole affair was the fact that the Jewish merchants who had been taken captive were subjects of the Signor Turco, and by the articles of each successive treaty between Venice and the Porte, the Signoria pledged itself to protect Turkish subjects with the same vigilance as those of the Republic.<sup>180</sup>

In the weeks that followed, forceful protests were made to the duke of Paliano, to Cardinal Carafa, and to Paul IV himself. The doge and Senate expressed surprise as well as disappointment at Paliano's bad faith. Mocenigo was instructed to continue his efforts, "con quella efficacia e vehementia che si conviene," to secure the release of the Jews and the restitution of their property. When Paliano's galleys returned to Civitavecchia, Mocenigo was to caution the Jews to make no commitment as to their ransom, for the Signoria was working in determined fashion to effect their liberation and the return of their property, of which the doge and Senate sent Mocenigo an inventory.<sup>181</sup>

At last, on 31 December (1558), the doge and Senate acknowledged with satisfaction the receipt of Mocenigo's letters of the twentieth and twenty-first, sent by a special courier, relating to his last audience with the pope, who was now said to have ordered the release of all persons and properties seized on the galleon *Briconi*. Paul had expressed

to Mocenigo, as he used to do to Navagero, his love of Venice, showing himself truly as the "amorevol padre della Republica." Mocenigo's secretary had submitted a later report, however, and now it appeared that a hitch had arisen after Paul's decision to release all the captives.

Three of the Jews whom Anguillara had taken aboard the *Briconi* were said to be Marani, i.e., Jews converted to Christianity who had relapsed or remained secretly within the Judaism of their fathers. The doge and Senate did not believe the charge. Someone had an axe to grind. Mocenigo must return to his Holiness, and secure the freedom of these three last Jews "senza sottometerli ad alcuna inquisitione!" Otherwise who knows what grief Venetian merchants might suffer in the domains of the Signor Turco, and who knows what other problems would arise if one set about boarding Venetian vessels just to look for a Marano. No, the doge and Senate were confident that his Holiness would act in consonance with their wishes, and that the Jews would be set free.<sup>182</sup>

A half-dozen or so letters from Mocenigo to Venice, from 6-7 to 14 January (1559), brought the reassuring news that, yes, Paul IV had ordered the release also of the three Jews accused of being Marani. While this was an immense relief to the Signoria, the pope had told Mocenigo that the Venetians should take care hereafter to refuse passage on their vessels to the Marani. The ambassador must explain, however, that this could not be done. Venetian ships were loaded at docks throughout the Mediterranean, where merchants of many nations were to be found. One could not possibly know who were Marani, and who were not. Besides, the treaty of peace and friendship, the "capitulation," which Venice had with the Signor Turco made it impossible to forbid passage on Venetian ships to any subject of the Porte. His Holiness could understand this, and the Senate assumed that he would drop the matter.

Goods belonging to the *Hebrei liberati* were scattered among the ports of Messina, Naples, and presumably Civitavecchia. Mocenigo must see to the restitution of all such goods and, if necessary, keep after the duke of Paliano. If there were undue delay in returning the seized property to its rightful owners, Mocenigo should have recourse again to his Holiness.<sup>183</sup> Thus the story seems to have had a happy ending.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 71, fols. 57-59<sup>r</sup> [77-79<sup>r</sup>], letters to Mocenigo in Rome and to the provveditore of the fleet, dated 28 and 29 October, 1558.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 71, fols. 59<sup>r</sup> [79<sup>r</sup>], 62-63<sup>r</sup> [82-83<sup>r</sup>], letters of the doge and Senate to Mocenigo, dated 10 and 26 November, 1558, and see, *ibid.*, fol. 64<sup>r</sup> [84<sup>r</sup>], all *ambassador a Roma*, letter dated 9 December, 1558. The pope had reacted favorably to the request for the release of the Jews and their property.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 71, fol. 70<sup>r</sup> [90<sup>r</sup>], all *ambassador a Roma*, dated 31 December, 1558.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 71, fols. 73-74<sup>r</sup> [93-94<sup>r</sup>], all *ambassador a Roma*, letters dated 21 January, 1559 (Ven. style 1558).

Giovanni Carafa had obviously been employing papal galleys, as *capitaneus generalis Ecclesiae*,<sup>184</sup> to enlarge his wealth by profiteering. As the liberated Jews were receiving back their stolen property, however, Paul IV had struck his unworthy nephews down with a blast that resounded throughout Europe. As we shall relate presently, in a full consistory on 27 January, 1559, Paul acknowledged their dastardly deceptions, took away their powers and privileges, and gave them twelve days to leave Rome. Among Giovanni's losses was the command of the papal galleys which, as Ansel was aware, he had been using as his own property.<sup>185</sup>

In the Europe of 1558 one could hardly remember when the Hapsburgs and Valois had not been at war with each other. There were short-lived negotiations for peace in May and again in October. Protestantism in one form or another was strong in the Netherlands of Philip II, and Calvinism was gaining strength in France. Henry II was as Catholic as Philip; they both needed peace to deal with the religious problem. They also needed peace, because they no longer had the means to carry on the war. They were both insolvent, unable to meet the needs of their creditors.

As Henry was writing, with more than a little fraud in his indignation, to M. de la Vigne (on 24 August, 1558) of the failings of the Turks toward France, he was in fact engaged in negotiations with Philip "pour commencer à bon escient d'une bonne paix ou trêve," which de la Vigne would have to explain at the Porte. Indeed, only an hour before the French envoy met with Rustem Pasha, the latter had learned from Marino Cavalli, now the Venetian bailie in Istanbul,<sup>186</sup> that represen-

tatives of Henry and Philip were trying to arrange terms of peace which should be acceptable to both sides, as they would have to be if the peace was to last. Henry was much worse off by now than Philip; he had to put an end to the war to reduce his expenses. In a letter of 14 November (1558) de la Vigne described to Henry his most recent encounter with Rustem Pasha, the grand vizir.

Their meeting was a memorable one. The French envoy informed Rustem that if peace were now made, he should understand that the reason lay in the beylerbey's failure to help the French. The envoy had found Henry II's letter of 24 August very useful. He also told Rustem that if peace were made, "it would be hard to break it in our lifetime." The war had been futile. Rustem had listened to de la Vigne with astonishment. Surely God intended to confound King Philip, to give victory to Henry's sharp sword. The sultan was going into Hungary in person next year. He had ordered the equipment of a larger armada than this last one (of which Henry had complained) in order to assist the French in 1559. Nevertheless, said de la Vigne, he doubted whether this would induce Henry to continue the war.

The Turkish armadas had not justified the huge

concerned, Noailles had written de la Vigne, then on his way back to the Turkish court, of the significance of Marino Cavalli's election as bailie to the Porte (to succeed Antonio Barbarigo) and of the allegedly devious machinations of the Venetians,

"lesquels désiraient destourner la tempeste si l'armée du Grand Seigneur sort, tant pour la despence qu'il sont contraints faire que pour la jalousie qu'il ont de leurs places, ne cesseront d'entretenir le bassa de nouvelles controuées pour troubler et refroidir la parfaite amitié qui est entre ces deux princes [Henry II and Suleiman]. . . . Et afin que toutes ces meneries ayent plus de poids et de gravité [i.e., that negotiations for peace with Philip II were in progress, and that Henry II's need for money and other assistance had been much exaggerated], ils envoient résider pour leur bayle en Constantinople, misser Marin de Cavalli, personnage de telle autorité et réputation que chacun s'esmerveille fort de ceste election, veu qu'il est desjà sexagénaire, et a par cy-devant tenu en ceste république si grand lieu que c'est le rabaisser de beaucoup d'il envoyer en ceste charge. Il est l'escole des affaires du monde, auxquels il a tant versé et vueillé qu'on le tient en ceste ville pour un des premiers hommes de ceste seigneurie. . . ." and so de la Vigne must take note on how much Cavalli would bear watching (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 413-17, esp. pp. 414-16, letter dated at Venice on 8 November, 1557).

Marino Cavalli's commission as bailie to the Porte is dated 4 June, 1558; it may be found in the *Sen. Secreta*, Reg. 71, fols. 37-40' [57-60']. Like his predecessors and successors Cavalli was to maintain in his household two young men sent to Istanbul to learn Turkish (*ibid.*, fol. 40' [60']). The practice of supporting two young Venetian *cittadini originari* on a sort of Turkish bursary lasted a long time (*cf.* *Sen. Mar.*, Reg. 39, fol. 88' [133'], *et alibi*).

<sup>184</sup> Cf. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 286, lines 13 ff., entry for 1 January, 1556.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Ansel, "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 487. Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 262, refers to Paliano's loss of "il comando delle galere," and Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi ("Firmanus"), *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 513-14, states that "[summus pontifex] privavit . . . ducem [Paliani] ex quibusdam trirēibus, quae in gubernio eo [sic] datae fuerunt pro locis maritimis in Romano littore tendis." Paliano's galleys had wandered far from the Roman littoral.

<sup>186</sup> Henry II's ambassador to Venice, François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, was hostile to the Signoria, which deplored the succession of Franco-Turkish naval operations in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas. The Venetians had always to lay out large sums of money to guard against possible Turkish attacks. They kept the Porte well informed of all French and Spanish peace negotiations. A year before the period with which we are now

expense of warfare with such a powerful enemy as Philip. If the sultan were willing, however, to aid his French Majesty with a part of the Turks' "infinite treasures," de la Vigne was inclined to think that Henry would not easily reach an accord with Philip. If he chose to go on with the war, it would of course only be "pour l' amour dudit Grand Seigneur." Without adequate help from the Turks, Henry could not afford to expose his lands and people to such perils, for Turkish armadas had always brought the French a larger loss than profit, "tousiours beaucoup plus de dommage que de profit!" Rustem wished de la Vigne to write Henry that Suleiman had been distressed that the Turkish armada which he had sent westward had not assisted the French as its commanders had been ordered to do. But Henry had made his point. Suleiman understood his needs, and did not want to fail him.

The sultan had written Henry on 10 November (1558), seeking to make amends, for it was easy to see that he desired "que perpetuellement vous luy soyez amy." The sultan's two sons were then at war with each other. The shah of Persia was again on the move. Suleiman was honor-bound to go on with the war in Hungary, according to de la Vigne, since it was the Turks themselves who had broken their truce with the Emperor Ferdinand, "comme ils disent, à nostre requeste." De la Vigne did not think well of Rustem Pasha, an arrogant and avaricious man, who wanted to see the Ottoman empire at peace while France and Spain were exhausting each other in endless warfare.

Suleiman's decisions often did not correspond to Rustem's wishes. It was obvious, however, that under current conditions the Turks needed the French quite as much as the latter needed the Turks. If Henry did not finally make peace with Philip, he should ask for another Turkish armada, but not under the command of the "beglierbey" who had let his Majesty down so badly. In any event de la Vigne advised maintaining a friendly relationship with the sultan, as Henry would be likely to do, so that French embassies would be welcome at the Porte when it was in the interests of France to send them.<sup>187</sup>

Although Lutheranism had increased the political disunion in Germany, and had impeded the Hapsburgs in their efforts to hold their own against Suleiman in Transylvania and Hungary, the Turks

were feared in the old empire quite as much by the Lutherans as by the Catholics. Toward the end of November (1558) Henry II, who like his father depended on German friends, was planning to send an envoy to the diet which was supposed to meet at Augsburg on 1 January. Since Henry's enemies were trying every day to render him odious in German eyes "pour l' alliance que l' on a voulu dire qu' il a avec le Turc," he intended to assure the German princes, "and of this he calls God to witness," that neither he nor his late father had ever made treaties or entered into alliances with the sultan. His Majesty would never be guilty of "an act so unworthy of the name and title he bears of Roy Très-Chrestien."

Henry had no intention of denying that both he and Francis I had on occasion sought the aid of Turkish galleys, which had never been as helpful as the French had hoped they might be. They had done this, however, merely to get the better of the late Emperor Charles V, who had been the first to approach the sultan "pour luy faire convertir ses forces contre la France." Charles had wanted the Turks to occupy the French at sea while he attacked them on land. . . . But now Charles was dead, and Henry had written to his ambassador resident at the Porte to desist from all intelligence and communication with the sultan and his pashas "pour le fait de la guerre." Henry wished to dissuade the Turks from anti-Christian enterprises on land as well as at sea. He was the everlasting ally of the German empire, which he was anxious to see spared of Turkish harassment. Henry had to keep a representative at the Porte, like other Christian princes, because of the trade which his subjects had with the Turks. He was quite ready to accept a reasonable peace, but he could not yield to the demand of Philip II's deputies that to satisfy the English he should give up Calais, "qui est du vray patrimoine de cette couronne."<sup>188</sup>

There was war in Italy as well as in Flanders, Artois, and Picardy. The Mediterranean was never without corsairs, and Christian shipping frequently had to contend with the Turks. Nevertheless pilgrims still made their way to Jerusalem, where friars were still to be found in attendance at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Every year pilgrims took at least one ship from Venice to the Holy Land, and inevitably things sometimes went awry. In the summer of 1557 a number of pilgrims from Venice had the misfortune to reach the Pal-

<sup>187</sup> Ribier, II, 770-72, "de Constantinople, 14 Novembre 1558."

<sup>188</sup> Ribier, II, 772-74, doc. dated 24 November, 1558.

estiania coast just after a raid by the Knights of Malta, who had carried off a flock of prisoners. When the pilgrims landed, as Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq informs us, the "Syrians" seized them as being part and parcel of the "pirates" who had made off with their friends and relatives (*crimnantur eos esse de numero piratarum*). The pilgrims, "mostly young, among whom were some nobles, partly Germans, partly Netherlands," were transferred to prison in Istanbul, and were to figure prominently in Busbecq's fourth Turkish letter.<sup>189</sup>

The Turks had also taken some friars into custody, and eventually their plight had been brought to Paul IV's attention. Paul ordered his nephew Giovanni, duke of Paliano, to write on behalf of the friars and pilgrims to Antonio Trivulzio, the cardinal legate at the French court. The friars in question were Franciscans of the Observance, resident in Jerusalem. They had already been held, it would seem, along with the pilgrims, "in harsh captivity" for several months before Paul had learned of their misfortune. In any event, on 14 December, 1557, Paul also wrote Trivulzio, directing him to regard Paliano's letter as coming from the pope himself, for Trivulzio must know how anxious his Holiness was for the liberation of the poor souls languishing in a Turkish prison.

The reason for writing to Trivulzio is obvious. He was to see to it that Paul's recent ally, Henry II, should write Jean de la Vigne, the French ambassador in Istanbul, that notwithstanding the losses which the Knights of Malta had caused the Turks, he should secure the release of the innocent friars and pilgrims. The papal vicar and an associate had also been imprisoned in Istanbul, and besides those being held in the Turkish capital other friars and pilgrims had been placed under arrest at Gaza. It was a crying shame that they should be so unjustly treated, their sole offense being to serve God, do penance, and visit the holy places.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>189</sup> Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 299-301, trans. C. T. Forster and F. H. Blackburne Daniell, *The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, 2 vols., London, 1881, I, 351-53, also trans. E. S. Forster, *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, Oxford, 1927, repr. 1968, pp. 197-99.

<sup>190</sup> Paul IV's letter to Trivulzio, dated 14 December, 1557, is to be found in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 118', by mod. stamped enumeration: "Mandavimus dilecto filio nobili viro Joanni Caraffae, duci Paleani, nepoti nostro quaedam nostro nomine super liberatione religiosorum Ordinis Minorum Observantiae in Sepulchro Domini apud civitatem Hierosolymitanam commorantium necnon peregrino-

rum ad loca sancta qui dura captivitate iam plures menses Turcharum regis imperio contra omnem equitatem detinentur ad te scribere, propterea ut noscas quam cordi sit nobis negotium istud et quantopere pauperum eorum liberationem desideremus, volumus (eisi id per te facturum fuisse [sic] confidimus) ut tandem prorsus fidem eius litteris, quae his nostris alligatae tibi exhibebuntur, habeas. . . ." Trivulzio was to pay the same heed to Giovanni Carafa's letter as if the pope himself had written it. If the said letter still exists, it has escaped my notes. See also the memorandum dated 13 December, 1557 (*id di Santa Lucia*), Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 115', "Quel che si ha da scriver al reverendissimo legato in Franza. . . che sua signoria reverendissima procuri con il Christianissimo re [Henry II] che efficacemente scrivi al suo orator" in Constantinopoli che nonostante il danno che a Turchi è stato dato da Maltesi, non havendo in ciò errato o peccato nostri frati o peregrini, che impetri la loro liberatione di carcer: Il vicario nostro con il suo compagno è pregione per questo in Constantinopoli, li peregrini et altri frati sono pur carcerati per simile causa in Gaza. . . ." According to another text, the seizure of the Franciscans and pilgrims was ordered by the Gran Turco "sotto pretesto che alcuni Maltesi habbano dati alcuni danni a Turchi ovvero altre persone suddite a quel signore, il che è cosa molto ingiusta, ché questi poveretti, li quali non attendono ad altro che a servir a Dio et pregar per il populo Christiano, et li peregrini che li vanno per devotione et per visitare quei santi luoghi fazzino la penitentia et siano puniti per il delitto d' altri. . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 117', doc. dated 14 December, 1557).

<sup>191</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 300-1: "aiunt se mihi dono missos ab oratore Christianissimi regis: eius opera se libertatem consequutos."



De la Vigne was pleased with his success, of which he informed Henry II in a report attached to a letter dated at Istanbul on 21 June (1559). He held the Venetian bailie Marino Cavalli up to scorn, declaring that Cavalli was incensed by his own failure to secure the pilgrims' freedom "in the name of his Signoria." Marino, in whom de la Vigne saw more of an *asino* than a *cavallo*, doubtless found it embarrassing, for the Venetians claimed to be the "protecteurs dudict saint voyage en Hiérusalem." Instead of commending de la Vigne for achieving their common objective, Cavalli was trying to create the impression that it was he who had brought about the sultan's release of the pilgrims. At least so de la Vigne stated in his report to Henry, even adding that Cavalli had tried to persuade Busbecq to write Ferdinand that the sultan had acted at the request of the Venetian Signoria. If so, Busbecq does not mention the fact.<sup>192</sup> In any event de la Vigne had done well as ambassador to the Porte. His last audience with Suleiman took place on Tuesday, 4 September (1559); his last letter from Istanbul, a brief and hasty note, was written on Sunday, the tenth. He was on the road soon after "pour aller trouver le roy."<sup>193</sup>

<sup>192</sup> De la Vigne's report to Henry II, *Des Demandes que je luy fais de vostre part*, with the sultan's answers to the several requests, the text of which was sent with the ambassador's letter of 21 June, 1559, is given by Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 583-84, note. Leaving aside the aspersions which de la Vigne cast upon Cavalli, he wrote, "Quant aux esclaves pellerins flamans, suisses, allemands, hennuyers, vénitiens, françoys, prins il y a deux ans [i.e., about June, 1557]; comme je fus baisier la main il y a cinq jours [presumably 16 June, 1559]. . . il me les a soudainement fait délivrer et mesme defférer en mon logis, donnant à ung chascun ung commandement de liberté à vostre requeste. . ."

In a letter to Henry II dated at Scutari (Üsküdar) on 17 June, 1559, Suleiman mentioned in passing that "iuxta desiderium vestrum illi captivi liberati sunt" (Charrière, II, 588, note).

<sup>193</sup> De la Vigne's last letter from Istanbul was addressed to François de Noailles, bishop of Dax and French ambassador to Venice (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 603).

We should perhaps note that in his fourth Turkish letter, which is supposedly dated at Frankfurt am Main on 16 December, 1562, Busbecq makes Suleiman's freeing of the pilgrims (which took place, as shown above, in June, 1559) concurrent with the invasion of Moldavia by Jacob Basilicus alias Heraclides in the late fall of 1561 (cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 680-82, 685-87, 694-95, 745-46, *et alibi*). Busbecq also makes the pilgrims' release contemporaneous with the last stages of his negotiations for peace with Ali Pasha, the successor of Rustem (d. July, 1561) as grand vizir, which peace was signed by Ferdinand at Prague on 1 June, 1562. The grand dragoman Ibrahim Beg accompanied Busbecq to Frankfurt at the end of the latter's eight-year embassy to the Porte (1554-1562). Ibrahim presented Suleiman's ratification of the projected eight years'

As reports and rumors of impending peace between France and Spain began flooding into Istanbul, and as the sultan's two sons continued their "discord and disobedience," de la Vigne wrote Henry II (on 11 February, 1559) that the sultan would not go in person into Hungary. Furthermore, the galleys which the sultan had planned to send westward to aid the French, if Henry asked for them, would be kept close to home to guard the Archipelago. Somewhat prematurely de la Vigne stated that peace was now being made between Austria and the Porte, to Rustem Pasha's satisfaction. Ferdinand was said to be accepting "conditions bien peu honorables pour un empereur Chrestien"—an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats, payment of five years' arrearages, and acceptance of the loss of Tata.

As for the arrearages, Ferdinand would pay 60,000 ducats within three months, and would be quit of the other 90,000 "pour la forteresse de Tata, qui restera es mains des Turcs." New boundaries would be defined for Transylvania, upon which Ferdinand was not to infringe. He was to be the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the sultan, Henry being among the Turks' chief friends. Ferdinand was thus prevented from assisting his nephew Philip II. In a long harangue Rustem explained to de la Vigne that since all the Christian princes were being forced into reconciliation with one another, to relieve their subjects of the heavy burden of warfare, Henry must not think it strange if the sultan should wish to do the same thing.

Rustem Pasha had explained to de la Vigne—at greater length apparently than the latter had wished—the great affection which Sultan Suleiman retained for Henry:

. . . His said Highness [the sultan] could have no greater pleasure in this world than to see you at ease, provided this should be to your honor and to the advantage of your friends, and he is sending you the letter for which you asked for the Germans in order that they may understand that he will never be an enemy to those who are your friends. . . .

The sultan had wanted Henry to remain at war

peace to Ferdinand on 27 November, 1562, and requested the latter to have his seal attached thereto as a final act of validation (see Busbecq, *Opera omnia* [1740, repr. 1968], pp. 429-33, esp. p. 431, and see Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 702 ff.).

The fourth Turkish letter is thus appropriately dated (*Francfortiadie 16 Decembris, 1562*), but since it was not printed until twenty-seven years later (Paris, 1589), it was doubtless revised more than once, and as Busbecq's memory of details became less certain, chronological confusion became inevitable.

with Philip; Henry had wanted the sultan to remain at war with Ferdinand. De la Vigne had done his best "pour empêcher ladite paix avec l'empereur."

The sultan would certainly conclude peace with Ferdinand if his rebellious son Bayazid should withdraw into Egypt and try to seize that province for himself or if he should join the shah of Persia against the Porte. All things considered, therefore, it would be a miracle if Henry received any assistance from the Turks in the event of the continuance of the war with Philip. Peace was in the interests of Rustem, "that rascal, the first pasha" (*ce bêtiste premier bassa*), and one could be certain that he would do his level best to achieve peace with Ferdinand, whose "ambition, iniquity, and bad faith" had been for twenty years (according to de la Vigne) the cause of the calamity which had fallen "upon the poor land of Hungary."<sup>194</sup>

Although de la Vigne was mistaken about the near certainty of the Austro-Turkish peace, because Suleiman rejected the proposals which Ferdinand had made through his ambassador Busbecq,<sup>195</sup> peace did come to western Europe. The battles of S. Quentin and Gravelines had been decisive, along with the Turkish refusal to loan Henry 2,000,000 *écus* [or ducats], and hence the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis of 3 April, 1559,<sup>196</sup> which left Spain the dominant power in Italy. It would be a long time before the French could return in force to the peninsula.

According to the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the kings of France and Spain were to employ their full powers to bring about the "convocation and celebration" of an oecumenical council of the Church "tant nécessaire à la réformation et réduction de toute l'Église Chrétienne en une vraie union et concorde."<sup>197</sup> As usual, the letters of

marque and reprisal, which each side had issued against the other, were annulled. Among the numerous articles of the treaty one provided for the return of the marquisate of Montferrat to Duke Guglielmo of Mantua (in 1536 Charles V had awarded Montferrat to Mantua rather than to Savoy). More importantly, Philip II was to marry Elizabeth, Henry II's elder daughter, who had been betrothed to Philip's son Don Carlos. Within a few months (on 22 June, 1559) Philip married Elizabeth, whose death nine years later, following closely upon that of the unhappy Don Carlos, was to help link their names in modern romance and in the opera.

Philip II restored S. Quentin, Ham, Le Catelet, and certain other places which had been taken by the Spanish since the beginning of the war. The erstwhile imperial cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun remained in French possession, "ainsi qu'elles [i.e., ces villes] sont, et ont esté iusques icy," and so they do to this day. Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy, the victor at S. Quentin, whom the French had almost entirely dispossessed, was to marry Henry II's sister Marguerite, the duchess

*matique*, V-1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), nos. XXIII-XXIV, pp. 34-46, and see, *ibid.*, nos. XXVI, XXVIII-XXIX, pp. 47-49, 50-57. Concerning the provision for summoning a "concile universel," Dumont, who was no advocate of authoritarianism in either church or state, wrote, "Cet article choqua si fort le Pape Paul IV qu'il en mourut de déplaisir!" Actually there were two treaties of Cateau-Cambrésis, both signed on 3 April, 1559, a *traité de paix général* and a *traité particulier* between Henry II and Philip II.

With reference to Dumont's *bon mot*, which is obviously not to be taken literally, it is true that Paul IV had no intention of continuing the Council of Trent "in the midst of the Lutherans." Rome, the home of five Lateran Councils, was the place for a general council, and under papal presidency. After the fifteenth-century Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basel—not to speak of the anti-Julian Council of Pisa in the early sixteenth century—the popes had always feared councils, and had sought to control them.

Paul was certainly an ardent and uncompromising reformer, but as Navagero wrote the doge and Senate on 7 December, 1555, "Esso Pontefice s'ha lasciato intendere che, per la riforma degli abusi della Chiesa universale, crede che sia poco necessario un concilio, nel qual si ritrovano sempre molte difficoltà e molta lunghezza, ma che bisogna a poco a poco corregger gli errori et abusi introdotti, e dar esecuzione a quel che sarà ordinato." Councils were a time-consuming distraction, creating as many difficulties as they solved, at least in Paul's opinion.

Councils also opened the door to the interference of the princes and secular authorities in the affairs of the Church. After the peace of Cave (in September, 1557) Paul gave himself up almost entirely to reform by enforcing old and providing new legislation, on which see René Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, VIII (1907), 716-41. On the consequences of Cateau-Cambrésis, see the old but valuable (and eminently readable) volume of Alphonse de Ruble, *Le Traité de Cateau-Cambrésis*, Paris, 1889.

<sup>194</sup> Ribier, II, 780-83, "de Constantinople, 11 Fevrier [1559]." Suleiman did write the German electors, as requested by Henry II (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 544-45, with a Latin version of Suleiman's letter, *ibid.*, pp. 546-47, note).

<sup>195</sup> On the inconclusive negotiations of Busbecq with Rustem Pasha and the war between the sultan's sons, Selim and Bayazid, cf. Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, esp. pp. 205 ff., 245 ff., and note von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 362-63, trans. Hellert, VI, 115-17, cited above.

<sup>196</sup> By a letter dated at Coucy-le-Château, ten miles north of Soissons, on 8 April (1559), Henry II informed de la Vigne of the peace which his ministers had just made with Philip II, and outlined the main terms of the treaty (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 578-82). Henry had received on 5 April a letter from de la Vigne of 26 February (*ibid.*, pp. 580-81), i.e., thirty-eight days for a letter to be carried from the Bosphorus to the north of France.

<sup>197</sup> The text of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, with various annexes, may be found in Jean Dumont, *Corps universel diplo-*

of Berry, and return at last to Savoy-Piedmont. Henry was to retain Turin, Pinerolo, and several other places until the settlement of certain French claims. While Henry held these places, Philip was to keep garrisons in Asti and Vercelli. The restoration of Savoy and Piedmont to Emmanuel Philibert was the beginning of a new era in the history of these two provinces, for he was to rule with a skill and statesmanship that few princes in Europe could match.

By the terms of the treaty Henry agreed to restore to Philip's Genoese allies all "les villes, places, et forteresses" that the French had occupied on the island of Corsica (which, as we have seen, had been a Turkish target). French and Genoese merchants were to have full and free access to each others' ports. By withdrawing French troops from the Senese so that the Siennese might be unmoled in the re-establishment of their "premier estat de république," Henry in effect recognized Cosimo de' Medici's acquisition of Siena. Above all, as everyone knows, the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis recognized, and thus left unchallenged, the proprietary rights of the Spanish sovereigns to the kingdom of Naples and to the duchy of Milan.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>198</sup> Cf. the letters of Anne de Montmorency, Charles de Brissac, and Henry II, in Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II (1666), 794 ff. Although it would take more than a treaty of peace to solve the problems shared by France and Spain, Cateau-Cambrésis was a milestone in the history of sixteenth-century Europe. Contemporaries recognized it as such. The Venetians were as relieved as they were pleased by the end of the war in Flanders-Artois and by brighter prospects for Italy (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fols. 86<sup>v</sup>-92<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>v</sup>-112<sup>r</sup>]). French patriots like Blaise de Monluc, however, were much saddened by Cateau-Cambrésis, "car ceste paix fut cause de la reddition de tous les pays et conquestes qu'avoient fait les roys François et Henry" (*Commentaires*, ed. Courteault [1964], bk. IV, pp. 461-63).

On 15 April, 1559, the doge and Senate wrote Alvisè Mocenigo, their ambassador at the Curia Romana: "Volendo noi che se la Sanctià del Pontefice et i altri ambasciatori che si trovano a quella corte faranno far segni di allegrezza in quella città per la conclusione della pace seguita tra li serenissimi re Christianissimo et Catholicò, come siamo avvisati per lettere delli ambasciatori che sono appresso le Maestà sue, che nè anco vi manchiate di farle in segno che si stia intesa da noi con soddisfazione, vi commettemo col Senato che come sua Beatitudine et detti ambasciatori faranno per tal cosa far allegrezza la debbiate far anchor voi con quei modi che si costuma in simil casi," to which is added the annotation *Similes mutatis mutandis oratori apud Caesarem electum*, together with the vote *De litteris 179, de non 1, non syneri 0* (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fol. 87<sup>r</sup> [107<sup>r</sup>]).

On 4 April the doge and Senate had written Giovanni Michiel, their ambassador in France, and in like fashion to Michiel Surian, their ambassador to Philip II (*ibid.*, fol. 86 [106]): "... Dobbiate con quella occasione che vi parerà opportuna ritrovarvi con sua Maestà overo con alcuno delli principali ministri suoi che giudicaste a proposito et dappoi l'aver ragionato d'altro entrar come da voi con quella forma di parole che vi parerà conveniente a rallegrarvi delli buoni termini, nelliquali

The last two years of Paul IV's troubled reign were given over to the thorough-going reform of the Church, which he had initiated in January, 1556.<sup>199</sup> He had actually begun with himself, for as he told Navagero, "Vogliamo cominciare la riforma da noi. . . ." The pope's chief source of personal income was the Dataria, for other papal revenues went largely to the various offices and

serà la trattatione della pace da noi desiderata et procurata, come sa ciascuno, aggiungendo che anchora che giudichiate che sua Maestà Christianissima senza alcun officio vostro daria ordine di far denominar la Signoria nostra dal conto suo nella prefata capitulatione, secondo che s'è fatto per il passato, et che ricerca la vera amicitia che tenemo con la Maestà sua. . . ." Venice, like the Holy Sec, was included in the treaty.

Another letter went off on or shortly after 22 April to the Venetian ambassador to Philip II (*ibid.*, fol. 88<sup>r</sup> [108<sup>r</sup>]): "Intendessimo questi di passati per lettere vostre con molta nostra contentezza la conclusione della pace fra sua Maestà Catholica et il Re Christianissimo con quei particolari che ne avete significato con la consueta diligenza vostra. Dappoi è venuto a presentiarne lettere della medesima Maestà il secretario suo qui residente, colloquiali ella ne avisa essa conclusione, partecipando con noi come con veri et sinceri amici suoi di così buona et salutar nuova et di questo suo contento. . . ."

The doge and Senate then wrote Philip II directly, on 29 April (*ibid.*, fol. 89<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>r</sup>]): "La nuova della conclusione della pace. . . ne ha certamente portato tanta contentezza et consolatione quanta è da stimare che habbi potuto far cosa, laqual fosse, come era questa, da noi sommamente desiderata et procurata, onde se ne rallegramo quanto più dir potemo così per l'universal beneficio et salute della Christianità come per il particular commodò et honore che ne viene a ricever la Maestà vostra. . . ." with abundant praise of Philip's overall nobility in making peace, ". . . della bontà, della religione, et della grandezza dell'animo suo. . . ."

On the same day (29 April, 1559) the Senate approved a ducal treaty to Henry II (*ibid.*, fol. 90<sup>r</sup> [110<sup>r</sup>]): "Grandissimo era veramente il desiderio nostro di veder la Christianità libera da quei travagli et incomodi che veniva a patire per così longa et dispendiosa guerra, onde grandissimo è il contento che sentimo della conclusione della pace et amicitia fra vostra Christianissima Maestà et il serenissimo re Catholicò firmata con così stretto legame di parentado che si può sperar che debba esser perpetua. . . ." which observation was followed by the usual excess of flattery.

On the background to Cateau-Cambrésis and the importance of the treaty, see Lucien Romier, *Les Origines politiques des guerres de religion*, 2 vols., Paris, 1913-14, II, 297-347; Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2 vols., Paris, 1966, II, 261-64; Ruggiero Romano, "La Pace di Cateau-Cambrésis e l'equilibrio europeo a metà del secolo XVI," *Rivista storica italiana*, LXI-4 (1949), 526-50; J. Lestocquoy, "De la Prise de Calais, au traité du Cateau-Cambrésis. . . ." *Revue du Nord*, XL (Lille, 1958), 39-47, critical of Romier; and Manuel Fernández Alvarez, "La Paz de Cateau-Cambrésis," *Hispania*, XIX (Madrid, 1959), 530-44.

<sup>199</sup> René Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, VIII (1907), esp. pp. 724-40; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 185-221, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 452-78; cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (1758), bk. XI, pp. 453-504, esp. pp. 488 ff. On Paul IV's career as a reformer before his election to the papacy, see Gennaro Maria Monti, *Ricerche su Papa Paolo IV Carafa*, Benevento, 1923.

officers of the Curia. Nevertheless, Paul ordered that marriage dispensations, when allowed, should be granted without charge. According to Navagero, such unnecessary financial rectitude was costing Paul tens of thousands of ducats, i.e., most of his income.<sup>200</sup> He was determined to stamp out every form of simony in the Church. There was to be no payment for the administration of the sacraments, no sale of benefices, no ordination of those under age. More than once Paul set about the reform of the Sacred College and the various branches of the Curia. From the restrictions he had placed upon the Dataria he went on to the rectification of abuses, as he saw them, in the Cancelleria, the Penitenzieria, the Rota, and the Segnatura. Incapable of compromise and sometimes of common sense, Paul expelled Cardinal Ippolito d' Este from Rome even as he was seeking an alliance with the latter's brother, Duke Ercole II, against the Spanish. He imprisoned Cardinal Giovanni Morone for heresy on quite inadequate grounds, and was bent upon the destruction of Cardinal Reginald Pole.

Distrusting the oecumenical council as a means of instituting ecclesiastical reform, Paul sought to gain his ends by elevating the moral leadership within the Church, as shown by his creation of cardinals (on 20 December, 1555, and 15 March, 1557). He also placed a higher premium on piety than on wisdom, however, and some of his appointments were hardly distinguished. They also included the unworthy Carlo Carafa, the ineffective Diomede Carafa, and the seventeen-year-old Alfonso Carafa.<sup>201</sup> Nevertheless, Paul insisted that benefices should be bestowed only upon the most exemplary; that bishops, the pillars of the Church, should reside in their dioceses;<sup>202</sup> and that the Church should everywhere be free of secular interference, especially in the matter of ecclesiastical appointments.

While exercising a dictatorial control over the Church and sometimes terrifying the cardinals, Paul IV could on occasion profess to side with the bishops against the centralizing tendencies of the Holy See. As he once told Bernardo Navagero, he had himself been a resident bishop, and he knew

that the avidity with which everything had been drawn to Rome had deprived the ordinaries of their freedom to act "by making many exemptions in favour of hospitals, confraternities, and religious communities," which had been removed from episcopal jurisdiction and granted a refuge or escape under that of the papacy.

So if there is an incontinent priest [*un prete concubinario*] or a rascally chaplain, the bishop cannot lay hands on them, being told to abstain, the one being privileged under the patronage of St. Antonio, the other of St. Spirito, so that everything goes to ruin. . . .<sup>203</sup>

The monks who had abandoned their monasteries, and the friars their convents, the *sfratati*, were confined in the Roman prisons or consigned to the papal galleys. In his efforts to reform the religious orders Paul IV took the sternest measures against the vagrant monks, the so-called "apostates." During the night of 22 August, 1558, when the city gates were closed, the chief of police in Rome, the *bargello*, and his agents rounded up about a hundred vagrant monks. Even Basilio Zanchi of Bergamo, who had been one of the *custodi* of the Vatican Library, found himself in prison. Bromato says that some thirty thousand fled from the papal states, frightened by the police who were always on the go, "spaventati dalla sbraglia che sempre era in giro." Many of them sought shelter in Venice, whence they passed on, some into Germany, others into Turkey, "and some others stayed shut up and hidden in [various] houses, awaiting the old pontiff's death."<sup>204</sup>

After the capitulations of Cave (in mid-September, 1557), Paul IV tended to live in almost complete isolation. He did preside over consistories, and granted some audiences. His attendance at the Thursday sessions of the Inquisition was unflinching. It was his favorite pursuit. The Inquisition extended its sway even to the distant island of Chios, where the Dominican inquisitor Antonio Giustiniani was made to pay a price for his vigilance by the local inhabitants, among whom were no few apostates from the Latin faith. Thus on 2 April, 1558, Paul addressed indignant letters with the usual admonitions to the authorities of the *maona* of Chios (*praetori et prioribus insulae Chiensis*) and to the doge and government of Genoa. To the

<sup>200</sup> Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile," pp. 731, 737, with refs. to letters of Navagero dated 18 January and 11 July, 1556.

<sup>201</sup> Ancel, "L'Activité réformatrice de Paul IV: Le Choix des cardinaux," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXXXVI (new ser., XLII, 1909), 67-103.

<sup>202</sup> On Paul IV's insistence that bishops should reside within their dioceses, cf. Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XI, pp. 543-46.

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile," p. 739, and *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3 (1884), no. 1162, p. 1447, letter of Navagero to the doge and Senate, dated 8 February, 1558.

<sup>204</sup> Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XI, pp. 490-92; Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile," p. 739; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 475-77.

authorities on Chios went the usual threats of "eternal malediction."<sup>205</sup>

In Rome the affairs of state—political, financial, and judicial—were left almost entirely to Cardinal Carlo Carafa. Carafa did not concern himself with the Inquisition, and was pleased that Paul IV did not concern himself with affairs of state. From at least the early spring of 1558 Paul walked back and forth several times a day through the long halls and corridors between the Vatican Palace and Innocent VIII's Belvedere, where he enjoyed spending his time with his grandnephew, the now eighteen-year-old Cardinal Alfonso Carafa. As for Cardinal Carlo, he led a life of concealed impropriety, at least as concealed as he could make it, with his good friends, especially Cardinals Vitellozzo Vitelli, Nicolò Gaetano di Sermoneta, and Ranuccio Farnese. Despite Carlo's failure to acquire either Siena or Bari for his family, he hoped to provide for the future of the Carafeschi, and apparently for an alliance with the Farnesi, which explains his companionship with Ranuccio.

If Cesare Borgia was the first scion of a non-principally family to try to carve out of the disjointed peninsula an independent state for himself, Carlo Carafa was the last. The Medici and the Farnesi had succeeded. In fact the former had become princes, and the Farnesi were still building upon foundations laid by a wiser pope than Paul IV. Also Ottavio Farnese was an able and determined man, and he had married a daughter of Charles V. Although Carlo had professedly sought Siena or Bari for his brother Giovanni, it is not inconceivable that (like Cesare Borgia) he would have given up the red hat, had he been able to secure the grant of either place from Philip II. After his return on 23 April, 1558, from the unsuccessful mission to the Hapsburg court at Brussels, Carlo gave himself up to the chase, to gambling, and to the maladministration of the papal states.

In August (1558) an unknown Theatine had felt moved to tell the pope something of Carlo Carafa's immoral life, but the cardinal-nephew talked his way out of the charges made against him, and seems to have regained his uncle's confidence. The unknown Theatine's accusations against Carlo were probably provoked by the rumor which represented him as guilty of the seduction of a young woman of noble rank, Plautilia de' Massimi. Carlo denied it, suggesting that his friend Ranuccio Farnese was to blame. Plautilia

had been found in possession of far more money and jewels than she could explain. The scandal had broken in early June (1558); in late July Plautilia's youngest brother tried to kill her to satisfy the Italian sense of honor. The pope was enraged by these unsavory events, but clearly did not hold Carlo in any way responsible, as indeed he may not have been.

Carlo's downfall began with the new year, and involved his brothers too. On 1 January, 1559, Giovanni Carafa's secretary Andrea Lanfranco invited some friends to dinner, including the wayward Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte and Cardinal Carpi's brother Gian Lodovico Pio, together with Carlo's secretary Andrea Sacchetti and Leonardo de Cardena, a relative of the Carafeschi. There were also three courtesans, one of them being the well-known Martuccia, in whom Gian Lodovico di Carpi was interested. As the guests and their host were finishing dinner, Marcello Capece, a nephew of the Carafeschi and allegedly the lover of the duchess of Paliano, burst into the room with ten or a dozen armed men. Capece had been disappointed in not finding Martuccia at home, but had learned that she was dining at Lanfranco's. Apparently disregarding those present, Capece sat beside Martuccia, and embraced her several times. He met Gian Lodovico's protests with insults, and the two were soon exchanging blows. Cardinal del Monte, who (contrary to papal decree) went about in secular dress and armed, tried to intervene, but was impeded by the furniture in the room. The scuffle soon ended, however, with apparently no greater mishap than one of del Monte's grooms suffering a cut on his face.

As soon as Carlo Carafa was told of what had happened, he ordered the confinement of both Lanfranco and Capece in the Castel S. Angelo. It was not a very serious affair, as Sacchetti could explain, and after a matter of hours Lanfranco and Capece were released from the Castello at Gian Lodovico's request. The next day the participants in the dining-room brawl were reconciled at a meeting which Carafa attended at del Monte's residence. That should have been the end of it all, but it was not. Carafa did not inform the pope, who learned of the fracas anyway, and on 6 January ordered Capece's rearrest and imprisonment in the Castello.

On the same day (6 January) Carafa treated with ill-disguised contempt and a certain malicious humor the Florentine ambassador Bongianini Gianfigliuzzi, who had been seeking an audience of the pope for several weeks. Carafa had promised time and again to arrange for Gianfigliuzzi's being re-

<sup>205</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fols. 177-78.

ceived by the pope, but he never brought it to pass. After dealing with the Florentine with mock courtesy Carafa foiled him again (still on 6 January), and when a lowly servitor slammed a door in his face, Gianfigliuzzi left the Vatican in anger. The next day, however, he did contrive to gain access to the pope, gave him an account of the insults to which he had been subjected, and apparently revealed some of the deceptions and concealments of which the nephews were guilty.

Gianfigliuzzi had set an investigation in motion. The ball gained momentum as it rolled downhill. Paul IV sent for Don Geremia Isachino, the superior of the Theatine convent of S. Silvestro on Monte Cavallo (the Quirinal). The rakish young Cardinal Vitelli had unburdened himself to Don Geremia. Vitelli had been raised to the cardinalate in Paul's third creation (of 15 March, 1557). While he owed his promotion to Giovanni Carafa, the duke of Paliano, he had soon become Carlo Carafa's bosom companion and right-hand man. Vitelli, who knew no end of unpleasant detail concerning Carlo's private life, had apparently sided with Giovanni in the brothers' disagreement over the question of the Spanish compensation for the duchy of Paliano. Vitelli and Carlo had then drifted apart, and the latter had probably made his erstwhile friend the butt of more than one unpleasantry.

Paul IV ordered Don Geremia, under pain of excommunication and of full privation, to tell him all he knew of the wrongdoing of Carlo and his two brothers. Owing to Vitelli, Don Geremia knew—and told the pope—a good deal. Next Paul summoned Cardinal Michele Ghislieri, later Pius V; under questioning and with reluctance the austere and not unkind inquisitor Ghislieri gave the pope such information as he had. It began to dawn on the old man that there was no fool like an old fool, that there were a host of people in Rome, elsewhere in Italy, at the French and Spanish and other courts in Europe, who knew more than a little of the self-seeking and depravity of the nephews. He had planned to make his reign the period of great ecclesiastical reform. The corruption of the nephews, especially the corruption of Cardinal Carlo Carafa, had made a travesty of his efforts. Carlo's career as the pope's first minister had run its course. The pope refused to receive him on 9 and 12 January (1559), and the papal treasurer was ordered no longer to make payments upon Carafa's endorsement.

Word of Carafa's fall from grace swept through the city, and soon the whole of Europe, *per urbem et orbem*, with the speed of a strong wind. Although Carafa was generally expected to confess his sins

and to receive pardon from his papal uncle, the city was rife with rumors. The pope was said to be listening to the Theatine reformers, and about this time someone seized the opportunity to tell him about Carafa's licentious way of life, especially about the seduction of Plautilla de' Massimi. There were those in the inner circle who believed that the pope was also holding Carafa accountable for the secret capitulation of Cave.<sup>206</sup>

Now that Paul IV was opening up alleys of approach to the papal throne, he was receiving more reports of his nephews' evil ways than he could bear. It had taken him a long time to perceive the Carafeschi's cloven foot. Attempts to enlighten him had come to nothing. When François de Guise was returning to France after his unsuccess in the war with Alva (in mid-September, 1557), he had given vent to his exasperation with the papal nephews. Guise had told the pope in no uncertain terms (as he informed Pietro Strozzi)

that the nephews, and not I, have betrayed the Apostolic See, and have failed badly in their duty to King [Henry], and they have also slandered me, although I have engaged my life and honor on their behalf.<sup>207</sup>

From Paris on 17 January, 1558, Cardinal Charles de Lorraine had written Odet de Selve, the French ambassador in Rome, a scathing denunciation of the hideous morals of those "qui touchent de plus près en consanguinité à notre Saint Père le Pape."<sup>208</sup>

As Paul IV mulled over the moral infirmities of his nephews, he became more enraged day by day. On 17 January (1559) Carlo Carafa was ordered to vacate the Borgia apartments in the Vati-

<sup>206</sup> On 24 February, 1559, Giovanni Carafa, the duke of Paliano, wrote his brother Cardinal Carlo from Galese that "l'indignazione del Papa contro di noi è stata la capitolazione segreta . . ." (Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XI, p. 518).

<sup>207</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 256; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XI, p. 506; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, pp. 295–96.

<sup>208</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'état*, II, 721–22. One need not believe all the charges leveled at the Carafeschi by their enemies, but in the course of their trial, or rather the investigation of their alleged crimes and misdemeanors, Girolamo de' Federici, the bishop of Sagona in Corsica and governor of Rome (and chief judge at the trial), required the interrogation of a twelve-year-old girl who had stated "che il Duca di Palliano . . . per forza l'aveva cognosciuta carnalmente et s'virginata . . ." (from the *Liber Jurium* or compendium of documents relating to the trial of the Carafeschi, now in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086, fol. 11, formerly in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Miscellanea, Arm. X, tom. 197, cited by Ansel, "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV [1907], 239, note 5; on the *Liber Jurium*, see, *ibid.*, XXII [1905], 530–32, and note Ansel's article on "La Secrétairerie pontificale sous Paul IV," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXXIX [new ser. XXXV, 1906], 446 ff.).

can Palace, although he was allowed to move into some rooms described as "above the palace gate." All night was spent in moving papers, works of art, and pieces of furniture. About a week later (on the twenty-third) Carafa was informed that henceforth he was not to attend consistories. Clearly his uncle had decided upon what he was going to do, and he did it at a consistory held on Friday, 27 January, which lasted from 2:00 to 4:30 P.M. All the cardinals in Rome were present—except Carlo Carafa—and all shared a wonderment and apprehension as the angry pope mounted the throne.

Paul was given to long speeches. Also he had plenty to say as he delved into details of his nephews' delinquencies. He said that he had suspected nothing, but made it immediately clear that he would now give them their just deserts. As Massarelli notes in his diary of current events, Paul deprived Carlo Carafa of the Bolognese legation and of all authority in the Apostolic See and the papal states. He removed Giovanni Carafa, *dux Palliani*, from the captaincy-general of the Church, and dismissed the third brother, Antonio Carafa, *marchio Montisbelli*, from the governance of the "Leonine city" (i.e., the Borgo) and from the command of the papal guard. He also ordered them to leave Rome within twelve days.

Giovanni was to stay on his property at Gallese (just north of Civita Castellana), Antonio at Montebello (north of Tarquinia), and Carlo was confined to Civita Lavinia (now Lanuvio) in the Alban Hills. Giovanni and Antonio were required to take their families with them. When by prearrangement six cardinals, two of each order, came forward to plead for some abatement of the punishment, Paul rejected their appeal with a harsh rejoinder. The diarist Massarelli, a papal secretary, whom Paul had made bishop of Telese (a suffragan see of Benevento), praised his decision as "a memorable example for all ages of a supreme pontiff's piety, religion, integrity, strength, and greatness of spirit."<sup>209</sup>

The fall of the Carafeschi was not the consequence of mistaken or self-seeking political enterprise. It was primarily punishment for the violence and indecency of their lives. The extent of their

profligacy and of their criminality would be revealed (and probably exaggerated) in their trial under Pius IV. It is hard to escape the feeling, however, that in the ruination of his nephews Paul IV was also seeking the salvation of his own reputation.<sup>210</sup> Deprived of their dignity, official status, and all their revenues, the Carafeschi had few sympathizers.

As Philibert Babou, the bishop of Angoulême and French ambassador in Rome, wrote Henry II on 22 March (1559), since there was still no sign of the pope's recalling his nephews from exile, little effort was being made any longer to conceal "l'extrême ioye que tout le monde avoit conceuë de leur disgrâce." The city was full of complaints of their arrogance, injustices, robberies, and violence. All those who owed their positions in the city and the Curia to appointment by the Carafeschi were being dismissed. Babou expressed approval of the new government in Rome, "le gouvernement d'aujourd'hui qui est très modéré." The armed forces in the city had been reorganized under the command of Camillo Orsini. All servants of the Carafeschi had been expelled from Rome, twenty-five or thirty of them having been sent off on 10 March. Others of higher rank like Cesare Brancaccio, who had been papal nuncio in France, were arrested. Brancaccio was taken into custody at Ancona, where he had been governor; the governors of Bologna and Perugia, appointees of the Carafeschi, were also imprisoned.<sup>211</sup>

Paul IV's war with Philip II had ended at Cave, Henry II's at Cateau-Cambrésis. Despite the words of praise which Paul could find for Philip on some

<sup>210</sup> Giuseppe Coggiola was thus inclined to believe that Paul IV "nella punizione dei nipoti eccedesse dai giusti confini per soverchio amore della propria reputazione" (*Paolo IV e la capitolazione segreta di Cavi*, Pistoia, 1900, p. 38, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 132 ff.).

<sup>211</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 791–92. For political reasons Cardinal François de Tournon advised Henry II to intercede with the pope on behalf of the Carafeschi (*ibid.*, II, 789–91, and cf. M. François, *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon* [1946], nos. 658–59, 665, pp. 386–88).

Contemporary accounts differ somewhat on the downfall of the Carafeschi, but see esp. Ancl. "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 235–53, whose account of events leading up to (and including) the memorable consistory of 27 January, 1559, is largely based on the unpublished letters of Giulio de' Grandi, bishop of S. Maria d'Anglona and Tursi, to Ercole II d'Este, and of Bongianini Gianfigliuzzi to Cosimo I de' Medici. Cf. Pietro Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 258–74; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (1753), bk. XI, pp. 505–18; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 296–304; Riess, *Die Politik Pauls IV. und seiner Nepoten* (1909), pp. 363–70; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 222–29, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 479–84.

<sup>209</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 329. The diarist had been made bishop of Telese on 15 December, 1557 (*ibid.*, II, 319). On the consistory of 27 January, see also Max Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius*, Leipzig, 1886, p. 315, a report (*Zeitung*) from Rome dated the twenty-eighth; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimologia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 513–14; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 262–68; and the article of Ancl. cited in note 211 below.

occasions, the old man's anti-Hapsburg feelings never died. Early in Paul's reign Federico Badoer, the Venetian ambassador in Brussels, had written the doge and Senate (on 31 May, 1556) of the news which Charles V had received from his brother Ferdinand to the effect

that the Pope has said he will hold a Lateran Council, summoning all the princes of Christendom to his presence, to deprive the Emperor and [Ferdinand,] the said King of the Romans, of their dignities, because at the last Diet of Augsburg [in 1555] concerning the matter of religion the King consented that Germany should live according to the Confession of Augsburg, and to this resolution the Emperor submitted. . . .

As Charles had looked toward retirement from the cares of state, he had sought for the means (contrary to previous assumptions) to secure his son Philip's eventual accession to the imperial throne. When Ferdinand, as king of the Romans, became emperor, he intended that his son Maximilian, and not Philip, should succeed him in the so-called Roman kingship, and thus be in line for the imperial title. The conflict of ambitions had caused a falling-out between Charles and Ferdinand, "but the chief ministers," Badoer reported, "who a few days ago were heard to say that there was a bad understanding between the King of the Romans and the Emperor, now express hopes that the Pope, thinking to do their Majesties harm, will make them become friends, and their sons also!"<sup>212</sup>

On 26 October, 1556, Zaccaria Delfino, bishop of the island see of Lesina (Hvar), returned to Rome from a discouraging, months-long mission to Germany and Austria, seeking some way to counter the gains the Lutherans had made at Augsburg. Four days later he dined with the Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero, to whom he described his two recent audiences with Paul IV. The pope had been delighted to learn from Delfino of

the dissatisfaction of King Maximilian with King Philip, or rather [of] the hatred which he bears him; . . . in the meanwhile the Spanish nation is so detested by Germany that [Maximilian] . . . would do whatever he could to revenge himself; . . . the most serene King of the Romans and his counsellors greatly fear the forces of Sultan Soliman, knowing that the most Christian King [Henry II] leads him as he pleases. . . .<sup>213</sup>

By the time of Delfino's return to Rome the papal war with Spain was already two months old. On Saturday, 7 November (1556), Navagero wrote the doge and Senate that the preceding Thursday the pope "in the congregation of the Inquisition spoke more violently than ever against the Emperor and the King of Spain, threatening to proclaim them accursed and deprived of their kingdoms." A number of cardinals feared that if he ever did so, it might well mean the end of Catholicism in both Spain and England as well as in Germany where, as everyone knew, the Church was in a parlous plight. Delfino had brought Ferdinand's protest to the Curia that if his Majesty expected to receive aid against the Turks, he would have to allow his subjects to live "secondo il loro appetito," i.e., according to the Augsburg Confession.<sup>214</sup>

We have followed the peninsular war sufficiently to see how badly the French and papal forces fared in their contest with the duke of Alva and Marc' Antonio Colonna. At the Curia Romana the Milanese Cardinal Giannangelo de' Medici was remonstrating with Paul IV that his war with the "house of Austria" was adding day by day to the Catholic losses in Germany. Navagero reported from Rome (on 2 January, 1557) that when Delfino and Cardinal Giovanni Morone tried to discuss the crisis in Germany with the pope, the latter told them in a rage that "your King of the Romans is the brother of that heretic [Charles V]: we tolerate him because at present we know not whom to put in that place."<sup>215</sup>

When peace was restored between Paul IV and Philip II, one might worry a bit less about schism in the Hapsburg domains. Medici, Delfino, and Morone could, however, share the Curia's mounting concern about Poland, where Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, Lutheran Germans, Orthodox Ruthenians, and Jews all pursued their own interests. Lutheranism had been increasing in strength from the later years of King Sigismund I (d. 1548), and was now finding competition in Calvinism, Anabaptism, and Unitarianism. The urbane and cultivated Sigismund II Augustus faced difficulties that exceeded his capacity to deal with them. The Protestant nobles had become all powerful in the diets, where the gentry (the *szlachta*) were taking over from the great seignorial families, from which the Catholic episcopacy was recruited.

A loyal son of the Church, Sigismund II was

<sup>212</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-1 (1877), no. 501, pp. 468-69.

<sup>213</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2 (1881), nos. 684, 686, pp. 751-52, 757.

<sup>214</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 695, pp. 775-76.

<sup>215</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-2, no. 781, pp. 897-98.



walking a hazardous, zigzag path between Catholicism and Protestantism, and he was getting no help from Rome. On 6 November, 1557, Navagero advised his government that Sigismund had recently sent an envoy to Paul IV. The reason for the envoy's coming was unknown, for he had not yet succeeded in getting an audience of the pope. Since his mission was believed to concern religion, however,

the Cardinals complain that every Thursday his Holiness assembles the congregation of the Inquisition for the prosecution of an individual heretic, and then shows himself regardless of losing whole kingdoms such as Poland, leaving it without a nuncio, and doing the like with regard to what little [Catholicism] remains in Germany, by not sending anyone to the King of the Romans, and not even answering his Majesty's letters!<sup>216</sup>

In one way or another the cardinals' dissatisfaction was communicated to the self-righteous pope, whose seeming unawareness of the world beyond the walls of Rome had cost the Church dearly. A week or so after Navagero's letter was on its way to Venice, Paul IV wrote Martin Guzman, Ferdinand's head chamberlain (*regii cubicoli praepositus*), on 14 November (1557) that he was sending his trusted notary Jacobus Liuterius "with letters and instructions to our dearest son in Christ, Ferdinand, most illustrious king of the Romans and of Hungary." Liuterius would bring Guzman the pope's greetings. Paul had no doubt that Ferdinand in keeping with his everlasting love and reverence for the Holy See would readily give Liuterius a hearing, for he would understand that Paul was not only concerned for the well-being of Germany, but for Ferdinand's own dignity, honor, and glory. And his Holiness would appreciate whatever assistance Guzman could render Liuterius in his mission.<sup>217</sup>

The notary brought Ferdinand a letter from Pope Paul, requesting the king to terminate the second colloquy of Worms (the first had been held in 1540), which was then in session. A medley of Protestant divines had gathered at Worms to disrupt the Church and to disseminate their pernicious doctrines. In fact, Paul had heard that the Protestants were engaged in no more bitter contention with the Catholics than they were with one another, as some defended and others chal-

lenged the same dogmas (and, indeed, at Worms Matthias Flacius was accusing Melancthon and his followers of heresy). It lay within Ferdinand's power and authority to disperse the heretics and to check their impious designs. Should he not, therefore, as a good Catholic do his best to free Germany from this pestilence, since he would thereby provide not only for the peace of the Church but also for the welfare of his various kingdoms and for that of the Roman empire?<sup>218</sup> It was easier for Paul to ask the question than for Ferdinand to answer it.

A month after the notary Jacobus Liuterius had received his assignment, Paul IV finally appointed a nuncio to Ferdinand. His choice fell on Antonio Agostino (Agustin), bishop of Alife, in which connection Paul wrote Ferdinand again (on 18 December), noting that he had already sent Liuterius ahead to renew the expression of their mutual joy in the restoration of peace "inter nos et charissimum in Christo filium nostrum Philippum Hispaniarum regem Catholicum." He now informed Ferdinand of the appointment of Agostino, through whose mediation (and by the exchange of letters) they could easily deal with the tasks that lay before them. They would find fulfillment in working for peace within the Christian commonwealth, and Paul would derive no less pleasure from Ferdinand's own achievement of tranquility.

Paul had no doubt that Ferdinand realized that in the peace which now lay ahead, a *regum concordia*, he would find a bastion of strength against his impious Protestant subjects and the Turks (*adversus impios tuos et Christiani nominis hostes*). He would receive help not only to defend his own frontiers, but to invade the enemy's territory. It was incumbent upon Ferdinand to join the pope in the pur-

<sup>216</sup> *Cal. State Papers* . . . , Venice, VI-3 (1884), no. 1076, p. 1362.

<sup>217</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 100, by mod. stamped enumeration, "datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum die 14 Novembris, 1557, anno tertio."

<sup>218</sup> Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fols. 107-108<sup>r</sup>, brief dated 14 November, 1557: ". . . Cum maxima cura et sollicitudine afficeremur ex impiorum consiliis, quos Vortiam confluisse adiebamus ad turbandum vehementius Ecclesiae Catholicae statum suosque perniciosos errores latius disseminandos, nec facile eorum furori ullo remedio occurrere possemus, ipse misericordiarum pater et Deus totius consolationis animum nostrum erexit et eiusmodi inter eos, ut audivimus, dissidia excitavit ut non acrius cum Catholicis quam inter se certare et dissidere alia alii dogmata defendentes coeperint. Quia quidem tam idonea occasione oblata, cum in manu tua, charissime fili, sit impia eorum consilia dissipare, nonne pro tua perpetua in Deum pietate et Catholicae religionis studio entere ut ea peste Germaniam liberes, praesertim cum in eo non solum Ecclesiae paci, sed regnis tuis et Romano Imperio consulturus sis? . . ." Jacobus's name appears as "Liuterius" in Arm. XLIV, tom. 4, fol. 192<sup>r</sup>. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 571, calls him Liuterius.

suit of such a pious and salutary objective, as the new nuncio Agostino would also urge.

And we would commend him to you if we did not know how courteously and honorably you have been accustomed to receive and deal with nuncios sent by this See, in accord with your piety and veneration for the Blessed Peter, prince of the Apostles.<sup>219</sup>

Antonio Agostino had a hard row to hoe, for among his several tasks was that of protecting the papal rights of unction and coronation which raised a king of the Romans to the imperial dignity. The meaning of Leo III's coronation of Charlemagne, the so-called *translatio imperii*, had been hotly debated by imperialists and papalists in the fourteenth century. Despite the increasing secularization of the political life of Europe, however, coronation by the pope had remained the only means of attaining the lustrous title of emperor. When Maximilian I in 1508 and Charles V in 1520 had taken the title of emperor-elect, they had both made clear their recognition of the right and significance of coronation by the pope. Finally, as everyone knew, at Bologna in 1530 Charles had received the holy unction from Cardinal Alessandro Farnese at the high altar in the basilica of S. Petronio, and thereafter the sword and scepter, the orb and crown at the hands of Clement VII.

Now, less than thirty years later, the world had changed. On 24 February, 1558, the electors had assembled at Frankfurt am Main, accepted the instrument of Charles V's imperial resignation (dated 27 August, 1556), and declared the election of Ferdinand as emperor. As Pietro Nores suggests, the twenty-fourth of February had been deliberately chosen for this solemnity; it was the date of Charles's birth, his victory at Pavia, his coronation at Bologna, and finally of his brother's election as emperor.<sup>220</sup> Ten days later, on 6 March (1558), Ferdinand received the nuncio Agostino at Frankfurt, where on 14 March the king of the Romans was to be crowned emperor-elect by Joachim II of Brandenburg in the electoral chapel to the south of the choir in the cathedral church of S. Bartholo-

mew. Agostino was to witness the proceedings, but not take part in them.

Before his coronation Ferdinand had sworn to adhere to his election capitulation, whereby he was committed to uphold the articles of the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555. Of the electors who witnessed the oath, voted for Ferdinand, and attended the coronation, three were Lutherans. Paul IV had declined to recognize the validity of Charles V's imperial abdication, and papal canonists affirmed that the election of an emperor was the prerogative of Catholic electors. Before Charles V had been crowned in 1530, he had taken an oath on the Gospels to defend the Church. Ferdinand, although a good Catholic, had just sworn to accept the legality of Lutheranism in accordance with the decrees of Augsburg.

Ferdinand's son Maximilian was being denounced at the Curia Romana for subscribing to "false doctrines," and Ferdinand was himself accused of allowing Lutherans to preach at his court and of leaving episcopal sees vacant "pour en prendre les fruits." As Cardinal Jean du Bellay reported to Charles de Lorraine, one charge after another was being brought against Ferdinand, who was said to have contrived his election in clandestine fashion, "refusant au nonce du Pape sa suite." *Indignus est electus*. Furthermore, he had got himself elected by heretics. *Ergo deponendus, si iam esset Imperator*. But suppose Charles V's resignation was not effective; he had taken an oath to the Holy See from which only the pope could absolve him.

Du Bellay dribbled on through the Latin clichés of the curial logicians. There must be an investigation *de vita, moribus, et idoneitate Ferdinandi*. Ferdinand was quite mistaken in the blithe assumption that to be king of the Romans was *ipso facto* an assurance of accession to the empire. If Charles V's abdication was admissible, it was apparently so much the worse for the Hapsburgs. Resignation redounded to the disadvantage of the resigner, *et devolvitur ad Pontificem*. There were ways of escaping the quandary, of "dressing this wound" (*médiciner cette playe*), for the pope wanted to be a good father and friend, *salva rerum substantia*, but first and foremost the house of Austria and its domains must be purged of "all that Lutheranism," evils must be remedied, and churches given back. Maybe a new election would be needed "or something similar;" whatever was to be the solution, the pope wanted "the voice of the Lutherans to count for nothing." The cardinals had been instructed to seek a way out, but du Bellay saw no way of running with the hare and hunting with

<sup>219</sup> Arm. XLIV, tom. 2, fol. 96, by mod. stamped enumeration, a brief to Ferdinand, dated 18 December, 1557, and of Paul's letter of 17 December to Ferdinand's son Maximilian, king of Bohemia, *ibid.*, fol. 135<sup>v</sup>, and see also fols. 148-49, 161, 179, *et alibi*. At the time of his designation as nuncio to Ferdinand, Antonio Agostino was also appointed bishop of Alife, a suffragan see of Benevento (on 15 December, 1557). Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 571, improperly calls him bishop of Lérida, to which see he was not appointed until 8 August, 1561 (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III [1923], 212). Although he appears in the Italian sources as Agostino, Antonio Agustin was a Spaniard.

<sup>220</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 236-37.

the hounds. Ferdinand's brightest Latinists were not going to be able to put together an argument that would hold in Rome.<sup>221</sup>

The nuncio Agostino had followed Ferdinand to Vienna, whence he was recalled to Rome by a letter dated 9 May (1558). Martin Guzman, Ferdinand's head chamberlain, arrived in Rome the night of 12–13 May as imperial envoy to the Holy See officially to inform the pope of Ferdinand's accession to the empire, to render the usual obedience to the pope, and to put his master's person and resources at the service of the Church. Paul IV refused to receive Guzman even in a private audience.

A papal commission of ten cardinals and six prelates, doubtless under some measure of papal intimidation, advanced arguments from late-medieval texts to make clear the invalidity of Ferdinand's election, despite sensible demurrals on the part of Cardinals Pedro Pacheco and Jacopo Puteo. Philip II supported his uncle's imperial claims. On 13 July Paul IV finally gave Guzman, who had been staying at Tivoli, a friendly reception, but not as an imperial envoy. Guzman left for home the following day, with nothing accomplished. He took back the list of requirements which du Bellay had detailed to the Cardinal of Lorraine—proof of the validity of Charles V's abdication, evidence of Ferdinand's moral suitability, an end to the recognition or tolerance of Lutheranism in the Hapsburg lands, and the removal of heretics from the electoral college. The Catholic imperialists responded with bitterness and contempt to Paul's refusal to recognize Ferdinand, whose popularity with the Lutherans grew by leaps and bounds.

When Charles V died in his monastic retreat at S. Jerónimo de Yuste in western Spain (on 21 September, 1558), the validity of his abdication of empire was no longer a problem. His death was not generally known in Rome until 25 October, on which date Massarelli paid a glowing tribute to him in the seventh diary.<sup>222</sup> On 12 December Cardinal Pacheco celebrated a *missa exaequalis* in the Sistine Chapel. The pope and all the cardinals were present. According to Massarelli, however, before the pope went into the chapel, he declared in a full congregation of cardinals that the imperial dignity had been made free [*vocasse imperium*] by Charles' death, but not by his resignation, since it had been delivered

not into the hands of the pope, as it should have been, but into those of the electors.<sup>223</sup>

Once Paul IV got an idea that appealed to him, he stuck with it. On or just before 25 December, when he had finally granted an audience to the French ambassador Philibert Babou, he told Babou much the same thing as he had stated in the congregation of cardinals.<sup>224</sup> As far as Paul was concerned, unless a thorough examination of Ferdinand's attitude toward the Holy See and heresy revealed him as likely to make a right and proper emperor, he was never going to recognize Ferdinand's succession to Charles. And he never did.<sup>225</sup>

The imperial legacy had brought the Hapsburgs religious and political problems which experience had taught them could only be dealt with by evasion and expediency. The Lutherans, the Turks, and the unwieldy structure of the empire were not their only afflictions. Despite the agreements reached at Augsburg in 1555, the Hapsburgs remained the chief defenders of the Church. For better or worse Philip II's long reign was to bear unending witness to that fact. Paul IV was not only alienating the Hapsburgs, but he was playing into the hands of the Lutherans. Kings of the Romans, who had outlived emperors, had indeed acceded to the empire, and (despite Paul) Ferdinand had done so also.

There was another reason, an important one, for not stirring up the hornets' nest and adding to the confusions and hostilities in Germany and central Europe. As a result of a vote in the Venetian Senate, held on 21 January, 1559, the Doge Lorenzo Priuli wrote the Republic's ambassador to the Curia Romana, Alvise Mocenigo, about the seriousness of the imperial issue. Mocenigo had already on his own initiative as well as by order of the Senate addressed the pope "in favor del nuovo Imperator eletto." Mocenigo had informed the Signoria by a letter of 7 January, however, that it had apparently become a question in Rome

<sup>221</sup> Massarelli, *ibid.*, II, 328, and cf. Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 250–51, who quotes Massarelli's text; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 513, who gives wrong dates for both Charles's death and the *missa exaequalis*; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II, 774–75, a letter of Philibert Babou, French ambassador in Rome, to Henry II, dated 12 December, 1558.

<sup>222</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II, 777, letter of Babou to Henry II, dated at Rome on 25 December, 1558.

<sup>223</sup> On Paul IV's refusal to recognize Ferdinand as emperor-elect, note also Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 236–54; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II (1753), bk. XI, pp. 437–44; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 347–59, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 570–79.

<sup>221</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'etat*, II, 759–60.

<sup>222</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 326, and cf. Seripando's appreciation of Charles V's last years in the *De Tridentino Concilio commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 457.

of taking steps to deprive Ferdinand of the imperial title. In the Senate's opinion this would be a grave mistake. As soon as possible Mocenigo should seek an audience with the pope, and renew his appeals on Ferdinand's behalf.

One must consider the perils of the time, and how much Ferdinand's title would mean to Christendom when the Signor Turco came westward again to attack Vienna, as it was said he intended to do. Ferdinand should be able, "senza altro disturbo col titolo et autorità che conviene ad Imperator," to look to his defense with confidence. He required the obedience of Germany, and his Holiness would understand the importance of Germany "per le cose della religione." One could only hope, therefore, that the imperial issue, "il presente negocio," would come to a good end.<sup>226</sup>

Paul's deprivation and expulsion of his nephews from Rome occupied the whole of January (1559), and weighed heavily upon his mind for months thereafter. Although he withheld his recognition from Ferdinand, Paul took no unduly reckless action in the imperial controversy. He immersed himself in ecclesiastical reform with a vigor which suggests he knew his time was short, although he was quoted as saying that he would live to be a hundred. In reform he also found a way of atoning for the blind and negligent confidence he had placed in his unworthy nephews. Four years of his papacy had been more than enough for the well-being of the Church. They had also taken their toll of his health, which began to break down in early May (1559). Sometimes he seemed on the road to recovery, especially in July, when he granted audiences, and attended meetings of the Inquisition, but age and illness, fasting and the heat of summer proved to be too much. He died on 18 August, a day after the death of the Venetian doge Priuli, who had urged him to see in Ferdinand not only the emperor (or emperor-elect), but also Christendom's chief defense against the Turks.<sup>227</sup>

The contemporary sources are in general agreement with Massarelli, who places Paul's death at about 5:00 P.M. (*hora circiter 21*) or slightly later. Firmanus says that Paul gathered the cardinals around his deathbed, and exhorted them to elect as his successor a worthy pontiff, "qui sanctam Dei ecclesiam recte et sancte gubernare debeat." He also recommended the Inquisition to them "as the very basis of the Christian faith and of the holy Apostolic See." Rumors of Paul's impending demise had been afloat for hours. By about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M. a crowd had assembled on the Campidoglio, "stultum et ignobile vulgus," Massarelli notes, "ne dicam senatus populusque Romanus." After a brief period of indecision the numerous enemies of the Carafeschi, including various nobles, moved the crowd to violence, always easy to do when a pope died.

Taking to arms, the madding crowd burst into the city jails—Torre Savella, Torre di Nona, and the Campidoglio—freeing more than four hundred prisoners. Then they proceeded to the Ripetta, near the church of S. Rocco by the Tiber, to the palace which housed the Inquisition. They broke down the doors, and freed all the prisoners. With a strange touch of piety, however, they made those whom they released (according to Firmanus) "swear on the Scriptures that they were good Catholics." Bromato says there were seventy-two heretics in the Carceri del Sant' Ufficio, of whom forty-two were "heresiarchs" or teachers of religious error. The rioters dealt the Dominican inquisitor Tommaso Scotti a mortal blow. They pillaged the Palazzo dell' Inquisizione, and set it on fire, destroying most of the books and records of the Holy Office. That day or the next they also went to the convent of S. Maria sopra Minerva, intending to burn it down along with all the Dominican friars who lived there. Only the intervention of Giuliano Cesarini and some other nobles

<sup>226</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fol. 74' [94'], doc. dated 21 January, 1559 (Ven. style 1558), *all' ambasciador a Roma*.

<sup>227</sup> Lorenzo Priuli died on 17 August, 1559, and Paul IV on the following day, the affairs of state resting with the College of Cardinals in Rome and the Councilors and Capi of the Quarantia in Venice (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fols. 111'-112' [129'-130']). The Venetian ambassador in Rome had notified the Senate of the pope's death in a letter dated 18 August, which reached Venice on the evening of the twentieth. On 31 August the Signoria—the Councilors and Capi of the Quarantia—wrote the Sacred College (*ibid.*, fol. 112 [130]):

"Auditio eo nuntio qui de summi pontificis obitu ex oratoris nostri primum literis, deinde reverendissimarum dominationum vestrarum, ad nos proxime allatus est, magno sane do-

lore affecti sumus; eum enim pastorem amimus, qui rempublicam Christianam singulari in Deum pietate, religione, ac prudentia administravit, nosque praeterea nostramque rempublicam summo amore ac paterna charitate ita semper est prosequutus ut eius erga nos animi egregia argumenta semper ostenderit. Quamobrem eius mors molestissima nobis profecto accidit. . . ."

On Paul's death, note Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 332, who comments on his months of ill health, and laments his passing: "Infelix, heu nimium infelix ecclesia sancta Dei tanto pastore orbata! Faxit Deus ut si non meliorem saltem similem (si is inveniri potest) ei restituat!" Cf. Seripando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 458-59; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimoniae*, *ibid.*, II, 516; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, pp. 275-76; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XI, pp. 571-73; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 303-4; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 411-17, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 617-22.

saved the convent and, very likely, the church. The Dominicans were hated in Rome because, Firmanus informs us, malign slanderers accused them of being spies (*exploratores*) and of revealing the secrets of the confessional.

Leaving the Minerva, the rioters went to the house of the rich merchant Giovanni Celsi da Napi, whom they blamed for the shortages which had plagued all four years of Paul's reign and especially the year of his war with Spain. Celsi had also helped finance the Curia by thinking up new taxes. They wanted to put him to death, but they could not find him, nor could they find one Claudio della Valle, a notary of the Inquisition, who had also frustrated their bloodthirsty intentions by flight. Either that same day or probably the next (i.e., on 18 or 19 August) the bellicose crowd went up to the Campidoglio again, this time to destroy the marble statue in the great hall of the Palazzo Capitolino, which the Roman people had put up in honor of Paul IV only a few months before.

The angry mob mutilated the statue, and knocked the head off, dragging it through the filth of the streets, says Massarelli, "ac denique pueris in ludibrium per cenam et stercora volutandum reliquerunt." Firmanus tells us the statue was hauled to the Campo dei Fiori, subjected to indignities, and finally thrown in the Tiber, for when he, his relatives, and some friends set out to save what was left of the statue, it was nowhere to be found. Finally on the third day of the uproar (20 August) the "plebs or Roman people," according to Massarelli, "habituque nescio quo seditioso conventiculo," issued a public proclamation that all the arms of the Carafa family should be removed from wherever they were to be found—churches, palaces, public buildings, and gates—and so they were, including the insignia of old Cardinal Oliviero Carafa, who had commanded the papal fleet against the Turks in 1472.<sup>228</sup>

Four or five hours after Paul's death his body was taken to the Cappella Paolina, which one entered through the Sala Regia in the Vatican Palace. On the morning of the following day (19 August) members of the papal choir sang the office of the dead, after which the chapel doors were opened, the cardinals came, and many persons were admitted (says Firmanus) "ad osculandum pedes papae." The canons of S. Peter's refused to carry the pope's body down from the Paolina into the basilica, according to custom, until they had received the usual two hundred ducats and other gifts. Gathering around Paul's mortal remains, the canons also sang the "consuetum officium" before the Cappella del Santissimo Sacramento, just off the right aisle of S. Peter's. At 6:00 P.M. (*hora 22*) the body was taken upstairs again to the Sistine Chapel.

At 10:00 P.M., however, by order of Cardinal Carlo Carafa, who had returned to Rome in a hurry, the master of ceremonies Firmanus himself saw to the almost secret burial of the unlamented pope, lest some further indignity be done his memory by the desecration of his corpse. Firmanus had him buried by the Cappella del Volto Santo in S. Peter's, where Carlo Carafa set guards to prevent "contra dictum corpus aliquid indignum."<sup>229</sup> In

Romans freed 4,000 prisoners; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIV, 414-16, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 620-21.

Although Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 517-18, entry for 20 August (1559), gives the decree ordering the destruction of the arms of the Carafa family "by order of the Roman people," his text contains numerous variations from that of the broadside which was printed and given a wide distribution in Rome. It may not be amiss, therefore, to give the text which I have transcribed from a copy of the original broadside: "Bando contra quelli che terranno l'arme di casa Carafa: Per ordine del Popolo Romano obediendissimo et fedelissimo della santa Sede Apostolica et del sacro Collegio degli Illusterrimi et Reverendissimi Cardinali. Si fa intendere a qualunque persona che habbia innanzi alla sua casa o di carta o dipinta in muro o di rilievo l'arme della tanto a questo Popolo inimica et Tirannica casa Caraffa, la debbia fra tutto il di di hoggi et domani haverla stracciata, scanzellata, et spezzata sotto pena di essere tenuto traditore di questo Popolo et infame et di essere quella casa dove sarà trovata da questo tempo in là saccheggiata et brusciata [sic], acciò si possi per tutto le vie possibile [sic] anichilare et spengere questo tanto odioso nome. Dat. in Roma il di XX di Agosto: 1559."

Following the death of Paul IV there was a flood of satirical and scurrilous verse in the form of "pasquinades" attached to the statue of Pasquino, which stood by the Palazzo Orsini [demolished during the pontificate of Pius VI Braschi (1775-1799), and replaced by the present Palazzo Braschi], on which see Fabio Gori, "Papa Paolo IV ed i Caraffa . . . : Pasquinade contro la memoria di Paolo IV ed i Caraffeschi," in *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 170-200.

<sup>229</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 517, entry for 19 August, 1559.

<sup>228</sup> On the tumult which attended the death of Paul IV, see Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 332-34; Seripando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 458-59; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, also *ibid.*, II, 515-18; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, II, 827-28, a letter of Philibert Babou to Charles de Lorraine, dated at Rome on 18 August, 1559; *Diario di quanto avvenne nella malattia e dopo la morte di Paolo IV, scritto da un contemporaneo*, ed. L. Scarabelli, in his edition of Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, append., no. XLII, esp. pp. 451-53; also Nores, *ibid.*, pp. 276-78; Alvisé (Luigi) Mocenigo, "Relazione di Roma [1560]" in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), pp. 36-39; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XII, pp. 576-79; Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa* (1882), pp. 304-5; Theodor Müller, *Das Konklave Pius IV. (1559)*, Gotha, 1889, pp. 17-20, who thinks the rioting

October, 1566, Pius V, Paul's old friend Michele Ghislieri, had his remains transferred to S. Maria sopra Minerva, where he still lies in the tomb designed by Pirro Ligorio in the Carafa Chapel.<sup>250</sup>

Paul IV had dealt with the affairs of Christendom with more piety than prudence. He had managed to achieve what he had sought to avoid, the rule of the Spanish in Italy. Only Venice and the Holy See now remained wholly independent. Never again would a pope be in a position to declare or to carry on war with a major power. Paul had diminished the political, without much enhancing the spiritual, power of the papacy. His reforms were necessary and beneficial, especially his insistence upon the residence of bishops in their sees. In one form or another, however, the moral renovation of leadership in the Church was inevitable, for the Catholic masses were not insensitive to the Protestant attacks, and there were already critics and reformers enough in the Church. After all, the Council of Trent had begun a decade before Paul's papacy.

Defeated and disillusioned, Paul had been obliged—fortunately for the papal states—to give up his warlike ambition to remake the map of the Italian peninsula. One had small reason to be sanguine about the future, but Paul could hardly be blamed for most of the difficulties which Europe

faced. The French, still caught between the Hapsburg Netherlands and Spain, were left no less disgruntled after Cateau-Cambrésis than before it. Calvinism was becoming a driving force, which seemed likely to undermine the political and social foundations of Europe. Wars of religion lay before the French. In Germany Lutheranism had taken root so deeply it could never be eradicated. Then, too, the Turks remained as formidable as ever.

The peace of 1559 threw thousands of mercenaries out of work. Even the papal states became, as Delumeau puts it, "un réservoir de soldats." Banditry increased, hastening the long-drawn-out process of depopulation and agricultural decline in the Roman Campagna. Emigration increased. Although, oddly enough, one continued to export grain from the papal states, agriculture was giving way to pasturage. The problems involved were complicated, and the jumble of factual (and sometimes conflicting) data collected by Delumeau has shed only a modicum of light on them.<sup>251</sup> In any event a thoughtful schoolboy could probably see that trouble lay ahead not only in the papal states but also in the coming conclave. Paul IV's reign had added to the long-standing enmities in the Sacred College, which was made up of princes and politicians, theologians and canonists, pleasure-seekers, and even a rogue or two. The obvious question was who among them would emerge as pope.

<sup>250</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VI (repr. 1957), 621; Renzo U. Montini, *Le Tombe dei Papi*, Rome: Istituto di Studi Romani, 1957, no. 224, pp. 327-29.

<sup>251</sup> Delumeau, *Vie économique et sociale de Rome*, II (1959), 521-98, et alibi.

## 17. THE ELECTION OF PIUS IV AND THE FALL OF THE CARAFESCHI, CYPRUS AND THE TURKISH SUCCESS AT JERBA (1559–1560)

AMID THE POPULAR manifestations of anger at the remembrance of things past—and at the presence of some of the Carafeschi in Rome—both Marc' Antonio Colonna and Julius III's nephew Ascanio della Corgna returned to the city on 21 August (1559). At or about the same time Cardinal Giovanni Morone was released by order of the Sacred College from his two years' imprisonment in the Castel S. Angelo, as were Tommaso Sanfelice, bishop of La Cava, and Alessandro Pallantieri, *olim procurator fiscalis*. Sanfelice had entered the Castello, along with Morone, on a charge of heresy. Pallantieri had been jailed by the Carafeschi for fraud in the conduct of the affairs of the annona (in 1557). He would soon take his revenge of the Carafeschi, and eventually pay for his hatred of them with his own life.

At a secret consistory held in late November, 1558, Paul IV had created his grandnephew Alfonso Carafa, cardinal of Naples, the "regens Camerae Apostolicae," taking the seal of the Camera away from Guido Ascanio Sforza, the camerlengo, and giving it to the new "regent." It was Paul's intention that the young Carafa should share "aequa potestate" with Sforza the control and administration of all the goods and properties of the papacy, including those of the Camera, when the Holy See should become vacant, owing to the pope's death. Sforza challenged the novelty of the office of "regent," and the College sided with him, leaving the decision as to the legality and propriety of such a regency to the next occupant of S. Peter's throne. The novena or nine days of mourning for the dead pontiff began on 23 August (1559), and so (not counting the two following Sundays) the papal obsequies were declared at an end on 4 September. Although very likely few could suspect it, an electoral contest was now beginning which was to prove longer and more difficult than the Julian conclave of 1549–1550.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Sebastian Merkle, ed., *Concilium Tridentinum*, II (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1911), 334–37; Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi ("Firmanus"), *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 518; Antonio Guido, *De obitu Pauli IV et conclave cum electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 606–11, who begins his account with Paul IV's death on 18 August (1559). Massarelli has almost

After a mass of the Holy Spirit celebrated by Rodolfo Pio di Carpi, cardinal bishop of Porto, and a sermon on the election of the next pope by the humanist Giulio Poggiani of Novara, the con-

nothing to say about the conclave of 1559, merely recording Giannangelo de' Medici's election as Pius IV on 25–26 December. Firmanus's account of the conclave, in Merkle, II, 518–31, is especially valuable, owing to the fact that as master of ceremonies he was an eyewitness of votes and events. Guido was a native of Mantua or thereabouts. He was present during at least part of the conclave as a juriconsult or as a conclave of Ercole Gonzaga, the cardinal of Mantua (*cf.* Merkle, II, p. CXXXVI).

Oñofrio Panvinio's extensive work *De varia Romani Pontificis creatione libri X* (Codd. Monacenses 147–52), of which the tenth and last book (as we have already noted) describes the conclaves of Julius III, Marcellus II, Paul IV, and Pius IV (Codd. Monacenses 152), is a most important source (*ibid.*, fols. 311<sup>r</sup>–385<sup>r</sup>, 409<sup>r</sup>–427<sup>r</sup>), giving all the votes from the first "scrutiny" to the sixty-eighth as well as a description of Pius's election (I am grateful to Professor Hans Eberhard Mayer for providing me with a microfilm of this manuscript). After traveling in northern Italy and Germany, Panvinio returned to Rome on 12 September, 1559. Cardinal Alessandro Farnese was unwilling to admit Panvinio to the conclave, "quum illico omnes [patres] egresuros pontifice creato speraret." Panvinio remained in Rome, however, for more than three months, and when Christmas day approached, Farnese finally had Panvinio admitted to the conclave (on 24 December), "quod multi religiosi viri tum introducebantur, qui privatas cardinalium et conclavitarum confessiones ob diei natalis celebratam audirent" (Merkle, II, 577–78), i.e., Panvinio, an Augustinian friar, entered the conclave with other religious to hear confessions at Christmas. On these and other sources, *cf.* Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 1–2, note, and *append.*, no. 1, pp. 381–89, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 11–12, and *append.*, no. 1, pp. 621–27; the most valuable introduction to the sources remains Seb. Merkle's "Prolegomena" to the *Conc. Trident.*, II.

The conclave of 1559 has not failed to attract the attention of scholars: Carlo Bromato (Bartolommeo Carrara), *Storia di Paolo IV*, 2 vols., Ravenna, 1748–53, II, bk. xii, pp. 582–87; George Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, Paris, 1882, pp. 308–14; Alphonse de Ruble, *Le Traité de Cateau-Cambrésis*, Paris, 1889, pp. 101–17; Theodor Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV. (1559)*, Gotha, 1889; Ricardo de Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el conclave de 1559*, Madrid, 1889; J. B. Sagmüller, *Die Papstwahlbulden und das staatliche Recht der Exklusive*, Tübingen, 1892, pp. 43–84; René Ancel, "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa: Conclave de 1559: Rôle du Cardinal Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 503–9; Paul Herre, *Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II.*, Leipzig, 1907, repr. Aalen, 1973, pp. 33–64, based largely on the work of Th. Müller; Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli (1540–1565)*, Città di Vaticano, 1961, pp. 79–87, and *append.*, nos. 11–13, pp. 213–15. De Maio's book is very valuable, but carelessly proofread.

clave of one hundred and thirteen days began on 5 September (1559). By the evening of that day, as the master of ceremonies Firmanus notes, forty cardinals had taken the cells assigned to them in the Vatican Palace. The cells extended from the altar or west end of the Cappella Sistina all the way through the Sala Regia and the Sala Ducale to the north wall of the Sala del Concistoro Segreto. The arrangements were almost exactly the same as those for the three preceding conclaves which had elected Julius III, Marcellus II, and Paul IV.

Cardinal Ehrle and Hermann Egger have published the original plans showing the location of the cells and identifying the occupant of each one of them. The Roman printer Antonio Blado published the plan for the conclave of 1559 shortly after 17 September, the last entry in the *diarium* of relevant events which Blado printed along with the plan.<sup>2</sup> When the conclave opened (on 5 September) fifty-five cardinals were living. Massarelli gives their names omitting, apparently by error, that of the French cardinal Antoine de Meudon (d. 25 November, 1559).<sup>3</sup> Owing to their absence from Rome, seven cardinals never entered the conclave at all.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Franz Ehrle and Hermann Egger, *Die Conclavepläne: Beiträge zu ihrer Entwicklungsgeschichte*, Biblioteca Apost. Vaticana, 1933, pp. 17, 30–31, with pl. no. v.

<sup>3</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 338–39. As Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 531, states, "Dies conclavis, cum ingressu et exitu, computati fuerunt 113 dies."

<sup>4</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 586, lines 16–19, identifies the seven who never came to Rome for the conclave: the French cardinals Claude de Givry, Antoine de Meudon, Charles of Lorraine, Charles de Bourbon, and Odet de Châtillon [who was to be declared a heretic, and deprived of all his benefices, the episcopate, and the cardinalate on 31 March, 1563], the Spanish cardinal Francisco de Mendoza y Bobadilla, and Prince Henry, the cardinal of Portugal. Cf. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, II, 339, lines 36–42, and see in general Theodor Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV*. (1889), pp. 67 ff., who notes that of the forty-eight cardinals who participated in the conclave (at one time or another) two were German, two Spanish, seven French, and thirty-seven Italian, of which last group fourteen were from Rome and the papal states, six from Naples and Sicily, four from Tuscany, three from Milan, two each from Venice, Genoa, and Ferrara, and one each from Mantua, Piedmont, Urbino, and Piacenza.

Scions of princely families and sons of poor fathers, the cardinals who made up the conclave of 1559 were an odder lot than usual, largely owing to Paul IV's creations. Jean Bertrand, cardinal archbishop of Sens, was eighty years old; Paul IV's grandnephew Alfonso Carafa, cardinal of Naples, was nineteen. Of the cardinals in the conclave thirteen were nominees of the late pope. As usual, cells were reserved for some of the absent cardinals. The area to the right, as one faced the altar, in the Sistina was left empty because of the doorway (*locus vacuus prop-*

The voting took place as usual in the Cappella Paolina. As time passed, the number of cardinals in the conclave was increased by new arrivals, and decreased by deaths and illnesses, so that when the last, formal scrutiny of the election took place, forty-three or -four cardinals cast their votes. The first vote (*scrutinium*) was held on 9 September; according to Panvinio, forty-two ballots (*schedulae suffragiorum*) were cast. As many as forty-eight cardinals were on hand to vote in some eighteen different scrutines between 23 October and 1 December (1559). Forty-eight was the largest number that could be present, for it included all the cardinals in Rome. Also 1 December was the last date at which such an attendance was possible, for Cardinal Girolamo Capodiferno died on 2 December, and Girolamo Dandino on the fourth.<sup>5</sup> From 9 September to 16 December sixty-eight scrutines were held, for which Panvinio has collected and recorded all the votes.<sup>6</sup>

After dinner on 5 September, as the conclave was getting under way, the forty cardinals then in Rome gathered in the Paolina, where the master of ceremonies Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, known as "Firmanus," administered the oath *de fidelitate* to all who were to remain in the conclave, including the conservators and barons deputed "ad custodiam conclavis." At 11:00 P.M. that night (*hora 4 noctis*) four cardinals, preceded by Firmanus, made a tour of inspection of the whole conclave and the cells of all the cardinals. Firmanus expelled from the conclave those who were not enrolled as conclavists. Another check was made of the conclavists at 4:00 P.M. the following afternoon, "et qui non erant in rotulo magistri cerimoniarum, fuerunt expulsi."

Since there were only eleven pro-French cardinals among those who had just entered the conclave, at about 9:00 P.M. on the evening of 6 September the Spanish faction sought to thrust Cardinal Carpi into the papacy by a sudden concerted act of homage or *adoratio*, as Firmanus notes, "sed magnum habuit obstaculum." Guido Ascanio Sforza, although he was one of the leaders of the Spanish party, helped to frustrate the maneuver, which Firmanus attributes to Carlo Ca-

*ter portam sacristiae*). Carlo Carafa's cell (no. 53) was immediately to the left of the altar in the Sistina, and Giannangelo de' Medici occupied the adjoining cell (no. 52).

<sup>5</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 340; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 526–27.

<sup>6</sup> Cod. lat. Monacensis 152, fols. 320<sup>v</sup>–385<sup>v</sup>, cited by Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, p. CXXXIII, and see Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 381–89, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 621–27.



rafa, who had entirely abandoned his erstwhile French allegiance. Two days later (on 8 September) the French cardinal François de Tournon was admitted into the conclave, and two hours later (at 5:00 P.M.) the cardinals were assembled in a congregation at which the election capitulation was read aloud. All the cardinals swore that, if elected pope, they would promote peace among the Christian princes, resume the work of the oecumenical council, and try (says Raynaldus) "by other proper means to rid the Realm of Christendom of heresy and corruption" (*aliis rationibus licitis haereses et alias corruptelas ex imperio Christianos excisuros*). They would restore discipline in the Church and in the Curia, and promote to the cardinalate only those of appropriate age, character, reputation, and education. They agreed that brothers should not wear the red hat at the same time, and that secret assurances of nominations to the Sacred College should not be given.<sup>7</sup>

Among the competitors for S. Peter's throne at least a score of ambitious cardinals entertained some hope of election, and at least a dozen or so seemed to have a reasonable chance—Pacheco, de la Cueva, Carpi, Cesi, d'Este, Ghislieri, Gonzaga, Medici, Pisani, Puteo, Reumano, Saraceni, and Tournon. Panvinio saw four separate groups in the conclave. The French party with about twelve members was under Louis de Guise and Ippolito d'Este of Ferrara. The Spanish faction, numbering about eight, was led by Guido Ascanio Sforza *intra comitium* and by Philip II's ambassador Francisco de Vargas *extra*, for the latter constantly interfered. When Carlo and Alfonso Carafa and their party were joined by the two Farnese cardinals with their adherents, they commanded twenty-one votes, according to Panvinio, while the few remaining cardinals were neutral.<sup>8</sup>

The contemporary sources vary on the number of votes cast in the long succession of scrutinies. According to Firmanus, whose figures often differ from those of Panvinio, de la Cueva received eighteen votes on 11 September, Pacheco eighteen on

the following day, and Lenoncourt another eighteen on the thirteenth. Votes of courtesy were frequent, especially in the earlier stages of a conclave, and on 14 September the absent cardinal of Portugal, Prince Henry, polled fifteen votes. Diomedea Carafa was given fourteen votes in the scrutiny held on 19 September. The next day Carpi received fourteen votes, no large number, but once more his opponents feared an apparent effort to heave him onto the throne by *adoratio*:

After dinner many cardinals of the imperialist [i.e., the Spanish] faction went to the Cappella Paolina, to which many of the opposing party repaired immediately, fearing lest the former might create the most illustrious Carpi pope, and because of this fear they stayed in the chapel until night, and [Carpi] faded away as pope.<sup>9</sup>

Just as the Spanish party could not bring about Carpi's election, so the French could not effect that of Tournon, to whose candidacy Guise and d'Este, as they wrote Francis II, could see no conceivable objection "except that he was French." They had collected promises of twenty-eight votes, and so apparently required only three more to reach the two-thirds majority of thirty-one. When the scrutiny came on 22 September, however, they could command only fifteen votes and five *accessitis*, leading Guise to write his brothers Charles and François of the disillusionment he felt in his cardinal confrères (. . . *nous fismes expérience de la seurété que l' on peut avoir en la parole de quelques uns*). Carafa and Farnese, who were working hand in glove, had managed to achieve Tournon's defeat.<sup>10</sup>

Pedro Pacheco had been an outstanding member of the Sacred College ever since Paul III had made him a cardinal during the first period of the Council of Trent (on 16 December, 1545), but the Italians and especially the French were opposed to him for the simple reason he was a Spaniard and too dedicated to the Hapsburgs. Pacheco's supporters were to try hard to make him pope,

<sup>7</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 519; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1559, no. 37; and cf. R. de Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el cónclave de 1559* (1889), pp. 40 ff., who states inaccurately that when the conclave opened on 5 September, there were forty-four cardinals on hand for the election.

<sup>8</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 579–80. The sources vary when seeking to identify the Italian adherents to either the French or Spanish factions. The numbers of votes given to this candidate or that in one scrutiny after another are often at variance, even when reported by persons present in the conclave.

<sup>9</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 519–20: ". . . et evanuit pontifex," and cf. Antonio Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 612–13, who describes how de la Cueva was almost elected pope by mistake.

<sup>10</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 832–34, letters of d' Este and Guise to Francis II, and of Guise to Cardinal Charles of Lorraine and Duke François, dated 27 September, 1559; Guido, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 613, who explains that Carafa's rumored willingness to vote for Tournon (which he had no intention of doing) had frightened those who had assured Tournon of their votes into withdrawing them, for despite their so-called promises they did not want the French cardinal for pope.

although he was not in good health and, indeed, he died on 5 March, 1560, shortly after the conclave. His election would, presumably, have been futile. Ippolito d' Este was the chief French candidate, but his ambition was as well known as his persistence was obtrusive. The Spanish party had no use for him. The Carafeschi and their adherents opposed Puteo. Of the candidates favored by Philip II—Carpi, Morone, Puteo, Medici, and the recently-created Cardinal Clemente Dolera (de Olera), general of the Minorites—the only one with a strong chance was Medici. As we have seen from the Roman dispatches of Bernardo Navagero, Giannangelo de' Medici had been one of the few members of the College who had dared to stand up to Paul IV. He had earned the respect of the Curia as well as the determined support of Cosimo I de' Medici, to whom he was not related.

Of Paul IV's eighteen or nineteen nominees to the Sacred College thirteen were still alive, and were in the conclave. The aged Jean Bertrand and Lorenzo Strozzi were the only members of this group to adhere to the French party. The eleven others operated pretty much under the leadership of Carlo Carafa, although some of them certainly disapproved of him. On 11 October, Alfonso Carafa, the youngest member of the electoral panel, wrote his father Antonio of Montebello from the conclave that Carlo Carafa and he had at first selected Cardinal Carpi as their candidate, and that (failing to elect him) they had been well disposed toward Ercole Gonzaga, the cardinal of Mantua. Since their party was not numerous enough, however, to be assured of success, they had joined with Alessandro Farnese and his adherents, "neli quali troviamo più amor et conformità che con altri."

Since Farnese was known to oppose Gonzaga, the two Carafa cardinals, Carlo and Alfonso, had been seeking to reassure their friend and ally. Suddenly and unexpectedly, however, their "adversaries" thought to make Gonzaga pope without the participation of the Carafa-Farnese faction. Although Alfonso Carafa does not state the fact in the letter of 11 October to his father—it was not necessary to do so, for Antonio of Montebello was kept informed of every move in the conclave—Gonzaga had become a Franco-Spanish compromise. He was being given the support of d'Este and Guise, leaders of the French party, as well as of Guido Ascanio Sforza and Cristoforo Madruzzo, helmsmen of the "imperialist" or Spanish party. This attempt to make Gonzaga pope by adoration failed, according to Alfonso Carafa, since his twenty supporters faced twenty-six op-

ponents.<sup>11</sup> The defeat made Gonzaga's candidacy "difficile per sempre." Alfonso assured his father that the Carafa cardinals were not only putting God's service above every other consideration, but that they were also seeking a candidate who would look after the Carafa family.<sup>12</sup> Of that there can be no doubt.

The failure to make Ercole Gonzaga pope by "adoration" had taken place on 25 September. It had caused no small commotion in the conclave. Alessandro Farnese, whose family was at political odds with the Gonzagas, had corralled his cardinals in the Cappella Sistina. His brother Ranuccio had risen from a sickbed, put on a fur wrap, and seated himself at the door of the Sistina so none of their flock could escape into the Sala Regia and continue down the hall into the Cappella Paolina, where popes were elected (or acclaimed by adoration). Carafa had joined his friend Farnese with his followers. Madruzzo had quarreled openly with Farnese. The French cardinals had tried to induce Gonzaga to go with them to the Paolina but, being a prudent man, as Firmanus says, he declined to do so. The move toward *adoratio* had begun about 2:30 P.M. It lasted all the rest of the day, "et suspirio fuit per totam noctem sequentem."<sup>13</sup>

Alfonso Carafa had not sought to mislead his father. It would indeed seem, as stated in his letter

<sup>11</sup> Alfonso Carafa actually wrote that "eglimo [Gonzaga's supporters] non poterno unire insieme a questa election più di XX voti et li nostri furno XXVI . . ." (ref. below), which was an odd way to put it since no vote was taken in an *adoratio*, although a scrutiny did follow the acceptance of a pope by acclamation in order to keep the record straight and to prevent subsequent trouble, especially a conceivable schism.

The Spanish ambassador Francisco de Vargas also puts forty-six cardinals in the conclave on 25 September, but he gives twenty-two "votes" in favor of Gonzaga's *adoratio* (Döllinger, *Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen und Culturgeschichte*, I, no. 70, p. 265, on which work see below, note 18).

<sup>12</sup> Alfonso Carafa's letter of 11 October (1559) to the Marchese Antonio di Montebello is to be found in the Arch. di Stato di Mantova, Busta 1931, and has been published by Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli* (1961), append., no. 12, pp. 213-14. Alfonso's father Antonio of Montebello was very anxious to see the election of Gonzaga, whom he believed most likely to protect the interests of the Carafa family.

<sup>13</sup> Firmanus, *Diario caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 520; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Etat*, II, 834-35, letter of Louis de Guise to his brothers Charles and François, written from the conclave on 27 September (1559); Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, II, 614-15. Since Ercole Gonzaga's brother Ferrante was responsible for the murder of Pierluigi Farnese, the father of Alessandro and Ranuccio, the latter were not likely to support a Gonzaga candidacy for the papacy.

of 11 October, that Carlo and he were prepared to vote for Gonzaga when it was clear that Carpi's chances of election were nil. Antonio Guido, who was apparently a conclavist of Gonzaga, declares in his history of the conclave (*de electione Pii IV*) that there were those who claimed to know that Carlo Carafa had conferred (on the very morning of 25 September) with Vitellozzo Vitelli and Alfonso Carafa "about deciding on Ercole Gonzaga" (*de decernendo Hercule Gonzaga*). But they had agreed to put the matter off until the following night.

When Carlo Carafa saw, however, that he had been anticipated by d' Este and Sforza, the leaders of the rival factions which had got together, he held his followers back, for he was much annoyed that the favor he had planned to curry with Gonzaga had now been pre-empted by others. If the move toward *adoratio* had been postponed for another twenty-four hours, Gonzaga would (in Guido's opinion) have attained the tiara "with no trouble" (*nullo negotio*), but no amount of human planning can go beyond the will of God.<sup>14</sup> Cardinal Louis de Guise regarded Carafa as more responsible than Farnese for the Franco-Spanish failure to effect Gonzaga's elevation to the throne. In fact Guise had never known a Burgundian, a Spaniard, or any other enemy of the French crown to nurture such ill-will against the most Christian king.<sup>15</sup>

The most Christian king was no longer the dull but hardy Henry II, who had been removed from the scene by an odd mischance some months before. While jousting on 30 June (1559) with Gabriel de Lorges, count of Montgomery, Henry had been struck in the face through a half-open visor by a blow of Montgomery's lance. Ten days later he died (on 10 July),<sup>16</sup> being succeeded by his son Francis II, who had married Mary Stuart, niece of the brothers Guise, who were now taking over the rule of France. One of these brothers, Louis, was of course a member of the present conclave. Francis was as weak in mind as in body. He would not last long, but the Guises would. The flames of Protestant reaction against the Catholic crown—and against the Guises—were mounting rapidly, being kindled by Louis I de Bourbon, prince of Condé. The Protestant "conspiracy of Amboise" and its bloody repression by the Guises lay in the immediate offing. No pope could have provided solutions to the religious and political problems of France. Approaching his middle fifties, Gonzaga had shown wisdom and restraint thus far in his career. He might have managed as well on the papal throne as any other member of the conclave.

Ercole Gonzaga was the son of Gian Francesco Gonzaga, marquis of Mantua, and his wife Isabella d' Este. He had a far better reputation than his cousin Ippolito d' Este, the son of Alfonso I d' Este of Ferrara (Isabella's brother) and Lucrezia Borgia. No less than Ippolito, however, Ercole was impeded by his princely descent. Papal electors were now shying away from princely popes, and so was Philip II, who did not want to see any further disruption of the Spanish hegemony in Italy. Papal authority was quite enough without adding thereto the prestige, wealth, and power of an Italian territorial principality.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Guido, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 615.

<sup>15</sup> Ribier, II, 834. The news of Paul IV's death (on 18 August, 1559) had reached Paris by 27 August (Rawdon Brown and G. C. Bentinck, *Cal. State Papers*. . . . Venice, VII [London, 1890], no. 95, p. 122). Cardinals Lorenzo Strozzi, Louis de Guise, and Jean Bertrand were on their way to Rome by 6 September. Giovanni Michiel, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, wrote the doge and Senate he had learned that Louis de Guise's instructions were to the effect "that . . . he is commissioned in the new election of the Pope to do his utmost for [Ippolito d' Este, the Cardinal of Ferrara, and to use all his power to defeat [Rodolfo Pio, the Cardinal of Carpi]; that as second candidate he is to support [François de] Tournon; and as third [Ercole Gonzaga], the Cardinal of Mantua. . . . For the fourth, Cardinal [Louis, not Charles] de Guise was to propose Cardinal [Francesco] Pisani; for the fifth, [Tiberio] Crispo, and for the sixth, [Ghirolamo] Capodiferro, Cardinal of [San] Giorgio; no mention being made of the other cardinals."

Michiel notes also that, in the opinion of Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, the world was sick and tired of "seeing popes without authority and of low extraction." For the well-being of the Holy See, Lorraine said that "it is necessary to make a prince by birth pope, that he may have authority not only with the cardinals, but also with other potentates" (*ibid.*, VII, no. 96, p. 123). As I have noted in the preceding chapter, Rawdon Brown has regularly confused the brothers Charles and Louis de Guise. Charles, not Louis, was the cardinal of Lorraine.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Léon Marlet, *Le Comte de Montgomery* [1530–1574], Paris, 1890, pp. 9–18. On the vastly increased importance of the house of Guise after Henry II's death, note A. Desjardins (and Giuseppe Canestrini), *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, III (Paris, 1865), 404 ff.: "Le cardinal [Charles] de Lorraine est pape et roi en France," etc.

<sup>17</sup> On Ercole Gonzaga and Ippolito d' Este, note Josef Šusta, *Die römische Curie und das Concil von Trient unter Pius IV.*, 4 vols., Vienna, 1904–14, I, introd., pp. XLIII ff., LXXXIII–LXXXI. These four volumes of documents, with Šusta's notes, have for years provided the indispensable background for the diplomatic and doctrinal history of the third and final period of the Council of Trent (1561–1563). On d' Este and the conclave of 1559, cf. Heinrich Lutz, "Kardinal Ippolito II. d' Este (1509–1572)," in *Reformatam Reformanda: Festsage für Hubert Jedin*, I (1965), 521–22.

Philip II's ambassador Francisco de Vargas had arrived in Rome on 25 September,<sup>18</sup> when Sforza and d'Este were unable to carry the day by *adoratio* on Gonzaga's behalf. Vargas courteously assured Gonzaga and the latter's friends that he was supporting the Mantuan candidacy under instructions from Philip II, who was well disposed toward Gonzaga. The Spanish party was divided. Sforza had proceeded with plans for the sudden *adoratio* without consulting his colleagues, and (among others) Pacheco, Carpi, Medici, and Montepulciano had refused to go along with him. Despite the confusion and the apparent attractiveness of Gonzaga's candidacy, Carafa had managed to retain the support of his own followers.

As for Vargas, despite what he said, he now worked against Gonzaga, who had never expressed any resentment against the Hapsburgs' dismissal of his brother Ferrante. But who could say what his attitude might be if he were elected pope? Gonzaga's supporters and opponents both sent letters and envoys off to Spain. Sforza and Madruzzo addressed no fewer than five letters to Philip in a week (from 25 September to 2 October), seeking the king's assistance to advance Gonzaga's cause. It was all in vain. Cosimo de' Medici also wrote several letters to Philip, always promoting Medici's candidacy.<sup>19</sup>

However discreet the king of Spain might be, it was not easy for him to conceal his preferences for election to the papacy. Philip II was then at Toledo, where an envoy from Mantua waited upon him, as did Ferdinand Francesco d' Avalos (d. 1571), marquis of Pescara, who had married Cardinal Ercole's niece Isabella Gonzaga. The Venetian ambassador to Philip's court, Paolo Tiepolo, was understandably interested in the machinations for and against Ercole. On 14 November (1559) he wrote his government he had been told "that his Majesty's desire and intention would be that the Conclave should elect either Carpi, Medi-

ci, or Morone, if possible. The King would consider it bad news, were the Conclave to elect either Mantua or Pacheco." Philip stated publicly that he was averse to interfering in the conclave, while he gave both Ercole and Pacheco private assurances of support. He was apprehensive, however, of Ercole's reputation and connections in Italy and of Pacheco's prestige and relatives in Spain, "and it has been seen by experience that Spanish Popes have little friendship for their natural sovereigns."<sup>20</sup>

At about 2:30 P.M. on 26 September, Franz von Turm, Ferdinand's ambassador in Rome, appeared at the window of the portal to the conclave (*in sportello*), and urged the cardinals to proceed with all expedition to the election of a pope "because of the perils threatening the Christian commonwealth." Jean du Bellay, dean of the Sacred College, answered him "per verba generalia." Then the Spanish ambassador Vargas, who had arrived in the city the day before, delivered a letter from Philip II and presented his letters of credence to the cardinals, to whom he also made a speech, following a somewhat different tact. Vargas said he believed that, with God's grace, peace had been made [at Cateau-Cambresis] at a most appropriate time, for now the cardinals could quickly, without distraction, and with due deliberation set about the election of a pope. He gave fulsome assurance that King Philip looked upon this election as his overriding concern, more important than any success or than life itself.

Du Bellay again made a fitting response, with some general words, to Vargas's exhortation, acknowledging and praising Philip's piety. He declared that the cardinals had assembled for no other purpose than to choose, *spiritu sancto demonstrante*, the best possible pontiff, which obviously could not be done in haste "propter rei magnitudinem et gravitatem." They must elect a pope of their own free will, and in doing so depend upon no man's judgment or authority. In the name of the Sacred College he thanked King Philip for his great concern for the Christian commonwealth.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Guido, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 614, lines 10–11. Vargas's dispatches to Philip II, relating to the conclave, may be found in J. J. I. von Döllinger, *Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen und Culturgeschichte der sechs letzten Jahrhunderte*, I (Regensburg, 1862), nos. 70–83, pp. 265–328, dated from 27 September to 28 December, 1559. In his first dispatch, dated 27 September, *ibid.*, no. 70, p. 265, Vargas says that he had arrived in Rome "three days ago" (*illegue aqui tres dias ha*), but he is counting inclusively. On Vargas, whose acquaintance we have made at the Council of Trent, cf. Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el cónclave de 1559*, pp. 59 ff.

<sup>19</sup> Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, esp. pp. 126–36, and cf. Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 73, p. 275, et alibi, on Vargas's unhelpful courtesy toward Gonzaga.

<sup>20</sup> Brown and Bentinck, *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VII, no. 111, p. 133, and cf., *ibid.*, no. 115. Philip II apparently did not want to see Cardinal Pedro Pacheco elected pope (cf. Giovanni Soranzo, "Relazione di Spagna [1565]," in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. I, vol. V [Florence, 1861], 96).

<sup>21</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialis*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 521; Guido, *De electione Pii IV.*, *ibid.*, II, 615–16; and cf. Vargas, in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 70, p. 267.

Vargas's determination to see a pro-Spanish pope elected quite exceeded whatever sense of diplomatic propriety he may have possessed. His conduct proved more than offensive. It became outrageous. As Alvise Mocenigo, the Venetian ambassador to the Curia Romana, later explained to the Senate (which hardly needed the explanation), the only rivalry in the conclave was that between the pro-French and pro-Spanish cardinals, for only the kings of France and Spain had any authority over the members of the Sacred College. Mocenigo says frankly that the cardinals were motivated "principalmente" by self-interest, for they were not only to a large extent subjects of these two kings, but they stood to lose the abbeys, benefices, and fat pensions which they owed either to the crown of France or to that of the Spains. Couriers were sent from the conclave more than once to the two kings, and everything would be held up for a month and a half until the answer came.

The ambassadors, as usual, importuned the cardinals on behalf of one candidate or another. This was to be expected, but there was no stopping Vargas,

who has turned the whole world upside down to make Carpi or Pacheco pope, engaging in many a hateful or unfair maneuver quite without his king's instructions, as is thought, against various cardinals—nay, against everyone whom he saw about to achieve success as pope.

His passion, his madness, was such that Mocenigo found it a "cosa odiosa e quasi insopportabile." Hardly a night passed that Vargas was not to be found at the doorway to the conclave. Sometimes he stayed there until dawn. Those within, presumably conclavists, emerged from the electoral compound to confer with him, and then returned to their supposed confinement, as did Don Ferrante di Sanguine, the abbot Gian Francesco Gambaro di Brescia (whom Alessandro Farnese sent to Vargas), and Monsignor Alessandro Casale, who conspired with Vargas on Carpi's behalf.<sup>22</sup>

The Franco-Spanish amalgamation was soon wrecked on the shoals of Vargas's underhanded

disapproval. Guido Ascanio Sforza, Alessandro Farnese, and Carlo Carafa began to go their different ways. There were some things one could be sure of, such as the fact that Ferrante Gonzaga had done the Farnesi enough harm in the past. Alessandro was not likely to vote for Ferrante's brother Ercole. The Italians would not rally behind either a French or a Spanish cardinal, and strong affiliations with the one side or the other, as in the case of d' Este or Carpi, could be an obstacle. Carlo Carafa was looking out merely for himself and his family. In early October (1559) his brother Giovanni had written him from his exile in Gallese that it was not important to strive for a candidate one might prefer. It was important to be on the winning side. The Carafeschi, he said, were hated by both the kings of France and Spain. If they could not be sure of the friendship of the next pope, they would spend the rest of their lives in exile. Carlo must try to be the arbiter of the conclave.<sup>23</sup>

Owing to the usual violations of the rules of the conclave, as letters and even conclavists were going in and out by the windows, a commission was soon set up "pro reformatione conclavis." On 5 October the reform commission decreed that the cardinals should have only three conclavists—sick cardinals four at the most—and the agents of princes and the merchants who had invaded the electoral enclosure should be expelled. All the windows and doors to the conclave should be closed, sealed, and examined every week. The cardinals were not to share food with one another.

Letters might be received only by Firmanus, the master of ceremonies, with the consent of *cardinales deputati*, who would read them first, and vouch for their admissibility. Among other regulations cardinals and conclavists were not to wander about the halls of the conclave after the bell rang at about 10:00 P.M. (*hora 4 noctis*). The cardinals should not show their votes to others, nor should they go near the doorway of the conclave except to greet some cardinal who was just arriving. If conclavists were caught going "ad portam conclavis," they were to be expelled. These measures were all well taken, says Firmanus, "but nobody observed them!"<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Alvise (Luigi) Mocenigo, "Relazione di Roma (1560)," in Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. 11, vol. IV (1857), pp. 44–45. In a dispatch of 5 November (1559) to Philip II, Vargas attested to his determined, perhaps excessive, efforts to elect a pro-Spanish pope, assuring Philip "que desde que nascí en cosa ninguna, ni en todas juntas jamás he trabajado, ni usado de tanta diligencia y buena manera posible, como en esta, y así haré hasta la fin y creo que si lo, que Dios no mande, sucediese contrario de lo que se desea y pretende, se me acabaría la vida con ello!" (Döllinger, *Beiträge*, 1, no. 75, p. 289).

<sup>23</sup> Ancl., "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 504.

<sup>24</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimoniae*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, 11, 521–22: ". . . sed a nemine observata." The reform of the conclave had been largely induced by the protest of the *conservatores Urbis* to the cardinals (on 4 October) because of the weeks-long duration of the conclave and the increasing disorder.

During the night of 27 September, Vargas had conferred with Sforza, who tried to dissuade him from supporting Carpi and Pacheco. Instead Sforza was in favor of Puteo or Medici, if it was necessary (as now seemed to be the case) to give up Gonzaga. When the three leaders of factions in the conclave got together again, however, Sforza found Farnese and Carafa unalterably opposed to Puteo which, as far as Carafa was concerned, could not have surprised him. Farnese and Carafa continued to stand by Carpi and Pacheco.

As the leader of the so-called imperialist or Spanish party, Sforza was forced into a position of halfheartedly working for Carpi and Pacheco, both of whom he disliked, and of trying to convince Gonzaga's friends and the French party that he was still co-operating with them.<sup>25</sup> Sforza thus gained the ill will of Vargas, losing the trust of the French faction as well as that of Spain. Sforza felt unable, however, to break completely with the French, as Vargas wanted, and ally himself with Carafa and Farnese, for if he did so, he feared his two rivals would lead their followers into the French camp and elect a pope without his collaboration.<sup>26</sup>

ders in the city. Although rebuffed by the dean of the College, du Bellay, the conservators had expressed indignation "quod eos [i.e., cardinales] ad reges nuntios et literas misisse intellegebant, ex quibus quem ita potissimum nominarent cognoscere possent." The cardinals, said the conservators, were being un mindful of their own authority and dignity, and subjecting themselves to the judgment and power of others (Güldo, *De electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 617). There was a similar public protest on 27 November (Firmanus, *ibid.*, II, 526).

Poor old du Bellay had a hard time operating as dean. When on 13 October Vargas addressed the cardinals at the conclave doorway (in *spottello*), du Bellay answered him "in lingua semigallica et italica absque capite et caudal" (Firmanus, *ibid.*, II, 523).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the dispatches of Vargas to Philip II, in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, nos. 71-75, pp. 269-88, and Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 137-43 and ff., followed by Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 29-31, who is absurdly mistranslated in *Hist. Popes*, XV, 27-28, for he never wrote that "Vargas had dissuaded Sforza from assisting Carpi and Pacheco . . . [I]"—his German text says exactly the opposite. Again, Pastor, VII, 34, says that on 11 October Carafa gave Sforza four days to break off his connection with the French; otherwise the Carafeschi and their supporters would themselves join the French, and make Tournon the pope. The English translation has, by an odd slip, become nonsense, whereby Carafa gave Sforza, the leader of the Spanish party, four days to "break off his alliance with the Spaniards" or Carafa would join the French to make Tournon pope (*Hist. Popes*, XV, 35). Cf. Müller, *op. cit.*, pp. 149, 159-60.

<sup>26</sup> Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 145-47, and see Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, nos. 72-75, pp. 272, 275, 280, 285, *et alibi*. Even the tough-minded Vargas was becoming disturbed by the extent of the hatred which Sforza was manifesting against

Sforza would have allied himself, almost, with the devil rather than with Carlo Carafa, who told Vargas that Sforza was his enemy, was determined to destroy his family, and was seeking to elect a pope who would effect the ruin of the Carafeschi. This was why Sforza had joined d' Este and the French, according to Carafa, and the camerlengo's desire for vengeance was working to the disadvantage of Philip II.<sup>27</sup> Carafa was thus under no illusions as to the peril of his position and the importance of the papal election. He had returned to Rome within hours of Paul IV's death. He had witnessed the popular manifestations of hatred, and had seen the broken arms of the Carafa family scattered through the streets of Rome. Condemned by his own uncle, who had made him a cardinal, Carafa was a scoundrel, and he knew it, but probably wondered with some justification whether he was so much worse than other papal sons and nephews of whom he had heard tell at the Curia.

Holding in the palm of his hand ten or so votes, more than a fifth of the total conclave, Carafa's future and that of his family depended upon how skillfully he managed to play that hand. Marc' Antonio Colonna was back in Rome, the friend of the camerlengo Sforza. Carafa knew that he was acquiring the hostility of Ercole Gonzaga by opposing his election, and Cristoforo Madruzzo was Gonzaga's friend. By his desertion of the French, Carafa had incurred Ippolito d' Este's enmity. Federico de' Cesi was already his enemy, so was Jacopo Puteo, and there were others. Alessandro Farnese and Sforza were enemies, to be sure, but the Farnesi were lords of Parma and Piacenza; they were reconciled with Philip II, and could take care of themselves.<sup>28</sup>

Although as a gambler and an opportunist Carlo Carafa had always believed in keeping his options open, the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (among other considerations) had made him take a stand. The

Farnese and Carafa, and especially against the latter, "como las pasiones entre el Camerlengo, Farnés y Carrafa han ido creciendo cada hora con una terrible desconfianza y enemistad" (*ibid.*, I, no. 75, p. 282, doc. dated 5 November, 1559). In the same dispatch Vargas wrote, "Finalmente el Camerlengo no se osa despegar de Ferrara y Franceses por lo ya dicho y porque en haciendolo le parece que Farnés y Carrafa se juntarán con otros y harán Papa sin él" (*ibid.*, p. 288).

<sup>27</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 75, pp. 282-83, Vargas's letter to Philip II of 5 November (1559).

<sup>28</sup> On Carafa's control of "nine or ten certain votes," cf. Vargas's dispatch of 27 September in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 70, p. 266, and on the hostility between Farnese and Guido Ascanio Sforza, *ibid.*, I, no. 71, p. 269, doc. dated 28 September.

future of the Carafa family lay in Italy. Philip II was the dominant power in Italy. The French had become outsiders. If Carafa's brother Giovanni were to be obliged to give up Paliano, the compensation would have to come from Philip. Carafa thus had to support the Spanish party of which, unfortunately for him, the leader was his archenemy Sforza.

The election of Rodolfo Pio of Carpi, Carafa's candidate and that of Spain, had been halted by d'Este and the French faction. Carafa and Farnese had frustrated French efforts to elect d'Este, Tournon, and Gonzaga. Giovanni Ricci of Montepulciano had little following. His candidacy was impossible anyway, for his colleagues knew of his Portuguese mistress and his children.<sup>29</sup> When it looked as though the conclave had reached an impasse, more attention was paid to Giannangelo de' Medici, whom Duke Cosimo I of Florence was supporting in every way he found practicable.

Medici was also quite acceptable to Philip II, for he had been no friend of Paul IV, whose anti-Spanish policy he had opposed. Alienated from the French, Carafa was probably unwise in declaring allegiance to the Spanish, the friends and supporters of the Colonnese, the most powerful Italian enemies of his house. Carafa's attachment to Carpi throughout the conclave is understandable. Carpi and Paul IV had been dedicated inquisitors, and Carafa believed he could trust his family's friend.

As 27 October was drawing to a close, the Spanish ambassador Vargas received from Philip II a dispatch dated 8 and 9 October, which was entrusted to one Pompeo Tutavilla for delivery to Rome. Falling ill along the way, however, Tutavilla had sent on the dispatch by a courier, who told a number of persons that King Philip was ordering the return of Paliano to Marc' Antonio Colonna. Tutavilla himself had said so. This report, apparently confirmed from other sources, was soon known in the conclave. It could not have come at a worse time for the Spanish party, as Vargas wrote Philip (on 5 November), and nothing could have made d'Este and the French happier. Vargas and Don Pedro Alfano (Per Afán) de Rivera, the new viceroy of Naples, were stunned by the news, and sought to give Carlo Carafa every assurance, from promises to money. Vargas hoped that his efforts and fear of Sforza would keep Carafa in line.<sup>30</sup>

Despite Carafa's joining the Spanish party and pledging his votes to Carpi and Pacheco, Philip II intended to re-establish Marc' Antonio in Paliano. The king had not bothered to review the matter with the Carafeschi; he had not even bothered to inform them in advance. Furthermore, there had apparently been no suggestion of the compensation which Giovanni Carafa was to receive (as provided for by the secret capitulation of Cave) in the event he was required to give up Paliano. What was more, Paliano was supposed not to be returned to the Colonnese, who had been declared enemies of the Holy See. And so what was to happen now? With his ten votes Carafa was in a stronger position in the conclave than he could possibly be after the election. Where would the Carafeschi stand if an unfriendly pope ascended the throne? For the time being, however, it looked as though Philip had played into the hands of Carafa, for now the latter could put his votes up for sale to the highest bidder.

Although Gonzaga had declared that his French supporters should not prolong the conclave any longer by advocating his candidacy, Vargas believed it was a ruse to get more votes.<sup>31</sup> In any event Francis II sent a friendly word to Carafa, and the queen mother Catherine de' Medici wrote to him. The French renewed their efforts, turning now to Carafa to whom they offered every inducement for his support, as d'Este and Guise wrote Francis on 20 November (1559), "mettant plus de peine que nous n'avions fait à caresser et entretenir le Cardinal Carafe." D'Este's own hopes were revived but, on 6 December, Francis sent a signed statement to Guise that if the French cardinals had no chance, and if Carafa's support could not be enlisted for d'Este, the French party should work for the election of Cesi, Dolera, or Medici.<sup>32</sup>

dated 29 (not 30) November. Pedro de Rivera, duke of Alcalá, had come to Naples as viceroy in June (1559), on which note Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 458, line 13; Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV.*, pp. 157 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 77, p. 294, letter dated 29 (not 30) November, 1559, and see Guido, *De electione Pii IV.*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 619, entry for 8 November. Gonzaga had had the support of his dual nephews, Guidobaldo II della Rovere of Urbino and Guglielmo Gonzaga of Mantua. Urbino had been highly indignant at Vargas's lukewarm support of (or rather clandestine opposition to) Gonzaga (cf. *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VII, no. 117, p. 137). Philip II did not want Gonzaga to become pope, but was less than honest in acknowledgment of the fact (cf. Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV.*, pp. 135-36, 175-76, et alibi).

<sup>32</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Etat*, II, 838-39, letter of d'Este and Guise to Francis II, "du conclave à Rome, 20 Novembre [1559]," and of Francis II to Guise, dated at Blois on

<sup>29</sup> Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Etat*, II, 837-38; Ruble, *Le Traité de Cateau-Cambresis*, p. 115; Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV.*, p. 155.

<sup>30</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 75, pp. 285-89, Vargas's letter to Philip II of 5 November, and cf., *ibid.*, no. 77, p. 298, doc.

Carafa's cunning appears not to have been reinforced by wisdom. His very insecurity now made him more arrogant and harder to deal with. As Farnese told Vargas in confidence, Carafa intended to choose the pope by himself, and was negotiating with d' Este and the French, throwing a fright into everyone, especially into Sforza. Carafa was still giving thought to Carpi, but was also considering d' Este, Dolerà, or one or another of the cardinals whom his uncle Paul IV had created, such as Reumano. Medici's position was ambiguous.<sup>33</sup> Another survey was made of the conclave on 29 November, and a number of pseudo-conclavists were expelled from the electoral halls.

By this time the loathsome conditions in the conclave had become a menace to everyone's health. Firmanus informs us that on 30 November twelve *fachini* were brought into the conclave to clean the halls. Some sweepers had been evicted the day before, along with the pseudo-conclavists. The stench had become insupportable. Many wanted to leave the noxious halls, "timentes aliquam contagiosam infirmitatem." Carafa had apparently taken charge of the conclave, for Firmanus says in his diary, "The most illustrious [Cardinal] Carafa consigned the cleaning men [*fachini*] to me to distribute them as I saw fit through the rooms of the . . . cardinals. I assigned four rooms to each one of them."<sup>34</sup> The cleaning came none too soon for, as we have already noted, Capodiferno died on 2 December, and Dandino two days later.

Carafa's importance would cease the very hour a pope was chosen.<sup>35</sup> Thereafter his future and that of his family would depend upon the new

pope. Gonzaga had withdrawn from the contest (on 8 November), and shortly thereafter Sforza and Vargas had revealed Philip II's opposition to the Mantuan candidacy, so there was no likelihood of its being revived. For weeks Pacheco had received twenty votes, more or less, but it had become clear that as a Spaniard he had no chance. On 19 November Carpi finally withdrew from the race.<sup>36</sup>

With all the aplomb of a huckster in a bazaar, Carafa weighed the competing offers of the Spanish and the French for his support. From the Spanish he wanted a principality (and the title of prince) for his elder brother Giovanni. The French offered him the marquise of Saluzzo, 30,000 ducats, and the sure retention of his Italian benefices. Vargas made him promises quite beyond what Philip II had authorized.<sup>37</sup> The deadlock in the conclave was causing lawlessness in the city, and furthermore (as the *conservatores Urbis* had explained on 27 November) the cardinals must take thought of the city's food supply which was dwindling day by day (*praeterea annonae rationem habendam, quae in dies gravior fieret*).<sup>38</sup>

On 8 December (1559) Vargas came into the Vatican Palace with a letter from Philip II, and requested an audience of the cardinals, who by common consent agreed to hear him at the window in the door of the conclave. He told them that their delay in electing a pontiff had caused Philip II "incredible grief." He reminded them of Gregory X's decree of papal elections (*Ubi periculum* of 1274): If they had not elected a pope within three days—let alone three months!—their food should have been reduced (i.e., to a single plate to be served them each morning and evening),<sup>39</sup> and they should have been subjected to many other "incommoda." Theirs was the gravest task, the most solemn responsibility on earth, considering the importance of the pontificate. Europe was ablaze with heresy while they dallied. Christendom needed a pope, and clearly the delay in choosing one should continue no longer.

As usual the old dean du Bellay answered for the Sacred College. The cardinals were quite aware, he said, of Philip's steadfast support of the Apostolic See—he had often made it manifest in

6 December. On the rapid revival and dissipation of d' Este's papal hopes, see Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 622–23, and Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 77, pp. 305–7, and note Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV*, pp. 245–47.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 77, pp. 301–2, letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated 29 (not 30) November, 1559: ". . . Lo que a propósito de esto en mucho secreto me ha dicho Farnés es que Garrafa, como se vee tan poderoso en Conclave, está sobervio y tan riguroso, que no le osan hablar y que en todas maneras quiere hacer Papa de su mano, y que para este efecto entretiene las pláticas con Ferrara y Franceses, y pone a todos en miedo, specialmente al Camarlengo . . ." and cf. *ibid.*, I, 305.

<sup>34</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialis*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 526, and on the dangerously unsanitary conditions in the halls of the conclave, cf. Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 621, entry for 19 November.

<sup>35</sup> Cosimo I de' Medici had no illusions about Carafa's importance, but he feared d' Este's ambition and Farnese's craftiness (Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV*, pp. 162–64).

<sup>36</sup> Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 620–21; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo IV*, II, bk. XII, p. 584.

<sup>37</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 77, pp. 296 ff.; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV*, pp. 147, 167–74; Pastor, *Hist. Papes*, XV, 36 ff., and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 36 ff.

<sup>38</sup> Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 621. <sup>39</sup> Cf. Volume I, pp. 117–18.



the past—but from the very beginning of the conclave they had assembled with but one purpose, “ut quam primum summus pontifex crearetur.” The restrictions on food would very shortly be fully observed. It had been easier to elect popes in earlier eras, for there had been fewer cardinals to reach an agreement, but even so they had often failed to do so, and it had taken five or six months or more than a year to elect a pope. The length of the present conclave was, however, no more the fault of the cardinals than of outsiders (like Vargas), who were forever meddling in the papal election, “which was none of their business” (*quod ad eos nulla ex parte pertineret*). There was no dissent within the walls of the conclave which was not broadcast outside. If such interference were removed, the cardinals could soon proceed to a proper election.

Du Bellay had spoken “not without vexation” (*non sine stomacho*), and had seemed to aim his remarks at Philip II, which caused some commotion, and led Vargas to embark upon a long defense of his sovereign, who had (he said) always looked to the dignity and advantage of the Church. Philip did not seek “like some lord” (*tanquam dominus*) to tell the fathers to vote for this person rather than that, but merely as an obedient son of the Apostolic See he had expressed an opinion concerning certain persons. As one who understood the need to obey rather than to command, of course he gave free rein to their judgment and their will to choose the next pope. Those who thought otherwise of Philip were mistaken. He was in no wise the cause of this long delay in choosing a pope. Having made his speech, Vargas delivered Philip’s letter to the cardinals. Du Bellay made a courteous acknowledgment of Philip’s concern, Farnese took the dean to task for his remarks, and (after Vargas’s departure) the cardinals went on to quash Reumano’s slender chances of becoming pope. When word reached the city that Reumano, a Frenchman, might be elected, the Romans came close to riot.<sup>40</sup>

Opinions varied among those who paced up and down the electoral halls in the Vatican Palace as to the extent to which, as Vargas believed, Carlo Carafa was really the “patron del conclave.” Sforza insisted that he was not, but Vargas was taking no chances. The latter made such promises on Philip II’s behalf that Carafa finally declared

his intention, as Vargas wrote Philip (on 12 December, 1559), “de durar firmamente en servir á vuestra Magestad.” Carafa had assured the worried ambassador that now he could sleep securely. As the days passed, however, and no confirmation of Vargas’s promises came from Spain, Carafa’s doubts and Vargas’s fears returned. Diplomatic toreador that he was, Vargas took the bull by the horns, and (as he informed Philip in a second letter of 12 December, this time in cipher) on his own responsibility he produced a paragraph, promising Carafa all due reward if he preserved his Spanish allegiance and supported Philip’s candidates in the conclave. He showed Carafa the text, and told him that it was an extract from Philip’s last letter.<sup>41</sup> They were a pair, Vargas and Carafa, *Arcades ambo*; it takes a thief to catch a thief, and Carafa was caught.

For appearances’ sake Carafa thought he could not immediately cross the aisle to rejoin the Spanish, but the full measure of his duplicity was to come to light on 14–15 December. The day before, word had spread through the city “that nothing was more likely,” says Guido, “than that Ercole Gonzaga should be made pope, a development which all thought probable, because it was believed that Cardinal Carafa had changed his mind and agreed to go along with Sforza in proclaiming him pope.” According to Vargas, Madruzzo and certain other cardinals were so sure of Gonzaga’s election that they had sent their silver plate out of the cells in the electoral halls “porque no se la saqueasen,” for (as everyone knew) when a pope was elected, crowds broke into the halls, and made off with whatever they could lay their hands on.

Carafa’s brother Antonio, marchese di Montebello, had been most courteously received by Gonzaga’s nephew Guidobaldo, the duke of Urbino. Antonio was urging Gonzaga’s election, and was said to have convinced his son Alfonso, cardinal of Naples, that the Carafa faction should all vote for the lord cardinal of Mantua. Farnese worked hard to defeat his enemy, and to relieve Farnese’s anxiety Carafa dined with him that afternoon or evening. Contrary to the expectation of the French, the Carafa faction did not join them. Also this time Sforza could not help Con-

<sup>40</sup> Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 623–26; cf. Müller, *Das Konklave Pius’ IV.*, pp. 182–85, and Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 42–44.

<sup>41</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, nos. 78–79, pp. 308–9: “. . . acordé sin dar parte a persona formar un capítulo, como que Vuestra Magestad me lo escribía . . .” quoted also by Müller, *Das Konklave Pius’ IV.*, p. 183, and Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 44. Cf. also Döllinger, I, no. 81, p. 316, letter dated 21 December, 1559.

zaga, for he now knew of Philip II's "exclusion" of the Mantuan.<sup>42</sup> Gonzaga's last chance of becoming pope had passed forever.

On Thursday, 14 December, Gonzaga had been thus disposed of, along with Tournon and Cesi, with a mere ten votes. Pacheco received eighteen. It was the sixty-seventh scrutiny of the conclave. Jean Reumano, one of Paul IV's earliest nominees, had remained a loyal member of the Carafa group. Carlo had apparently told Louis de Guise that he wished, once more, as a gesture of courtesy to bring up Reumano's name before the conclave, to which no one, especially a Frenchman, could have any objection. It was a waste of time; Reumano had no chance of election; anyhow they had already wasted more than three months. The French were, however, with good reason suspicious of Carafa, owing to his failure to abide by an apparent promise to assist Gonzaga. Carafa assured Guise that as long as they were all concerned with Reumano, no effort would be made on Carpi's behalf.

Guise had been shocked to learn that Carafa had reconsidered the possibility of Carpi's election. By 9:00 P.M. that night it was clear that Carafa had lied to Guise, for *contra suam promissionem* he tried once more to effect Carpi's elevation by "adoration" before the French thought he had finished with his gesture toward Reumano. The result was a violent quarrel, *verba altercatiora et iniuriosa*, between Guise and Carafa, which was certainly the end of the latter's French connection.<sup>43</sup>

According to Guido, the enraged Guise now banged on the door of d' Este's cell, and stomping in, he found there Madruzzo, Sermoneta, and della Corgna. He accused d' Este of sitting there, as though he hadn't a care in the world. Carafa has broken with us, he yelled, and they're trying to make Carpi pope. The conclave was soon in pandemonium—the old cardinals declared they had never seen such great disorder in any conclave. D' Este hurried off with his friends to the Cappella Sistina, where Guise stationed himself at the door leading into the Sala Regia, still yelling (says Firmanus) "Voglion far papa Carpi!" Madruzzo had gone with d' Este not so much with the desire to prevent Carpi's elevation as in the forlorn hope that maybe Gonzaga had a chance.

<sup>42</sup> Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 626; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 528; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 186–87.

<sup>43</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 528.

As Carafa was rounding up his own followers, obviously to join the Spaniards in the Paolina, he ran into Vitelli, and asked him to come too. Vitelli coldly replied that Carafa must pardon him. Some other day, perhaps, but not now. Carafa had used Vitelli as his go-between with the French "to decide upon Ercole [Gonzaga]." Then he had abandoned the French, rejoined the Spanish, and left Vitelli in an embarrassing lurch. Once more they had reached an impasse in the malodorous halls of the conclave, with great contention on both sides.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the debacle of Carafa's efforts on Carpi's behalf, the Spaniards decided again to press the candidacy of Pacheco, who had shown consistent strength in one scrutiny after another. Also it would appear that Philip II had written Vargas (on 27 October) that Pacheco headed his list of preferred candidates.<sup>45</sup> The time seemed well chosen for the Spanish faction to rally around Pacheco. The pro-French cardinals Capodiferno and Dandino were dead. Du Bellay had withdrawn from the conclave on 13 December, owing to illness, and Carafa was now irrevocably committed to Spain.

After mass, on the morning of 18 December, the master of ceremonies Firmanus made the usual preparations *pro scrutinio* in the Cappella Paolina, where as always the voting would take place. When the conclavists had been excluded, and the door of the chapel locked, Carafa proposed that the cardinals should cast their votes openly (so Guido informs us) rather than drop them into a covered chalice. Carafa said this would hasten the process, but Tournon, who was acting as dean in du Bellay's absence, declared that such a procedure would be *contra leges et decreta pontificum*. Farnese replied that the election of a pontiff was effected by the overall consensus of the cardinals, and that it made no difference how the consensus was reached.

<sup>44</sup> Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 626–27, entry dated 15 December; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 528, entry for 14 December; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 48–49, note, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 45–46, note, letter of 15 December from Curzio Gonzaga to the castellan of Mantua, describing events in the conclave. Although in essential agreement, the contemporary sources vary considerably in recounting details.

<sup>45</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 77, pp. 294, 295, letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated 29 (not 30) November, 1559, with reference to Pacheco's candidacy: "La misma noche traté con el Camarlingo [Sforza] lo del Cardenal Pacheco, diciendole la voluntad de vuestra Magestad, y de como le anteponia a todos. . . ."

Fearing that the scrutiny was going to be bogged down in another futile discussion, Cardinal Carpi rose, extolled the merits of Pacheco, and upset the table against which he had been leaning. Obviously this was no accident, for according to Guido, this was the table on which the ballots were to be deposited (*ad puncta excipienda*). As the table dropped to the floor with a crash, Carpi moved toward Pacheco, fell at his feet, "illumque pontificem maximum salutavit."

Carafa, Farnese, Sforza, and others followed him in this act of *adoratio*. Those who wanted to make Pacheco pope (says Firmanus) were requested to assemble on the gospel or right side of the altar, i.e., as one stood behind the altar and looked toward the door which led into the Sala Regia. A number of cardinals did so, but others went to the epistle side in opposition to Pacheco, among these being Jacopo Savelli, Fulvio della Corgna, Taddeo de' Gaddi, and Gian Andrea Mercurio. Gonzaga and Sermoneta hurried from the chapel to Federico de' Cesi's cell to enlist his vote against Pacheco, while Alfonso Carafa went off to summon Gian Michele Saraceni and Michele Ghislieri to the chapel in support of Pacheco. Cesi, Saraceni, and Ghislieri were absent because of illness.

All told, Carpi, Carafa, and Farnese had garnered only twenty-seven votes for Pacheco, according to Firmanus, at least three short of the required two-thirds majority. Pacheco's cell had been plundered, and the valuables removed, by members of his household under the belief that his election was certain. After a mid-day meal the cardinals of both parties repaired to the chapel, and thereafter at about 2:00 P.M. (*hora 21*) some twenty cardinals gathered together with Pacheco, who returned to his ruined cell three hours later. His adherents could see no way to collect thirty votes, for certain Italian cardinals, although members of the pro-Hapsburg faction, had no desire for a Spanish pope.

When Francisco de Vargas learned that the tiara had eluded Pacheco once more, he hastened to the Vatican Palace, furious with della Corgna and Mercurio for deserting the Spanish party. Firmanus tells us that there was an open or unfastened window facing the pharmacy of the conclave; one could reach it by the roof, and thus gain access to the electoral halls. This was the way Vargas used to come "ad confabulandum cum cardinalibus secreto," and this was the way he came now, summoning Mercurio to come and see him. Mercurio came, and so did Louis de Guise, Lorenzo Strozzi, and other cardinals of the French

persuasion, who protested this unseemly intrusion of Vargas. His trespassing was on this occasion all the more unpardonable, for he had brought with him Ascanio della Corgna, who had come to bring pressure on his brother, Cardinal Fulvio. The Spanish ambassador's whole performance was so absolutely outrageous that both he and Guise could not fail to succumb to some measure of humor, dealing "cum summa benevolentia . . . et inter se amicissime. . . ." When Vargas and Ascanio departed, having achieved nothing, Guise had the window filled with bricks and mortar.<sup>46</sup> Another week had passed. Another candidate had been put away. Would the conclave never end?

By 12 December (1559) Vargas had come to the conclusion that there was little chance of Philip II's seeing a so-called imperialist cardinal on S. Peter's throne. Carpi and Pacheco faced great difficulties, "and Morone is just not getting into this dance" (*y Moron no entra en esta danza*). Carafa wanted none of Puteo or Medici. Vargas dismissed Dolera as a Franciscan friar and a creature of Paul IV. Nevertheless, Carafa did not (in Vargas's opinion) have good cause for excluding Medici merely because the duke of Florence was supporting the hereditary claims of Gian Francesco Guidi da Bagno to Montebello against those which Carafa's brother Antonio had acquired by the papal grant (of 1556). To be sure, the duke of Florence did want to see Medici pope, but the latter was not responsible for the duke's actions, nor was Philip II.

There was something to be said for Montepulciano, but Carafa did not want him either. Venturing farther afield into the ranks of the older cardinals, one had to consider Federico de' Cesi and Francesco Pisani. (Cesi had been a cardinal for fifteen years, and Pisani for more than forty.) Of these two, Cesi was preferable, for Pisani was of the French faction, besides which he was a Venetian and an idiot to boot, "que sería infame elección." Thus on the whole, despite the concerted effort on 18 December to elect Pacheco, Vargas regarded Medici as the most promising candidate from the Spanish point of view, and he was trying "with all his strength" to win Carafa over to the support of Medici.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialis*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 528-29, entries for 18 December, 1559; Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 628-29; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 81, pp. 317-22; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 213-16; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 50-53, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 46-48.

<sup>47</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 79, pp. 312-13, letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated 12 December, 1559, and cf. Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 187-89.

Just as the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had ended the war between France and Spain, so was some similar agreement going to be necessary to end their rivalry in the conclave. The cardinals continued to go through the expected motions of masses, scrutinies, and inspections of the electoral halls. On 19 December, Pacheco received twenty-four votes, and Saraceni left the conclave sick. More windows were sealed up, and the governor of the Borgo was ordered to close securely all entranceways into the conclave. There was *more solito* another scrutiny on the twentieth—Pacheco was given twenty-three votes—and on this day it was discovered that little holes had been made in the floor of certain cardinals' cells in the Sistina, "whence letters were being sent and received."

The French had been pushing Pisani's candidacy. The conclave had become too heavy a cross for some of the cardinals to bear, and to bring it to an end Vargas thought they might well elect some blockhead. Firmanus notes, however, that on 22 December both before and after dinner Farnese, Sforza, Guise, and Carafa consulted at length "pro electione futuri pontificis." Later on they gathered again in Guise's cell, where they were joined by Tournon and d' Este. They decided there were four possible candidates—Cesi, Puteo, Montepulciano, and Medici<sup>48</sup>—although it was presently decided that the election of Cesi or Medici would be the easiest to manage.

On Sunday, 24 December, in *vigilia natiuitatis*, Firmanus witnessed the admission of some "poenitentiarum" to hear confessions of the conclavists (and cardinals) so that they might receive the sacrament on Christmas day.<sup>49</sup> Among those admitted for this purpose, as we have already noted, was the Augustinian friar and historian Onofrio Panvinio, who was thus enabled to provide us with another firsthand description of the last stages of the conclave.

Once he had got into the electoral halls, Panvinio started looking for his old friends and patrons. He began with Carpi, who was glad to see him, and told him sadly that if they failed to elect a pope that day or the next, "we shan't have one for six months." The choice had been narrowed to Cesi and Medici, "de quibus tantum contro-

versia erat." Panvinio spent the night before Christmas in Farnese's cell, where he had found him having dinner with Savelli and del Monte. Otto von Truchsess told Panvinio that the leaders of the two factions had just about decided on Giannangelo de' Medici. What did Panvinio think of him? "I replied that he seemed to me to be a fine man—peaceful enough and generous, a student of the liberal arts—and that he would make an excellent pope."

Panvinio received friendly greetings from Medici, *iam pontifex destinatus*, and from Madruzzo, who also wanted to know the Augustinian's opinion of Medici. "I replied, 'He is a fine father, and I think we shall have a prosperous pontificate.'" Then with a laugh Madruzzo asked, "What name shall we give him? He'll certainly be called Aesculapius!" The joke was obvious, *alludens ad Medicis nomen*. Madruzzo said that Alfonso Carafa was ultimately responsible for the choice of Medici, and although he explained why he had also been in favor of Medici's elevation, Panvinio could see that there were limits to his enthusiasm, for Gonzaga had been far and away Madruzzo's candidate for the tiara.<sup>50</sup> The results of this conclave would be important for Europe as well as for Italy. Panvinio, who knew well so many of the participants in the electoral drama, was fascinated by the procedures, and set about learning all he could about what had thus far happened.

As Madruzzo implied to Panvinio, the young Alfonso Carafa, cardinal of Naples, had played a part (a reluctant part) in the final choice of Medici. In the days just before Christmas the conclave had seemed almost as divided as ever, despite the fact that the *papabiles* had been narrowed to Cesi and Medici. The French favored Cesi; the Spanish wanted Medici. Carlo Carafa's followers were caught in a serious disagreement. The voluble Vitelli was all for Medici, but Alfonso Carafa would have none of him, for his granduncle Paul IV had disliked him.

Also Medici had caused a bit of a scandal in the conclave when, toward the end of September, he had told von Truchsess that the pope and the council might have to meet the Lutheran challenge by allowing the Germans a married clergy and communion *sub utraque specie*.<sup>51</sup> Carlo Carafa,

<sup>48</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 529-30; Vargas, in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 81, p. 317, letter dated 21 December, 1559: "... se corria grande petigrão, y mas por estar todos de manera que parece que concurrían ya en un leño, que se les propusiese. . . ."

<sup>49</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 530.

<sup>50</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 578. While Firmanus calls Medici *de Medicis*, Panvinio and Guido use the Latin form *Medices*, genitive *Medicis*.

<sup>51</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 74, p. 278, letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated 18 October, 1559, concerning Medici's being taken to task, "... oponiendo a Medicis ciertas palabras que

who still bore Medici's sponsor Duke Cosimo and the latter's former ambassador Gianfigliuzzi no small resentment, disliked the idea of Medici, but Carlo had joined the Spanish party, which wanted Medici. Carlo was, therefore, uncertain of his next step. Louis de Guise, who was well aware of the differing views of Vitelli and Alfonso Carafa, suddenly offered their faction a means of terminating the conclave.

Carlo Carafa and Vitelli had encountered Guise in the Sala Regia near the entrance to the Cappella Paolina, where after some tactful give-and-take Guise had said that he was of course not going to remain in Rome after the conclave. It made little difference to him who the next pope would be, provided he was an honorable man who would work for the good of the Christian commonwealth. Guise said that the Carafa faction (and the Spanish) had rejected Tournon, Pisani, Gonzaga, d'Este, and others, while the French had turned down Carpi, Puteo, and other Spanish candidates. Before Guise could expatiate on the merits of Cesi, Vitelli intervened with his own plea for the cardinals to turn to the best man, who belonged to everyone's party and to no one's. To this Guise replied in the vernacular Latin of the day,

I get the point, Vitelli, I quite understand. You would like Medici. And so that you may at last understand that I am not the obstacle to the election of a pope, go and consult among yourselves. In the name of all of us I propose Cesi and Medici to you. You choose which one of the two you want, and then we'll declare him to be the pope. There is this proviso, however, that the one Carafa assents to, the cardinal of Naples must also accept. Otherwise it would be of no use, for I understand [and now he looked at Carafa] that there is some dissension between you two.

Panvinio says that Guise had just awakened, and was bleary-eyed with sleep, when Carafa and Vitelli ran into him by the Paolina. If so, his recovery was rapid. He offered a bold and forthright solution to the long electoral controversy. It was also

a generous move, for although Medici was not a dedicated partisan of Spain, he was regarded by many as an imperialist. As Guise made clear, however, the *fazione Carafesca* would have to agree among themselves; otherwise the struggle would continue, for those who did not want Medici would naturally try to reinforce Alfonso Carafa in his opposition. Vitelli believed that he held Medici's pontificate "in manibus," but Guise made him and Carafa swear that they would tell no one but Alfonso Carafa of his offer. He declared that he was not even going to tell d' Este, his co-leader of the French party. Shortly thereafter, to be sure, he did want to be released from his promise, for he saw that it would probably be necessary to reveal the plan to d' Este.

Carlo Carafa was not consumed with enthusiasm for his uncle's old opponent Giannangelo de' Medici. He was also highly suspicious of Giannangelo's friend Duke Cosimo who had, so to speak, beat the Carafeschi to the gates of Siena. Carafa's closest friends and most loyal supporters, such as Giovanni della Casa and Silvestro Aldobrandini, had been exiles from Florence and bitter enemies of Cosimo. Nevertheless, Vitelli prevailed upon Carafa to throw in his lot with the Medicis, especially when Francisco de Vargas and Alessandro Farnese also pled Medici's cause. When Vitelli went off to look for Alfonso, cardinal of Naples, he found him in the little singers' gallery (*in moeniano cantorium*) in the north wall of the Cappella Sistina, where he was having his hair washed.

Alfonso said that he certainly preferred Cesi, whom his father had recommended highly, but after listening at length to Vitelli's praise of Medici, Alfonso said he would "give the matter some thought, and in this way the twenty-second day of December came to an end." Despite renewed efforts, Vitelli got nowhere with Alfonso the following day, and all the next day, Sunday, the twenty-fourth, was spent in the same apparently futile effort to gain the young man's adherence to Medici. On the one hand Alfonso considered his father Antonio Carafa's letters in favor of Cesi and, on the other, Cardinal Carlo's endorsement of and Vitelli's "perpetua pugna" for Medici.

Although these discussions were all most private, some word of them went through the conclave. Medici's adversaries, whom Panvinio does not identify, tried to induce Alfonso to hold out, and to drive a wedge between him and his uncle Carlo, which caused the latter no end of indignation. Accompanied by Vitelli, Carlo sought out Alfonso, and finding him difficult to persuade, "assailed him violently, and now with prayers, now

pocos días antes había pasado con Augusta [Otto von Truchsess, cardinal-bishop of Augsburg] sobre el dispensar por el Papa y concilio, si pareciese convenir, en el conjuicio de los clérigos de Alemania y comunión sub utraque specie, de que en Conclave hubo mucho rumor," on which cf. Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el conclave de 1559*, pp. 69-70; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 151-53; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 34.

Alfonso Carafa was opposed to Medici, "tum quod Paulus III nunquam hominem laudasset, sed levisculum, vanum et ut dicitur cerebellinum appellare solebat" (Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV.*, in Merkle, II, 582, lines 2-5). Paul also disapproved of the underhanded way (*ex non bonis artibus*) that Medici had acquired the archbishopric of Milan.

with threats and arrogance, whereby he prevailed, finally terrified him to the extent that, quite subdued, he said that he would be at his command." When Carafa reported his success to Farnese, the latter said he was delighted at the prospect of Medici's election.

Early Monday morning, 25 December (1559), Vitelli was after Alfonso Carafa again to declare his support of Medici so that the Milanese might be elected pope that very day. According to Panvinio, Vitelli now showed Alfonso a letter which Duke Cosimo had written to the young cardinal in his own hand, urging Medici's election "with many prayers and promises." Vitelli had, he said, intercepted the letter, but had not ventured to show it to Alfonso, since the latter was then so incensed by the duke's support of the count of Bagno's claims to Montebello against those of Alfonso's father.

Vitelli was as shady a character as his friend Carafa. He also got Cosimo's envoy to Rome, Matteo de' Concini, the bishop of Cortona in Tuscany, to write in the duke's name a four-page letter with a full harvest of promises to the Carafeschi if they came out strong for Medici. "As a result, therefore, of so many and such extensive machinations," says Panvinio, "the poor youth's mind was bent, and finally on Christmas day itself he threw in his hand, and declared for Medici." After dinner Vitelli informed Louis de Guise that the Cardinal of Naples' objections to Medici had been overcome. The heads of the various factions—Guise, d' Este, Sforza, Carafa, and Farnese—then met and decided to proclaim Medici pope on the morrow.<sup>52</sup>

Vargas was not the only member of the diplomatic corps in Rome carrying the Medicean load at the conclave. The Florentine envoys Matteo and Bartolommeo de' Concini as well as Bongianni Gianfigliuzzi were doing their part, although Bongianni had to lie low. They had promised that as pope Medici would assign Montebello and Paliano to the Camera Apostolica until the question of rightful possession had been decided, and that both the pope and Duke Cosimo would support the cause of the Carafeschi at the Spanish court.<sup>53</sup> Promises grow readily in the fertile soil of deception and, being misled by Vargas, as we shall note

presently, Medici himself declared openly that as pope he would support the Carafeschi in the matter of Paliano, and would intervene on their behalf with Philip II. At any rate he would try to see that Paliano was held in sequestration until the Carafeschi received the promised compensation from Philip,<sup>54</sup> in accord with the secret capitulation of Cave.

There were good reasons for some of the cardinals to support Medici, as Hinojosa has pointed out, for the Milanese was about sixty-two years old, and clearly in poor health. He had spent most of the long months of the conclave in bed. His pontificate was, therefore, not likely to last very long. Although Carpi, Gaddi, and Sermoneta did what little they could to get their colleagues to take a stand against the coming "adoration" of Medici, no leader of one of the factions joined them, and their labors were finally spent in confusion.<sup>55</sup> There were doubtless those who saw in Medici's apparent ill health another conclave in the early offing and, perhaps, their own chance at the tiara. Since Medici had always seemed, as he was, affable and easy going, his papacy should not be a hard one, and various cardinals saw a large increase in their influence at the Curia.<sup>56</sup>

The Venetian ambassador Mocenigo in his report to the Senate some months later stated that Medici seemed to suffer severely from the universal ailments of the time, "gout and catarrh," that he had entered the conclave a sick man, and that he spent most of his time in bed. After he was made pope, however, he suddenly regained his health.<sup>57</sup>

By the time Vitelli and Alfonso Carafa called on Medici, in the early evening of 25 December, in his cell in the southwest corner of the Sistina, every member of the conclave had learned what was afoot. Furthermore, the complete failure of Carpi, Gaddi, and Sermoneta "ad excludendum Medicem" now assured Medici's elevation. When Alfonso Carafa left Medici's cell, Vitelli stayed and conversed with the pope-to-be until about 8:00

<sup>52</sup> Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV.*, pp. 223–24.

<sup>53</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV.*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 583.

<sup>54</sup> Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el cónclave de 1559*, p. 98.

<sup>55</sup> Alvisi (Luigi) Mocenigo, "Relazione di Roma [1560]," in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), 61: "Prima dunque io dico che il Pontefice è di 62 anni in circa, di grandezza comune, non grasso nè magro, e di assai grazioso aspetto; mostravasi assai mal disposto di gola e catarro essendo cardinale, ed entrò in conclave mezzo annalato, e sempre quasi vi stette in letto, ma di poi fatto pontefice par si assai ben riavuto, onde si può credere che sia per viver qualche anno."

<sup>52</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV.*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 581–82; Müller, *Das Konkclave Pius' IV.*, pp. 188–90, 218–23; Hinojosa, *Felipe II y el cónclave de 1559*, pp. 97–99; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 55–60, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 50–53.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 52–53.

P.M. (*usque ad horam noctis tertiam*). Medici told Vitelli that he did not want to go to sleep before he had had a chance to talk with either Guise or d' Este, the two leaders of the French faction. Vitelli hurried off to inform them, and then wasted (says Panvinio) "some hours" going back and forth between Medici and the two cardinals, as the latter deferred to each other, Guise insisting the honor go to d'Este, and d'Este trying to yield it to Guise. About 9:00 P.M. Cardinal Gianbattista Cicada had a long talk with Medici, and now members of the Sacred College were gathering about Medici's cell to offer their congratulations. Since Vitelli had got nowhere in Guise and d' Este's deadlock of courtesy, Medici said, "If they won't come to me, I shall go to them."

In the meantime a dozen or more cardinals had crowded before Medici's cell, where (according to Firmanus) Carlo Carafa had placed himself, urging his fellows not to try to approach Medici. Let him rest, he said, there will be time enough tomorrow morning.<sup>58</sup> Turning to Morone, Carlo remarked that they had chosen the best man, and one whom the Apostolic See especially needed at this time. He also added jocosely that Morone must bear it patiently "if this time the lot has not fallen on you." Morone answered solemnly that he had never aspired to the pontificate, but he could rejoice in the election of one who was entirely worthy of so high an office. Then Carafa turned to Panvinio, who was standing behind him, "And what do you think of this election, father? Could we have chosen a better man?" As expected, Panvinio replied, "Certainly not, *illustrissime domine!*" While time was being wasted "in these and similar absurdities," says Panvinio, the hour of midnight (*hora . . . noctis septima*) was approaching.

Although Carafa had explained that the election would take place when the morning came, because the French wished it so, Panvinio remarked to Morone that there was many a slip between the cup and the lip, *multa possunt inter os et offam cadere*. Morone agreed, and presently asked those present, in a loud voice, whether they should not take Medici immediately into the Paolina, place him on S. Peter's throne, and thus do quickly what they had so long desired to do. Everyone seemed to agree except Carafa, who reminded them that the French had planned on a vote in the morning, and had gone to bed.

There was not to be much sleep that night, however, and an appeal was sent to Guise, Sforza, and d' Este to come at once. Within a few minutes Guise and Vitelli appeared on the scene. Guise went into Medici's cell and spent a while with him. Sforza arrived, and so did a number of others. Panvinio ran off to alert Farnese, who was asleep, but hastily donned his cardinal's robe, and made for Medici's cell, where he found d' Este and most of his colleagues except for those who were too old or too sick to move rapidly. Madruzzo, who was suffering from the gout, was borne in a chair to the Paolina.

Shortly thereafter Medici was conducted into the Paolina. He walked between d' Este and Alfonso Carafa, and was accompanied by most of the cardinals. A papal throne was placed in the middle of the chapel, before the altar. The cardinals took their accustomed places according to rank. Meanwhile most of the conclavists had crowded into the chapel, gathering near the altar. Space must have been at a premium. Carlo Carafa wanted to expel them, but Panvinio appealed to him to allow them all to witness the proceedings "than which no more august sight can be seen in all the world." Others appealed to him also, and he relented.

When the cardinals were all seated, Tournon rose, declaring *viva voce* that he cast his vote for Medici. One by one the rest of the cardinals did likewise. There were no written ballots. Medici then left his seat between Ranuccio Farnese and Tiberio Crispi, and occupied the throne, where he received the homage or *adoratio* of all the cardinals in the conclave. Panvinio's description of the ceremony is ecstatic. Even the sickest cardinals had left their cells, being carried in chairs to the Paolina, to take part in the declaration of the Milanese as pope.

To Panvinio it was clear that Medici's elevation had taken place "*divini spiritus vi atque impetu,*" for a dove had somehow found its way into the Sistine many days before the cardinals had made their decision. It had flown all over the chapel, seeking an exit, and finding none it had finally settled upon Medici's cell. Other portents had also foretold this happy event. When an opportunity presented itself, Carlo Carafa approached the throne. He asked the new pope to forgive the Roman people's demonstrations against the memory of Paul IV and the house of Carafa. When Medici expressed an unwillingness to do so, Farnese and Sforza added their requests to Carafa's. Medici then agreed, whereupon d' Este and others inquired "by what name he chose to be called." His reply was, "Pius."

<sup>58</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 530.

The doors of the conclave were opened. The bricks and mortar were removed from the doors and windows which had been sealed. Since Medici's cell had already been demolished, he made his way, accompanied by the cardinals, to Alfonso Carafa's cell, which was located at about the middle of the north wall of the Sistine. There Panvinio went to kiss his feet. He found Medici seated on a bed in the cell, between Alfonso and Vitelli. As Panvinio was withdrawing, *pedibus osculatis*, Vitelli said, "Holy father, don't you know Fra Onofrio?" Medici answered, "I know him very well, for he makes himself known everywhere by his books." Apparently Medici shared Alfonso Carafa's cell that night, a night which in the years to come they must often have recalled.

When morning came on Tuesday, 26 December (1559), the cardinals returned to the Paolina, seating themselves according to rank. Medici took his place between Ranuccio Farnese and Tiberio Crispi. He asserted, as was usually done after elevation by *adoratio*, that the coming scrutiny with its sealed ballots (*obsignatis sygraphis*) was merely a confirmation of the electoral decision already made. On his own ballot Medici inscribed the names, *honoris causa*, of Tournon, Pacheco, Carpi, Gonzaga, and d' Este. Retiring for a moment, he removed his cardinal's dress, donned pontifical garb, and took the throne before the altar. Again the cardinals made their obeisance before him, after which he was carried into S. Peter's in the *sedes gestatoria* in a procession of cardinals, ambassadors, barons, and other dignitaries. Amid the acclamations of the populace the cardinals did obeisance once more. When the ceremony was over, Medici was conveyed back into the Vatican Palace, the joyous applause of the people being so great that one could hardly hear the salvos of cannon fire from the Castel S. Angelo.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 583–86; Guido, *De electione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 630–32, whose account contains several passages word for word the same as in Panvinio; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialis*, *ibid.*, II, 530–31, entries for 25 and 26 December, 1559: "Et cum iam omnibus electio facta publicata esset, omnes cardines quos dormitum iuerant surrexerunt e cubiculo, et cum lecto concluso certa esset, attamen ad maiorem cautelam, ne exclusio tentaretur, voluerunt cum confirmare per viam adorationis, et in mane sequenti per viam scrutinii illum denuo eligere et confirmare" (Firmanus, II, 530). Cf. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d' état*, II, 840–42; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 83, p. 324, letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated 29 December, 1559; Reynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1559, nos. 36–38; Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Consistorialia coram Pio Quarto, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 68, by mod. stamped enumeration; Bromato, *Storia di Paolo*

The reign of Pope Pius IV had begun. A day or two after the election the indefatigable Vargas was reminding Pius of how much his Holiness owed King Philip II. Pius replied that his every effort would be directed toward the service of God, the honor of the Holy See, the peace of Christendom, and the satisfaction of his Majesty. He reminded Vargas, who needed no reminding of the fact, that as a Milanese he had been born and had served as the "vassal and creature" of Philip's father, the late Emperor Charles V (*que había nascido vasallo y sido hechura del Emperador*). Pius was also, as we have noted in an earlier chapter, the brother of Cosimo de' Medici's commander Giangiacomo de' Medici, who had won Siena for Charles V, and (as finally came to pass) for Cosimo himself.<sup>60</sup> Cosimo had had several reasons for working so hard for Pius's election.

Like all popes, Pius IV had to face some serious problems at his accession. No sooner had he acknowledged his sense of obligation to the house of Hapsburg than Vargas brought up the touchy subject of Paliano. Although Vargas had led Carlo Carafa to believe otherwise, Philip II had firmly decided upon the restoration of Paliano to Marc' Antonio Colonna. (Paliano was, however, a fief of

*IV*, II, bk. xii, pp. 586–87; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius' IV.*, pp. 325–27; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 54–56; Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli* (1961), pp. 85–87.

<sup>60</sup> Giangiacomo de' Medici, who had terrorized the areas north of Milan from 1525 to 1532 as the castellan of Musso, just below Gravedona on the western shore of Lago di Como, had been forced by Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, to give up his landed possessions and accept the empty title marquis of Marignano. On his early career, cf. the bibliographical monograph of Solone Ambrósoli, *Giangiacomo de' Medici, castellano di Musso (1523–1532): Saggio bibliografico*, Milan, 1895, who lists some 400 works, many of which have little to say about Giangiacomo, and some of which are worthless. On the other hand, R. Beretta has written a valuable article on "Gian Giacomo de' Medici in Brianza (1527–1531)," *Archivio storico lombardo*, 5th ser., XLIII-1 (1916), 53–120. We have dealt above with Giangiacomo's command in the war against the Sienses.

Giangiacomo had died (on 8 November, 1555), four years before his brother Gianangelo's election. A bold, self-seeking, and generally successful soldier, "dagli uni chiamato tiranno e pirata," as Beretta says, *art. cit.*, p. 53, "dagli altri esaltato come un eroe," he had helped launch his brother on the ecclesiastical career that finally led to the papal throne. On the relations of the two de' Medici, see Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 66–82, with addenda and alterations in the *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 58–70, and on Giangiacomo's death, note Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1038, fol. 103r: "Al Marchese di Marignano mancò di questa vita alli 9 del presente [i.e., 9 November, 1555] del mal di non poter urinare, dove gli creppò la vescia—ha lassato, per quanto s' intende, 500,000 ducati di contanti, parte qui [a Roma], parte a Genova, et parte appresso di lui," and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 108r.



the Holy See, and Colonna would not secure possession and papal recognition of his feudal rights until 17 July, 1562.<sup>61</sup> As Vargas wrote Philip on 29 December (1559), Pius knew only too well that Carafa had played the principal role in his election. The pope insisted that he must assure Carafa the return of Paliano or the fief must remain in escrow until Philip had paid Giovanni Carafa appropriate compensation in accord with the secret capitulation of Cave.

Vargas informed Philip that he had done his best with Pius, telling him privately that before he had known otherwise, Philip had ordered the return of Paliano to Colonna (which would soon cause some altercation between the Holy See and Spain). Vargas admitted that a certain amount of underhanded persuasion had been necessary to win Carafa's support. Pius became quite agitated, and asked Vargas more than five or six times for details. Clearly Vargas gave him some account of the paragraph he had made up and shown Carafa as though it were an extract from one of Philip's letters, assuring Carafa of all due reward for his services in the conclave. Pius told Vargas two or three times that if Carafa had known what was going on, he would not have served the Spanish cause. No, agreed Vargas, if God had not granted them this singular favor (of deception), Pius would not have been elected pope.<sup>62</sup>

Pope Pius was the offspring of a Milanese family of physicians and notaries, the Medeghini, which name became altered to Medici. After serving Paul III Farnese faithfully through the fifteen years of the latter's papacy, Giannangelo de' Medici had received the red hat in Paul's twelfth and last creation of cardinals (on 8 April, 1549). The family had increased somewhat in importance when Giannangelo's soldierly brother Giangiacomo married the daughter of Luigi Orsini, count of Pitigliano, for she was the sister-in-law of the pope's son Pier Luigi Farnese. Following in the footsteps of his patron Paul III, Giannangelo had at least three illegitimate children. He had attracted favorable notice in Hapsburg circles by his sometimes outspoken opposition to Paul IV's frenetic anti-Spanish policy.

Despite the friendship and support which Cosimo I de' Medici gave him, Giannangelo had not stood out at the papal court to the extent that Carpi, Pacheco, and Gonzaga had done. But becoming archbishop of Ragusa on 14 December,

1545, which must have increased his interest in the Turkish problem, and (what was more important at the Curia Romana) archbishop of Milan on 20 July, 1558, Giannangelo was certainly a figure to be reckoned with, and reckoned with he was in the last days of the conclave. Sociable, lively, intellectually adept, and generous to the poor, Pius was given to physical exercise, riding and even walking about Rome, constructing new buildings, and advancing members of his family and his friends.

Pius's coronation took place on Saturday, 6 January (1560), the feast of the Epiphany, which commemorated the coming of the Three Magi (*in festo trium regum*). Appropriately enough, on Wednesday, 31 January, he created three new cardinals. Two of them were his own relatives, Gian Antonio Serbelloni and Carlo Borromeo; the third was Giovanni de' Medici, the seventeen-year-old son of Duke Cosimo I of Florence.<sup>63</sup> Before the month of January had ended, some twenty nephews as well as other relatives had descended upon Rome, seeking their fortune, but Carlo and his elder brother Federico Borromeo, sons of the pope's sister Margherita, were by far the favorites. Federico was soon married to Virginia della Rovere, the daughter of Guidobaldo, duke of Urbino. Although Federico gave but slight evidence of ability, his papal uncle made him captain-general of the Church on 2 April, 1561. Pius planned a

<sup>61</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Acta Consistorialia coram Pio Quarto, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 70: "Die Mercurii 31 Januarii 1560 fuit consistorium secretum in eadem Camera Paramentorum [i.e., in Camera Paramentorum Inferiori] where, on 12 January, Pius IV had held his first consistory], et in eo interfuerunt reverendissimi cardinales qui in preterito interfuerant, exceptis reverendissimis Sanctae Florae [Guido Ascanio Sforza] et Ghisio [Louis de Guise], qui elapsis diebus discesserunt ab Urbe.

"In ipso consistorio serenissimus dominus noster creavit et publicavit tres cardinales, videlicet: Dominum Johannem Antonium Serbellonum, episcopum Fulginatensem [Serbelloni had been made bishop of Foligno on 7 May, 1557, his uncle Cardinal Giannangelo de' Medici having ceded the bishopric to him], consanguineum suum, presbyterum, praesentem. Dominum Carolum Boromeum, nepotem suum ex sorore, Mediolanensem, praesentem. Dominum Johannem de Medicis, Florentinum, filium Ducis Florentiae in septimo decimo aetatis anno constitutum, absentem, diaconos [i.e., Carlo Borromeo was also made a cardinal deacon], libenter assentientibus et consentientibus omnibus reverendissimis dominis cardinalibus."

Cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III (1925), 37; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 341; Firmarus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 531-32; Raynaldus, *Ann. ecc.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 92. The Serbelloni were relatives of Pius IV on his mother's side. Carlo Borromeo was his nephew.

<sup>61</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 139-40.

<sup>62</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 83, pp. 325-26.

princely future for this nephew whose unexpected death, however, on 19 November, 1562, shattered all such hopes.<sup>64</sup>

Carlo Borromeo was still twenty-one years of age. He was getting an early start on what was to become an eminent career, his services to the Church and to Christendom being eventually signaled by his canonization on 1 November, 1610. His first important appointment came on 7 February (1560) when he was assigned the administration of the church of Milan, then vacant owing to Ippolito d' Este's "cession" thereof (with the usual "regressus" or right of recovery in the event of Carlo's own relinquishment of the church "per cessum vel decessum"). On 26 April (1560) he was made papal legate in Bologna and the Romagna.<sup>65</sup> Pius IV and his successor Pius V loaded him with honors and responsibilities over the next half-dozen years, making him cardinal protector of the seven Catholic cantons of Switzerland (on 12 March, 1560) and the Knights of Malta (before 29 July, 1560), and thereafter of Portugal, the Netherlands, the religious Orders of the Franciscans, Carmelites, Humiliati, the Canons regular of the Holy Cross at Coimbra, and the Knights of S. Lazarus. Afflicted with an impediment of speech, of a reserved and distant nature, unprepossessing in appearance, not brilliant but certainly thorough, Carlo Borromeo was pious, honest, and self-effacing.

The reports of the Venetian ambassadors Girolamo Soranzo (in 1563) and Giacomo Soranzo (in 1565) bear witness to the fact that he seemed

to carry all the chief burdens of the Curia Romana, "con la soprintendenza di tutte le cose." All the cardinals addressed themselves to him, and so did the ambassadors and those who had need of anything at all. He headed all the congregations, was endlessly patient in audiences, and wholly competent in the conduct of affairs. He answered everyone with such modesty that one could not wish for more, employing less authority than he had been given and consulting the pope when he was not certain of the latter's intention. Although extravagant in the maintenance of his household during his first three or four years in Rome, he was conspicuous for his charities and the payment of his debts. Girolamo Soranzo reckoned his income at a minimum of 48,000 scudi.<sup>66</sup>

After the death of Federico Borromeo, brother of the young Cardinal Carlo, it was widely assumed that the latter would return to the secular life, to continue the family line and to found the princely dynasty which, as was well known, Pius IV was eager to see established. Whatever Pius's wishes, and at the notable consistory of 4 June, 1563, he was to deny that he had ever wished his pious nephew to leave the Church, Carlo was determined to remain a churchman. At the consistory in question Pius raised his nephew from cardinal-deacon to cardinal-priest—*erit tanquam utriusque ordinis medius*—and thereafter the latter received ordination at the hands of Cardinal Federico de' Cesi (on 17 July, 1563).<sup>67</sup>

From the year 1564 Carlo Borromeo became increasingly ascetic, weakening his health and

<sup>64</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 543, lines 30–31, places Federico Borromeo's death on Wednesday, 19 August (and in 1562, 19 August did fall on a Wednesday). According to Firmanus, his body was taken on 22 August to the church of S. Pietro in Montorio. The next entry in Firmanus's diary is dated, however, 23 November (1562) when the news of the young Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici's death was announced in Rome. Although in 1562, 19 November fell on a Thursday, Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 93–94, has shown that something appears to have gone awry in Firmanus's diary, and that Federico in fact seems to have died on 19 November. On his marriage to Virginia della Rovere, see Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in *Conc. Trident.*, II, 537–39.

<sup>65</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 72<sup>r</sup>, 83<sup>v</sup>: "Reverendissimus dominus Cardinalis Borromeus, praesens, fuit creatus legatus Bononie et Romandiole." Cf. Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 92, and Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 81, with the wrong date 25 (for 26) April for the consistory at which Carlo received the Bolognese legation. Note also Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 344, lines 26–30. On 26 April legations were also assigned to Cristoforo Madruzzo, Ercole Gonzaga, Ippolito d' Este, and Giulio della Rovere.

<sup>66</sup> Girolamo Soranzo, "Relazione di Roma [1563]," in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), pp. 90–92; Giacomo Soranzo, "Relazione di Roma [1565]," *ibid.*, pp. 133–36.

<sup>67</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 164<sup>r</sup>, 167<sup>v</sup>: "Pride nonas lunias [4 June], XIV[!] Junii habitum esse consistorium ad Divi Petri, quo de more claudi iusso . . . [summus pontifex] rursus exorsus obiisse dixit Comitem Federicum, in quo spes omnes successionis suae possuisset, relicum solum cardinale eius fratrem, quem alii fortasse multi pontifices ad saecularia vota transire fecissent, ut plerique alii iam fecerunt, nec sibi status temporales sine Sedis Apostolicae damno defuturos fuisse. Nos tamen, inquit, intendimus, ut et ipse intendit, in ea vacatione in qua ipse est eum permanere, ideo velle in presbyterum cardinale illum assumere, si patribus placeret. Presbyteris gratias agentibus, diaconis vero id se aegre ferre asserentibus, pontifex inter vos inquit se debet—erit tanquam utriusque ordinis medius."

A somewhat abridged text of this act of the consistory may be found in J. Susta, *Die römische Kurie und das Konzil von Trient unter Pius IV.*, IV (1914), 68, note 3 (cf., above, note 17), and see Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 95. From the first volume of Susta's work (1904) to the second (1909) the spelling of *Curie* and *Conzil* were altered to *Kurie* and *Konzil*.

shortening his life "per gli studi, i digiuni, le vigilie ed altre astinenze," as Giacomo Soranzo emphasized as early as 1565. After the death of his papal uncle (on 9 December, 1565), Borromeo was allowed by Pius V Ghislieri to go to his archdiocese of Milan, where he arrived on 5 April, 1566. Although his return to Rome was assumed at the time, he resided henceforth in Milan, where he promoted reform by pastoral visitations, diocesan synods, and provincial councils. He had been almost the mainstay of the final period of the Council of Trent (in 1562–1563), and supported by the Barnabites and the Jesuits, Borromeo struggled uncompromisingly to effect the complete renovation of the morals and education of the clergy. If in his reforms he sometimes dealt harshly with others, Borromeo dealt no less harshly with himself. He died on 3 November, 1584, at the age of forty-six.<sup>68</sup>

As a cardinal Pius IV had found the reign of his predecessor almost intolerable. He had been glad to withdraw from Rome, still on reasonably amicable terms with Paul IV, in mid-June, 1558, and he had not returned to Rome until the long conclave the following year. The Venetian ambassador Bernardo Navagero, whom Pius made a cardinal in his second creation of 26 February, 1561, had reported to his government on several occasions Giannangelo de' Medici's disapproval of Paul's ill-considered war with Spain. Giannangelo had been more discreet concerning Paul's imprisonment of Cardinal Giovanni Morone whom, now that he was pope, he promptly cleared of the unwarranted charge of heresy which Paul had leveled at him.

Thus on 19 March, 1560, Pius wrote to Alfonso d' Este, duke of Ferrara, and to others, that his predecessor Paul had taken Morone into custody on the suspicion that his views of *aliquibus fidei Catholicae dogmatibus* were less than orthodox. Immediately upon his accession, however, Pius had appointed a commission of cardinals, *theologiae peritissimi*, to investigate the charge of doctrinal aberration. As he now wrote Alfonso, the commission had found the charge entirely without foundation. He had, therefore, exonerated

Morone "cum ingenti omnium fratrum nostrorum approbatione atque laetitia."<sup>69</sup>

For the first two years or so of Pius's reign Morone ranked high in his counsels and, as Alvisio Mocenigo suggests, enjoyed the esteem of a large part of the Sacred College. In the summer of 1560 there were, all told, about fifty-four cardinals, of whom thirty-seven were Italian, two German, eleven French, and four Spanish. As time went on, Pius tended to consult Stanislaus Hosius, whom he made a cardinal (on 26 February, 1561), more frequently than Morone, especially on German affairs, concerning which they were both regarded as experts.<sup>70</sup> Morone retained Pius's complete confidence, however, and reached the summit of his career in early December, 1563, when he presided over the last congregation and the last session of the Council of Trent.<sup>71</sup>

Pius IV lost no time in correcting other dangerous vagaries of Pauline policy. While Paul had thought he was enhancing the papal dignity by trampling upon emperors and kings (*il grado dei pontefici esser per mettersi sotto i piedi gl' imperatori e i re*), as Girolamo Soranzo puts it, Pius used to say that in fact the authority of the popes depended upon that of the princes.<sup>72</sup> While demanding certain minor concessions from Ferdinand, he recognized his succession to the empire, which Paul had refused to do, and on 17 February, 1560, the imperial envoy Scipione d' Arco rendered obe-

<sup>69</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Busta 1300/15, no. 60. On 20 February, 1560, Giovanni Morone, *episcopus Albanensis*, was made protector of the church of S. Stefano in Vaticano and of the Abyssinians (*Abyssini*) in Rome, a mark of esteem accompanying his absolution (Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 10, fol. 65, by mod. stamped enumeration, and see *ibid.*, fols. 95<sup>v</sup>–97<sup>r</sup>, briefs of 18 March, 1560, *de absoluteione Cardinalis Moroni*, to King Ferdinand, Maximilian, Albrecht of Bavaria, and the kings of Portugal, Poland, and France). Cf. Stephan Elshes, *Concilium Tridentinum*, VIII (Freiburg in Breisgau, 1919), no. 7, pp. 11–13. The records of Morone's trial for heresy are now being published by Massimo Firpo and Dario Marcotto (Rome, 1981 ff.).

<sup>70</sup> Mocenigo, "Relazione di Roma [1560]," in Allèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 40: "Questo dirò solamente, che essendo ora assoluto il cardinal Morone, e in gran riputazione e credito appresso il presente pontefice e gran parte de' cardinali, molti credono che debba aver gran parte nel pontificato futuro, dicendo il pontefice averlo per un angelo di paradiso, e adoperandolo per consiglio in tutte le cose importanti. . . ." Hosius was bishop of Warmia (Pol. Warmja, Germ. Ermland), formerly in east Prussia, but since 1945 in northeast Poland.

<sup>71</sup> Morone and Navagero had been appointed legates to the council at a general congregation held at S. Peter's on 7 March, 1563 (*Acta Consistorialia*, in *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 34, fol. 157; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII [repr. 1957], 242), to which we shall return in the next chapter.

<sup>72</sup> Soranzo, *Relazione [1563]*, in Allèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 75.

<sup>68</sup> The literature on S. Carlo Borromeo is enormous, but note Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 104–22, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 86–99, and for the essential facts of his career, see esp. Roger Mols, "S. Charles Borromée," in the *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, XII (1953), cols. 486–534, with a bibliography, *ibid.*, cols. 530–34, and cf. M. de Certeau, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XX (1977), 260–69.

dience and reverence to the pope "cum debitis et consultis ceremoniis."<sup>73</sup> Pius restored the nunciatures to Venice and to Florence, to which Paul had not made reappointments, thus easing communication with both states, but Pius was careful not to reappoint or in fact to assign to any diplomatic post those who had served his predecessor as nuncios.

The Roman carnival was resumed, and the Inquisition was restrained. Life took on an easier and pleasanter tone. Pius also did what he could to solve some of the problems raised by the multiplicity of so-called "apostate" monks whom Paul had cast adrift upon the city and the countryside. He renewed the residential requirement for bishops, and since the general council could not be called back into session immediately, he established a "deputation" of cardinals for reform. This deputation or commission, "qui . . . moribus ipsis emendandis operam navant," was to meet in the papal presence every Thursday. The diarist Angelo Massarelli, now the bishop of Telesse, was made their secretary.

Pius was sovereign of the city of Rome, the Campagna, the so-called "Patrimony" of S. Peter, Umbria, the March of Ancona, the Romagna, the city of Benevento, and the city of Avignon with its surrounding territory. Girolamo Soranzo believed that God had ordained Rome always to have the "imperio grande nel mondo." The greatness of republican and imperial Rome was impressed upon one "by the sight of those few remains which are still left of ancient buildings." Soranzo was also moved by "the beauty of so many modern palaces built with great magnificence." He was impressed by the handsome streets, for Rome was quickly becoming under Pius "one of the most beautiful cities in Italy." According to Soranzo, the population had reached 80,000 by mid-June of 1563.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 533, and note Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 74<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, which text is given in St. Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 4, p. 8. Scipione d' Arco made an address of obedience to the pope, "additis multis ad creationem suae Sanctitatis, ad providendum haeresibus et conservandum pacem, et ad impugmandos Turcas pertinentibus."

<sup>74</sup> Soranzo, *Relazione [1563]*, in Albèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV, pp. 82-83; see Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 532-33, and Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, *ibid.*, II, 343, on Pius IV's residential requirement for bishops and the reform commission of 1560; also Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 100-5, with refs. On the *Roma resurgens* under Pius IV, cf. Anton Haidacher, *Geschichte der Päpste in Bildern: Eine Dokumentation zur Papstgeschichte von Ludwig Freiherr von Pastor*, Heidelberg, 1965, pp. 418-23.

Rome had recovered from the sack of 1527, and Pius IV was a builder. Venetians like Bernardo Navagero who had lived on the Bosphorus as well as the Tiber must have found the contrast between Istanbul and Rome striking. In his third Turkish letter, dated at Istanbul on 1 June, 1560, the imperial envoy to the Porte, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, wrote his friend Nicole Michault that he preferred to stay at home rather than move through the streets of the Turkish capital. Aside from the discourtesy of the Turks, according to Busbecq, he preferred the countryside to the city, "especially this city, which threatens almost to collapse into debris, in which there is nothing left of its former splendor except its site. And though once it stood out as the rival of Rome, it is now bogged down in a shameful servitude."<sup>75</sup>

If the most important chapter in Pius IV's papacy is centered upon the last sessions of the Council of Trent, certainly the most dramatic proceedings of his reign revolve around the denouement and destruction of Cardinal Carlo and his brother Giovanni Carafa. The Carafeschi had acquired the hatred of Cardinal Guido Ascanio Sforza, the camerlengo, whom Paul IV had treated harshly, as well as that of Marc' Antonio Colonna, from whom Paul IV had seized Paliano. Ercole Gonzaga's chances of being elected in the conclave of 1559 had been frustrated by Carlo's opposition, and so Ercole had joined the enemies of the Carafeschi.

At first Pius seemed well disposed toward the Carafa family for, after all, everyone knew that he owed his election to Cardinals Carlo and Alfonso. To begin with, he took the stand that Philip II should live up to the secret capitulation of Cave. If Giovanni Carafa was to lose Paliano, he should receive adequate compensation. Within a few days of his election Pius had sent Fabrizio di Sanguine, a pro-Spanish adherent of the Carafeschi, to Philip "a dar cuenta de su elección y a este negocio de la recompensa." The Spanish ambassador Fran-

<sup>75</sup> Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, p. 195. The seventeenth-century travelers to Istanbul were also impressed by the site and depressed by the streets; although some of the mosques were impressive, the houses were on the whole miserable, and apparently always catching on fire (cf. Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, 1962, pp. 24-35, et passim [Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut français d'archéologie d'Istanbul, XII]).

cisco de Vargas was also working strenuously on the Carafeschi's behalf.<sup>76</sup>

Cosimo I de' Medici added his appeals to those of the pope who, as the weeks passed, seemed not to be relaxing his efforts to secure the promised compensation for Giovanni Carafa, although Carlo had been required to give up his apartment at the Vatican. Since Philip II had ordered the restoration of Paliano to Marc' Antonio Colonna, a break between Philip and Pius IV seemed possible, for Paliano was a papal fief. Pius wanted to keep the peace, however, despite the fact that the Spanish made clear their complete disavowal of the secret capitulation of Cave which, to be sure, Paul IV seems not to have accepted publicly.

No less a nepotist than his predecessor, Pius had to provide for his family. His brother Giangiacomo had left no children, but his sister Margherita had married Gilberto Borromeo, count of Arona, and another sister Chiara had married one Wolf Dietrich, lord of Hohenems in Vorarlberg in western Austria. We have noted Pius's attentiveness to Federico and Carlo Borromeo. Chiara's son Mark Sittich von Hohenems was to be among the nineteen recipients of red hats in Pius IV's second creation (of 26 February, 1561).<sup>77</sup> The name Hohenems was converted or corrupted into Italian as Altemps. In his report to the Venetian Senate in 1560 Alvise Mocenigo had a good deal to say of the pope's relatives and their marriages,<sup>78</sup> which were to have some bearing upon the fortunes of the Carafeschi.

Shortly after the wedding of Federico Borromeo to Virginia della Rovere, his sister Camilla was married to Cesare Gonzaga di Guastalla, the eldest son of Ferrante and the nephew of Cardinal Ercole, whose influence at the Curia, already very great, was increased by this new relationship with the pope. Cardinal Cristoforo Madruzzo of Trent, who was bilingual in German and Italian, became attached to the pope's warlike German relatives, the Hohenems or Altemps, and the pope's niece Margherita Altemps was married to one of the nephews of Madruzzo who, it would seem, now

conceived the idea of purchasing the Carafa castles of Gallese and Soriano for the Altemps. Later on, this was done, and the properties were to remain in the hands of the Altemps into the present century. Madruzzo was the friend and ally of Gonzaga. Like Sforza and Colonna, they wanted to remove the Carafeschi from the Roman scene.

Curial politics were a painstaking business. Caution was required, for French or Spanish interests were likely to be involved in every major move. The Gonzagas had transferred their allegiance from the Hapsburgs to the Valois. The Farnesi had shifted theirs from France to Spain. Although the Farnese cardinals, Alessandro and Ranuccio, had supported the Spanish and Medicean candidature of Giannangelo de' Medici, as pope the latter now proposed to take the duchy of Camerino from the Farnesi in order to bestow it upon his nephew Federico and the latter's wife Virginia, whose mother belonged to the family of the Varani, formerly lords of Camerino.

Carlo Carafa believed that he could stay afloat in this welter of hostilities and conflicting interests. He was wrong. Although Pius IV had given no sign of a change of attitude toward the Carafeschi, and he still insisted upon the Spanish fulfillment of the no longer secret capitulation of Cave, on 27 March, 1560, Girolamo de' Federici, bishop of Sagona (on the island of Corsica), was reinstated as governor of Rome and papal vice-chamberlain, from which positions he had been removed at the beginning of Paul IV's pontificate. Alessandro Pallantieri was reappointed fiscal procurator (also on 27 March), from which charge he had been removed on 7 October, 1557, and thrown into prison. Although Pallantieri had delighted Paul IV by his denunciation of the Hapsburgs *cenuris et poenis* in the secret consistory of 27 July, 1556, as we have seen, he had offended Carlo Carafa by his apparent participation in the behind-the-scenes maneuvering which had brought about the downfall and disgrace of Carlo's friend Silvestro Aldobrandini.<sup>79</sup>

From the end of March (1560), therefore, in addition to Sforza and Colonna, Gonzaga and Madruzzo, two more enemies of the Carafeschi found themselves in positions of authority, both of whom exercised judicial functions by virtue of

<sup>76</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I (1862), no. 83, pp. 326-27, Vargas's letter to Philip II, dated 29 December, 1559, and see René Ansel, "La Disgrace et le procès des Carafa," *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV (1908), 194 ff.

<sup>77</sup> On Mark Sittich von Hohenems (Hohenemb), note G. Constant, in the *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, II (1914), 786-91.

<sup>78</sup> Mocenigo, *Relazione [1560]*, in Albèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV, pp. 51 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. R. Brown, *Cal. State Papers . . . , Venice*, VI-2 (1881), nos. 827, 831, 1058, pp. 966, 970-71, 1340, docs. dated 6 and 12 March and 9 October, 1557, in the last of which texts Brown confuses Aldobrandini with the fiscal procurator, who on 7 October had been "put in the Castle."

their office. Pallantieri, who had suffered severely during the last nearly two years of Paul IV's reign, was thirsting for revenge upon Carlo Carafa, whom he rightly held responsible for his hardships. Apparently Girolamo de' Federici and Pallantieri went to work immediately, for on 3 April Pius IV issued a bull renewing the penalties leveled against purloiners of goods belonging to the Holy See—jewels, ornaments, gold, silver, coins, gems, pearls, etc., vestments, manuscripts, books, and horses, mules, statuary, furniture, "et alia quaecumque . . . , et bona mobilia et immobilia."

Pius noted that thefts had occurred in times past, when popes were in their last illness, and when the Holy See was vacant. All those who had improperly acquired such goods—whether ecclesiastics or laymen, whatever their rank or station (*etiam cardinalatus honore*)—must return them within six days or face the extreme penalty of excommunication and malediction, regardless of any privileges and exemptions they might have received from previous popes.<sup>80</sup> This bull was aimed at Alfonso Carafa, the cardinal of Naples, who acknowledged having received a casket of jewels from Paul IV, as the latter lay dying. The gift had been confirmed by a brief dated on 18 August, 1559, the day of Paul's death, but the authenticity of the brief was being challenged. Paul IV's friend Scipione Rebiba found himself in somewhat similar trouble.<sup>81</sup>

On 12 May (1560) Don Iñigo Lopez de Mendoza, count of Tendilla (near Guadalajara in central Spain), arrived in Rome to convey to the new pope the formal expression of Philip II's "obedience," which was done four days later (on 16 May),<sup>82</sup> after which Tendilla was lodged at the

Vatican. Unlike the ambassador Vargas, Tendilla showed little regard for Cardinal Carafa, and quite openly recognized Marc' Antonio Colonna as duke of Paliano. Pius IV had seen to it that Tendilla was received with no end of pomp and with great friendliness, but Pius remained quiet on the matter of Paliano. Tendilla had brought the Carafeschi no sort of assurance, no word of "la recompensa," and no offer of Rossano, which was said now to be the object of litigation, owing to the rights of Bona Sforza's son, Sigismund Augustus of Poland.

Finally, on 25 May, Philip wrote Vargas from Aranjuez, a royal haven on the left bank of the Tagus, giving his decision concerning the Carafeschi. Because of the pope's request, Philip was prepared to pay Cardinal Carlo the pension of 12,000 ducats (which he had been promised more than two years before), to be levied on the revenues of the archbishopric of Toledo. He also recognized Carlo as a sort of honorary citizen of the Spanish domains, which would have allowed him to hold benefices to the extent of a further 8,000 ducats a year. Since Carlo's mission to Brussels (in 1557–1558) he had served Philip well, especially in the recent conclave, but Count Giovanni Carafa had done nothing, and deserved nothing, having failed to contribute to the maintenance of the garrison at Paliano, having retained his membership in the French Order of S. Michel, and having consorted with the king's erstwhile enemies. Philip hoped his response would satisfy the pope. Some recompense to Count Giovanni might be possible at a later date.<sup>83</sup>

Although Philip II clearly had no intention of living up to the secret capitulation of Cave as far as "la recompensa" was concerned, he had made a slight financial concession (always revocable) to Cardinal Carlo, and had left the door ever so slightly ajar for his brother Giovanni. Before Vargas had received the king's letter, however, although one had already got wind of his intentions, the blow had fallen on the Carafeschi who, strangely enough, seem to have suspected nothing. Pius IV had his own reasons for insisting upon the Spanish observance of the secret capitulation—

<sup>80</sup> *Magnus bullarium romanum*, IV-2 (Rome, 1745, repr. Graz, 1965), ad ann. 1560, no. v, pp. 12–14, "datum Romae apud S. Petrum, anno incarnationis dominicae 1560, tertio nonas Aprilis" [3 April]; Ancel, in *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV (1908), 204–5.

<sup>81</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 111–12; Pietro Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, in the *Archivio storico italiano*, XII (1847), 276, who sketches the sad scene as Paul IV lay on his deathbed: "E prima il cardinal di Napoli fu imputato d' aver levato tutte le gioie e gran quantità de' denari, che il Papa conservava nella stessa sua camera: imputazione per la quale stette lungo tempo in Castello, e n' uscì condannato in cento mila scudi. Si supposse ancora che di consenso e saputo del medesimo cardinale di Napoli si formasse un breve, spedito il giorno medesimo della morte del Papa, a favore del cardinal di Pisa [Scipione Rebiba] nel quale il Papa donava lo spoglio di Nofri Bartolino [d. 27 December, 1555], suo predecessore nell' arcivescovado di Pisa, il qual breve fu per ciò, dopo lunga discussione, reputato surretizio. . . ."

<sup>82</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 345; Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 85<sup>r</sup>.

Don Iñigo was the fourth count of Tendilla, and *alcaide* of the Alhambra. He was a son of Luis de Mendoza, brother of Don Diego, Charles V's ambassador to Venice, Trent (in 1545–1546), and Rome, on which note Erika Spivakovsky, *Son of the Alhambra* (1970), pp. 349, 352, 371, 374–75 ff. A decade after his mission to Rome, Don Iñigo became involved in the revolt of the Moriscos at Granada.

<sup>83</sup> Ancel, in the *Rev. Bénédictine*, XXV, 209–10.

reasons which had nothing to do with the Carafeschi, whom he had been planning to destroy since shortly after they had helped elect him pope. He could not move too quickly, however, for he had to lull them into a sense of security which, week after week, he took pains to do. As he later explained, he did not want them to become frightened and flee. Also the longer he delayed the blow, the less severe the inevitable charge of ingratitude would be. Pius's interest in keeping the secret capitulation alive lay in the fact that, when he had disposed of the Carafeschi, he might make his nephew Federico (or some other member or members of his family) their beneficiary. Paliano was a papal fief. If Philip insisted upon returning it to the Colonnese, from whom a pope had taken it, Philip must pay the price agreed upon at Cave.

On Monday, 27 May (1560), Cardinal Innocenzo del Monte was arrested and sent to the Castel S. Angelo, charged with a variety of crimes as well as with two recent homicides which he was said to have committed *suis manibus* at Nocera in Umbria, while he was traveling from Venice to Rome to attend the recent conclave.<sup>84</sup> Apparently Carlo Carafa saw no resemblance between del Monte's career and his own. In a letter of 1 June to his brother Giovanni he seemed to regard the news from Spain as encouraging. Philip had not yet reached a definite decision regarding the compensation for Paliano—Vargas did not receive Philip's letter of 25 May until 15 June—but the pope, on whom the matter really depended, was most favorably disposed toward them, "as he has always been." Giovanni had inquired whether he might safely return to Rome for, after all, he had been party to the murder of his wife the preceding August. Carlo now replied that it was up to Giovanni. As far as he was concerned, Carlo clearly saw no reason for alarm.<sup>85</sup>

On Tuesday, 4 June, Donna Giovanna d' Aragona di Colonna, the widow of Ascanio and the mother of Marc' Antonio, returned to Rome, "maxima comitata caterva," being met by members of Pius IV's household as well as by the duke of Ferrara, the Spanish ambassador, and many nobles. She had fled from Rome with Marc' Antonio's wife Felice on 1 January, 1556, to escape the clutches of the Carafa pope.<sup>86</sup> As the enemies of his house gathered in Rome, Carlo Carafa still did not take fright, and his brother Giovanni, returning from Gallese, made an ostentatious entry into the city during the evening of 6 June. He went to Carlo's palace in the Piazza Navona, where he found Alfonso Carafa. A banquet was prepared, to which the Carafeschi invited Philippe Lannoy, prince of Sulmona, who had been in Rome three days on business.

According to a report from Rome (of 8 June), the Carafeschi and their guests went on into the night with music and dancing, and thereafter made their way through Rome in carriages, "singing and sounding off most joyously with courtesans." The reason for their celebration was the good news which had been relayed from Spain that his Catholic Majesty had acknowledged his promise to pay Carlo a pension of 12,000 scudi, make up for the arrears, and allow him also "ottomila scudi di naturalezza." Furthermore, his Catholic Majesty was alleged to be giving Giovanni "everything that had been agreed upon and promised him in the time of the aforesaid Paul [IV]." Their joy, however, was soon cut brutally short.

Pius IV had summoned all the cardinals then in Rome (except del Monte) to a secret consistory for Friday morning, 7 June (1560). They had assembled at the Vatican Palace in the Sala del Conclistoro Segreto, which lay between the present-day Sala Ducale and the Sala dei Pontefici (the first chamber of the Appartamento Borgia).<sup>87</sup> As they

<sup>84</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, 11, 345; Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 86'.

<sup>85</sup> For the sources, see below, note 88. On 21 May (1560) Carlo had written his brother Giovanni (Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086, fol. 22): "Ancor ch' io non stia in tutto bene dela mia indisposizione et hoggi particolarmente mi sente assai travagliato, non di meno ho voluto andar da nostro Signore [Pius IV] per dolermi con sua Santità del' infortunio occorso a l' armata [i.e., the news of the Christian disaster at Jerba had just reached Rome, on which see below, note 129], e veder s' io potevo intender' alcuna cosa del Conte di Tendiglia, et principalmente per ricordare a sua Beatitudine il desiderio che vostra Eccellenza ha di venir a basargli il piede, perchè dovendosi trattar del interesse suo, se bene per suo servizio io farò sempre quel che possa far lei stessa in questo caso, non di meno mi par che sia necessario ch' ella ci intervenga et veda et intenda lei stessa il tutto; et a questo sua Santità mi ha detto che il venire

sta in arbitrio di vostra Eccellenza—determini hora lei quel che li par da far' quanto al venir' e stabilisca il tempo ch' io là starò aspettando, et in tanto gli baso le mani, benedicendo il marchese e Donna Antonia mia. Di Roma li XXI di Maggio LX. . . [signed] Servitore il Car. Carafa." The letter is the original addressed to *illusterrimo et eccellentissimo signore mio et fratello asservatissimo il signor Duca di Paliano a Gallese*.

<sup>86</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, 11, 346: ". . . eo tempore [i.e., 1 January, 1556, on which see above, Chapter 15, p. 646] ab Urbe clam [Donna Ioanna] au fugit, nunc autem ovans revertitur, volentibus sic magnis diis [!]." The duke of Ferrara was now Alfonso II d' Este (d. 1597), his father Ercole II having died on 3 October, 1559 (cf. Firmannus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, 11, 522, lines 28–29).

<sup>87</sup> Cf. the plans in Franz Ehrle and Hermann Egger, *Die Conclavepläne: Beiträge zu ihrer Entwicklungsgeschichte*, Bibl. Apost.

awaited the pope, Aurelio Spina, a chamberlain of Cardinal Borromeo, informed Carlo Carafa that the pope wished to speak to him in an audience hall on the upper floor. Taking a small, winding staircase, he hurried off "gladly," as the Florentine ambassador Gianbattista Ricasoli wrote Cosimo I later that day, but the pope was not in the audience hall.

Carlo was told to wait; presently his nephew Alfonso entered the hall. Instead of their receiving the good news which Carlo had obviously expected, the pope's young relative Gabrio Serbelloni, captain of the Swiss guard, came up to them, and told them "che gl' erano prigionieri di sua Santità, et che haveva commissione di condurli all' ora in Castello." They were prisoners. Gabrio had the pope's orders to take them to the Castel S. Angelo. Alfonso was dismayed, and remained silent. Carlo was neither dismayed nor silent. Ricasoli, who witnessed the scene, reports that Carlo said, "Questi sono i frutti delle mie buone opere!" This was his reward for making Pius pope.

Meanwhile the governor de' Federici and the fiscal procurator Pallantieri had been ordered to arrest Giovanni Carafa, "count of Montorio," whom they found in the Palazzo Carafa in Piazza Navona. They put him in a carriage, and took him to the Castello. According to the *avviso* or report of 8 June, Giovanni was at first inclined to show some resistance, but seeing all the police (*il bariello con tutti li sbirri*), he got hold of himself, and climbed into the carriage. An inventory was taken of the contents of the palace; the most valuable items were taken off to the Vatican, the rest being assigned in sequestration to the papal fisc. Although some members of the Carafa households escaped, the police rounded up about twenty persons, including relatives and friends, among whom were Ferrante Garlonio, count d' Alife, Leonardo de Cardena, Torquato Conte, Cesare Brancaccio, Ferrante di Sanguine, and others. Antonio, the marchese of Montebello, Alfonso's father, was not arrested, for he was in Naples. The pope was quoted, however, as saying "that he will get him." The author of the *avviso* of 8 June notes that "there are few who are not gladdened by the imprisonment of the Carafi, especially the Roman

people, who have suffered so much injury at their hands."<sup>88</sup>

The prosecution of the case against the Carafeschi devolved upon the governor of Rome and the fiscal prosecutor, both well known for their enmity toward the defendants. According to a letter of 28 June (1560) of Ferrante di Sanguine, a respected Neapolitan relative of the Carafeschi (and the father of Fabrizio di Sanguine, who had been

<sup>88</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 346; Scipando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 460; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 534-35; Panvinio, *De creatione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 591-93; Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, in *Arch. storico italiano*, XII (1847), 279-99. Panvinio and Nores cover the whole sad story of the Carafeschi, Nores in some detail. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, *append.*, nos. 4-7, pp. 392-96, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), *append.*, nos. 6-9, pp. 630-33, gives the texts of Carlo Carafa's letter of 1 June, 1560, to his brother Giovanni; the record of the consistory of 7 June; Gianbattista Ricasoli's letter of 7 June to Cosimo I; and the *avviso* di Roma of 8 June. Note also the Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 87: "Die Veneris VII Junii 1560 . . . fuit consistorium in loco solito. . . Antequam Pontifex fuisse deit ad consistorium, vocati fueret eius iussu reverendissimus dominus Cardinalis Carafa, nepos, et reverendissimus dominus Alphonsus, cardinalis Neapolitanus, pronepos Pontificis Pauli IV, et missi sunt ad Arcem Sancti Angeli. Descendit postea Sanctitas sua ad consistorium, et de actione rationem reddidit ceteris reverendissimis dominis cardinalibus, et terminavit consistorium."

The *avvisi* di Roma for the years 1559-1562 may be found in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urbinas lat. 1039, which Pastor has used extensively. Cod. Urb. lat. 1038 covers the years 1554-1558; cod. 1040, the years 1565-1568; cod. 1041, 1569-1570; cod. 1042, the year 1571. These five volumes of *avvisi* (codd. 1038-42), coming down to Lepanto, were for the most part prepared in Venice for the rich banker Ulrich Fugger of Augsburg, on which see Dom René Ancl. "Étude critique sur quelques recueils d' *avvisi*: Contribution à l'histoire du journalisme en Italie," *Mélanges d' archéologie et d' histoire*, XXVIII (1908), 115-39, and note the catalogue of *Codices Urbinas latini*, III (Rome, 1921), nos. 1038 ff., pp. 47 ff. The first thirty-six volumes of the *avvisi*, with the periods they cover to the beginning of the seventeenth century, are listed in Jean Delumeau, *Vie économique et sociale de Rome*, II (1959), 947-48.

Original *avvisi* of the spring of 1559 may be found in Cod. Urb. lat. 1039, addressed *Illustri viro Domino Huldricio Fuggero, Augustae* (fol. 33<sup>v</sup>), and of the years 1560-1562 at *magnifico et mollo generoso signor mio, il Signor Ulrico Fucari, Augusta* (fols. 217<sup>v</sup>, 221<sup>v</sup>, 239<sup>v</sup>, 241<sup>v</sup>, 242<sup>v</sup>, 244<sup>v</sup>, 246<sup>v</sup>, 249<sup>v</sup>, 253<sup>v</sup>, 257<sup>v</sup>, 260<sup>v</sup>, 266<sup>v</sup>, 271<sup>v</sup>, 275<sup>v</sup>, etc., 331<sup>v</sup>, 332<sup>v</sup>, 334<sup>v</sup>, 336<sup>v</sup>, 339<sup>v</sup>, etc.). This volume, as noted above, contains detailed reports of the major events of 1559-1562, including the disgrace of the Carafeschi, the death of Paul IV, the election of Pius IV, the siege of Jerba, the trial of the Carafeschi, and almost everything else which occurred in the early years of Pius IV. The following volume in this series contains only copies of *avvisi*, and so no inscribed addresses, but (as Ancl has stated) they are certainly all from the Fugger archives, as apparently are most of the *avvisi* in the next three volumes. Cf. also Cesare D'Onofrio, "Gli 'Avvisi' di Roma dal 1554 al 1605 conservati in biblioteche ed archivi romani," *Palatino: Rivista romana di cultura*, VI (1962), 177-83, VII (1963), 18-23, etc.

Vaticana, 1933, pls. 1-v, illustrating the location of the cardinals' cells during the conclaves from 1549-1550 to 1559, at which time the two sections of the Sala Ducale were known as the *Lectorium Magistr[um] Sacri] Palatii* and the *Sala Consistorii Publici*—from the latter hall one entered the antechamber of the Secret Consistory, and thence into the *Aula* [or *Locus*] *Consistorii Secreti*.



a conclave of Carlo in the last conclave), the papal prosecutors had seized seven or eight chests of letters and documents.<sup>89</sup> Indeed, de' Federici and Pallantieri tracked down every piece of evidence that could be used against the prisoners. They questioned everyone whom they believed to have cause for action or complaint, and so might be useful at the coming trial.

Gianbattista Ricasoli had reported on 15 June that in Alfonso Carafa's palace there had been found not only several chests of papers, but 13,000 ducats, jewels, and satchels and money-boxes bearing the papal arms, which did nothing to diminish Pius IV's indignation. The search for hostile deponents and incriminating data was extended to Gallese and Naples; the former yielded little, but the papal nuncio Paolo Odescalchi made a rich find at Naples. By the middle of July it was known in Rome that he had discovered, hidden away in a monastery, furniture and objets d'art allegedly worth sixty to seventy thousand ducats or more, which had been taken from the Vatican.<sup>90</sup> The Neapolitan monastery also yielded two more small chests of letters and documents.<sup>91</sup>

By a *motu proprio* of 1 July (1560) Pius IV defined the charges against the Carafeschi, and initiated the trial which was to begin a week later. Giovanni Carafa, called the duke of Paliano and a knight of the Order of S. Michel, was charged with the murder of his nephew Marcello Capece, the alleged lover of Giovanni's wife Violante Garlonia d'Alife. Capece had been put to death without a trial, *absque etiam notario et sine aliqua penitus scriptura*. He had been cruelly tortured, and denied sacramental confession. After his death his body had been thrown into a latrine. Giovanni's wife, a noblewoman of unblemished reputation, in the sixth or seventh month of pregnancy, had been murdered by her brother [Ferrante Garlonio, count d'Alife] and another relative [Leonardo de Cardena],

and furthermore Carlo and Alfonso Carafa, Neapolitans, commonly called cardinal deacons of the Holy Roman Church, quite unmindful of their own safety and dignity, agreed to the murder of the said Violante, wife of their brother and uncle respectively, and directed, advised, and urged that she should be put to death.

...

As for the cardinal Carlo, he had been guilty of numerous hideous homicides, murders for money, which he had committed with his own hands or engaged others to do for him. He had also deceived Pope Paul IV—*falsis coloribus ac mendaciis varisque dolis et machinationibus*—to go to war [with Spain], which had resulted in numberless deaths, sacrileges, crimes, rapine, and incendiary destruction. Also Carlo and his brother Antonio [di Montebello] had defrauded the Camera Apostolica of large sums of money which had been collected to pay the papal troops in the ill-omened war. Carlo, like his brother Giovanni, was guilty of "plura adulteria et stupra mulierum," intimidating husbands, brothers, and parents with threats, imprisoning them, and employing force in other ways. Under the guise of justice they had condemned many innocent persons to death or to the galleys. The scandalous brothers and Cardinal Alfonso had levied extortionate exactions upon every province in the papal states, embezzling funds from the inhabitants as well as from the Camera.

At Paul IV's death Alfonso had removed from the papal chamber "a large, extraordinary sum of money, jewels, silverware, vessels consecrated for ecclesiastical usage and the divine service as well as other precious objects of huge value." Thereafter Alfonso had spurned Pius IV's admonitory bull, ordering "sub certis censuris et penis" the return of expropriated and illegally-possessed church property, and had gone to the extent of having a brief forged in the name of Paul IV, falsely making him a gift of all the valuables he had in effect stolen.

The crimes of the Carafeschi were common knowledge, a scandal throughout Christendom and to the Church. Since Pius feared the likelihood of their fleeing at the first sign of a legal step to be taken against them, he had ordered their confinement in the Castel S. Angelo, and had instructed Girolamo de' Federici, the bishop of Sagona, *almae Urbis nostrae gubernator et vicecamerarius*, to undertake a thorough investigation of all the aforesaid charges and of others likely to be brought against the two cardinals and the duke of Paliano. De' Federici and Alessandro Pallantieri, fiscal procurator of the Camera, were to be fortified in the exercise of their duties by the full range of the ecclesiastical armament—major excommunication, deprivation of churches, dignities, benefices, pensions, offices, and fiefs—whenever they might encounter recalcitrant and unco-operative witnesses and deponents, whoever and of whatever station they might be. The in-

<sup>89</sup> Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV, 213.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 216–17, and see Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli* (1961), pp. 87–92, who is critical of Pius IV, and inclined to defend Alfonso Carafa.

<sup>91</sup> Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXII (1905), 530.

terrogation of members of the Sacred College would take place in the presence of other cardinals. De' Federici would report in detail to the pope, who reserved for himself the right of passing sentence. No previous apostolic legislation, no immunities, privileges, indults, nothing (*etiam per capitula in proximo preterito conclavi*) was to impede the investigation nor to exempt the guilty from punishment.<sup>92</sup>

A second *motu proprio*, on 5 July (1560), designated eight cardinals—Federico de' Cesi, Bartolomé de la Cueva, Gianmichele Saraceni, Jacopo Puteo, Gianbattista Cicada, Jean Bertrand, Giulio della Rovere, and Alvise Corner (Cornaro)—to observe the proceedings as guarantors of justice. They were to take no part, however, in the trial, the conduct of which was left entirely to de' Federici and Pallantieri, who put questions to the defendants and the witnesses. The defendants' interests were also supposed to be watched over by the *Societas charitatis Urbis*, the Roman legal-aid society, whose representative was the Spaniard Luis de Torres. The trial or interrogation of the two cardinals began on 8 July. It took place in the Castel S. Angelo, and was to last a full three months. Questions were put to the accused in Latin. They answered in Italian. The eight cardinals were silent observers of the judicial procedure, the like of which had not been seen at the Curia Romana since the trial, condemnation, and execution of Cardinal Alfonso Petrucci in 1517.<sup>93</sup>

Aside from the fact that the judges de' Federici and Pallantieri were known to be enemies of the Carafeschi, it would seem that neither Alfonso nor Carlo should have been indicted on the charges set forth in Pius IV's *motu proprio* of 1 July (1560). According to the election capitulation of 1559, which all the cardinals had sworn to observe (and which Pius had confirmed by a bull), members of the Sacred College could be prosecuted only for heresy, schism, or treason (*laesa maiestas*). By another *motu proprio*, however, of 10 July, the pope maintained the validity of the charges, even though

the indictment had not taken account of the election capitulation.

The younger cardinal, Alfonso, maintained a quiet composure throughout the interrogations. He was charged with theft and forgery only. Carlo was accused of an appalling array of crimes, but he appealed to the election capitulation as his defense against arraignment for all his evil deeds since 7 June, 1555 (five years to the day before his arrest), the date on which Paul IV had made him a cardinal. He pled exoneration from the crimes he had committed before that date (when he was a soldier) on the basis of the brief of absolution which had accompanied Paul's gift of the red hat, and had obliterated the chargeable offenses of his past up to the date in question. Carlo's memory was likely to fail him when the questions became incriminatory.

On 22 July Pallantieri informed Carafa in the presence of the cardinals that the pope had declared null and void both Paul IV's brief of absolution and the relevance of the election capitulation, to which Carafa responded with violent and not unjustified indignation. From the end of the month the prisoners were each confined to a single cell, and visitors no longer had easy access to them. The grueling interrogations continued through August and most of September, and early in October de' Federici presented to the pope the voluminous procès-verbaux of the trial.<sup>94</sup>

Carlo Carafa had been indicted on some twenty-two counts of criminality, heresy, and malfeasance, of which fourteen were considered borne out by the evidence, including five murders. It must be acknowledged that in some cases the proofs were nebulous. Giovanni Carafa, duke of Paliano, was accused of having "executed" Marcello Capece, alleged lover of his wife Violante, in the castle at Soriano on the night of 26-27 [or 29-30] July, 1559, stabbing him twenty-seven times with a dagger.<sup>95</sup> He was also held responsible

<sup>92</sup> Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXV, 219-24.

<sup>93</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086, fols. 492 ff., formerly in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. X, tom. 197 [see below, note 100], the *Liber Jurium*, with the text given in Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, append., no. 8, pp. 396-401, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), append., no. 10, pp. 633-36. On the charges made against the Carafeschi, see the preceding chapter, note 79, and on the *Liber Jurium*, cf. *ibid.*, note 208. On the brief, false or otherwise, whereby Alfonso Carafa had removed the papal jewels and money to his own quarters, see Fabio Gori, "Papa Paolo IV ed i Carafa," *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 49 ff.

<sup>94</sup> See, above, Volume III, pp. 167-68.

<sup>95</sup> On the "execution" of Capece, cf. Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV (1907), 497-501, and Fabio Gori, "Papa Paolo IV ed i Carafa," *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, I (1875), 245-56, and II (1877), 47-48, from the records of the trial. Gori also gives, *ibid.*, II, 262-63, the twenty-two charges levelled against Carlo Carafa, of which cap. xv was *solicitatio classis Turcarum*. Of the five murders of which he was accused two of them were the so-called executions of Capece and Violante. On the murders of Capece and Violante, cf. Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Miscellanea, Arm. XI, tom. 114, fols. 82 ff., by mod. stamped enumeration; for Capece's "confession," dated at Rocca di Soriano on Saturday evening, 29 July, 1559, see, *ibid.*, fols. 308<sup>r</sup>, 309<sup>r</sup>, and cf. fols. 339 ff.

for the murder of his wife Violante at Gallese on 29 August (1559), although the deed was actually done by her brother Ferrante, count of Alife, and her uncle Leonardo de Cardena.<sup>96</sup> Cardinals Alfonso and Carlo were said to have approved of Violante's removal to protect the honor of the house of Carafa. Indeed, it was stated that Carlo had insisted upon it.<sup>97</sup>

The election capitulation of the last conclave had conceded that cardinals could be brought to trial for heresy, schism, and treason, and Carlo Carafa was in fact soon charged with both heresy and treason. Schism lay without the scope of his interests and activities. Indifference to religion and an alleged tendency to blasphemy opened him up to the accusation of heresy. On one occasion, while in Venice, he was said to have encountered a procession in which the host was being borne. With an obscene gesture toward the sacrament, he was quoted as saying that he did not believe in the real presence in the eucharist, and that anyone who did was crazy.<sup>98</sup>

Marc' Antonio Borghese, the father of Camillo (later Pope Paul V), represented the Carafeschi along with six other advocates. He took up their defense in October, 1560 (on Marc' Antonio's career, see G. de Caro, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XII [1970], 598-600), and tried to maintain the validity of Carlo's *plenaria restitutio* when he was made a cardinal. For his answers to the charges against Carlo, see Arm. XI, tom. 114, fols. 194-207, and for his plea "pro illustrissimo Don Joanne Caraffa, duce Palliani," *ibid.*, fols. 266-72.

<sup>96</sup> On the murder of the duchess of Paliano, cf. Domenico Gnoli, "Violante Caraffa: Storia del Secolo XVI," *Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti*, XIX (1872), 341-57, 538-55, 799-829; Fabio Gori, "Papa Paolo IV ed i Carafa," *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 200-6; George Duruy, *Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa*, Paris, 1882, pp. 315-18; Alphonse de Ruble, *Le Traité de Cateau-Cambresis*, Paris, 1889, pp. 94-98, 124-25; Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXIV, 501-2; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 136-38, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 110-11.

<sup>97</sup> The charges against the Carafeschi are outlined in Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXVI (1909), 52-80.

<sup>98</sup> Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XXVI, 65-66, and see Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Nuntiatenberichte aus Deutschland*, 1-14 (Tübingen, 1971), introd., pp. XXIV-XXV, and no. 139, p. 354, a letter of the papal nuncio Girolamo Muzarelli to Giovanni Carafa (then serving at the Vatican as interim secretary of state) dated at Brussels on 5 June, 1556, and esp., *ibid.*, append., no. 13, pp. 420-21, from a statement which Muzarelli sent to Cardinal Carlo Borromeo in June, 1560: "L'heresia imputata al suddetto cardinal [Carlo Carafa] era circa il santissimo sacramento del altare, perchè dicevano ch' essend' esso in Venetia quand' era in minoribus, et vedendo portare il detto sacratissimo sacramento processionalmente, faceva la fica con le mani verso esso sacramento dicendo, 'io non ti credo, pazzo è chi ti crede!'" Cf. the *Processo de' Caraffi*, in the appendix to L. Scaramelli's publication of Pietro Norea's *Guerra di Paolo IV*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, XII (1847), 480-81.

Carlo was also accused of political relations with the Lutherans, especially with Albrecht, the margrave of Brandenburg, one of the great troublemakers of the mid-century. Early in 1556 Albrecht had become the anti-Hapsburg ally of Henry II, who had just formed his alliance with Paul IV (on 15 December, 1555). Under the circumstances negotiations between Carlo and Albrecht were inevitable; they had known each other for a decade (since 1546). Carlo and the margrave's agent, Friedrich Spedt, who had come to Rome (in 1556), had been friends or at least acquaintances for years. One must always remember Carlo's past as a soldier; he had once been in imperial employ in Germany. Later he had fought for the French at Siena. Albrecht had sought money from the Holy See, and had promised to put troops into the field against Charles V.

When questioned about his dealings with the Lutherans, Carlo's memory failed him (*io non mi ricordo di avere avuto lettere da Luterani*), but when it was clear that the prosecution was well supplied with documentary evidence, he did recall that Spedt had spent a month in Rome. In fact Spedt, whom Carlo had wanted (he said) to send away from the time he first arrived, had finally discussed his mission with the pope. They had spoken Latin, however, and so Silvestro Aldobrandini had served as go-between. Yes, there had been some discussion of a league with the Lutherans. Carlo could not remember the details, but Spedt had made a hopelessly confusing statement as to the purpose of his mission. As for Carlo, as always, he had merely carried out Paul IV's instructions. He could not remember this, and he could not remember that. He could recognize Spedt's handwriting, but not that of his own secretaries. He had not trusted Spedt.

Otto von Truchsess, the cardinal of Augsburg, had made it clear to Carlo (he said) that Spedt was a scoundrel. When asked whether Spedt had written to him before coming to Rome, Carlo did not remember having received a letter from him. When shown letters which had been found among his own papers, with annotations in his secretary's hand, Carlo still did not remember. Secretaries were careless. They had interfiled letters of Spedt, about which he knew nothing, with his own correspondence. He claimed to have turned over to

Muzarelli had served as nuncio to Charles V at Brussels from 1554 to 1556. He was archbishop of Conza di Campania, some miles northwest of Potenza in southern Italy, from 1553 to 1561.

the pope all the letters he had received but, of course, the pope may have sent them back, a secretary filed them, and he had not seen them. De' Federici and Pallantieri were unremitting and unrelenting in their questions. They had documents that proved him wrong, and so they could only assume him to be a liar "ex his . . . involutis responsionibus et tot cavillationibus."

No union was possible between the Lutheran Albrecht of Brandenburg and Paul IV, not even if, conceivably, German troops might have assisted the Carafeschi to acquire Siena, which was in any event unlikely. Carlo asserted, however, that the only reason he had kept Spedt in Rome, and heard him out, was that Paul IV had ordered him to do so (*al certo non l'avrei inteso, ma l'avrei cacciato via come un infame*). However that may have been, Spedt was not dismissed until Cardinal von Truchsess intervened. According to the statement which Girolamo Muzzarelli, archbishop of Conza di Campania, sent Cardinal Borromeo in June (1560), Carlo Carafa's comportment in Venice had been a scandal to the faith. He had hobnobbed with Lutherans resident on the lagoon, attending their dinners and eating meat on Fridays as well as scoffing at the mass.<sup>99</sup>

Among the more serious charges brought against Carlo Carafa was that he had diverted Paul IV from ecclesiastical affairs and church reform to the war with the Hapsburgs. Less than two months after Cardinals Charles de Guise and François de Tournon had negotiated the papal-French alliance (of 15 December, 1555), Henry II had in wondrous wise entered into the truce of Vaucelles with Charles V and Philip II (on 5 February, 1556) which, as we have seen, was likely to undo the pope's plans to expel the Spanish from Italy and to frustrate Carlo's ambition to acquire Siena.

Carlo's devious diplomacy, however, had soon done away with the truce of Vaucelles, plunging the Holy See into the disastrous war with Spain, and the prosecution now accused Carafa of being the *autor belli, treguae fractae sollicitator*, as indeed he was. Having seized all Carafa's papers, de' Federici and Pallantieri were well equipped to prove the charge, although in the interests of the Holy See they were careful to free from blame Paul IV, on whom by and large Carafa fixed the respon-

sibility, since he claimed to be the mere instrument of papal policy.

The prosecution blamed Carafa for exciting the pope to take extreme measures in the notorious affair of the Sforza galleys. They claimed, and it was true, that he had given Henry II false assurances that when French troops entered Italy (after the truce of Vaucelles was broken), the pope would appoint several French partisans as cardinals. They also claimed, and it was apparently not true, that Carlo had concealed from the pope the secret capitulation of Cave. We have already dealt, in its chronological setting, with one of the most serious charges which Carlo had to face at his trial—that in the papal war with Spain he had sought to enlist the aid of the Turk, enemy of the name of Christ, against Philip II, the Catholic king.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>99</sup> See, above, Chapter 16, pp. 678–79; *Processo de Caraffi*, in the *Arch. stor. italiano*, XII (1847), 483–507; Ancel, in *Revue Bénédicte*, XXVI, 70–80. The chief sources for the charges brought against the Carafeschi may be found in the so-called *Liber iurium coram reverendissimo gubernatore . . . contra illustrissimos et reverendissimos dominos, cardinales Carolum Carafam, Alphonsum Neapolitanum, etc.*, in the *Bibl. Apost. Vaticana*, Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086 [formerly in the Archives as *Miscellanea*, Arm. X, tom. 197] and in the proceedings outlined in the *Arch. Segr. Vaticano*, *Miscellanea*, Arm. XI, tom. 114, *Diverse scritture concernenti la causa del Cardinale Carlo Caraffa et altri fatta dal governatore di Roma, vescovo di Savona [Sagona], tanto in favore che contro di essi: Capita quatuordecim articulorum pro parte facti contra illustrissimum et reverendissimum Dom. Carolum Cardinalem Caraffam coram reverendissimo domino Hieronimo episcopo Sagonensi, Urbis gubernatore et commissario super inscriptis delictis proditorum: Almae Urbis Caristatis Societas . . .*, which texts (says a note) were "trovati nella Guardarobba." The early folios of this volume are crumbling, owing to the corrosive effect of the ink. To the elucidation of these texts Dom René Ancel devoted much of his scholarly career. Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 118–19, note, on the major sources for the trial of Carlo, Alfonso, and Giovanni Carafa, Ferrante Garlonio and Leonardo de Cardena.

Carlo Carafa maintained of course that he had requested aid of the Turks because of the verbal orders which Paul IV had given him. Also, concerned for the well-being of Italy, he declared at his trial, "Nel fine mi ristrinsi a dire che le difese non si possono far senza offesa, et che questa richiedeva così armate come eserciti, onde io vedeva di lontano che il re di Francia facendo per terra quello che et può, et che già si sente vorrebbe forse servirsi dell'armata Turchesca a fine di non restare inferiore in mare, ch'è cosa di tanto momento et totalmente necessaria in questa impresa, et che a questa sua volontà io non vedeva come poi sua Santità potesse obviare con tutto il dispiacer' che ne avesse a sentire, massimamente havendo il re presa questa guerra a difesa della Chiesa di Dio et della Sede Apostolica, et servendosi il re d'Inghilterra di molto maggiori nimici di essa, quali sono gl'heretici . . ." (Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086, fol. 215, by original numeration). On Monsignore della Vigna and the Turks, note, *ibid.*, fol. 212.

On 2 January (1557) Carafa wrote from France, "Scrissi all

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédicte*, XXVI, 66–70, and refs. to Lutz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, in the preceding note; *Processo de Caraffi*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, XII, 461–82; Fabio Gori, in the *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario della città e provincia di Roma*, I (1875), 228–33.

After the prosecution (*ad offesam*) the Carafeschi could, with their attorneys, prepare for their defense (*ad difesam*) which, considering the time spans allotted for the purpose, must have extended to about 20 November (1560). The trial was over by the following 15 January.<sup>101</sup> Among their attorneys was Marc' Antonio Borghese, whose son Camillo was to become Pope Paul V (1605–1621). Marc' Antonio was a "consistorial doctor" and *advocatus pauperum*. The attorneys could dispute the charges against their clients, on certain occasions at least, in the presence of the pope and the cardinals assigned to the case. The defendants were not admitted to these sessions. On the whole the defense took the form of written statements, of which ten were presented to the pope and cardinals on Carlo Carafa's behalf, and six or eight for his brother Giovanni, who had merely defended his honor in the murders of Capece and Violante. The attorneys emphasized the flimsiness of the evidence adduced against Carlo. It was, they said, largely hearsay; the witnesses against him were mostly low-born laymen; furthermore, he had acted in important matters always and only on the orders of Paul IV.

While the Spanish ambassador Francisco de Vargas worked hard for his friend Carlo Carafa, the count of Tendilla, who left Rome at the end of December, had sided with Guido Ascanio Sforza and the Colonnese, who were determined to destroy the Carafeschi. Although, as time went on, the Roman populace tended to get tired of the long-drawn-out trial, tensions increased at the Curia. Suddenly on 26 February, 1561, Pius IV created eighteen (or nineteen) cardinals, largely to bolster his position in the consistory.<sup>102</sup> His ac-

tion was not unlike that of Leo X, who, after the Petrucci conspiracy, had created no fewer than thirty-one cardinals (on 1 July, 1517). The recipients of Pius's new hats included several opponents and no favorites of the Carafeschi.

For months Philip II had remained silent, reluctant to commit himself with regard to the trial going on at the Curia, although he finally made a lukewarm recommendation to the pope for clemency. His letter was brought to Rome on Saturday, 1 March, by which time (as Philip had probably assumed) the die had already been cast.<sup>103</sup> At a memorable consistory held on the following Monday, 3 March, at the instance of the fiscal procurator Pallantieri, the pope directed de' Federici, the governor of Rome, to read the statement of the case against Cardinal Carafa. According to the consistorial record, it took from noon to 7:00 P.M., after which the pope pronounced sentence, and brought the consistory to a close.<sup>104</sup> Cardinal Borromeo, to whom we shall return in a moment, was present at the consistory. In the postscript to a letter dated 4–6 March (1561), he wrote Gian Francesco Commendone, bishop of Zante and papal nuncio in Germany, that de' Federici's presentation of the "relation" of the case against the Carafeschi had lasted from about 11:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M.<sup>105</sup>

Pius IV pronounced sentence "according to the docket," *prout in cedula*. Although the sentences against the defendants were given in sealed texts, everyone at the consistory realized that the pope's decision had been the penalty of death. Pius had spent hours and days studying transcripts of the testimony of both the defendants and the witnesses. Five cardinals rose immediately—Rodolfo

ventisette che sua Maestà Christianissima haveva mandato a sollicitare l'armata del Turco, et per Piemonte voleva di più se mila Suizzeri et quattro mila Franzesi per havervi venticinque mila fanti" (*ibid.*, fol. 321'). On the charge that Carafa "armatam Turcharum sollicitaverit contra Imperiales," see also *Arm. XI*, tom. 114, fols. 128 ff., by mod. stamped enumeration.

A letter, written by Pietro Strozzi to the duke of Paliano on 23 July, 1557, was produced at the trial, relating to Jean de la Vigne, "che fu mandato all'armata Turchesca." "Monsignor della Vigna fò espedito et se parti, et tornò a replicare a vostra Signoria illustrissima che questo maneggio col Turco è stimato da sua Maestà Christianissima sopra ogn'altra cosa. . ." (Fabio Gori, in the *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, I [1875], 233–35).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. the Acta Consistorialia, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 103', by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>102</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 106'–107'; Massarelli, *Diarium Septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 351–52; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 540; Van Gulik, Eubel, Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, 111

(1923), 38–39; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 129–30. The nineteenth cardinal, Daniele Barbaro, was listed in *pecore*, and seems never to have been publicly recognized.

<sup>103</sup> Philip II's letter, which arrived in Rome on 1 March, was dated at Toledo on 11 February, 1561 (Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I [1862], 353). He wrote Pius IV that ". . . en las causas que ahí se tratan de los Cardenales Carrafa y Napoles. . . sé cierto que vuestra Santidad no dejara de usar con ellos lo que sule por su acostumbrada bondad y benignidad[!]." Philip also wrote Vargas on the same date, sending him a copy of the letter to the pope.

<sup>104</sup> The text of the consistorial record has been published by Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, append., no. 13, p. 403, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), append., no. 19, p. 639. The consistory of 3 March (1561) was a long one, and a lot of work got done, as revealed by the entries given under that date in the Acta Consistorialia, in the Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 107'–109', where (oddly enough) there is no reference to de' Federici's detailing of the charges against Carlo Carafa.

<sup>105</sup> For the text, see below, note 109.

Pio of Carpi, Alessandro Farnese, Ippolito d' Este, Tiberio Crispi, and Jacopo Savelli—and came before the pope. They implored him to suspend the sentence against Carlo. Nothing which had been revealed at the trial justified an extreme penalty. The evidence had all been conjectures and assumptions. The pope replied that he would obey the divine law, and withdrew from the consistory.

On Wednesday, 5 March, at the fifth hour of the night (about 12:00 P.M.) the *bergello* or papal chief of police, Gasparino de Melis, went to Cardinal Carafa's cell in the Castel S. Angelo. Carafa was awakened. Although he had been informed of his condemnation to death the day before, he had apparently not believed it. When the *bergello* said that he had come to see to the execution of the sentence, Carafa asked ten times, "I am to die? So the pope wants me to die?" When it was finally made clear to him that his last hour had come, he still asked, "I, who have not confessed to anything, am to die?" He called upon all those present to bear witness that he pardoned the pope, the king of Spain, the governor of Rome, the fiscal procurator, and his other enemies. Then he turned to the priest in attendance. According to one account his confession was an hour long. After reciting the seven penitential psalms, he was strangled at an hour or more after midnight. The contemporary reports are at odds with one another. The woeful performance of strangulation is said to have required a full half-hour, for the executioner's cord broke twice, and he ended up by using a bed sheet.<sup>106</sup> With the death of Carlo Carafa the seeming immunity of cardinal-nephews from being called to account for their conduct of affairs in the Vatican secretariate of state had come to an end.

Carlo's brother Giovanni, still called the duke of Paliano, had already been removed from the Castello, and taken across the Tiber to the old

papal prison, the Tor di Nona, which was to be torn down about the year 1600, the last remains being swept away in the demolitions along the Lungotevere in 1887. The Tor di Nona stood near the south end of the Ponte S. Angelo. Giovanni's brother-in-law Ferrante Garlonio, count of Alife, and Don Leonardo de Cardena had been removed from the Castello with him. All three were beheaded, Giovanni first, between 4:00 and 6:00 A.M. (on 6 March), in the small courtyard of the three-storey Torre. The cells in the old prison bore such names as Inferno, Paradiso, Purgatorio, la Monachina, and La Zoppetta. Earlier on, the duke of Paliano had been confined in the Tor di Nona for some forty days. His cell was long known as "la Paliana." The duke had faced death, says Pietro Nores, "con grandissima constanza, e degna veramente della qualità e della nobiltà della sua casa."<sup>107</sup> Indeed, nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.

<sup>106</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, in the *Arch. storico italiano*, XII (1847), 297-98, whose account, however, is otherwise inaccurate. Giovanni Carafa had addressed a letter to Pius IV from the Tor di Nona on 17 January, 1561 (*ibid.*, pp. 456-58). A few hours (not one hour) before his death he had written a touching letter to his young son Diomed, marquis of Cave (pp. 458-60), which he dated "l'ultimo giorno di questa fallace vita, che sono li cinque di marzo 1561, alle cinque hore di notte" (i.e., about midnight). On the failure of the Carafeschi's defense, the death sentences, and the executions, see esp. Ancel, in the *Revue Bénédicte*, XXVI, 189-220, and Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 147-73, with appendix, nos. 9-18, pp. 401-9, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 118-37, with appendix, nos. 13-15, 18-24, pp. 637-43. Cf. also Fabio Gori, in the *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 302-8.

Although Pastor quite rightly attaches much importance to the letter of 8 March (1561) from Francesco Tonina, the Mantuan ambassador in Rome, to Duke Guglielmo Gonzaga, it contains obvious inaccuracies like all the contemporary reports dealing with the four executions. For example, Giovanni Carafa himself fixed the time he wrote the letter to his son "at the fifth hour" (midnight) on 5 March (see above), and yet Tonina, who claimed to have got his information directly from the *bergello* Gasparino de Melis (*come egli stesso ha narrato di bocca*), says that Gasparino went "alle cinque hore di notte [midnight] . . . primieramente al Cardinale Caraffa, il quale dormeva. . . ." Considering Carlo's protests, his long confession, his recitation of the psalms, and the half-hour bungling of the strangulation, it must have taken at least two hours to effect his execution. After this, says Tonina, the *bergello* and the police "andorno poi al duca di Palliano, qual condussero in Torre di Nona . . ." but (Tonina continues) since Giovanni wanted to write letters to his son (and his sister), they took him back into his cell at the Castel S. Angelo, where he composed the two time-consuming letters, and "poi fu condotto a Torre di Nona" (Pastor, VII, appendix, no. 23, p. 641).

According to Tonina's timetable, these letters could not have been written before 2:00 A.M., but we know they were written at midnight. Also Giovanni Carafa, the count d'Alife, and de Cardena were taken to the Torre before, not after, the exe-

<sup>107</sup> Cf. the letter of 7 March (1561) from Marc' Antonio da Mula, Venetian ambassador in Rome (and later cardinal), to the Signoria in Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), appendix, no. 22, p. 640, but note the other use of the sheet (*lenzuolo*) mentioned in the *avviso* of 8 March, *ibid.*, VII, appendix, no. 24, p. 642. The sentences of death pronounced against Giovanni Carafa, Ferrante Garlonio, and Leonardo de Cardena, all dated 4 March, 1561, may be found in Fabio Gori, "Paolo IV ed i Carafa," *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 259-61. Gori did not succeed in finding (in the Arch. di Stato di Roma) the text of the death sentence passed against Carlo Carafa (and I do not know that it has ever been found). The formulation of Carlo's sentence remains unknown. His brief appeal to the pope "da Castello di Santo Angelo li III de Marzo del '61" is the last text given in Cod. Vat. lat. 12,086, fol. 583.

Less adroit as the cardinal-nephew than Alessandro Farnese, more immoral than his friend Vitellozzo Vitelli, Carlo Carafa had lived a violent life, and now he had died a violent death. The enemy of Spain, he had tried to become the friend of the Hapsburgs; the friend of France, he had become the enemy of the Valois. Untrustworthy himself, he seems too easily to have placed his trust in others: "nel principio si fidò troppo degli amici," as Nores observes, "nel fine si fidò troppo de' nemici."<sup>108</sup> He had used great power dishonestly; his trial had been conducted unjustly. Pius IV's austere nephew, Carlo Borromeo, who was familiar with all the testimony given in Carlo's long trial, apparently agreed with the papal sentence of death. As he wrote Commendone, in the letter alluded to above, if Pius could have employed his usual kindness of heart in the case of the Carafeschi, he would have done so gladly. But the enormity of their crimes was such that he had no alternative to a severity that belied his nature.<sup>109</sup>

cution of Cardinal Carlo. So much for the accuracy of the account which Pastor, VII, 135, note, regards as "der am meisten authentische Bericht." On the other hand, the Venetian ambassador Marc' Antonio da Mula, who seems well informed concerning the details of Carlo's execution (as confirmed from other sources) mistakenly places his execution after that of Giovanni, Ferrante Garlonio, and de Cardena (*ibid.*, VII, append., no. 22, pp. 639-41, letter dated at Rome on 7 March, 1561). The executions of the last three are fixed as to time (Arch. d. S. Giovanni Decollato, Giustiziani, III, fol. 169<sup>r</sup>, cited by Pastor, VII, 136-37, note 1): "dalle hore nove sino a hore XI incirca giovedì addi 6 di marzo. . . ." Cf. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 352-53; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialis*, *ibid.*, II, 540, who had paid a sad visit to Cardinal Carlo, who was glad to see him, on 18 January (1561), "et deituit me in prandio secum" (II, 539); Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 97, pp. 354-55.

Concerning the Tor di Nona I might add that it was the possession of the Orsini, perhaps in the later thirteenth and certainly in the fourteenth century, when it was probably the Torre dell' Annona, for in 1347 Giordano Orsini was the *praefectus Annonae*. On the left bank of the Tiber, the Torre was well situated to receive grain and other products, which could be stored in the adjoining warehouses. From the first decade of the fifteenth century it had, on occasion at least, been used as a papal prison, and was popularly known as "la presone de lo papa." The Torre having been demolished about 1600, the lower part of the structure and its annexes were remade later on, into an inn with adjoining shops and a large hayloft, which was itself converted into a theater by Carlo Fontana in 1669-1670, the first opera house in Rome. The theater burned in 1781, but was replaced by the "Apollo," which lasted for many years, and was finally cleared away in 1887 (see Emma Amadei, *Le Torri di Roma*, Rome, 1969, pp. 58-62). One of the most striking and long-remembered dramas ever enacted on the spot was that which took place during the early morning hours of Thursday, 6 March, 1561.

<sup>108</sup> Nores, *Guerra di Paolo IV*, p. 299.

<sup>109</sup> In the postscript to the letter dated at Rome on 4-6 March, 1561, Carlo Borromeo had written Commendone (Let-

Everyone associated with the Carafeschi had seemed to be in danger. Cardinal Scipione Rebiba had been arrested on 7 February, and was only freed from imprisonment a full year later (on 31 January, 1562).<sup>110</sup> Even Nicola Barone was dropped from the Sistine Chapel, because he had been a familiar of Carlo Carafa. Another Carafa, the scholarly young Antonio, lost his canony in S. Peter's, and fled for his life, but was to be rewarded for his suffering with a cardinal's hat by Pius V Ghislieri (on 24 March, 1568). Antonio was to become one of the better-known librarians of the Vatican. His imprisoned cousin, Cardinal Alfonso, escaped condemnation by giving up the "regency" of the Apostolic Camera, and impoverished himself by trying to pay a fine of 100,000 gold scudi. Alfonso was released from the Castel S. Angelo on 2 April (1561). After living for almost a year and a half under hardship and apprehension, however, another misfortune gave him the courage to flee from Pius IV's control.

During the eventful night of 11-12 August, 1562, while Rome was under heavy guard because of rumors that an attempt would be made on the life of Pius IV, a French notary of the Camera Apostolica was arrested, one Jean de Save, whose papers were seized. Among these papers a statement was found which had been signed by Carlo Carafa and (it was said) also by Alfonso, whereby Jean du Bellay, dean of the Sacred College, had promised the two Carafeschi twelve cardinals, 12,000 scudi, and confirmation of the duchy of

tere di principi, vol. XXII, fols. 244-245<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration): "Lunedì, che fu a li 3 del presente. Nostro Signore fece riferir in concistorio secreto dal governatore di Roma la causa di questi signori Carafè, et la relazione durò da le 16 hore [about 11:00 A.M.] fin a un' hora di notte [8:00 P.M.], la qual finita sua Santità pronunziò *proti in cedula*. Hieri poi sua Santità sottoscrisse la sententia, la qual diceva che *traderentur curiae seculari*, et così questa notte passata [of 5-6 March] la giustizia li ha fatti morire, ciò è il Cardinale Carafa, il Duca di Paliano, il Conte d' Alife, et Don Leonardo di Cardine. Se Nostro Signore avesse potuto in questo caso usar la solita sua benignità et misericordia, l' haverrebbe fatto volentieri, ma la grandezza de li delitti loro ha sforzato sua Santità a uscir da la natura sua. Die VI Martii."

In the journal of his student days in Italy the young Philipp Eduard Fugger, scion of the Augsburg banking family, noted under the date 5 March (1561) the executions of the Carafeschi, the count d' Alife, and Don Leonardo de Cardena (Paolo Piccolomini, "Ricordi di Filippo Edoardo Fugger," in the *Arch. storico italiano*, 5th ser., XLII [1908], 366).

<sup>110</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 351; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialis*, *ibid.*, II, 539; Panvino, *De creatione Pii IV*, *ibid.*, II, 593; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 138-39. Rebiba was present at the conspiracy held on Wednesday, 18 March, 1562 (*Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 34, fol. 135<sup>v</sup>).

Paliano, if they could manage to get the tiara for him. If genuine, which one may doubt, the document must have related to the conclave of 1559. Du Bellay had been dead since February, 1560, and Carlo since March, 1561, but poor Alfonso remained for questioning and for punishment. He was then at Baucò (now called Boville Ernica, six miles east of Frosinone), a little signory which Pius had given him as a place to stay.

Summoned to Rome, Alfonso fled to S. Germano (now Cassino), over the border in the kingdom of Naples. From there he went to the little town of S. Angelo a Scala, a Carafa fief southeast of Montesarchio, and appealed to Philip II, who took him under royal protection. In late October (1562), with the support of Don Pedro de Rivera, duke of Alcalá, Alfonso took possession of the cathedral of Naples, to which Paul IV had appointed him (in April, 1557). In Naples Alfonso devoted himself to study and to a serious if short-lived effort to effect reform in his archdiocese, but he died at the age of twenty-five (on 29 August, 1565) without even the satisfaction of outliving his persecutor Pius IV.<sup>111</sup>

Giannangelo de' Medici, now Pius IV, had been among the last of the seventy-odd cardinals created by Paul III. He had received the coveted hat in Paul's twelfth promotion (of 8 April, 1549, as we have noted above), and had thus been a member of the Sacred College for a full decade before his election. He had lived through the costly papal participation in the war of Parma, and had appreciated Julius III's decision to remain neutral in the war of Siena. As a cardinal Giannangelo had been appalled by his predecessor's venture into war with Spain. On various occasions he had protested against it, risking imprisonment in the Castel S. Angelo. In retrospect it became clear that he had grown to hate Paul IV and the self-seeking Carafeschi. With the exterior amiability, for which he was well-known, Giannangelo had cheerfully watched Carlo Carafa help to engineer his election in the last stages of the longest conclave of the century.

Four of the five defendants in the Carafa trial, being charged with murder, had paid with their lives, Carlo in the Castel S. Angelo, the other three

in the grim courtyard of the Tor di Nona. Carlo had also been charged with heresy and treasonable correspondence with the Turks. Even the grand inquisitor Michele Ghislieri (later Pius V) did not take the charge of heresy against Carlo seriously, however, and being in fact a friend and fautor of Paul IV, Ghislieri was to restore the reputation of the Carafeschi and the fortunes of their family to the extent he could.<sup>112</sup> The evidence which Girolamo de' Federici and Alessandro Pallantieri had employed against Carlo was on the whole rather tenuous hearsay.

The charge that Carlo Carafa had appealed to the Porte directly and through France for assistance against the Spanish had been well founded, however, and had doubtless meant a good deal to Cardinal Giannangelo, who had abhorred Paul's

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Fabio Gori, "Paolo IV e i Carafa." *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 317-21. Pius V was slow to take action against Pallantieri, and it looked for a while as though he were not going to do so. The former fiscal procurator, who had risen to more elevated posts (serving as governor of Rome [1563-1566] and governor of the March of Ancona [1567-1569]), was finally arrested, however, and held for trial in 1569. Pallantieri was charged with the falsification of evidence and the concealment of documents favorable to Carlo Carafa. He was put to death in 1571 (cf. Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 335, note).

On Pallantieri's trial and execution, see Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 38<sup>r</sup>, 39<sup>v</sup>, 59<sup>r</sup>, 66, and 67<sup>r</sup>, the last reference being to an *avviso* dated at Rome on 6 June, 1571: "Questa sera s'è detto per cosa certa che l'Palantiero è stato condotto in Torre di Nona, et che ivi si sarà troncato il capo, e poi la mattina mostrato in publico," and note, *ibid.*, fol. 71<sup>r</sup>, an *avviso* dated at Rome on 9 June: "Mercordì fu degradato il Palantiero, già governor di Roma, et la sera gli fu denuntiata la morte, et la notte a 6 hore gli fu tagliata la testa nel luoco ove fu tagliata al duca di Paliano . . ." with an assessment of Pallantieri's character on fol. 71<sup>v</sup>. Furthermore, according to a dispatch from Rome of 20 June, fol. 74<sup>r</sup>, "Tutti li beni del Palantiero sono stati confiscati, che importano 20 m. scudi, et sono fuori editi che ognuno debba rivelare i crediti et beni del detto Palantiero. . . ." The proceeds realized by the sale of Pallantieri's property were given to the Inquisition (fols. 85<sup>v</sup>-86<sup>r</sup>).

The process of exoneration of Cardinal Carlo Carafa of certain of the charges made against him was begun by Pius V Ghislieri in November, 1566 (cf. Luciano Serrano, ed., *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de S. Pio V*, 4 vols., Madrid, 1914, I, no. 152, p. 388, a letter of the Spanish ambassador Luis de Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 14 November, 1566; note also, *ibid.*, no. 162, p. 412, and II (also 1914), nos. 27, 56, 69, 87, 90, and 103, pp. 74-75, 151, 181, 218-19, 224-25, 264. On 13 October, 1567, Requesens wrote Philip that Pius V had just pronounced his "sentence" in favor of the Carafeschi (*ibid.*, II, no. 90, pp. 224-25). The exoneration, however, did not include those directly responsible for the murder of the duchess of Paliano, on which see Filippo Gauttieri, "La Revisione del processo Carafa sotto il pontificato di S. Pio V," *Arch. della Società romana di storia patria*, LIII-LV (1930-32), 375-84, who adds an important document to the copious file on the Carafeschi.

<sup>112</sup> Romeo de Maio, *Alfonso Carafa, Cardinale di Napoli* (1961), pp. 90-117, 127 ff., 197-203, and on Alfonso's fine of 100,000 scudi of gold, cf. Fabio Gori, in the *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877), 311-12, and Firmans, *Diaria caerimoniaia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 541, entry for 2 April, 1561. On 23 September (1561) Innocenzo del Monte was also released, "et spoliatus a multis abbatibus et beneficiis" (*ibid.*, II, 542).



anti-Spanish policy. Much of Germany had been lost to the Church. Scandinavia could not be reclaimed; England had drifted away; Bohemia, Hungary, and Transylvania were teeming with religious dissidents. The Huguenots were strong in France. Why should the Holy See—through the cardinal-nephew Carlo Carafa—turn to the Turks for armed assistance against Spain, the most Catholic power in Europe?

Pius IV had been a mild "imperialist," and Philip II had supported his candidacy from the earliest days of the conclave. In line with his disapproval of Paul IV's policy Pius had, as we have seen, recognized Ferdinand's accession to the empire shortly after his election. Paul's refusal to accept Ferdinand's right to succeed Charles V could well have created dissension within the empire, and exposed Austria to Turkish attack.

The Turks were to be the great problem of Pius IV's last year, when they attacked the island of Malta. Like his predecessors, however, Pius wondered and worried about them even when their armies were not invading Hungary and their armadas were not attacking the Italian coasts. With words of praise for Venice early in his reign Pius lamented *inter anxias apostolatus nostri sollicitudines* the religious obstinacy and factional differences in Greece and elsewhere in the Levant which had exposed the lovely islands, populous cities, and even whole kingdoms to Turkish devastation. The Venetians had, however, maintained "invincible forces" (*invicta militiae . . . vexilla*) on both land and sea in the Levant, especially in the island kingdom of Cyprus, which lay in the farthest waters of the eastern Mediterranean, a target for Turkish arms.

Cyprus was the haunt of merchants, a source of wealth, a land of fertile fields, and a stopping-place for pilgrims on their way to the Holy Land. The sturdy sons of the Republic not only guarded the ports and fortresses, but also the churches, and especially the metropolitan see of Nicosia, which was in the hands of Venetian prelates. Acknowledging, therefore, their rights as well as their responsibilities, Pius granted the Venetians "henceforth the right of appointment" (*ius patronatus . . . pro tempore existentis*) to the archiepiscopacy of Nicosia. The Signoria was to submit to Pius and to his successors the name of an appropriate person within six months of each vacancy in the see.<sup>113</sup>

Pius had already responded favorably to the request of the Signoria for the nomination of a Venetian noble, Filippo Mocenigo, to the archiepiscopal see of Nicosia, and had himself in a rather unusual gesture presented the name of Mocenigo to the consistory on 13 March, 1560, on which date the latter had been duly appointed.<sup>114</sup> At the same consistory Cardinal Georges d' Armagnac also presented, at the request of Duke Giovanni IV Crispo of Naxos (1517-1564), the name of the Benedictine Stefano Gattilusio for appointment as bishop of the island of Melos, a suffragan see of Naxos, to succeed the late Giorgio Castagnola, a Dominican, the date of whose death is unknown.<sup>115</sup>

In the bull conceding the right of nomination to the archbishopric of Nicosia to the Venetian state, the pope was to refer to the "lovely islands" (*amoenae insulae*) of the Aegean, and he was looking eastward when on 19 June, 1560, the consistory met in its accustomed place for the usual confirmation of ecclesiastical appointments. On this occasion Cardinal Federico de' Cesi presented the name of Marco Grimani, a priest of Tenos, for appointment as bishop of the combined island sees of Tenos and Mykonos to replace the late Alessandro Scutarini.<sup>116</sup>

XIV Kalendas Ianuarii, pontificatus nostri anno primo. The same date appears in the Lucca edition of Raynaldus, XV (1756), 108a, and in R. Predelli, *Regesti dei Commemorati*, VI (1903), no. 72, p. 298, and so it is presumably accurate. Contrary therefore to Raynaldus, *loc. cit.*, and to Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, III (1948), 1099, Filippo Mocenigo could not have been appointed archbishop of Nicosia "in accordance with this privilege," for Mocenigo's nomination had already been confirmed in the consistory on 13 March, 1560, on which see the text below and the following note.

<sup>114</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 75<sup>v</sup>, 77: "Die Mercurii XIII Martii 1560 fuit consistorium secretum in loco solito [i.e., in the Aula Consistorii Secreti, on which cf., above, note 87]. . . . Referente sanctissimo domino nostro [usually cardinals introduced motions for ecclesiastical appointments]. Sanctitas sua providit ecclesie metropolitane Nicosiensi in regno Cipri vacanti per obitum bone memorie Cesaris [Podocathari] extra Romanam Curiam defuncti de persona domini Philippi Mocenici, nobilis Veneti. . . ." Cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 258.

<sup>115</sup> *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 243, where the date 1550 is an error for 1560, on which cf. Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 76<sup>v</sup>. On the long rule of Giovanni IV Crispo as duke of Naxos or the Archipelago, see Wm. Miller, *Latins in the Levant*, London, 1908, pp. 621-35.

<sup>116</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 88<sup>v</sup>: ". . . Referente reverendissimo Cesio, sanctissimo dominum nostro providit ecclesie Tinarum [sic] et Minocorum [sic], insularum maris Aegei, invicem unitis vacantibus per obitum bone memorie Alexandri Scutarini de persona domini Marci Grimani, presbyteri Tinarum. . . ." Action would seem al-

<sup>113</sup> The bull is dated 19 December, 1560 (Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, XXI-2 [Rome, 1677], ad ann. 1560, no. 91), datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum anno Incarnationis Dominicae MDLX,

Although lesser ecclesiastics sought episcopal status, and were happy to accept nomination to the island bishoprics of the Aegean, they were often loath to reside in their sees. They preferred to live in Rome, Venice, or some other urban center, appointing vicars to their churches, and collecting such slender revenues as they could. Livio Podocataro, for example, whose handsome tomb by Jacopo Sansovino may still be seen in the church of S. Sebastiano in Venice, became archbishop of Nicosia (on 5 October, 1524), but he had no intention of living in the land of his forebears. In 1552 he surrendered the see of Nicosia to his brother Cesare, a Knight of S. John of Jerusalem.

The popes and the Tridentine fathers had been trying with indifferent success to require bishops in Europe to reside in their dioceses. Residence was much less attractive in the Latin East, and when Nicosia, the primatial see of Cyprus, could not hold its archbishop,<sup>117</sup> the little island sees could hardly be expected to do so. It was, however, the merit of Filippo Mocenigo that he did take up his residence in Nicosia, and made every effort to reform the church. By the time the Venetian provveditore Bernardo Sagredo had established himself in Cyprus, two or three years after Mocenigo's appointment, the new archbishop had achieved a surprising success. There were frequent masses under Mocenigo's regime, whereas previously when the Venetian *rettori* had gone to mass, it had often been necessary to scout around to find a priest.<sup>118</sup> Mocenigo was, however, the last Latin archbishop of Nicosia, for the Catholic archiepiscopacy ceased to exist in Cyprus when the Turks occupied the island in 1570.

The Latin Church in Cyprus had been in a parlous state ever since its first establishment in the years following the conquest of the island by Richard the Lionhearted (in 1191) and his grant of the Cypriote throne to Guy de Lusignan in the following year. Anxious for the introduction of Catholicism into Cyprus, Guy's brother and successor Amaury (1194-1205), *romanam ecclesiam caput et magistram ecclesiarum omnium recognoscens*, had sought the assistance of Celestine III, who by a bull of 13 December, 1196, had confirmed the rights and properties of the newly-named archbishop of Nicosia, which rights and properties were to remain "permanent and undiminished" (*firma . . . et illibata*) for his successors. There were to be a few suffragan sees under Nicosia, namely Paphos, Limassol, and Famagusta,<sup>119</sup> which was still the arrangement when the Turks took over. The Latin Church has never taken easy root in Greek soil, however, neither in Cyprus nor in continental Greece, the Morea, and the Aegean islands.

The absenteeism of the Latin bishops kept the Church in a state of sad enfeeblement. Devouring most of the revenues available for religious purposes, the Latins also kept the Greek Church impoverished without much enhancing their own position. The mingling of Greeks and Latins caused the commingling of their creeds. The result was a strange "fusion, a confusion" worse confounded, which went on for generations although the Greeks, especially in Cyprus, had recourse to revolt from time to time, and never lost their resentment of the invaders. Despite the Greeks' rejection of the decree of union of the Council of Ferrara-Florence (of 6 July, 1439), there remained some befuddlement in the minds of simple folk, which still manifests itself here and there in some odd church buildings in the islands, especially in Cyprus and in Chios.

In the village of Kalopanayiotis in western Cyprus, in the upper valley of the Marathassa on the road from Lefka to Troódos, one may still find the old monastic church of S. John Lampadistes which, "as seems often to have been the case in mediaeval times in the Levant, is divided into two

ready to have been taken on Grimani's appointment to Tenos and Mykonos on 15 February, 1559 (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 313).

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, Schmitz-Kallenberg, III, 258; G. Fedalto, *La Chiesa latina in Oriente*, 3 vols., Verona, 1973-78, II, 175; L. de Mas Latrie, *Hist. de l'île de Chypre*, 4 vols., Paris, 1852-1873, repr. Famagusta, 1970, III, 542-45, from the report to the Venetian Signoria of Bernardo Sagredo, *provveditore generale* in Cyprus (1562-1564), and IV, 588-90; John LaMonte, "A Register of the Cartulary of the Cathedral of Santa Sophia of Nicosia," *Byzantion*, V-2 (1929-30), nos. 137-40, pp. 490-91; and esp. Hill, *Hist. Cyprus*, III, 1096 ff. On the archbishops of Nicosia, see J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*, London, 1901, repr. New York, 1972, pp. 537-64.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Sagredo's report to the Venetian government in Mas Latrie, *Hist. de l'île de Chypre*, III, 542-43: "La prima [chiesa di Cipro] è l'arcivescovato di Nicosia, chiesa tanto ben redotta da questo arcivescovo [Mocenigo] quanto si può desiderare, oltre che vi son molte messe, che per avanti li clarissimi rettori, molte volte, quando andavano a messa, bisognava che mandassero cercando qualche prete!"

<sup>119</sup> Mas Latrie, *Hist. de l'île de Chypre*, III, 599-605, bulls of 21 February and 13 December, 1196, the first being misdated by Mas Latrie, who forgot that 1196 was a leap year. The few suffragan sees were designated in the bull of 13 December (*ibid.*, p. 602): "Episcopatus quoque inferius annotatos, videlicet Paphensem, Limichionensem [Limosienensem] et Famagustanum, tibi tuisque successoribus statuiimus esse de cetero metropolitico iure subjectos."

separate chapels appropriated to the two forms of Christianity . . . , the Latin chapel on the north, the Orthodox church on the south. . . ."<sup>120</sup> On the whole, however, this seeming juncture of the two rites was largely a matter of the Latins joining the Greeks who, comprising the large majority of the population of Cyprus, had no intention of giving way to the foreign intruders. Greek peasants and shopkeepers might have little or no knowledge of purgatory and indulgences, but they knew that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father alone, a true baptism required triple immersion, and one used leavened bread in the mass.

If the rites were kept separate, however, sometimes clerical functions (like church buildings) were oddly combined, for one could find the same priest serving both churches. This was certainly not the order of the day, but one may wonder to what extent such reciprocity was rare. One of the classic accounts of this strange phenomenon, and perhaps the one most frequently cited, is to be found in the *Evagatorium* of the Dominican friar Felix Fabri, who twice went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land (in 1480 and 1483). On his second journey eastward he reached Larnaca (*ad Salinensem portum*) on 25 June, and was held up for a few days when the skipper of the galley departed to see his wife at Nicosia, where she was serving Queen Caterina Corner (Cornaro) as a lady-in-waiting.

With a half-dozen companions and a guide named Andreas, Felix Fabri went off on 26 June (1483) to see the church at the monastery of S. Crux (Stavrovouni), about eleven miles west of Larnaca. Here he kissed the large silver-clad cross of Dysma, the thief crucified to the right of Christ, who had promised him paradise. S. Helena, the mother of Constantine, had placed the cross in the monastery, "they say," together with "particula una de vera Christi cruce," which had rendered Dysma's cross the more worthy of veneration. Thereafter the pious pilgrims descended the precipitous, rocky mountainside to the little town of Stavrovouni,

where they had dinner, "et cum gratiarum actione manducavimus." The day was oppressively hot, and leaving the house of the Greek who had fed them, they took refuge in the nearby Greek church.

While we were sitting in the church, a certain cleric came in, and spoke to us in the Latin language. "What are you doing," he asked, "in the Greek church? Nearby is another church, a Latin church of your own rite, in which you should say your prayers and take your rest." So we got up, and went with him to the Latin church. He then took from the archive of the church the arm of S. Anne, mother of the blessed Virgin Mary, which had been reverently covered with silver. He also brought out a nail, which likewise had a silver coating, and which he said was one of the nails wherewith Christ had been affixed to the cross. We kissed these relics, and brought our jewelry into contact with them. I learned, moreover, that this cleric was a monk, a fact which I could not deduce from his garb, for he was enveloped in a camel's-hair cloak. He proved to be the parish priest [*plebanus*] of both churches, Greek and Latin, and was making every accommodation to both rites. Thus on Sundays he celebrated mass first in the Latin church, and did it according to the western usage with unleavened bread. When that service was finished, he went over to the Greek church, and performed according to the oriental rite with leavened bread.

I found this highly objectionable, and adjudged this priest to be the worst sort of heretic, misleading the people on both sides of the fence, for the two rites are incompatible. The same person cannot officiate in both. The two rites can hardly be suffered in the same city because of the difference in many, most important articles of faith. Once the Roman Church did put up with the Greek rite, to be sure, and yet even then it was not permissible to be both a Greek and a Latin parish priest at the same time, and much less so now since the Church condemns them [the Greeks] as schismatics and heretics.

The Greeks themselves fight shy of us in their ritual observances, and on all Sundays they denounce the Latin Church as excommunicate to their people, and hold us Latins as hateful to the very death. How, then, can an upright man and a good Catholic be both a Latin and a Greek parish priest? No one acts in this way except a man who is trying to cater to his greed and his own satisfaction, for such persons take the things which please them in each of the two priesthoods, and in truth reject the onerous and difficult in both the one and the other. Indeed, many Latin priests go over to the Greek rite so that they may find the courage to take a wife, but withal they want to enjoy the civil rights [*libertates*] of Latin priests, which certainly do not belong to them.<sup>121</sup>

<sup>120</sup> George Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus: Studies in the Archaeology and Architecture of the Island, Nicosia, Cyprus, 1918*, pp. 287-88. The hillside town of Kalopanayiotis is some thirty-five miles southwest of Nicosia. About 2,400 feet above sea level, it is well known for its sulphur springs. Concerning the monastic church of S. John Lampadistes, with "the Latin chapel . . . on the north and Orthodox church on the south, both under the same roof, and with no division between them," see also Rupert Gunnis, *Historic Cyprus*, London, 1936, pp. 245-47. On the Genese island of Chios the chapels of a few of the wealthier families, in which there had been mixed marriages of Greeks and Latins, also had two separate sections, one for each rite.

<sup>121</sup> Felix Fabri, *Evagatorium in Terrae Sanctae, Arabiae et Egypti peregrinationem*, ed. C. D. Hassler, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1843-49, I, 171-77, with the passage quoted on pp. 176-77. The reader may prefer the translation of Aubrey Stewart, *The Book of the*

Felix Fabri does not make it clear whether the parish priest who had thus aroused his indignation carried his adherence to both rites to the extent of being married only on alternate days. In any event, when in 1560 Filippo Mocenigo went to Cyprus as archbishop of Nicosia, he still encountered precisely the same problems as those upon which Friar Felix had fastened his attention. Raynaldus says that Mocenigo found the Lord's vineyard grown wild with thorns and brambles. In the same family, within the same walls, a man, his wife, and various children might all be professing different rites, some pursuing one practice, some another, but very few of them adhering faithfully to any single rite. They observed such aspects of religion as pleased them.

Since the Greeks were not permitted to eat meat on Wednesday (*feria quarta*), that was obviously a good day to live in the Latin fashion; on the Sabbath, however, they could have meat, and so that was the day for a Latin to become Greek (*die Sabbathi, quo Graecis carminibus vesci fas est, graecaretur*). Latin priests sometimes took wives according to the Greek rite. Absenteeism caused chaos. Nicosia, the primal seat of Cyprus, was said not to have seen an archbishop for seventy years. Mocenigo had done his best, but he was called away to the Council at Trent (in 1562–1563). Anyhow Cyprus had grown accustomed to a religious and ritualistic anarchy, which was too much for him. The sins of the Cypriotes would bring the Turks upon them.<sup>122</sup>

For long generations the Turks had been an unholy dread. The Mediterranean had become a sea of troubles. With the accession of Pius IV, however, there came the hope of a Christian counteroffensive. It was not merely that Pius had been an advocate of peace and the union of Christendom during the troubled reign of Paul IV, but rather that the certainty of peace in Italy, the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, and the death of Henry II had freed the hands of Philip II, who had inherited his father's role as the chief defender of the Christian commonwealth. The Turks had been the beneficiaries

of the wars between France and Spain. They had been, almost, the allies of the Valois. The Genoese had joined the Hapsburgs. The Venetians had remained independent, but their naval power was no longer a match for that of the Turks, nor was Philip able by himself to challenge the sultan's armament at sea. Installed in Algiers and Tripoli, the Turks were a menace to the eastern coast of Spain as well as to Naples and Sicily.

Suleiman had named Dragut Reis as the beylerbey of Tripoli, which the Knights of S. John of Jerusalem had lost to the Turks in mid-August of 1551, as we have seen in an earlier chapter. The Knights had been encouraging Philip II to undertake the reconquest of Tripoli, to which he had agreed, appointing Don Juan de la Cerda, duke of Medina Celi, the viceroy of Sicily, as commander-in-chief of the enterprise. The young Giannandrea Doria, the famed Andrea's grand-nephew, was to serve under him as admiral of the naval forces, and Don Álvaro de Sande as commanding officer of the army. Preparations for the expedition were unduly prolonged. If the Spanish fleet had been able to strike at Tripoli toward the end of the summer of 1559, it would have had a chance of success, for it might have been too late in the season for the Turks to muster a sufficient task force and send it to Tripoli.

The so-called Spanish fleet, however, did not sail from Messina, where it had first assembled, until about 28 October (1559). It spent the entire month of November at Syracuse. Here it received reinforcements, and left for Malta on about 1 December. Upon its arrival at Malta the Grand Master Jean de la Valette (1557–1568) received the fleet with all honor and no less exuberance. Owing to fearfully bad weather, the expedition was held up for ten weeks at Malta, where fifteen hundred men were said to have died as a result of disease and of the cold. At length on 9–10 February (1560) the fleet set sail toward the Barbary Coast. All told, there appear to have been at least forty-seven galleys—eleven Genoese galleys belonging to Giannandrea Doria, five Neapolitan galleys under Sancho de Leyva, four from Sicily under Berenguer de Requesens, three papal galleys under Flaminio Orsini dell' Anguillara, four belonging to the Order of S. John under Charles de Tessieres, commander of the Langue de Provence, and four furnished by the duke of Florence.

To these thirty-one galleys another sixteen were added, the property of individuals who leased them to the king of Spain for the expedition—five under Scipione Doria, son of the owner Antonio Doria, two under Sancho de Leyva, two under

*Wanderings of Brother Felix Fabri*, 2 vols. in 4 pts., London, 1887–97, repr. New York, 1971 (in the Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, vols. VII–X), I, 199–200. Cf. J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (1901), p. 153, and G. Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus* (1918), pp. 189–93.

<sup>122</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 91, and cf. Hackett, *Hist. Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (1901), pp. 153–54, 563–64.

Jacques Laurentii, lieutenant of the Grimaldi duke of Monaco, and another seven such galleys, whose crews had doubtless seen a good deal of privateering as well as trading in the Mediterranean. But this was not the entire armament, for there were also four galliots and three galleons plus some thirty-six ships (*naves*) for transport.<sup>125</sup> The costs of a galley were high, but according to the usual contract the owner was entitled to no indemnity if his property were sunk or captured in the course of a naval campaign.

The land force which finally sailed from Malta aboard the galleys (and some aboard the ships) probably numbered from eleven to twelve thousand men. Recruitment had been fairly easy. The peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had caused widespread unemployment among mercenaries. It had been time-consuming, however, to collect men from here and there. Although the Christian fleet was under Spanish command—and, as we shall note presently, Massarelli calls it the “*classis Philippi regis Hispaniarum*”—the galleys and other vessels were almost all Italian. The Italians also constituted almost one-half the land forces, in which, to be sure, the Spanish soldiery stood out, but there

were perhaps a thousand Germans, some French volunteers, four hundred Hospitallers of S. John, and about five hundred Maltese arquebusers. As one might expect, however, the Venetians were staying clear of the whole business.

Although the duke of Medina Celi was commander-in-chief of the expedition, he seems to have had little or no authority over the galleys. Giannandrea Doria, twenty-one years of age, sick through most of the campaign, had disapproved of setting out from Malta during the harsh and uncertain weather of winter. The Christian high command was at constant odds with itself. No sooner had the expedition made landings in the area of Tripoli than Dragut Reis moved from Jerba into Tripoli, reinforcing its garrison with the fifteen hundred Turks he had had with him.

Very likely one of the major reasons for attacking Jerba and abandoning the plan to take Tripoli was the fact that Dragut's presence in the latter place made it too strong, just as his withdrawal from Jerba made the island fortress too weak to resist. On 2 March (1560) most of the fleet anchored along the sandbank before the fortress, and cold and weary men now huddled in the wet shelter of the galleys and transports through four days of stormy weather. At length, when the sea had become calmer, they began coming ashore on 7 March in the northwest corner of the island at about six or seven miles from the fortress. Having ward off a futile attack by the Jerbians, the expeditionary force took possession of the fortress on 13 March in apparent accord with the local sheikh.<sup>124</sup>

<sup>125</sup> According to a letter of Sultan Suleiman to the Turkish admiral Piali Pasha, dated 15 Shaawāl, A.H. 966, i.e., 21 July, 1559, the Spanish had already gathered sixty-two galleys and ten galliots at Messina, and were awaiting forty ships from France. Medina Celi, viceroy of Sicily, had been appointed commander-in-chief of the projected Christian expedition. The sheikhs of Jerba and Tripoli had been the instigators of these preparations, which were aimed at Dragut “*Beg*.” Thus far Suleiman was repeating, after the epistolary practice of the time, information which Piali had sent him, requesting troops to meet the coming Christian attack.

The sultan therefore informed Piali that he had ordered the ex-*kapudan* of Rhodes and the latter's successor to join Piali's forces immediately. The *kapudan* of Egypt would protect Rhodes. Preparations were proceeding in the naval arsenal at Istanbul. The Turks were all to remain on the alert and in close communication with the Porte (Alessio Bombaci, “*Le Fonti turche della battaglia delle Gerbe [1560]*,” *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX [1941], no. 1, p. 202; cf. *ibid.*, nos. 2-18, and note p. 213). The sanjakbey of Rhodes was soon ordered not to join Piali, whose armada was apparently large enough.

Piali Pasha had expected the Christians to attack Dragut during the second half of August (1559), thinking that the Ottoman fleet would begin to curtail its activity as the sailing season drew to a close. Having few soldiers, Piali requested that the sanjakbey of the Morea be ordered to send him some. He also asked whether the fleet should return or await the Christians' next move. Suleiman ordered the sanjakbey of the Morea to send Piali a sufficient force of sipahis, and instructed Piali to hold the fleet in ports where supplies would be readily available, always keeping a weather eye on the Christians (a letter from Suleiman to Piali, dated 29 August, 1559, summarized in Bombaci, *ibid.*, no. 9, p. 203). On Bombaci's article, see below, note 124.

<sup>124</sup> On the Spanish seizure and loss of Jerba, see especially Charles Monchicourt, “*L'Expédition espagnole de 1560 contre l'île de Djerba*,” in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XX (Tunis, 1913), 499-516, 627-53, and XXI (1914), 14-37, 136-55, 227-46, 332-53, and 419-50, esp. pp. 147 ff., who in addition to a detailed account of the expedition provides an extraordinarily full bibliography as well as descriptions of the then fortress of Jerba (*ibid.*, XXI, 332-37) and of the topography, inhabitants, and customs of the island. The Turkish sources add a good deal, on which note Alessio Bombaci, “*Le Fonti turche della battaglia delle Gerbe (1560)*,” *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX (Rome, 1941), 193-248, and [for those who read Turkish,] *ibid.*, XX (1942-43), 279-304, and XXI (1945-46), 189-218.

Note also Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, IV: *La Guerra dei pirati* . . . II (Rome, 1887), 333-401, who gives a list, *ibid.*, pp. 343-44, of fifty-three Christian galleys and four galliots, on which cf. Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 149, note 2. As usual it is difficult to determine the precise number of vessels in either the Christian or the Turkish naval forces. Although Monchicourt's study is by far the best account of Jerba in 1560, note also Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reichs*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 419-24, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (1836), 189-97; Camillo

Jerba lies at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Gabès. The Spanish had already contested Moslem hegemony over the island (which Dragut Reis had recently acquired) on two previous occasions, in 1510 and 1520, and Dragut had himself outwitted Andrea Doria at Jerba in 1551. Inevitably the area had become a major scene of Turco-Spanish warfare. The Spanish were the dominant power in the West, the Turks in the Levant. Catholics and Moslems, irreconcilably hostile, they could not reach each other by land. The Mediterranean was their battleground. Tunisia (with the island of Jerba) was a midway point to which they both could easily get, and here they were bound to meet. The duke of Medina Celi and Giannandrea Doria had hardly occupied the island stronghold of Jerba than the news reached them of the departure of the Ottoman armada under Piali Pasha, who was coming to the relief of Dragut Reis.

Pius IV renewed the crusading indulgences which Paul IV had already granted (and which had come to nothing). The Spanish fleet at Jerba, with its Genoese, Sicilian, Neapolitan, Florentine, Maltese, and other contingents was assumed to be unequal to the Turkish armada. No one denied that the commanders of the Christian naval and land forces found few areas of agreement. The skippers of rented galleys, as usual, were concerned for their employers' property, and anxious to leave the scene as soon as feasible. Having taken Jerba, however, Medina Celi wanted to hold it, and spent some two months trying to make the fortress secure enough for the garrison he intended to leave behind.

When the Turks put many men and much money into a large-scale naval enterprise, the time

seemed opportune for the Christians to move into Turkish-held Hungary. To propose such a diversion may have been the reason—or part of the reason—for the mission of one Aloysius de Cortili who was on his way, as the envoy of the grand master of the Knights of S. John, to the Hapsburg courts in central Europe. Not only had the Maltese been heavily engaged in the expedition to Jerba, but if the armada under Piali Pasha succeeded in retaking the island fortress, the Knights' own position on Malta might be endangered. On 22 April (1560) Pius IV wrote Maximilian, king of Bohemia, and the latter's father Ferdinand, king of the Romans, in support of Aloysius's mission and in praise of the "Knights of Rhodes" (*pro Ordine Militum Rhodiensium*).<sup>125</sup>

Medina Celi hoped to gain the support of the Jerbians by establishing a regime on the island as honest as that of Dragut Reis had been rapacious. Instead of seizing wood and water, always very scarce on the island, the Spanish paid a high price for them. Holding on to Jerba would be a first step toward the reconquest of Tripoli. It would also be a first line of defense for Malta and Sicily. The Spanish possession of the island would forbid the area to corsairs who often spent the winter there. There had been grave differences of opinion in the councils of the high command as to whether to leave the island before the Turks arrived, and what fortifications to build, if any, for ships could not draw near the fortress on the northern shore because of the shallows. Galleys had to anchor in the open sea. The fortress did exist, however, and it had seemed more practicable to add to it than to start from scratch. So Medina Celi and Álvaro de Sande insisted. Sancho de Leyva and Giannandrea Doria disagreed with them.

Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana dalla caduta di Costantinopoli alla battaglia di Lepanto*, Rome, 1897, pp. 407–22; Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1966, II, 285–96; and J. F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, Cambridge, 1974, p. 125–34.

See also Cesáreo Fernández Duro, "El Desastre de los Gelves," in *Estudios históricos del reinado de Felipe II*, Madrid, 1890, pp. 1–244, with two contemporary relaciones of the Christian expedition and its failure as well as Don Álvaro de Sande's own account of the expedition with the comments of the duke of Medina Celi. De Sande's account was presumably written toward the end of 1562 or in 1563, after his release from captivity in Istanbul. Fernández Duro returned briefly to the subject in his work on the *Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragón*, II (Madrid, 1896), 18–39. On the number of Christian galleys in the expedition (which varies, as we have noted, from one source to another), cf. Fernández Duro, *Estudios históricos*, pp. 18–19.

<sup>125</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 10, fol. 134, by mod. stamped enumeration, letter of 22 April, 1560, to Maximilian: "Serenitas tua novit qua virtute, qua constantia, quo religionis studio fortissimus Ordo fratrum domus Hospitalis Sancti Hierosolymitani per tot saecula adversus impios hostes nostrae religionis depugnet, quanta sint eorum in republicam Christianam merita, quo minus commendatione egerit. . . . Serenitatem tuam vehementer in Domino hortamur ut dilectum filium Aloysium de Cortili militem et oratorem eius Ordinis missum ad quaedam eiusdem Ordinis negotia procurandam regia auctoritate tua studiosissime adiuves, quo conficiat ea quam primum ex sententia et ut eum Ordinem pro ipsorum meritis excellentique virtute perpetuo tueare atque defendas. . . ." Cf. the similar appeal to King Ferdinand to assist Aloysius de Cortili, the envoy of the Grand Master Jean Parisot de la Valette, in his mission of no small importance (*non parvi momenti negotia*), as Ferdinand would learn from Aloysius (*ibid.*, fols. 137<sup>v</sup>–138<sup>r</sup>, brief dated 21 April, 1560).

On 5 April (1560) de Leyva wrote Philip II that the galleys had had such usage that they were in no condition for combat or for flight. If the Ottoman armada really came that summer, there would be no defending the fortress, for it was hardly possible to build trenches or a moat around it in the possibly two or three months which might be available to them before the Turks' arrival.<sup>126</sup> The Jerbians, Moslems and Jews alike, were quite unco-operative. They might fear and hate the high-handed Dragut Reis, but they had no desire to see their island under Christian, especially Spanish, domination. Anyhow the Jerbians thought well of the corsairs. They did business with them.

All the work on the new fortifications was done by the soldiers. The work was ceaseless, tiring, debilitating. By the end of April the heat had come, and six thousand men are alleged to have died of the plague, undoubtedly typhus fever. By this time, too, everyone knew that the Turks would come. Jean de la Valette, grand master of the Hospitallers, recalled the Maltese galleys to provide for the security of S. John's embattled island.

The fortress of Jerba was hardly finished. Sancho de Leyva had been of little help to Medina Celi, having declined to put his men to work on the walls or the moat. If the garrison was subjected to a siege, water would be the great problem. The small cistern in the fortress had been neglected. The troops began the long process of embarkation at the beginning of May (1560) but, quite undisciplined, they were in one another's way. Some two thousand or more men were supposed to remain as a garrison in the fortress—twelve hundred Spaniards in eighteen companies, eight hundred Italians in nine companies, and one company of two hundred Germans. It was not an attractive prospect, and many men tried to hide aboard one vessel or another. The leaders of the expedition wasted a good deal of time trying to put merchandise and other goods aboard the ships and galleys.

Medina Celi did not expect the Turks to put in their fearsome appearance before June. Three months had elapsed from the Christians' first arrival at Malta to their landing at Jerba. They had

been delayed by bad weather and by their own changes of plan, but the distance from Istanbul to Jerba is six or seven times that from Malta. How would the Turks make it in a month? In the sixteenth century fleets and convoys stopped frequently to take on water and to leave the sick behind. Nevertheless, on 8 May (1560) the Grand Master de la Valette sent from Malta a fast galley which reached Jerba on the tenth. Piali Pasha's armada had been sighted just off the little island of Gozo, to the north of Malta. It was a formidable display of Turkish power, allegedly consisting of eighty-five vessels, two thousand janissaries, and three thousand sipahis, without counting the crews of the galleys and other ships.<sup>127</sup>

The startling news caused dismay among the leaders of the Christian host. At least a few of them, including Giannandrea Doria, wanted the Christian fleet to leave without more ado. A large part of the Italian footsoldiers as well as all the Germans and French were still ashore, however, and Medina Celi refused to leave them behind in such cavalier fashion. Doria agreed that they should spend the entire night bringing the soldiery aboard the galleys which, propelled by oarsmen, were much faster than the bulky ships that had to depend on the wind. Orders were given to let out the sails on the ships for their immediate departure. In view of the demoralized state of the army and the unending controversies among the commanders of the Christian forces, discretion was doubtless preferable to valor. Almost everyone seemed to agree that there was no reasonable alternative to flight, although a sizable garrison must be left behind to hold the fortress.

Unfortunately for most of the Christian host there was no time for flight. Despite bad weather Piali Pasha's armada had now reached Jerba, and with surprising speed. It was 11 May (1560). Piali had simply sailed into victory. Among the Christians consternation led to chaos. A few of them apparently ran aground as they tried to dodge the Turks and maneuver their galleys out to sea. Some headed for the shore, hoping to find safety in the fortress. Others set out for the Qerqenah Islands

<sup>126</sup> Monchicourt, "L' Expédition espagnole de 1560," *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 237. Believing that the Christians had decided to abandon the expedition, owing to their month-long sojourn at Syracuse in November, 1559, Piali Pasha had returned to Istanbul (Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 215); the Turkish armada was not ready for the voyage to Jerba until about the middle of April, 1560, and even then its progress was delayed by adverse weather (*ibid.*, pp. 218-19).

<sup>127</sup> Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 240-41, who seems to think the distance from Istanbul to Jerba is only "5 à 600 milles de mer," and cf. Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 220-21. On the Turkish galleys, galliots, cogs (round ships), caracks, and other vessels, see Svat Soucek, "Certain Types of Ships in Ottoman-Turkish Terminology," in *Turcica*, VII (1975), 233-49, and cf. C. H. Imber, "The Navy of Süleyman the Magnificent," *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 211-82.

and for Sfax; Piali sent twenty-six galleys after them. Medina Celi, Giannandrea Doria, and Álvaro de Sande left their galleys, and sought a temporary refuge on Jerba. Everywhere it was *sauve qui peut*.

One Genoese galley, *La Fortezza*, two Florentine galleys, a galleon, and a vessel with sick aboard seemed prepared to fight. The Turks let them have their way. Piali's purpose apparently was the recovery of Jerba rather than an attack upon the Christian fleet. If the Christians had been able to meet the Turkish armada with their galleys in battle array, most of them might have escaped. Piali, however, could hardly fail to accept the good fortune the Christians had thrust upon him.

Surrounding the Christian ships and galleys one by one, the Turks seized both men and merchandise in abundance. Sailors and free oarsmen were usually petty merchants, and now they had lost their freedom, no few of them their lives, as well as the goods they had just acquired or had not sold. According to the contemporary account of Antonfrancesco Cirmi (published at Florence in 1560), nineteen galleys and a dozen ships were lost. The Turks were said to have taken some five thousand prisoners, including Sancho de Leyva and his two sons, Berenguer de Requesens, and Gastón de la Cerda, the young son of Medina Celi.

During the night of 12 May, however, Medina Celi himself and Giannandrea Doria with a chosen and fortunate few eluded the Turkish encirclement, for Piali Pasha had not yet had time to organize an effective blockade. They escaped to Malta in five "frigates," small, sailless craft manned by eighteen or twenty oarsmen. From Malta they were conveyed to Sicily. On 28 May Cirmi himself got away to Messina in a frigate, and even in June some enterprising Christians made surreptitious departures to Malta or Sicily. In the meantime the news of the disaster had traveled westward more quickly than even Medina Celi and Giannandrea Doria. On Tuesday, 21 May (1560) the papal secretary Massarelli wrote in his seventh diary:

In these past months the fleet of Philip, king of the Spains, attacked the island of Jerba in Africa, and built there a heavily fortified stronghold in order that they might have thereby an easier and more manageable approach to the town of Tripoli, which [if successful] certainly could have caused a notable reversal in Turkish affairs. The sultan of the Turks himself, therefore, sent his fleet to the island of Jerba with orders to expel the Christians. In the Turkish fleet there were 80 galleys and more than 50 smaller ships equipped for warfare, while the Christians had 40 galleys and 30 ships.

Thus, as soon as the Turkish fleet drew near the is-

land, the Christians decided to withdraw, leaving a suitable garrison in the aforesaid fortress. But they ran right into the Turkish fleet, quite unexpectedly, and in the ensuing battle the Christians lost 12 galleys and 15 ships, all the rest having turned their backs in flight. This happened on the . . . [Massarelli was uncertain of the precise date] of the present month of May. But those who were within the fortress, fighting bravely and defending themselves, are still holding out safely, besieged by the Turkish fleet.<sup>128</sup>

Firmanus, the papal master of ceremonies, informs us that the news had reached Rome on 21 May, the day that Massarelli made the entry in his diary. According to Firmanus, however, the Christians had lost twenty-eight galleys and thirty-one ships. Pius IV and the whole Curia were much upset by the terrible news.<sup>129</sup> Whether it is a matter of victory or defeat, gains or losses, the sources usually leave us to wrestle with different figures.

The duke of Medina Celi had left Don Álvaro de Sande in command of the garrison in the fortress, where all the Christians who had not got away or been killed sought refuge. The garrison was thus said to number at least five thousand, for whom there was enough ship's biscuit and grain to last six or eight months. The great, the inevitable lack would be water. Don Álvaro's coffers contained about 25,000 *écus*. He might have bought food and water if the Jerbians had been willing or had dared to respond to the Christians' needs. With the advent of the Turks, however, the Jerbians severed all connections with the garrison. Without water the Christian garrison had no future. Summoning Dragut Reis from Tripoli,

<sup>128</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 345, and cf. Seripando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 460.

<sup>129</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 534: "Die Martis 21 dicti mensis [Maii] allatum fuit malum novum de naufragio ad Gerbas 28 trirremium et 31 navium ex classe regis Philippi Hispaniarum, in quibus erat maximus numerus nobilium magni valoris, propter quod sanctissimus dominus noster valde turbatus est, et tota Curia cum illo." When the final reckoning was made of the Christian losses, it would appear that Firmanus was not far wrong, for Cirmi gives them ultimately as twenty-seven galleys and one galliot (cf. Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 245, with note 2, and Fernández Duro, "Desastre de los Gelves," *Estudios históricos*, p. 41).

Piali Pasha informed the Porte that the Christians had lost twenty galleys, one of which had been burned, and the others captured, plus twenty-six ships, burned, sunk, or captured. Eleven Christian galleys had been grounded near the fortress of Jerba (Bombaci, in *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, no. 27, p. 207, from a letter of Suleiman to Piali, dated 26 June, 1560, and cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II [1850, repr. 1965], 611-12, note, Italian translation of a letter from Piali to his friend Ferhad Agha in Istanbul).



Piali Pasha disembarked a large force on 16 May, and twelve days later Dragut brought two thousand men and some cannon to take part in the siege of the Jerbian fortress.<sup>150</sup>

The Venetians had not joined the Holy See, the Knights of S. John, and the Italian states dominated by Philip II in the expedition to Jerba. Although Firmanus states that the news of the Christian disaster reached Rome on 21 May, Marc' Antonio da Mula, the Venetian ambassador to the Curia, had sent his government the sad tidings on the twentieth. The Signoria was genuinely distressed, even though in Venice there had never been any love lost on the Hapsburgs. The Ottoman establishment in Jerba and Tripoli, now under the notorious pirate Dragut "Reis," was an obvious danger to Venetian shipping.

In a letter dated and approved by the Senate on 24 May the Doge Girolamo Priuli instructed the Venetian ambassador at Philip's court to convey to the king an expression of the Signoria's dismay at the unexpected victory of the Turks. Acknowledging in fulsome terms Philip's high-minded motives in assembling the fleet, and praising his services to Christendom, the doge and Senate were certain that the prudent government and armed forces of his Catholic Majesty would, with God's help, easily rise above these adverse blows of fortune. Nevertheless, the Venetian Senate issued orders month after month that the Republic's fleet should stay absolutely clear of the Turkish armada.<sup>151</sup>

According to Antonfrancesco Cigni, Piali Pasha and Dragut Reis had in all some seven thousand Turks, one hundred and fifty horse, and fifteen to twenty cannon. The Jerbians also assisted them in various ways. The new, outer walls of the fortress proved stronger than Dragut, to whom the conduct of the siege was entrusted, had thought could possibly be the case. The Christians had removed some seventy pieces of artillery from the galleys they had run aground. At first Álvaro de Sande's garrison might not have seemed too badly off, but Dragut was in touch with some of his former servitors within the fortress who kept him informed of every move the Christians made. The Turks had neither men enough to take the fortress by storm nor cannon large enough to demolish the walls. The Christians would be done for when they ran out of water. The Turks, however, received ship's biscuit, oil, and olives from Tunisia.

---

role che si promettemo di voi farle intendere la molta molestia che ha dato alla Signoria nostra il successo predetto, affermandole che et per rispetto universale della Christianità et per particolare della Maestà sua ne sentimo quel dispiacere che dovemo.

"Et ne sentiressemo veramente anco maggiore se non fusse la speranza che habbiamo che Iddio forse haverà provveduto che l' danno non sarà stato molto, et insieme il prudente governo et molte forcie della Maestà sua Catholica, lequali intrucchiandosi come fin' hora ha fatto al bene universale ci fa fermamente credere che facilmente resisteranno a questi colpi di fortuna, porgendole alla giornata rimedii tali che le cose della Maestà sua resteranno in quella prosperità et salute che desideramo, et questo officio eseguirete per modo tale che sua Maestà venghi a farsi certa che per ogni rispetto ne habbiamo sentito quel dispiacere di questa nova che si deve. De litteris 197. de non 1, non sinceri 1."

Cf. also the letter of 5 June (1560) to the providitore of the Venetian Fleet (*ibid.*, fol. 13 [34]), and that of 10 July, 1561, to the providitore (fol. 61' [82]):

"Vi scrivessimo a cinque di zugno dell' anno passato che per schivar il suspetto che si potesse dar a Turchi con lo andar vostro in Puglia dovreste fermarvi nei luoghi nostri et attendere alla unione et governo della armata nostra, hora intendendo che voi havevi qualche animo de conferirvi in quelle acque de Puglia, havemo voluto replicarvi queste altre per commettervi con il medesimo Senato che per schivar l' istesso suspetto et quelli altri disturbi che per questo potessero nascere, debbate intertenervi con tutta l' armata in detti luoghi nostri et attendere ad unir et governar essa armata, come aspettamo dalla molta virtù et diligentia vostra, procurando di esser avisato degli andamenti dell' armata Turchesca per quelle altre vie che vi parerà, et che per la pratica et esperienza che havete sapete tenere. De litteris 125. de non 6, non sinceri 6."

On 29 August (1561) the providitore was informed ". . . possiate transferirvi alla volta de Corfu per conforto et aiuto di quelli fidelissimi nostri. . . . Nè volemo restar de dirvi che le ultime che havemo da Constantinopoli sono de 25 del passato [25 July], lequal ne dicono che dell' armata di quel Signor [Suleiman] non ne havevano nova alcuna. . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 77 [98]).

<sup>150</sup> Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 332, 337-38, and see Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 220-26, on the activities of the Turks at Jerba.

<sup>151</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fol. 12 [33], doc. dated 24 May, 1560, all' ambasciatore presso il serenissimo re Catholico: "Il sinistro accidente avvenuto all' armata di quel serenissimo re alli XI del presente per la sopraggiunta che li fece così all' improvviso l' armata Turchesca, come dovete haver inteso a quella corte, et noi ne siamo avisati dalli ambasciatori nostri in Roma per lettere loro de 20, ne ha veramente apportato quella molestia et dispiacere che ricerca questo fatto, perochè se noi vorremo riguardare al commodo et beneficio della Christianità, per il quale quel serenissimo re si havea disposto a metter insieme quell' armata, laudando il suo ottimo et Christiano proponimento, convenimo attristarsi di questo infortunio occorsoli.

"Et se riguardando la molta affettione et oservantia che portamo alla Maestà sua (come hereditaria de quella che havemo portato al serenissimo imperator suo padre et serenissimi soi maggiori) vorremo considerare il disonzo ch' ella vi ha ricevuto in particolare, convenimo anco parimente dolersene, onde a fine che la Maestà sua sia certa che questo successo, sicome invero ha fatto, ne habbi apportato quel dispiacere che ne si conviene per le cause dittevi di sopra, vi commettemo col Senato che conferitovi alla Maestà sua Catholica debbate a meno nostro con quella prudente et accomodata forma di pa-

Although at first ambitious plans and strenuous efforts were made (with Pius IV's help) both in Spain and in Italy to organize another expedition to rescue the garrison at Jerba, not enough was done, and what was done was too late.<sup>132</sup> By the end of May the Turks had enclosed the Jerbian fortress in a tight blockade, cutting the Christians off from all access to water outside the walls. The fortress consisted of the old castle (*Castello, Castillo*) and the surrounding walls and outworks (*Forte, Fuerte*) which Medina Celi had just built around the castle. There were two cisterns, one in the *Castello* and the other in the *Forte*, both of which depended upon rain water, but in the spring and summer of 1560 (as usual at this time of year) the rain did not come. Don Álvaro de Sande refused to consider surrender, having rejected the easy terms offered by Piali Pasha, who was made uneasy because his galleys were riding at anchor off shore, and most of his men and cannon were on land. If either the Spanish or Italian plans to rescue the garrison had been put into even partial effect, Piali's forces might have fared badly.

Dragut Reis was the moving spirit of the Turkish siege, encouraging Piali and dismissing the complaints of the janissaries. In the *Castello* and the *Forte* water was rationed, the soldiers receiving more than the sailors and the non-combatants. As the weeks passed, however, men died of thirst. Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, the imperial ambassador in Istanbul, has described their suffering in an eloquent passage in his fourth Turkish letter.<sup>133</sup>

There were desertions to the Turks, for many preferred to live as a galley slave than to die of a parching thirst.

The besieged had managed somewhat to increase their supply of water by distillation. A Sicilian named Sebastiano Poller, whom Busbecq calls "quidam alchimiae peritus," taught them how to do it. For a while they apparently produced some thirty barrels of potable water a day. By 27 July (1560), however, they had run out of wood to heat the eighteen or so alembics they had improvised. Even when the process of distillation was productive, they had had to try to maintain the availability of water by using some that was brackish, for drinking as well as for cooking. Thirst was a torment worse than the Turks. Having eaten up their horses, donkeys, and camels, they were reduced to the usual salted fish or other salted food. After the long, hard winter the lack of fresh fruit and vegetables (and so of ascorbic acid) must have added scurvy, with its debilitating effects, to the other problems of the besieged.

By 27 July not only had the Christians exhausted their supply of wood to heat the alembics, but there was only a three days' supply of water left in the *castello* cistern. Breaches had been made in Medina Celi's outer walls. Death, desertion, and illness had reduced the garrison to about a thousand men in condition to bear arms. Don Álvaro now decided to attempt a sortie in force without the walls. If on 16 May, when the Turks were coming ashore, the garrison had ventured out to cut them down, the Christians might have had a chance. They had made a few sorties, achieving some success on 2 June, but Don Álvaro had been unwilling to risk men enough to try to break the Turkish hold on the fortress. Now, however, on the night of 28–29 July (1560), several hundred Christians sallied forth only to run into Turkish trenches, bulwarks, and firearms. Some of them got back within the walls of the fortress.

According to Busbecq, who had doubtless got his account from Don Álvaro himself some months later, the latter had seen that the siege could no longer be sustained. He had, therefore, left the

<sup>132</sup> For details, see Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 338–42, and on Cirni, *ibid.*, XXI, 14–16.

<sup>133</sup> Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 265–66: "Magna constantia arx ea trimestri spatio amplius ab Hispanis defensa fuit [which is true if one thinks of the Christians as 'defending' the fortress from the time they took it over on 15 March], pene rerum omnium necessarium usu, atque etiam auxiliis spe (quod est miserimum) defectis. Sed nihil fuit in illius coeli caloribus quo premeretur gravior quam sitis. Una modo erat cisterna, magna illa quidem, et aquae abundans [actually there were two cisterns, and apparently neither produced an abundance of water], sed quae tantae multitudinis non sufficeret. Inde singulis certa aquae portio quotidie dividebatur, quantum vitae sustinendae satis esset. Haec agebatur a plerisque aquae marinae mixtione, vi ignis a salsiore parte stillante [drop by drop, i.e., by distillation] repurgatae. Hoc oportunitate docuerat quidam alchimiae peritus: quanquam non omnibus ea facultas suppetebat. Itaque videre erat multos humi stratos, morti propinquos, rictu hiante unius aquae nomen assidue frequentantes. Quibus si misertus quispiam paulum quid aquae in eis infudisset, levati erigebantur, assidebantque, donec ejus aquae auxilio consumpto eodem relaberentur, ac demum torridi animam efflarent. Sic multo quotidie peribant, praeter eos quos bellis causa, morboque, in illa solitudine, omni medicamentorum subsidio destitutos aiebant."

English translations of this passage may be found in C. T. Forster and F. H. B. Daniell, *The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, 2 vols., London, 1881, I, 320–21, and in E. S. Forster, *The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq*, Oxford, 1927, repr. 1968, pp. 172–73. On the terrible hardships of those caught in the fortress, cf. Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 346 ff., and Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 227–31, who makes clear that the Turks also found the siege no easy matter.

fortress with a chosen few, and seized a small ship (*navicula*) to try to make his way to Sicily. He was most anxious not to sully his reputation as a soldier by surrendering the fortress to the Turks. Don Álvaro was captured, however, and "thus the fortress came into the possession of the enemy, for the soldiers opened the gates (which it was futile to keep closed against the Turks any longer) in order to receive more merciful treatment."<sup>134</sup> It would seem that Don Álvaro's sortie was designed rather to facilitate his attempt to escape than to break the Turkish siege.

As Busbecq indicates, most of the commanders in the garrison agreed to surrender. They sent emissaries to Piali Pasha, to whom they turned over the strongbox of the expedition containing more than 20,000 *écus*. At first one Juan de Castilla refused submission to the Turks, but when the janissaries, bent on pillage, stormed within the outer walls (i.e., into the Forte), he had to lay down his arms. All those in the Forte, including the sick and wounded, were slain. The various commanders and their lieutenants with perhaps a thousand men shut themselves up in the Castello for a brief while, but they soon gave way to necessity. The Turkish siege of the fortress of Jerba had lasted eighty-two days, from 11 May to 31 July, 1560.

After demolishing the outer walls (the Forte) Piali Pasha and Dragut Reis sailed in an ostentatious display of Ottoman naval power to Tripoli. On 13 August Piali proceeded northward with the armada, took on water at Gozo, and continued to the east coast of Sicily, where he burned what was left of the town of Augusta, which the Turkish captain Sinan Pasha had almost leveled in mid-July of 1551. From Augusta Piali went on through the Gulf of Squillace to Corfu and Prevesa, which everyone remembered as the site of the Holy League's sad failure against Khairuddin Barbarossa in the late summer and early fall of 1538. Thereafter, rounding the Morea, the armada sailed through the Aegean to Istanbul, "captivos spoliaque et tirames nostras secum trahens." Busbecq witnessed the reception of the victorious Turks in late September (1560), "as pleasing a spectacle to Turkish eyes as it was grievous and lamentable to Christians."

Suleiman had gone down to the colonnade at the end of his garden overlooking the harbor "in

order that he might see at closer range the armada as it entered and the Christian commanders who were on display." On the poop of the flagship one could see Don Álvaro de Sande, Don Sancho de Leyva, and Don Berenguer de Requesens. The captured Christian galleys had been stripped of oars, masts, and riggings—*nuda corpora*—"so that they might appear small, shapeless, and contemptible when compared with the Turkish galleys." Those who stood close enough to Suleiman to see his face reported that he showed no signs of rejoicing.<sup>135</sup> Be that as it might, the Turks had scored another triumph. The Christians had suffered another defeat. The success of Piali Pasha and Dragut Reis in taking Jerba from the Spanish and their allies would finally induce Suleiman, five years later, once more to employ Piali and Dragut (among others) to try to take Malta from the Knights of S. John.

Christendom had been shocked by the prolonged disaster at Jerba, which must have netted the Turks almost seven thousand captives. It was fortunate for the more prominent members of the Christian expedition that the imperial ambassador Busbecq was still in the Turkish capital when Piali Pasha's armada returned (on 27 September, 1560). Busbecq could provide food to some of the captives to relieve the monotonous diet of dry black bread (*ater panis siccus*), which they found nauseating. Although there had been a terrifying need of water in the fortress of Jerba, the *bons vivants* now demanded wine, which the obliging Busbecq was able to get for them. Finding good wines in Istanbul must have involved some difficulties. To others he gave a blanket (*vestis stragula*), a cloak or shawl (*amiculum*), or a pair of shoes (*calcei*).

The Turks paid particular attention to Álvaro de Sande as the commander and as a soldier of high reputation. De Sande showed the strain of his command by sometimes manifesting obvious fear. Sancho de Leyva and Requesens required more help, and they received it. Above all, the important captives required money until they could be ransomed or their release somehow ar-

<sup>134</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, p. 265; Fernández Duro, "Desastre de los Gelves," in *Estudios históricos* (1890), pp. 122-24, 148-49, on the distillation of water; and see Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 230-31.

<sup>135</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 266-67; cf. Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 351; Bombaci, in the *Rivista degli studi orientali*, XIX, 232-33; and see in general Fernández Duro, "Desastre de los Gelves," in *Estudios históricos* (1890), pp. 96-161, 164-95, from two contemporary Spanish accounts of the whole expedition, of which the first is especially rich in detail. On these two accounts, cf. Fernández Duro, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 ff., and Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 17-18, and note the reports of the French agent in Istanbul, Jean Dolu, in Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 621 ff.

ranged and, says Busbecq, no day passed without his advancing many a gold coin to the needy, *hic nullus abibat dies quin plures aurei insumerentur*. He states further that on his own credit he guaranteed the payment of thousands of *écus* or ducats for ransoms, which led him to wonder whether he was not removing shackles from others to attach them to himself.<sup>136</sup>

Busbecq expected his generosity to cost him a good deal, but he consoled himself with the pious thought that virtue was its own reward:

*Ipsa sibi virtus semper pulcherrima merces.*

Eventually with the help of the dragoman Ibrahim, whom Jean de la Vigne had hated and almost ruined, Busbecq secured the release from confinement—on 9 August, 1562, the day before the feast of S. Lorenzo—of all three of the Turks' chief captives, de Sande, de Leyva, and Requesens. The erstwhile captives came to live with Busbecq, who was preparing to leave Istanbul to take back to the Emperor Ferdinand the eight years' truce with the Turks, which he had been seeking for a full eight years.<sup>137</sup> Busbecq also took the three captives with him. De Leyva and Requesens left him at Sofia to take the road to Ragusa, and thence to Venice, to arrange for the payment of their ransoms and the debts they had left behind on the Bosphorus. Requesens was an old man. He died en route.

De Sande traveled with Busbecq (perhaps as far as Vienna) on the long route through Buda, Gran (Esztergom), Komorn (Komárno), Vienna, Prague, and Würzburg to Frankfurt am Main, where Ferdinand was attending the diet that recognized his son Maximilian as king of the Romans.<sup>138</sup> It was well to be rich and a nobleman. Such a person could arrange for the payment of his ransom. The Christian failure at Jerba, however, had left behind in Istanbul thousands of captives, to be sold as chattel; in the years to come many of them would end their lives in chains as galley slaves. Others would last

out the decade, and be freed from the oars when the Turks were defeated at Lepanto.

The Turkish victory at Jerba was a worry to western Europe. The Venetians found it especially frightening. The defense of the islands of Crete and Cyprus was forever in the forefront of the business which now came before the Senate, although they constantly reminded those at sea at all costs to avoid encounters with the Turks.<sup>139</sup> The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had been a source of reassurance to the Venetians, since the French would not be encouraging the Turks to attack the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily.

The war with Spain had kept the French nobles occupied. They did not like the ennui and unemployment of peace. But they would soon be fully occupied, for France was descending into more than thirty years of religious warfare and political chaos, which were already beginning during the reign of Francis II (1559–1560). The siege of Jerba was just getting under way when on 24 May (1560) the doge and Senate directed Giovanni Michiel, their ambassador at the French court, to make clear the Signoria's distress at the disturbances which had recently occurred in France and the confidence with which the Venetian government looked to the future conduct of French affairs.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fols. 31<sup>v</sup>–32<sup>r</sup> [52<sup>v</sup>–53<sup>r</sup>], 56<sup>v</sup>–57<sup>r</sup> [77<sup>v</sup>–78<sup>r</sup>], 74 ff. [95 ff.], 91<sup>v</sup>–93<sup>r</sup> [112<sup>v</sup>–114<sup>r</sup>]. Piero Tron, commander of the galleys of convict-oarsmen assigned to the protection of Crete, *governator delle galee de' condannati destinato alla guardia dell'isola de Candia*, was directed (in his commission of 15 October, 1561), "Se incontrerai fuste armate di corsari, sudditi del serenissimo Signor Turco, . . . gli tratterai da corsari. . . . Ben volemo et io commettemo che per convenienti rispetti debbi fuggir d' incontrarti colle galee di predetto serenissimo Signor deputate alla guardia di Rhodi et Alessandria, usando in ciò tutti quelli mezi che aspettamo dalla tua virtù" (*ibid.*, fol. 92<sup>r</sup> [113<sup>v</sup>]). The Turco-Venetian peace provided for the pursuit of corsairs.

<sup>137</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fols. 12<sup>v</sup>–13<sup>r</sup> [33<sup>v</sup>–34<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 24 May, 1560, *all'ambasciatore presso la Christianissima Maestà*: "Quanto che habbiamo sentito con molestia et dispiacere per molte mani de lettere vostre continuate li disturbi, nelliqui s'è ritrovato quel Christianissimo re per causa della religione et della congiura, tanto n'è stato carissimo et di molta soddisfazione sempre che habbiamo inteso per altre lettere vostre che queste perturbazioni tendessero a buon camino di acquietarsi. . . ." etc. The ambassador, Giovanni Michiel, was ready to return home (*ibid.*, fol. 25<sup>r</sup> [46<sup>v</sup>]).

<sup>138</sup> The conspiracy and the disturbances to which the letter of the doge and Senate refers were part and parcel of the well-known Protestant "conspiracy of Amboise," for which Francis II blamed Queen Elizabeth of England and the Calvinists in Geneva, on which see his letter to François de Noailles, the French ambassador in Venice, dated at Chenonceau on 28 April, 1560 (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 608–9, and in general

<sup>136</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 267–74: "His rationibus ad ductus [i.e., the appeals of the captives], meam fidem pro multis aureorum millibus obtinxi neque in tam altam voraginem demisi ut nesciam quo modo sim emerisus ac verear ne compedes, quas its ademi, ego meis pedibus aptarim" (p. 274).

<sup>137</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, p. 342; for the text see Chapter 18, note 11, and cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 669 ff., letters of Antoine Petremol, the French agent in Istanbul, to Catherine de' Medici and to the Sieur de Boisstaillé, the French ambassador in Venice, dated 9 and 30 August, 1561. Busbecq had worked long and hard on the prisoners' behalf (cf. Charrière, II, 702 ff., a letter of Petremol to Boisstaillé, dated 30 August, 1562).

<sup>138</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 321–25, 342–54, and cf. Monchicourt, in the *Revue Tunisienne*, XXI, 419–24.

The treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had caused something of a lapse in Franco-Turkish relations. Jean de la Vigne had left Istanbul in early October, 1559, and died on the way back to France, his funeral having been held at Ragusa with appropriate honors. His last word of advice to Francis II was to give up "l'amitié et intelligence" which had existed for a quarter of a century between France and Turkey. At least seven months passed before another French agent, Jean Dolu, the young king's valet de chambre, arrived on the Bosphorus in April or May, 1560, to take de la Vigne's place. During this interval the Turks had prepared and launched the armada which recovered Jerba.

Henry II's death had elevated François, duke of Guise, and the latter's brother, Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, to positions of political supremacy in France. Their niece Mary, queen of Scots, had married Francis II. Although François had commanded the French forces in Paul IV's war against Spain, he and his cardinal-brother had now adopted a strong pro-Catholic policy, persecuting the Protestants and veering toward Spain. It is no wonder, therefore, that Francis II should write François de Noailles, his ambassador in Venice, on 13 June, 1560, that he could not find words to express the sorrow he felt at the loss which Philip II, *mon bon frère*, had suffered at Jerba. In any event he was glad of the fact that "at the hour of this misfortune Dolu had not arrived in the Levant."

No one could assert that the French had advised the Turks to attack Jerba or had informed them of the extent of Philip's forces at Jerba.<sup>141</sup> Al-

though M. Dolu had arrived at the Porte well before the Turks took the island fortress, the French certainly could not be accused of either encouraging or assisting them.

On 18 September, 1560, however, Francis II had occasion to write Sébastien de l'Aubespine, bishop of Limoges and the French ambassador to Spain, with reference to Philip II's apparent belief that the French had been prepared to assist the Turks with two shiploads of munitions. Francis could not believe that any such aid had been rendered the Turks, but he was ordering an investigation. If there was any truth to the charge, he would order the severest punishment for those who were guilty. It was barely conceivable, Francis acknowledged, that something had been done on the sly, without his knowing of it. There were evil men everywhere. Francis did add, nevertheless, "Il est vray que chacun garde ses amys, et ne nieray pas que je ne veuille bien conserver l'amitié du Grand Seigneur. . . ."<sup>142</sup>

The Turkish success at Jerba was reassuring to Suleiman, who had had his troubles of late. The growth of population was forcing people off the land. Inflation had become rampant. There were shortages of food, and widespread unrest among the sipahis who, as Busbecq noted, had supported the revolt of the Pseudo-Mustafa in the Balkans in 1555 (. . . *quod multis equitibus abundabat, qui Mustapham praecipue coluerant*).<sup>143</sup> Again in 1559, this time in Anatolia, they had supported the revolt of Suleiman's son Bayazid, who had been defeated

---

II's letter of 13 June (1560) to de Noailles, lamenting the Christian catastrophe at Jerba, is given in Charrière, II, 614, note.

Francis II died on 5 December, 1560, and on the fourteenth the doge and Senate wrote his brother and successor, the ten-year-old Charles IX, "dell' avviso dell' immatura et inespettata morte del serenissimo re, fratello della Maestà vostra Christianissima, habbiamo sentito grandissimo dolore, . . . ma . . . noi veramente siamo sicuri che la Maestà vostra continuerà nella bona amicitia che li serenissimi soi predecessori hanno per tanti anni tenuta con la Republica nostra. . . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fols. 37<sup>r</sup>-38<sup>r</sup> [58<sup>r</sup>-59<sup>r</sup>], with letters to Catherine de' Medici and the widowed Mary, queen of Scots). On 15 March, 1561, Marino Cavalli and Giovanni da Lezze (*Leze*) received their commission from the Doge Girolamo Priuli as ambassadors to the French court (fols. 49<sup>r</sup>-50<sup>r</sup> [70<sup>r</sup>-71<sup>r</sup>]), although not to replace Michiel Surian.

<sup>142</sup> Louis Paris, ed., *Négociations, lettres et pièces diverses relatives au règne de François II, tirées du portefeuille de Sébastien de l'Aubespine, évêque de Limoges*, Paris, 1841, pp. 528-29 (Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France). In Istanbul there was a rumor, as Jean Dolu wrote de Noailles on 29 August (1560), that Francis II had promised to lend or sell some galleys to Philip II (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 623).

<sup>143</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, p. 115, referring to the many equites (sipahis) in the Balkans.

---

see Lucien Romier, *La Conjuración d' Amboise*, Paris, 1923, esp. pp. 89-125, and note W. P. Fischer, *Frankreich und die Wiedereröffnung des Konzils von Trient [1559-1562]*, Münster, 1973, pp. 54 ff.). There were also troubles in Provence and Savoy, and alleged appeals to the Turks for aid. As Ottaviano Raverta, bishop of Terracina and papal nuncio to Spain, told Philip II, Pius IV was gravely disturbed (St. Eshes, *Concilium Tridentinum*, VIII [Freiburg im Breisgau, 1919], no. 26, p. 23, lines 15 ff.).

<sup>141</sup> On de la Vigne's departure from Istanbul and his death, see Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 603-8. De Noailles found de la Vigne's death-bed advice to Francis II "si contraire et esloigné de ce que luy-mesmes en avoit, de son vivant, si souventes fois escrit au feu roy [Henry II], et aux démonstrations et effectz qui s'en estoient ensuiviz" (from a letter to Charles of Lorraine, dated at Venice on 10 November, 1559, *ibid.*, II, 605). De Noailles advised against any abrupt breaking off of France's hitherto friendly policy with Turkey, and suggested an ambassador be sent to the Porte with more "gravité et suffisance" than the agent Dolu possessed. Owing to unfortunate typographical errors, Charrière, II, 608, and note, says that Dolu wrote de Noailles from Ragusa on 23 May, 1550 (for 1560), and wrote de Noailles again from Istanbul on 24 May! Francis

at Konya by his elder brother Selim. Bayazid fled to the court of Tahmāsp, the shah of Persia, who was holding him a prisoner. In another year (in 1561) Tahmāsp would, for suitable recompense, allow an Ottoman agent to put the young prince to death, after which Suleiman breathed more easily. Busbecq was as fascinated by the tragic career of Bayazid as he was saddened by the Christian disaster at Jerba.<sup>144</sup>

If the sultan had his difficulties, so did the pope, who in 1560–1561 was struggling to reconvene the Council of Trent. Anxious to make the council truly oecumenical, Pius was extending an invitation to Gabriel, the Coptic patriarch of Alexandria, to send one or more representatives to the council.<sup>145</sup>

Gabriel had recently declared his obedience to the Holy See,<sup>146</sup> which could not have endeared him to the Turks.

---

The brief in question is addressed "dilecto filio Christophoro Rodriguez, Societatis Jesu professori, nostro et Sedis Apostolicae in Aegypti partibus nuncio, ut hortetur patriarcham Alexandrinum ad mittendum ad Concilium unum vel plures qui ei suo nomine intersint." Several briefs were addressed to the Patriarch Gabriel, the first being dated 17 February, 1561.

Having heard that Andreas de Oviedo, S.J., titular bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, was then in Ethiopia, Pius wrote him to urge Menna, *Aethiopiae imperator illustris*, to send one or more envoys to Trent (Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 176, pp. 245–46, brief dated 20 August, 1561). Invitations to Trent were sent to Christopher, "patriarch" or katholikos of Sis (Kozan) in Cilician Armenia (*ibid.*, no. 194), and apparently to the Patriarch Joseph II of Constantinople (*ibid.*, p. 244, note 3, and no. 176, p. 246, lines 2–3), as well as to certain other eastern ecclesiastics and to Ivan IV of Moscow and Alexander of Moldavia, on which note Wilhelm de Vries, "Einladung nicht-Römisch-Katholischer Orientalen zum Konzil von Trent," *Catholica: Vierteljahresschrift für Konversontheologie*, XV (1961), 134–50.

<sup>146</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 176, p. 246, lines 3–5. On 24 January, 1561, Pius recalled to Rome the Dominican Antonio de Melita "ex Indiae orientalis partibus," directing him to sail first to Portugal, as soon as the weather made navigation possible (Arm. XLIV, tom. 11, fols. 12'–13', by mod. stamped enumeration). I assume that Antonio was also being summoned in connection with the Council.

<sup>144</sup> See, above, Chapter 14, note 99, where references are given to Busbecq's second, third, and fourth Turkish letters.

<sup>145</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 98, 153, 174, 176, pp. 155 ff. The brief in Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 10, fols. 274'–275', by mod. stamped enumeration, dated 15 August, 1560, should be assigned to the following year. The brief is given without the day and month in Reynaldus, *Ann. ecdl.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 77, but see Ehse, VIII, no. 174, p. 244, note 1. Since the brief refers to the dispatch of the "bull of indiction of the Council" of 29 November, 1560 (*ibid.*, no. 60, pp. 104–7), it could not have been written in August (1560), for the bull had not yet been presented to and approved by the cardinals in consistory (*ibid.*, no. 59, pp. 103–4).

## 18. THE THIRD PERIOD AND CLOSURE OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT (1561–1563)

**D**ESPITE THE recalcitrance of the Emperor Ferdinand and the objections of the French government, Pius IV declared the conciliar suspension of 28 April, 1552, at an end, and by the bull *Ad Ecclesiae regimen* of 29 November, 1560, he convoked the reassembly of the council. It was supposed to convene at Trent on the following Easter Sunday (6 April, 1561).<sup>1</sup> As the secretary Massarelli puts it, the council was being summoned for the well-being of the Catholic faith, the extirpation of heresy, the union of the Church, peace among the Christian princes, and "ad depressionem Christiani nominis hostis Turcae." He also states that in the bull of convocation there were "certain words" which implied that a new council was being summoned, and others "quod sit continuatio."

The suggestion of a *novum concilium* was being made lest the Lutherans should be offended, for they hated the council which had been held at Trent, where their beliefs had been condemned. They wanted a wholly new summons to a wholly new council, hoping to see changes made in the Tridentine decrees on doctrine. Certain words had therefore been used, at the request of the Emperor Ferdinand, "lest they should be deprived of all hope." However, "the second set of words are being employed to indicate the truth, since certainly this is a continuation of the council previously summoned by Paul III and suspended under Julius III, and it will always be the same council until such time as it shall have been closed and dissolved."<sup>2</sup>

In seeking to summon the council Pius IV had been caught for months between the Spanish

Scylla and a Franco-German Charybdis. Philip II wanted the council to resume its sessions at Trent and to attend to the business left unfinished at the hasty suspension (of April, 1552). The French, however, had not been represented at any of the previous sixteen sessions at Trent, and the government of Francis II was unwilling to see the continuation of the assembly at its former site. Francis wanted a "new council" to help restore religious peace in Europe. Some revision of the Tridentine decrees seemed possible, for the Holy See had in fact not yet confirmed the theological definitions arrived at during the first two periods of the council.

The imperial government seemed no less difficult to deal with, and was complicating the pope's task with impracticable suggestions, such as the necessity of securing the representation of England, Denmark, and Sweden at the council. In late June (1560) Ferdinand had sent to Rome his *responsum circa concilium indicendum*, which contained his privy councilors' requirements. They wanted to see the council meet at Cologne, Regensburg, or Constance to forestall any further German secessions from Catholicism. They also proposed a far-reaching reform of the Church before the convocation of the council plus the concession of the chalice to the laity and of marriage to the priesthood.<sup>3</sup>

Pius had already expressed, at the conclave which had elected him, a willingness to grant laymen the wine as well as the water and to see a married priesthood, but he now agreed with a congregation of cardinals that such alterations in the ritual and in ecclesiastical discipline would require action by a general council. Obviously one could

<sup>1</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 69, *datum Romae apud S. Petrum anno Incarnationis dominicae II* [it should be III] *Kal. Decembris pontificatus nostri anno primo*, and Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 59–60, pp. 103–7, where the bull of 29 November is correctly dated, and the full text is given.

<sup>2</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 349. The bull *Ad Ecclesiae regimen* was read in a secret consistory on 29 November (1560), and it was ordered that the emperor, kings, and princes should be informed, and sent copies of the bull, which was published on 2 December (Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 537, 546–47, and cf. *Acta Consistorialia*, in *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 34, fols. 100<sup>v</sup>–100<sup>r</sup> [sic], by mod. stamped enumeration). Cf. H. Jedin, *Geschichte des Konzils von Trient*, IV-1 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1975), 36–38.

<sup>3</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 26, pp. 39–51. Ferdinand's preference for Cologne, Regensburg, or Constance as the best places for the council is expressed, *ibid.*, p. 43, where emphasis is given to the then-widespread belief "concilium in Germania esse celebrandum." On the necessity of reform before any council was held and on the advisability of allowing communion *sub utraque specie* and permitting the marriage of priests, see *ibid.*, pp. 46–49. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 189–91, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 149–51, has summarized Ferdinand's *responsum*, which was prepared by his counselor Georg Gienger. Cf. Eshes, VIII, no. 33, pp. 59–63, the papal answer to the imperial "response."

not recognize the priestly right to marriage in Germany but not in Spain or Italy. By lifting the Tridentine suspension of 1552 the council could easily return to the scene of its former activities. It might, if desirable, be removed to another place later. Nevertheless, the council had to start at Trent to make clear that it was in fact the continuation of the council which Paul III had first summoned in December, 1545. If it were to be regarded as a "new council," as Massarelli indicates, there would be the grave danger of calling into question the doctrinal decrees passed in the important, sometimes momentous, sessions of 1546-1547 and 1551. If the decrees of Trent could be altered, why not those of earlier councils?<sup>4</sup>

The Turks were suspicious of church councils, where the religious unity of Europe was likely to be preached as a necessary prelude to a crusade. The Venetians tried, and succeeded, during the whole Tridentine era to keep the council out of Venetian territory. They became unhappy when the popes spoke of Vicenza as an appropriate site for the council,<sup>5</sup> and the popes had done so from

<sup>4</sup> After various difficulties and delays Pius IV had finally moved rapidly toward the convocation of the Council at Trent for fear that a national council would be summoned in France, on which cf. Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 9, pp. 14-15, et *alibi*, esp. nos. 30-31, 37 ff., and Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1560, nos. 48 ff., and see in general Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 179-215; *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 142-68; and C. J. Hefele, H. Leclercq, and P. Richard, *Histoire des conciles*, IX: *Concile de Trente*, 2 pts., Paris, 1930-31, repr. 1973, pt. 2, pp. 539-61.

At a secret consistory held on 15 November (1560) Pius informed the cardinals that the princes had now agreed to the holding of the Council at Trent, for which reason there were to be fasts and appropriate prayers, with a special mass at the church of S. Maria sopra Minerva. He charged Cardinals Gianmichele Saraceni, Jacopo Puteo, and Gianbattista Cicada to compose a bull with the help of other theologians. The bull would be read in the consistory, "as had been done before" (Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1560, no. 67).

According to another report of the same consistory (Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 99<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration), "In eo consistorio sanctissimus dominus nosr prudenter et piis verbis exposuit placere serenissimo Caesari et omnibus regibus Christianis ut fiat prosecutio Concilii generalis in civitate Tridentina, et inter ceteros regem Christianissimum scripsisse ad Sanctitatem suam quod, si talis prosecutio fieret, sua Maestas nullo modo permissura erat quod in Francia fieret concilium nationale. . . ." (the same text, from other sources, is given in Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 56, p. 100). There would be no French national council. On 1 December, 1560, an appeal was addressed to the Protestant princes to send envoys to the council to be resumed at Trent (*ibid.*, VIII, no. 66, p. 114).

<sup>5</sup> On the Venetian fear of a church council's being held on Venetian territory, cf. the answer of Marc' Antonio da Mula, the Venetian ambassador in Rome (and later cardinal), to Pius

time to time. The Christian failure at Jerba had been especially worrisome to the statesmen on the lagoon. In letters of 3-18 February, 1561, Girolamo Ferro, the bailie in Istanbul, had written that work was going ahead on from eighty to one hundred galleys in the Turkish arsenal. They were expected to set sail about Easter.

Although the doge and Senate had no doubt that the provveditore of the Venetian fleet, which was apparently hovering between the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, had also heard from the bailie, they sent him a word of warning on 24 March. The provveditore remained on guard through the weeks and months that followed. He took steps to keep track of the Turkish armada, which usually made an annual voyage westward, and he looked to the fortifications of Cattaro and Lesina. In early June (1561) the doge and Senate expressed satisfaction in the provisions he had made for the defense of Venetian Dalmatia. Such decisive steps encouraged the local population. The Senate proposed to do its part also, sending ship's biscuit and other essential things, just as they had already filled the provveditore's request for gunpowder, lead, and various other items.<sup>6</sup>

IV when the latter mentioned Vicenza: "Beatissimo Padre, certo saria gran pericolo di muover Turchi a far qualche danno alla Serenissima Signoria: se essi intendessero che in una città di sua Serenità [i.e., the Doge Girolamo Priuli] si congregassero i principi Christiani, non diriano che fusse per causa di religione, ma per unione o crociata contra di loro. . . ." (Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 27, pp. 51-52, a letter of da Mula to the doge, dated at Rome on 12 July, 1560).

<sup>6</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fols. 50<sup>r</sup>-51<sup>r</sup> [71<sup>r</sup>-72<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 24 March, 1561, *provvisori classis*: "Essendo noi avvisati dal bailio in Constantinopoli per sue lettere de 3 fin 18 del mese passato che si attendeva a lavorar intorno a 80 fin 100 galee, lequali sariano espeditte per Pasqua [6 April], et uscivano assai per tempo, non havemo voluto mancar di farvilo sapere per le presenti, seben siamo certi che ne haverete anco havuta nova dal bailo sopraditto. . . ." and vigilance must be maintained in the waters of Corfu.

On 7 June the doge and Senate wrote the provveditore (*ibid.*, fol. 56<sup>r</sup> [77<sup>r</sup>]), "Dalle vostre de primo del mese presente havemo inteso li diligenti ordini che per voi sono stati posti per intendere delli progressi dell'armata Turchesca et la provisione parimente che havete fatta per munire la fortezza di Catharo [Cattaro, Kotor] et il castello di Liesena [Lesina, Hvar] con delli homini dell'armata nostra, lequal cose, si come sono state fatte con buono et prudente giudicio, così ne sono state grate, et ve ne laudamo col Senato, essendo molto ben sicuri che nell'avvenire non mancarete da tutte quelle provisioni che vi pareanno necessarie così per sicurtà delli luoghi nostri di Dalmatia et sollevatione delli animi di quei fidelissimi popoli come per tener l'armata sopraditta quanto più unita che si possa, perchè non mancaremo di provedervi de' biscotti e de tutte le altre cose necessarie, si come havemo già fatto della polvere, piombo, et altro che ne havete richiesto," the vote to send the letter being *de literis* 192, *de non* 3, *non sinceri* 2.



The Venetians were finding it difficult to pay their bills owing to the widespread inflation. Offices were sold in the Curia Romana as in the secular states. Paul IV's reign had been a costly mistake. Charles IX and Henry III, especially the latter, were always hard-pressed for funds. At the Porte men purchased positions by gifts to the grand vizirs and the pashas. European monarchs borrowed irresponsibly. There was a constant need for money. Taxes, tolls, feudal rents, customs duties, and various other revenues were farmed or pledged to secure loans. With some ups and downs inflation continued throughout the sixteenth century, becoming especially severe after about 1570, when American specie made its greatest impress on the economy.<sup>7</sup> War was the costliest item on every state budget, if there was anything like a budget. A city-state or seigniorial domain soon lost its independence when it could not afford to meet annual increases in the cost of war—fortifications, supplies, artillery, heavy transport, and the recruitment of adequate forces.

Whenever the Turk moved at sea, the costs of government rose in Venice. On 12 June (1561) the Senate approved by a decisive vote the imposition of a levy (*sussidio*) of 100,000 ducats on "terra ferma," i.e., on the Veneto and Friuli, "for the security of our lands and subjects." With the exception of the clergy, who were subject to the clerical tithe which the Senate usually managed to extract from the Holy See, no one was to enjoy exemption from payment. One half the levy was due in August, the other half in October, and ten percent of a given assessment was to be remitted for payment on time. Once the period of payment had passed, however, not only was the reduction no longer to be granted, but a ten percent surcharge was to be added "according to custom." The "rectors" (*rettori*) of the various cities and towns on the Venetian mainland were to send to the *camerlenghi de comun* all the money they had collected. Their failure to do so would involve the usual heavy penalties.<sup>8</sup>

In Istanbul, in early July (1561), the grand vizir Rustem Pasha died, and was succeeded by the second vizir Ali Pasha, for whom the imperial ambassador Busbecq entertained the highest regard.<sup>9</sup>

Along with his predecessor Ibrahim Pasha and his successor Mehmed Sokolli, Rustem remains one of the three best-known grand vizirs of the sixteenth century. The years from 1560 to 1563 were a period of economic turmoil in the Levant and the Middle East, during which the Portuguese tried to carry on a long-distance war with the Turks. Turkish vessels, issuing from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, were disrupting the lucrative trade of the Portuguese, the rivals of Venice, in pepper and other spices, pearls and chinaware, drugs and perfumes from India, Sumatra, Java, and the Moluccas.<sup>10</sup>

In Rome Pius IV was busy with plans for the council. In Istanbul Busbecq was also busy, with negotiations for peace between the empire and the Porte. And the ambassador as well as the pope found in success a reward for his efforts. Busbecq had also found the new grand vizir, Ali Pasha, a gentle, courteous man, far easier to deal with than the overbearing Rustem Pasha. At Prague on 1 June, 1562, the Emperor Ferdinand signed a *declaratio et confirmatio conditionum pacis cum Turchis*, whereby he renounced his agreement to pay the sultan the annual tribute of 30,000 ducats.

Ferdinand gave up his claims to Transylvania, and promised to reach an understanding with Queen Isabella's son John Sigismund with regard to their conflicting claims in the no-man's-land of Hungary. Melchior Balassa, Nicholas Báthory, and other Hungarian magnates who either had resumed their feudal ties with Ferdinand or were soon to do so were included in the peace. The sanjakkbeys, voivodes, and other Turkish officers and vassals were instructed to keep to the terms of the peace along the troublesome Hungarian border. Each of the two signatories might fortify, as he chose, the towns and castles in his own territories. Each agreed, however, to correct and punish all transgressors of this new nonaggression pact. Busbecq left the Bosphorus in late August, 1562, as he tells us in his fourth Turkish letter, eight years' effort having produced an eight years' truce, which might well (unless some untoward event occurred) be extended indefinitely.<sup>11</sup>

Turca mirandum) in quo nihil desideres humanitatis." Rustem Pasha probably died of heart failure, accompanied by edema, *aqua extinctus intercute* (*ibid.*, p. 280). He was already seriously ill in January, 1561 (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 646).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, I (1966), 498-503.

<sup>11</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, p. 342: "Sic bonis avibus sub finem mensis Augusti optatum iter ingressus sum, mecum referens annorum octo fructum octennales inducias, quas tamen nisi aliqua mutatio insignis incidere, facile erit quamdiu libebit progare."

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1966, I, 468 ff., and II, 22-23.

<sup>8</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 72, fol. 57<sup>r</sup> [78<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 12 June, 1561, *de parte 150, de non 15, non sinceri* 3.

<sup>9</sup> Busbecq, *Opera omnia* (1740, repr. 1968), p. 91: "Est vero Halli Bassa natione Dalmata, vir elegantis ingenio, et (quod in

As we have already noted, the grand dragoman Ibrahim Beg, whom Busbecq had befriended, accompanied the amiable ambassador to Vienna and to Frankfurt am Main, where on 27 November (1562) Ibrahim presented Ferdinand with his letters of credence and Suleiman's ratification of the treaty. Ibrahim solemnly assured Ferdinand that when he ratified the treaty with his own seal and signature, he would establish a beautiful bond of friendship with the sultan.<sup>12</sup> Having finished his address to Ferdinand, Ibrahim asked which one of the princes and nobles present was his son Maximilian, *imperii legitimus haeres*. Ferdinand gestured toward Maximilian, who was sitting on his left. Ibrahim then paid fulsome respects to the heir to the empire, after which he turned back to Ferdinand, and presented him with the gifts which the sultan had sent—two crystal goblets adorned with jewels, a fine Turkish horse caparisoned with golden spurs, trappings, and jewels, and four of the finest camels that could be found in Istanbul. He apologized for the wear and tear on the horse and camels, "macie et defatigatione confecti et attenuati," caused by the four months' journey from the Bosphorus to Frankfurt.<sup>13</sup>

Pius got less far in his efforts to persuade the German Protestants to attend the Council at Trent than did Busbecq in his negotiations with the Turks to accept peace with the German emperor. The papal nuncios Gian Francesco Commendone, bishop of Zante, and Zaccaria Delfino, bishop of Lesina (Hvar), had done their best. In Vienna at the beginning of January, 1561, Commendone

had joined his fellow Venetian Delfino, the nuncio to the imperial court, where they had taken up the conciliar problem with Ferdinand, to whom they also explained Pius's desire to form a league of the Christian princes against the Turks.

Ferdinand urged Commendone and Delfino to attend the diet which the Lutheran princes were convening at Naumburg on 24 January. The nuncios dutifully appeared before the diet in early February, but all in vain, for the Lutherans had no intention of attending or sending envoys to any council convoked by the Holy See. Commendone had left Rome on or about 11 December (1560) with 120 briefs addressed to princes, archbishops, bishops, free cities, and others summoning them to the council.<sup>14</sup> Swallowing their disappointment in making no headway with the Protestant princes at Naumburg, Commendone embarked on his long mission through northern Germany, the Netherlands, the Belgian provinces, and the Rhineland, and Delfino upon a circuit of southern Germany to recruit attendance at Trent.

The pope was making a practice of reinstating those whom his predecessor had imprisoned or driven from Rome. On 25 January, 1561, Pius had appointed Gian Tommaso Sanfelice, bishop of La Cava, commissioner of the forthcoming council to see that proper provision was made for lodgings and supplies (*hospitia et comaeatus*) to take care of the numerous bishops and others who would soon be converging upon Trent. Sanfelice had been arrested for heresy by Paul IV at the same time as Morone (at the end of May, 1557). Now he was instructed to go to Trent as soon as possible and to appoint as many assistants as he might need to help him in his manifold duties. Pius had already written Girolamo Priuli, the doge of Venice, asking him to allow Sanfelice to secure "grain and other things" from Venetian territory. He also wanted Cristoforo Madruzzo's nephew Lodovico, to whom he was about to give a red hat (on 26 February, 1561), to aid Sanfelice in any and every way he could.<sup>15</sup>

Going by way of Leipzig and Magdeburg to Berlin, Commendone was hospitably received by Joachim II von Hohenzollern, the Protestant elec-

<sup>12</sup> *Relatio sive sermo legati pacifici Ebraimi . . . a Solymano, Turcarum Imperatore, ex Constantinopoli ad . . . Ferdinandum eius nominis primum destinati . . .* in Busbecq, *Opera omnia*, pp. 429, 431: "Invictissimus, ter maximus ac potentissimus Turcarum Imperator, princeps meus clementissimus . . . rogat insuper ac petit ut ad has literas, quas suo nomine tuae Majestati ego presentavi, tua Majestas non gravetur sigillatim respondere. Quod si a tua Majestate praestitum fuerit, experietur modis omnibus tuam Majestatem amicabile atque pulcherrimum mutui amoris certamen cum principe meo, Turcarum Imperatore potentissimo et aequitatis observantissimo, inisse. . ."

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 432–33; cf., above, Chapter 16, note 193; and see von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 389–91, trans. Hellert, VI, 149–52, who points out that the Latin version of the treaty differed from the Turkish text in several important articles, which required straightening out at a later date.

Ibrahim Beg's embassy and the imperial-Turkish peace of 27 November, 1562, were widely publicized in printed tracts in German, Czech, and Latin, for which see Carl Göllner, *Turcica. II: Die europäischen Türkenrückende des XVI. Jahrhunderts*, Bucharest and Baden-Baden, 1968, nos. 1035–40, 1048–49, pp. 91 ff., and note fig. 7, p. 93, reproduction of a Nuremberg imprint (no. 1035), with Ibrahim's retinue depicted on the title page.

<sup>14</sup> *Eshes, Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 66, 68–71, 73, 78–80, 82–86, 93, pp. 114 ff., and on Naumburg, *ibid.*, no. 94, pp. 142–48, and cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 219–25, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 170–75.

<sup>15</sup> *Eshes, Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 87, 89–90, pp. 136–38. The papal letters to the doge of Venice and Lodovico Madruzzo are dated 17 and 18 January, 1561. On the appointment of Sanfelice and all the other officials of the council, see Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialis*, *ibid.*, II, 546–47.

tor of Brandenburg. Pius had entertained some hope that Joachim might send envoys to Trent.<sup>16</sup> Commendone had no luck, however, in prevailing upon Joachim to accept the papal invitation to be represented at the council.<sup>17</sup> Commendone's experience at Berlin set the tone of failure to his extraordinary nunciature of more than a year, as he traveled back and forth with small effect throughout northern Germany, the Netherlands, and the thickly-settled region of Belgium, the Rhineland, Lorraine, and finally back to Italy by way of Bavaria.<sup>18</sup> Delfino's journey through the states and cities of southern Germany hardly revealed a more enthusiastic response to the prospect of the continuation of the Council at Trent.<sup>19</sup>

It did not seem likely that the Lutheran problem in Germany could be solved by conciliar action, although obviously Pius IV was willing to try to do so. In France, however, despite the dedication of the royal family to Catholicism (and the increasing devotion thereto of the now all-powerful Guises), the Calvinists were gaining in strength at an alarming rate. Calvinism, hostility to Elizabeth of England, and near bankruptcy had helped push Henry II into the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. Although he had sought the collaboration of the Protestant princes in Germany against Charles V and Philip II, Henry had wanted to do away with Protestantism in France. The Calvinists would not participate in any council summoned by the pope, and would not accept any assembly in which only bishops could vote. For them all theological questions must be answered on the solid ground of Scripture.

The historian, with the wisdom of hindsight, can see that the Lutherans and Calvinists were not going to accept the third period of the Council of

Trent any more than they had the decrees of 1546-1547 and 1551. The Calvinists in fact were not going to attend Francis II's national council, to be composed of bishops, and so the French government had become reconciled to Trent. As far as one could see in 1560-1561, however, if the council could consolidate the Catholic world, and the Church define its basic doctrines once for all, perhaps political and military measures might eventually be employed for the eradication of heresy.

In a secret consistory on 14 February, 1561, Pius IV appointed Jacopo Puteo and Ercole Gonzaga as legates to the general council, and in a consistory of 3 March he named three more legates to the council, Girolamo Seripando, Lodovico Simonetta, and Stanislaus Hosius. All three had just been created cardinals on 26 February. Seripando and Simonetta were present in Rome. Hosius was then at the imperial court in Vienna, where henceforth he was to have the authority of a *legatus de latere* until, that is, he should leave the court to take up his duties at Trent.<sup>20</sup> All five appointments were published in a bull dated 10 March.<sup>21</sup> Seripando and Simonetta received the legateine cross on Monday, 17 March, and the former left Rome for Trent on the twenty-sixth.<sup>22</sup> Simonetta was to leave much later.

<sup>20</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 106<sup>r</sup>, 108<sup>r</sup>. As we have already seen, eighteen (or nineteen?) cardinals were created in Pius IV's second promotion of 26 February, 1561, on which note Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 38-39.

<sup>21</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 115, pp. 176-77; cf. Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *ibid.*, II, 351, 353, and Firmanus, *Diaria caerimoniae*, *ibid.*, II, 539, 541, both of whom (contrary to the Acta Consistorialia, as cited in the preceding note) state that Seripando, Simonetta, and Hosius were named conciliar legates in a consistory of 10 March. Seripando also places his appointment as legate and that of Simonetta and Hosius on the tenth (*Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 464).

<sup>22</sup> On the five legates, cf. Borromeo's letter to Delfino, dated 22 March, *ibid.*, VIII, no. 119, p. 179; on Seripando, see Hubert Jedin, *Girolamo Seripando, Sein Leben und Denken im Geisteskampf des 16. Jahrhunderts*, 2 vols., Würzburg, 1937, esp. II, 104 ff., trans. F. C. Eckhoff as *Papal Legate at the Council of Trent, Cardinal Seripando*, St. Louis, Mo., and London, 1947, esp. pp. 562 ff.; on Hosius and the difficulties attending Pius IV's nomination of the several conciliar legates, note H. D. Wojtyška, *Cardinal Hosius, Legate to the Council of Trent*, Rome, 1967, pp. 15-37 and ff., and Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, nos. 93 ff., pp. 346 ff. As we shall note below, Puteo became too ill to go to Trent, and was replaced by Pius's young nephew Altemps.

<sup>23</sup> Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 464-65, giving his itinerary to Trent, where he arrived on Wednesday, 16 April (1561); Firmanus, *Diaria caerimoniae*, *ibid.*, II, 541, 547; Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, *ibid.*, II, 353, gives the date of Seripando's departure from Rome.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 69, p. 116, and note, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 18, p. 30, lines 29-33.

<sup>17</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 104, 110-11, pp. 162 ff. Sigismund, archbishop of Magdeburg (since 1553), was the son of Joachim; he promised to come to Trent, but defected to Protestantism before the year 1561 had run its course (*ibid.*, no. 111, and p. 171, note 3). When Ferdinand was told that Sigismund had said he would be at Trent, he replied, "Si videro, credam!"

<sup>18</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 116, 120, 129, 131, 133-34, 138, 141, 143, 147, 149, 151, 154, 156-57, 162-65, 167-68, 170, 184-85, 189, 193, 196, and 209, pp. 177 ff., and note Max Lossen, *Briefe von Andreas Masius und seinen Freunden, 1538 bis 1573*, Leipzig, 1886, nos. 243-45, pp. 331 ff. On 8 March, 1562, Commendone sent Cardinal Borromeo from Trent the last report on his mission (Eshes, VIII, no. 214, pp. 281-83). Denied entry into Denmark, Commendone had decided not to undertake a futile venture into Sweden.

<sup>19</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 113, 136, 148, 152, 175, 177-78, and 201, pp. 174 ff., and cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 226-40, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 176-86.

Angelo Massarelli had been named secretary of the coming council on 2 February (1561) and, as he reminds us, this was his third such appointment, for he had served as *secretarius sacri generalis concilii* under both Paul III and Julius III. After spending two hours with the pope, Massarelli took his leave of the Curia at about 4:00 P.M. on Tuesday, 11 March, arriving in Trent on Wednesday, the twenty-sixth, the day Seripando set out.<sup>23</sup>

While the Emperor Ferdinand delayed committing himself to the assignment of envoys to Trent for fear of the Lutheran reaction in Germany, Philip II and his Spanish counselors were displeased with the deliberate ambiguity of the bull of convocation. They wanted assurance that the coming council was not to be a new one, but a continuation of the earlier sessions, in which the Spanish theologians and their imperialist allies had played so prominent a part. In mid-March (1561) Philip sent Don Juan de Ayala to Rome on what he regarded as a matter of great importance, namely "la continuación del Concilio de Trento."<sup>24</sup> Ayala arrived at the Curia on 16 April, and was given an audience with the pope on the following day.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 351, 353. Massarelli and the master of ceremonies Firmanus left Rome together: ". . . Simul discussimus e domo mea, ubi pransi sumus, hora 21 [about 4:00 P.M. in March], cum maxima pluvia, et hora 3 noctis [about 10:00 P.M.] cum maximo periculo et labore applicuimus Castrum Novum, ubi male hospitati fuimus" (*Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 541). They both arrived in Trent on 26 March.

On Massarelli and the conciliar acts in his possession, see Th. R. von Sichel [one of the more important figures in the modern history of the council], "Römische Berichte," in the *Sitzungsberichte d. kaiserlichen Akademie d. Wissenschaften in Wien*, Phil.-hist. Cl., CXXXIII (1895-96), ix, Abh., pp. 17-39, 123-24. An inventory of Massarelli's *libri et scripturae* in the hands of his niece Sulpizia's husband Marguritus de S. Severino shows that the secretary of the council was holding on to fifty-four large and small hand-written tomes (all relating to the council?) at the time of his death (*ibid.*, pp. 34-39). Von Sichel continued his commentaries on the Tridentine correspondence, acts, minutes, etc., with the texts of some letters, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, Phil.-hist. Cl., CXXXV (also 1896), x, Abh.: CXLI (1899), iv, Abh.: CXLI (1901), v, Abh., and CXLIV (1902), VIII, Abh. Each *Abhandlung* has its own pagination.

<sup>24</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I (1862), no. 99, pp. 358-60, Ayala's instructions dated at Toledo on 13 March, 1561, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 98. The text of his instructions had already been published by Miguel Salvá and Pedro Sainz de Baranda, in the *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IX (Madrid, 1846), repr. Vaduz, 1964), 93-96.

<sup>25</sup> Josef Susta, *Die römische Curie und das Concil von Trent unter Pius IV.*, I (Vienna, 1904), no. 5, pp. 14-16, with notes, a letter of Borromeo to Ercole Gonzaga dated at Rome on 16 April, 1561 (Ayala arrived in Rome on the evening of the sixteenth, just after Borromeo had finished his letter). On the

background, cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 192 ff., and Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), pp. 573 ff., and *Girolamo Seripando* (1937), II, 116 ff.

Unless the pope made clear the fact of the Tridentine continuation, Philip could not, he said, accept the bull of 29 November. As conditions worsened in France, however, Philip gave way, and agreed to send the Spanish bishops to Trent a full month before Pius IV gave him the assurance he wanted. In an autograph letter of 16 July (1561) Pius wrote Philip, "We are sending you the brief which your Majesty has requested concerning the continuation of the Council. This has always been our intention, and whoever has pondered closely the words of our bull, has never had any doubt thereof. . . ." The doctrinal decrees which had already been accepted at Trent would be defended, Pius said, "col sangue nostro, se sarà bisogno."<sup>26</sup> Blood would be spilled, especially in France. A little later that year (1561) the Colloquy of Poissy, which brought together some Catholic prelates and a dozen or so Calvinist divines, could not take even the first step toward restoring religious tranquility in the kingdom.<sup>27</sup>

Like the first two periods of the council, the third got off to a slow start. Cardinals Ercole Gonzaga and Girolamo Seripando, *sacri concilii praesidentes et legati apostolici*, entered the city of Trent in solemn procession on Wednesday, 16 April (1561), at about 6:00 P.M., being received by Cardinal Lodovico Madruzzo and the nine bishops who had so far put in an appearance. Most of the bishops had only recently arrived in the city. Gonzaga published the conciliar plenary indulgence, accompanied by prayers "pro unione Ecclesiae." On Sunday, 20 April, he bestowed upon Lodovico Madruzzo the red hat of the cardinalate after a high mass of the Holy Spirit. Firmanus prescribed the details of the ritual, and Massarelli was there to see it all.<sup>28</sup>

background, cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 192 ff., and Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), pp. 573 ff., and *Girolamo Seripando* (1937), II, 116 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 103, p. 366. The brief which accompanied Pius's autograph letter is dated 17 July (1561), and contains the categorical assurance "non novum a nobis concilium convocatum, sed continuationem inchoati indictam fuisse" (von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV [1896], x, Abh., p. 107).

<sup>27</sup> On the beginnings of the Colloquy of Poissy, in which Cardinal Charles de Guise and the Calvinist Theodore Beza played the leading roles, and on the religious situation in France in the fall of 1561, cf. Susta, *Die römische Curie*, I (1904), appendix, nos. XXVIII-XXIX, pp. 248-57, and on the futile Catholic-Calvinist Colloquy, see H. O. Evennett, *The Cardinal of Lorraine and the Council of Trent*, Cambridge, 1930, pp. 284-393.

<sup>28</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 354; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 547-48; Seripando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 465. According to the bull of con-

A month later (on 21 May) Carlo Borromeo sent the wandering nuncio Commendone, who was then in Brussels, a report on the council. Gonzaga and Seripando had been at Trent "già più d' un mese;" there were many prelates with them, and there would soon be more. Stanislaus Hosius, the cardinal of Warmia, would be joining them presently, just as soon as the Emperor Ferdinand agreed to send the imperial envoys to Trent, or at least to send those whom he had already appointed to represent the hereditary domains of the Hapsburgs in central Europe. Although conditions in France had been chaotic, and order had not yet been restored, the French government had taken some salutary steps toward tranquillity, and one could hope for the best. As for sending envoys to the council, Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici were unwilling to be the first sovereigns to do so, but as soon as the emperor or Philip II did so, they would also send their ambassadors and prelates, a promise which they had made many times.

Philip II had his problems, and was proving more difficult than had been expected. At any rate he had sent Don Juan de Ayala to Rome to deal with matters. The pope was sending Ottaviano Raverta, bishop of Terracina, as his nuncio to Spain. At the Curia one certainly hoped that Raverta could make his Catholic Majesty see the light and not delay any longer in carrying out the pope's wishes.

Word had come from the nuncios in Portugal and Poland that Kings Sebastian and Sigismund Augustus had both appointed envoys, and designated the prelates who were to go to Trent. The pope had sent Gian Francesco Canobio to Prussia, whence he was supposed to go to Moscow "to invite those lords to the council," for his Holiness wished to have the consolation of having extended his paternal charity to everyone. Indeed, for this very reason the pope wanted Commendone to go into Protestant Denmark, after which one might give some thought to his return to Italy.<sup>29</sup>

vocation, the council should have opened on Easter Sunday (6 April, 1561), by which time only four bishops had appeared in Trent, including the commissioner Sanfelice and the secretary Massarelli, the other two being Nicolò Sfondrati of Cremona (later Gregory XIV) and Pietro Contarini of Paphos (Astorlo Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, ed. Sebastian Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, III-1 [Freiburg im Breisgau, 1931], 6-7).

<sup>29</sup> Lettere di principi, vol. XXII, fols. 248<sup>r</sup>-249<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, letter of Borromeo to Commendone, dated 21 May, 1561: ". . . De le cose di qua non accade che io vi dia particolare ragguaglio, sapendo che dai vostri ne sete ben' avvisato. Nel particolare di questo negotio del Concilio vi posso dire che li reverendissimi legati Mantua e Seripando

Everyone knew that Italian bishops were for the most part not well off, and that the Holy See would have to finance their journeys to Trent and to maintain them at the council. It was thought that the costs might reach 15,000 scudi a month. Various bishops were receiving travel grants of from one to three hundred scudi to provide for their transportation to Trent. At first their monthly stipend was fixed in most cases at twenty scudi a month, but as time went on, prices rose in Trent, and there were serious shortages of grain and supplies. On 6 August (1561) the monthly subvention for bishops was increased to twenty-five scudi. In the meantime, however, it was twenty, as when on 24 May (1561) Borromeo wrote the legates Gonzaga and Seripando that

sono in Trento già più d' un mese, et con essi molti prelati, dove similmente se ne mandano et vanno degli altri. Il Cardinale Varmiese [Stanislaus Hosius, cardinal bishop of Ermland (Polish Warmia) in Poland, formerly East Prussia] vi andrà anch' esso, subito che l' Imperatore [Ferdinand] si risolve a mandare i suoi ambasciatori, almanco quelli che ha già deputati per i suoi stati hereditari, et speramo che non tarderà più a mandarli.

"In Francia se ben le cose hanno tumultuato, et non si sono per ancora ben acquijetate, tuttavia si sono fatte buone provisioni, et se ne può sperar buona fine. Et quanto al mandar al Concilio, quelle Maestà dicono di non voler esser i primi, ma subito che l' Imperatore o il Re Catholico cominci, essi ancora manderanno i loro ambasciatori et prelati, il che hanno replicato molte volte. Il Re Catholico ha havute molte difficoltà fin' adesso, et per tale effetto ha mandato a sua Santità Don Giovanni d' Ayala. Hora sua Santità manda in Spagna Monsignore di Terracina, con l' arrivo del quale speramo al fermo che la Maestà sua non tarderà più effettuar la volontà di Nostro Signore.

"Di Portogallo et di Polonia havemo similmente avviso dai nostri nuntii che quelle Maestà hanno deputati et ambasciatori et prelati per mandarli a Trento, di modo che le cose stanno tanto ben' al ordine che subito che uno cominci, spero con la gratia del Signor Dio che tutti seguiranno prontamente.

"Sua Santità ha similmente mandato il Canobio [i.e., Gian Francesco Canobio of Bologna, an apostolic protonotary and papal chamberlain] in Prussia, et di là in Moscovia a invitar quei signori al Concilio, perchè in tutti i modi la Santità sua vuole havere questa consolatione d' haver satisfatto al debito de la paterna charità sua con ogn' uno, et per tal effetto manda anco vostra signoria in Dania, dopo il quale negotio la se ne tornerà, eseguendo il resto et avvisando di mano in mano. . . . Di Roma a li XXI di Maggio MDLXI."

On Canobio, *nuncius apostolicus ad duces Moscovitarum, cf. Massarelli, Diario septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 355, entry for 20 April, 1561; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1561, no. 17; Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 157, p. 227, and esp. p. 200, note 1. Canobio never got to Russia (Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII [repr. 1957], 193-94). Since the fall of 1560 there had been endless worry in Rome over conditions in France (cf. von Sicking, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXLIV [1902], VII, Abh., pp. 62-64, a letter of Seripando's secretary Filippo Musotti to an unidentified cardinal, dated at Rome on 19 October, 1560).

besides the two hundred gold scudi which our lord [the pope] has had given to the archbishop of Naxos [Sebastiano Leccavella], bearer of the present letter, to enable him to get to the council, his Holiness wants your most illustrious and reverend lordships to assign him a subvention of twenty scudi a month, to start from the day he arrives there [in Trent]. . . .<sup>30</sup>

Tommaso di Sanfelice, the conciliar commissioner, was paid a monthly stipend of a hundred scudi; the secretary Massarelli received fifty, and the master of ceremonies Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, known as Firmanus, only twenty. Antonio Capriana, the physician, also received twenty. Antonio Manelli, the financial officer (*de-positario*) of the council, was paid twelve scudi a month. The two conciliar couriers each received fifteen scudi a month, but the eight singers in the chapel received, all together, only twenty-two scudi, and Massarelli's scribe a mere one and a half each month.<sup>31</sup>

Sebastiano Leccavella, the archbishop of Naxos, was a Dominican, a native of Chios, where the Genoese colony was living on Turkish sufferance, at least for a few more years. He had been present at the Council of Trent in 1546-1547. Back in Trent, he was probably enjoying his twenty scudi a month, for he knew the perils of seagoing.

"This is certainly a day of evil tidings," wrote Seripando in his diary on 15 July, 1561:

Seven galleys of the Catholic king, sailing from Sicily for Naples, have been overwhelmed by African pirates in a bloody battle, and carried off to Africa. Many have been killed, and many captured, and [Nicolò Maria] Caracciolo, the bishop of Catania, was said to have been among them. Would that our primates and princes might some day wake up to the facts!

Leccavella had certainly awakened to the facts. He was not going to venture into the eastern Mediterranean if he could help it. On 17 February, 1562, he got himself appointed to the conciliar commission on the Index Librorum, and the following December he was named bishop of Lettere, a suffragan see of Amalfi.<sup>32</sup>

Cardinal Hosius arrived in Trent at 6:00 A.M. on 20 August, 1561. He came quietly in a Hungarian carriage, apparently choosing the hour to avoid all pomp, "since (as he himself said) he was opposed to ceremonies." He had been nuncio, and then legate, at the imperial court. Seripando welcomed him as a man "pietate, eruditione, mansuetudine . . . insignis."<sup>33</sup> From April to the end of November (1561), when his seventh diary breaks off, Massarelli recorded day by day the arrival of one bishop or another. From late September to the end of November at least one bishop came almost every day. In his last entry, for 30 November, Massarelli says that eighty-nine archbishops and bishops, including the four cardinals, then constituted the Council of Trent: "Interfuerunt ipsi tres illustrissimi legati, cardinalis Madrutius, et 85 patres."<sup>34</sup> Another diarist, Astolfo Servanzio da S. Severino in Piceno, who was in Massarelli's service, also kept a record of the bishops' arrivals and of their activities to the very last day of the council, which was to come on 4 and 5 December, 1563.<sup>35</sup>

At a secret consistory on 10 November, 1561, Pius IV appointed his nephew Mark Sittich of Altemps (Hohenems) as a fifth legate to the council to replace Jacopo Puteo, who was too ill to serve.<sup>36</sup> Altemps received the same "faculties" as the other legates (on 12 January, 1562).<sup>37</sup> He came to Trent on 30 January, but was not equipped to play a significant role in the council.<sup>38</sup> If not an ornament, at least he was not to be an impediment.

In the meantime the fourth legate, Cardinal Simonetta, had finally arrived (on 9 December, 1561). Able canonist and papal henchman, Simonetta would protect the interests of the Holy See. Seripando says he came "cum mandatis de incohando Concilio." The third period of the council had begun. The first general congregation assembled at 1:00 P.M. on Thursday, 15 January, 1562, in the Palazzo Thun, the residence of Cardinal Gonzaga, in the then Via Lata, now the Via Belenzani.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Šusta, *Römische Curie u. das Concil von Trent*, I (1904), 27. Payments were irregularly made, however, as the legates complained to Borromeo in a letter from Trent on 17 July, 1561 (*ibid.*, no. 21, pp. 52-53). According to Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 357, Sebastiano Leccavella arrived in Trent on Monday, 7 July (1561). Massarelli says that he was "natione Graecus, patria S[c]ijensis."

<sup>31</sup> Šusta, I, 54-55; cf. *ibid.*, no. 59, p. 162, et *alibi*.

<sup>32</sup> Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 465-66; cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 254 and 226-27, on Leccavella; and for his appointment as one of eighteen "patres deputati ad Indicem Librorum," see Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 229, pp. 328-29.

<sup>33</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 357; Seripando, *Commentarii*, *ibid.*, II, 466; Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 550.

<sup>34</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 357-62.

<sup>35</sup> Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, III-1, 6-90.

<sup>36</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 126-127, on which note Šusta, I, 101.

<sup>37</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 211, p. 278.

<sup>38</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 556; von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXLI (1899), iv, Abh., pp. 33 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 466;

At 8:00 A.M. on the morning of 18 January, 1562, the four conciliar legates Gonzaga, Ser-

firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia, ibid.*, II, 553, 554; and see Ehse, *ibid.*, VIII, no. 215, pp. 283-86, for the proceedings of the general congregation of 15 January, at which the assembled fathers gave their *placet* to open the council with a formal session three days hence, on 18 January (1562). On the following day the legates wrote Borromeo that with the arrival of Lorenzo Priuli, the patriarch of Venice, "and some others" the number of mitred prelates, including abbots, had reached 110 (*Stata, Die römische Curie*, I, no. 60, p. 163, letter dated 19 January).

Giovanni Drei has published ninety-three documents from 1 January, 1562, to 10 February, 1563—mostly an exchange of letters between Ercole, "il cardinale di Mantova," and his young nephew, Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga—as "La Corrispondenza del Card. Ercole Gonzaga, presidente del Concilio di Trento (1562-1563)," in the *Archivio storico per le provincie Parmensi*, XVII (1917), 185-242, and XVIII (1918), 29-143.

Trent remains a museum of the past, where one can still walk through the city streets, identifying the palaces in which the cardinal legates, ambassadors, and other officials of the council were lodged during their sojourn between the Adige and the Torrente Fersina. Considering the age of various palaces in Trent, we can be almost certain that they were occupied by conciliar dignitaries even without being sure who found their abode in them or for how long.

During the first two periods of the council (1545-1547, 1551-1552) we know that the cardinal legates Giovanni Maria del Monte, Marcello Cervini, and Marcello Crescenzi were housed in the Palazzo Girolodi-Prato, a short walk along the Via Calceolina to the southeast entrance of the cathedral of S. Vigilio, where all the formal sessions of the council were held. The general congregations were convened in the large hall of the Palazzo Girolodi-Prato. When in mid-November of 1562, during the third period of the council, Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, arrived in Trent with a retinue of French bishops and doctors of the Sorbonne, the Palazzo Girolodi-Prato was assigned to him as a suitable residence. The palace was destroyed by fire in 1845. Today the post office, Posta e Telegrafo, occupies the site.

During the second period of the council the imperial envoy Francisco de Vargas was lodged (in 1551) in the Casa Cazuffi at nos. 37-43 Via Oss Mazzurana. On the same street, a little to the north, is the Palazzo Tabarelli, which was being restored in 1983 to house a local bank. The Palazzo del Monte may be found at no. 60 Via del Suffragio, near the long arcade (*ji portici*), in the busy Cantone, the haunt of German merchants, innkeepers, and artisans in the time of the council.

Cristoforo Madruzzo and (in the third period of the council) his nephew Lodovico had as their residence the Castello del Buonconsiglio, one of the great palaces of medieval-Renaissance Italy if, indeed, Trent was in Italy in those distant days. The Via Bernardo Clesio runs along the walled enclosure of the Castello. The Palazzo Thun, at the north end (no. 509) of the Via Rodolfo Belenzani (the old Contrada Larga), housed Ercole Gonzaga and, after his death (on 2 March, 1563), Giovanni Morone, both presidents of the council. The Palazzo Thun, actually two palaces joined together, is now the Nuovo Municipio. Across the street, at no. 22 Via Belenzani, is the Palazzo Geremia (now the Comando dei Vigili Urbani), which was the residence of Lodovico Simonetta. The Palazzo Colico, the façade of which always captures the tourist's eye, nearby at no. 30 Via Belenzani, is now the home of the local agency of the Società italiana per l'esercizio telefonico. Girolamo Seripando stayed in the Palazzo Salvadori at nos. 119-27 Via Mancini (part of the

pando, Hosius, and Simonetta, together with Lodovico Madruzzo, Duke Guglielmo Gonzaga of Mantua, and the patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, abbots, generals of the Orders, and many others assembled in the church of S. Pietro in the eastern, German quarter of the city. From S. Pietro's they went in procession to the cathedral, where Cardinal Gonzaga began the proceedings by singing the solemn mass of the Holy Spirit. The indulgence was proclaimed, and Gasparo dal Fosso, archbishop of Reggio di Calabria, delivered the sermon, of which Massarelli has preserved the text. The master of ceremonies Firmanus was on hand to guide the elaborate ritual. Massarelli read *alta et intelligibili voce* the bull of convocation (of 29 November, 1560) and that of the legates' nomination (of 10 March, 1561).

By the first decree, to which all but four of the fathers gave their *placet*, the first session of the council to be held under Pius IV was now declared convened "by the removal of whatever previous suspension there might be" (*sublata quacumque suspensione*), an ambiguous phrase which had been bandied about for some time. If the suspensions of the first two periods of the council (of September, 1549, and April, 1552) were irrelevant, the present assembly was a new council, which was what the Emperor Ferdinand and the French wanted. Otherwise it was a continuation of the earlier periods, which was what Philip II and the Spanish had demanded, for this was the only way to preserve the validity of the decrees (the articles and canons) of 1546-1547 and 1551. (This was of course Pius's intention, and the "prima sessio . . .

old Strada Longa), built for Cardinal Bernhard von Cles in 1515 by the master Lucio di Como. A few steps away is the Palazzo Pedrotti at nos. 105-11 Via Mancini.

The conciliar secretary Angelo Massarelli was apparently lodged in or near the Torre Massarelli in the south end of the historic area of the city. Claudio Fernández Vigil de Quiñones, count of Luna, Philip II's envoy to the council in 1563, rented the Palazzo Roccabruna (for fifty scudi a month) at no. 24 Via S. Trinità. In fact Luna died in the palace (on 18 December, 1563), close by the Torre Massarelli.

A short walk from the cathedral of S. Vigilio, to the northwest along the present Via Cavour, takes one to the church of S. Maria Maggiore, where general congregations were held during the third period of the council, i.e., when they were not held at Gonzaga's residence, the Palazzo Thun. A well-known canvas of Elia Naurizio, dated 1635, formerly in S. Maria Maggiore and now in the local Museo Diocesano Tridentino, depicts a general congregation being held in the church. Today there are 38 pews in S. Maria Maggiore. With six persons to a pew—not that the bishops sat in "pews," but I mention the number in the church today as an indication of its size—S. Maria Maggiore could easily hold some 228 or more persons, a larger number than one was likely to find in any general congregation of the council.

sub Pio IV" was in effect the seventeenth session of the Council of Trent.<sup>40</sup>

The four prelates who withheld their full *placet* from the first decree were all Spaniards—Pedro Guerrero, archbishop of Granada and leader of the Spanish faction; Francisco Blanco, bishop of Orense; Andrés de Cuesta, bishop of León; and Antonio Corriero, bishop of Almería. Guerrero had already demanded that the first session be immediately declared a continuation of those of the earlier years, which the legates had declined to do in fear of the Emperor Ferdinand's reaction. Now, however, he and Blanco objected to the words *proponentibus legatis ac praesidentibus*, which stood out in the decree, for they meant that only the presiding legates could propose conciliar legislation.

Guerrero asserted these words were an unnecessary innovation, and were ill-advised, "his maxime temporibus." Blanco pointed out that they imposed a "certain limitation" upon procedure. They did not appear in the papal bull of convocation, to which the decree opening the council should correspond, and the limitation they now put upon the fathers he regarded as "contra rationem concilii generalis." De Cuesta and Corriero wished to be sure that the legates made only worthwhile proposals to the council,<sup>41</sup> which (now at least) seems like a gratuitous touch.

The mild contention with which the third period of the council thus began soon mounted into strong conflict. The Italians, who outnumbered the other voting members, were divided between reformers and advocates of papal authority and

curial interests. Gonzaga and especially Seripando were among the reformers. Simonetta headed the defenders of the Holy See and the Curia, and (as Jedin has noted) four future popes were to be found in the curial ranks—Ugo Boncompagni (Gregory XIII), Giambattista Castagna (Urban VII), Niccolò Sfondrati (Gregory XIV), and Giannantonio Facchinetti (Innocent IX). Only Boncompagni was, incidentally, to have much of an impact on his times, for the brief reigns of the other three were to be crowded into the years 1590–1591. The Spaniards, who had been named to their episcopal sees by the Crown, made up in wealth, arrogance, and ability what they lacked in numbers.

Except for Lodovico Madruzzo, who was regarded as a German, there were no imperialists at the council when it opened on 18 January (1562), but on 6 February the Moravian Anton Brus of Müglitz (Mohelnice), archbishop of Prague, and Georg Drasković, bishop of Fünfkirchen (Pécs), were admitted to a general congregation as Ferdinand's representatives. Fünfkirchen had been under Turkish rule for almost twenty years. Brus came on behalf of the empire, the kingdom of Bohemia, and the archduchy of Austria. Drasković would speak "in the name of the kingdom of Hungary." They showed Massarelli their letters of credence, and excused the absence of their lay colleague Count Sigismund von Thun, who had been unable to get to Trent "because of the snows and the difficulties of the journey," but he would appear soon.<sup>42</sup> France was not well represented until 13 November (1562), when Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, arrived at Trent, "accompanied by twelve or fourteen bishops and as many French doctors."<sup>43</sup>

There was no harmony between the Hapsburgs

<sup>40</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 216–18, pp. 289–303, where Massarelli gives a complete list of those in attendance at this "first" session of the council, including the theologians and the various "officiales Concilii." Cf. Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, II, 554–56, and Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 21–22. There were about 113 prelates with the right to vote on 18 January. A contemporary assessment of the character and capacity of each of the four chief legates may be found in von Sicking, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXLIV (1902), VIII, Abh., pp. 64–67.

<sup>41</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 216, p. 291. On Pedro Guerrero, see C. Gutiérrez, *Españoles en Trento*, Valladolid, 1951, pp. 946–62, and on Blanco, *cf.*, *ibid.*, pp. 382–94; on de Cuesta, pp. 76–81; and on Corriero, pp. 126–28. Note also Ricardo G. Villoslada, "Pedro Guerrero representante de la reforma española," in *El Concilio de Trento y la reforma tridentina* [proceedings of the historical congress held at Trent on 2–6 September, 1963], 2 vols., Rome, 1965, I, 115–55, esp. pp. 145 ff., and Antonio Marín Oceite, *El Arzobispo Don Pedro Guerrero y la política conciliar española en el siglo XVI*, 2 vols. (with continuous pagination), Madrid, 1970, II, 514–21 (Monografías de historia eclesiástica, vols. III–IV). For Guerrero's demand for a public statement of the "continuation" of the council, see Susta, I, nos. 56, 58, pp. 152–55, 158 ff., letters

of the legates to Borromeo, dated at Trent on 12 and 15 January, 1562.

<sup>42</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 222, pp. 311–13; Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 23; and *cf.* Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), pp. 581 ff., and *Girolamo Seripando* (1937), II, 124 ff. The Portuguese ambassador arrived in Trent on 6 February, 1562 (Servanzio, II, 23).

<sup>43</sup> Pedro González de Mendoza [bishop of Salamanca, 1560–1574], *Lo Sucedido en el Concilio de Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 661, who says the French arrived on 14 November, but see Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 562–63; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 467–68; and *cf.* Ehes, *ibid.*, IX (1924), 150, note 2. Lorraine was received with almost excessive honors, for "questa sua intrata fu con grande gaudio d'ogni uno" (Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, *ibid.*, III-1, 58). Eustache du Bellay, the bishop of Paris, had arrived in Trent on 14 April (1562) with an escort of thirty men (Ehes, *ibid.*, VIII, 457, note 7), thus preceding Lorraine by seven months.



in the German Empire and in Spain. They both stood for reform in the Church, but while Philip II insisted upon the "continuation," Ferdinand wanted to avoid all reference to the council as a prolongation of its earlier sessions. Fearing to move the Lutherans to acts of hostility, Ferdinand was determined to maintain the religious peace of Augsburg (of 1555). He also required the votes of the Lutheran electors to secure the kingship of the Romans for his son Maximilian in order to assure the latter's eventual succession to the empire.

Ferdinand, moreover, still wanted to concede the chalice to the laity and marriage to the priesthood, which would have won him no little support in Germany and Bohemia. On 13 February (1562) the imperial envoys Anton Brus and Sigismund von Thun, together with Georg Drasković, presented a petition to the legates, setting forth Ferdinand's urgent wishes that all reference to the "continuation" be avoided, the *confessio Augustana* be kept off the Index, and the next session of the council be postponed.

The legates were as co-operative as they could be under the circumstances. At least there would be no *continuationis mentio* in the next session, which was to be held on 26 February. They would, however, postpone the third (or nineteenth) session until the first Thursday after Ascension, which would put it on 14 May (1562).<sup>44</sup> In the meantime, if expediency suggested that the fathers go easy on the Lutherans for a while, it was always appropriate to assail the Turks, *perpetui hostes nostri*, and both Scipione Bongallo, the bishop of Civita Castellana, and Georg Drasković, the Hungarian envoy, found fitting occasions to do so.<sup>45</sup>

Since there was to be no "mention of continuation," the conciliar fathers could not immediately resume consideration of the sacrifice of the

mass and the sacrament of holy orders. At the fifteenth session of the council (on 25 January, 1552) they had postponed decrees concerning both the mass and holy orders until the next session (scheduled for 19 March), which had been prorogued to 1 May, owing to Maurice of Saxony's revolt against Charles V. By a brief of 15 April (1552), however, Julius III had suspended the council, which had been left in limbo at the sixteenth public session, held quickly on 28 April, a few days earlier than the fathers had planned, after which the flight from Trent had begun.<sup>46</sup> To deal with the mass and holy orders, and then pass on to matrimony, in the spring of 1562 would indeed have established a direct connection with the fifteenth and sixteenth sessions of the council. The fathers turned, therefore, to the question of reform, which Charles V had been urging upon the council ten years before.

The reform of the Curia was not to be undertaken at Trent. It was being dealt with in Rome, where Pius IV published bulls for the reform of the Rota Romana (on 27 December, 1561),<sup>47</sup> the Office of the Apostolic Poenitentia (on 4 May, 1562),<sup>48</sup> the Office of the Corrector of the Apostolic Chancery (on 27 May),<sup>49</sup> the Tribunal of the Apostolic Camera or Treasury (also on 27 May),<sup>50</sup> and the Tribunal of the Auditor of the Curia of the Apostolic Camera (on 2 June).<sup>51</sup> Pius also embarked upon a thorough reform of the tribunals, judges, and officials of the judicial system and the papal prisons, covering both civil and criminal cases, as well as a reform of the office of the fiscal procurator (or attorney general) and of a host of notarial and other offices (on 30 June, 1562).<sup>52</sup>

The reform of the Curia Romana was a costly business. On 29 June (1562) Pius instructed Leonardo Marini, archbishop of Lanciano, whom the legates had sent from Trent to confer with his Holiness, to tell the legates that the reform in Rome had already cost him more than 200,000 scudi, not to speak of the forfeiture of substantial emoluments from the dataria and other offices. The loss of such funds, however, Pius regarded

<sup>44</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 228, pp. 325-28, gives the texts of the imperial envoys' petition and the legates' response thereto (on 17 February, 1562). On 25 February, the day before the "secunda publica sessio . . . sub . . . Pio IV," Cardinal Gonzaga proposed, and most of the fathers agreed, to set the third public session on the "feria quinta post festum Ascensionis Domini" (*ibid.*, no. 236, pp. 353-54), i.e., Thursday, 14 May (1562). We need not be concerned with the second (or eighteenth session), at which Antonio Cocco, titular archbishop of Patras and archbishop-elect of Corfu, gave the sermon (*ibid.*, nos. 238-40, pp. 355-68). Cf. the long account of the proceedings at Trent after the second session of the council (on 26 February), which Seripando regards as the first real session under Pius IV, in his letter to Borromeo of 17 May, 1562, published by von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., pp. 108-17.

<sup>45</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 231E, 235, pp. 338, 351, docs. dated 20 and 24 February, 1562.

<sup>46</sup> See above, Volume III, Chapter 13, p. 547.

<sup>47</sup> *Magnum bullarium romanum* IV-2 (Rome, 1745, repr. Graz, 1965), no. LII, pp. 97-100.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2, no. LXII, pp. 116-18.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2, no. LXIV, pp. 120-22.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2, no. LXV, pp. 122-25.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2, no. LXVI, pp. 125-27.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-2, no. LXVIII, pp. 129-36; cf. *ibid.*, no. LXIX, LXXI, and LXXIII; and Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVI, 65 ff., and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 333 ff.

as a gain, "vedendo che cede in beneficio publico et edificazione de la Chiesa di Dio."<sup>53</sup>

Amid some confusion and contention ninety-three articles (*capita*) of reform were submitted by the conciliar fathers to the legates. Seripando reduced them to eighteen,<sup>54</sup> which were thereafter narrowed to twelve, and presented to a general congregation of the council on 11 March (1562). The first of these twelve articles of reform was to the effect that "the fathers should consider what means may be devised whereby patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, and all others who have the cure of souls should reside in their churches, and not be absent from them except for just, proper, and necessary reasons on behalf of the Catholic Church."<sup>55</sup> The other articles concerned holy orders, large parishes, benefices, and clandestine marriages.

The necessity of episcopal residence had often been asserted, and in fact decreed, but never taken very seriously. There were usually eighty to a hundred bishops more or less resident in Rome. We have already observed the episcopal love of large urban centers. In mid-February, 1560, when Pius IV was himself declaring the necessity of residence-in-their-sees to the bishops, he had an episcopal audience of no fewer than sixty or seventy, whom he told to go back to their churches and remain in them, as they were required to do by God's law and man's, until they were summoned to the council which he intended to convoke.<sup>56</sup>

Toward the end of February or at the beginning of March (1560) Pius IV had established a commission (*deputatio*) of fourteen cardinals to meet with him every Thursday to effect reform in the Curia and the Church. Massarelli had been appointed secretary of the commission.<sup>57</sup> At one of these Thursday meetings, on 25 April (1560), with the "cardinales deputati super reformatione" Pius had decreed that all patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops should return to their churches as soon as possible, and attend to their flocks by their pastoral presence—

and also, so that they might be able to reside in their churches more comfortably and with greater peace of mind, his Holiness decided and decreed that the resident patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and bishops shall be exempt and immune from all payment of tithes as long as they reside personally in their churches, and not [function] by the act of another. . . .

Resident prelates were also to have the right to appoint to smaller benefices as well as the power to proceed, "even as delegates of the Apostolic See," against exempted clerics and wandering monks.<sup>58</sup>

The residential requirement for bishops was to cause a storm in Rome as well as in Trent. The four chief legates were hardly in unison. When the fifth legate, Altemps, joined them, his presence added nothing to the council. The princely Gonzaga and the industrious Seripando got along well, especially since the latter did most of the work for both of them. They were both sincere reformers, and so was Hosius who tended, however, to go his own way, probably because he did not speak Italian.<sup>59</sup> Simonetta was especially concerned with the defense of the Sacred College and the Roman Curia. Various cardinals and curial officials were alarmed at the thought of necessary residence in dioceses to which they had been appointed, and

<sup>53</sup> The text of Pius IV's instructions to Marini was published by von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., pp. 118–22, with the reference to the financial losses caused by the Roman reform on pp. 118–19. Marini had been appointed to the see of Lanciano, southeast of Chieti, on 26 January, 1560; two years later (on 9 January, 1562) his see had been raised to an archbishopric (*Magnum bullarium romanum*, IV-2, no. LV, pp. 101–3).

<sup>54</sup> Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 482–83.

<sup>55</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 244, pp. 378–79; *Documentos inéditos*, IX (1846, repr. 1964), 107–8; Gabriele Paleotti [auditor of the council, made a cardinal by Pius IV on 12 March, 1565], *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in S. Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1 (1931), 286–87; see Seripando's letter to Borromeo of 17 May (1562), in von Sichel, *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., pp. 109–12; and cf. Šusta, *Die römische Kurie*, II (1909), 47. On the alteration in the title of Šusta's work, see above, Chapter 17, note 67.

<sup>56</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 3, pp. 6–7: "Romae die Mercurii 14 Februarii factum fuit verbum a sanctissimo domino nostro ad praelatos ut revertentur ad ecclesias suas. . . . In eo consistorio [also on Wednesday, 14 February, 1560] Papa vocatis omnibus episcopis, qui erant in Urbe, ex quibus interfuerat circa 70, amantibus verbis dixit eis mentis suae Sanctitatis

esse ut post receptos cineres omnes irent ad eorum ecclesias, sicut de iure divino et humano facere tenebantur, et inibi manerent et res disponerent donec vocarentur ad Concilium quod sua Sanctitas celebrare intendebat. . . ." from the *Acta Consistorialia*. I note, however, that the same text in the *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 34, fol. 72<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, reads, ". . . ex quibus interfuerat circa 60. . . ."

<sup>57</sup> Massarelli, *Diarium septimum*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 343.

<sup>58</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 10, pp. 15–16.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXLIV (1902), VIII, Abh., p. 66: "[H] Varmiense, i.e., Hosius] non parla nè intende italiano, onde bisogna che fra di loro in privato parlino latino; et importa perchè non si può così facilmente nè con quella prontezza et efficacia che bisognaria discorrere à largo sopra le materie che si trattano." from a contemporary appraisal of the four legates (and others) at Trent.

to which they had never gone. As far as they were concerned, bishoprics were a source of revenue, not a place of residence. If the Holy See was the hub of the great wheel of Christendom, certainly the bishoprics were the spokes.

Serious reform of the Church had to start with the bishops, who could then deal with the canons of cathedral and collegiate churches and with the priests in the many parishes. Episcopal authority would have to be restored, which meant that the pope would have to stop granting so many exemptions and reservations. Required residence was sure to be a hotly-contested issue. Simonetta objected to it. Gonzaga and Seripando then declared their willingness to omit it from the conciliar agenda.

Simonetta withdrew his objection, however, because he was fearful of facing the indignation of the imperialist and Spanish reformers. Gonzaga had resided in Mantua, where he had been regent as well as bishop, and Seripando had remained in his archiepiscopal see of Salerno. In the consistory of 14 February, 1560, Pius IV had told the bishops that they should remain in their sees, *sicut de iure divino et humano facere tenebantur*, for the laws of God and man held them to the obligation of residence.<sup>60</sup>

Seripando stated frankly that he agreed with those who asserted *residentiam esse iuris divini*, but he remained open-minded and tolerant of those whose knowledge and conscience might suggest otherwise. Pedro Guerrero, the archbishop of Granada, like many a Spaniard in years gone by, had no doubt that there was a divine law of residence, which he sought to prove by Scripture as well as by reason. In any event, wisely or unwisely, the legates had presented the twelve articles of reform, including the first article (on residence), to the council at the general congregation of 11 March, 1562, and the discussions began in the general congregation of 7 April.<sup>61</sup> Dark clouds were gathering over Trent.

<sup>60</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 3, p. 7, quoted above in note 56, and *cf.* *ibid.*, no. 35, p. 66.

<sup>61</sup> See Seripando's letter to Borromeo of 17 May (1562), in von Sichel, *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), X, Abh., pp. 110-16. On 18 March (1562) Borromeo wrote the legates that Pius IV approved of the conciliar discussion of the twelve articles of reform, but the legates must take care not to get involved in the question *an residentia sit de iure divino*, "perché saria cosa che potrebbe generare qualche inconveniente" (Susta, II, 65), which was to prove an understatement. Since it seemed most inadvisable to try to avoid the issue, however, Borromeo wrote the legates on 29 March that Pius left the matter of debating the divine law of residence entirely up to the legates (*ibid.*, II, 73).

The four weeks between 11 March and 7 April (1562) were occupied by various ceremonial and liturgical functions. Thus the conciliar fathers received Ferdinando Francesco d'Ávalos, marquis of Pescara, at a general congregation on 16 March. D'Ávalos came as Philip II's envoy. On the eighteenth they welcomed the Florentine Giovanni Strozzi as Cosimo de' Medici's ambassador to the council, and on the twentieth they received the two *oratores* of the seven Catholic cantons of Switzerland.<sup>62</sup> Easter came on 29 March, ending a busy week. On 6 April the fathers admitted to the council the procurators of the prelates and clergy of Hungary "in confiniis Turcicis," and again they heard how the madness of the Turks and the heresies of Lutherans, Calvinists, and others had turned the affairs of the kingdom topsy-turvy.<sup>63</sup> Like many German bishops, those of Hungary could not attend the council, for they feared the disorders which their absence would entail.

On Tuesday, 7 April (1562), the conciliar fathers gathered in the Palazzo Thun (now the Municipio) in the first of fourteen general congregations convoked to discuss the twelve articles of reform. The first ten, highly contentious, congregations considered the divine law of episcopal residence from 7 through 20 April.<sup>64</sup> Pedro Guerrero, the archbishop of Granada, had begun the contest by insisting upon the importance of making clear the nature of the law of residence. If there was a divine obligation for a bishop to reside in his see, the theologians should be called upon to clarify it.<sup>65</sup> Guerrero was known to believe in

<sup>62</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 245-47, pp. 379-95.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 248, pp. 395-401; Gabriele Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 287-89.

<sup>64</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 249, 251, 253, 255, 257-59, 261, 263, 265, pp. 402-65 [the ten congregations devoted to the question of episcopal residence, and whether there was a divine law thereon], and nos. 266, 268, 270, 272, pp. 465-81 [congregations devoted to other articles of reform]; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 291-319, who has omitted the general congregation of 8 April (Ehes, *ibid.*, VIII, no. 251, pp. 414-16). Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), p. 606, and *Gilrolamo Seripando* (1937), II, 147, apparently is not counting the critical congregation of 20 April, when he states that "nine general congregations were required in order to give each of the 137 voting members of the Council an opportunity to be heard" (and *cf.* Jedin, "Der Kampf um die bischöfliche Residenzpflicht 1562/63," in *Il Concilio di Trento e la riforma tridentina*, 2 vols., Rome, 1965, I, 15). On 20 April the voting members were heard more vociferously than ever although, to be sure, there was little time to debate the substance of the controversial issue.

<sup>65</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 249, p. 403: ". . . Quoad primum declaretur quo iure residere teneamur, et esset scan-

the *ius divinum residentiae*, and he had widespread support in the council.

The opposite position was taken later in the day (7 April) by Gianbattista Castagna, the archbishop of Rossano (and later Pope Urban VII), who said that, as he saw the problem, it was not by what law but by what means bishops should be forced to live in their dioceses.<sup>66</sup> Castagna was a defender of the Curia. The curialists were quite opposed to any thought of a divine law of residence, for many of them were bishops, and had no intention of living elsewhere than at Rome. Guerrero's view prevailed, however, and the *ius divinum* now filled some two weeks of sometimes harsh dispute.

Almost all the bishops agreed that "residentia est necessaria." At least so they said. The guardians of the Curia had no objection to the principle, but they did not want to be bound by a divine ordinance. A papal dispensation could always relieve the conscience of a bishop absent from his flock. Also the assertion of a divine law of residence would be something of an innovation. At the Curia one held to traditions and past practices. The argument went on from day to day. On 9 April, for example, Martino de' Martini de' Medici, the bishop of Marsico Nuovo in the south of Italy, rose to say (as Castagna had done) that he saw no reason to ask "quo iure sit residentia, sed qua ratione episcopi residere debeant." Let the ancient canons be restored; let the bishops all observe a *ius commune* as far as exemptions and privileges were concerned. But Lodovico Vanino de' Teodoli got up after de' Medici to say that not only was "residentia" an obligation, but one must certainly find out "quo iure ea sit."<sup>67</sup>

After almost a week of wrangling, on 13 April the general congregations began assembling in the church of S. Maria Maggiore "because of the heat" instead of the Palazzo Thun, Gonzaga's residence, where they had been held up to this

point.<sup>68</sup> (The church is at the end of the Vicolo Colico, a short distance from the Palazzo Thun.) The change of site did little to lower the heat of contention. Gonzaga stayed away on the thirteenth;<sup>69</sup> he had apparently had enough for a while. Some of the fathers complained of the poor acoustics in S. Maria Maggiore. If the speaker's voice was too low, he could not be heard; if he spoke too loud, there were reverberations in the vault.<sup>70</sup> Considering the repetitiveness of the arguments, however, and the verbosity of some of the speakers, a number of fathers probably saw no reason to complain of the acoustics. Anyhow by the thirteenth most of them knew where they stood on the question of residence.

The vote came at a general congregation on 20 April (1562), almost unexpectedly and sooner than some of the fathers wished. Cardinal Gonzaga began the proceedings at 3:00 P.M. in S. Maria Maggiore. He said that a committee should be chosen to compose the decree or decrees relating to reform, and that they must consider the remaining articles on the agenda. Massarelli then read a statement to the effect that many fathers had maintained there must be a formal declaration *residentiam esse de iure divino*; others had said nothing at all about the issue; and still others had asserted that no such declaration should be made. Since those who were delegated *ad conficienda decreta* must know where they stood, Massarelli now requested that each of the fathers should vote on the issue of the divine obligation of residence "by the word *placet* or *non placet*." A majority vote would determine the nature of the decree. Speak clearly and distinctly, said Massarelli, so that the votes may be counted.

Taken by surprise, some of the fathers were suspicious that they were being maneuvered into affirming the *ius divinum*, of which Gonzaga and especially Seripando were known to approve. The result, according to the conciliar auditor Paleotti, was "varia confusio." Antonio Agustín, bishop of Lérida, declared that they should not try to resolve the issue so quickly. Sebastiano Leccavella, archbishop of Naxos, was ready for the vote. Gianbattista Castagna made some ambiguous comment, but was ready to vote (as he did) *non placet*. Giulio Parisano, the bishop of Rimini, wanted the

dalum id non explicare ut, si est de iure divino, id declaratur, et canones antiqui renouentur. . . . Et audiantur theologii quo iure episcopi tenentur [sic] residere."

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 249, p. 410: "Non loquor ego hodie super questione illa, quae ab aliquibus, qui ante me dixerunt, mota videtur an residentia sit de iure divino, an vero de iure positivo, et an expedit id declarare, tribus motus rationibus. Prima est, quia video, illustrissimos dominos praesidentes petere a nobis sententias, non quo iure residentia fieri debeat, sed praesupposito eam esse necessariam, quocumque id iure sit, quaerunt quo facto fiet ut qui residere tenentur, vere residentant."

Gianbattista Castagna was elected pope on 15 September, 1590. He took the name Urban VII, and died twelve days later (on 27 September), never having been crowned (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 53).

<sup>67</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 253, p. 429.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 257, p. 440.

<sup>69</sup> Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 484, entry for 13 April, 1562; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 303, and note 14.

<sup>70</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, 440, note 2.

council first to consult the pope, and so did a number of others. Nevertheless, the vote was taken.

Although the results of the balloting are clear, the precise count is not. To begin with, Antonio Elio, bishop of Pola (Pula) in Istria and the titular patriarch of Jerusalem, assigned his vote to the pope (*non placet nisi consulto sanctissimo domino nostro*). The patriarchs of Aquileia and Venice and about thirty-three other prelates followed Elio, and when their thirty-six or so qualified negatives were added to the *non placets*, Massarelli emerged with the count *pro parte affirmativa* 66, *pro parte negativa* 71. Paleotti recorded 67 affirmative and 72 negative votes. Seripando's secretary Filippo Musotti counted 67 straightforward *placets*, 33 *non placets*, and 38 *non placets* unless the pope should choose to make these votes *placets*, i.e., 67 votes for the divine law of residence and 71 against it.<sup>71</sup>

On the evening of that memorable 20 April Simonetta sent a frightening report to Rome, marked by an extreme hostility to Gonzaga, who had supported the divine obligation of residence. Simonetta wrote that this was playing into the hands of the Protestants, who would hold up to opprobrium all popes who had dispensed bishops from residence in their dioceses as having acted contrary to divine law. The ultramontanians, i.e., the Spanish, French, and imperialists, had followed Gonzaga's evil lead. The whole purpose of

the motion on residence was to tie the pope's hands, ". . . la residentia de iure divino, il che non mirava ad altro che a legar le mani al papa!" The motion would weaken the authority of the Church, and go far to show that a council was superior to the pope.<sup>72</sup>

On 23 April Gonzaga and Seripando wrote Borromeo of their displeasure that, when the fathers ought to have voted *placet* or *non placet* on the motion of residence, some of them should have "remitted" their votes to the pope. Catholics as well as heretics would be confirmed in their opinion "that the council was not free," and that one was doing only what the pope ordered, "a thing which above all one must avoid." The two legates advised Borromeo to have the pope send a brief to Trent, lamenting the failure of these prelates to do their duty, and telling them that they should vote on conciliar issues according to their own conscience. Many of those who had remitted their votes had already regretted it. Most of those who had assigned their votes to the pope had been Italians, "una nazione contra tutte le altre nazioni."<sup>73</sup>

The Venetian ambassadors to the council, Niccolò da Ponte, *doctor et eques*, and Matteo Dandolo, *eques*, had arrived in Trent on the evening of 19 April,<sup>74</sup> just before the stormy vote of the twentieth. They had come in good time, for they had only received their commission on the ninth and their letter of credence (or *mandatum*) on the eleventh. In sending da Ponte and Dandolo to Trent, the doge and Senate had expressed the pious hope that the worthy prelates at the council were going to restore Christianity to its ancient integrity and dignity.<sup>75</sup> The worthy prelates were finding it dif-

<sup>71</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 265, pp. 463-65, from Angelo Massarelli's *acta Concilii*; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 315-19, who comments on the distress of the fathers (p. 319): The bishop of Paris said he regretted coming to the council (he had voted *placet*). Many of the fathers were distressed, "quia Concilium non videretur liberum, cum prelati multi se ad papae voluntatem reiceissent."

See also Musotti, *Actorum Concilii Tridentini epitome*, *ibid.*, III-1, 106-8, whose count of the affirmative votes corresponds with that of Paleotti, and of the negative votes with that of Massarelli. Musotti's figures are repeated in the summary given in the *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 131. The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Francisco de Vargas, wrote Philip II on 4 May that the vote was 68 or 69 of *iure divino* and 71 or 72 against the motion (*ibid.*, IX, 154-55). Seripando himself gives 67 *placets*, 33 *non placets*, with 38 *non placets* "nisi consulari prius sanctissimus dominus noster" (*Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 484).

In a letter of 14 May (1562) the marquis of Pescara wrote Philip from Trent that the motion on residence had received 68 affirmative votes and 48 negative votes, "y el otro terçero tomò por medio que primero se consultase con su Santidad, de la cual opinión fueron veinte y cinco, de manera que juntados los cuarenta y ocho con estos posteros, la parte afirmativa vino á ser inferior—lo cual puso el negocio en gran confusión!" (*Documentos inéditos*, IX, 171-72). Pescara's total was thus 68 for and 73 against the motion *residentiam esse de iure divino*. On the confusion to which Pescara refers, note the legates' letter to Borromeo of 20 April, in *Šusta*, II, 88.

<sup>72</sup> Šusta, II, 89: "Questa dichiarazione [della residentia de iure divino] . . . la quale enervava l'autorità della Chiesa e ancho tendeva a mostrar che il concilio era sopra il papa," and *cf.*, *ibid.*, II, no. 32, p. 92, doc. dated 27 April, 1562.

<sup>73</sup> Šusta, II, no. 31, pp. 90-91.

<sup>74</sup> Šusta, II, 87, letter of the legates to Borromeo, dated 20 April, 1562: "Hieri entrarono gli ambasciatori Venetiani che furono Messer Matteo Dandolo et Messer Nicolò da Ponte, due delli principali senatori di quella Republica. . . ." *Cf.* Firmanus, *Diaria carminialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 559.

<sup>75</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 8 [25], commission of da Ponte and Dandolo as *nostris ambasciatori et representantes*, dated 9 April, 1562: ". . . Vi commettemo col Senato che proseguendo il vostro viaggio dobbiate condurvi nella sopradetta città di Trento, . . . esponendo con quella grave et prudente forma di parole che ben saperete usare la somma riverentia che noi ad imitatione delli nostri progenitori et dovemo et volemo portar ad esso santo concilio et il molto desiderio, anzi ferma speranza, che per la somma virtù et sapientia di tanti dignissimi prelati congregati nel spirito santo noi havemo di veder a questo

ficult to maintain their own dignity in the everlasting daily disputes. Da Ponte and Dandolo were admitted as the Republic's representatives to the council with all due ceremony at a general congregation on 25 April.<sup>76</sup> If in Istanbul the pashas expressed suspicion of, and dissatisfaction with, their Venetian friends for sending envoys to the council, the baillie could explain that theological controversy was more likely to pull Christians apart than bring them together. In any event the baillie would keep the Porte informed of the proceedings at Trent.

In the meantime the legates were keeping the Curia Romana informed of the proceedings at Trent. As late as 3 May (1562) Pius IV wrote the legates that he was satisfied with the way things were going, and was resolved to reform the Church in Rome and everywhere else. His reforms were going to cost him 50,000 scudi a year. He would have done more, but he had been ill. The legates should not, however, try to satisfy every demand of the Spanish, French, German, and other prelates, "especially when their demands are directed toward the destruction of the Curia Romana."

tempo restituita la religion Christiana nella sua pristina integrità et dignità. . . Entrarete nelle congregazioni et sessioni che si faranno quondo sarete chiamati, et quando v' entereranno gli altri ambasciatori de principi secondo il costume in tali occasioni solito servarsi, et di tutto quello che sarà proposto et risoluto nel santo concilio et d' ogni altra cosa ch' intertenderete occorrer degna di nostra notizia ne tenirete per giornata diligentemente avisati. . . ."

Da Ponte and Dandolo were each to receive 400 ducats (in gold) a month, with the usual four months' advance (of 1,600 ducats each in their case), for which they were not to be held to any accounting. They were each required to maintain fifteen horses, counting those of their secretaries and other servitors, as well as four grooms. Their letter of credence is dated 11 April (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 8<sup>r</sup>-9<sup>r</sup> [25<sup>r</sup>-26<sup>r</sup>]), and on their mission to the council during 1562-1563, note, *ibid.*, fols. 10-11<sup>r</sup> [27-28<sup>r</sup>], 12-13<sup>r</sup> [29-30<sup>r</sup>], 15<sup>r</sup>-16<sup>r</sup> [32<sup>r</sup>-33<sup>r</sup>], 25 [42], 32<sup>r</sup>-33<sup>r</sup> [49<sup>r</sup>-50<sup>r</sup>], 34<sup>r</sup>-35<sup>r</sup> [51<sup>r</sup>-52<sup>r</sup>], 39<sup>r</sup>-40<sup>r</sup> [56<sup>r</sup>-57<sup>r</sup>], 50<sup>r</sup> [67<sup>r</sup>], 55 [72], 68<sup>r</sup>-69<sup>r</sup> [85<sup>r</sup>-86<sup>r</sup>], 69<sup>r</sup>-70<sup>r</sup> [86<sup>r</sup>-87<sup>r</sup>], 71 [88], 73<sup>r</sup> [90<sup>r</sup>], 80 [97], 82 [99], 83<sup>r</sup>-85<sup>r</sup> [100<sup>r</sup>-102<sup>r</sup>], 86<sup>r</sup>-89<sup>r</sup> [103<sup>r</sup>-106<sup>r</sup>], and *cf. ibid.*, Reg. 75, fol. 33<sup>r</sup> [55<sup>r</sup>].

The doge and Senate regarded the question of the Tridentine reform as a matter of the highest consequence, "come cosa importantissima non solo per causa di religione ma per interesse del stato nostro et delli altri principi d' Italia" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 25 [42], doc. dated 24 September, 1562). Letters of da Ponte and Dandolo to the Capi of the Council of Ten in Venice, and of the latter to the ambassadors, are given in Bart. Cecchetti, *La Repubblica di Venezia e la corte di Roma nei rapporti della religione*, 2 vols., Venice, 1874, II, 25-67, who also provides, *ibid.*, II, 287-89, an incomplete list of papal nuncios to Venice. Note also Hubert Jedin, "Venezia e il Concilio di Trento," *Studi Veneziani*, XIV (1972), 137-57, esp. pp. 144 ff.

<sup>76</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 273, pp. 482-85.

Decrees relating to the pope should be sent to Rome for issuance under the familiar formula *Nos Pius . . . sacro approbante concilio*. This procedure would have the advantage of immediate publication. Decrees passed by the council had to await papal confirmation. (In either case, of course, the decrees would be subjected to papal scrutiny.) As for the appointment or "collation" to benefices, Pius agreed to a bishop's nominating six, eight, or ten suitable appointees, from whom he would make the selection. It would not be well, he said, for the bishops to make such appointments directly, lest the abuses which had to be done away with in Rome should merely be transferred to the dioceses.

Pius promised to put an end to abuses involving the "fabrica di S. Pietro" and the related "crociata di Spagna," but he wished to do so in such fashion as not to alienate Philip II. Finally, after dealing with other matters pertaining to reform, Pius declared he had no objection to the council's determining whether residence was a matter of "divine or positive law." He resided in his see, and he intended to require other bishops to reside in theirs. One must, nevertheless, avoid seeking to draw certain conclusions as to the relation of conciliar to papal authority, as some prelates in Trent appeared ready to do.<sup>77</sup>

There is scant reason to doubt the sincerity of Pius IV's desire for reform, but as cardinals and curialists added their voices to Simonetta's, Pius became alarmed. If there was in fact a divine law of episcopal residence, which the popes had failed to enforce for generations, presumably bishops

<sup>77</sup> Šusta, II, no. 37, pp. 107 ff., esp. pp. 109-13. Federico Pendaso, a Mantuan theologian and dependent of Gonzaga, was acting as an intermediary between the legates and the pope. On the reform of the Curia, note Vargas's letter of 4 May to Philip II, in the *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 158.

Part of the money collected in Spain under the assessment known as the Cruzada was going into the construction of S. Peter's in Rome. Only four or five months before this, Pius IV had been requesting funds under the Cruzada. *Cf. Ar. XLIV*, tom. 11, fol. 136, by mod. stamped enumeration, a brief of Pius to Philip II of Spain, dated 20 November, 1561:

"Cum eius pecunia, quae Cruciatæ nomine in Hispaniarum regnis ex nostra concessione exigi coepit est, pars quaedam—sicut Maiestas tua novit—aedificationi basilicæ Principis Apostolorum in Vaticano fuerit attributa: aequum est et decet quod in tam laudabile et Deo gratum opus impenditur sine ullo pendio erogari. Proinde hortandam in Domino diximus et rogamus Maiestatem tuam ut, quo eiusmodi pecunia hic sine ulla diminutione perveniat, curet aquæ efficiat, scilicet Catholicæ regis dignum est, pro Beati Petri reverentia sine ulius solutione portorii et absque ullo onere atque impedimento commissariis eiusdem fabricæ eam pecuniam ex tuis Hispaniarum regnis hic mittere liceat. . . ."

must have some sort of apostolic responsibility for the cure of souls (*cf.* Acts, 20:28). Obviously the popes should not disperse bishops from residence in their dioceses, at least not after the fashion they had been doing for so long. If the bishop of Rome shared the apostolic mission with his episcopal brethren, was papal primacy (*primatus*) no longer to mean supremacy (*plena potestas*)? Would an assembly of bishops in a council be superior to the pope?

Episcopalianism seemed no less a threat to papal primacy than conciliarism had been a century or more before. Were they not the two sides of a coin? The problem beset the Curia from time to time until the fourth session of the First Vatican Council sought (on 18 July, 1870) to make clear for all time the perpetuity of the Petrine primacy.<sup>78</sup> In the meantime, if residence was a requirement for those to whom the cure of souls had been entrusted, would curialists and the cardinals resident in Rome have to give up their bishoprics and other distant benefices?

Although the question of the bishops' diocesan residence had serious implications, one must beware of overmuch retrospective speculation. The current issue seemed clear. As Gonzaga and Seripando had written Borromeo (on 23 April), the contest on residence had been "one nation against all the other nations." Although the vote of 20 April shows that their statement is something of an exaggeration, it is apparent that the issue of residence was being used as a means of protest, even revolt, against the Italian domination of the Sacred College and the Curia.

Four months later Borromeo had occasion to write the legates (on 22 August, 1562) that although Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, had said he was not planning to attend the Council at Trent,

nevertheless, we understand from our nuncio in France [Prospero Santa Croce] that he is very much involved, and that he is being urged on by the queen and other great personages, by whom he has been promised not only the support of the French but also of the Germans, and what is more important, he has told a friend of his quite confidently that he believes he will also have that of the Spaniards, which is of all the more significance, as he denies and conceals his intention.<sup>79</sup>

Pius IV decided to send more Italian bishops and some pro-papal theologians to Trent. Borromeo informed Simonetta (in a letter of 11 May, 1562) that Pius had also been thinking of sending two more legates to the council, the canonist Giovanbattista Cicada and the ex-diplomat Bernardo Navagero. Cicada could assist Simonetta as "protector" of the Curia and the Holy See. The Venetian Navagero could keep the prelates of the Republic in line, "la republica amorevole a questa Santa Sede."<sup>80</sup> Later on, however, it was considered inadvisable to add to the five legates already appointed to the council. Although Simonetta's reports and the fears of the cardinals and curialists had set Pius's nerves on edge, and he had become furious with Gonzaga and Seripando for allowing the question of residence to become such a contentious issue, on 11 May he wrote his "dilecti filii," the legates, with some restraint.

Pius did state, to be sure, that he had never in all the world felt such displeasure as when he had learned of the "confusione et disparere" caused by the article on residence. As legates they should have worked in unison, and agreed upon everything in advance. They should not have put the question of residence to a vote on 20 April. Pius perceived that the legates had need of learned canons, and he planned to send to Trent some cardinals, "who we hope will satisfy you." The Sacred College was determined to proceed en masse to Trent, if need be, to defend their rights, inasmuch as the French were proposing to do away with annates and other sources of revenue on which their dignity and effectiveness depended. But his Holiness trusted in the legates' goodwill, and assumed that still more cardinals would not be necessary at the council. Pius looked upon the cardinal of Lorraine's coming to the council with annoyance, "non mandato da noi, ma mosso da sè stesso."

The legates should get on with the articles of reform and the definitions of dogmas. The French ambassador Louis de Lansac was trying to hold up proceedings until he and his colleagues could reach Trent. It was unwise and undesirable to prolong the council unduly, for as Pius said,

nova [of peace] mi disse che pensava a Settembre avviarsi al Concilio, et che 72 prelati di questo regno gli havevano promesso di seguirlo . . ." (*ibid.*, append., no. xxx, pp. 491-92). The Catholic negotiations for peace with the Huguenots came to nothing (Jas. Westfall Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France [1559-1576]*, Chicago and London, 1909, pp. 149 ff., and *cf.*, *ibid.*, append., no. III, pp. 537-38, letter of the duke of Guise to his brother, Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, dated 25 June, 1562).

<sup>80</sup> Susta, II, no. 40a, p. 138.

<sup>78</sup> *Cf.* Heinrich Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, ed. C. Rahner, 28th ed., Freiburg im Breisgau and Barcelona, 1952, pp. 501 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Susta, II, no. 88, p. 325. The nuncio Santa Croce wrote Borromeo from Paris on 26 June, 1562, that since peace had allegedly been made between the Catholics and Huguenots, "Monsignore, illustrissimo [cardinale] di Loreno, con l'occasione del ragionamento di questa matina et di questa buona

The French are asking us for no end of aid against the Huguenots, the emperor against the Turks, the Swiss Catholics against the Lutherans and against the duke of Savoy too. We must also be prepared for our own defense against the heretics, and on this account we are facing excessive costs in Avignon. The sultan [Suleiman] cannot live much longer. He is suffering from dropsy, and is quite worn out in mind and body. . . . Milords, we are seeking to end this council quickly and fruitfully, to unite the whole of Christendom, and to turn our arms against the infidels, heretics, and schismatics. . . .<sup>81</sup>

Of the twelve articles on reform which had been submitted to the general congregation of 11 March, two were dropped from the conciliar discussions, namely nos. 10 and 11 concerning clandestine marriages. On 21 April the congregation began consideration of the ten articles which remained. The discussions went on for days. The prelates who had been chosen to draft the general decree on reform (after the dramatic vote on 20 April) submitted a long-winded and unsatisfactory text, which was rejected on 7 May. Revised and shortened, the decree was in order by 12 May, but acceptance had to be postponed until the fourth session of the council "sub Pio IV," the twentieth session at Trent. It was simply not ready for submission to the third public session, which was held on Thursday, 14 May (1562) in the cathedral of S. Vigilio.<sup>82</sup>

The third session made up in ceremony what it lacked in substance. The secretary Massarelli read (as he tells us) in his usual "loud, clear voice" the commissions (*mandata*) of the Spanish, Floren-

tine, Hungarian, and Venetian envoys to the council. Until Gonzaga and Seripando received, on 15 May, Pius's admonitory letter of the eleventh, they had tried to preserve the article on residence. Ten days later, however, the council was officially notified that the article on residence would be reconsidered later in connection with the sacrament of holy orders, because it seemed to have more to do with dogma than reform.<sup>83</sup>

On the day the fathers were informed that the council would eventually return to the question of residence in connection with holy orders (25 May, 1562) Francisco de Vargas wrote Philip II from Rome that orders had been sent to the legates to stop the arguments on the bitterly-disputed question, and to go to work on the other nine articles. Vargas assumed that the fathers would never resume the debate on residence. The pope, he said, placed most of the blame for the conciliar strife which was dividing Catholic Christendom (in a period of Protestant strength and Turkish power) squarely on the shoulders of Seripando. Pius was saying quite openly that he regretted having elevated Seripando, and that he would gladly pay 50,000 ducats to get back the cardinal's hat he had given him.<sup>84</sup>

In Rome wagging tongues were spreading senseless rumors. The young Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga, nephew of the legate Ercole, informed his uncle that any number of curialists had reached the conclusion that Ercole and his colleague Seripando had joined forces with the intention of ruining the Curia.<sup>85</sup> As soon as Pius IV's censorious and reproachful letter of 11 May reached Trent (on the fifteenth), Seripando addressed the long, defensive answer to Borromeo on the seventeenth, to which we have already alluded more than once. Rehearsing the history of the controversy, he justified himself and Ercole Gonzaga all along the line, and showed his contempt for the Tridentine troublemakers, whose malicious letters to Rome had distorted the facts.<sup>86</sup>

Ercole Gonzaga had powerful relatives in Germany and a princely standing in Italy. There was

<sup>81</sup> Šusta, II, no. 40, pp. 132-33, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 134-37 (Šusta's notes are usually abundant and always illuminating). On Lansac's efforts to have the session scheduled for 14 May (1562) postponed until the arrival of further envoys from France, cf. Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 32, entry for 28 April, and Ehes, *ibid.*, VIII, no. 274, pp. 485-86.

Also Borromeo addressed a long, handwritten letter to Gonzaga on 11 May, telling him that the legates must put an end to the aggravating question of residence at this time, for it was certainly not contributing to ecclesiastical reform (. . . *che si sospica questa pratica, che alla reformatioe porta pochissimo frutto o niuno*). He informed Gonzaga of the stir the conciliar contention had caused in Rome, which was being flooded with letters from Trent, and of the likelihood of the canonist Cicada's appointment as a legate to the council, which would have been an affront to Gonzaga. It was a courteous letter, for which Gonzaga thanked him on 16 May, acknowledging the discord among the fathers, but denying that there had been such discord among the legates (i.e., with Simonetta) as had been reported (Šusta, II, nos. 40b-41, pp. 139-49, with Šusta's notes).

<sup>82</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 266-72, 275-79, pp. 465-81, 486-501; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 327-30; Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 32-36.

<sup>83</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 280, p. 502, doc. dated 25 May, 1562: ". . . quia iste articulus [de residentia] visus est magis congruere materiae dogmatis quam reformationis."

<sup>84</sup> *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 208-9.

<sup>85</sup> Šusta, II, 143: "Concludono che vostra Signoria illustrissima et Monsignore reverendissimo Seripando sono uniti et d' uno stesso volere alla ruina della Corte Romana!"

<sup>86</sup> Von Stessel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., pp. 108-17, on which note Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), pp. 612-14, and *Girolamo Seripando* (1937), II 153-55.



widespread apprehension in Trent that, if Cicada were sent as "head of the council," Gonzaga would leave, as in an impressive letter of 16 May (1562) he informed Borromeo he would do.<sup>87</sup> Now there was fear in Rome also, for Gonzaga's departure could well cause an international upheaval. Strange as it may seem, the question of episcopal residence had become an issue of great importance throughout Catholic Europe, a rallying cry of churchmen and princes against the Italian domination of the Church.

Among the conflicting reports which came from Rome to Trent, as Antonio Agustín, the bishop of Lérida, wrote Francisco de Vargas, was one to the effect that Pius IV had said episcopal residence was indeed of divine ordination, but that the public declaration thereof would destroy the Curia Romana [which was in fact Simonetta's view]. Discord had reached the point that there was danger of schism. Gonzaga was said to have asked for the *licentia abundi*. Agustín was not sure that he would even wait for it. He would be sorely missed; his courtesy was unflinching, "y un tan gran Señor, como vuestra Señoría sabe." According to some of the gossips, Gonzaga and Seripando had declared that Pius IV had deceived them in not making clear what kind of a council he wanted, for they were not about to defend the malpractices of the Curia.<sup>88</sup>

On 6 June Borromeo wrote Seripando in answer to his long apology of 17 May which, the cardinal-nephew said, the pope had read. His Holiness was allegedly pleased with the general progress of the council. As for the article on residence, however, although he realized that everyone was moved by a wholesome zeal, he was "not able not to blame" the legates for allowing the article to come to a vote. As soon as they had seen "tanta discordia de' padri in detto articolo," they should have tried quietly to bury it. There had been no possibility of finding a satisfactory solution to the problem by balloting. The result had been a scan-

dal in which only the enemies of the Holy See could rejoice.

Nevertheless, his Holiness still entertained that high opinion of Seripando that he had always had, and he was confident that every day Seripando would now give him cause to hold him in still greater esteem.<sup>89</sup> Seripando seemed to be pleased with this letter, and asked Borromeo for permission to show it to his friends, but as Vargas had written Philip II on 2 June, the pope was openly hostile to Seripando—to the point of saying that if he had only listened to Vargas in the first place, he would never have made Seripando a cardinal.<sup>90</sup>

At the same time that Borromeo wrote Seripando he also sent word to Simonetta (in cipher) that since Ercole Gonzaga had tried to explain in defensive tones the whys and wherefores of the discord at Trent, his Holiness could only hope that hereafter Gonzaga would pursue a better course of action. Simonetta was cautioned to deal most gently with Gonzaga "et con tutta la mansuetudine et cortesia del mondo et mostrargli confidenza." While thus appearing to have confidence in Gonzaga, Simonetta was to keep a weather eye open, follow his previous instructions, and agree to nothing contrary to the pope's wishes. He would find the curialist prelates like Boncompagni, Castagna, the auditor Paleotti, and others helpful amid the trials at Trent.<sup>91</sup>

At the fourth session of the council "sub Pio IV," held in the majestic cathedral of S. Vigilio on 4 June (1562), the fathers approved a decree, with thirty-six dissenting votes, postponing until the next session (on 16 July) the decisions to be taken with regard to reform as well as to dogma.<sup>92</sup> Owing to illness, Gonzaga was not present at the fourth session, which was attended by five ambassadors, two patriarchs, seventeen archbishops, 128 bishops, two abbots, four generals of Orders, and 73 theologians in addition to the four legates and Cardinal Lodovico Madruzzo.<sup>93</sup> The theologians included Diego Laynez, Alfonso Salmerón, and Pedro de Soto, who were among the intellectual luminaries of the day.

<sup>87</sup> Šusta, II, no. 41, pp. 143-46: "Mi duol bene nell' anima che tante cose sieno state credute di me tutte false, et da quelle si sia causata una risoluzione così presta et di tanto pregiudicio all' honor mio di mandar San Clemente [i.e., Cicada] qua capo di questo Concilio senza avvisarmi tanto a tempo che havessi potuto mostrare la falsità di dette cose con vive giustificationi [p. 144]. . . Et similmente mi perdoni se mi risolvo di non star qui venendoci San Clemente superiore [p. 145]. . ." Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 208-9.

<sup>88</sup> *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 188-89, letter of Agustín to Vargas, dated at Trent on 18 May, 1562, and cf. *ibid.*, IX, 216-18, and Šusta, II, no. 45, pp. 161-64.

<sup>89</sup> Šusta, II, 194.

<sup>90</sup> Šusta, II, 194; *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 245.

<sup>91</sup> Šusta, II, no. 54, p. 193, and see in general G. Drei, "La Corrispondenza del Card. Ercole Gonzaga," *Arch. storico per le provincie Parmensi*, XVIII (1918), nos. xxx-xl, pp. 29-62.

<sup>92</sup> Ehnes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 283, pp. 521-23; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 339; Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 36-38.

<sup>93</sup> Servanzio, *op. cit.*, in *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 38, and cf. Ehnes, *ibid.*, VIII, no. 285, pp. 527-28.

It was a stately gathering, but it had not accomplished much. As far as the vociferous Spaniards were concerned, episcopal residence remained the major item of reform. While the legates were struggling, at the pope's insistence, to set this issue aside, they had encountered a new problem when on 18 May (1562) Louis de Lansac arrived at Trent as the French envoy to the council. Within the next few days he had been joined by two colleagues, "mandati dal re di Francia . . . al sacro Concilio."<sup>94</sup>

Lansac and his fellow envoys had soon presented to the legates the demands of the French government that the current proceedings be recognized as a new council, a fresh attempt to solve the religious problem, which (as we have seen) would have invalidated the dogmatic decrees of the first two periods of the council (at which the French had not been represented). Fortunately, however, as the legates wrote Borromeo (on 1 June), the French had agreed, for the immediate future at least, to be satisfied with the imperialist position—that there should be no official statement as to whether the current sessions were the proceedings of a wholly new council or the continuation of the old one.<sup>95</sup>

As far as Philip II was concerned, this ambiguity had been going on long enough. Like the Spanish clergy—anxious to preserve the dogmatic decrees of the earlier sessions—Philip looked upon the Tridentine assembly of 1562 as a continuation of that of a decade before. Pius IV had assured him that this was in fact the case, but Philip now wanted some official affirmation of the fact.<sup>96</sup> The Spanish bishops at Trent had, however, been concentrating (as we are only too well aware) upon the con-

ciliar recognition of the *ius divinum residentiae* as the foundation of ecclesiastical reform. It was hard to advance upon both fronts at the same time; the royal concern with continuation became an impediment to the bishops' insistence upon the divine law of residence.

The imperialists and the French were heartily in favor of a declaration of the divine law of residence, but they were equally opposed to the view that the council they were attending was in any way a continuation of that which had been suspended at the end of April, 1552. The imperialists, French, and Spanish, however, stood together against the Italians, which does not mean of course that there were not a goodly number of Italian reformers, including Gonzaga and Seripando. That the two senior legates should put the well-being of the Church before that of the Holy See and the Curia angered Simonetta. The latter saw a "beautiful opportunity" to separate the French from the Spanish in their disagreement over the question of "continuation." But what did Gonzaga and Seripando do? To Simonetta's extreme annoyance they brought the opposing forces together by "continuing" the council without ever putting the fact into words.<sup>97</sup>

One way of "continuing" the council, while not saying so, was to resume the dogmatic discussions at precisely the point at which they had been halted in 1552. This was done at a general congregation in the church of S. Maria Maggiore on 6 June (1562), when the legates announced that the next important "materia" to be dealt with would be the sacrament of the eucharist, the question of *utraque species*, and the communion of children. That was all very well as far as the Spanish bishops were concerned, but the *articulus residentiae* must not be put aside. Pedro Guerrero, the archbishop of Granada, made it abundantly clear that the Spanish were never going to forget that issue, "sed memoria retinet et semper retinebit."

Gianbattista Castagna, archbishop of Rossano, became enraged at the fact that the Spaniards brought up residence at every single congregation, and made it impossible to get on with other matters (*unde ceterarum rerum progressus interrumpetur*). As the embattled bishops were lining up on

<sup>94</sup> Servanzio, *op. cit.*, in *Conc. Trident.*, 111-1, 35-36, entries for 18, 19, 22, and 26 May, 1562; Susta, II, no. 44, pp. 156-58; Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 274, pp. 485-86.

<sup>95</sup> Susta, II, no. 48, p. 172, letter dated 1 June, 1562: ". . . Questi ambasciatori Francesi ci hanno fatto grandissima istanza per la nuova indictione del concilio. . . ." The legates, however, had managed to bring the French envoys around to the point "che si sono contentati di quel tanto che si contentano anco gli ambasciatori dell' imperatore, cioè è che non si faccia dichiarazione alcuna né d' indictione né di continuatione. . . ."

Lansac had wanted to hold up the agenda of the council until the "hoped-for arrival of the English, Scots, Danes, Saxons, Württembergers, unus denique ecclesiae totius," which made no sense at all (Seripando, *Commentarii*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 487). Cf. the legates' letter of 21 May to Borromeo, in Susta, II, no. 44, p. 157, and the letter of the Spanish agent Hércules Pagnano (Pañano) to the marquis of Pescara, dated 22 May, 1562, in the *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 195-96.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. the various texts in the *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 185, 187, 193-95, 197-98, 200 ff., 211, 215-16.

<sup>97</sup> Susta, II, 173, from Simonetta's dispatch to Rome: "Era bella occasione di disunir Francesi di Spagnoli col articolo della continuatione o indictione, ma sono stati riuniti da Mantua col consiglio di Seripando, essendosi contentati Francesi che in effetto si continuasse ma non si esprimesse queste parole, al che Spagnoli pareva che si acquetassero et si era scritto al marchese [di Pescara] sopra questo."

one side and the other, Ercole Gonzaga, fearing lest the learned fathers might be descending into a tavern brawl, *rixae iam excitatae periculum prospiciens*, solemnly promised that in due time, when they came to the sacrament of holy orders, the question of residence would be dealt with.<sup>98</sup> He was careful, however, to give no indication as to when that might be. Although the pope and Borromeo had wanted the legates to bury the article on residence *del tutto* or at least put it off into the indefinite future without any sort of commitment, they had in fact permitted the legates (in their letter of 23 May) to defer the debate on residence "finchè si tratterà de sacramento ordinis."<sup>99</sup>

Severely pressed in the stormy congregation of 6 June, Gonzaga had acted within the range of decision allowed him by the pope. It was hardly his fault that he had been forced to resort to the pope's least desirable choice, but his promise to the bishops did not endear him to the curialists. A few months later the divine law of residence was to come to the fore with even greater force and almost wreck the council.

Ercole Gonzaga had lost the pope's confidence. He was also fed up with cantankerous and long-winded bishops. Having warned Borromeo in mid-May (1562) of his intention to resign if Cicada were sent as first legate to the council, Gonzaga wanted to be relieved of his unpleasant charge at Trent. Throughout the month of June he made plans and took steps to bring about his resignation, for which he needed the pope's permission. Borromeo, however, was trying to heal the rift between Gonzaga and the pope. In the spring of 1560 the cardinal-nephew's sister Camilla had married Ercole's nephew Cesare Gonzaga, eldest

son of the well-known Ferrante.<sup>100</sup> Union with the family of a reigning pope was always much sought after, and Ercole had been pleased with young Cesare's marriage, for it had increased his own influence at the Curia. Ercole had, to be sure, lost the tiara to Giannangelo de' Medici in the long conclave of 1559 when, owing to the interference of Spain, he had been locked out of the election. The princely Ercole doubtless looked upon Pius IV, the brother of the rowdy castellan of Musso, as an upstart, but it was an age of upstart popes. Anyhow Ercole had had enough of Spain, especially of Spanish bishops.

Despite the religious unrest in France, there was no reason to suspend the council. The Catholic reformation was incomplete. Aside from the article on residence there were dogmatic decrees to be produced and approved. Cicada was not sent to Trent. On 29 June (1562), as Leonardo Marini, archbishop of Lanciano, was preparing to return from Rome to Trent, he was instructed to assure the legates that the rumors of a "dissolution" of the council were absolutely groundless. Pius IV informed Marini that he could not stop all the talk, "se ben potemo fare che dicano la bugia," but he could label it lies.

Pius had not encouraged the princes to send their envoys to Trent for nothing. He had been well aware of the expense—and the vexation—which would lie ahead. The first two periods of the council had made all that clear. He had instituted reforms in Rome (as we have already heard him say) which had cost the Holy See more than 200,000 scudi. The council was "open." It would remain so. He had never intended to suspend or dissolve it, but was determined to see it do its work through to the very end.<sup>101</sup> Ercole Gonzaga's resignation as first president of the council was, therefore, not accepted, and on 6 July even Simonetta acknowledged that had the pope done so, it "would have been a scandal to all the world, and especially to those here at the council."<sup>102</sup>

The conciliar fathers could now go to work with some measure of peace. Philip II, who was almost as anxious for the success of the council as was Pius IV, helped restrain for a while the animus of

<sup>98</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 287, esp. pp. 529-31, with the first note on p. 531; Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 38; and Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 340: "Illis, qui petunt questionem residentiae tractari, [Mantuanum] se fidem polliceri hoc eis tempore suo, cum de sacramento ordinis ageretur, permittimus iri."

On 5 June (1562) a mass was celebrated in the cathedral of S. Vigilio "for the victory achieved by the king of Portugal against the Turks and also for the coming victory which God would grant the most Christian king of France against the heretics," i.e., the Huguenots (Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 561). On the Portuguese victory alluded to, see António Dias Farinha, *História de Mazagan durante o período filipino*, Lisbon, 1970, pp. 30-32, and esp. Henry de Castries, *Les Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc de 1530 à 1845*, 1st ser., I-1 (1530-1578), Paris, 1905, no. 11, pp. 231-39. The Portuguese had held Mazagan, on the Atlantic fifty-five miles southwest of Casablanca, against a large Moorish army from 4 March to 30 April, 1562.

<sup>99</sup> Šusta, II, no. 47, pp. 167-68.

<sup>100</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Pöpaste*, VII (repr. 1957), 82.

<sup>101</sup> Von Sickingen, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., pp. 118-19: "... Maii fu nostra intentione di dissolverlo, ma si ben di finirlo, confermarlo, et esseguirlo."

<sup>102</sup> Šusta, II, 220, notes; cf. *ibid.*, no. 64a, pp. 229-30, a letter of Borromeo to Simonetta, dated 1 July, 1562; and see Drei, "La Corrispondenza del Card. Ercole Gonzaga," *Arch. storico per le provincie Parmensi*, XVIII, nos. XLII-L, pp. 64-84.

the Spanish bishops on the score of residence. He also softened his own demand for an official statement affirming the continuity of this third period of the council with the first two.<sup>103</sup> Week after week, in wearisome detail, the fathers discussed and debated the articles and canons "de usu sacramenti Eucharistiae" and the doctrine and canons "de communione sub utraque specie et parvulorum."<sup>104</sup>

The envoys of the Emperor Ferdinand and Albrecht V of Bavaria did their best to secure the laity's access to the chalice. In addressing the council on 27 June (1562), Albrecht's envoy, Dr. Augustin Baumgartner (Paumgartner), had three requests—the reform of the clergy, communion under both species, and the admission of married men to holy orders. The emperor's "oratores" presented a written petition to the fathers, requesting communion *sub utraque specie* for those Christians who wanted it (*qui magno quodam zelo calicem sibi dari expetunt*) in Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, Moravia, Silesia, Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Bavaria, Swabia, and "very many parts of Germany."<sup>105</sup>

In dealing with the everlasting question of reform, especially in the matter of benefices, Lodovico Beccadelli, archbishop of Ragusa, declared that caution must be exercised lest one make too rigorous the economic and social requirements for entry into the priesthood. The Turkish conquests, like the Lutheran confiscations (and the religious war then raging in France), had swept away ecclesiastical lands and endowments. In certain areas of Christendom, in Dalmatia for example, there were almost no benefices sufficient to support a priest. Those who would serve the Church were very poor, "but these people are not to be scorned, for they are the remains of a famous nation and well deserving the name of Christian." The more miserable they were, the more Mother Church

should help them. Too harsh an application of restrictions on holding benefices, patrimonies, and pensions could very quickly deprive the Dalmatians of a priesthood "with the great danger of their turning into infidels or heretics, for the Turks and the Greek rite are pressing in upon them from all sides, and they have no other refuge in their misfortunes than recourse to prayers and masses."<sup>106</sup>

As Beccadelli resumed his seat, Girolamo Savorgnan, the bishop of Sebenico (Šibenik), rose to speak in agreement. Savorgnan also warned the fathers against seeking to withhold ordination "nisi ad titulum beneficii." In Sebenico the revenues of so-called benefices were so small

that unless many "beneficed priests" sought a living for themselves by the fine art of fishing [*arte piscatoria*], they could not feed and maintain themselves, and this has come about because all the fertile land round about has been occupied by the Turks. Since in the flock committed to my care there are 15,000 souls, who require many priests to administer the sacraments of the Church, sufficient consideration will have been given to my needs, I daresay, if the faculty is granted me that in ordaining [priests] I may look only to the integrity and training of the candidates, since almost all benefices are utterly without incomes. The resources of laymen are likewise so tenuous that without some extra diligence they are insufficient to provide a livelihood.<sup>107</sup>

Despite such practical problems the council was finally making progress in its efforts to clarify dogma. On 16 July (1562) at the twenty-first session of the council, the fifth under Pius IV, the fathers approved the memorable decree "de communione sub utraque specie et parvulorum." The doctrine was now established that the whole and undivided Christ is administered to the communicant under either the wine or the wafer (*totum et integrum Christum ac verum sacramentum sub qualibet specie sumi*), and that children, *usu rationis carentes*, need not take communion. In four canons attached to the decree anathemas were, as usual,

<sup>103</sup> Šusta, II, no. 70, pp. 261–63, letter of the legates to Borromeo, dated 20 July, 1562, with Šusta's notes.

<sup>104</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 286 ff., pp. 528 ff.

<sup>105</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 314–15, pp. 619–33, esp. pp. 623 ff., 629. According to Baumgartner, the Germans much preferred in their clergy a chaste marriage to a corrupt celibacy, and many German clerics would rather have wives without benefices than benefices without wives (*ibid.*, p. 624).

On the desire for the chalice in Bohemia and Germany (as demanded by Hus, Luther, and Calvin), see the detailed and careful study of G. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne de la communion sous les deux espèces: Étude sur les débuts de la réforme catholique en Allemagne (1548–1621)*, 2 vols., Paris, 1923, I, esp. pp. 30–76, 212 ff. Constant's second volume is an appendix of 139 documents, most of them from the period 1562–1565.

<sup>106</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 344, pp. 694–95, doc. dated 15 July, 1562. Both Beccadelli and Savorgnan, who followed him, were concerned with the second of the nine canons relating to reform which were passed at the fifth session of the council under Pius IV (*ibid.*, VIII, no. 346, p. 701), inc. *Cum non debeat eos, qui divino ministerio adscripti sunt, cum ordinis dedecore mendicare aut sordidum aliquid quaestum exercere*, etc. It was one thing for the mendicant friars to beg, quite another for secular priests or those holding cathedral or collegiate prebends.

<sup>107</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 344B, p. 695, also dated 15 July, 1562.

directed against those who entertained contrary views.<sup>108</sup>

In his address to the council, Andrea Duditić (Dudić) Sbardellati, bishop of Krnin on the Krka in western Croatia, assailed Luther, Melancthon, Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Bucer, Kaspar von Schwenkfeld, "and innumerable others." Sbardellati represented the Hungarian clergy.<sup>109</sup> Condemnation of Protestants—and Turks—was a natural pastime at ecclesiastical assemblies. But what of the request of the emperor and the duke of Bavaria to allow the laity the wine as well as the wafer? The French had no objection to the concession of the chalice to the laity.<sup>110</sup> The Spaniards did object, and so the issue was postponed for consideration at the next session, which was to be held on 17 September.<sup>111</sup> The imperial envoys to the council, Georg Drasković and Sigismund von Thun, were distressed by the delay, and remonstrated (but quite in vain) with the legates, who hardly knew where to turn.<sup>112</sup>

To Ferdinand and Albrecht of Bavaria the political as well as religious implications of the chalice were most important. Indeed, they believed it was by the laity was necessary to maintain Catholicism in Germany whence, with some sort of doctrinal peace established, Ferdinand hoped for assistance against the Turks. Later on in the year 1562 (as we have seen) he was finally able to make peace with the Porte, thanks largely to Busbecq's intelligent and courteous persistence. Meanwhile the fathers at Trent discussed and disputed for long, hard weeks the proposed articles and canons on the sacrifice of the mass. At a general congregation on 22 August (1562) two questions were put before the council for examination—whether and on what terms communion might be administered under both species in Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, and other Hapsburg lands, and whether the

faculty should be accorded to archbishops and bishops to allow curates within their dioceses to hand the chalice to the lay members of their parishes who requested it.<sup>113</sup>

On 27 August Drasković addressed the council on behalf of the *concessio calicis*. Whenever imperial diets met to consider war against the Turks, he said, immediately the question of the chalice arose with the demand that it be made available to all (*ut calicis usus omnibus communis sit*). Thereafter every important matter—above all the defense of Christendom against the Turks—was postponed to some later date. Unless one could bring this discord and these controversies to an end, "which we hope to do when the use of the chalice is permitted," the barbarous Turks would soon occupy Germany as well as the whole of Hungary!<sup>114</sup>

The discussions *de concessione calicis* began on 28 August and went on through endless hours until 6 September (1562).<sup>115</sup> The pro-German Cardinal Lodovico Madruzzo spoke first. Everyone knew what he would say: the council could and must grant the imperial request for lay access to the chalice. The fathers were anxious not to offend the emperor, but many of them, like Antonio Elio, the patriarch of Jerusalem, opposed the concession of the chalice, for they feared some clumsy lout would always be spilling the blood of Christ. Also the lay use of the chalice was contrary to the custom of the Church.<sup>116</sup> If some of the fathers thought that Gianbattista Castagna of Rossano was long-winded when he spoke against the concession (on 28 August),<sup>117</sup> they must have been further discouraged by the length of Dudić Sbardellati's defense of the concession (on 5 September).<sup>118</sup> Sbardellati was forceful, however, and well informed. Diego Laynez's almost interminable performance, when he spoke against the concession (on 6 September), was relieved by the importance of what he had to say.<sup>119</sup> When the question came to

<sup>108</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 346, esp. pp. 698-700; cf. *ibid.*, p. 709, and Beccadelli, *Monumenti*, ed. Morandi, II (1804), nos. 1-11, pp. 352-55; Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne de la communion sous les deux espèces*, I (1923), 254 ff.

<sup>109</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 347, pp. 705, 707. Sbardellati was later made bishop of Pécs (Fünfkirchen) in Hungary, became an apostate, took a wife, was deprived of his see in 1568, and died in 1589 (cf. Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 280).

<sup>110</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 325, pp. 651-52, doc. dated 4 July, 1562.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 346, p. 704.

<sup>112</sup> Šusta, II, no. 70B, p. 261, a letter of the legates to Borromeo. Both Pius IV and Ercole Gonzaga were quite prepared to give the chalice to the laity if the council would approve communion *sub utraque specie*. See Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 260 ff.

<sup>113</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 376, esp. pp. 774-76. By a brief of 26 August, 1562, Pius IV revoked the concession which Paul III had granted the German bishops by a well-known brief dated 5 December, 1545 (Eshes, *ibid.*, IV [1904], no. 340, pp. 443-44), of being represented at the council by proctors, which cut down the German attendance at Trent in the last period of the council (*ibid.*, IX [1924], no. 18, pp. 36-37).

<sup>114</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 384, pp. 786 ff., esp. pp. 789-90; cf. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 279-83.

<sup>115</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 385-417, pp. 791-909.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 385, p. 791.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 386, pp. 793-98.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 410, pp. 866-75.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 414, pp. 879-98. Laynez spoke for three hours (Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 306-7).

a vote, the fathers' differences of opinion were bewildering.<sup>120</sup>

Massarelli tallied the votes, and found that 29 fathers had voted outright for concession of the chalice. Thirty-one were in favor of it, if the pope had no objection (*cum remissione ad sanctissimum dominum nostrum*). Nineteen voted affirmatively for the lay use of the chalice in Hungary and Bohemia, if the pope had no objection. Thirty-eight were quite against it, and there were ten further negative votes, provided the pope also disapproved. Twenty-four would refer the question of the chalice to the pope. Let him decide. Fourteen refrained from committing themselves on 6 September, believing the issue required more investigation or more something. One person remained "dubious" despite all the long-drawn-out discussions. In all, 166 votes had been recorded,<sup>121</sup> and nothing had been decided.

There was apparently only one way to reach a compromise that would be acceptable to a majority of the voting members of the council. It was very simple. One had only to leave the problem of the chalice to the pope, and this the fathers did when they resumed their discussions *de concessione calicis* at the general congregations of 15 and 16 September (1562), declaring *integrum negotium ad sanctissimum dominum nostrum esse referendum*.<sup>122</sup> At the twenty-second session of the council, the sixth under Pius IV, held in the cathedral of Trent on 17 September, the fathers gave final confirmation to their decree designating the pope as arbiter of the chalice.<sup>123</sup>

Later on, after the council had closed, by a series of briefs dated 16 April, 1564, Pius IV did grant the chalice to the laity in Germany, Bohemia, Austria, and Hungary, but only under stringent conditions, which (time was to show) were not to be properly observed. At first the concession of the chalice seemed to be saving Catholicism in certain areas. Having acquired the sacrificial wine, however, most people appeared

rather quickly to lose interest in it. On the whole the German episcopate opposed the concession, and made little effort to obey Pius's briefs. The wine was found to be doing more harm than good, and even such an advocate of the chalice as Georg Drasković, bishop of Fünfkirchen (Pécs), came to regret having worked so hard for the concession which failed to achieve the beneficent results that Ferdinand, Albrecht V of Bavaria, and Zaccaria Delfino, the papal nuncio at Vienna, had expected of it.<sup>124</sup>

Of more significance than the decree assigning the chalice to the pope's judgment were the nine doctrinal articles or "chapters" (*capita*) and the nine condemnatory canons which the fathers now endorsed "on the most holy sacrifice of the mass," for these make the twenty-second session of the council rank in importance with the sixth, at which the decree on justification had been passed (on 13 January, 1547). The decree asserted the validity of the mass as it had always been, and was to be, against the Protestants' denial of its sacrificial nature. The mass is a commemoration of Christ's passion, "uti semper Catholica Ecclesia intellexit et docuit," the Christian's pathway to salvation. It is in effect a representation of the sacrifice of the cross, not a mere commemoration, "and although it constitutes the major instruction of the faithful, nevertheless it has not seemed useful to the fathers that it should be celebrated everywhere in the vernacular."<sup>125</sup>

At the twenty-second session the long-awaited decree on reform was also published.<sup>126</sup> Despite the constant disagreements and sometimes bitter disputes among the fathers, the council was obviously making progress. There had been 187 persons in official attendance at the twenty-second session, including eight ambassadors, 20 archbishops

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 415, pp. 899-906.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 416, pp. 906-7, doc. dated 6 September, 1562.

<sup>122</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, nos. 431-35, pp. 942-53, esp. pp. 952-53, the *acta* of Massarelli, who records the vote as 96 in approval of the decree to refer the chalice to the pope, and 42 opposed; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 424-26, who gives the vote as *affirmativus* 98 and *negativus* 38.

<sup>123</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 439, p. 968, lines 27 ff. Although few of the fathers were pleased with the decree, remission of the problem to the pope was at least a solution of sorts, and they could move on to other matters (Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 313-42).

<sup>124</sup> Cf. in general Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVI, 111-33 and ff., and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 365-81 and ff., and esp. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 495-531. As Laynez had foreseen in his "vote" of 6 September, 1562 (Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 414, pp. 888-89), those who received the chalice tended also to demand other concessions, especially the right of marriage for the priesthood (Constant, *op. cit.*, I, 546-611). Pius V Ghislieri tried unsuccessfully to revoke the grant of the chalice in Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola (*ibid.*, I, 682 ff.), but he encouraged the German bishops in their opposition to ultracism, which was eventually suppressed in Bavaria (in 1571), in Austria (1584), in Hungary (1604), and in Bohemia (1621), on which see Constant, I, esp. pp. 706 ff.

<sup>125</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 437, pp. 959-62, and see Erwin Iserloh, "Das tridentinische Messopferdekret in seinen Beziehungen zu der Kontroverstheologie der Zeit," in *Il Concilio di Trento e la riforma tridentina*, 2 vols., Rome, 1965, II, 401-39.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 437, pp. 965-68.

ops, and 142 bishops,<sup>127</sup> not counting the host of theologians and others. Very likely not one of them suspected that a full ten months would elapse (from 17 September, 1562, until 15 July, 1563) before it would be possible to hold the next, the twenty-third, session of the council.

The last decree of the twenty-second session of the council had been to set the date for the next session (on 12 November, 1562, but one postponement after another would prove necessary), and also to declare the sacraments of holy orders and matrimony as the next topics on the conciliar agenda.<sup>128</sup> The legates started the ball rolling on 18 September, when they presented the theologians with seven heretical assertions "de sacramento ordinis," and on the twenty-third Salmerón began the discussions with the observation that Martin Luther had denied "sacerdotium esse sacramentum." Order was, however, a sacrament of the new dispensation instituted by Christ, Salmerón declared, and it conferred grace.

It was the beginning of weeks of discussions which mounted into fiery disputes.<sup>129</sup> We shall not try to follow them. On 13 October, however, the doctrinal decree on holy orders, together with seven condemnatory canons, was presented to the fathers for examination. From 13 to 20 October the texts were considered in eleven general congregations. One hundred and thirty fathers gave expression to their views *de doctrina et canonibus de sacramento ordinis*. On the twentieth there was only one speaker, Laynez, and as always he spoke with telling effect.<sup>130</sup>

Pouring oil on troubled waters, Gonzaga had promised the council on 6 June (1562), as we have noted, that when the sacrament of holy orders appeared on the agenda, the fathers might also seek to determine whether the obligation of bishops to reside in their dioceses was the consequence of divine or clerical law. Inevitably the subject of the episcopate came to the fore. In the discussions which now began on 13 October the indomitable Pedro Guerrero, archbishop of Granada, altered somewhat the tenor of the previous debates by the categorical assertion of the divine origin of the episcopate.<sup>131</sup>

In his address to the general congregation of 20 October Laynez dealt with the disputed seventh canon *de sacramento ordinis*, i.e., with the nature of episcopal authority. Authority or power (*potestas*) is of two sorts, he said, civil and ecclesiastical. Ecclesiastical authority is also of two sorts, one of "order" and the other of jurisdiction. Both are employed for man's sanctification, but the power of order is bestowed in consecration by the sacraments. The power of jurisdiction is quite otherwise; it is granted by commission, and may be held by a "mere layman" in an ecclesiastical context. The power of "order" bishops receive from God, whether through the pope or another bishop, but that of jurisdiction they receive from the pope.<sup>132</sup> Laynez's Latinity makes up in clarity what it lacks in grace.

Borroмео is clearly following Laynez in his letter to the legates of 29 October (1562) concerning the Tridentine controversy pro and con the proposition "institutionem episcopatus esse iuris divini." He wrote in answer to their reports to Rome of 19 and 22 October, reminding them, "although I know it to be unnecessary," that the divine ordination of bishops was all well and good "as far as order is concerned," but as far as jurisdiction was concerned, this all bishops receive from the pope, *i vescovi l'hanno dal summo pontifice*.<sup>133</sup> Laynez was general of the Jesuits, a papal theologian, and hardly in agreement with most of the Spanish bishops at Trent.

The curialists were rendered uneasy by the arrival in Trent, on 13 November (1562), of Charles de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine, accompanied by a phalanx of French bishops and doctors of the Sorbonne.<sup>134</sup> On the following day, however,

ment of holy orders, which condemned anyone who said "episcopus non esse presbyteris superiores vel non habere ius ordinandi vel, si habent, id esse illis commune cum presbyteris . . ." (Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 20, pp. 40-41). Guerrero insisted that this was not good enough: "Petivi etiam poni in doctrina et feri canonem quod episcopi sunt constituti iure divino et Christo, et eodem iure divino esse superiores presbyteris" (*ibid.*, IX, no. 23, pp. 48-49, and *cf.* no. 22, p. 44, line 16, and esp. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 443).

<sup>127</sup> Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, 94-101, esp. pp. 95-96. It might be noted that when Pastor's *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), first went to the press, the actual text of Laynez's conciliar address of 20 October, 1562, had not yet been published (*cf.* *ibid.*, p. 231, note 6). It was well known, however, to Palavicini (*cf.* Hartmann Grisar, ed., *Jacobi Laynez. . . disputationes Tridentinae*, 2 vols., Innsbruck, 1886, I, 371-82).

<sup>128</sup> *Susta*, III (1911), no. 14, pp. 49-50. The debate on the sacrament of holy orders was resumed on 3 November, and lasted for weeks (Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 25, 27-45, 48 ff., pp. 105 ff.).

<sup>129</sup> *cf.* above, p. 778b.

<sup>127</sup> Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, III-1, 53.

<sup>128</sup> Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, VIII, no. 437, p. 970.

<sup>129</sup> Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, IX (1924), nos. 2-3, pp. 5 ff.

<sup>130</sup> Ehese, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 20-23, pp. 38-101; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, III-1, 442-53.

<sup>131</sup> In criticism of the seventh canon concerning the sacra-

Guise called on Ercole Gonzaga at the Palazzo Thun, where the other legates had gathered. In the presence of the French envoys to the council he assured the legates he would abstain from all activities and arguments that might be directed against the pope's authority.<sup>155</sup> On 19 November Arnaud (Raynaud) du Ferrier, president of the Parlement de Paris, de Lansac's colleague as an envoy to the council, met with the legates to explain that Guise was confined at home [in the Palazzo a Prato, near the church of the S. Trinità] because of illness. He was anxious, however, that time should not be wasted in useless disputations, but that the fathers should get on to the reforms all Europe was waiting for, the learned and the uneducated alike, nobles and commoners, ecclesiastics and laymen.

The legates and the Italians remained suspicious of Guise despite his fine words, and their suspicion was hardly lessened when on the twentieth Pierre Danès, bishop of Lavaur (in southern France), launched a sharp attack on papal claims to primacy. Danès said that bishops were installed in their sees "by divine law" (*a iure divino*), and that in their churches they were the equals of the pope in his. Like Francisco Blanco, bishop of Orense (in northwestern Spain), in a statement (*votum*) of 16 October, Danès denied that the bishop of Rome was or ever had been the universal pastor of the Church. Gregory the Great, for example, had refused to be called *universalis papa* "lest it detract from [other] universal bishops." Everyone wondered at Danès's statement, says Paleotti, for up to this point no one had spoken so bitterly, and one suspected that he had been encouraged by Guise. Later on, however, still according to Paleotti, it was "understood" that Guise had known nothing about Danès's intention, and that he heartily disapproved of his attack on the Holy See.<sup>156</sup>

Having recovered from his illness, Charles de Guise appeared at a general congregation for the first time on 23 November, when a letter of Charles IX (dated 7 October, 1562) was read to the fathers, and Guise himself gave a brief, polished address replete with classical and biblical reminiscences. He ended his discourse with a sweeping declaration of obedience to Pius IV to whom, after God, he and his French colleagues at

the council wanted forever to be subject. It was all very reassuring, and Gonzaga made a fitting reply to Guise.<sup>157</sup> For some time Guise did his best to reconcile the opposing points of view concerning the obligation of residence and the nature of episcopal authority. It seemed impossible, however, to put an end to the contest.

An outburst of anger followed the assertion of Melchor Álvarez de Vozmediano, bishop of Guadix (in southern Spain), in a general congregation (on 1 December) that when one had been elected bishop according to the canons of the early Church, he was a true bishop, and the pope had had nothing to do with his elevation. The person elected would then be consecrated by the metropolitan, *nulla facta mentione summi pontificis*. Álvarez de Vozmediano added, moreover, that even now the archbishop of Salzburg ordained, confirmed, and consecrated his four suffragan bishops quite without leave of the pope, *absque ulla licentia summi pontificis*. Simonetta protested "that what the archbishop of Salzburg does, he does by apostolic authority." Simonetta's remonstrance was courteous, but his fellow countrymen yielded to violent indignation. Quite a number of Italians, in fact *multi ex patribus*, began to stamp their feet and shout "Anathema, throw him out, don't listen, heresy!" Other insults were added to the injury being done him, but Vozmediano was not to be deterred.

The legates had to let him go on "lest freedom of speech should appear to be hampered." And Vozmediano did go on. In criticism of the seventh canon on holy orders (*episcopos . . . esse presbyteris superiores*) he said that of course bishops were superior to priests, but it must be made clear *quo iure* they were superior: the episcopate was established by divine law, and that was the reason. He cited as authorities Leo the Great (440-461), Basil of Caesarea, Cyprian, and S. Thomas.

Among the bishops who had abused Vozmediano, and tried to shout him down, were Bartolomeo Sirigo of Castellanea, Egidio Falcetta of Venetian Caorle, Girolamo Maccabeo of Castro (Acquapendente), Giannantonio Facchinetti of Nicastro, and Giovanni Trevisan, the patriarch of

<sup>155</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 468.

<sup>156</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 471-72: "Omnes mirati sunt hoc votum [Danesii], quia adhuc nemo adeo acriter loquutus est. . . ." Blanco's statement or *votum* may be found, *ibid.*, III-1, 445-46.

<sup>157</sup> Elshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 46, pp. 161-65, and cf. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 473. On the uneasiness of Pius IV and Borromeo as they contemplated the possible results of Guise's coming to Trent with a sizable French contingent, note Vargas's letter to Philip II, dated at Rome on 8 October, 1562, in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 133, pp. 449-50, and Borromeo's letter to Gonzaga dated 6 November, in Susa, III, no. 19a, pp. 62-63.



Venice. When they had yelled "Anathema!" at Vozmediano, Pedro Guerrero of Granada had turned on them with the answer "Anathema vos estis!"<sup>138</sup> Charles de Guise, who was already beginning to lose patience with the Italian curialists, told the legates that Vozmediano's statement to the general congregation had not merited such outrageous treatment.

Guise was extremely irritated that the curialist bishops should have labeled with such passion "as heresy what is not heresy." On 2 December, the day after the turmoil, the legates reported to Rome that Guise was so offended by the

inconsideration and insolence of some of our people that he has been compelled to say if this had happened to one of his French [bishops], he would have told the congregation, "I appeal to a freer council," and this very morning without any further delay he would have gone with all his prelates. . . .

The legates wrote Borromeo that Guise had intended to say a "hundred words" to the congregation of 2 December on this whole business, but fortunately Sebastiano Gualterio, the bishop of Viterbo, had been able to dissuade him, for it would only have made matters worse.<sup>139</sup>

References to the Turks appear less frequently in the records of the final period of the council than was the case during the earlier periods. At a general congregation on 15 December (1562), however, Dionisio de' Zanettini, "il Grechetto," did inveigh "adversus Turcas et piratas" before getting around to the question of residence.<sup>140</sup> At this time, as we shall see, the pirates were proving

a greater harassment than the Turks. During the period in which the Council of Trent was assembling, and holding its various meetings (1561-1563), about three dozen Turkish tracts were printed at Frankfurt am Main, Lyon, Nuremberg, Venice, Paris, Wittenberg, and elsewhere. These tracts covered a wide range of subjects—the early history of the Ottoman Empire, the fall of Constantinople, the Turkish capture of Negropente, the career of Scanderbeg, the Turkish occupation of Otranto (in 1480-1481), the Christian seizure and loss of Jerba, and finally the imperial-Turkish peace of 27 November, 1562. If one could read, he could learn something about the Turks, for these works were written in Latin, German, Italian, Spanish, French, English, and Czech.<sup>141</sup>

Since the early days of printing the Turks had been a favorite subject. Works concerning them had a wide circulation, and even today they are among the commoner items of note in rare-book collections. The chief readers of serious books were still, in the Tridentine era, to be found among the clergy, in the universities, monasteries, and convents, among theologians, civil and canon lawyers, physicians, humanists, and bankers,<sup>142</sup> i.e., the classes most conspicuous at the councils. Now and then a number of Tridentine fathers must have turned to *Turcica* as a change from their patristic *Florilegia*. During the years 1562-1563 one could read about the Turks with greater peace of mind, for they seemed singularly inactive.

Exciting news, nevertheless, did reach Trent from the world outside. During the early afternoon of 28 December a courier brought word of Duke François de Guise's victory over the Huguenots at Dreux (on 19 December) and of the capture of Prince Louis I de Condé. Paleotti notes the incredible joy which filled all hearts. The legates made their way immediately to the cathedral of S. Vigilio, along with all the prelates. In the cathedral the *Te Deum laudamus* was sung "magna omnium cum iubilatione" in thanksgiving for this defeat of Protestantism.<sup>143</sup> By this time the members of the council had left the sacrament of holy

<sup>138</sup> On the uproar of 1 December (1562), see esp. Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 56, pp. 194-95, with notes; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 483-84, with notes; Pedro González de Mendoza, *Lo Sucedido en el Concilio de Trento*, *ibid.*, II, 664-65; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 142, pp. 474-75, an important letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated at Rome on 28 December, 1562; C. Gutiérrez, *Españoles en Trento*, Valladolid, 1951, pp. 807-9, esp. the notes. With reference to the relations of the episcopacy to the priesthood, as debated by the divines at Trent in 1562-1563, see Gerhard Fahrnerberger, *Bischofsamt und Priestertum in den Diskussionen des Konzils von Trient*, Vienna, 1970, pp. 87 ff. (Wiener Beiträge zur Theologie, vol. XXX).

Sometimes history does repeat itself. Note the attack (for much the same reasons as that upon Vozmediano) upon the outspoken Bishop Joseph Strossmayer of Djakovo in Bosnia at the First Vatican Council on 22 March, 1870 (J. J. Ignaz von Döllinger, *Letters from Rome on the Council by Quirinus*, London, Oxford, and Cambridge, 1870, repr. 2 vols., New York, 1973, I, 386-89, 426-27, and II, 540, 546). We shall return to these letters.

<sup>139</sup> Šusta, III, 95, and cf. *ibid.*, p. 96.

<sup>140</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 508.

<sup>141</sup> Carl Göllner, *Turcica*, II: *Die europäischen Türken drucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts*, Bucharest and Baden-Baden, 1968, nos. 1016-50, pp. 82-101.

<sup>142</sup> On readers and reading to the mid-century, note Rudolf Hirsch, *Printing, Selling and Reading (1450-1550)*, Wiesbaden, 1967, esp. pp. 125 ff.

<sup>143</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 522, with note 7, and cf. J. W. Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France (1509)*, pp. 172-81. François de Guise was assassinated shortly after his victory at Dreux.

orders, and were struggling with the proposed decree on residence.

As the fathers assembled on one cold and windy day after another, the Spanish extolled the divine origin of the episcopate, and the French embraced conciliarism.<sup>144</sup> It was as Simonetta had feared. The spirit of Constance and Basel was being renewed at Trent, especially after the advent of the French, who gave frequent expression to their Gallicanism. The Church was a constitutional monarchy; the power of the pope was subordinate to that of the council. The date for the twenty-third session had been postponed four times, and on 3 February (1563) it was postponed for the fifth time, until 22 April.<sup>145</sup> Since the voting members of the council found agreement impossible on holy orders as well as on residence, on Thursday, 4 February, they turned to the examination of eight articles on matrimony.<sup>146</sup> Poor Gonzaga and Seripando must have wondered whether it would ever end. Very shortly, however, it would end for both of them.

If the council was making slow progress in defining doctrine, it was doing no better in effecting reform. In the spring of 1562 the Emperor Ferdinand had sent to Trent proposals for a sweeping reform of the Church in head and members. Ferdinand's *libellus reformationis* was based upon earlier proposals made by his brother Charles V. It begins with the hope that the supreme pontiff might benignly put up with his own reform and with that of the Curia. The number of cardinals should be reduced to twenty-four or twenty-six. There must be no more "scandalous dispensations," and all exemptions granted *contra iura communia* should be revoked. One must put an end

to the plurality of benefices, require bishops to reside in their dioceses (and not discharge their duties through vicars), do away with all simoniacal activities, and so on and on.<sup>147</sup>

At the beginning of January (1563) the French ambassadors in Trent presented another *libellus reformationis* to the council. It contained thirty-four articles.<sup>148</sup> When the general congregation met on 11 February, Massarelli read a Latin translation of a letter dated 18 January from Charles IX to the council. The letter began with the official announcement of the duke of Guise's victory over the Huguenots at Dreux, and closed with a plea for reform. The French ambassador Arnaud du Ferrier added another plea for the fathers to turn effectively to reform, as had been done at Constance and at Basel. Obviously little had been accomplished at Ferrara-Florence, the Lateran, and the earlier Tridentine sessions, as whole kingdoms and nations had defected from the Roman Church.<sup>149</sup>

The insistence upon reform brought the French and the imperialists more closely together. As we have already noted, by a brief of 26 August (1562) Pius IV had revoked a concession by which Paul III had allowed German bishops to be represented at Trent by proctors.<sup>150</sup> This had greatly reduced the German presence at the council, but the emperor's influence and prestige were enormous. Moreover, after the election of Ferdinand's son Maximilian as king of the Romans (on 24 November, 1562),<sup>151</sup> the imperial court was probably inclined to deal somewhat less gingerly with the pope whose recognition, however, of Maximilian's status was still desired.

On 12 February (1563) Charles de Guise left Trent for Innsbruck, where Ferdinand had taken up residence to consult with theologians and to

<sup>144</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 487, 492-94, 505-6, 543-44; Ehes, *ibid.*, IX, nos. 58, 64, 74, pp. 200-1, 212-13, 246-47; and esp. Vargas's letter to Philip II of 28 December (1562), in Dellinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 142, p. 475. Speaking of the respect and fear in which the pope and legates held the French, Vargas adds, "y así uno dellos maestro que fué del dicho Cardenal [Guise] salió en publica congregación con su opinión parisiense, que les es como artículo de fe, de la superioridad del Concilio al Papa, diciendo que el Papa tenía poder limitado y el sínodo amplísimo. . . ." Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 235.

<sup>145</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 119, pp. 375-79. The last date set for the twenty-third session had been 4 February, 1563, but as Gonzaga wearily told the contentious fathers on the third, "Pervenimus ad diem sessionis; sed non pervenimus ad concordiam, quae sessionem antecedere debebat" (*ibid.*, p. 375, lines 44-45). Cf. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 562.

<sup>146</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 120 ff., pp. 380 ff., and nos. 126 ff., pp. 395 ff., and cf. Egidio Ferasin, *Matrimonio e celibato al Concilio di Trento*, Rome, 1970, pp. 56 ff.

<sup>147</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1562, nos. 58-59; Gottfried Eder, *Die Reformvorschlage Kaiser Ferdinands I. auf dem Konzil von Trent*, I, Munster i. W., 1911, esp. pp. 153 ff., 239 ff.; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 286-90, and *Gesch. d. Papste*, VII (repr. 1957), 220-23.

<sup>148</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1562, nos. 86-88, on which cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 308, and *Gesch. d. Papste*, VII (repr. 1957), 236-37; Jedin, *Gesch. d. Konzils vom Trent*, IV-1 (1975), 157-59, 200 ff., 252 ff.; and note Susta, III, no. 44, pp. 142 ff. On the numerous complaints and grievances of the French, see V. Schweitzer and H. Jedin, eds., *Concilium Tridentinum*, XIII (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1938, repr. 1967), nos. 80-81, pp. 501-25.

<sup>149</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 125, pp. 389-92.

<sup>150</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 18, pp. 36-37.

<sup>151</sup> On 8 December, 1562, a solemn high mass in the cathedral at Trent commemorated Maximilian's election (Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 67, p. 219).

keep a closer watch on Trent. Guise reached Innsbruck on the sixteenth, and sought the emperor's assistance against the papal domination of the council, where only the legates could put items on the agenda, and where the Italian puppet-bishops constituted a majority, against which the French and Spanish were making little progress. More bishops were needed, Guise declared, from Spain, France, and Germany. The emperor should himself attend the next session of the council. His mission accomplished, Guise returned to Trent on 28 February.<sup>152</sup> Guise had got along very well with Ferdinand, as Paleotti says, "et magna inter eos coniunctione inita."<sup>153</sup>

During the night of 2 March (1563) Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga, legate and first president of the third period of the council, died at Trent. As usual the sources differ in detail. Firmanus says that he died at 10:00 P.M. (*hora 3*) after a long illness. According to Paleotti, death came at about 11:00 P.M. (*hora fere 4 noctis*), and it "was altogether unexpected, since he had been suffering from his illness for only seven days." Massarelli's *acta* set Gonzaga's departure at about midnight (*hora circiter 5*). Upon one thing, however, there was general agreement: everyone mourned his death, in Paleotti's words, "ob summam eius probitatem, humanitatem et virtutem." His presidency had brought honor to the council; his word had counted for much with the princes.<sup>154</sup>

Two weeks later, on Wednesday, 17 March, Girolamo Seripando, cardinal-priest of S. Susanna and second president of the council, died between 6:00 and 7:00 P.M. He had become ill on Monday, the eighth, and received extreme unction the afternoon before his death, which came as a shock to the assembly at Trent. It was not merely, says Paleotti, that Seripando was a man of singular

learning, good judgment, and piety, "especially necessary in these times," but that the loss of the two first presidents of the council within fifteen days seemed sure signs of divine anger. Many persons were being led to predict "failure in our affairs."<sup>155</sup>

Conciliar affairs had not gone well. On 3 March (1563) the Emperor Ferdinand had sent two letters to Pius IV. In the first letter, copies of which went to a number of persons at Trent, Ferdinand complained that for several months there had been no session of the council to deal with the pressing problems of Christendom. Like other princes he had hoped the Catholic faith might flourish again amid the controversies in which the Protestants were engaging among themselves. But, no, the fathers and doctors of the council were proving no less contentious, causing injury to the Church and affording her enemies gales of laughter. There were also rumors afloat that his Holiness "was considering the dissolution or at least the suspension of the council," which would be a grave mistake, "for in our opinion it would have been better never to have begun the council than to leave it unfinished and suspended." An unfinished council would be a scandal, and would redound to Pius's dishonor.

There would be further defections from the faith, for the dissolution or suspension of the council would be interpreted as an effort to avoid that reform "which we have been seeking and demanding for so many years, and which we adjudge to be so essential that, without it, it would seem futile to hope for a better situation for the Church." There was a danger of national councils. The conciliar fathers must be given freedom to act, *ipsique Concilio salva et integra sit antiqua et solita sua libertas*. They must be allowed to make proposals for the council to consider, and so should the envoys of the princes. The right of proposal should not be the prerogative only of the papal legates. Popes and emperors had attended councils in the past. Ferdinand would come to Trent himself, *volente Deo*, and he urged Pius to do so also. In Trent Pius could do away with difficulties as they arose, and help restore to the Church the peace, unity, and concord of old.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>152</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 565; González de Mendoza, *ibid.*, II, 671; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 571, 585 and note 13; cf. Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1563, nos. 28 ff.; Susta, III, no. 68, pp. 250-53, with refs.; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 237.

<sup>153</sup> Paleotti, *op. cit.*, p. 585, lines 25-27.

<sup>154</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 565; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 587, with note 2; Eshes, *ibid.*, IX, no. 145, p. 425, *acta* of Massarelli, with note 3; Susta, III, nos. 68a-69, pp. 253-54, 257-60, with refs., letters of Seripando to Borromeo, dated 1 and 3 March, 1563; von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXIII (1895-96), IX, Abh., pp. 127-31, three letters of Seripando, Hosius, and Simonetta to Borromeo, all dated 3 March (1563): They say that Gonzaga was feverish for eight days, and that he died "this night at the fourth hour," i.e., at 11:00 P.M. on 2 March, the first letter of the three cardinals (*ibid.*, pp. 127-28) being written in the early morning hours of the third.

<sup>155</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 565-66; Paleotti, *ibid.*, III-1, 595; Eshes, *ibid.*, IX, no. 157, pp. 461-63; Jedin, *Cardinal Seripando* (1947), pp. 689-703, and *Girolamo Seripando* (1937), II, 225-38.

<sup>156</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 34; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 239-40; Jedin, *Koncil von Trient*, IV-1, 261-63, 358; and cf. the notice in Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3 (1903), 234-35.

Ferdinand's second letter of 3 March was slightly more relaxed in tone and much more specific about the required reforms. We must take thought, he wrote, your Holiness and I (*sumus enim coaetanei ferme*), of the approaching end of our lives, and seek to reach the desired and blessed goal of this transitory existence, *id est aeterna felicitas*. Sinning shepherds and lay rulers of the Christian flock, *peccantes pastores et rectores populi*, not only bring evil upon themselves, but they put the salvation of many thousands of souls in jeopardy, "for whom they must also answer, later on, in God's own court of justice." The Christian religion was in peril. Pius IV had convoked the Council at Trent. Europe, terribly wounded, torn apart, was seeking a wholesome, a salutary remedy, which must be found "ut populus Christianus expectatione sua non frustretur." The council must achieve its purpose. The pestilential heresies of our time have arisen because of our own sins.

There was widespread public criticism and complaint, said Ferdinand, because of the failure to bring about the absolutely necessary reform of the Church:

Here we do not touch upon the person of your Holiness, in whom we find no lack of piety, nor reverence, nor purity of life, nor of anything else that may be required of the august and upright pastor, for the things we are about to say of the supreme pontiff have nothing to do with the person of your Holiness, since it is by divine providence that your Holiness has come to possess the pontificate, and rules it with great credit to himself.

By the time Pius IV has gone from this life into the celestial kingdom, however, he must have seen to it

that in the future, owing to his devotion, we shall in truth have holy pontiffs, cardinals, bishops, priests, and pilots of the soul, so that by word and by example they may recall the people committed to their care to the same zeal for piety in order that we may all finally serve God in justice and in truth.

First of all, the papal electoral process must be so reformed that no unworthy person could aspire to the tiara. It was essential that the papal electors, i.e., the cardinals, should be persons of such character that they would want and be able to choose a pontiff, "to whom the Church of Christ can be rightly and safely entrusted." Unfortunately, however, there were grave complaints that cardinals were being created who were too young to have judgment, too ignorant and illiterate to meet their responsibilities. It was no wonder that they pursued their own self-interest and desires in electing

a pontiff, "and shackle the pious votes of good and learned men, whence inevitably many misfortunes come about thereafter in the Church."<sup>157</sup>

Great care must also be taken in a matter of almost no less importance, the election of archbishops and bishops. Whether chosen by cathedral chapters, papal collation, or otherwise, they should be worthy of the episcopal dignity. The plurality of benefices "et alii multi abusus" must be done away with. Having dealt with the necessity to reform the conclave and the ecclesiastical orders, Ferdinand went on to the council, where the fathers simply had no *decernendi facultas*, for they could make no motions in the conciliar congregations, nor could the envoys of the princes. The papal legates passed on everything, and suppressed any proposal they did not wish to come before the council. The pope and the cardinals were themselves being consulted almost daily and interfering constantly.

A sort of schism had arisen, "just as though there were two councils, of which one is being celebrated at Rome, the other at Trent!" It was highly inappropriate that the business of the council, "which ought to represent the Church Universal," should be submitted for review to certain cardinals in Rome, whose own self-interest made them suspect when it came to reforming the conclave, passing the conciliar decree of episcopal residence, and allowing freedom to the fathers in the conduct of conciliar affairs. Ferdinand thought that Pius IV would be better advised to follow the guidance of the two hundred or so fathers of the council than of some fifteen cardinals in the critical issues of reform and residence which were being

<sup>157</sup> On 6 January, 1563, Pius IV had named Federico Gonzaga, a nephew of the Cardinal Ercole (Susta, III, no. 47, pp. 157-59; Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 66, pp. 176, 178-79), and the fourteen-year-old Ferdinando de' Medici, the son of Cosimo I, as cardinals (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 40). According to the Acta Consistorialia (*ibid.*, III, 40, note 3), "1565 Febr. 21 hora XIII Mantuae obiit Federicus Gonzaga, presbyter cardinalis, Mantuanus, aetatis XXX annorum. . . ."

If Federico was thirty years old when he died in February, 1565, he was twenty-eight at the time of his nomination as cardinal, not eighteen, as stated by Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 240, note 1. Incidentally, with regard to the date of Federico Gonzaga's birth, his father Duke Federico died on 28 June, 1540.

As Borromeo wrote Zaccaria Delfino, nuncio at the imperial court, "Quanto a la promotione de li dui cardinali, quel di Mantua è in età legitima, essendo già prete di messa. . ." (*Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 66, p. 176, letter dated 6 February, 1563). Ferdinand's reference to young, ignorant, and illiterate cardinals (*ibid.*, II-3, no. 79, p. 227) did apply to Ferdinando de' Medici, but not (as Pastor assumes) also to Federico.

dealt with at Trent.<sup>158</sup> The emperor went on, but we cannot. More than enough has been recounted to make clear the extent of the imperial discontent with the pope's dominance over the council and the cardinals' interference.

The news of Ercole Gonzaga's death reached Rome on Saturday, 6 March (1563). The next morning without consulting the cardinals in consistory the pope appointed Giovanni Morone to replace Gonzaga and Bernardo Navagero to replace Altemps,<sup>159</sup> who (as we know) had been of no use to the council. Ferdinand's two letters of 3 March were delivered in Rome by a courier at midday on the eighth. The imperial ambassador Prospero d' Arco took them immediately to the pope, who read and reread the shorter (first) letter in d' Arco's presence, and then remarked that he perceived the cardinal of Lorraine's influence in the letter. He was deeply disturbed, however, and embarked on a long defense of his papacy, from the bull he had had prepared to effect a reform in the conclave to the advisability of the nominations he had made to the Sacred College.

Pius was also distressed, he told d' Arco, by the dissension among the fathers over the question of residence. He had wanted Ercole Gonzaga to go on an official visit to the imperial court to reassure the emperor concerning the papal desire for reform, of which Pius said he had given ample evidence in Rome, and to provide a full account of the proceedings in Trent. Gonzaga had declined to undertake the mission—all this d' Arco outlined

in a letter to Ferdinand of 10 March—but now the pope had made Giovanni Morone first president of the council, "sapendo ch' era confidente di vostra Maestà."<sup>160</sup>

Answers were prepared at the Curia to Ferdinand's two letters of 3 March, setting forth in Pius's name the latter's agreement that the affairs of the council had indeed lagged in ceaseless altercation. The first of the two papal letters—they were both dated 18 March—denied that Pius had ever thought of dissolving or suspending the council. *Absit a nobis, charissime fili, ut quidquam huiusmodi cogitemus!* (He had, of course, thought of it often, and discussed it with Borromeo and others.) As for reform, surely Ferdinand had been told of what Pius's care and diligence had effected at the Curia; as for going to Trent, it was far too small a town to accommodate the cardinals, guards, and retinue that would have to accompany the pope. And what would be the result if Ferdinand came also "cum imperatorio suo comitatu"? Trent was situated in the midst of heretics. Would the pope and the Curia be safe? Would the emperor be safe?

Do we not remember what happened to your brother, the Emperor Charles, of glorious memory? In what peril the council often was at that time! Added to this is the fact that it is considered certain that next summer a huge Turkish fleet will come our way, and pirates along with the fleet, and it will make the sea unsafe with all manner of plunderers.<sup>161</sup>

Having dealt in general with matters relating to the council, Pius turned in his second letter to a more specific consideration of the "res ad reformationem spectantes." He thanked Ferdinand for the sincerity of his admonitions. Yes, Pius said, he was well aware of the brevity and the fragility of human life and of his own shortcomings. He knew that when he appeared before the divine tribunal, nothing would help him secure forgiveness of his sins so much as having effected the reformation of Christendom. He then went on to his bull providing for a reform in the papal elec-

<sup>158</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. ecd.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 37; Steinherz, *Nuntiaturreichte*, II-3, no. 79, pp. 223-34, *datum in oppido nostro Innsprug [Innsbruck] die tertia mensis Martii anno Domini 1563*.

<sup>159</sup> Susta, III, no. 71, pp. 267-68, 270; Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 157, by mod. stamped enumeration: "Nonis Martii, die vero septima Martii, habita est ad Divi Petri post missam congregatio generalis, et in ea decreti sunt legati ad Concilium Tridentinum Moronus et Navagerius cardinales suffecti in locum Cardinalis Mantuani nuper vita functi." On 17 March (*sexto decimo Kal. Aprilis*) Morone and Navagero received the legatine cross (*ibid.*, fol. 157). Cf. von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXIII (1895-96), IX, Abh., pp. 52-53; Steinherz, *Nuntiaturreichte*, II-3, no. 86, p. 251; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 146, p. 487, a letter of Vargas to Philip II, dated at Rome on 7 March, 1563, which contains the notable comment:

"Hanse maravillado muchos desta elección, y señaladamente de la de Morón por las cosas pasadas, y no estar aun enjuta la tinta de su prisión, y no sé que mas me diga, y haber tan poca amistad entre el y Borromeos."

Mark Sittich d' Altemps (Hohenems) had left Trent on 22 October, 1562, for Constance, of which he was long to be bishop (1561-1589). He was supposed to return to Trent in three months (Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 453), but he did not do so.

<sup>160</sup> Von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils* (1872, repr. 1968), no. CCXXXVIII, pp. 452-55, with von Sichel's notes. Two days before Ferdinand's letters were delivered in Rome, the pope had addressed an appeal to the emperor for assistance against the detractors of the Holy See at Trent, urging him to instruct his envoys "ut cum Sedis Apostolicae legatis consentiant" (Raynaldus, *Ann. ecd.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 67; also in Steinherz, *Nuntiaturreichte*, II-3, no. 81, pp. 237-38, a brief dated 6 March, 1563). Ferdinand answered Pius's appeal on 23 March (von Sichel, *op. cit.*, no. CCXLI, pp. 468-70). Cf. Sägmüller, *Die Papstwahlbulden und das staatliche Recht der Exklusiv* (1892), pp. 142-45.

<sup>161</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. ecd.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 35.

toral process and to the creation of new cardinals. Cardinal Morone would soon leave for the council. He would come to see the emperor, and give him further information.

Every effort would be made to ensure that only proper persons were elected or appointed to bishoprics. Whether episcopal residence was finally declared to be an obligation of divine or human law, Pius would see to it that bishops did live in their dioceses. There would be no exemptions, not even for cardinals. Pius had always wanted full freedom in the council, but surely it was no error for the legates or the conciliar fathers to consult the Apostolic See, *Ecclesiae caput et veritatis magistra*. Pius had explained in his first letter why his going to Trent was impracticable. If Ferdinand would come to Bologna, however, Pius would also go there, unless illness prevented him, in order to invest the emperor-elect with the imperial insignia. Bologna was an appropriate place for the ceremony. It had been the site of his brother Charles V's coronation.<sup>162</sup>

At the Curia one believed that in a period of contention it was better to make verbal than written commitments. The times were always changing; princes were unpredictable; and the council was a problem. The two papal letters of 18 March were not sent; Morone could use them for his own guidance in dealing with the emperor. The less put on paper, the better. On 19 March both the pope and Morone, in separate letters, notified the emperor of the latter's appointment as legate and of his imminent departure for Trent and Innsbruck. Ferdinand replied to both letters on the twenty-eighth. He was pleased by his friend Morone's appointment, as he wrote him, "Paternitatem vestram avide expectabimus."<sup>163</sup>

Morone left Rome on 23 March (1563), moving northward through the little town of Rignano to Forlì and Bologna. He set out from Bologna on 5 April, and using the waterways, he reached

Trent on 10 April at about 6:00 P.M. Hosius and Simonetta went out to meet him, together with all the envoys to the council as well as a number of conciliar fathers. Firmanus describes the ceremony of his reception and the attire of the legates.<sup>164</sup> At a general congregation on 13 April the conciliar secretary Angelo Massarelli read *dara voce* the papal brief (dated 20 March) whereby Morone had been designated legate and first president of the council. Thereafter Morone addressed the congregation briefly on the dire state of Christian society with its religious upheavals, endless wars, and the failure of ecclesiastical discipline.

Not the least of their troubles, Morone acknowledged, had been the scourge of Turkish raids and attacks over a period of years. The Turkish peril still hung over them, for the sultan's power was increased by the Christians' own dissension. To deal with these problems Pius IV had summoned the council to Trent. Morone had tried to avoid the legatine appointment the pope had thrust upon him, fearing his utter inadequacy. The necessity of obedience had overcome his anxiety, however, and here he was in Trent. Presently he would set out for the imperial court, but *Deo dante* he would soon return to the council. The pope had no desire but to free the faith of every tinge of heresy and to effect a true reform in the Church. Morone had no purpose but to carry out the pope's instructions.

Nevertheless, it would be the fathers' own prudence and learning which would bring the council to the desired conclusion. Morone appealed to them to remove discord from their midst and have done with useless questions, which contributed "nothing to the building of the faith," but merely alienated those who heard the senseless debates. Polemic was a waste of time. By working together, working hard and humbly, the fathers would deliver the Church from untold perils. Their reward would be glory to God and the life everlasting. According to Massarelli, the congregation was adjourned at 6:30 P.M. Besides Hosius, Simonetta, and Madruzzo, Morone's audience had consisted of the envoys of the Empire, France, Portugal,

<sup>162</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 38.

<sup>163</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 89, pp. 257-58, and esp. p. 259; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1563, nos. 60-61; cf. von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCXIII, p. 471, a letter of Prospero d'Arco to Ferdinand, dated at Rome on 23 March (1563): "... la Maestà vostra intenderà molto bene il tutto dal G. Morone, quale verrà benissimo informato dil tutto, et è affectionatissimo servitore di vostra Maestà. . . ."

G. Constant, *La Légation du Cardinal Morone près l'empereur et le Concile de Trente (avril-décembre 1563)*, Paris, 1922, has published 229 letters and other texts (from 4 March, 1563, to 3 March, 1564) which directly or indirectly are concerned with Morone's mission to Innsbruck and his conduct of affairs at Trent.

<sup>164</sup> Susta, III, pp. 286-87, notes, and no. 79, pp. 291-93; Firmanus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 566; Eshes, *ibid.*, IX, no. 162, p. 471; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 602-3. It is not a matter of importance, but Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, pp. 277-78, dates Morone's departure from Rome on 24 March. Constant, *La Légation du Cardinal Morone*, introd., p. XXXVII, puts it on the twenty-third, as does Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2 (1975), II.

Hungary, Savoy, and Florence-Siena, plus 166 fathers of the council.<sup>165</sup>

Morone left Trent for Innsbruck at 2:00 P.M. (*hora 18*) on Friday, 16 April. Before his departure, however, Pedro Guerrero, the obstreperous archbishop of Granada, and Martín Pérez de Ayala, the bishop of Segovia, came to see him. They appeared to be full of goodwill, especially Granada.<sup>166</sup> Owing to the cold and rain, it took Morone five days to get from Trent to the imperial court at Innsbruck. He arrived on 21 April, and was invited to dine with the emperor the next day. He found the papal nuncio Zaccaria Delfino at dinner as well as the Archduke Charles and Duke Guglielmo Gonzaga of Mantua. Guglielmo had married the emperor's daughter Eleonora; in fact his elder brother Francesco III (d. 1550), who had preceded him in the duchy of Mantua, had married the emperor's daughter Catherine. It was the Gonzagas' long-standing connection with Germany which had led Pius IV to try to get the Cardinal Ercole to undertake the mission upon which Morone was now embarked.

After dinner everyone went off to rest, but Morone returned to an audience with the emperor at about 4:00 P.M. (*alle 20 hore*). They remained together for four hours, which gave Morone an opportunity to take up with the emperor every detail set forth in the two (unsent) papal letters of 18 March. From Innsbruck on 23 April Morone sent Borromeo a long account of their deliberations. He had found Ferdinand well disposed toward Rome, but he did encounter difficulties, "his Majesty having already reached an agreement on diverse matters not only with the Catholic King [Philip II], but also with the French, especially in their desire that their ambassadors should be allowed to make proposals in the council." It was a pity, Morone said, that one had not been able to take these matters up with the emperor six or eight months earlier, for then this entente with Spain and France might never have come into being.

Although Ferdinand declared himself ready to defend the pope's authority with his own life's blood, he contended that papal dispensations must not be granted without really compelling reasons. Morone pointed out that papal power was an endowment from God, and that the pope neither could nor would accept any limitation thereof. Pius IV was so eager to effect reform, however, that he would doubtless restrain himself to the point of displeasing the princes, who were always the first to try to extort some transgression of the law from Rome.

As for Ferdinand's insistence upon trying to bring about a reform in episcopal elections throughout the empire, Morone reported that while the emperor preferred that bishops be named by the pope and the princes, he did not want to do away with capitular elections. In Germany cathedral canons had to be of noble birth. Let them also be upright in character and orthodox in doctrine, said the emperor, let them be of the sort that should be made bishops. Cathedral canons were, of course, likely to elect one of their own number. Morone assumed that Ferdinand would try to bring this matter before the council. It was conceivable that Ferdinand might go to Bologna to be crowned by the pope (but not very likely), provided he could do so without the German princes' taking umbrage.<sup>167</sup>

The Emperor Ferdinand was in continuous consultation with the theologians he had gathered around him at Innsbruck, seeking another courteous formulation of the imperial demands to be made of the pope with respect to reform of the Church in head as well as members, the right of the ambassadors to make proposals to the council on behalf of their principals, and the reorganization of the council to some extent into "nations" (although not so completely as at Constance and Basel). National deputations would prepare the preliminary agenda for the council. Shortly after his arrival at court Morone had a severe attack of gout (*podagra*), the leading ailment of the time. He was confined to bed with a fever which, as he informed Borromeo on 2 May, was hampering his efforts to deal with the imperial theologians "per

<sup>165</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 163, pp. 472-73; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 603-4. Cardinal Charles de Guise was not present at the congregation of 13 April. He had left Trent on 23 March to go to Venice and Padua. He returned to Trent on 20 April (Paleotti, *op. cit.*, p. 606, with note 2). In Venice Guise was said to have tried to arouse the Signoria against the pope and the Holy See, asserting that the council was not free, and that one had to limit the exercise of papal power (*Susta*, III, 312).

<sup>166</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 163, p. 474; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 604; *Susta*, III, no. 82, p. 303.

<sup>167</sup> Steiner, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-3, no. 93, pp. 266-70, letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Innsbruck on 23 April, 1563. Along with this letter Morone sent a *Summario della risposta data dal Cardinale Morone all' imperatore*, *ibid.*, pp. 270-76. This document illustrates Morone's diplomatic dexterity. The arguments he addressed to the emperor follow the lines of reasoning so well expressed in the two (unsent) papal letters of 18 March, in the composition of which Morone had had a hand.

incaminare il negotio a quel buon fine che conviene per servizio di Dio et del publico et per satisfatione della Santità sua."

Every day Morone had to combat the conviction which prevailed at the court that the Curia did not want reform, "che noi altri di Roma non vogliamo riforma." Morone insisted that the pope not only wanted to see reforms provided for in conciliar decrees and canons, but that his Holiness intended to put into effect the proposed reforms and to demand their observance by everyone. The suspicion was widespread that when all was said and done, the pope would still be granting dispensations and exemptions, and thus frustrate the council's endeavor to revive the ailing Church. During the period of Morone's illness the emperor even came to see him, and stood by his bedside; Morone seized the opportunity to talk business, for they had to reach some agreement. The legate had to get back to Trent. After all, he was first president of the council.

Ferdinand told Morone that he would always defend the Holy See, but he was also obliged to defend the authority of the council. Morone protested that pope and council were an entity; the pope gave the council its "autorità et forza." The legate had not only to contend with the skepticism of those at Ferdinand's court, but also with outside influences such as that exerted by Charles de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine, who was said to have sent the emperor a tract containing forty arguments seeking to prove "that the pope should not be called pastor of the Church Universal."<sup>168</sup>

Morone's report to Rome of 6 May carried the news that the fever was gone, and so was the pain from gout, but his legs were still so wobbly that he could not leave his bed. He had been at work, however, talking with Scipione d' Arco, the emperor's lord high chamberlain, and with the emperor's theological advisors who came to his sickbed. He dwelt on the hopeless disorder and confusion that would come of granting the right of proposal to all at the council (*ei dar la propositione a tutti*, which was, however, not what the emperor was requesting). The conciliar reform of the papacy was impracticable, indeed impossible, for the pope neither could nor should consent to such a thing. Anyhow Pius IV wanted to reform "the Curia and himself in canonical and proper ways,

and anyone who refuses to be content with this, and tries to go off on his own [*et cerca d' uscir di strada*], shows that he merely desires confusion and not reform."

As for the formation of national deputations (*il far i deputati per nationes*), that would confound everything. It would deprive the bishops of their rights and their place in the council. Other issues were discussed, "but because these are the most important, I have emphasized them above all the rest, and I shall continue to do so by all possible means."<sup>169</sup>

On 7 May the emperor paid Morone a second visit. He brought the legate a statement prepared partly by the theologians and partly by himself. It remained only too apparent that no one believed Rome was sincere about the desire for reform, but the imperial statement was surprisingly moderate in tone. Leaving his bed on the eighth, Morone went to see Ferdinand, concerned about the three persistent demands of the imperialists: "delle nationi, delle propositioni, et della riforma in capite." This time they spent three hours together, and Ferdinand seemed moved by Morone's arguments, but he said he required the counsel of his theologians. He also "needed time to think about it." At this juncture Morone's negotiations became somewhat impeded by the report which, rightly or wrongly, had reached Innsbruck that Pius IV had granted Philip II's request that the ambassadors should be allowed to make "propositioni" to the council.<sup>170</sup>

As Morone wrote Borromeo on 13 May from Matri (on the Brenner Pass), as he began his return journey to Trent, the "princes," i.e., Ferdinand, Philip II, and the French, were "agreed on these three points"—the division of the council into nations, the extension of the right to make motions, and the conciliar reform of the papacy. In a way each of the three points, upon which the "princes" insisted, embraced the other two. Their effect would have been to break the Italians' hold upon the council and, eventually, to restrict the authority of the pope. As part and parcel of the conciliarists' desire to set about a reform *in capite*, some of them would use the right of proposal to throw invectives at the Holy See. Morone had spared no pains to resist these three demands.

Although Morone had not been getting his own

<sup>168</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-3, no. 95, pp. 279-84, letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Innsbruck on 2 May, 1563.

<sup>169</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-3, no. 96, pp. 285-88, letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Innsbruck on 6 May.

<sup>170</sup> The report was accurate, on which cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 330-31, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 252-53.



way at Innsbruck, he had managed to moderate the emperor's insistence upon the ambassadors' right of proposal. The legates would make the formal motions at the congregations, but (Ferdinand still insisted) the ambassadors should have the right of proposal when the legates failed to bring before the council matters formally requested by the princes. The imperialists' demands for the national deputations and especially for the council's dealing with the reform *in capite* had both been modified. The Council of Trent, therefore, was not going to resemble very closely the historic assemblies at Constance and Basel. At each concession the emperor made, Morone's face grew longer, showing "small satisfaction and evincing pain," but each concession brought no small measure of inward relief.

On the morning of 12 May Morone received another statement from the emperor, "and I had hardly finished reading the said statement along with the nuncio [Delfino] than the emperor himself came to see me and bid me farewell, since I was preparing to leave." Again Morone discussed the "three principal points" with Ferdinand, this time for two hours. Although they agreed upon some minor rules of parliamentary or rather conciliar procedure, there was still no meeting of minds on the right of proposal, the national deputations, and the imperialists' desired reform of the papal electoral process. During his last hours at the court, however, Morone had been singularly active, conferring with the imperial vicerchancellor Dr. Georg Seld and the emperor's secretary Marcus Singmoser. To these two "favorite ministers" of the crown Morone summarized once more his objections to the "tre punti sopradetti," and begged them to take up these critical matters again with his Majesty.

Morone also prepared a last-minute memorandum (*scriptum*) which the nuncio Delfino took to the emperor. Ferdinand's response was prepared immediately, and given to Delfino, who delivered it to Morone at Matrei (just north of Lienz) on the morning of 13 May, as the legate was beginning his long letter to Borromeo. Although the emperor still maintained the advisability of his three requests, his response to Morone was gracious and conciliatory. Indeed, Delfino told the legate that he "had understood from Dr. Seld that his Majesty had decided not to have any demand raised in the council for any one of the three major points." It would now be well, Morone suggested, to have the pope summon Prospero d' Arco, the imperial ambassador in Rome, and praise his Maj-

esty's piety and goodness of heart, "expressing satisfaction in the decisions we have made."<sup>171</sup>

Morone's mission had been a success. He had saved the council by pacifying the emperor and the latter's advisors. He had undone the effects of Guise's visit to Innsbruck. Gallianism would have to stand alone. The futility of endless argument had wearied many a bishop, and before 8 February (1563) the bishops of Padua, Osimo, Tivoli, Rimini, and Cittanova had left Trent without seeking the legates' permission. After the deaths of Gonzaga and Seripando still others had left.<sup>172</sup>

The understanding which Morone had reached with Ferdinand had disarmed what was threatening to become an anti-papal accord among the princes. Pius IV had wanted to detach the imperialists from France and Spain to such an extent that Morone had been instructed to deal "solo et secretamente" with the emperor, and (if necessary) to give way on the right of proposal and even to concede the "reformatio capitis" to the council. He had also been instructed to take up with the emperor, at some appropriate moment, the question of Maximilian's election as king of the Romans. In this connection Morone was sent a document "by which it is clearly to be seen that this last election of the king of the Romans has no precedent, and is defective in many respects."<sup>173</sup> Maximilian's orthodoxy had been suspect for years, and he was known not to be a friend of the Curia Romana. Ferdinand did not want papal confirmation of the election to be withheld. If he was reasonable, Pius would be reasonable.

Morone arrived back in Trent during the early morning hours of 17 May, and immediately prepared a long report to Borromeo of the whole extent of his mission, which had been attended by numerous perils for the Church. Various "new questions" had come to the fore, some of them not being so new—that the council was superior

<sup>171</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 98, pp. 295-300, letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Matrei on 13 May, 1563; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 316-24, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 243-48; Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2 (1975), 11-28, and notes on pp. 262-63, with a glance at Morone's early career. For some of the chief documents relating to Morone's mission to Innsbruck, note von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils* (1872, repr. 1968), no. ccl., pp. 498-503, who gives (pp. 500-2) Ferdinand's response to Morone's final appeal, *datum Insprugg, 13 Maii, anno 1563*, which was republished by Constant, *Légation du Cardinal Morone*, no. 27, pp. 122-25.

<sup>172</sup> Susta, III, append., p. 497; Constant, *La Légation du Cardinal Morone*, introd., p. xlii; cf. Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2 (1975), 262, note 6.

<sup>173</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, 277.

to the pope, that the many Italian bishops at the council should have no more authority or a larger vote "than the few of any other nation," and (among others) that the election of the pope should become the responsibility of the conciliar fathers if the council were still in session at the death of his Holiness. But the emperor had shown good sense, and Morone had been able to deal with these problems, or rather he had not had to deal with them, for the emperor had excluded them from the discussions. Behind the scenes Morone had found much distrust of Rome. Ferdinand had received word from the Tiber as well as from Trent that the Curia did not want reform.

Despite all the wagging of wicked tongues, however, the emperor's "grande opinione" of Pius IV's goodness had helped Morone carry the day. We need not follow Morone in his review of the various demands for reform in *capite*, the right of proposal, and the national deputations. There were those enemies of the Holy See at the council and among the advisors of the princes who wanted to see the voting done by nations, as at Constance and Basel, so as to hamstring the large Italian majority then assembled on the banks of the Adige. The emperor had helped to overcome this danger by an express declaration that decisions should be made in the council at full congregations of the fathers, and by a majority vote. Once Morone was assured that every conciliar issue would be decided "dal magior numero de voti," most of his worries were gone.

As allowed by Pius IV, Morone had distributed gifts among the imperial ministers, some in money, some in objects of silver and gold—a silver decanter and basin of French workmanship, worth 150 gold scudi, to Dr. Seld the vice-chancellor and a ring worth fifty to the secretary Singmoser. Ferdinand's confessor Matthias Citard received 100 scudi, as did Dr. Konrad Braun, a canon of Augsburg. The theologian Friedrich Staphylus was given 200 scudi, and had obtained a promise from the pope of 300 scudi a year, which should be paid to him in Augsburg at his convenience. All told, the money spent on gifts during Morone's month in Innsbruck had amounted to about 820 scudi.<sup>174</sup> It

was a modest sum. If it had not paved his way, it had helped to remove more than one stone from his path.

The pope was vastly relieved and thoroughly delighted by the outcome of Morone's mission to the imperial court. Borromeo expressed both the pope's and his own satisfaction, indeed admiration, for Morone's single-handed achievement.<sup>175</sup> Actually Ferdinand had not in any way altered his views on the "three principal points," but it was a huge gain for the Holy See that he had finally agreed not to press his views at the council. Pius IV had insisted that he would require bishops to reside in their dioceses, but Ferdinand had endorsed Morone's view that one should either settle the question *quo iure* peaceably or sweep it under the rug.

In Trent the imperial ambassadors to the council informed Cardinal Charles of Lorraine in detail of Morone's negotiations with Ferdinand, as the latter had instructed them to do. In fact they read a written "summary" of the negotiations to Lorraine, and later on the same day they showed it to Claudio Fernández Vigil de Quiñones, the count of Luna, who had come to Trent (on 12 April) as Philip II's ambassador to the council. Lorraine was profuse in his thanks for this evidence of Ferdinand's goodwill. While he seemed to accept Ferdinand's accord with Morone de *residentialia decreto*, he could not approve the emperor's "softness" (*lenitas*) in yielding so far as he did on the right of proposal. Lorraine felt the recurring phrase *proponentibus legatis* was an affront to both the princes and the fathers, and seemed to suggest the superiority of the legates (and hence of the pope) over the council.<sup>176</sup>

Ferdinand had sent his son Maximilian a letter from Innsbruck on 16 May, together with a sheaf of texts detailing his negotiations with Morone. Maximilian responded with a lengthy epistle dated at Vienna on 24 May. His father, he believed, had

wish to give him"—but no more (Šusta, III, 282, note). Pius IV was willing to give Drasković a cardinal's hat to buy him off (von Sicking, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV [1896], x. Abh., p. 134, a letter in cipher from Borromeo to Morone, dated 8 May, 1563).

<sup>175</sup> Šusta, *Die römische Kurie und das Konzil von Trient unter Pius IV.*, IV (1914), nos. 3a, 6a, pp. 18, 31: "Et in vero," Borromeo wrote Morone on 19 May (1563), "io posso affermarle che in tutto il suo pontificato [nostro Signore] non ha mai da alcun ministro ricevuta maggior satisfatione." Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 249, and Constant, *La Légation du Cardinal Morone*, introd., p. XLIX.

<sup>176</sup> Von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils* (1872, repr. 1968), no. CCLIII, p. 509.

<sup>174</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-3, no. 99, pp. 303-12, letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Trent on 17 May, 1563: "Hoggi sono arrivato in Trento . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 312), on which note Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 567, and Šusta, III, no. 92, p. 334.

One paid a price for everything. Like Pedro Guerrero, the imperialist bishop Georg Drasković of Fünfkirchen (Pécs) was a problem at the council. They both declared quite openly that the pope was a patriarch—"or whatever other title one may

acted with an excess of co-operativeness in dealing with Morone, and now it seemed clear that they could hope for little or no benefit or advantage from the Council of Trent. The word "head" having been removed from the projected reform of the Church in "head and members," what could be expected from the Curia Romana? The Church was in a sad state, especially in Lower Austria and the Hapsburgs' other hereditary domains. The loss of thousands of Christian souls might be anticipated as strange new cults made their advent. Maximilian gave vent to other fears and criticisms in a postscript to his letter, but (as he could see) the die was cast.<sup>177</sup>

When Morone returned to Trent on 17 May, the conciliar fathers were discussing almost every day, in the usual congregations, the abuses which awaited correction in the sacrament of holy orders. All four legates were now assembled in Trent—Morone, Hosius, Simonetta, and Navagero. The onetime Venetian bailie in Istanbul and ambassador to Rome, Navagero, had left the Curia on 25 March, spent some time on the Grand Canal, and arrived in Trent on the night of 28 April "absque ulla pompa."<sup>178</sup> When Morone took over as first president, the affairs of the council began to move more rapidly. The bishops, however, were a contentious lot. The council still had some seven months to go, and Morone and his colleagues were to enjoy hardly a day without problems.

On 14 June (1563) the legates sent Borromeo an extraordinary letter, setting forth some of the basic reasons for their troubles. They informed the cardinal-nephew, without beating around the bush, "that just as this council consists of three principal nations, namely the Italians, Spanish, and French, so is it divided into three factions, each of which has an end and an objective of its own." Self-interest aroused the passions of each faction. Most of the Italians were devoted to the service of the pope "et alla conservazione della Corte di Roma." The Spanish were trying to elevate the status of the episcopate,

and to lower the grandeur and dignity of our lord [the pope] and of the cardinals, whom they would in our opinion like to put not only under the patriarchs but also under the archbishops and probably even under the bishops, so that they should not hold bishoprics and would be merely the pope's counselors, and would stay in Rome to look after their churches and titles. . . .

The Spanish bishops hoped to enhance their own well-being and honor to the same extent as they could lower the cardinals' power and perquisites. They were trying to take away the authority of the pope as well as that of the cardinals, "because they would like to be popes in their own bishoprics," *perchè vorrebbero esser papi ne li loro vescovadi*. As for the French, "they have no other purpose than to increase the reputation of the council, which they want to be not only above the pope, but also to have within it all the authority of the Apostolic See. . . ." The French were seeking to follow the precepts of the anti-papal Council of Basel.

The French and Spanish had acquired a following "not only of those few Germans who are here, but also of some Italians who, since they know less and are poorer, oftentimes easily allow themselves to be drawn from ignorance or necessity toward ends they should avoid." The dissidents had on their side the princes, "who abhor the customs and procedures of the Curia Romana, and desire nothing else than its reformation. . . ." Much of this widespread animus was directed against the cardinals. The legates acknowledged the need of reform. If the Sacred College and the Curia refused to accept it, they would be shamed and dishonored throughout the entire world.

Although the aims of the French and the Spanish differed, they helped each other—to achieve the French objective of lifting the council above the pope and the Spanish objective of lifting the episcopate above the Sacred College. The legates could not say whether or not the faithful band of Italian bishops at Trent could stand up to their opponents,

for when the French, Spanish, Germans, and some of the Italians get together, they comprise a large number, and would be so much larger if others should come both from Spain and from France, as has been said, with the support of the princes.<sup>179</sup>

The French and Spanish, however, were not going hand in hand at Trent. When on 21 May (1563) Fernández Vigil de Quiñones, count of Luna, was admitted as Philip II's ambassador at

<sup>177</sup> F. B. von Buchholtz, *Gesch. d. Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten*, 9 vols., Vienna, 1831–38, repr. Graz, 1968, IX, 689–93, ref. from von Sickingel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXVII, pp. 517–20, who has published Ferdinand's answer to Maximilian, dated at Innsbruck on 2 June, 1563.

<sup>178</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 609; Firmianus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, *ibid.*, II, 567; and cf. von Sickingel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXIII (1895–96), ix. Abh., pp. 52–53.

<sup>179</sup> Susta, IV, 64–65.

a general congregation, the master of ceremonies, Firmanus, assigned him a place opposite the legates

near the cross and the little table, where [Massarelli] the secretary of the council writes and sits, on the secretary's right to be sure. He was unwilling to sit there until the secretary had read in a loud voice his protest concerning the order of precedence which he was contesting with the envoys of the most Christian king [of France].

After the reading, Luna sat down, and the French envoy Arnaud du Ferrier rose to protest Luna's protest.<sup>180</sup> The order of precedence was a serious business at public assemblies and ceremonies. The ambassador's place in the social hierarchy denoted his master's standing among the sovereigns of Europe.

Charles IX's own standing was uncertain. His mother Catherine de' Medici was regent in France. François, duke of Guise, had been fatally wounded by an assassin on the night of 18 February (1563), and had died six days later. His departure from the scene was an apparent boon for the Huguenots, who received (especially the French-Protestant aristocracy) almost full freedom of religion in the Edict of Amboise of 19 March. Philip II was incensed by the French edict of toleration, and disgusted by Catherine's assertion that a truly oecumenical council, and not the assembly at Trent, was needed to unravel the religious tangle in France and in Europe.<sup>181</sup>

Considering Ferdinand's unsteadiness and his son Maximilian's apparent antagonism to the Curia Romana, Pius needed the support of the Spanish king. On 8 May Pius wrote the legates in Trent that, without wishing to decide the ceremonial order of precedence for the future, he was directing them to gratify Philip II by giving his ambassador priority over the French in the Tridentine sessions and congregations. It was to be an *ad hoc* concession. Borromeo also wrote the legates on the same day (in cipher) that they were

to give the count of Luna precedence over the French in a sudden, offhand manner, as though without premeditation (*a l'improvviso*). If the French protested, and threatened to leave the council, the legates need not worry about it. It would be better to let them go than fail to heed the wishes of his Catholic Majesty.

In Rome the new Spanish ambassador Luis de Àvila and his colleague Francisco de Vargas had negotiated with Pius IV a "most secret" agreement,

in which they promise in the king's name that his Catholic Majesty will always take up arms, and expose his forces, states, and person for the defense and augmentation of the authority of his Holiness and of this Holy See and of our Catholic religion.

Borromeo sent Morone word of this agreement, also on 8 May and also in cipher, adding that

his Holiness has wanted your most illustrious lordship to know this, so that you may understand that not without full reason has his Holiness made this decision [in the dispute over precedence], but as I have said, it is well to keep it absolutely secret.<sup>182</sup>

The cardinal of Lorraine apparently gave Luna to understand that his precedence was merely a generous concession from the French. If Luna was a bit disgruntled by this, he was at least pleased with his place at the council. There were other difficulties associated with the problem of precedence, which we shall pass over. Lorraine discussed them with Morone, who made a gentle allusion to the recent Edict of Amboise (*l'accordo di Franza*), which was causing the French cardinal no end of embarrassment.<sup>183</sup> The legates had little problems as well as large ones.

Borromeo wrote them, for example, on 19 May (1563) that Achille Brancia, the bishop of Bova (low down in the toe of the Italian boot), who had arrived in Trent on 8 July, 1562,<sup>184</sup> wanted to go

<sup>180</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 567; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, 111-1, 626.

<sup>181</sup> Cf. Jas. W. Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France* (1909), pp. 188-97, with refs. to sources. The French sent Yves d'Alègre to Rome to explain the Edict of Amboise and to demand the transfer of the council to Constance or elsewhere in Germany "per commodità et sicurezza de Ugonoti et Protestanti." A French envoy was sent to Spain to make the same request, and René de Birague, who was "tanto sospetto di heresia," was sent to the emperor on a like mission (Susta, IV, no. 3, pp. 16-17; Borromeo to the legates, letter dated 19-20 May, 1563, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 3a, 5, 7, 9, pp. 21, 26, 37-38, 45).

<sup>182</sup> Von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXV (1896), x. Abh., no. 26, pp. 133-34, three briefs all dated 8 May, 1563, and note Susta, IV, no. 2, p. 12. By a brief of 8 June Pius IV intervened directly to decide the Franco-Spanish struggle over precedence in favor of Spain (von Sichel, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61). Pius would also confirm Maximilian's election as king of the Romans, provided he swore an oath of adherence to the Catholic faith and wrote the pope a letter to that effect (Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 156, pp. 520-22).

<sup>183</sup> Susta, IV, no. 1a, pp. 6-11, a letter of Morone to Borromeo, dated at Trent on 20-21 May, 1563.

<sup>184</sup> Servazio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, 111-1, 43: "Addì 8 di Luglio arrivò in Trento il reverendissimo monsignor Achille Brancia da Surrento, vescovo di Bovo [sic]." Brancia was bishop of Bova from 21 August, 1549, until his resignation from the see on 13 August, 1570.

back home. He had written the pope, requesting the "license" to leave the council "under the pretext of wanting to arrange for the freeing of some of his brothers and relatives who, he says, have been taken by the Turks in these past years."

In Rome one did not know what side Brancia was on, but the pope said the legates should make every effort to keep him in Trent, especially if he was among the defenders of the Curia. If he was among their opponents, well, of course, *manco male*, there was obviously less harm in giving him the *licentia* and letting him go where he pleased.<sup>185</sup>

While his brothers and other relatives allegedly languished in Turkish hands, Achille Brancia did not leave Trent. It is not clear whether he was a supporter of the Curia or not, for the views he expressed at the council sometimes show deference to the Holy See, although on occasion he followed the Cardinal of Lorraine. At any rate he did not want the widows of Greek priests, of whom there were always a fair number in the south of Italy, to be allowed to marry other men. Brancia was clearly a bit of a complainer, and outspokenly so against archbishops, especially those in the kingdom of Naples where, he declared, false witnesses against bishops were easy to find.<sup>186</sup> As for the Turks' having seized his brothers and other relatives, it is quite likely. Bova lies on the far southern slope of the Aspromonte, five miles from the Ionian shore, where "Turkish towers" and their remains are still to be found.

The Tridentine doctrinal decrees and canons would become more important with the passing years than those who composed them could ever have believed. Churchmen and theologians of the preceding century and a half had lived amid a round of councils—Constance, Basel, Ferrara-Florence, Rome, and the fifth Lateran—and so why should the Tridentine fathers have regarded their efforts as likely to have a larger impact on the future than those of their predecessors? Who could suppose that the doctrinal declarations enunciated at Trent, composed largely to combat Protestantism, were going to endure with so little change for so many centuries?

Aside from a sprinkling of imperialists, the third

period of the Council of Trent consisted to no small extent of Italian politicians, Spanish episcopals, and Gallican conciliarists. They tended to be more interested in their differing views of reform than in the formulation of dogma, which was largely the métier of theologians, who also had their differing views. As the council was just beginning, the second president Girolamo Seripando wrote his friend Marc' Antonio da Mula in Rome (on 1 December, 1561),

These prelates who have lately arrived [here in Trent] from distant lands can talk of nothing but "reform," and they openly assert that this council will be a ridiculous business if it does nothing but define some of the sacraments of the Church and [deal with] similar matters, which they regard as quite clear, and which the heretics will no more believe in after the council than they do today!<sup>187</sup>

Although the passage of time has tended to make us recall the Tridentine fathers chiefly for the wisdom of their reforms and the preciseness of their doctrinal decrees, the council was also a battlefield of nationalist hostilities, theological controversies, and learned attacks on papal authority. Endless disagreements prolonged the discussions, which usually became debates. The twenty-third session of the council was repeatedly postponed—to 17 December (1562), 1 January (1563), 15 January, 4 February, 22 April, 20 May, and 15 June.<sup>188</sup> During the morning of 14 June Morone had gathered in his chambers the legates as well as Cardinals de Guise and Madruzzo, the ecclesiastical ambassadors of the Empire, Poland, and Savoy, together with a number of other prelates. They decided to set the date of the twenty-third session for 15 July which, despite some *non placet*s, was confirmed by a general congregation on the next day.<sup>189</sup>

The strife in the council went on through the weeks that followed. While the fathers sought the ways and means of doing away with abuses of the sacrament of holy orders, the Spanish ambassador de Luna continued to challenge the legates' exclusive right of proposal which Morone, despite the pope's concession to Philip II, was determined to maintain.<sup>190</sup> The Spanish insisted upon the di-

<sup>185</sup> Šusta, I, 135.

<sup>185</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 3, p. 17, letter of Borromeo to the legates, dated 19 May, 1563.

<sup>186</sup> Ehnes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 185, p. 528, lines 5-8 (24 May, 1563); no. 220, p. 610, ll. 30-31, (11 July); no. 232, p. 658, ll. 29-31 (26 July); no. 253, p. 710, ll. 26-31 (14 August); no. 292, p. 832, ll. 1-9 (18 September); and no. 331, p. 930, ll. 12-15 (5 November, 1563).

<sup>188</sup> Ehnes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 84, 95, 112, 119, 164, 177, pp. 262 ff.; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 511, 525, 544-45, 562, 606, 624.

<sup>189</sup> Šusta, IV, nos. 13-14, pp. 67, 69; Ehnes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 213, p. 584; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 664.

<sup>190</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 15, p. 78, letter of the legates to Borromeo, dated 19 June, 1563.

vine bases of episcopal authority. The French assailed the universal primacy of the Holy See, and attacked the cardinals, demanding an end to the abuses which had their origin in the Curia Romana.<sup>191</sup> Laynez, the general of the Jesuits, was indefatigable in his defense of the God-given rights of the supreme pontiff.<sup>192</sup> The practical politicians in Rome and Trent, however, knew perfectly well that the conciliar fathers could only reach a general consensus by avoiding precision in the issues upon which they could not agree.

As Borromeo advised the legates (on 26 June), one must try to make the canons as succinct as possible, omitting all reference to the primacy of S. Peter (and consequently to papal authority) as well as all reference to the nature of the episcopate (and hence to the jurisdiction of the bishops).<sup>193</sup> But without the co-operation of Charles de Guise, as Morone and his colleagues saw only too clearly, the session scheduled for 15 July would have either to be postponed or to content itself with some foggy generalities. The French were well aware of the fact, and they had become as weary of futile discussions as had the curialists. On 29 June, however, a violent altercation over precedence almost wrecked the council.

At a mass in the cathedral church the Spanish ambassador de Luna was given a place *extra ordinem*; the French were supposed not to be offended, because they kept their places next to the imperial ambassadors. But Guise and Louis de Lansac were offended, and soon enraged. They threatened to leave the council, in accordance with their *mandata*, "if any such thing should happen." They also declared that France would withdraw her obedience from the Holy See for the remainder of the reign of Pius IV, whom Guise and his compatriots threatened to denounce as a simoniac and a tyrant.

Fear and despair swept through the council—*nemo non dolet atque excruciat*—but it was finally decided that until further instructions came from Spain and from Rome, "nothing new is to be tried." The Spanish and French ambassadors would not attend the same service. If they did, there would be no blessings of incense nor censings of persons, for here the order of ceremonial precedence had caused trouble.<sup>194</sup>

Guise had gone too far, and he knew it. He expected to become perpetual legate in France. Would Pius IV now make the appointment? After the Protestant gains in the Edict of Amboise, France should hold fast to Rome, and avoid schism. On the very day after the uproar in the cathedral Guise sent Filippo Musotti, now his secretary (and formerly Seripando's), to Rome to make amends and offer the pope his full assistance. With the helpful co-operation of the count of Luna, Morone could now draw Guise into a reasonable compromise. Sebastiano Gualterio, bishop of Viterbo and nuncio to France, served effectively as a go-between. When on 7 July the French ambassador Louis de Lansac went back home, a larger measure of tranquillity was soon discernible. Morone dealt gently with Guise, "vedendolo assai più dolce del solito," and before 15 July they arrived at a practicable settlement of the major problems afflicting the council.<sup>195</sup>

The four legates Morone, Hosius, Simonetta, and Navagero headed for the cathedral church of S. Vigilio at an early hour on Thursday, 15 July (1563), along with Guise and Madruzzo, the various ambassadors, a host of prelates, and numerous others. According to the secretary Massarelli, the assembly had gathered at 6:00 A.M. or, as the Italians reckoned time, at the ninth hour (*mane hora circiter 9 more italico*). Already the weather gave signs of a distressing heat, and so the long-robed ecclesiastics were brought together in the lower part of the church. The twenty-third session of the council, the seventh under Pius IV, began with a solemn high mass celebrated by Eustache du Bellay, the bishop of Paris. The mass was followed by an address, delivered by Diego Gilberto Noguera, the Spanish bishop of Alife (northwest of Benevento), who offended the French by putting Philip II before Charles IX. He also annoyed the Venetians by naming the duke of Savoy before the Republic.

The next day the French and Venetian ambassadors requested the legates neither to print Noguera's address nor to include it in the *acta* of the council. Noguera is said also to have declared

<sup>191</sup> Cf. Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 183, pp. 526–27.

<sup>192</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 214, pp. 587–89.

<sup>193</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 21, p. 100, and note Borromeo's letter of 6 July to the legates, *ibid.*, no. 25C, p. 119, and the legates' letter to him of 5 July, *ibid.*, no. 23, p. 108.

<sup>194</sup> Firmianus, *Diaria caeremonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 568; Nicole Psaulme (Psalmicus, bishop of Verdun), *Frag-*

*menta de Concilio Tridentino*, *ibid.*, II, 861–62; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 677–79; and von Sickel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXVIII, pp. 560–62, a letter of Prospero d' Arco to the Emperor Ferdinand, dated at Rome on 7 July, 1563.

<sup>195</sup> Cf. Šusta, IV, nos. 21–26, esp. pp. 102–4, 107–8, 108–9, 111, 119, 121–22, 125–26; *Monumenti di varia letteratura tratti dai manoscritti di Monsignor Lodovico Beccadelli, arcivescovo di Ragusa*, ed. Giambattista Morandi, 2 vols., Bologna, 1797–1804, repr. Gregg: Farnborough, Hants., 1967, II, 90–93.

that there were as many heretics as orthodox in the area of Trent, and that of course the current sessions of the council were a continuation of those held under Paul III and Julius III, which would naturally arouse the imperialists. Massarelli did not include Noguera's text in his *acta*, and if it is extant, it seems to have eluded modern Tridentine conciliar scholarship.<sup>196</sup>

Aside from Noguera's unfortunate address, however, there were few discordant notes in the long-awaited session. Rather, as Paleotti tells us, "It is incredible how great an exultation of spirit might be discerned in everyone, because those rocks, which had been twisting and turning us askew for so many months, have finally been passed over as a result of God's mercy to us." After the usual formalities of reading the papal briefs of appointment of the new legates (Morone and Navagero), the letters and mandata of the princes (Sigismund Augustus, Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, and Mary, queen of Scots), and the official confirmation of a new ambassador (Luna's replacement of Pescara as Philip II's representative), the legates moved on to the decrees.

The first decree to be presented was that on holy orders, now drafted in four doctrinal "chapters" (*capitula*) and eight condemnatory canons. Du Bellay, as celebrant of the mass, read the text to the assembly. The decree spelled out the sacramental nature of ordination, asserted the indelible character of the priesthood, condemned the concept of the priesthood of all believers, defended the existing hierarchy, declared that bishops were superior to priests, and maintained that bishops chosen by the pope were "legitimi et veri episcopi."

Although nothing was specifically said of the "divine law" (*ius divinum*) of the episcopate, the Spanish were on the whole satisfied that their lofty view of bishops—*qui in Apostolorum locum succurrunt* (chap. 4)—had been sustained. When the chapters and canons of the decree on holy orders had been read, the bishop of Paris asked the assembled fathers, "Placentne haec omnia vobis?" Aside from a little quibbling here and there, almost all the fathers gave their *placets* of approval.

The legates had climbed over the first great hurdle.

Having defined and buttressed holy orders against the Lutherans, Calvinists, and others, the fathers came to the decree on reform. Du Bellay now read the lengthy eighteen canons *de reformatione*. The first canon got around the explosive issue of the divine obligation of episcopal residence, in which Simonetta and the curialists had seen (perhaps rightly) a form of episcopalianism encroaching upon the Petrine primacy. Ambiguity is the last refuge of the theologian.

The first canon reads,

Since all to whom the cure of souls has been entrusted are required by divine precept [*praeccepto divino*] to know their flocks, offer sacrifice for them, and maintain them by preaching the divine word, administering the sacraments, and providing an example of all good works . . . , the sacrosanct synod [of Trent] declares that all . . . , even if they are cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, are bound to personal residence in their own churches or dioceses, where they are held to discharge the duty laid upon them, and that they cannot be absent except for reasons and in ways [which are then defined in the long first canon].

The equally long eighteenth canon of this (reform) decree imposed upon the bishops the task of establishing in their diocesan seminaries or *collegia* to begin training for the priesthood boys (of legitimate birth) who should be not less than twelve years of age. With eleven fathers objecting to the statement on residence and a half dozen dissenting on other matters, the reform decree was passed by a huge majority. It was decided that the next session would be held on 16 September (1563).

At about 1:00 P.M. (*hora circiter 16*) Morone blessed the fathers *signo crucis*, and they went their ways, we are told, in a joyful and thankful mood. There had been a huge attendance at the twenty-third session. Besides the four legates, Guise, and Madruzzo, the secretary Massarelli gives us the names of twelve ambassadors, three patriarchs, twenty-five archbishops, one hundred and eighty-eight bishops, four abbots, seven generals of Orders, and three doctors of laws. Massarelli does not list the theologians, said to have been one hundred and thirty all told.<sup>197</sup>

<sup>196</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 224, p. 617, with note 3; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 692; Jedin, *Konzil von Trent*, IV-2, 76, who mistakenly gives Noguera's name Francisco. A picture of the twenty-third session of the council, held in S. Vigilio on 15 July, 1563, is given in a painting attributed to Gianbattista Moroni (d. 1578) or Paolo Farinato (d. 1606). The painting may be seen in the Louvre in Paris.

<sup>197</sup> Ehses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 224-25, pp. 617-39; Ser-vanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, *ibid.*, III-1, 79-80, who gives seventeen (not eleven) votes against the statement on residence; Nicole Psalme [Psalmaeus], *Fragmenta de Concilio Tridentino*, *ibid.*, II, 866-67, notes that there were "208 bishops together with the generals of the Orders, abbots, doctors, etc.;" Bec-

Difficulties and ceaseless contention still lay ahead as the conciliar fathers took up the next item on their agenda—matrimony—which proved more troublesome than they had perhaps anticipated. We shall not follow their debates, but we may note that the legates presented them with eleven canons *de sacramento matrimonii* and a proposed decree declaring clandestine marriages utterly illicit. Marriage was a sacrament, and Catholics could have only one wife (or husband) at a time.<sup>198</sup> The manifold problems of marriage were examined and debated (in their ecclesiastical context) in incredible detail and with revised canons from 24 to 31 July, from 7 to 23 August, and from 7 to 10 September.<sup>199</sup> The deeper they delved, the greater their differences of opinion, as their inquiries extended to marriages with heretics and excommunicates, consanguinity and impotence, adultery, rape, and uxoricide. It was more than enough to make them rejoice in their celibacy.

The weeks of preoccupation with matrimony were a disappointment to the legates who, like the pope and Borromeo, wanted to bring the council to a close as soon as possible. As long as the outspoken fathers were gathered in Trent, the Holy See might come under renewed attack at any time. Philip II was trying to prolong the council, however, for as long as the Holy See was vulnerable to censure, he felt that by giving or withholding his support he could constrain the pope to do this or not do that.<sup>200</sup> On 19 July (1563) the legates

wrote Borromeo that the count of Luna had come to Morone two days before to try to persuade him that the German Protestants should again be invited to attend the council. He claimed to know that a number of them wished to do so. The Emperor Ferdinand would soon find himself with a number of "those princes" at the coronation of his son Maximilian [as king of Hungary on 8 September]. The legates should write Ferdinand, Luna declared, and ask him to use his authority on this occasion to get them to come to Trent. Morone declined to do so, and expressed astonishment that the Catholic king should believe prolonging the council could do Christianity the slightest good, "essendo tanto chiaro a tutto 'l mondo il contrario!"<sup>201</sup>

Toward the end of the discussions on matrimony the learned Hospitaller Don Martín de Rojas Portalrubio, vice-chancellor of his Order, appeared at a general congregation on the morning of 7 September to present his letter of credence as the conciliar envoy of the Knights of S. John of Jerusalem. Frey Don Martín was a Castilian, and a doctor of both laws. His letter of credence, drafted in the name of Jean de la Valette, grand master of the Order (1557–1568), was dated at Malta on 14 November, 1562. Don Martín had first appeared at the council as "orator" of the Hospitallers on 28 March (1563), when he requested assignment of a place among the envoys of the secular princes.

The result was another battle over precedence. The envoys and procurators of various German archbishops and bishops, especially those of Salzburg, Eichstätt, Basel, and Regensburg, objected that their principals were "princes of the Empire" with extensive secular jurisdictions. Nevertheless, inasmuch as their princely lords had an ecclesiastical status which made them "immediately subject to his Holiness," the said envoys had to sit and march in processions among the ecclesiastics. They demanded, therefore, that since the Knights of Malta, the "Religio Hierosolymitana," were a

cadelli, *Monumenti*, ed. Morandi, II, 93–94; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 257–59, who finds 193 bishops present on 15 July; Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 76–79, who counts "236 Konzilsväter" as voting. According to Massarelli's *acta*, Beccadelli was not present at the seventh (twenty-third) session (Ehes, *op. cit.*, IX, 638, line 31). Massarelli, being ill, was also absent; his place as secretary was taken by Bartolomeo Sirigo, bishop of Castellana; as usual the lists of bishops were prepared, and the counting done, by the conciliar notaries. On the establishment of seminaries, note James A. O'Donohoe, "The Seminary Legislation of the Council of Trent," in *Il Concilio di Trento e la riforma tridentina*, 2 vols., Rome, 1965, I, 157–72, with refs.

<sup>198</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 226, pp. 639–40, dated 20 July, 1563.

<sup>199</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 227–42, pp. 641–80 (24 to 31 July); nos. 244–50, 252–67, pp. 682–747 (7 to 23 August); and nos. 269, 271–77, pp. 760–65, 779–95 (5 and 7 to 10 September); Beccadelli, ed. Morandi, II, 96–109, 114–17.

<sup>200</sup> As late as 2 October (1563) Galeazzo Cusano, an imperial agent in Rome, wrote Ferdinand's son Maximilian, "... Mentre il Concilio dura, li principi seculari tengono il freno in bocca alla sua Santità et da lei ottengono ciò che si sanno immaginare, che è un farsi rarissimi sopra li beni ecclesiastici, et ella è costretta ad impoverirsi spendendo tutti li tesori della Chiesa in legatione, corrieri, et mantenimenti di prelati al

Concilio, al tale che la redurranno, non possa mai addunar un quattrino [!], essendo il danaro il nervo d' ogni cosa mondana" (von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXXXVI, pp. 608–9). Cf. the observations of Giovanni Soranzo, the Venetian ambassador to the Spanish court, in his report to the doge and Senate early in 1565 (E. Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. I, vol. V [1861], pp. 93–94). Soranzo had spent about two years in Spain. He was not much attracted to Philip II.

<sup>201</sup> Susta, IV, nos. 28, 34, pp. 129–30, 153; Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, III, 380–81; von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXIX, p. 563; Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1563, nos. 160–161.



religious Order, either Don Martín should receive a place among the ecclesiastics or they should be seated among the secular envoys. The legates could see that a bitter controversy lay ahead, and so making no decision, they appealed to Borromeo to settle the dispute.<sup>202</sup>

By a brief of 20 July (1563) Pius IV had left the seating of Don Martín to the legates, who placed him

among the ecclesiastical envoys [of the lay princes], namely after [Girolamo Gaddi, bishop of Cortona in Tuscany,] the envoy of the most illustrious lord Cosimo, duke of Florence and Siena, and this was done without prejudice to the patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops.

Precedence being a matter of incredible importance at the courts and councils (as we know well), Pius said in his brief that he neither "intended nor desired" to settle this particular dispute. When his introductory letters had been read, Don Martín addressed the august assembly.

The vice-chancellor of the Hospitallers expressed the hope of his grand master and the Order that the Council at Trent might rescue the Church from the grief it had suffered in these "miserable, calamitous, and turbulent times." Inevitably he spoke of the perils which threatened the island of Malta, "exposed to the enemies of the Catholic faith," of the fearsome rumors that reached the Hospitallers concerning the Turkish fleet, "always hanging over our necks," and of the wonderment attending the next moves of the archpirate Dragut and the other corsairs on the sea.

The work being done at Trent was important to the Order, for the conciliar fathers must find remedies for the ills besetting Christendom, and free all Christians from the perils of the perverse and dissolute times. Interlarding his rhetoric with references to the early history of the Hospitallers, he stressed their service *contra barbaros Christi hostes* "through many generations." If he were to recount the exploits of his Order in any detail, he would run out of time rather than material.

The Turks had become, Don Martín declared, a greater menace than ever. The Hospitallers' home in Malta, situated between Sicily and Africa, was the best bulwark against the now vastly increased power of the Turks, who gazed with longing upon both Sicily and Italy, which two "clarissimae provinciae" must be guarded against and protected from their attacks. If Malta were lost,

*quod Deus avertat*, the Christian commonwealth would sustain a terrible blow, from which there might be no recovery.

Don Martín, therefore, on behalf of the grand master, the Order, and indeed all Christendom, appealed to the conciliar fathers to extend a helping hand to the defenders of Malta. Possessions, properties, and *commendae* belonging to the Order had been unjustly seized. They should be restored. Henceforth no one should expropriate the resources of the Order. The fathers should pass a decree to this effect, and also confirm the Order's remaining immunities and privileges. All men would then proclaim the still further merit of the council for thus helping the Christian commonwealth, "for which we are forever fighting."

When he had finished, Don Martín received a seemly, meaningless answer. The council would do what it could, *quatenus licebit*, for love of the grand master and the Order, and the fathers returned to their discussions of matrimony.<sup>203</sup> Eighteen months later they would have reason to recall Don Martín's address to the council, of which printed editions had appeared at Brescia and Padua.

The fathers found another distraction from the problems relating to matrimony in the long-drawn-out charge of heresy which had been brought against Giovanni Grimani, the senior patriarch of Aquileia, who had come to Trent on 18 or 19 June (1563). At 5:00 P.M. on 31 July the four legates got together at the Palazzo Thun to select judges for the trial (or investigation) of Grimani. Among those chosen were Guise, Madruzzo, Pedro Guerrero, Bartolomé de Martyribus, Georg Drasković, François Richardot, and Andrés de Cuesta. The Venetian envoys da Ponte and Dandolo, like the rest of the Venetian patriariate, were most interested in the case.<sup>204</sup> Judgment was rendered on 13 August, also in the Palazzo Thun, and Grimani was declared "liber ab omni suspitione haeresis,"<sup>205</sup>

<sup>202</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 271, pp. 774-79, texts dated 7 September, 1563; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 708, is more interested in the protocol of precedence than in the Hospitallers' appeal to the council, and so are Firmann, *Diaria caerimoniae*, *ibid.*, II, 570; González de Mendoza, II, 694-95; and Psaulme (Psalmæus), *Fragmenta*, II, 864, who notes that Don Martín "habuit orationem prolixam." Cf. Raynaldus, *Ann. ecl.*, ad ann. 1563, nos. 147-49, who does no better by Don Martín, on whom see C. Gutiérrez, *Españoles en Trento*, Valladolid, 1951, pp. 792-96.

<sup>204</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 672; Eshes, *ibid.*, IX, no. 243, p. 681; Susta, II, 173-75, and IV, 86-87.

<sup>205</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 251, p. 705.

<sup>203</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 601-2, and cf. Susta, III, 305, 321.

after which his absolution finally came on 17 September.<sup>206</sup> The Tridentine verdict brought Grimani and his friends satisfaction, but the disfavor with which he was viewed in Rome never abated, and the cardinal's hat he had sought was never attained.<sup>207</sup> Meanwhile, however, he could return home with a sense of vindication.

For Giovanni Grimani home was the family palace in Venice between the Ruga Giuffa and the Rio S. Severo, near the church of S. Maria Formosa. He was the grandson of Antonio, who had gone from a miserable failure against the Turks at Lepanto (in 1499) to election as the doge of Venice (in 1521).<sup>208</sup> After the "trial" Giovanni devoted much of his time to enriching the family's extraordinary collection of antiquities and works of art. He also reconstructed the Palazzo Grimani, making it into what was probably the foremost museum in the Europe of the 1560's and seventies. When Henry of Valois escaped from Cracow (in June, 1574), to exchange the crown of Poland for that of France, he was given a royal welcome in Venice, where (in July) he was shown the treasures in the Palazzo Grimani as well as the galleys in the Arsenal. In 1593 Giovanni Grimani died at the age of ninety-two. Today the Palazzo Grimani also lies close to death, neglected and almost forgotten in desuetude and decay.<sup>209</sup>

When the Hospitaller Don Martín de Rojas Portabru addressed the general congregation at Trent (on 7 September, 1563), and Giovanni Grimani was absolved of heresy (on 17 September), the council had less than three more months to go. If the legates could have known, they would have been relieved, for they lived in an atmosphere of almost daily crisis. Weeks before (on 22 July) they had written in annoyance of the Spanish efforts to draw out the proceedings, for when they had finished with matrimony, they still had to deal with indulgences, images, Purgatory, the veneration of saints, monastic vows, and other matters. Let them have to spend further months and years

at the council, they proposed to appoint two theologians of each nation, two generals of Orders, and Laynez and Salmerón to study their remaining problems and prepare the data on which chosen prelates might formulate "the doctrines and canons to extirpate heresies, remove abuses, and establish the pertinent dogmas." The count of Luna could say what he wished. They intended to get on with the business.<sup>210</sup>

If the pope and the cardinals needed reforming, so did the princes, time-consuming as it might be, and toward the end of July (1563) the legates gave the ambassadors of the Empire, France, Spain, Portugal, and Savoy copies of a preliminary draft of a "general reform" (*42 capita generalis reformationis*), the thirty-ninth "chapter" of which was designed to free the Church entirely from lay jurisdiction and taxation. It was a proposed *reformatio principum*, a thorough-going indictment of generations of temporal intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs. It caused an uproar. Princes had long been accustomed to demanding the reform of the Church. Churchmen had rarely demanded the reform of the state in such sweeping terms.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>210</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 29, p. 135.

<sup>211</sup> Von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXXII, pp. 571-75; Šusta, IV, nos. 31-33, 35, 37, pp. 140-41, 143-44, 148-51, 158-59, 163-67; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 697-99.

The Emperor Ferdinand notified his ambassadors at Trent, Archbishop Anton Brus of Prague and Bishop Georg Drasković of Fünfkirchen (Pécs), on 23 August of his objection to the thirty-ninth chapter relating to the princes (von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXXVII, p. 585): "Sunt nonnulli alii articuli [i.e., other than those concerned with ecclesiastical reform] sub capitulo trigesimo nono comprehensi, qui tangunt principes saeculares ac praecipue iurisdictionem eorum in personas et res ecclesiasticorum ipsamque libertatem et immunitatem exemptionemque ecclesiasticam tam a contributionibus et quibuslibet impositionibus et exactionibus quam ab aliis oneribus. Quod ad tales articulos attinet, vobis notum esse volumus eos graviores esse quam ut a nobis ac fortassis etiam a reliquis regibus et principibus Christianis tolerari aut admitti queant. . . ."

Ferdinand's letter of 23 August came to Trent by courier in three days from Vienna. Brus conveyed his message to the legates, requesting removal (from the proposed decree on general reform) of the chapter relating to the princes, "mostrando che" ella [i.e., sua Maestà] haveva diverse ragioni che la movevano a farci questa richiesta, et non tanto per sè quanto per gli altri principi che non si trovano in Concilio, edell' interesse de quelli in loro absentia et de loro ambasciatori non si doveva trattare. . . ." But, as the legates reminded Brus, the emperor had been demanding a general reform, and how could one call a reform general that did not emend the ways of princes in their intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs?

It was a fine thing, they declared, that when the legates consulted the pope, "ch'è capo et padron nostro," his Majesty should say that the council was not free—and now he was trying

<sup>206</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 290, pp. 828-29, and Šusta, IV, 254-55.

<sup>207</sup> Cf. Pio Paschini, *Tre Illustri Prelati del Rinascimento*, Rome, 1957, esp. pp. 178 ff.; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVI, 319-26, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 517-22; and P. J. Laven, "The Causa Grimani and its Political Overtones," in *The Journal of Religious History*, IV (1966-67), 184-205.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Volume II, pp. 517-18.

<sup>209</sup> Cf. Marilyn Perry, ". . . The Palazzo Grimani at S. Maria Formosa, Venice," *Apollo*, CXIII (April, 1981), 215-221, with refs.

On 20 August, however, Anton Brus and Georg Drasković, the imperial envoys in Trent, sent the emperor an emended version of the "chapters on general reform . . . now revised for the third time, in a different order, and reduced in number."<sup>212</sup> The *reformatio principum* had now been much softened. Ferdinand, who had found the first version (i.e., chapter 39 of the *42 capita*) wholly unacceptable, might in Brus's opinion be induced to accept the revised version. As tempers were rising, the pope and the legates had been seeking ways to get through the remaining material and end the council. Borromeo had written (on 4 August) that the more Luna tried to make the council last forever (*et far immortalē il Concilio*), the more anxious his Holiness became to see it brought to a fitting conclusion, with its work all done.<sup>213</sup>

The forty-two "chapters" (or canons) on reform had been reduced to thirty-five. The first twenty-one of these *canones reformationis* were discussed and debated in general congregations from 11 September to 2 October (1563).<sup>214</sup> The fathers had hardly got into the subject, however, when on 15 September they had to postpone the next (the twenty-fourth) formal session of the council (scheduled for the following day) until 11 November, the feast of S. Martin.<sup>215</sup> Everything was taking too much time.

The canons on reform had been put together by Gabriele Paleotti, the auditor of the Rota, un-

der Morone's instructions from Spanish, imperial, and French *libelli reformationis*. Their purpose was to see that only the worthiest servitors of Christ should be chosen, from parish priest to pope, for the sacred task of trying to guide the faithful along the road to salvation. The episcopate was recognized as of especial importance, as indeed it was, and the powers of the bishops were much enhanced. The second canon provided for annual diocesan and triennial provincial synods. The third canon imposed upon the archbishops and bishops visitations encompassing the whole of their provinces and dioceses at least once every two years. The fourth canon dealt with the necessity of widespread preaching; the fifth required the indictment of bishops on criminal charges, including heresy (*quod absit*), to be referred to the pope; the sixth did away with the exemptions of cathedral chapters, putting them back under episcopal jurisdiction; and canon after canon was thus designed, as the fathers saw their bounden duty, to rebuild the Church on the firmer foundations of olden times.<sup>216</sup>

The remaining fourteen *capita reformationis* (numbered from twenty-two to thirty-five) had become available for discussion about 15 September, but had to be postponed until the fathers could finish with the *canones de matrimonio* and with the first twenty-one canons on reform. The thirty-fifth canon or chapter on reform, relating to the princes, "whom God has established for the protection of the holy faith and Church, and armed with the sword of justice," was divided into twelve articles.<sup>217</sup>

Clerics were to be tried by ecclesiastical and not by secular judges. No lay authority was to impede ecclesiastics in the performance of their duties nor try to prevent an excommunication or to have one lifted. No layman could grant a benefice or expectancy. Ecclesiastics were not to be subjected to taxes or tolls of any kind (*ad nullas prorsus taxas, tributa, gabellas, decimas, pedagia subsidiaive*), and no lay authority could seek to impose such levies under the deceitful guise of a gift or a loan. In areas threatened by the Turks ecclesiastics, with their consent, might be held to payment of the traditional *subsidia contra Turcas*.

Ecclesiastical sentences, citations, decrees, and

to limit the freedom of the fathers by "saying that one should not discuss this or that." No, the legates would go on with the proposed decree, but Brus thought that, in view of the modifications made in the decree, especially as to the reform of princes, Ferdinand might be willing to accept it, "ma che essendo poi mutato et ridotto in forma assai honesta, era d' opinione che sua Maestà se n' avesse a contentare."

Brus requested time enough to consult Ferdinand with the new version of the reform decree. The legates, anxious not to be offensive to the emperor [with whom the pope was negotiating], agreed to give Brus eight days. In the meantime they would proceed with ecclesiastical reform "nella quale ci resta ancora che far assai," returning later to the princes (Šusta, IV, no. 46, pp. 200-5, letter of the legates to Borromeo, dated 28 August, 1563, and note von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, pp. 586-87, and no. CCLXXVIII, pp. 588-90, letter of Morone to the emperor, also dated 28 August).

<sup>212</sup> Von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXXVI, p. 582.

<sup>213</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 38, pp. 169-70.

<sup>214</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 269, pp. 748-59, gives the text of the first twenty-one canons on reform and, *ibid.*, nos. 278-89, 291-98, 300-16, pp. 795-888, detailed summaries of the conciliar fathers' statements concerning them (from the *acta* of Massarelli), and note Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 712-37.

<sup>215</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 285, p. 819; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 720-21.

<sup>216</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 269, pp. 748 ff.

<sup>217</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 270, pp. 766-74, *capita 14 reformationis*, a 22 *scilicet usque ad 35*, the thirty-fifth chapter on princes being on pp. 771-74. These chapters or articles were sometimes reckoned as thirty-six (Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, III-1, 699, 706).

mandates, especially those coming from the Curia Romana, were henceforth freely to be published. No prelate's taking possession of a cathedral church or benefice was to await the *exequatur* or *placet* of a secular prince. The prince was also cautioned not to quarter his officials, familiars, soldiers, horses, and dogs in ecclesiastical houses and monasteries.<sup>218</sup> If the *reformatio principum* had been watered down, it was still a stronger potion than any prince in Europe was likely to accept.

The conciliar fathers were insisting upon a frank discussion of the chapters on reform, including the thirty-fifth on the *reformatio principum*, as the legates informed Borromeo on 11 September.<sup>219</sup> A few days later (on the fifteenth) the imperial envoys read the legates a letter from Ferdinand, who was aggrieved that they had allowed him "only ten days' time to reply," including the time it took the courier to travel between Trent and the imperial court. He needed more time to consult with his advisors concerning the chapter on "secular reform." The legates answered that they would have to take up the questions on the reform of the princes when the current discussions on the first twenty-one articles or chapters on ecclesiastical reform had been finished.<sup>220</sup> A week later, on 22 September, the French envoy Arnaud du Ferrier delivered before a general congregation a blistering attack upon the proposed reform of the princes as an invasion of the independence of the Gallican Church and an unacceptable violation of the age-old rights of the French crown.<sup>221</sup>

In the meantime Charles de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine, had left Trent in the early morning hours of 18 September, headed for Rome "with the intention of returning within a month in order to attend the session [scheduled for 11 November]." He was accompanied by several French

prelates, three Italians, and the archbishop of Braga, de Martyribus, *vir magnae sanctitatis et religionis*.<sup>222</sup> Guise and his companions arrived in Rome on the twenty-ninth. He was received most graciously by Pius IV, who lodged him at the Vatican, and honored him with more than one visit to his rooms.<sup>223</sup>

At Trent Guise had lost his temper on occasion, and had attacked the pope or given vent to Gallicanism. He was concerned, however, about the religious future of France, for the Edict of Amboise gave promise of troubles to come. France needed papal support against the Huguenots. Guise also wanted to be named primate of France. The pope and the legates needed his support to bring the council to a successful conclusion. Pius and Guise spent hours together, sometimes alone. They reached almost complete agreement on all the issues with which they were concerned.

The pope and Borromeo had found Ferrier's address to the general congregation in Trent "excessive, unexpected, and scandalous." Guise was said to have been equally astonished by the ambassador's diatribe, "knowing that the said Ferrier had no commission to put, as one says, so much flesh in the fire." If some of the disaffected French chose to leave the council, as Borromeo wrote the legates on 2 October, there was little one could do about it. One must handle them gingerly, but both the pope and Guise were confident that the legates could bring the council to a quick and satisfactory conclusion. The next session must be held, as planned, on 11 November. If anyone of the four legates found himself in disagreement with his colleagues, he was to keep quiet (*lo tenga almeno in sè*), and not provide a model for those who wanted to see dissension in the council.<sup>224</sup>

<sup>222</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 723.

<sup>223</sup> The imperial ambassador in Rome, Prospero d' Arco, reported on 6 October, "Sua Santità non resta di fare tutte le sorte di carezze al C. di Lorena fino ad andare a visitarlo alle proprie camere sue . . ." (von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, p. 609, note). Note also Averardo Serristori's letter to Cosimo I, dated 3-4 October (Giuseppe Canestrini, ed., *Legazioni di A. Serristori*, Florence, 1853, pp. 392-93): "Il Papa fa al Cardinale di Lorena tutti quei favori che ei saprebbe desiderare, con ogni dimostrazione d'affezione e amore. . . Non voglio lasciar di dire a vostra Eccellenza come questa mattina il Papa si partì dalla sua camera, e accompagnato da alcuni cardinali e ambasciatori e molti altri signori, se ne andò alle stanze del Cardinal di Lorena, e se n'entrò solo seco in una anticamera, dove stettero insieme più di una ora e mezzo, favore sraordinario e insolito." Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 267-268, and Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 93-95.

<sup>224</sup> Susta, IV, no. 68, pp. 303-4. By 2 October Guise had had three conferences with the pope.

<sup>218</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 270, pp. 771-74.

<sup>219</sup> Susta, IV, no. 55, p. 237; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 712.

<sup>220</sup> Susta, IV, no. 56, pp. 243-45. Ferdinand's letter was dated at Pressburg (now Bratislava in Slovakia) on 4-5 September, 1563 (von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCLXXX, pp. 595-97).

<sup>221</sup> Ferrier and his colleagues had requested permission to address the congregation on some matters "che sono pertinenti alla riforma et di non molto momento" (Susta, IV, 255, note, and see esp., *ibid.*, no. 61, pp. 268-72). Ferrier had stated "che il re di Francia era fondator di tutte le chiese Gallicane, . . . che de jure divino era padrone di tutti i beni et frutti et senz' altro mezzo poteva servirsene pro necessitate republicae." He offended even the French prelates. Cf. González de Mendoza, *Lo Sucedido en el Concilio de Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 697-98; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 266-67; Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 129-30.

Pius had high praise for Guise in the consistory that met at S. Peter's on the morning of 8 October. Owing to the cardinal's stalwart character and diligence, he said, the affairs of the council were in a far better state than they had been. He looked now toward a daily improvement. It was not his intention, as some people were falsely alleging, to end or suspend the council in hasty fashion, but he did wish to expedite matters, and bring the conciliar sessions to a fruitful conclusion. One important reason for this was that the bishops should not be kept too long from their dioceses, but should return home as soon as possible to resume their responsibilities. Pius wished, he declared, that all who had churches, including the cardinals, should remain with them. Such was "God's precept." Pius also stressed the sincerity of his desire for reform, and was said to have assured the cardinals that he was going to confirm all the decrees passed by the council.

Some stirring news had apparently just reached Rome. Pius was happy to share it with the consistory. A terrific storm was reported to have struck "Byzantium" in August. Estimates of the damage done on the Bosphorus exceeded 3,000,000 gold ducats (*trices centum millia aureorum*). Many had perished in the storm, but Sultan Suleiman, who happened to be living in the suburbs at the time, had managed to escape death. People said that stones rained down from heaven, and "that a certain building recently put up by the sultan had been struck by lightning and burned down." The whole area of the Turkish capital was overwhelmed by fear, and a rumor or prophecy was being recalled, which had spread abroad many years before, that the end of the Ottoman empire was at hand.

Pius had heard the prophecy many times in the past, from Paul III as well as from others. What could make Christendom ready now to act? Pius was distressed beyond words that the opportunity to attack the Turkish empire (*occasio . . . illius imperii vexandi*) was being lost "in the discords of our princes." The quarrelsome princes had lost other chances which God had given them to strike a decisive blow at the Turks. But Pius prayed that the Almighty would inspire the princes this time to take action. As pope he would not fail to do his duty.<sup>225</sup>

Two years later the Venetian ambassador Giacomo Soranzo, who knew Pius IV well, informed

the Senate that his Holiness had not been well disposed toward France not only because of the Huguenots but also because of the French threats to convoke a national council. The fear of a national council in France had led Pius to summon the Council of Trent. When Guise came to Trent, it was said that he wished to reform the papal electoral process as well as the whole Church. Dissatisfied with the French, Pius used to speak contemptuously of them, "especially of the Queen [Catherine de' Medici] and of the Cardinal of Lorraine."

When the question arose, however, of Guise's being made the papal legate in France,

his Holiness began to make light of his first intentions and to show a desire to reach an accommodation with him. So he called him to Rome, honoring him in every way possible, to such an extent that his Holiness even went on several occasions to visit him in his chambers. In order to bring about the end of the council he promised to make him the perpetual legate of France, to name two cardinals at his instance, and to give precedence to his king. Upon the cardinal's return to Trent the council was brought to an end. . . .<sup>226</sup>

It was not to be all that simple, but when Guise returned to the council (he left Rome on 19 October),<sup>227</sup> he did assist the legates to carry their burden to a successful conclusion.

The day after Guise's departure the pope wrote Morone and the legates,

The cardinal of Lorraine left yesterday, as well satisfied with us as could be. He promises us wonderful things, and we believe that he needn't fail us. We have confidence in him. He has certainly behaved honorably with us, and has asked of us nothing but what is honest and pertinent to the service of God and the faith. We see, furthermore, that his interests are so closely bound up with our own that he has so much the less reason to distrust him. . . .<sup>228</sup>

Guise returned to Trent by way of Venice. He got back to the council on 5 November, says Paleotti, "mira praedicans de sanctitate, religione ac pietate suae Beatitudinis, et in primis de magno illius ardore reformandae Ecclesiae tollendorumque abusuum."<sup>229</sup>

Before Guise had left Rome, the way had been opened to effect the peaceful termination of the

<sup>226</sup> Soranzo, "Relazione di Roma [1565]," in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), pp. 147-48. Cf. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 738.

<sup>227</sup> Von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, p. 611, note, an informal letter of Prospero d' Arco, dated 20 October, 1563.

<sup>228</sup> Susta, IV, no. 77, p. 338, brief dated 20 October, 1563.

<sup>229</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 745.

<sup>225</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 175 ff., by mod. stamped enumeration; Susta, IV, append., no. XXXI, pp. 570 ff.; cf. von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, pp. 609-10.

council. Objections might be anticipated from the Spanish, but the emperor had been won over to concluding the discussions at Trent. After long negotiations Pius IV, through the papal nuncio Zaccaria Delfino, had succeeded in trading papal confirmation of Maximilian's election as king of the Romans for the emperor's agreement to close the council. Despite Maximilian's seeming laxness in dealing with heresy, Pius had sent him assurance of his favor and support on 6 February, 1562, almost ten months before Maximilian's election at Frankfurt am Main (on 24 November).<sup>230</sup> On 18 March (1562) Borromeo had assured Delfino that the pope was delighted "che le cose de la casa et successione di sua Maestà [Ferdinand] sieno in così propinqua speranza di buon esito," and everything that could be done in Rome to help achieve Maximilian's election would be done.<sup>231</sup>

When on 6 June (1562), however, the imperial envoys in Trent gave the conciliar legates a sizable tract, "uno assai giusto volume," containing the emperor's demands for reform, the nature and novelty of which the legates found astonishing,<sup>232</sup> the pope quickly lost his desire for Maximilian's elevation to the kingship of the Romans. Neither the legates nor the Curia had received the slightest forewarning of the emperor's intention to interfere in this way in the already troublesome affairs of the council. The pope resented the emperor's lack of consideration.

Pius was also doubtful about Ferdinand's negotiations for peace with the Porte, which would help free the Turks for further attacks upon Italy. Thus on 27 June (1562) Borromeo wrote Delfino,

His Holiness cannot but be pleased that the emperor is seeking a settlement and arranging his affairs with the Sultan [Suleiman], presupposing the fact that he is doing this, however, only for the lifetime of the present sultan, and with the intention of availing himself later on, at the sultan's death, of the opportunity which God will provide of our being able to recover in a few days what we have lost in the course of so many years.

In this same letter, moreover, Borromeo linked the pope's confirmation of Maximilian's expected election as king of the Romans with Ferdinand's

co-operation in the conduct of conciliar business. Although upon reconsideration Pius had this passage deleted from Borromeo's letter to Delfino, the secret was revealed. It was a winning card; Pius preferred to keep it up his sleeve, and use it later. As early, therefore, as June, 1562, as Steinherz has noted, the pope had decided that the price of his recognition of Maximilian as his father's successor might well be Ferdinand's agreement to close the council.<sup>233</sup>

Although Pius IV had expressed pleasure in Maximilian's election, months had passed. As pope he required proof of Maximilian's orthodoxy and assurance that he would always defend Catholicism in the welter of German heresy. But now the time had come. As Guise had softened his tone, and was becoming the pope's ally, Delfino finally brought negotiations with Ferdinand to a most satisfactory conclusion. With some excitement Delfino wrote the legates from Pressburg (Bratislava) on 4 October, 1563, that his imperial Majesty after due consideration of the state of the world "et particolarmente del sacro Concilio" had wisely come to the firm belief that the desire expressed by many of the fathers to finish the council with the very next session was "honesto et conveniente." Ferdinand had, therefore, instructed his ambassadors in Trent to help the legates remove all the difficulties in the way of closure, and bring the council as soon as possible to an end with the very next session.<sup>234</sup>

At daybreak on 10 October the courier bearing Delfino's news and the emperor's instructions to his ambassadors arrived in Trent. The legates sent him on to Rome. They were hard at work on the proposed decree on the sacrament of marriage as well as that on general reform. As for the chapter on "riforma secolare," i.e., the reform of princes, the legates were (in accord with the pope's instructions) making such changes therein as should ease their guiding the council to a proper close. They wanted whatever directions Borromeo wished to send them. How should they deal with Claudio

<sup>230</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 7, pp. 17-18, papal brief dated 6 February, 1562. On the same day Pius had written Ferdinand of his desire to contribute "ad augendum filii dignitatem" (*ibid.*, introd., pp. XLII-XLIII, 18).

<sup>231</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 13, p. 29, and *cf.* *ibid.*, no. 25, p. 55.

<sup>232</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 28, pp. 62-64, a letter of the legates to Delfino, dated 8 June, 1562.

<sup>233</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 31, pp. 74-75, letter of Borromeo to Delfino, dated 27 June, 1562, and see, *ibid.*, p. XLIII, to the effect that papal recognition of Maximilian as king of the Romans was now put "in Verbindung mit der Concilsangelegenheit . . . d. h. für die Approbation Maximilians die Zustimmung des Kaisers zum Schlusse des Concils zu erlangen sei."

<sup>234</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 131, p. 440. Delfino wrote three letters to Morone, spelling out the count of Luna's efforts to dissuade Ferdinand from agreeing to the closure: Luna's letters were "full of venom toward Rome, your most illustrious lordship, and your colleagues" (*ibid.*, pp. 441 ff.).

Fernández Vigil de Quiñones, the count of Luna.<sup>235</sup>

In addition to the legates' usual joint dispatch to Rome, Morone wrote Borromeo at length (on 10 October). The emperor would go along with the legates' thirty-five chapters on general reform, although he had wanted something more. With regard, however, to the thirty-fifth chapter, "which relates to the secular princes," Ferdinand preferred confirming the ancient canons to producing new decrees, making specific suggestions here and there. "And to tell the truth," Morone declared,

I should also much prefer that the old canons be renewed because, as I understand it, there are many which are much rougher [on the princes] and more favorable to the Church than these with which we are at present dealing, besides the fact that they have already been approved by other councils, and accepted and approved by the world at large as well as by the princes themselves. They will also meet less objection than any new canon which we might produce now. . . .

The old canons on the princes—"secular reform"—would only require a *placet* to confirm them. One would not have to listen to the interminable "votes" or statements (*vota*) of the garrulous fathers. It could be done without controversy.<sup>236</sup>

It was hard to tell how successful Luna's efforts to prolong the council might be, but the legates were confident the next session would be held on 11 November, the feast of S. Martin. They hoped that it would be the last session. On 13 October they presented the fathers with the fourth recension of the decree *de sacramento matrimonii*, in twelve canons and ten chapters, which were reconsidered (with less disagreement) in general congregations of 26-27 October.<sup>237</sup> Meanwhile in Rome Pius IV had been rejoicing in the emperor's willingness to see the council draw to a hasty close.

Pius also approved of the emperor's idea of confirming "the old canons and councils and imperial laws" rather than seeking to push too much reform legislation through the council. Borromeo suggested it would be desirable to specify "what

canons and what laws" they were talking about. When Luna saw that a majority of the fathers were ready to end the council, he would throw in his hand. Otherwise there was no need to worry about him, but one must show him "varie sorti di amorevolezze." While it was most important to avoid a break with Philip II, in conformity with the "resoluzioni" of his imperial Majesty, the legates must concentrate on "la fine del Concilio."<sup>238</sup>

Maximilian had obviously played a part in his father's agreement to close the council as soon as might prove practicable. In the consistory which met on Friday, 15 October, the pope had words of high praise for Maximilian.<sup>239</sup>

In Trent there was still a lot of work to do. Morone was doing most of it. On 8 October he and his colleagues appointed eighteen fathers to recast the first twenty (sometimes counted as twenty-one) canons *de reformatione generali*. Three days later they divided the eighteen into three committees to work concurrently.<sup>240</sup> On Friday, 22 October, at about 7:00 P.M., the eighteen *deputati* gathered to begin work on their revision of the chapters on general reform. They had considered, according to Paleotti, the 203 different statements (*vota, suffragia*) on reform which the fathers had made in the general congregations.

The meetings of the eighteen *deputati* were held in Morone's palace. It was no small task to effect a synthesis of the repetitious and contradictory opinions of the bishops and others who had expressed themselves, sometimes at quite unnecessary length. The eighteen (Paleotti says sixteen) worked through 30 October.<sup>241</sup> The twenty canons they drafted were discussed and debated in eleven general congregations from 2 through 8 November, with long *vota* being voiced on 4 November by Martín Pérez de Ayala, bishop of Segovia, and on the seventh by Melchor Álvarez de Vozmediano, bishop of the ancient see of Guadix in the south of Spain. Pérez de Ayala was more disgruntled than his Spanish colleague.<sup>242</sup>

<sup>235</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 134, pp. 465-66, and Šusta, IV, nos. 74-74a, pp. 327-33, letters of Borromeo dated 15 October, 1563.

<sup>236</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 180<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, and cf. Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, p. 466, note.

<sup>237</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 316, p. 885; cf. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 737-38. As noted above, the twenty canons are given, *ibid.*, IX, no. 324, pp. 906-11.

<sup>238</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 319, pp. 891-98; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 737.

<sup>239</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 324-37, pp. 906-55; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 743-46.

<sup>235</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 69, pp. 305-6, letter of the legates to Borromeo, dated 10 October, 1563. Delfino had done well; he was an adroit diplomat. In a letter of 9 November (1563) Maximilian recommended Delfino to Borromeo for promotion to the Sacred College in the next creation of cardinals (Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II-3, no. 140, p. 481), which was done on 12 March, 1565 (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III, 40b).

<sup>236</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 69a, esp. pp. 308-9.

<sup>237</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 318, 320-23, pp. 888-90, 898-906.

The eighteen *deputati* met again at Morone's palace on 9 and 10 November to put the final touches on the twenty (or twenty-one) *canones de reformatione*. Most of them agreed to add the phrase "saving the authority of the Apostolic See" (*salva Apostolicae Sedis auctoritate*) to the decree on reform. They had discussed it at length. A general congregation was assembled at about 1:00 P.M. (*hora 2*) on 10 November to approve the decrees to be presented to the session, which could now be held on the following day. Although Guise was an inveterate defender of the freedom of the Gallican Church, he was of much assistance to the legates, who might have had trouble with him on the thirty-fifth canon of the decree on the reform of the princes, but this was not yet at issue. In any event, despite considerable opposition to the chapter on clandestine marriages, approval was given to proceed to the session.

The legates' right of proposal (*proponentibus legatis*) was also accepted unanimously when Morone explained that it was in no way intended to limit the freedom of the council. He also stated that another session after the one on the morrow would obviously be needed to consider the remaining fifteen chapters on "general reform," of which the last (the thirty-fifth) was concerned with the princes. There were also several dogmatic questions still to be dealt with. The date for the presumably last session was set for 9 December although, if possible, it might be held earlier.<sup>243</sup> It would be held earlier.

At about 8:00 A.M. on Thursday morning, 11 November (1563), the conciliar fathers gathered in the upper part of the cathedral church of S. Vigilio for the twenty-fourth session of the council, the eighth under Pius IV. It was to be a long session, lasting until about 7:00 P.M. According to Pedro González de Mendoza, the bishop of Salamanca, once the fathers had taken their seats, they never moved from them for "twelve hours."<sup>244</sup> At

any rate the proceedings and "votes" probably took more than eleven hours. The roster of those in attendance was headed by the legates Morone, Simonetta, and Navagero. Hosius was ill, and could not appear, but he was to make a brief statement (*votum*) the next day. There were present the ambassadors of the Empire, Portugal, Venice, Poland, Savoy, Florence, and the Knights of S. John. Most important in the assembly, of course, were the numerous prelates—Guise and Madruzzo, three patriarchs, twenty-five archbishops, at least one hundred and fifty-four bishops, five abbots, six generals of Orders, and three doctors of the civil and canon law.<sup>245</sup>

Giorgio Corner (Cornaro), bishop of Treviso, celebrated a solemn mass of the Holy Spirit. François Richardot, bishop of Arras, preached the sermon.<sup>246</sup> The prelates donned their "pluvialia et mitrae," hymns were sung, and letters read from Margaret of Parma, who ruled the Netherlands for Philip II; Cosimo I de' Medici, duke of Florence and Siena; and Jean de la Valette, the grand master of the Knights of S. John. Corner then read the twelve canons and ten "chapters" of the decree on marriage. The first chapter, inc. *Tametsi non est dubitandum*, declared clandestine marriages invalid. Marriages must be performed by a priest in the presence of two or three witnesses, and must be duly recorded in the parish register, which was to be carefully preserved.<sup>247</sup> The *Tametsi* is the best known of the chapters of the decree on marriage.

A number of fathers could vote *placent omnia*, but some objected to the proposed enactment invalidating clandestine marriages. It was one thing to prohibit them, another to declare them null and void. So many fathers had something to say that the "voting" took a long time. Finally, however, when the results had been tallied, the president Morone declared that the doctrinal chapters and condemnatory canons had been approved. A majority of the voting members had accepted the invalidity of clandestine marriages despite the op-

<sup>243</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 338–39, pp. 955–64; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 747–48.

<sup>244</sup> González de Mendoza, *Lo Sucedió en el Concilio de Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 711, lines 14–16: "Duró el votar hasta las ocho de la noche [i.e., an hour longer than stated in the *acta* of Massarelli], de suerte que estubimos doce horas sin levantar de un lugar, por la mucha diversidad que avia de votos y ser las cosas que se tratan en la reformatione de manera que lastiman a muchos." According to Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 749, line 32, the session began at the fifteenth hour (8:00 A.M.), and closed at the third hour of the night (8:00 P.M.). Cf. Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 288, note 7.

<sup>245</sup> Cf. Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 342, pp. 1004–1007, the *acta* of Massarelli, who gives the names of only 154 bishops as in attendance at the twenty-fourth session of the council. Elsewhere Massarelli notes in his *acta* that the fathers cast, all told, 203 votes in this session (*ibid.*, IX, no. 344, p. 1008, lines 36–37). For Hosius's *votum* on 12 November, note, *ibid.*, no. 343, pp. 1007–8.

<sup>246</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 341, pp. 1000–4.

<sup>247</sup> Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 340, p. 969, lines 14–15, from the *Tametsi*: "Habeat parochus librum, in quo coniugum et testium nomina diemque et locum contracti matrimonii describat, quem diligenter apud se custodiat."



position of fifty (or fifty-five) fathers, among whom was Simonetta. Morone approved the decree, "si a sanctissimo domino nostro approbatum fuerit," i.e., he approved if the pope did.

Bishop Corner of Treviso, who had remained in the ambo during the whole period of the voting, read the now twenty-one canons on reform, which a majority of the fathers had accepted on the day before. The voting which followed seemed interminable, but Morone finally declared that the decree on reform had been approved "by almost all," *ferè ab omnibus*. The additions and alterations which had been proposed, he said, "did not change the substance" in any of the twenty-one canons. The fathers were then reminded that the next session would be held on 9 December; to this at least they could all say, "aye," *placet*. Morone then began the *Te Deum laudamus*. The singers took up the hymn, at the end of which Morone blessed the assembly, "and all the fathers removed their robes, and departed at about the second hour of the night" [about 7:00 P.M.].<sup>248</sup>

Much work remained to be done. Some of it would get done before the close of the council. Although a majority of the fathers had accepted all the canons of the decree on reform, there was strong objection to the third, fifth, and sixth canons relating to visitations and the episcopate. The disputed canons were, therefore, returned to the eighteen *deputati*, who modified them (on 12 and 15 November); they were formally republished on 3 December, just before the final session of the council.<sup>249</sup> On the morning of 13 November Morone gathered in his residence (at the Palazzo Thun) the three legates, Guise and Madruzzo, and twenty-five of the "principal prelates of all the nations." They agreed that the next session should be the last.

The emperor and the king of the Romans wanted to see the council end. Its continuance

would do nothing but harm in Germany. The Italian states, especially Venice, were eager to have done with the council. The ambassadors of Portugal, Poland, and Spain were in full agreement. Philip II had allegedly written Luna to assist in "la prosecutione et fine del Concilio." Philip's position remained ambiguous, however, and both Andrés de Cuesta, bishop of León, and Antonio Agustín, bishop of Lérida, wanted to await his express consent. Guerrero of Granada was convinced of the necessity of closure with the next session. So was Guise, who was gravely concerned about France.

The pope had seen very clearly, said Guise, the urgent necessity of summoning the universal council. Otherwise a national council would have been held in France, "from which there would probably have resulted the complete separation of that kingdom from obedience to the Apostolic See." According to Guise, the clergy and estates of France, having gathered at Poissy [in September, 1561], had been induced only with great difficulty to await the end of the council assembled at Trent "senza far altra novità," i.e., not to have recourse to a national council unless the universal Council of Trent should fail to find remedies for the ills which beset the Church.

Now, however, it was in the interests of the faith in France quickly to end the council. The French prelates could remain at Trent no longer. Most of them had already gone. Guise said that he would also have to leave "within a few days" for the affairs of his house as well as for those of the kingdom of France. Still, if the council was to end with the session on 9 December, he would delay his departure, "more reassured and better able to reassure others by taking them salutary medicines."<sup>250</sup>

On 13 November the archbishop of Prague, Anton Brus von Müglitz, the emperor's ambassador in Trent, addressed an informal congregation of bishops, advocating closure of the council and urging confirmation of the Florentine decree on Purgatory as well as the Tridentine decrees on penance and the sacrifice of the mass. He suggested that the secular princes should not be "provoked to malevolence" (by the "chapter" on the

<sup>248</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 340, pp. 965-1000; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 749-50; Jedin, *Konzil von Trent*, IV-2, 159-63. Late in the evening of 11 November Morone wrote Borromeo that he was thankful the session had gone so well, "perchè siamo usciti de più pericolosi scogli che havessimo in questo mare del Concilio, il quale veramente può chiamarsi mare per il continuo suo fluctuare, et certo il tutto è passato con quiete assai maggiore ch' io non pensavo et con soddisfazione delle nationi et dell' ambasciatori et di tutto il sinodo." He says that the session had lasted "dalle 16 hore fino alle due di notte et più" (Šusta, IV, no. 87, pp. 379 ff.). Even Luna was said to be pleased, and was now looking forward to the end of the council (*ibid.*, no. 88, pp. 384-85).

<sup>249</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 344-45, pp. 1008-11; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 750-51.

<sup>250</sup> Šusta, IV, no. 89, pp. 385 ff., letters of the legates to Borromeo, dated 13-14 November, 1563, and cf. Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 751. The imperial ambassadors expected to be recalled if the council did not end soon (Šusta, IV, no. 91, pp. 396-97, and cf. von Sicken, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCXCIV, pp. 639-40).

*reformatio principum*), for the Church needed their support "as never before." They should merely be exhorted to do their duty according to the canons of the Church and the laws of the Empire, and benignly to help maintain ecclesiastical freedom.<sup>251</sup>

When prepared for discussion some two months earlier (about 15 September) the thirty-fifth chapter on reform, which related to the princes, had contained twelve separate articles.<sup>252</sup> Now it was reduced, as Paleotti says, to a general formula of empty words,<sup>253</sup> renewing the "sacred canons and all the general councils as well as other Apostolic legislation on behalf of ecclesiastical freedom and against those who violate it."

To cut short the unending disputations Morone's commission of twenty-five (along with the legates, Guise, and Madruzzo) decided that the dogmas which remained to be considered—Purgatory, images, the veneration of saints, and indulgences—had already been dealt with sufficiently by past councils. It would, therefore, be enough to condemn certain abuses, *satis nunc esse paucis decretis abusus quosdam damnare*, and let it go at that.<sup>254</sup> The first twenty-one canons of reform had already been considered. Examination of the remaining fourteen began in a general congregation on 15 November, and was concluded on the eighteenth.

Most of the fathers complacently accepted the watered-down chapter on the reform of princes, but there were some objections: The princes should receive a more forceful admonition. The goods of clerics must be made exempt from their "tithes and taxes." Princes must not oppress their subjects with intolerable burdens, nor allow the practice of usury in their domains. Papal letters must not require their *placet* for publication, and so forth.<sup>255</sup> There was no strident debate, although as usual some voting member of the council chose to find fault with something.

On 18 November the text of six entirely new canons of reform, based upon the fathers' past censures and complaints, was distributed. In ad-

dition to the proper employment of church revenues, excommunication, the payment of tithes, and a few other matters, the compilers of these *six canones novi reformationis* wanted to see an archive established in every cathedral and collegiate church, in which all documents should be kept which had to do with the church, the bishop, or the chapter.<sup>256</sup>

To these six new canons there were added, two days later, two new decrees, one on the reform of regulars, the other on that of nuns. These canons and decrees were gone over with some care in general congregations from 23 to 27 November.<sup>257</sup> Up until this time Claudio Fernández, the count of Luna, had been surprisingly amiable, offering no objection to the termination of the council with the coming twenty-fifth session. Now, however, he argued against closure on 9 December, for the theologians would not have time enough to study the full implications of decrees on Purgatory, indulgences, images, and the veneration of saints. Also Luna was again indignant at the thought of the legates' ending the council without Philip II's consent to the date of closure.<sup>258</sup>

Once more Morone gathered at the Palazzo. Then his fellow legates, Guise, Madruzzo, and a large number of prelates, in fact forty-four of the more active and more pro-papal bishops at the council. This time he also invited the ambassadors of the Empire, Poland, Savoy, and Florence. The question was, Would the council close on 9 December? Guise gave several reasons why he had to return to France before Christmas, including the fact that Charles IX had summoned him home. The archbishop of Granada approved of the date posted for the next session, but he wanted a twenty-sixth session to be held two weeks thereafter, so that everything might be more properly finished. Most of the prelates wanted to end the

<sup>251</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 346, pp. 1011–12.

<sup>252</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 270, pp. 771–74.

<sup>253</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 753: "... id caput [no. 35] in generalem quandam formulam et fere inanem verborum sonum redactum," which is no exaggeration, as the revised chapter 35 itself makes sadly clear (*ibid.*, IX, no. 347, pp. 1013–14, and note Susta, IV, no. 73a, pp. 326–27).

<sup>254</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 751, lines 26 ff.; Susta, IV, no. 89B, pp. 388–89, letter of the legates, dated 14 November, 1563.

<sup>255</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 348–54, pp. 1014–33.

<sup>256</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 355, p. 1035, can. 4: "In qualibet ecclesia cathedrali vel collegiata archivium [sic] publicum constituatur, in quo scripturae omnes conserventur, quae ad ecclesiam, episcopum vel capitulum, communiter vel divisim, pertinent. In eodem quoque cathedralis ecclesiae archivio scripturae omnes includantur, quae ad inferiores ecclesias et quaecumque alia secularia beneficia in dioecesi spectant. Porro duo custodes deputentur, qui non sint de capitulo et quorum unus ab episcopo, alter vero a capitulo eligatur, sintque hi viri honesti et probatae fidei, a quibus etiam iuramentum et fideiussores idonei exigantur. . . ."

<sup>257</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, nos. 356–66, pp. 1036–69; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 755–57; Susta, IV, no. 90, p. 393; and on the reform of regulars and nuns, cf. Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 172–75.

<sup>258</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 757; Susta, IV, nos. 89a, 95a, pp. 390–91, 415 ff.

council on 9 December. Two more decrees could easily be drafted, they said, one on Purgatory, the other on images and the veneration of saints, the purpose of the decrees being to correct abuses. Established dogmas could be confirmed, others put aside.

During the next two days, on 29-30 November, Luna put up a determined fight against closure, summoning the Spanish bishops to his lodgings, and urging the forty or so prelates whose sees were located in the Neapolitan kingdom to take a firm stand against ending the council in a mere ten days. There were dogmatic decisions still to be made. Philip II had not consented to the hasty closure. All the Italian bishops, however, except for two or three, told Luna that the opportunity which various circumstances now offered to close the council must not be lost. The French were leaving Trent. Luna's meeting with the Italian prelates, also at his residence, lasted until about 7:00 P.M. (on 30 November). An hour or two later he received word from Requesens, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, that Pius IV was gravely, perilously ill, *sanctissimum nostrum gravi et periculo morbo laborare*.<sup>259</sup>

Cardinal Borromeo had warned Morone and Simonetta of the pope's illness in a letter of 27 November, which was not received in Trent until 1 December, by which time the legates were more fully informed. Paleotti puts the arrival of Requesens's courier in Trent at 9:00 P.M. (on 30 November). The legates put it an hour earlier. In any event the ailing count of Luna must have spent as sleepless a night as the legates.<sup>260</sup> In Luna's meeting with the Italian prelates, only a few hours before he had received Requesens's letter, someone had suggested that the council should close as soon as possible, for it was always conceivable that the pope might die. Luna had scoffed at the idea.

The legates now summoned all the ambassadors to ask what should be done. Should one seek to end the council immediately or await further news from Rome? The ambassadors wanted to take

counsel until the evening. If the pope died while the council was still assembled, there was a danger that the fathers might claim the right to elect his successor (. . . *periculum erat ne eius electio a patribus in Concilio tanquam ad se spectans vindicaretur*). The French conciliarists might well move in this direction. Nevertheless, Guise advised immediate closure and so, after some hesitation, did the imperial ambassadors. The Portuguese envoy agreed with them "ut quam primum Concilium claudatur." Although Luna now toned down his objections, he was loath to join them, but it did seem clear that he would not try to prevent the coming end of the council, "non havendo commissione del re di farlo."

As the legates wrote Borromeo, however, on the evening of 1 December, Luna was certainly to be commended for one thing: He had conferred with the Spanish prelates and the imperial ambassadors, and they had all declared that if the pope died before the closure, the council was not to interfere in the cardinals' election of his successor.<sup>261</sup>

On Thursday morning, 2 December, the legates brought together the ecclesiastical envoys, such as Anton Brus and Drasković, and some fifty prelates "of diverse nations." They put the same question to the gathering. What was to be done? "They all replied, except for a few Spaniards and three Italians," according to the auditor Paleotti,

that the council must be ended at once. The material which had already been prepared should be presented [to the conciliar fathers], and there must be no further delay. The legates, therefore, decided to hold a general congregation on that very day. . . .

The congregation met at about 2:00 P.M. (*hora 21*). Morone asked the fathers to be brief in the statement of their *vota*, and later to submit written texts to the secretary.

Bartolommeo Sirigo, the bishop of Castellanea, read the decree on Purgatory, and thereafter that on sacred images, veneration, and the relics of the saints. Mostly the legates received the *placets* they needed, but one father wanted mention made of the Council of Florence in connection with Pur-

<sup>259</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 757-58; Susta, IV, nos. 96-96a, 99, pp. 420-26, 434 ff. The Spanish ambassador in Rome, Vargas's successor, was the Castilian nobleman Don Luis de Zúñiga y Requesens. Vargas had left Rome on 12 October, 1563 (Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII [repr. 1957], 549, note 5).

<sup>260</sup> Susta, IV, nos. 98-99, pp. 431-37, exchange of letters between Borromeo and the legates, dated 27 November and 1 December, 1563. In a postscript to his letter Borromeo added, "Dopo scritta questa sua Santità mi ha comesso che io solitico con ogni efficacia le Signorrie vostre illustrissime ad anticipar la sessione più che sia mai possibile. . . ."

<sup>261</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 758-59; Susta, IV, no. 99, pp. 435-36; Beccadelli, *Monumenti*, ed. Morandii, II, 150-52; von Sicking, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils*, no. CCXCVI, pp. 642-43, a letter of the imperial ambassadors at Trent to Ferdinand, dated 2 December. On Pius IV's condition, see the reports of Prospero d' Arco from Rome, *ibid.*, pp. 643-44, notes, and the Acta Consistorialia, in Ehlers, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, append., no. XIII, pp. 1141-42.

gatory. Another wanted to hear the theologians first; when certain questions had been answered, he still desired further discussion. Obviously there was no time; he said he would give his opinion in the coming session. Purgatory was more troublesome than images. At length Sirigo could read the decree on general reform. Special attention was given to the proposed legislation on the exemption of cathedral chapters from episcopal control, the canons relating to regulars and nuns, and the problem of grants in *commendam*.

The *vota* were numerous and varied, but expeditiously pronounced. When they were finished, Morone declared that the decrees would be emended *iuxta sententias patrum*, which was to be no small task. It took until midnight for a deputation to give the final touch to the canon on the exemption of cathedral chapters. Morone then proposed that the formal session be held on 3 and 4 December, almost a week earlier than planned. They would have to work all day. The decrees to be passed must be read aloud, as was done in the time of Paul III and Julius III.

Everyone knew by now that the situation was grave. If some disaster should occur (such as the pope's death), Morone said that all their labors and all their decrees might prove to have been in vain, for the peoples of Europe might not accept them. There could be no calamity worse for the Church than the suspension or dissolution of the unfinished council which, deriving its authority from the pope (as Morone saw it), would have to await the decision of his successor. Then there would probably be national councils, especially in France, and they would take no account of the Tridentine decrees. The remaining French prelates were preparing to leave the council.

Morone asked the fathers to pray for the pope: "Sanctitas enim sua diligit vos ut filios." He then requested their approval for the session to be held on 3 and 4 December, and placed his trust in the Almighty that this would be the end of the council. All but fourteen fathers gave him their *placets* to begin the next (and last) session on the following day. "Then all rose," says Massarelli, "and shedding abundant tears for joy, they left [the church] at the third hour of the night," i.e., 8:00 P.M. The congregation had lasted at least six hours.<sup>262</sup>

<sup>262</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 759-61; Ehes, *ibid.*, IX, no. 368, pp. 1069-76; González de Mendoza, *Lo Sucedido en el Concilio de Trento*, *ibid.*, II, 718; Paulme, *Fragmenta*, *ibid.*, II, 875-76.

On the evening of 2 December the legates wrote Borromeo

At 7:00 A.M. the next morning, 3 December, the presidents and fathers of the council assembled in the upper part of the cathedral church of S. Vigilio to begin the twenty-fifth and last session, the ninth under Pius IV. Reassuring news had already reached Trent of a marked improvement in the pope's condition,<sup>263</sup> but the legates hurried on with the proceedings, thankful that the end was apparently in sight. Pompeo Zambeccari, bishop of Sulmona, celebrated the usual mass of the Holy Spirit; Girolamo Ragazzoni, titular bishop of Nazianzus in Asia Minor and coadjutor of Famagusta in Cyprus, preached the sermon.<sup>264</sup> Ragazzoni told the fathers this was a bright day for Christendom: the Tridentine ship was coming safely into port.

Zambeccari read the decrees on Purgatory, on the invocation, veneration, and relics of the saints, and on sacred images. Angelo Massarelli, Bartolommeo Sirigo, and the notaries collected the written *vota*, which were all *placets* except two. Álvarez de Vozmediano, bishop of Guadix, was one of the two; he said that while he approved of the truth of the articles, he certainly disapproved of the haste with which they were being pushed through the council. Zambeccari then read the twenty-two "chapters" of the (now single) decree on regulars and nuns and the twenty-one chapters of the historic *decretum de reformatione generalis*. The nineteenth chapter of the decree on general reform condemned the *detestabilis duellorum usus*, and declared excommunicate all duelists, their seconds, and all witnesses to the barbarous practice of "single combat" (*monomachia*). The twenty-first chapter reasserted the inevitable precept that no conciliar decree could impair the authority of the Apostolic See.

Again Massarelli, Sirigo, and the notaries collected the votes. Forty fathers took exception to the (fourteenth) chapter *de regularibus* relating to the punishment of delinquent monks. Another forty objected to the weak (twenty-first) chapter *de regularibus* allowing continuance of the evil

"che per gratia di Dio sono passati tutti gli articoli della riforma che s'erano dati a li padri et similmente quelli del purgatorio, delle imagini et delle reliquie et invocazione de santi, talmente che di tutti i voti non ne sono stati se non quattordici contrarii, cioè è dodici Spagnuoli et duo Italiani, et s'è risoluto di far la sessione domani . . ." (Šusta, IV, no. 100, p. 100). According to Lodovico Nucci, Paleotti's secretary, the congregation had still not ended at 9:00 P.M. (*Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 760, note 5): "Hora, che sono circa le 4 di notte, la congregazione non è anchor finita. . ."

<sup>263</sup> Cf. Šusta, IV, no. 102, p. 441.

<sup>264</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 370, pp. 1098-1103.

practice of granting monasteries, priories, and other benefices in *commendam*. Morone declared, however, that the decrees as a whole had been "approved by almost all." It was agreed to continue the session on the next day. The fathers left the cathedral at about 3:30 P.M.<sup>265</sup>

The last general congregation met in the Palazzo Thun at about 8:00 A.M. on 4 December. The brief decrees to be published on the second day of the session were read. The first was the decree on indulgences. Morone said frankly that in his opinion this proposed decree should be deferred "ob rei dignitatem et gravitatem ac temporis angustiam:" the subject was too important, there was too little time. That was his opinion; his colleagues were to make up their own minds. Indulgences had been a serious matter for almost fifty years, ever since Luther had issued his ninety-five theses in 1517. Hosius, Simonetta, and Navagero apparently had nothing to say, but Guise spoke at length on the necessity of the decree, and presently it was approved by a majority of the fathers.

"Some words [in the decree *de indulgentiis*], however, were then dropped," says Paleotti,

which expressly forbade the assessment of certain sums as taxes for the purpose of getting indulgences, nor should any indulgences of the sort called "suspensions" be granted. These words were removed as a friendly gesture to the count of Luna, who said that they seemed designed on purpose to denote the Spanish *Cruzada*.<sup>266</sup>

The *Cruzada* was a source of considerable income to his Catholic Majesty.

Decrees were also read on fasts and feast days, the index of forbidden books, the catechism, the breviary, and the missal. A decree was read admonishing the princes "not to allow the decrees of the council to be violated by heretics." It was also proposed that all the conciliar decrees passed in the time of Paul III and Julius III should be reread at the coming session, "quod omnibus placuit." Morone had crowded a good deal into an hour, but he was impatient. "Now we shall go to the church," he said, "with the intention, if it

please you, my fathers, of bringing to an end and closing this sacred council. . . ."<sup>267</sup>

It is no great distance from the Palazzo Thun to the cathedral church of S. Vigilio, where (according to Massarelli) the fathers assembled by about 9:00 A.M. Niccolò Maria Caracciolo, bishop of Catania in Sicily, celebrated the "missa solemnis de Spiritu Sancto." There was no sermon. As usual at the opening of a session a plenary indulgence was published "by apostolic authority." The four legates, the two cardinals, and all the prelates donned their "pluvialia et mitrae," a prayer was said, and all were seated in their accustomed places. Caracciolo read the brief decrees on indulgences, on fasts and feast days, on the index, catechism, breviary, and missal, on the seating of the ambassadors at the council, and on the reception and observance of the numerous conciliar decrees.

According to the first of these decrees (*de indulgentiis*), indulgences were a gift of Christ to the Church. They dated from olden times, were constructive, and had received conciliar confirmation. The decree pronounced anathema on those who declared them useless or denied that it lay within the authority of the Church to grant them. Indulgences should be conceded with moderation, however, "lest ecclesiastical discipline be too easily weakened." Abuses must be corrected and avoided; indulgences must not yield ill-gotten gains (*pravi quaestus*). The bishops should consider other abuses arising from ignorance or superstition, when they met in provincial synods, and should refer all such problems to the Roman pontiff.

No assumptions as to rank, privilege, or authority were to be drawn from the order of precedence assigned to either ecclesiastical or lay ambassadors in the seating, processional, or other arrangements which had been made at the council. All the rights and prerogatives of emperor, kings, and princes remained after the council no more and no less than they had been before it. Such was the decree *de loco oratorum*. As for the last decree which Caracciolo read (on the reception and observance of the decrees), the princes must take care that heretics did not distort or repudiate the conciliar enactments, for which the Church had paid a heavy price. So many bishops, drawn from the far provinces of Christendom, could not be away from their churches for so long "without

<sup>265</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 369, pp. 1076-98; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 761-62, and Nucci, *ibid.*, p. 761, note 3; Jedin, *Konzil von Trient*, IV-2, 177-85, 291, note 12. On Pius IV's urgent desire to close the council, note Susta, IV, no. 103, pp. 443-44, a letter of Pius to the legates, written at Rome on 30 November (by which time he felt "better than before"), and received in Trent on 4 December.

<sup>266</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 762, lines 10-13.

<sup>267</sup> Eheses, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 371, pp. 1103-4; Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, *ibid.*, III-1, 761-62.

great loss to their flocks and widespread peril." Nevertheless, the conciliar fathers had been fighting for the faith, and had condemned the chief heretical errors of the time. They were handing on to the future "vera et catholica doctrina."

Masarelli, Sirigo, and the notaries collected the votes. When they had been tallied, Morone announced unanimous approval except for the desire of twenty fathers to restore the words impugning the Spanish *Cruzada*. Álvarez de Vozmediano, bishop of Guadix, wanted no indulgences allowed "without just cause." The council had decided that all the decrees passed in the earlier sessions under Paul III and Julius III should be reread. Caracciolo now read, therefore, those relating to dogma; to save time, however, he read only the beginning of those concerned with reform. The subscription of the French was thus gained to the decrees of the first two periods of the council, at which they had not been represented.

At long last Cardinal Morone could ask the assembled fathers whether they were ready to terminate the council and to request papal confirmation of all the decrees passed in all three periods of their prolonged labors. They all gave an unqualified *placet* except Pedro Guerrero of Granada, who declared: "Placet quod finiat, sed non peto confirmationem!" It was the end. Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, following an ancient custom, started to chant the *laudes* or *acclamations*, to which the fathers made the responses in a joyful unison. Caracciolo reminded the voting members not to leave Trent, under pain of excommunication, without subscribing to the decrees. Morone began the *Te Deum laudamus*. When the hymn was finished, he turned to face the assembly, blessing them *signo crucis*. His last words as president of the council were, "Most reverend fathers, go in peace!"<sup>268</sup>

The endorsement of the Tridentine decrees bears the signatures of the four presidents of the council, Cardinals de Guise and Madruzzo, three patriarchs, twenty-five archbishops, one hundred and sixty-nine bishops, seven abbots, seven generals of Orders, and the subscriptions of the procurators of a number of absent prelates.<sup>269</sup> They

had made history, and they knew it. During the last session Álvarez de Vozmediano had wanted a definite statement as to the time and place of the next general council.<sup>270</sup> It was just as well that no one could tell him it would be held at the Vatican three centuries later (in 1869–1870). It might have introduced a discordant note into the joyous last hours of the council.

"I could not explain here," writes Paleotti at the conclusion of his *Acta Tridentina*,

the heartfelt exultation with which all the fathers rejoiced, and recognized God as truly the author of so many blessings, as they gave Him their thanks. In the very midst of the session I saw many grave prelates shedding tears of joy, and congratulating one another—those who had previously been quite hostile! When the time came for the "acclamations," which even at that [last] hour struck many of them as something strange and quite unexpected, all were seized with wonder. Applause broke out, and rapture. There was no one who did not show in his face, his words, his entire person an absolute ecstasy, thanking God, to Whom honor, virtue, and glory forever and ever.<sup>271</sup>

As soon as Pius IV had recovered from what was regarded as a serious illness, he summoned a general consistory, which met in the Sala di Costantino in the Vatican Palace (on 12 December, 1563). He was eloquent in the expression of his gratitude to the Almighty "ut finem videret Concilii Tridentini," emphasizing the fact that he had given the legates and fathers at Trent full freedom. According to Pius, he had done this

because he had believed it more pleasing and acceptable to God. . . . If there were need, he would convene the council all over again, and he would certainly confirm the acts of the Council of Trent. . . . If anything were lacking by way of reform, he would add it! Finally, he wished all [bishops] to leave [Rome] for their churches: he would not exempt anyone, nor would he accept anyone's excuses.

were prepared on 6 December (1563) for the lay and ecclesiastical envoys of the princes, including Dr. Niccolò da Ponte and Matteo Dandolo of Venice, Anton Brus, Sigmund von Thun, Georg Drasković, et omnes al. (*ibid.*, nos. 374–75, pp. 1120–22).

<sup>270</sup> Ehlers, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 372, p. 1107, line 26: "In decreto, ubi dicitur concilio celebrando, statuatur locus et tempus. . . ." Cf. Jedin, *Konzil vom Trident*, IV-2, 187.

<sup>271</sup> Paleotti, *Acta Concilii Tridentini*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 762, lines 26–33. Gabriele Paleotti, auditor of the Rota and the literary craftsman of the third period of the council, was made a cardinal in Pius IV's fourth promotion (of 12 March, 1565) along with Zaccaria Delfino, Ugo Boncompagni (later Gregory XIII), and Gian Francesco Commendone (Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia Catholica*, III, 40–41).

<sup>268</sup> Ehlers, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 372, pp. 1105–10; González de Mendoza, *Lo Sucedió en el Concilio de Trento*, *ibid.*, II, 718–19; Psalme, *Fragmenta*, *ibid.*, II, 876–77; Jedin, *Konzil vom Trident*, IV-2, 184–89. On the *laudes* or *acclamations*, note E. H. Kantorowicz, *Laudes Regiae*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958, pp. 180 ff., esp. 181, note 4.

<sup>269</sup> Ehlers, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 373, pp. 1111–20. Instruments of the receipt or acceptance of the acts of the council

Pius told the consistory that he still did not know whether the prelates at Trent were going to send to Rome directly to ask for confirmation of the decrees or whether they had delegated this charge to the legates. He repeated his intention to confirm the Tridentine decrees. Hereafter let no one propose anything contrary to the decrees. All Christians owed a great debt to the four legates, Guise, Madruzzo, and the fathers. The ambassadors of the princes were worthy of every commendation. The emperor had been especially helpful. Most of all, however, Christendom was indebted to Morone. He had expected to leave Trent on 6 December. He should soon be in Rome, and could give them a detailed account of events at the council.

When Pius had finished speaking, the cardinals congratulated him upon the successful conclusion of the council after so many years. It would bring glory to his pontificate. Ah, yes, Pius agreed, no council in the preceding five hundred years had been brought to a more satisfactory closure, nor had any council dealt with more important issues relating to the faith and to reform. He then embarked upon a long discourse concerning the Council of Constance (1414-1418) and the trials of Eugenius IV at Ferrara-Florence (1438-1442), ending with the proud statement "that by this council the authority of the Apostolic See has been confirmed forever!"<sup>272</sup>

Simonetta had left Trent early on Monday, 6 December, and Morone during the late afternoon of the same day. They headed for Rome. Charles de Guise also departed on the sixth, "andando in Francia." Navagero left on 8 or 9 December to go to his diocese of Verona, and Hosius on the fifteenth on his way to his diocese of Ermland (Warmia in north Poland, formerly in east Prussia).<sup>273</sup> According to a papal brief addressed to the four legates (as early as 14 October), when the council had ended and the legates had given a *recedendi licentia* to the prelates, the latter were required to leave Trent within eight days.<sup>274</sup>

Angelo Massarelli, secretary of the council, and Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi (known as Firmanus), the master of ceremonies, bade farewell to Trent on Monday, 13 December. They traveled

together to Rome, where they arrived on Saturday, 8 January (1564), "and we made the journey," says Firmanus, "with the greatest peril, owing to the continuous and very heavy rain as well as the intolerable cold. Finally, with God's help, after three years we have returned safely to our longed-for fatherland."<sup>275</sup>

Morone and Simonetta had either less rain or more fortitude, for they reached Rome before Christmas. At a general congregation, held "ad Divi Petri in aula Constantini" on 30 December, Pius told the cardinals that a new day had dawned, which required a new way of life (*haec dies . . . aliam vitam adfert, alios mores postulat*). Thanks to the virtue and diligence of the legates as well as to divine intervention "the Council of Trent had been brought to completion." A useful and necessary reform had been effected, "less severe than if it had been brought about at Rome." Everything at Trent had gone according to his wishes (*ex sententia*), for the council had shown respect for his authority and for the dignity of the Sacred College. Pius had allowed the conciliar fathers to provide for the reform of the College in order to satisfy the princes. It could not be otherwise. The council had dealt leniently with those in Rome, more leniently than he himself was prepared to be. He was going to confirm whatever the council had decided; he would put all their decrees into effect "down to the last detail" (*ad unguem*).

Pius also intended to nominate certain persons (*deputati*) to deal with the decrees, but rather to preserve the custom of taking counsel on all important matters than to call any action of the Tridentine fathers into doubt. His deputies would watch over the administration, "and so no one of the cardinals should dare henceforth to propose anything contrary to the decrees." If they heard of anything running counter to the council, they must give warning in the consistory. Although the cardinals and curialists might seem to have suffered some loss, the reality was otherwise. The more important things had been preserved: the authority of the Apostolic See had been upheld. The princes who had doubted the seriousness of his desire for reform would soon perceive the full measure of his sincerity. Wherever he thought it necessary to be stricter than the council had been, he would institute a firmer discipline.

In the context of reform Pius regarded the dataria and the consistory as perhaps the two most sensitive areas in the Curia. The consistory was

<sup>272</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 191<sup>v</sup>-193<sup>v</sup>, slightly abridged in Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, appendix, no. XIIIc, pp. 1141-42.

<sup>273</sup> Servanzio, *Diario del Concilio di Trento*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, III-1, 90; Psalme, *Fragmenta, ibid.*, II, 878; von Sichel, in the *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXIII (1895-96), IX, Abh., pp. 29-31; Susta, IV, 448, note.

<sup>274</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, 1110, note 2, gives a partial text of the brief.

<sup>275</sup> Firmanus, *Diaria caerimonialia*, in Merkle, *Conc. Trident.*, II, 571.

the privy council of the Church. The datary, who presided over the dataria, conducted an extensive business in grants, dispensations, and various financial receipts. Pius appointed Simonetta to keep the dataria under inspection (*datariae res ut Cardinalis Simonetta inspiciat*), and Morone to keep an eye on the proceedings of the consistory, to see that the Tridentine requirements for reform were duly observed.

With almost devastating candor Pius excoriated the ambition and underhandedness of certain members of the Sacred College. Again he declared that he was going to require the bishops to reside in their dioceses, in accordance with the conciliar decree. He wanted his decision made known to all bishops. The cardinals must make it clear to their friends and familiars. He assumed that cardinals who held bishoprics would not fail in their duty. As for Pius himself, he would no longer employ bishops in administration. He would assign nunciatures and other such tasks to protonotaries.

Pius spoke with approval of the conciliar fathers' idea of establishing seminaries to educate the young, and said that he would set up such schools in Rome and Bologna, with the hope that others would do the same elsewhere. He called upon the cardinals and the clergy to embark with him upon a new way of life. Although he recognized the supreme authority of the Holy See, he looked upon himself as bound by the law. Pius ended his address to the general congregation with the same words as he had begun it: "Haec dies . . . aliam vitam adfert, alios mores postulat. . . ." <sup>276</sup>

After several consultations and congregations, in which this and that were considered and reconsidered, <sup>277</sup> Pius IV finally and officially confirmed all the decrees of the Council of Trent at a memorable consistory held on 26 January (1564). The instruments of confirmation were duly recorded in the acts of the consistory and the chancery. <sup>278</sup> As time passed, longer and shorter texts of the bull of confirmation were prepared, all dated 26 January. The official text, which was ultimately published, is the bull *Benedictus Deus*. <sup>279</sup>

<sup>276</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 193<sup>v</sup>-195<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, which text differs from that used by Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, append., no. XIV, pp. 1142-44, who omits (from no. XIVb) the pope's attack upon the corrupt cardinals.

<sup>277</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, append., nos. XV-XIX, pp. 1144-50, docs. dated from 18 until after 21 January, 1564.

<sup>278</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, append., no. XXABC, pp. 1150-52.

<sup>279</sup> Eshes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, append., nos. XXI-XXIV, pp. 1152-59.

In Rome the cardinals and curialists had no desire to see the decrees on reform put into effect. They saw in them their own ruin as well as that of the city. The Romans were frightened. As Bernardo Tasso wrote his friend Francesco Tosabazzi, the castellan of Mantua, on 27 January,

The declaration which his Holiness made yesterday in the consistory that he was confirming, "in omnibus et per omnia" and without any exception, everything that had been decided in the council has reduced this whole court to desperation. It is regarded as certain that this city will remain desolate as a consequence. His Holiness is resolved that all the cardinals, the bishops, and all those who hold benefices with the cure of souls are to go and take up residence [in their charge], so that two thirds of the Curia will leave, and with these there will necessarily depart the greater part of the merchants, craftsmen, and prostitutes. <sup>280</sup>

Pius IV took an immense and pardonable pride in the successful termination of the council. S. Peter's bark had weathered the winds of Spanish and Gallican opposition. The Tridentine decrees were printed before the middle of March (1564), for on the eighteenth of the month Borromeo wrote to the nuncio Delfino:

The volumes of conciliar decrees have finally been printed and published, but since they are in sheets [in *foglio*], I cannot send your lordship many of them. I am, however, sending you about eight or ten [he actually sent six] by way of Bologna through the nuncio in Venice, with instructions that he should forward them to you at the first opportunity. When you have received them, have them bound, and give one of them in the name of his Holiness to his imperial Majesty and another to the most serene king of the Romans. . . . <sup>281</sup>

Pius IV and the cardinal-nephew Borromeo had hoped also to see a reasonably full record of the Tridentine proceedings published in addition to the small volume of the decrees, which were republished in one form or another several times. <sup>282</sup> After Pius's death, however, the suspicion and fear which the cardinals and curialists felt for their Protestant, Gallican, and other opponents stood in the way of publication of the proceedings. Also the bulk of the material was rather formidable—

<sup>280</sup> Attilio Portioli, ed., *Lettere inedite di Bernardo Tasso*, Mantua, 1871, p. 36, cited by Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 293, note 2.

<sup>281</sup> Steinheer, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-4 (1914), no. 15, pp. 73-75.

<sup>282</sup> Von Sicking, "Römische Berichte," in *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, CXXXIII (1895-96), IX, Abh., pp. 34-39; Steinheer, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-4, no. 35, p. 149.



for example, Angelo Massarelli's niece Sulpizia, his "heirress in part," was left with fifty-four volumes, large and small, of Tridentine protocols, documents, "votes," and other records. For more than three centuries, unfortunately, what opponents of the Church could not find out from the records locked up in the Vatican Archives and elsewhere, they sometimes invented.

At the time the First Vatican Council was being assembled the Tridentine procedures were known to very few persons. The same old questions were asked again about the representation of the Catholic states, the right of proposal, the freedom of debate, the method of voting, the order of business, and the nature of papal primacy. As is well known, many members of the German episcopate in 1869–1870 wanted to model Vatican I after the Council of Trent. Pope Pius IX, the cardinals, and the curialists had other ideas.

The relation of the Vatican Council to its immediate predecessor—three centuries earlier—is a fascinating, much-studied subject. After the works of Paolo Sarpi (first published in London in 1619) and Sforza Pallavicini (Rome, 1656–1657) historians had to wait a long time for access to the primary materials relating to the Council of Trent. Despite various publications and the widespread scattering of miscellaneous sources bearing directly or indirectly upon the council, one had to await certain useful but faulty editions of Döllinger, the important but still inadequate Tridentine texts of Theiner, and finally the thoroughgoing, almost matchless volumes of Merkle, Ehse, Buschbell, and their colleagues in the *Concilium Tridentinum* (1901 ff.), one of the monuments of modern German scholarship.<sup>283</sup>

<sup>283</sup> H. Jedin, *Das Konzil von Trient: Ein Überblick über die Erforschung seiner Geschichte*, Rome, 1948, esp. pp. 177–213, and cf. Owen Chadwick, *Catholicism and History: The Opening of the Vatican Archives*, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 46 ff.; also Jedin, "Augustin Theiner: Zum 100. Jahrestag seines Todes am 9. August 1874," *Archiv für schlesische Kirchengeschichte*, XXXI (Hildesheim, 1973), 134–76, with a list of Theiner's books compiled by Robt. Samulski, *ibid.*, pp. 177–86; Jedin, "Gustav Hohenlohe und Augustin Theiner, 1850–1870," *Römische Quartalschrift*, LXVI (1971), 171–86; "Kirchenhistorikerbriefe an Augustin Theiner," *ibid.*, pp. 187–231, thirty-two letters to Theiner from (among others) Döllinger, Hergenröther, Laemmer, Janssen, Hefele, Gams, and Johann Friedrich; and "Das Publikationsverbot der Monumenta Tridentina Augustin Theiners im Jahre 1858," *Annuario historiae conciliorum*, III (Paderborn, 1971), 89–97, with two petitions addressed to Pius IX on 28 February and 8 April (1858) by Theiner, prefect of the Vatican Archives, whereby the latter, whom the pope had forbidden to proceed with his plans for publication of the *acta Tridentina*, tried in vain to have the ban lifted.

Although the bull of confirmation, *Benedictus Deus*, is dated 26 January (1564), it was not really published until the following 30 June. Borromeo sent copies of the bull to Delfino immediately (on 1 July) to give to the Emperor Ferdinand (d. 25 July), his son Maximilian, and their ministers. Also ten copies of the Tridentine decrees, which had been reprinted "correttissimi et nettissimi," were given to Delfino's secretary Simone Fata to transmit to the nuncio. More copies would follow so that Delfino might distribute them throughout the whole of Germany,<sup>284</sup> which was certainly the place to send them.

Theiner was the victim of the Curia's now-centuries-old fear of the Protestants. At the fourth session of the Council of Trent, on 8 April, 1546, the decree had been passed defining the Canon of Sacred Scripture (Ehse, *Conc. Trident.*, V, no. 34, pp. 91–92). This canon, Theiner believed, was "l' unico motivo della sospensione," one of his opponents having stated "che per questa sola sessione [i.e., la quarta] bisognarebbe interrompere la stampa del Concilio come capace di provocare ed armare tutto il Protestantismo contro il Concilio di Trento e la Chiesa cattolica" (Jedin, "Das Publikationsverbot," *loc. cit.*, pp. 90, 94).

Later on, in 1868–1870, Pius IX and the Curia did not want the *acta Tridentina* to provide the model of procedure for the First Vatican Council (cf. J. J. I. von Döllinger, *Letters from Rome on the Council by Quirinus*, London, Oxford, and Cambridge, 1870, repr. New York, 2 vols., 1973, I, 194, 234, esp. II, 654–56). These letters, of which there are sixty-nine (from December, 1869, to 19 July, 1870), first appeared in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* and thereafter as a book, *Römische Briefe vom Concil*, Munich, 1870, which appeared almost simultaneously in the English version.

Döllinger's sources for the *Letters from Rome* were 1) Lord Acton, who was in the city from the end of November, 1869, until 10 June, 1870, when he left for Tegernsee; 2) Johann Friedrich, who was at the time Cardinal-Gustav Hohenlohe's conciliar theologian; and 3) Acton's brother-in-law Count Louis d' Arco, attaché of the Bavarian embassy in Rome during the period of the First Vatican Council. D' Arco's letters to Döllinger may be found in Victor Conzemius, "Römische Briefe vom Konzil," *Theologische Quartalschrift*, CXL (1960), 427–62. The *Letters from Rome* are hostile to Pius IX, the Curia, and the Jesuits. Note also Jedin, "Kirchenhistorikerbriefe an A. Theiner," *Röm. Quartalschrift*, LXVI (1971), no. 30, p. 227.

I shall not go into the matter any further, but Döllinger believed that the Catholic states should have been represented at Vatican I, as they had been at Trent. He was strongly opposed to the decree of papal infallibility—"die Frage der päpstlichen Unfehlbarkeit ist durchaus keine 'rein dogmatische' Frage"—for he saw it as likely to have dire political consequences, and disrupt the relations of church and state in Europe and elsewhere (cf. Georg Denzler, "Neuentdeckte Briefe des Ignaz von Döllinger an Chlodwig von Hohenlohe," *Römische Quartalschrift*, LXVII [1972], 212–31, and note, *ibid.*, p. 224).

<sup>284</sup> Steinherz, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-4, no. 35, pp. 149–50, letter of Borromeo to Delfino, dated 1 July, 1564. Pius IV's authorization to publish the bull was allegedly to "shut the door" on any Spanish differences of understanding or interpretation of the decrees from the views held in Rome (Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, no. 175, pp. 563–64, letter dated at Rome on 6 July, 1564).

The Tridentine decrees redefined the basic doctrines of Catholicism. Now Catholics knew who they were, and what they believed. The decrees told them. Catholic theologians could now distinguish between articles of faith and subjects still open for scholastic disputation. When Protestants read the decrees, their own religious identity became clearer. They were precisely informed concerning various dogmas, and now they knew in detail what they had been objecting to for a lifetime. The lines of demarcation were sharply drawn. Nationalist hostilities had also helped to draw them.

The Italian states and Poland accepted the decrees. Spain did so to the extent they did not infringe upon royal authority. The French crown declined to do so, and the German imperial government found their official adoption inadvisable. England, Scandinavia, and Lutheran Germany remained apart from it all. Even so, the successful closure of the council was a great achievement. The doctrinal decrees gave Catholics a new sense of direction, and in so far as they were put into effect, those relating to reform improved the qual-

ity and tone of ecclesiastical life. As the Church used the Tridentine weapons to combat Protestantism, religious authority in the Catholic half of Europe became increasingly centralized in Rome, and this at the expense of the episcopate.

The learning of the Tridentine fathers was more than merely impressive, and so were their independence, conscientiousness, and acuity. Protestantism had forced them into detailed exegesis. Time would tell whether precise doctrinal definition is, in the long run, an aid or an impediment to religious belief. As at Trent, so at the First Vatican Council, real work was done in general congregations, the "sessions" being "solemnities only held for the formal promulgation of decrees already discussed and passed."<sup>285</sup> The dogmatic assertion of papal primacy would await the latter council (in 1870), where a minority of German, French, and Hungarian opponents of the doctrine of infallibility would raise another storm.

<sup>285</sup> *Letters from Rome on the Council by Quirinus* (1870, repr. 1973), I, 62, and *cf. ibid.*, pp. 115-16, 127-28, 209, 371-72, etc., and II, 461 ff., 485, 530, 807 ff., on the formal sessions.

## 19. FRANCE, VENICE, AND THE PORTE—THE TURKISH SIEGE OF MALTA

IN A LETTER addressed to the Emperor Ferdinand (on 18 March, 1563), as we have noted in the preceding chapter, Pius IV had asserted that it was impracticable for pope and emperor to think of their personal attendance at the Council of Trent. They must bear in mind the fact that "it is considered certain that next summer a huge Turkish fleet will come our way, and pirates along with the fleet, and it will make the sea unsafe with all manner of plunderers."<sup>1</sup> A month later (on 16 April), in his first address to a general congregation of the council, Cardinal Morone had stressed the Turkish peril, emphasizing that dissension among Christians was forever increasing the sultan's power to strike at them.<sup>2</sup> On the following 7 September, as we have also seen, Don Martín de Rojas Portalrubio, vice-chancellor of the Knights of S. John of Jerusalem, had solemnly warned the Tridentine fathers that the strategic island of Malta was in danger of attack by the Turks, and that if the island fell, Christendom might well suffer a *gravissimum . . . ac forsitan insanabile vulnus*, a blow from which there would perhaps be no recovery.<sup>3</sup> The Turks had been quiet for some time, however, and the fathers seem not to have been much alarmed by this warning.

Pius IV also appeared to have been unduly concerned by the alleged prospect of a huge Turkish armada's entering western waters during the summer of 1564. In fact during the entire period 1561–1564 the Turks embarked upon no large-scale expedition either on land or at sea. An eight years' peace had, moreover, finally been arranged between the emperor and Sultan Suleiman, the latter's ratification of the accord being delivered to Ferdinand by the Turkish dragoman Ibrahim Beg at Frankfurt am Main on 27 November, 1562.

The Turks had certainly rendered a signal ser-

vice to Christendom, for this period of peace had helped make possible the fathers' two full years of fruitful conciliar employment at Trent, where they had engaged in strife enough without having to contend with the fears and frustrations which always attended Turkish attacks. Pius, especially, had reason to be grateful for the Turks' inactivity. The dioceses of the south Italian bishops, many of whom were supported at Trent by papal funds (and tended to cast their votes in defense of the Curia), would have been the most exposed, as they always were, to Turkish naval incursions. A goodly number of these bishops would have had to return to their dioceses in the wake of Turkish attacks such as those of a decade before.

The Emperor Ferdinand had given much time and attention to the proceedings at Trent, even taking up residence at Innsbruck to be nearer the council. A Turkish invasion of Hungary would have distracted him entirely from the affairs of the council. Pius and the nuncio Delfino might not have been able to effect his agreement to the formal closure of the council, and the results might have been the disastrous suspension which both the princes and the fathers had feared as a possibility. Suleiman had rarely been so co-operative, but now he was old, and he was tired.

One could never be quite sure in the winter, however, that the spring might not bring a Turkish attack. Everyone with access to Istanbul tried to keep an eye on the arsenal. France was just beginning to drift into religious chaos, but French agents on the Bosphorus remained, on the whole, well informed. Nevertheless, Turkish relations with France had cooled, and Sultan Suleiman was much less likely than hitherto to reveal his intentions. The *avvisi* and ambassadorial reports of the time are often rich in accurate factual information, but the ambassadors' own speculations could only leave their governments wondering what to expect. Thus, on 18 February, 1561, at the beginning of the four-year lull in Turkish aggression, Jean Dolu, whom Francis II had sent to Istanbul as "mon agent à la Porte du Grand Seigneur,"<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. ead.*, ad ann. 1563, no. 35 (and cf., above, p. 799b): "Huc accedit quod aestate proxima pro certo habetur venturam esse classem Turcarum maximam eamque una cum pyratis et praedonibus omnibus infestum hoc mare esse habituram."

<sup>2</sup> Ehes, *Conc. Trident.*, IX, no. 163, p. 472: ". . . Nullus enim ignorat . . . quas clades a potentissimo ac perpetuo Christiani nominis hoste Turca superioribus annis terra marique accepimus. Quam ingens denique periculum nobis ab eius potentia ex tot dissidiis nostris imperium imminet."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, IX, no. 271, p. 778, lines 28 ff.

<sup>4</sup> E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols., Paris, 1848–60, repr. New York, 1965, II, 607, note. On Jean Dolu's assignment to Istanbul as a sort of chargé d'affaires, note also P. Grunebaum-Ballin, *Joseph Naci, duc de Naxos*, Paris

wrote François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax and French ambassador in Venice, that Suleiman had ordered a review of all the galleys in the arsenal that were ready for action. Dolu could only guess what lay ahead.

The vigilant agent had learned, to be sure, that there were 113 Turkish galleys ready to sail on short notice. There was, however, no indication that Suleiman was planning an expedition; he seemed to be merely providing for "les garde et conservation de ses pais." That such was the case Dolu believed to be clear from the sultan's refusal to send forces to aid the rulers of Tunis and Algiers against La Goletta. They had declared "that this was the only way to reduce the Moors entirely to obedience to his Highness, and prevent them from rebelling against him, as they usually do." Suleiman had declined their appeal; apparently the Turks were not moving westward. Furthermore, the sultan had not issued orders for the production of ship's biscuit, the inevitable prelude to a major expedition. But Dolu was disturbed by the fear that he might be misinterpreting the facts he was collecting. With all the slaves in Istanbul and with that endless mass of persons, "who are only waiting for wages," the Turks could easily put to sea some eighty galleys which they had ordered to be held in readiness.

Dolu thought that Suleiman was postponing further military enterprises to spare his people the costs of warfare which, taken "with the avarice of his ministers," had caused such terrible inflation in the Ottoman empire, *une si grande cherté de toutes choses*, that even the most well-to-do were going to have trouble finding the means to live. The difficulties were increasing from day to day. They were having a demoralizing effect. The sultan's subjects had abandoned themselves to all sorts of pleasures. He was trying to get them to revert to a more religious way of life.

In the effort to restore the moral values of Ottoman society Suleiman was destroying all the vineyards with no thought of the injustice he was doing to the poor. If this rigor continued, the Greeks would not have the wherewithal to pay the tribute they owed him. Wine was a source of income; the sweet malmsey was always in demand in Europe. Suleiman was trying to return the Turks to prayer with small success. The janissaries were grumbling; they had been reared to do evil rather than to practice piety. People were pre-

dicting a change in the sultan's commands. He was not going to win the hearts of these barbarians by depriving them of their old freedom to do wrong. From all this, de Noailles must realize that France was not alone in being troubled by the fact of religion, "et qu' il semble que ceste inclination s' étende par tout le monde."

Anyhow the Turks had finally sent two galleys to give some assistance to Algiers. They were holding fifteen others and five galliots all ready to send to Caffa (Feodosiya) upon the return of a *cha' ush* or envoy whom they were awaiting from one hour to the next. The *cha' ush* would tell them something about the forces and intentions of the Muscovites. In Dolu's opinion, however, the Muscovites' wintry attacks upon Tana (Azov) were rather raids than actual warfare.<sup>5</sup> Suleiman was off on a prolonged hunt when Dolu wrote de Noailles. He had had good reason to leave Istanbul.

Two weeks later, on 5 March (1561), Dolu wrote Charles de Guise, the cardinal of Lorraine. The Grand Seigneur had spent three weeks on the hunt, accompanied only by his domestic servants. Orders had been given to clean up the whole area of the palace, the "seraglio," for it was infested with the plague. As for the grand vizir Rustem Pasha, if he had been unmanageable before, he was worse now. Things were not going the way he would have liked. He had also been ill for a long time, and was in a grievous, vexatious state, like King Louis XI at the end of his days. One could certainly wish for a change for the better in the Ottoman empire.

Poverty was everywhere. Prices were out of reach. The trouble was attributed to the sultan's old age, for he let himself be ruled by the avarice and appetites of his ministers. Dolu informed Guise of the eighty galleys ready to patrol the Archipelago, but there seemed to be no evidence that they would be sent on an expedition westward. The Turks might also send twenty galleys into the Black Sea "for the defense of the Tatars and the fortification of Caffa and Tana against the Circassians and Muscovites." Suleiman was awaiting the news from Persia, and Istanbul was awaiting his decision as to whether he would be going to Aleppo, or would solve his Viennese problem and assure his possession of Transylvania.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 650-51. According to Busbecq, *Ep. IV*, in *Opera omnia* (1740, repr. 1968), pp. 277-79, Suleiman forbade only the making of wine, not the growing of grapes.

<sup>6</sup> Charrière, II, 652-53. Suleiman, as we have already noted, was at this time seeking the extradition of his rebellious son Bayazid, who had fled to Persia (*ibid.*, II, 620-21, 649, 653-54, 657, 660, 666-67, 670-72, 677 ff., 691, 715, *et alibi*).

and The Hague, 1968, pp. 103 ff. Jean de la Vigne, Dolu, and Dolu's successor Antoine Petremol all had trouble with Joseph Nasi, the Jewish favorite and a chief advisor of Suleiman's son Selim. Nasi later became the duke of Naxos.

In the early spring of 1561 François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, was recalled from Venice, and later employed by the queen-regent Catherine de' Medici on an unsuccessful mission to Rome. De Noailles had his problems. Like his friend Cardinal Odet de Châtillon and a half-dozen other French bishops, de Noailles was charged with heresy by the Roman Inquisition. He had been too useful to Catherine, however, to be left in the embassy at Venice. She had things for him to do. The French court was at odds with the Curia, and such was the religious and political confusion of 1563-1564 that France never did officially accept the decrees of the Council of Trent.<sup>7</sup> De Noailles was replaced in Venice by the Sieur de Boistaillé, who tried to keep Catherine and the boy-king Charles IX up-to-date on Levantine affairs.<sup>8</sup>

To some extent the Venetian government shared the reports of their baillie in Istanbul (then Girolamo Ferro) with M. de Boistaillé, who combined the information with that which he received from Jean Dolu, and sent it all on to Catherine de' Medici. By 7 June, 1561, it was clear that Venice and the Holy See, Naples and Sicily had little to fear from the Turks. The season was a bit too far advanced for long voyages, as Boistaillé wrote Catherine, and "ladicte armée n'est pas pour faire grandz exploitxz ès mers de Ponant pour ceste année."<sup>9</sup>

Three weeks later (on 27 June) Boistaillé wrote again to tell Catherine that he was forwarding by an express courier two letters addressed by Sultan Suleiman to Charles IX. In the first of these letters the sultan expressed his extreme annoyance that corsairs from the Barbary coast and elsewhere were harassing French subjects, "whom he esteems as his friends and allies." Suleiman had, consequently, sent orders both to Hassan, the "king" or pasha of Algiers, and to Dragut Reis, the pasha of Tripoli, to chastise these corsairs severely and to see to the return, to the proper French authority, of all the vessels, merchandise, and prisoners the corsairs had seized in their "courses et pilleries." Boistaillé could even send Catherine copies of the sultan's orders, which he said were as favorable as any communications the French had received from the Porte for a long time. If the sultan's orders were properly carried out, Boistaillé had no doubt that, besides the recovery of the losses, the corsairs would henceforth be restrained, and that

French merchants would find open the road to wealth.

The sultan's two letters were written in response to a friendly letter which Charles IX had sent him. According to the Italian text of the sultan's second letter, which is dated 8 May, 1561, Charles had stated that he wanted to continue the friendship and understanding which his father Henry II and his brother Francis II had had with the Porte. Charles had mentioned, perhaps in passing, the French losses at the hands of corsairs. M. Dolu, however, had described these losses in some detail, and the sultan now sent assurances that they would be made good. Furthermore, "since it is [among] the ancient customs of our house and of our predecessors," he wrote Charles,

to receive all those who have desired our friendship, we are happy to accept that of your Majesty, and all the more so, for it goes back a long time. For our part we promise to maintain and to observe it without fail.

Boistaillé adds in his letter of 27 June to Catherine that Suleiman was presumably moved by "the likelihood which he sees of a long peace existing among the Christian princes." The pressure of old age and the rebellion of his son Bayazid had also helped to produce this friendly attitude. However that might be, Boistaillé regarded the sultan's response as straightforward and his reputation such as to merit an expression of thanks from Charles IX, especially since Suleiman had made a point of the fact that he wanted to hear frequently from his Majesty.<sup>10</sup>

Safety from the Barbary corsairs was worth a word of thanks from the French king, as Boistaillé reminded Charles in a letter from Venice of 11 July (1561), for in these past days seven galleys belonging to Philip II or his subjects had been attacked and taken by corsairs. The galleys had set out from Sicily, and were pursued by three Barbary galliots as they made their way to the isle of Lipari, where ten other Barbary galliots were hidden. Boistaillé had just learned from the Signoria how the seven galleys "furent combatues et miserablement déprédées," a great loss to Philip II, for there was little hope that the Spanish would ever see again the captured vessels or the men aboard them.<sup>11</sup>

The plague which Suleiman had wanted cleaned out of the seraglio became much worse, and took a heavy toll in Istanbul during the summer of

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVI, 191-97 ff., and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 423-27 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Charrière, II, 653 ff. Boistaillé had been sent on a mission to Istanbul in 1558 (*ibid.*, II, 452 ff.).

<sup>9</sup> Charrière, II, 657.

<sup>10</sup> Charrière, II, 659-60, with the Italian text of Suleiman's letter of 8 May, 1561, in a note.

<sup>11</sup> Charrière, II, 661.

1561. On 15 July one Antoine Petremol wrote Catherine de' Medici from the stricken city that he was sending her Jean Dolu's last letter. Dolu had just died, a day before the grand vizir Rustem Pasha, who had been succeeded by Ali Pasha. Petremol, obviously a close associate of Dolu in the French mission to the Porte, entreated Catherine to replace the able Dolu with some good and sufficient person "pour le besoing qu' on peut avoir de ceste amitié." In the meantime Petremol would do his best to serve their Majesties, and he had already begun to do so. Familiar with all the concerns of the French mission, Petremol had gone to see Ali Pasha, recommending to him "above all things this true and perfect friendship" between France and the Porte. Ali replied "that it is in our hands." The Grand Seigneur would never fail the French.

Petremol then brought up with Ali Pasha the question of the French ships,

seized last year by Algerian corsairs, begging him to repeat the command (for their return) to Ahmed Pasha, the new beylerbey of Algiers, who has replaced Barbarossa's son, brought here to the Porte in fetters by his own people, accused of treason. Even as [Ali Pasha] made me the promise to do so, the said beylerbey arrived unexpectedly. [Ali] Pasha ordered him directly to carry out all the commands which had been sent to Barbarossa's son.

The French agent was confident that Ahmed Pasha would indeed carry out his orders, for he had observed Ahmed to be a person who moved swiftly. He was also well disposed towards the French, for he had been raised in the pro-French atmosphere of the seraglio, and of course he shared the sultan's affection for the French king.<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, yes, Dolu was dead. Catherine de' Medici received the news from Venice also. M. de Boistaillé wrote her (on 5 August, 1561),

Madame, a frigate has just arrived, sent from Constantinople by the ambassador of the Signoria, by which means I have learned of the death of poor Dolu, his Majesty's agent at the Porte. He died of the plague on the tenth of the past month. Since I fear that inasmuch as the pestilence is raging so wildly over there, there may remain no one to give you this news or to keep in touch with the Grand Seigneur and his ministers—while awaiting whatever arrangement his Majesty and you will choose to make later on—I have decided tomorrow, as was previously done in a like case, to send a letter by express courier to the pasha [Ali] as well as to your

dragomans both to assure them that his Majesty and you . . . will not fail to send your minister very shortly and also to have [Dolu's] papers and the documents relating to the king's service put into a safe place. . . .<sup>13</sup>

Dolu's reports from Istanbul to François de Noailles in Venice were now replaced by those which Antoine Petremol began sending to the Sieur de Boistaillé. Despite the aged Suleiman's seeming inactivity, the French dispatches from the Porte are particularly interesting for the year 1561, because the Turks were basking in the sunshine of their victory at Jerba. On 24 July Petremol wrote Boistaillé of Ahmed Pasha's imminent departure from the Bosphorus for his new post as beylerbey of Algiers:

Monsieur, the lord Ahmed Pasha will leave shortly with four galleys and a galliot to join the armada at Castel Rosso [Carystus] on the island of Negroponte and to put in order the twenty-five galleys which are to go with the said beylerbey to Algiers. I suspect that, having been made aware of the sixty Christian galleys which are at Messina, he will take a larger number of galleys either for his own security or for an encounter with the Christian galleys, unless he is so puffed up with vainglory because of the victory which the Turks won last year [at Jerba] that he thinks the whole Christian fleet insufficient to make any headway against him. . . .

Aside from rumors of alleged happenings in Transylvania and the likelihood—or unlikelihood—of Suleiman's marching off again to Aleppo (Haleb), Petremol could furnish Boistaillé with a few facts. A Tunisian ambassador had appeared at the Porte to kiss the hand of the sultan and request aid against the Spanish forces which were supposedly being marshaled against his sovereign. The latter would receive the aid, "inasmuch as his Highness never refuses assistance to those who ask it of him, especially those who are of his faith and are opposed to his enemies." Petremol kept an eye on Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq: "Yesterday Ferdinand's ambassador went to see Ali Pasha with a great present of silk cloth, clocks, and other things. I have not yet been able to learn what they have agreed upon. . . ." Petremol thought Busbecq was trying to negotiate the release of a gentleman who had been languishing in a Turkish prison for two years,<sup>14</sup> which may well have been the case. Busbecq was

<sup>12</sup> Charrière, II, 663–65. Barbarossa's son was restored to favor (*ibid.*, II, 697).

<sup>13</sup> Charrière, II, 662. Boistaillé notes Rustem Pasha's death, which he puts on 8 July (1561), and also Ali Pasha's promotion to the grand vizirate.

<sup>14</sup> Charrière, II, 665–66. Although this letter of Petremol to Boistaillé is dated (by the editor at least) 24 July, 1561, Petremol says that the Tunisian ambassador appealed to the sultan for aid on "le XXIX" de ce mois."

always moved by the plight of Christian prisoners at the Porte, especially after the flood of Christian captives from Jerba. Mostly, however, he was trying to negotiate a peace between Suleiman and Ferdinand, as Petremol was quite aware,<sup>15</sup> and (as we are quite aware) he was eventually to succeed in doing so.

Petremol kept Boistailé and the French government informed concerning the plight of the Spanish prisoners taken at Jerba. He was supposed to effect the extradition of certain officials of the French royal treasury who were thought for a while to have fled "to Cairo or Alexandria in Egypt or to Aleppo and Tripoli in Syria." It seemed more likely, however, that these officials, whose financial accounts were awry, must have gone to England or Germany, "or rather to some place in Italy," for they would have little chance of concealing themselves in the lands of the sultan.<sup>16</sup> Petremol reported on the marriage of Ahmed, the agha of the janissaries, with the late Rustem Pasha's only daughter. The sultan had given Ahmed all Rustem's revenues, large sums of money, and Rustem's residence. As soon as the marriage had been consummated, it was expected that the agha would be made "the fifth pasha or at least the beylerbey of Greece." In Istanbul there were rumors of a peace having been made between the kings of Spain and Tunis. Thirty Spanish galleys were said to have captured seventeen Algerian galliots.

A Persian ambassador, sent by Suleiman's old enemy, the Shah Tahmāsp I (1524–1576), arrived on the Bosphorus on 23 October (1561). Four days later the ambassador was received by Ali Pasha, to whom he gave Persian carpets and gems of rich turquoise. On 1 November the ambassador was ushered into Sultan Suleiman's presence to kiss his hand. He presented the sultan with the shah's gifts of silk tents and hangings woven with gold and silver. The tent poles were gilded, and rigged with silver instead of iron. Among the other gifts for the sultan were perfume more Persian carpets "riches et exquis," also thirty birds of prey, two Korans and six other books of Islamic law, porcelain, and a large *larme de cerf* as an antidote to poison.

Bayazid was of course the subject of the Turco-Persian negotiations. The ambassador was kept in seclusion so that no Turk could communicate with him. On 26 October and 4 November Petremol

wrote Boistailé everything he had been able to learn. Suleiman, it would appear, had sent off two *cha'ushes* to the shah, threatening him with war if he did not surrender Bayazid. Four other *cha'ushes* were dispatched to the frontiers of Persia to warn all the Turkish beylerbeys and sanjakbeys to hold themselves in readiness for the possible invasion of Persia. Apparently one of the pashas (*les premiers de ceste Porte*) had promised Petremol a copy of the letters which the shah had sent the sultan.<sup>17</sup>

Despite the assumed "friendship" between Suleiman and Charles IX, Petremol had not been able to effect the release of the French prisoners. Apparently the orders sent to Algiers and Tripoli had not been fully carried out, and Suleiman seemed to be overlooking the fact. However that may be, Petremol was above all now seeking to recover the French who had been captured at Jerba. Charles had recognized Petremol as his agent, for which the latter thanked him in a letter of 25 November (1561). Suleiman had been alienated, however, by the Franco-Spanish peace of Cateau-Cambrésis and by the fact that since the peace no French ambassador had been sent to the Porte, "mais seulement gens de petite qualité soubz le nom d'agens." Besides this affront, as he now wrote Boistailé on 15 January, 1562, Petremol was the fifth person to come to the Porte without bringing any presents. Petremol's answer to the Turks was that his countrymen had been forced into Cateau-Cambrésis, because the commander of the sultan's armada had abandoned them in his operations in the western Mediterranean (in the summer of 1558), at the very time when the French had had to place their greatest reliance on the naval power of the Porte.<sup>18</sup>

Catherine de' Medici did send a noble envoy to Istanbul, her Florentine relative, the Chevalier de Salviati, of whose coming Petremol made much at the Porte. Salviati was well received. His purpose was to secure the freedom of certain leaders of the Christian host at Jerba, especially to gain the release of Don Álvaro de Sande. From February to June, 1562, Petremol tried to keep Boistailé and the French government up to date on the following important news from Istanbul—Salviati's attempts to have Sande set free were getting nowhere; Jacob Basilius, the "despot of Serbia," was

<sup>17</sup> Charrière, II, 674–79.

<sup>15</sup> Charrière, II, 667–69, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, pp. 702 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Charrière, II, 672–73 (and the note), letters of 10 August and 19 September, 1561.

<sup>18</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 680, 682–83, and *cf.*, above, Chapter 16, pp. 700–1. Most of the French prisoners held at Algiers were not freed until 1567, just after the accession of Selim to the Ottoman throne.

continuing his war against the so-called king Alexander in Moldavia; John Sigismund was doing well in his conflict with the Emperor Ferdinand in Transylvania; and Busbecq appeared to be increasingly successful in his negotiations with Ali Pasha.

Suleiman was much preoccupied with his rebel son Bayazid. Would Suleiman have another war with Persia? Would the shah surrender the prince to the fate his father had decided upon or would he try to use him to stir up revolt in Turkey? Suleiman was ill for some time in 1562, and for a while one feared an uprising of the janissaries, who would presumably set about sacking the better houses in Istanbul and Pera, "ainsy qu' ils ont coutume de faire intervenant la mort de leur seigneur." One thing did seem clear: the Turks would send no sizable armada into the western Mediterranean during the current year. As Petremol wrote Boistailé on Wednesday, 29 April (1562), twenty galleys would guard the Bosphorus on 1 May "pour la garde de l' Archipelago,"<sup>19</sup> and with those usually assigned to Rhodes, Mytilene, and Negroponte there would be some thirty Turkish galleys patrolling the Aegean.<sup>19</sup>

In France the wars of religion had begun, and French influence at the Porte declined. Antoine Petremol continued to send his dispatches from Istanbul to Charles IX and to the Sieur de Boistailé, the French ambassador in Venice. At the beginning of 1564, however, Arnaud du Ferrier took over Boistailé's responsibilities on the lagoon. Ferrier had been, as we have seen, one of the French representatives at the Council of Trent, and now he began years of service as the ambassador of Charles IX and Henry III in Venice (1563–1567, 1570–1582). Petremol's dispatches, therefore, went to Ferrier, the last of those extant apparently being dated 25 October, 1565.<sup>20</sup> Very likely Petremol continued at his post for a few months beyond this date, but in any event his dispatches cover the period of the Turkish siege of Malta.

Suleiman had received from Algiers an urgent request for aid against Spain during the early

spring of 1564. On 27 May Petremol wrote Arnaud du Ferrier that

by the last dispatch which has come from Venice, and by other galleys which have come from the West, the Grand Seigneur has had news of the great preparation of galleys and troops that the king of Spain was intending for the Barbary [coast], which has been the reason for his suddenly ordering that sixty galleys should be put in order in this port [Istanbul] to go to the assistance of the said Barbary [coast]. The pasha or "beylerbey of the sea" is trying to urge him on because of the desire he has to venture out and take some booty.

The grand vizir Ali Pasha, however, who looked further ahead than the beylerbey, disapproved of any such move for the current year. It was already the end of May, entirely too late, for the sixty galleys the sultan wanted prepared for the distant voyage would require more than two months to put in readiness. Petremol believed that Ali's view would prevail, and it did. The news had also made the pashas, especially the grand vizir, more friendly toward France, for they feared that Charles IX might throw in his lot with the king of Spain. Although the Porte had its troubles, including a mutiny of the sipahis and janissaries at Buda, as Petremol noted in his dispatch of 27 May,<sup>21</sup> it seems clear that the sea-going pashas and beylerbeys were tired of staying at home or patrolling the Aegean.

In July (1564) the plague again struck the Turkish capital, as Petremol reported: "Et, qui est de pis, elle règne plus entre les chrestiens qu' entre les Turcs. Les juifs n' en sont exempts." He found the deaths day by day most disquieting. One of the sons-in-law of the "Sultan" Selim, the one who had been the beylerbey of Greece, had just died. Ali Pasha was ill. Otherwise everything was strangely tranquil. Except for the plague, "nous serions trop heureux de vivre en si douce paix."<sup>22</sup> It was the calm before the storm.

The death of the Emperor Ferdinand was known in Istanbul by 12 August (1564). Would his son Maximilian II pay the financial tribute to the Porte, as had been agreed upon in the peace of 1562? The sultan had learned that Spanish galleys had left Sicily and Naples, moving westward, perhaps to strike at the area of Algiers. Galleys of

<sup>19</sup> Charrière, II, 687–97. On Salviani's failure to secure the release of Don Alvaro de Sande, cf. Busbecq, *Opera omnia* (1740, repr. 1968), p. 321. The Turks had reason to be cautious in allowing the ransom of the warlike prisoners taken at Jerba (cf. Charrière, II, 761 ff.).

<sup>20</sup> Charrière, II, 805–6. Petremol's first dispatch to Ferrier is dated 27 May, 1564 (*ibid.*, II, 750 ff.). Ferrier's career from about 1563 is sketched in Édouard Fremy, *Un Ambassadeur libéral sous Charles IX et Henri III*, Paris, 1880, which is based partly on Ferrier's unpublished correspondence.

<sup>21</sup> Charrière, II, 750–53.

<sup>22</sup> Charrière, II, 754–55, letters of Petremol to Ferrier, dated at Istanbul 12 and 29 July, 1564, combined as a single text. The dragoman of the Venetians died of the plague in September (*ibid.*, II, 757).



the Knights of S. John had reached the Archipelago, where they had seized a ship belonging to the sultan's chief eunuch (*capi-aga*) near the island of Cerigo (Cythera) in the Gulf of Laconia. Suleiman immediately ordered the sixty galleys prepared for action to send them to the Barbary coast in case the Spanish fleet should launch an attack. But the season was late. Before the Turkish galleys could get so far westward, winter would be on its way. The beylerbey of Algiers, *le roy d'Algier*, and Dragut Reis of Tripoli were strong enough to defend themselves and resist the first assaults of the Spanish fleet. Suleiman thus countermanded his previous orders, and merely strengthened the patrols in the Archipelago.

On 15 September (1564) Suleiman had returned from a quail hunt, and that night a fire broke out in Istanbul. According to Petremol, it burned up more than 7,500 shops and stalls, a good 2,000 small houses, and two large caravan-series, all in less than four hours. They were all built of wood, "et le vent estoit un peu grand." The loss was not as large as one might think, however, as Petremol explained to Ferrier, inasmuch as the merchants stored their merchandise under heavy vaults and in warehouses at the end of each day. Nevertheless, only the exercise of great diligence had saved a good part of the city. The shops and stalls, the houses and the two caravan-series had produced a daily rent of 800 *écus*, which went to the chief mosques in the city.<sup>23</sup>

Events in Istanbul and central Europe seem sometimes to occur before our eyes as we read the dispatches of Petremol. On 14 October (1564) he informed Ferrier,

The ambassadors of King John [Sigismund] of Transylvania, with some chausshes who have returned from Hungary, have informed the Grand Seigneur that the emperor's tribute, which was at Komorn [Komárno], has been taken to Vienna after the death of Ferdinand. Under these circumstances these lords here [in Istanbul] do not know what to do about Maximilian nor what response to give his ambassador with regard to the confirmation of peace which he is requesting in his master's name in accordance with the "capitulations" which were agreed upon two years ago between them and the late Emperor Ferdinand. . . . Two days ago the pasha [Ali] sent off to Maximilian the person who had come here to bring the news of Ferdinand's death, with the same capitulations and conditions of tribute as had been granted two years ago, provided that the tribute, which was said to be at Komorn, be first and foremost turned over to the officials of the Grand Seigneur, and that in

the future Maximilian not fail every year to make the same payment. . . .<sup>24</sup>

Petremol's efforts to secure the release of French prisoners held by the Porte had been somewhat complicated by the mission of Sampietro Corso, the anti-Spanish, pro-French leader of the Corsican revolt against the Genoese, to whom the island of Corsica had been reassigned by the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.<sup>25</sup> Sampietro had come to Istanbul (late in 1562) seeking money both for the French and for the anti-Spanish Corsican rebels. Suleiman was full of expressions of friendship, "mais de prester argent on n'en parle point."<sup>26</sup> Having begun with significant refusals, the Turks found negative answers to such appeals increasingly easy, affirming all the while their great love and esteem for the French.

On 25 November, 1564, Petremol wrote Charles IX a most interesting letter, concerned with the Turkish retention of French prisoners—and with the French retention of two Turkish "ladies-in-waiting," to whom we shall come shortly.

<sup>23</sup> Charrière, II, 756, 759–61. Maximilian's succession had all Europe wondering what was coming next. Cf. the Venetian Senate's expressions of grief at the death of Ferdinand (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 114<sup>v</sup>–117<sup>r</sup> [131<sup>v</sup>–134<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 4–5 August, 1564, including a letter to Ferdinand's nephew Philip II). Zápolya's able son John Sigismund had been the opponent of Ferdinand, and was the protégé of Suleiman. The Venetians maintained a cordial but cautious diplomatic connection with John Sigismund (*ibid.*, Reg. 74, fols. 6–7 [27–28], docs. dated 5 April, 1565, and fol. 27 [48], docs. dated 11 September, 1565, also fols. 28<sup>r</sup> [49<sup>r</sup>], 32<sup>r</sup> [53<sup>r</sup>]).

In 1563, of the sixty-two counties (*contadi*) which comprised Hungary seventeen were in Turkish hands; sixteen had been held by Ferdinand; twenty appear to have wavered between recognition of the sultan and the emperor, and six were ruled by John Sigismund of Transylvania. There was not a fortress strong enough to resist a determined Turkish assault. The Venetian observer who gives us this information had a low opinion of the Hungarians as cruel, avaricious, unreliable, and heretical—"nell'aspetto et vestimenti sono assai simili a Turchi" (from the report of Giovanni Michiel, former ambassador to Vienna, in *Mon. Spectantia hist. Slav. meridionalium*, XI [Zagreb, 1880], no. XXIII, p. 157). It might be observed, however, that the Hungarians did not have an exalted opinion of the Venetians.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Charrière, II, 711 ff., docs. dated from late November, 1562, and cf. *ibid.*, II, 760, doc. dated 14 October, 1564, *et alibi*. On the prolonged revolt of the Corsicans against Genoa, which began in June, 1564, see Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1966, II, 308–11.

<sup>25</sup> Charrière, II, 724–26; cf. Grunbaum-Ballin, *Joseph Naci, duc de Naxos* (1968), pp. 106–7, and Philip P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese and their Administration of the Island (1346–1566)*, 3 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1958, I, 362–63.

<sup>23</sup> Charrière, II, 756–58, letters of Petremol to Ferrier, dated at Istanbul on 12 August, 1 and 24 September, 1564.

The sultan had declined to release from imprisonment one Captain Cigalla, whom he regarded as a "grand corsaire," a menace to Christians as well as to Turks. Cigalla might do worse even than Sancho de Leyva who, having sworn at the time of his release never to bear arms against the Turks, had then embarked upon a career of vengeance aboard Neapolitan galleys. Charles IX must not think the sultan's refusal to let Cigalla go indicated any lack of affection on the sultan's part, and certainly Suleiman hoped that it would not detract from Charles's friendliness toward the Porte.

Petremol was not finding it easy to deal with Ali Pasha, for this was not the first refusal, nor the second, nor the third that the Turks had given Charles "en chose de petite conséquence." If the French really required substantial assistance [as Francis I and Henry II had done], they could expect a refusal *a fortiori*—the Turks were holding poor Frenchmen as slaves contrary to reason and right [especially those taken at Jerba], and yet they had released Don Álvaro de Sande as well as de Leyva. Apparently they preferred to please the emperor rather than the king of France. And now they were even refusing to let Cigalla go, an old man and a cripple, who was trying to ransom himself with his own money. Since the Turks had obviously never intended to release Cigalla, they could have said so two years before "sans jusques à cette heure nous entretenir de belles paroles et promesses."

Ali Pasha remained full of assurances of the sultan's friendship for the French, but he reverted to the persistent failure of Charles IX's envoys to bring presents to the sultan after the eastern fashion. Even a clock or a basket of fruit would be a gesture of courtesy. The recent envoys might have succeeded in their missions, if they had brought presents, for the Turks were not so much concerned (according to Ali) with the value of the presents as with the fact of their being made "pour estre signe d' amitié." With regard to the sultan's unwillingness to accept ransom for Cigalla, however, the reasons which Ali had given were not the only ones,

but also the protest of a Turkish woman, who by her unceasing prayers and persistent requests to the Grand Seigneur demands back her two daughters whom the late grand prior of France [François de Lorraine], when he was in the service of the Order of Malta,<sup>27</sup> had seized

<sup>27</sup> On the career of François de Lorraine (1534–1563), the grand prior of France, who died before reaching the age of thirty, cf. Jurien de la Gravière, *Les Chevaliers de Malte et la marine de Philippe II*, 2 vols., Paris, 1887, I, 25–55. This work is largely concerned with the Turkish siege of Malta.

and presented, one to the queen and the other to Madame, the duchess of Savoy.

This was actually the reason, said Ali, that he could not free "the rest of the poor French slaves who are in the Grand Seigneur's possession."

If the Turks found Charles IX's government unsatisfactory to deal with, so did Petremol, who in his letter of 25 November reminded the king that after the death of Jean Dolu, more than three years before, his Majesty had promised to send a resident ambassador to the Porte. No such appointment had been made. His Majesty should do so. In closing, Petremol stated that the sultan was making tremendous preparations, *un fort grand appareil*, of galleys and other vessels to carry horses as well as munitions. The coming year would certainly witness an expedition.

The sultan had ordered the production or the readying of 150 galleys, "and another 150 large galleasses, or 'mahonnes' [Turk. sing. *māūna*] as they call them, besides the other vessels." The wisacres were divided as to the sultan's objective. Some believed that he would attack the Hospitallers on the island of Malta, others that his objective would be the Italian and Spanish forces in Apulia. Most people believed that the expedition would be directed against the Venetians on the island of Cyprus, for the sultan had built, on the mainland opposite the island, a castle to which he had been sending artillery and other things for the past two or three years.<sup>28</sup>

The two Turkish girls to whom Petremol made reference had been captured by François de Lorraine, younger brother of the Guises and grand prior of the Hospitallers in France. The girls had been taken while being conveyed to Mecca on a pilgrimage, apparently in the year 1557. The elder, named Fati, was christened Catherine after the queen. The younger was called Marguerite after Marguerite de France (1523–1574), daughter

<sup>28</sup> Charrière, II, 761–68, letter of Petremol to Charles IX, dated at Istanbul on 25 November, 1564. There are abundant references in the sources to the *mahonne*, *maona*, etc., which is the Turkish galleass. Cf. also Bart. Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* . . . , Monte Cassino, 1845, p. 285: ". . . maone, non molto dalle nostre galeazze differenti." J. F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys*, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 87, 98, 232–34, seems to think the maona and galleass are two different vessels. On François de Guise of Lorraine, note the Abbé R. A. de Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem* . . . , 4 vols., Paris, 1726, III, 377–78, and Susan A. Skiller, "Catherine de' Medici's Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting: A Dilemma in Franco-Ottoman Diplomatic Relations," *Turcica*, VII (1975), 191–93.

ter of Francis I, duchess of Savoy from 1559, when according to the terms of Cateau-Cambrésis she had married Emmanuel Philibert. The Turkish girls, known also as "la Turque et la More," appear three times in Catherine de' Medici's household accounts between March and June [?], 1558, when they received small sums to go to confession and to the fair at S. Germain des Prés.<sup>29</sup> In an undated letter (of 1558) Jean de la Vigne had written Henry II that Suleiman wished the king to seek out at his court "Faty, sa soeur et frère." The brother seems to have disappeared; he may have ended up on a Maltese gallej.

Suleiman wanted the girls and their brother returned to Istanbul, and had sent orders to that effect to the beylerbeys of the sea and of Algiers. De la Vigne suggested Henry should reply that there were, to be sure, Turkish and Moorish slaves in France and even at the court, including women. But when they had become converted to Christianity "of their own free will and without constraint," the king could not give them up, just as the sultan could not return French slaves "who had become Turks." Toward the end of his letter, however, de la Vigne added,

There is someone at your court who has written here a letter in Turkish, in the name of these two girls to their mother, declaring that they have been made Christians by force. You ought to track down and expel that person from your kingdom.<sup>30</sup>

Suleiman had relaxed his demands, as Petremol wrote Catherine de' Medici on 22 April, 1564, on learning that one of the girls at least had long been a Christian and was married. Ali Pasha managed three or four times to turn the mother, who was named Huma, away from a public audience or meeting with the sultan. Petremol thought that he was now free from the woman's harassment, after three long years, and that he could begin again to press for the release of the French prisoners. Huma was indefatigable, however, and soon enlisted in her support Suleiman's daughter Mihrmah and his granddaughter Esmā. The latter was the daughter of Selim, the heir to the Ottoman throne. She was also the wife of Mehmed Sokolli, the second vizir,

who for his wife's sake has taken the mother's cause in hand, alleging in line with her argument that the said

daughter is so young it is impossible that she should be married, and that he knows for certain by the girl's letters, whether they be true or false, and by the report of a certain Assun-Aga, who came to your Majesty two years ago on behalf of the "king" of Algiers, that the girl wants nothing more than to come back here and live according to the law of her first religion.

The weary Petremol offered to send the girl's father (or some other Turk), along with a French gentleman to take care of him, to France to learn the truth for himself. Petremol would pay all their expenses. Nevertheless, he expected little to come of his proposal but "un nouvel assault des sultanes," who wanted the girl back home, whether she had become a Christian or remained a Turk. Petremol could get nowhere under the circumstances in his attempt to free the French prisoners taken at Jerba and elsewhere. In fact he believed that the pashas were pleased with the affair of the (married) Turkish girl, which had become a *cause célèbre*, for it gave them an opportunity indirectly to show their dissatisfaction with the French government. There was no getting around the Franco-Spanish treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.

It looked as though only the deaths of the participants could bring the controversy to a close. The plight of the Turkish girls—there were still two of them—began to give rise to other problems. On 27 May (1564) Petremol informed Arnaud du Ferrier in Venice that du Ferrier's predecessor M. de Boistailé had just written him of the misfortune of two poor Frenchmen—the *Sieur des Barres*, the *maître des comptes* of Dijon, and one Cresset, a merchant of Montpellier—who had been seized by a Turkish Aegean patrol on their way back from Cairo aboard a Ragusan ship. Their property had been taken, and they were sold to three Turks at Modon. Ali Pasha had sent a *cha'ush* to Modon to bring the two Frenchmen to Istanbul and to see to the return of their lost goods and possessions. When Mehmed Sokolli learned of what was afoot, he intervened "pour raison de cette fille turque qu' il demande au roy."

Why the demand was being made for only one Turkish girl, the elder one now called Catherine, is not clear, but on 12 July (1564) Petremol filled another letter to Charles IX with the sultan's resolve to effect the return of "laditte fille" and his refusal to release Captain Cigalla. Also, alas, Ali Pasha had again told Petremol that the sultan would not allow him to set free "the poor French slaves who are kept here in miserable servitude."<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> M. L. Cimber [a pseudonym for Louis Lafaist] and F. Danjou, *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu'à Louis XVIII*, 1st. ser., vol. IX (Paris, 1836), pp. 115-16, in which text "le dernier jour de mars 1557" is March, 1558, for the French year began with Easter (10 April in 1558) until 1563, from which time it has begun with 1 January.

<sup>30</sup> Charrière, II, 459-50, note.

<sup>31</sup> Petremol's letters of 22 April, 1564 (to Catherine de' Medici), 27 May (to Arnaud du Ferrier), and 12 July (to Charles IX) are given in Charrière, II, 764-66, in the notes,

The Turkish girl in question and her sister were by no means Petremol's only problem at the Porte.

Aside from the Turkish resentment of Cateau-Cambrésis, prince Selim's Jewish advisor and banker Joseph Nasi was inclined to make trouble for the French, who were indebted to him (and to the Ottoman government) for large sums of money, allegedly about 150,000 *écus* all told, most of which sum was owing to Nasi. He had long been trying to collect what the French crown owed him, and the Turks now recalled the various sums which French ambassadors and agents had borrowed from the Porte, going back to the time of Francis I. On 28 November (1564) Petremol wrote Charles IX that a Turkish envoy, Hajji Murad, would soon be going to France, and the French agent duly noted that Suleiman as well as Selim would be pleased if Joseph Nasi's financial claims were satisfied. Hajji Murad went westward in the spring of 1565, sailing aboard one of the Ottoman galleys headed for Malta.

Hajji Murad and his retinue then received passage on two galleys, and were landed at Marseille in May (1565). They were hardly welcome, for the French were supposedly preparing to renew with the Spanish the friendship they had pledged at Cateau-Cambrésis. Although Catherine de' Medici doubtless intended to preserve the French connection with the Porte, a Turkish ambassador could not have appeared at a more inopportune time. In any event Hajji Murad was conveyed with all honor to Narbonne and thence to Toulouse, where the municipal government spent thirty *livres tournois* on lodgings for him and his attendants, ten *livres* for his carriage and eight horses, and sixteen *livres* for young goats, chickens, pigeons, and capons. The municipality of Toulouse also met the expense of a boat with a cabin to take Hajji Murad down the Garonne to Bordeaux, where he arrived too late to present his letters to Catherine de' Medici and Charles IX, who were traveling south for a much-heralded meeting with Elizabeth of Valois, queen of the Spains, and Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, the duke of Alva. Elizabeth was Catherine's daughter and Charles's sister. The meeting was to be at Bayonne. Hajji Murad was hurried to Dax to keep him out of sight of the Spanish party, which had arrived at Bayonne

sooner than expected. To Catherine his presence in the area was a personal embarrassment which she feared might mount into an international scandal.

Hajji Murad had to be granted an audience with the king somewhere, somehow, and it had to be done soon, for he claimed that he must return to Marseille by 1 July. The Spanish were well aware that a Turkish envoy had arrived, and that somewhere, somehow, the king must receive him, which Charles did quietly on 18 June at the monastery of S. Bernard, half a mile or more from Bayonne on the right bank of the Adour. Hajji Murad delivered Suleiman's letters to the king, one requesting payment of the French debts to Joseph Nasi and another asking to have the two Turkish girls sent home. Also it is hard to believe that Hajji Murad's mission had nothing to do with the Turkish siege of Malta, which was then in progress. Before embarking for his return to Malta and to Istanbul, Hajji Murad appears actually to have met at Perpignan with the duke of Alva, who is said to have wanted to end the long period of Turco-Spanish warfare.<sup>32</sup>

In late June, 1565, Ali Pasha died,<sup>33</sup> and Mehmed Sokolli succeeded him as the grand vizir.

<sup>32</sup> On Hajji Murad's mission to the south of France in 1565, see esp. Grunbaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi* (1968), pp. 111-16, and on the French debt to Nasi, *ibid.*, p. 107. The debt was not paid. On 30 August, 1569, Claude du Bourg, the French agent in Istanbul, wrote Charles IX, "Et au regard de Micques [i.e., Joseph Nasi], il me déplaisait dudit consentement presté par ledict sieur de Grandchamps [Grantrier de Grandchamps, also a French agent] et de l' instrument et acte par lui passé sous vostre nom, devant le cadet et juge ordinaire de Constantinople, par lequel vous estes constitué débiteur au dit Miques de la somme de cent cinquante mil escuz . . ." (Charrière, *Négociations*, III [1853, repr. 1965], 70, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, III, 60-61, 931, and II, 403-4, 707-8, 773-74, notes).

For the Franco-Spanish negotiations at Bayonne and the embarrassment to the French caused by the Turkish envoy's appearance, *cf.* Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 327-29. The Spanish believed that Hajji Murad had gone to Bayonne to ask Charles IX for ports where Turkish galleys might spend the winter as well as for munitions and foodstuffs (*Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, XXIX [Madrid, 1856, repr. Wiesbaden, 1967], 231, a letter of Philip II's secretary Gonzalo Pérez to Don García de Toledo, dated at Madrid on 19 June, 1565). Ceremonial entries were made into more than a hundred cities on the journey of the royal entourage to and from Bayonne, attended by fêtes and festivities, on which see the handsome volume by Victor E. Graham and W. McAllister Johnson, *The Royal Tour of France by Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici, 1564-6*, Toronto, 1979. The Turkish envoy is mentioned, *ibid.*, p. 286.

<sup>33</sup> On Ali Pasha Semiz, "the Fat," agha of the janissaries, beylerbey of Rumelia, and grand vizir (1561-1565), *cf.* R. Mantran, in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I (1960), 398a.

and see S. A. Skilliter, "Catherine de' Medici's Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting . . ." *Turica*, VII (1975), 194 ff. On the later history of the "sultanas" Mirmah and Esma, *cf.* von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, IV (Pest, 1829, repr. Graz, 1963), 101 ff., trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l' empire ottoman*, VII (Paris, 1837), 127 ff.

Sokolli had campaigned in Hungary years before, in the time of Brother George Martinuzzi, and Petremol thought it likely that the Turks might resume their war against the Hapsburgs "if the emperor does not withdraw his army immediately." But the summer was advancing, and winter would come before the Turks could reach the confines of Hungary. It was unlikely that the war would be renewed this year.

Despite Sokolli's insistence upon the return of at least one of the Turkish girls to Istanbul, Petremol expected to find him easier to deal with than Ali had been:

Inasmuch as the late grand prior de Guise [François de Lorraine], when he was at Malta, had seized one of [Ali's] ships on its way back from Alexandria, Ali kept the affairs of the emperor and the Venetians all the more under his protection and advanced them. . . . Now, however, the wheel of chance has turned, because the said pasha [Sokolli] is an old enemy of the emperor, for he has fought against him and led the army of the Grand Seigneur in Hungary.<sup>34</sup>

The affair of the Turkish girl, *la fille autrefois turque*, was not finished. Petremol had tried to explain to the sultan that Catherine de' Medici and Charles IX could not return the girl, for she was now a Christian convert and no longer a Turk. He received his answer from Mehmed Sokolli. If the king valued the sultan's friendship, the girl would have to be sent back home, even if she was a Christian, "sans regarder de si près les points de la loi." Obviously, if the sultan were much concerned with such "points of law," he would never have accepted the friendship of the French "pour estre de religion contraire." Petremol's explanation for the sultan's renewed insistence in the matter is noteworthy:

The reason which moved the Grand Seigneur to make such an issue of it was entirely the importunity of the said girl's mother, who does not let the Grand Seigneur appear anywhere without pleading with him and harassing him with grievous lamentations.

Suleiman, before whom armies had fled, was seeking cover from the poor woman's lament for her children.

Petremol remonstrated with Mehmed Sokolli "that I could not believe the Grand Seigneur attached so little importance to the king's friendship that he would be willing to break it off merely for

a simple woman." If Petremol passed on the sultan's statement to Charles, it might well untie the bond between France and the Porte, which would not easily be renewed. Sokolli should rid the sultan of this wraith, chase the woman away, and punish her as she deserved. The grand vizir replied, however, that Suleiman had ordered him to speak as he had done and to instruct Petremol to pass the message on to the queen-mother and the king.

Sokolli thought that the French agent himself should give thought to appeasing the woman by some appropriate means, for when she ceased pestering the sultan, the latter would no longer care very much about the girl's return. But Petremol was not sure what had become of the woman. Someone said she had remarried; she had been quiet for a month. Anyhow the girl should write her mother; Catherine or the king should write the sultan. Both letters should be sent to Petremol: "I will present them in a full divan to the pashas." When the woman learned that in fact her daughter did not want to go back to Istanbul, but wanted "to live and die a Christian with her husband," she would cease to labor the sultan and cease scolding Petremol. The woman was the chief cause of the Turks' retention of the French prisoners, several of whom had died.<sup>35</sup>

The Turkish woman's persistence had apparently exceeded the weary Petremol's endurance. Four years later, on 30 August, 1569, Claude du Bourg de Guérines, then the French agent at the Porte, wrote Charles IX,

On three separate occasions and in three audiences the pasha [Mehmed Sokolli] has insisted earnestly upon the return of a Turkish woman, concerning whom one has written you so often, and whose mother is [still] stubbornly raising an awful clamor. The said pasha remonstrated with me that this seemed to him a small matter, considering your numerous offers and declarations of friendship. . . .

Du Bourg disclaimed all responsibility in what he knew to have been an unceasing nuisance, but he did observe to Sokolli that there was a great difference between friendship and religion. The young Turk had become a Christian; she was determined in her faith, and had been married in France. She could not be sent back to Istanbul.<sup>36</sup>

By this time, of course, Suleiman was gone from the scene (he died in 1566), but not the girls' mother. Late in the eventful year 1571 François

<sup>34</sup> Charrière, II, 793-95, letters of Petremol to Arnaud du Ferrier, dated at Istanbul on 29 June, 15 July, and 23 July, 1565.

<sup>35</sup> Charrière, II, 803-4, note. Petremol's letter is apparently to be dated in late September, 1565.

<sup>36</sup> Charrière, III, 71-72.

de Noailles, bishop of Dax, formerly the French ambassador to Venice, was sent to the Porte. On 8 May (1572) he wrote Charles IX that

the Sieur de la Tricquerie [previously the king's agent in Istanbul, now returning to France] will give you an account of the cries and importunities in which Catherine's mother regularly indulges here, and the troubles which have come of it all, and which can still come.<sup>37</sup>

The French had troubles enough. After the victory of their doubtful friends, the Spanish, at Lepanto, peace had been shattered in France by the massacre of S. Bartholomew (on 23–24 August, 1572) and the fourth war of religion (1572–1573). Nevertheless, Valois ambition was sustained by the election of Charles's brother Henry, duke of Anjou, as king of Poland.

Charles IX returned to the problem of the Turkish girl, now a woman, in a letter to de Noailles on 14 October, 1573. The king and his brother Henry, now also a king, had gone from Paris to Villers-Cotterêts in northern France on their way to Metz, where they were to take leave of each other. Henry would go on through Germany to Poland. The brothers appear to have agreed that it was in the interests of both to prolong the state of war between Spain and Turkey. They invited the sultan, Selim II, to send a representative to Henry's forthcoming coronation, and were doing their best to prevent Spanish agents from negotiating a truce with the Porte.

By the edict of Boulogne (of 8 July, 1573) peace had been restored in France, which fact, Charles wrote de Noailles, the latter must make clear to the pashas. A war-torn France could be of no use to the Turks, with whom Charles's government wanted to restore the friendship of almost forty years. The Grand Seigneur must not enter into a treaty with the Catholic king, "qui luy est . . . capital enemy, jaloux et envieux de sa grandeur et prospérité." Charles's letter to de Noailles reeks of hostility to Spain. Since the Turkish girl's mother Huma was still a source of irritation, with her "crierie et importunité," Charles agreed that de Noailles should provide Huma with an annual pension of fifty *écus*, for which the crown would reimburse him "together with your other expenses."<sup>38</sup>

Almost a decade later, on 5 September, 1580, the French ambassador Jacques de Germigny, after a full year in Istanbul, instructed his secretary Berthier, whom he was sending to Henry III, to

make clear to his Majesty that there had reappeared on the scene "a poor Turkish woman who calls herself the mother of Marguerite, the queen-mother's *femme de chambre* . . . , and of Catherine, her sister. . . ." Once again she was lamenting "that her two girls are being kept as slaves in France," although she had been told repeatedly that they were not slaves, were now married, and had been well provided for by the kings of France. Even so, her loud moaning and incessant appeals to the sultan had been damaging to French interests at the Porte. She had been the reason for the "long servitude" of the French prisoners being held by the Turks. De Germigny suggested a suitable pension, perhaps a hundred *écus*, "to shut her mouth."<sup>39</sup>

If payments were ever made on Huma's hundred *écus*' pension, they were not enough, for on 16 June, 1581, Sultan Murad III wrote Henry III "that the lady named Humā has time and again presented written petitions to our imperial stirrup. . . ." The sultans accepted petitions as they rode through the streets. Murad reviewed the capture of the two girls by the grand prior of France when the prior had seized certain ships on their way to Mecca, contrary to the terms of peace between

<sup>39</sup> Baron Ignaz de Testa, "Instructions données au secrétaire Berthier, pour porter en cour, par M. de Germigny, en date du 5 septembre 1580," art. xxv, in the *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissances étrangères*, I: France (Paris, 1864), p. 132; cf. Charrière, II, 931, note, and Skilliter, "Catherine de' Medici's Turkish Ladies-in-Waiting . . .," *Turcica*, VII, esp. pp. 201–3—an informative article, without which I should have missed more than one important reference to the *affaire des filles turques*. Jacques de Germigny had arrived in Istanbul on 10 September, 1579 (Charrière, III, 814).

Henry III's reply to Berthier's articles of instruction is dated 6 January, 1581, in Testa, I, 133–37: The Sieur de Germigny was directed to inform the sultan that "la paix de ce royaume a été conclue et arrêtée avec [Henry] le roi de Navarre et aucuns des députés de la nouvelle religion" (by the treaty of Fleix of 26 November, 1580, ending the so-called seventh war of religion). Henry was looking forward to the sultan's renewal of "les anciennes capitulations faites entre cette couronne et ses prédécesseurs." He was, however, too pressed for funds just now to send a clock which de Germigny had requested for the sultan and the presents of cloth from Paris for the sultanas and the pashas, but would try to do so later.

Philip II had added the kingdom of Portugal to his Spanish domains, which (de Germigny was to tell the sultan and the pashas) had been made possible by the truce which the Porte had accorded Philip. Henry was willing that de Germigny should make provisions of 100 *écus* to Rabbi Isaac and to the dragoman Ali, provided it did not increase the expenses allotted to the envoy, but there is no mention of a pension for Huma. The Turco-Spanish armistice of 1580–1581 was later renewed for three years (von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, IV, 113, 159, trans. Hellert, VII, 140, 194–95). See below, Chapter 24, note 194.

<sup>37</sup> Charrière, III, 267, note.

<sup>38</sup> Charrière, II, 443–45, note.

France and the Porte. He further stated that "although, out of pity, three prisoners from the Imperial Arsenal were given in exchange for those girls, the girls were not handed over," which seems to be the only reference to the release of these three presumably French prisoners. The sultan had been informed that Hajji Murad had also asked for the return of the girls but, nevertheless, they had never been released, and were still living in France. Since Huma had requested the sultan's exalted aid, it was important that they should now be sent back to their mother, in accord with the French kings' affection for and devotion to the sultans. "Let pity be shown to the above-mentioned lady in this matter, and let it not be necessary that our imperial letter arrive yet again for this particular case."<sup>40</sup>

Murad III's letter asking that the Turkish girls be sent back to Istanbul was to be conveyed to the French court by the dragoman Ali Aga, who had recently been made (at Henry III's request) a member of the sultan's guard of honor. The purpose of Ali's mission, however, was to take with him the sultan's renewal of the Franco-Turkish capitulations. The French ambassador Jacques de Gernigny now wrote Henry III again (on or about 20 July, 1581):

The aforesaid Ali Aga bears besides the letter to your Majesty a letter of the sultan on behalf of the Turkish woman, the mother (as she says) of the two girls with the queen-mother, whom your Majesty has heard discussed so often. This letter has been accorded her more as a consequence of her persistence and to get rid of her than otherwise, to which letter, however, there is a very pertinent response in the nineteenth article of the capitulations, since thereby these people hold it to be inadmissible for them to hand over to your ambassadors Frenchmen who have become Turks, thus merely letting them go free—an article which in reciprocity ought to apply to Turks who have become Christians, your Majesty being unwilling to do anything contrary to the Christian faith, from which you derive your title ["Most Christian King"], and there is no doubt but what the sultan will remain satisfied with this answer.<sup>41</sup>

This had supposedly been the understanding since the first Franco-Turkish treaty of February,

1536.<sup>42</sup> Actually it was not Huma but rather Cateau-Cambrésis that had disrupted French relations with the Turks. Nevertheless, the several direct approaches of a poor woman to three sultans over a period of twenty-five years were noteworthy. The fact that the sultans listened to her appeals, and accepted her petitions, attest to an effort to see justice done at the Porte, and Huma's appeals were effective enough to cause concern to the ambassadors and agents of three kings of France. But, after all, one may be pretty sure that the Turks were retaining the French prisoners (and at least some of them were being held contrary to the capitulations) in resentment of Cateau-Cambrésis rather than in a genuine effort to secure the return of Huma's two daughters, who had become Christians. During the very year after Cateau-Cambrésis a number of Frenchmen—the bulk of these very prisoners—had been taken at Jerba fighting beside the Spanish and Italian enemies of the Porte. The kings of France might rail against the Spanish in letters to the Porte, but as the French drifted into one war of religion after another, they ceased to be useful to the Turks, who might grant their ambassadors precedence at court functions,<sup>43</sup> but inevitably took the Franco-Turkish entente less seriously than in earlier years.

It is surprising that the Turks did not take more advantage of the Christian disaster at Jerba, for the maritime power of the Italian states had been almost shattered by the success of Piali Pasha and Dragut Reis. Genoa, Sicily, and Naples had lost heavily, and the slender naval resources of the Holy See and Tuscany, where mariners were scarce anyway, had been sorely reduced. Many of the best officers and sailors had been killed or imprisoned. Strong armaments were hard to find. Sultan Suleiman was free from his concern that the Persians might assist or try to use Bayazid against the Porte, for Bayazid had been put to death in 1561. Suleiman was also free of fear that the war with the Hapsburgs might be renewed in Hun-

<sup>40</sup> Skilliter, in *Turcica*, VII, 188–91, has published and translated the Turkish text of Murad III's letter of 16 June, 1581.

<sup>41</sup> Charrière, II, 64–65, note. A letter of Murad to Henry III, dated 15 July, 1581, makes no mention of Huma (Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane*, I, 137–40). Although the Franco-Turkish capitulations were confirmed, de Gernigny was having his difficulties in Istanbul (von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, IV, 112–13, trans. Hellert, VII, 139–40).

<sup>42</sup> Charrière, I, 290: ". . . et si aucun desdits esclaves [i.e., captives] avoit changé de foy et de religion, que ce néantmoins la personne soit libre . . ." (art. 10), and *cf.* Testa, I, 18. The date of the treaty is February, 1536, not 1535 on which note above, Volume III, Chapter 11, pp. 400–1. According to the treaty or capitulations of 1569, ". . . si ledit esclave s'est fait Turc, qu'il soit libre, le laissant aller; et s'il est encore sous la foi chrétienne, qu'il soit consigné aux Français" (Testa, I, 95, art. 13).

<sup>43</sup> *Cf.* Murad III's letter of 15 July, 1581, to Henry III, in Testa, I, 139.

gary, for he had made peace with Ferdinand in 1562.

Nevertheless, no Ottoman expedition moved westward, although the Barbary corsairs were a danger to Italian shipping and to the Italian coasts. Suleiman was, to be sure, intermittently ill during these years of peace. After the worries of Jerba, some of the pashas preferred peace. The Muscovites might become a menace. There had been a serious fire in Istanbul. The harvests had not been good, and the plague had been rampant. At length, however, as we have seen, in a letter dated at Istanbul on 25 November, 1564, the French agent Antoine Petremol had written Charles IX of the sultan's vast preparations for an expedition, apparently against Malta, Apulia, or Cyprus.<sup>44</sup>

If the Turks attacked Venetian Cyprus, they would move the Signoria to arms. If they attacked the Spanish in Apulia or the Hospitallers at Malta, the Venetians would do nothing. The policy of the Signoria—we have observed it so often—was to keep out of trouble with the Turks. When on 20 April, 1564, Benedetto Soranzo was appointed "capitano al Colfo," i.e., commander in the Adriatic, he was (like his predecessors) instructed carefully to observe "the articles of peace which we have with the most serene Signor Turco."<sup>45</sup> In Istanbul, Venetian observers knew what to look for, and had sources of information that do not always appear in the documents. They kept an eye—both eyes—on the movement of the janisaries into or out of the capital, the recruitment of mariners, the enlistment of mercenaries, the arrivals and departures of ambassadors and foreign agents, the production of ship's biscuit, the delivery of timber and metals to the arsenal, the construction and equipment of galleys, the casting of heavy cannon, the storage of powder, the making of rope, sails, and oars, and whatever else might indicate a large expedition in the offing. And now they were quite aware that the maritime peace of the last four years in the Mediterranean would almost certainly be broken.

Antoine Petremol kept sending reports from Istanbul of Sultan Suleiman's mobilization of his naval forces. On 28 December, 1564, he wrote Arnaud du Ferrier in Venice "que de jour en jour lesdicts préparatifs s'augmentent." This would be the greatest *armée de mer* the sultan had ever put together. From the Bosphorus alone 150 galleys would set sail in the spring of 1565. Dragut Reis

and the "king" of Algiers would add at least another 50 galleys and corsairs' fustas. It would be difficult to make an estimate of the transports which would carry soldiers and munitions. Suleiman was drawing upon the Ottoman forces in Syria as well as in Egypt. Piali Pasha was the grand admiral of the sea. Mustafa Pasha would command the land forces which would be set ashore. The army would number at least fifty thousand men, for thirty to forty thousand *sipahis* were being drawn from Asia Minor and Egypt.

Four or five thousand janissaries would go with the expedition, not counting the *asapis*, "les soldats ordinaires des gallères, qu' on nomme *azappes*." No one knew where this vast armament would strike. The sultan was keeping his secret "hidden even from his chief pashas." Some said that he would attack Malta, others that his objective would be places that the king of Spain held on the Barbary coast [La Goletta and Oran], "especially his last conquest" [Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera]. There were, however, still those who worried about Apulia and other places in the Italian peninsula. The sultan might not make Cyprus the target. He had a treaty with the Venetians.<sup>46</sup>

Petremol wrote a similar letter to Catherine de' Medici on 20 January (1565). The Turkish armada, he thought, would be ready to sail on or about 12 March. He was concerned about Malta, but the king of Spain had become so strong in the area that it seemed likely the sultan was aiming at some other place in Christendom.<sup>47</sup> The Vene-

<sup>44</sup> Charrière, II, 772-73. On the *asapis*, cf. Volume II of the present work, p. 525, note 86. The Spaniards had taken Peñón de Vélez in 1508, but had lost it. It had been reoccupied by Don García de Toledo on 6 September, 1564. There is an inaccurate account of the event, which disturbed the Turks, in the Abbé de Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers*, II (1726), 419-21, followed by von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 424-25, but see Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española*, II (Madrid, 1896), 66-71, and especially Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II (1966), 306-8.

<sup>45</sup> Charrière, II, 774-75. The Spanish were very much on the alert, and regarded an attack upon Malta as a perilous possibility, on which note in general the letters of Philip II, Don García de Toledo, and others from the Archives of Simancas in the "Correspondencia de Felipe II con Don García de Toledo y otros, de los años 1565 y 1566, sobre los preparativos terrestres y marítimos para defender la Goleta, Malta y otros puntos contra la armada del Turco," *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, XXIX (Madrid, 1856, repr. Wiesbaden, 1967), 5-45 and ff., esp. pp. 7, 25-26, 31-32, 38. An *aviso de Constantinopla* of 7 December, 1564, *ibid.*, p. 7, is almost suspiciously prophetic in the accuracy of its forecast, there having been a meeting of the divan on 5 December (1564), "... y se descurrió sobre la empresa de Malta, y su designo es de tomar primero Castel de San Ermo [S. Elmo] para en-

<sup>44</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 768.

<sup>45</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 100-101' [117-118'].



tians were as well informed as anyone in Europe, and the doge and Senate had already written their ambassador at Philip II's court, Antonio Tiepolo, to warn his Majesty that the sultan's objective was going to be Malta or Messina. Thereafter the Turks would land troops in Apulia. They were planning to seize whatever territory they could. One could not of course be entirely certain of the projected Turkish movements. The Senate intended, Tiepolo was told, to keep Philip informed of "that which comes to our notice," but his Majesty should be cautioned to keep the Venetian communications secret.<sup>48</sup>

As for the Senate's own precautions, they were slight in view of the sultan's massive preparations. On 10 February Antonio Bragadin was elected provveditore general of "our kingdom of Cyprus" to see to "li soldati di quel regno così da piedi come da cavallo," provide for the maintenance of the salt flats (*salina*), and prevent corsairs from getting ship's biscuit or other victuals from the island. As usual, neither he nor any member of his suite could engage in any form of trade or commerce.<sup>49</sup> The Venetians were clearly convinced that, whatever the future might hold, the Turkish expedition would not be directed against Cyprus, their major possession in the Levant.

On the day of Bragadin's election as provveditore in Cyprus various members of the Senate wanted the colonial government of Crete to take action against one Antonio da Ravenna, an inhabitant of Candia, "[i]qual] habbia operato per far pigliar dalle galee di Malta la fortezza di Malvasia." Antonio's wife and sons should be made to leave Crete immediately, although they had not been involved in his attempt to help the Hospitallers to take from the Turks the important fortress of Monemvasia on the southeastern coast of the Morea. The desire of the more fearful mem-

bers of the Senate to secure Antonio's condemnation and banishment from Venice and Venetian territories everywhere was, however, defeated by the customary device of postponing the decision.<sup>50</sup> While trying to keep out of trouble with the Turks, the Venetians were anxious also to avoid altercation with the Hospitallers—and the Spanish—in view of the armed conflict which would apparently soon fill the sea-lanes east and south of Sicily.

Although no Turkish armada had come westward in strength for a full four years, the Barbary pirates had harried the coasts of Italy, Spain, and the islands from the strait of Gibraltar to the Ionian Sea.<sup>51</sup> The Venetians suffered their share of losses at the hands of corsairs, even in the western Mediterranean, where at times Dragut Reis seemed almost to hold sway. The Signoria had other problems too, for owing to the Uskoks the Adriatic had also become unsafe for shipping. The coastal town of Segna (Senj) was the thriving center of Uskok piratical enterprise. The town was nominally under the jurisdiction of Ferdinand and thereafter of his son Maximilian II, who were not as distressed by Uskok piracy as the Venetians and the Turks thought they should be.

When on 24 February, 1565, Niccolò Surian received his commission as "captain of the fustas in the Gulf" (the Adriatic), Uskok depredation along the Dalmatian coast and among the islands had again become a matter of serious concern in the Senate, "perturbando la sicura navigazione et violando le giuriditioni nostre." The offensive Uskoks were to receive no clemency. Surian was to put their leaders to death when he could capture them; the lightest penalty for the others was to be no less than twelve years in the galleys.<sup>52</sup> To

señorearse del puerto [i.e., of Marsamuscetto], y meter en él la mayor parte de los bajeles para invernar y ganar despues por asedio Castel San Angel. . . ."

<sup>48</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 134' [151'], *all' ambasciator appresso il Re Catholico*, doc. dated 10 January, 1565 (Ven. style 1564). The doge and Senate also sent Tiepolo a "summary" of the news from Istanbul, of which the text is not given. The Senate vote to send the letter to Tiepolo was passed by a large majority (*de literis* 167, *de non o, non sinceri* 4). Thirty-eight members of the Senate "vuoleno che sia mandato et comunicato il summario solamente senza scriver le lettere all' ambasciator soprascritte," but their motion did not pass. Warnings of the Turkish naval preparations were sent to the colonial governments of Crete and Cyprus, but no sizable defensive measures were taken.

<sup>49</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 134'-136' [151'-153'].

<sup>50</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 137' [154'], doc. dated 10 February, 1565, ". . . che la presente materia sia differita fino al primo consiglio." According to Francesco Balbi di Correggio [on whose work, see below, note 89], *La Verdadera Relacion de todo lo que el anno de MDLXV ha sucedido en la isla de Malta* . . . , Barcelona, 1568, fol. 18, Suleiman was incensed by the Hospitallers' attempt to seize the "island" of Monemvasia (*Malvasia*).

<sup>51</sup> On the corsairs in the western Mediterranean during the "four years of peace" (1561-1564), cf. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 301-8.

<sup>52</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 138-139' [155-156'], doc. dated 24 February, 1565 (Ven. style 1564): ". . . Et di quei de predetti Usocchi che potrai haver nelle mani farai morir li capi, et altri che ti parerà et a quei che non saranno capi, et che ti paresse di non far morir, non darai minor pena che della galea per XII anni." Two days later, on 26 February, the doge and Senate informed Surian that reports which had just been received made it clear that the Uskoks' activities had been more

their daring at sea the Uskoks added brigandage on land. Protests sent to the imperial court did no good. Despite his promises Maximilian failed to take effective action against the ubiquitous Uskoks, who were plundering Turkish subjects in areas under Venetian rule.<sup>53</sup>

After the death of the Emperor Ferdinand payment of the Hapsburg tribute to the Porte, already two years overdue, was further delayed by the revolt of the Turkish garrison at Buda as well as by the political uncertainties of the time. The tribute, which the Austrians called a gift, had been ready at Komorn (Komárno) for delivery to the Porte, but was then returned to Vienna for safekeeping,<sup>54</sup> as we have seen. According to a letter of Petremol, however, dated 28 December, 1564, Michael Czernowicz, "with two other gentlemen of the emperor," finally brought the tribute to Istanbul (on 20 December). Since the sultan was absent, nothing definite could be done about the renewal of the peace of 1562 until his return. Petremol reported that Czernowicz had brought eighty [or ninety?] thousand ducats and several vases of silver gilt as presents for the sultan and the pashas, "and it seems that the Emperor Maximilian desires to confirm his friendship [with the Turk] and to preserve it more carefully than ever."<sup>55</sup>

worrisome than had been assumed when Surian's commission had been issued, for they had now attacked Turkish subjects in Venetian territory (*ibid.*, fol. 139 [156]), which was doubly disturbing (cf. fols. 140<sup>r</sup> ff. [157<sup>r</sup> ff.], and Reg. 74, fols. 16<sup>r</sup>-17<sup>r</sup> [37<sup>r</sup>-38<sup>r</sup>], 18<sup>r</sup>-19<sup>r</sup> [39<sup>r</sup>-40<sup>r</sup>], 27<sup>r</sup>-28<sup>r</sup> [48<sup>r</sup>-49<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>53</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 45<sup>r</sup> [66<sup>r</sup>], all' *ambasciatore appresso l' imperatore*, doc. dated 15 December, 1565: "Veramente che è cosa grande che non ostante le promesse et ordeni della cesarea Maestà, non cessino li Uscochi de continuar per mar et per terra far et contra nostri sudditi et contra sudditi Turcheschi ogni sorte de violente, prede, et incursioni, secondo che più volte vi habbiamo scritto. . . ." The Uskoks had become almost as great a cause for concern as the Turks (*ibid.*, fols. 51 ff. [72 ff.], 92 [113], and Reg. 75, fols. 1 [23], 7<sup>r</sup> [29<sup>r</sup>], 9-10 [31-32], 13<sup>r</sup>-14<sup>r</sup> [35<sup>r</sup>-36<sup>r</sup>], 21-22<sup>r</sup> [43-44<sup>r</sup>], 25 [47], and Reg. 76, fols. 10 ff. [31 ff.], 35<sup>r</sup> [56<sup>r</sup>], et *passim*). References to the Uskoks' depredations are almost innumerable.

<sup>54</sup> Charrière, II, 756, 759, letters of Petremol to du Ferrier, dated at Istanbul in July and October, 1564. Maximilian, Ferdinand's son and successor, had asked the Porte for a safe-conduct "pour le présent qu' ils appellent tribut, qu' ilz disent estre à Comaran, isle voisine de Vienne, pour ne l' exposer ainsî légerement au danger des révoltes et mutineries des soldats de Bude, lesquels ne sont encors bien appaizés. . ." (letter of 12-29 July, *ibid.*, p. 756).

<sup>55</sup> Charrière, II, 773, the letter of 28 December, 1564, to du Ferrier. There is an excellent account of Czernowicz's career by Josef Zontar, "Michael Cernović, Geheimagent Ferdinands I. und Maximilians II., und seine Berichterstattung," in the *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, XXIV (1971), 169-

At a meeting of the divan on 4 February, 1565, Czernowicz turned over to the Porte the Austrian tribute of 60,000 ducats (for two years) and another 30,000 ducats which Ferdinand's ambassador Busbecq had promised the viziers, whereupon the grand vizir Ali Pasha renewed the peace for a further span of eight years. As soon as Czernowicz and his colleagues had arrived on the Bosphorus with the money, it had been widely assumed that the peace would be confirmed. The doge of Venice and the Senate wrote their ambassador in Vienna of the satisfaction they had felt upon the receipt of "li avisi che habbiamo havuti da Constantinopoli della pace conclusa tra sua Maestà et il Signor Turco." The ambassador was directed to express the Signoria's pleasure in the renewal of peace between the Empire and the Porte both to Maximilian and to the latter's brothers Ferdinand and Charles "if they are at the court."<sup>56</sup> But, alas, peace had not been made.

On 18 February (1565) Michael Czernowicz, "il Cernovichio," had kissed the sultan's hand, after being presented to his Highness according to custom, and thereafter (on 22 February) he had departed with all his household. Presently, however, news had come from the pashas of Buda, Temesvár (Timișoara), and Transylvania that troops of the Emperor Maximilian II had moved into Transylvania. Two state messengers or "cha'ushes" (*chiasus*) had then been dispatched in haste to order Czernowicz's return to Istanbul and his internment.<sup>57</sup> Apart, then, from what seemed

222, and for the negotiations at the turn of the year 1564-1565, see, *ibid.*, esp. pp. 214 ff., where Czernowicz's arrival on the Bosphorus is dated 22 December (1564), and note esp. M. Lesure, in *Turcica*, XV (1983), 127-54.

<sup>56</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 137<sup>r</sup> [154<sup>r</sup>], all' *ambasciatore appresso l' imperatore*, doc. dated 17 February, 1565 (Ven. style 1564), de *litteris* 185, de non 7, non *sinceri* 1. On 9 February, 1565, Don García de Toledo wrote the Emperor Maximilian II from Messina, asking him to instruct the imperial ambassador in Istanbul to send reports on the progress of the Turks' naval preparations directly to Sicily "para la seguridad de sus reinos [i.e., del Rey mi señor] y quietud de buena parte de la cristianidad" (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX [1856, repr. 1967], 44-45). In his reply to Don García's letter Maximilian agreed to keep him informed (via Naples) to the extent it could be done without endangering the life of his ambassador at the Porte (*ibid.*, XXIX, 72-73, doc. dated 13 March, 1565).

<sup>57</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 5<sup>r</sup> [26<sup>r</sup>], in *lettere del bajlo in Constantinopoli fino 3 Marzo, 1565*, doc. entered in the register under the date 24 March, 1565. On the translation of *maone* as "large galleasses," cf. Charrière, II, 768, Petremol's letter of 25 November, 1564, to Charles IX: ". . . grandes galéaces, ou mahonnes qu' ilz appellent."

Czernowicz, John Sigismund of Transylvania, the war in Hungary, and reports concerning the Turks fill the imperial-papal diplomatic correspondence in 1565-1566 (S. Steinherz,

at the time like a minor disturbance, Suleiman's plans were moving forward—as far as the baillie could see—the imminent departure of the armada, almost certainly for the West.

One could almost write the history of the years before and after the Turkish siege of Malta from the Venetian documents. Letters from Vittore Bragadin, the baillie in Istanbul, had kept the apprehensive Doge Girolamo Priuli and the Senate well informed up to 3 March, 1565, concerning the progress being made on the Turkish armada. All the galleys had now been set afloat. Sultan Suleiman's was to be launched, according to the baillie, with great solemnity on the following day (4 March). Suleiman had ordered that, besides the admiral (*il Rayi*), there should come aboard for the ceremony "twenty of those priests of his who read the Koran continually, to pray God for the happy success of the [forthcoming] enterprise." The sultan had apparently been attentive to the details of preparation, for Vittore Bragadin had written

that the said Signore has wanted more than once to go with his brigantine around the arsenal to see with his own eyes how his affairs are getting along, and he has been urging on the expedition with much insistence.

When the Gran Signore spoke, men stirred. Almost everything seemed to be ready. Masts were in place. Sails were being rigged. On many of the galleys cannon were already in place. All the commanders (*tutti li rayi*) and the other officers of the armada had been instructed to have everything in order aboard their galleys by 15 March "sotto pena della vita." Most of the oarsmen had already arrived on the Bosphorus. For the present, it was said, the horse-transporters (*pallandarie, che sono navili da tragiettar cavalli*) were not leaving port, but only the ships and large galleasses (*le navi et maone*), upon which were to be distributed three of the five thousand janissaries who were to go on the expedition. The other two thousand were to be put aboard fifty galleys along with thirty-five

hundred arquebusiers.<sup>58</sup> The Turks were apparently making rapid progress, perhaps too rapid.

When on 24 March (1565) the motion was made in the Venetian Senate to share the contents of Bragadin's informative letters with the ambassadors and agents of the various princes who maintained diplomatic missions in Venice, the Senate was reluctant to pass it, deciding also not to inform their secretaries in Milan and Naples and their other envoys in Europe.<sup>59</sup> Later on, in the same session, however, the Senate agreed that their ambassador to the imperial court might inform the Emperor Maximilian by word of mouth of Czeronowicz's recall to Istanbul and his detention at the Porte.<sup>60</sup> It was becoming clear that Ali Pasha's confirmation of the eight years' peace had come to naught.

Maximilian and John Sigismund of Transylvania had become embroiled in armed conflict with each other over certain areas in northeastern Hungary (Tokay and Szatmar-Bereg).<sup>61</sup> Presently the Turks entered the fray on behalf of John Sigismund, the sultan's protégé. Maximilian then suffered a loss in the death of the friendly Ali Pasha, who was succeeded in the grand vizirate by the anti-Hapsburg Bosnian Mehmed Sokolli. During the Turkish siege of Malta the Porte was also at war with Maximilian in Hungary. Indeed, in the spring of 1566 Suleiman undertook to lead the campaign himself, determined to take the fortified towns of Erlau (Eger) in northeastern Hungary and Sziget (Szigetvár) in the southwest. Both Erlau and Sziget had resisted, so far with success, all Turkish efforts to get the better of them.

It was Suleiman's thirteenth campaign. Now old and stricken with gout, he no longer rode, but went in a carriage. Progress was slow; the rains were heavy. The Turkish forces numbered thousands. Suleiman received John Sigismund at Semlin (Zemun, Hungarian Zimony), on the Danube next to Belgrade, at the end of June (1566). Learning of the success of Count Nicholas Zrinyi in an attack upon a Turkish encampment at Sikkls in

*Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland [1560-1572]*, II-4 [Vienna, 1914], nos. 73, 82, 87, 90, 91, 96, 99, 103, 106-7, 110, 113, 116, 121-23, 125; I. P. Dengel, *ibid.*, II-5 [Vienna and Leipzig, 1926], nos. 5, 14, 17, 18 [on p. 63], 20-21, 24, 27, 33-34, 36-37, 39, 41-44, 49, etc.; and Dengel, *ibid.*, II-6 [Vienna, 1939], nos. 1-4, 6-8, 10, 12-16, which volume contains for the most part only summaries [with brief quotations] of the texts. As for Czeronowicz, who had been almost given up for lost, to everyone's amazement he returned to the imperial court on 24 August (1565), with a Turkish dispatch for the Emperor Maximilian, who might have peace if he met the sultan's demands—and war if he did not (*ibid.*, II-4, pp. 455-56).

<sup>58</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 5' [26'].

<sup>59</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 5' [26'], the vote being *de parte* 38, *de non* 5, *non sinceri* 13, without the cross before the vote *de parte*, which would have indicated the passage of the motion. On Bragadin's two years in Istanbul and his dispatches in cipher to the Signoria, see Christiane Villain-Gandossi, "Les Dépêches chiffrées de Vittore Bragadin, baillie de Constantinople (12 juillet 1564-15 juin 1566)," *Turcica*, IX/2-X (1978), 52-106.

<sup>60</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 5' [26'], the vote now being *de literis* 152, i.e., the doge would write to the emperor about Czeronowicz's detention.

<sup>61</sup> Charrière, II, 778-79, 780-81.

southern Hungary, Suleiman decided not to attack Erlau first, but to head for Zrinyi's command at nearby Sziget. The sultan entered Fünfkirchen (Pécs) on 4 August (1566), and the siege of Sziget began on the following day. After witnessing the failure of three assaults upon the town, Suleiman died during the night of 5–6 September (1566). Two days later, on the eighth, Sziget fell to the Turks, and the heroic Zrinyi was killed.<sup>62</sup> Selim II succeeded his father, Mehmed Sokolli, who had held the high command under the sultan at the siege of Sziget, continued as the grand vizir until his death thirteen years later.

In Rome and Venice as throughout Italy and the islands one awaited further news. At a consistory at S. Peter's on 23 February (1565) Pius IV spoke of the "magna Turcarum classis" which would set sail in the spring. The Hospitallers on the island of Malta had expressed some apprehension, and had asked the Holy See for assistance. Pius would not fail them whether they sought money, troops, or anything else, "sed pro Religione contra infideles, hereticos, et scismaticos sua omnia profusurum."<sup>63</sup> He returned to the Turkish peril at the consistory of 13 April, emphasizing the grants and allowances he had made to the kings of Spain, France, and Portugal, and also to the Republic of Venice, so that they might arm themselves for the protection of Christendom. In this connection he emphasized that he had made concessions to Philip II to the extent of 420,000

gold scudi a year for the construction and equipment of galleys, but so far little seemed to have come of it all.<sup>64</sup> Actually a great deal had come of it all. Philip's fleet, which had been seriously impaired at Jerba, had been largely rebuilt by imposts laid on the Spanish clergy with papal authorization.

Pius was not exaggerating the assistance he had rendered the Spanish king. By a bull of 11 March, 1560, he had granted Philip II a renewal of the notorious *Cruzada*, under which the laity purchased spiritual benefits from the crown by giving "alms." When the pope granted the king the *subsidio*, the money was drawn from the clergy. As for the *Cruzada*, the Venetian ambassador Paolo Tiepolo wrote the doge and Senate from Toledo on 7 April (1560), that Ottaviano Raverta,

the bishop of Terracina, the nuncio sent by the pope, has been very graciously received by his Majesty and by the whole court, especially because he has brought the "Cruzada" for three years, which bull will yield the king about 900,000 crowns, nor would the late pope [Paul IV] ever consent to it.<sup>65</sup>

The following year Tiepolo wrote from Madrid (on 3 July, 1561) that

the nuncio, the bishop of Terracina, has told me that the pope had revoked the subsidy from the clergy and the grant of sale of fiefs of the churches with the assent of the king, provided his Holiness conceded him in perpetuity 300,000 ducats annually, to be levied from the clergy of Spain, for the maintenance of fifty galleys; but that his Holiness, after having complied with what had been required, was surprised that his Majesty should insist on having, besides the 300,000 ducats, the first two grants likewise. Notwithstanding, to satisfy the king, his Holiness was content that the king should levy from the clergy the 300,000 ducats for last year, but his Holiness must take care not greatly to dissatisfy the clergy, and although he has a mind to gratify his Majesty about the sale of [the large, ecclesiastical] fiefs, he cannot do so now. . . .

In fact Philip wanted more than 400,000 ducats annually from the Church, i.e., a fourth part of the revenues of the Spanish clergy.<sup>66</sup>

The "papal subsidy," levied on the Church in Spain, was increased from 300,000 to 360,000 ducats, so that the fleet of fifty galleys, the "classis

<sup>62</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III, 429–53, trans. Hellert, VI, 204–37. Pius V Ghislieri was much distressed by the Turkish capture of Sziget (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 300', by mod. stamped enumeration): ". . . Il Papa ha sentito tanto dispiacere della perdita di Seghetto che subito havuto la nova si ritirò in Aracelli, et per tutto quel giorno non attese ad altro che a deplorar la mala fortuna de' Christiani, alla quale se potesse col sangue suo remediar, lo faria volentieri. . . ." Cf. Giacomo Bosio, *Dell' Istoria della sacra religione et illustrissima militia di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano* (see below, note 89), III (1602), bk. XXXVII, pp. 784–85, and on Suleiman's last campaign and its immediate consequences, see the dispatches of Leonardo Contarini, the Venetian ambassador to Ferdinand, and of Contarini's secretary Girolamo Albini, in Gustav Turba, ed., *Venetianische Despeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Dispacchi di Germania)*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1889–95, III, nos. 159–74, pp. 320–78, docs. dated from 1 June to 28 November, 1566.

A firman, addressed to John Sigismund, dated "in the last decade of Safar . . . in the year 974," bearing the tughra of Suleiman and drafted in the camp before Sziget, announces the taking of the fortress, but it was clearly issued after Suleiman's death (Otto Spies, "Ein Firman Sultan Süleijmans des Prächtygen an König Johann Sigismund von Siebenbürgen" [Transylvania], in *Jean Dery Armağani (Mélanges Jean Dery)*, Ankara, 1958, pp. 221–29).

<sup>63</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 34, fol. 258', by mod. stamped enumeration, *VII Kal. Martii*.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 261', *Idibus Aprilis*.

<sup>65</sup> R. Brown and G. C. Bentinck, eds., *Cal. State Papers* . . . Venice, VII (1890), no. 148, p. 186.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, no. 265, p. 317, and see, *ibid.*, no. 267, also Josef Susta, *Die römische Curie und das Concil von Trient unter Pius IV.*, 4 vols., Vienna, 1904–14, I, 85, 92, 205, 284, and nos. XXXI, XXXV, pp. 258–59, 275–76, on the galleys to be maintained "against the infidels."

ecclesiastica," which Philip was maintaining at the expense of the Spanish clergy, could be increased to sixty galleys. When these sixty galleys were added to Philip's "classis ordinaria" of at least forty galleys, a full hundred galleys should be available for service against the infidels in the Mediterranean. But owing to the rising costs of galleys and their maintenance it was agreed at a secret consistory, and announced in a bull of 2 March, 1562, that the papal subsidy—drawn of course from the Church in Spain—should be raised from 360,000 to 420,000 ducats a year.<sup>67</sup>

Pius IV had become disappointed in the princes of his time, especially in Philip II, who was always putting pressure on the Holy See for money. Actually Philip needed the papal concessions to maintain the defenses of his states, but the years had wrought changes in papal-Spanish relations. According to a detailed (papal) statement of Spanish revenues prepared shortly after Pius's death,

The Apostolic See used to have in Spain a jurisdiction almost equal to the king's, possessing the collation [i.e., the right of nomination] to all bishoprics and benefices, with the military orders dependent upon its authority, as well as the monastic and regular clergy, and all the holy places, the revenues of which are believed to reach at least ten million ducats. . . . But now the power of the Apostolic See is much diminished, and that of the king has increased immeasurably as a consequence of many negotiations and concessions which the kings have obtained from the popes, who were perhaps not well informed concerning the importance of the concessions they made nor of the mood and mentality of that kingdom, or who for other reasons have been much too anxious to gratify these princes on diverse occasions, whether persuaded by unfaithful ministers to make the concessions or perhaps too intent upon their private interests.

The author of this survey of Spanish revenues derived from ecclesiastical sources notes that Pius IV had given Philip II *la quarta de' frutti* to maintain sixty galleys to guard these seas against the infidels, which at seven thousand ducats a galley amounts to 420,000 ducats, which he collects in such a way that they come to more than 500,000 and possibly 600,000 ducats a year.

<sup>67</sup> Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1562, no. 186, *datum Romae apud S. Petrum anno Incarnationis Dominicae MDLXprimo* [the year of the Incarnation begins on 25 March, hence 1562], *VI nonas Martii, pont. nostri anno III. Cf.* Th. E. von Sichel, *Zur Gesch. d. Konzils von Trient*, Vienna, 1872, repr. Aalen, 1968, p. 281, where the bull is misdated 4 March; Susta, II, 401, 423; and Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 546–47, who also misdates the bull 4 March. On papal concessions of the *Cruzada* and the *subsidio* to the Spanish crown, see Modesto Ulloa, *La Hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II*, 2nd ed., Madrid, 1977, pp. 571–621, esp. pp. 583 ff., 603 ff.

It was no wonder the Spanish clergy felt alienated from the Holy See. The author, obviously an informed curialist, examines one by one the eight or ten chief sources of ecclesiastical income which the Spanish king tapped, and which yielded him 1,970,000 ducats every year.<sup>68</sup>

The Venetian ambassador to the Holy See, Giacomo Soranzo, was well aware of Pius IV's dissatisfaction with the European princes. After his return home (in 1565) Soranzo reported to the doge and Senate that Pius would not especially lament a renewal of armed conflict between the kings of France and Spain. With these two at odds, the papacy would find itself "in greater reputation and authority." Pius himself, such being his nature, would have liked to ally himself with one king against the other. But Philip II wanted to avoid the entanglements of warfare, and France was in such a state that an alliance with the Holy See was almost impossible. If Pius had not entirely given up such bellicose ideas, he was at least keeping them in abeyance "for now." The result was that he held neither king in high esteem,

and I know that sometimes he has deplored the situation of his pontificate, in which one finds an emperor without troops, a king of Spain who has withdrawn into the woods, and France, England, and Scotland ruled by women and boys.

Pius did show, however, a desire to see Christendom united against the Turks. He had in fact said that he would like to stand at the head of such a union, for he believed that there was no more glorious way to die than on a crusade. For this purpose he would gladly spend the resources of the Church, which could be compensated for by conquest. Sometimes he had discussed a war against the Turks with the ambassadors at the Curia "to excite their princes to this enterprise." Nevertheless, he had often assured Giacomo Soranzo that he would never bring pressure upon the Venetian government to join a crusade until he saw the greater princes of Europe actually united against the Turks, for he realized that the Venetians had important connections with the Porte.<sup>69</sup>

In mid-March (1565) the Doge Girolamo Priuli and the Senate sent off a letter to Filippo Bragadin, the provveditore of the Venetian fleet, reminding him that the Turkish armada would soon be lev-

<sup>68</sup> D. Luciano Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de S. Pio V*, 4 vols., Madrid [but printed in Rome], 1914, I, 447 ff., 453.

<sup>69</sup> Soranzo, "Relazione di Roma [1565]," in Eugenio Albreri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), pp. 145–46.

ing the Bosphorus, and that of course he must avoid any possibility of an encounter with it. In anticipation of the arrival of the armada Filippo was to withdraw with the Venetian fleet from the Ionian Sea "into the waters of Dalmatia," putting himself under the command of the captain-general of the sea. He was to leave two galleys at Corfu "for the needs of that fortress." If the officials at Corfu did not have the means of arming frigates—small, fast slender vessels with a score of oarsmen—Filippo must leave them two armed frigates from the fleet. The local baillie and provveditori would thus have the means of rapid communication with Venice.

Filippo Bragadin was also instructed to make proper provision for the secure voyage of the galleys assigned to Cyprus and Crete. The Venetian secretary in Naples, Daniele Bonriccio, had advised the doge and Senate "che dovevano esser deputate sette galee di continuo alla guardia di Brandiccio," i.e., that seven [Neapolitan] galleys [of Philip II] were going to be assigned to the defense of Brindisi. Although these galleys would apparently not be sent to Brindisi for some time, when they did take up their station there, Filippo must avoid all contact with them "so as not to give the Turks reason to suspect that we have any connection with armed vessels of the most serene Catholic king for the purpose of causing harm [to their armada]." The prudent Filippo would certainly understand the importance of exercising caution under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the doge and Senate wished to be sure that he would exercise all diligence in following orders.<sup>70</sup>

At the same time (on 14 March, 1565) the doge and Senate issued a commission to Francesco Barbaro as provveditore general at Corfu, expressing concern "per il bon governo et sicurtà della importantissima città et isola nostra de Corfu." Barbaro must make a survey of the fortifications of the island, add to them if he believed an increase to be necessary, and make sure that the defenses

were manned by an adequate soldiery of both horse and foot, which should be equipped with sufficient "artillery, powder, and other munitions." In addition to funds for payment of the troops on Corfu, Barbaro was provided with 10,000 ducats for construction, "per bisogno di quelle fabriche, liquali spenderai con quel più vantaggio della Signoria nostra che sia possibile." The doge and Senate had ordered the purchase of a thousand bushels (*stara*) of rice, another thousand of rye, and five hundred *stara* of beans for the fortress at Corfu, which had been supplied with biscuit and grain of very poor quality. Whether those responsible for this sad state of affairs were guilty of fraud or incompetence, Barbaro was after proper investigation to find out and to punish them "as an example to others."<sup>71</sup>

The provisioning of the troops and garrisons and the maintenance of the fortifications at Cyprus, Crete, and Corfu were an enormous and ever-lasting drain on Venetian resources.<sup>72</sup> There were also lesser expenses, and when they concerned Istanbul, the doge and Senate considered them carefully, rarely leaving them to local officials or to some lesser branch of government. Thus, for example, Vittore Bragadin, the baillie, and the Venetian Council of Twelve in Istanbul had selected Rabbi Abraham Abensach as physician for the Venetian colony on the Bosphorus. They proposed to pay him sixty ducats a year, which was apparently the going rate. It was obviously within their authority to make such an appointment. Abraham, however, wished the Senate to confirm his appointment "with some increase in his said salary," as Vittore had recently written the doge and Senate. Since Abraham was known to be a "learned and capable person," and had diligently attended Venetians in the past, the Senate approved his appointment, "and to his salary, which is at 3,600 aspers, there should be added another 1,400 aspers, so that the total should amount to 5,000 aspers, which is one hundred gold scudi a year." This sum was to be paid, however, only to Rabbi Abraham, and not to his successors as physicians to the Venetian colony in Istanbul.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 1<sup>r</sup>-2<sup>r</sup> [22<sup>r</sup>-23<sup>r</sup>], *provvisori nostro clausis* [Filippo] Bragadeno, doc. dated 14 March, 1565, *de literis* 185, *de non* 3, *non sinceri* 5. On Filippo Bragadin, note also Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fols. 43<sup>r</sup> [88<sup>r</sup>], 56<sup>r</sup> [101<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 13 August and 16 September, 1569. In the spring of 1565 all officials in the Adriatic and Levantine possessions of the Republic were warned to try to avoid trouble of any sort with the Turks (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 4 [25], 9 [30]). Although the Venetians were taking care not to be seen with the Spanish, they were eager to have Philip II confirm their various privileges in the kingdom of Naples (*ibid.*, fol. 21 [42]), doc. dated 16 June, 1565, and *cf.* fol. 37<sup>r</sup> [58<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 3 November of the same year).

<sup>71</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 2<sup>r</sup>-3<sup>r</sup> [23<sup>r</sup>-24<sup>r</sup>]. On the *stara* (*stara*) as a measure for grain, etc., see R. E. Zupko, *Italian Weights and Measures from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century*, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981, pp. 278-81.

<sup>72</sup> *Cf.* Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 34<sup>r</sup> ff. [56<sup>r</sup> ff.], 39<sup>r</sup> ff. [61<sup>r</sup> ff.], 44<sup>r</sup> ff. [66<sup>r</sup> ff.], *et alibi*.

<sup>73</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fol. 4<sup>r</sup> [35<sup>r</sup>], doc. also dated 14 March, 1565, *de parte* 185, *de non* 1, *non sinceri* 1. The Venetian Council

Despite their isolation for the past half-century in the ghetto in Venice, between the Canale di Cannaregio and the Rio di S. Girolamo, the Jews had been of no small assistance to the Signoria. They served as diplomats, physicians, interpreters, merchants, advisors, and sources of information concerning the affairs of the harem and the Porte. The Jews were also very useful to the Turks. Joseph Nasi was a Jew. He was also one of the more important figures in Istanbul, and from 1566 he was also duke of Naxos, the leading lord of the Aegean. A half-dozen years later (in 1573), after the war of Cyprus and the battle of Lepanto, another Jew, Salomon Askenasi (like Abraham Abensach an honorary "rabbi"), was to assist the Venetian bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro make a much-needed peace with the Turks.

The international banking house of the Fuggers of Augsburg maintained a sort of news bureau, the center of which was in Venice, as good a place as any for gathering factual reports and questionable rumors. According to a Fugger news dispatch (*avviso*) dated at Istanbul on 25 March (1565), twenty galleys had set out from the Bosphorus for Negroponte to see to provisions for the armada, which (it was said) would leave port on 8 April. The great Turkish armament would consist primarily of one hundred and twenty-nine galleys and four galliots. Two other galleys were expected to arrive from Algiers. The Turks' destination was unknown, but word was abroad that it would be the Hospitallers' island of Malta.<sup>74</sup>

of Twelve in Istanbul (the *Consejo di Dodexe*) had survived from the old days of Byzantium, on which cf. Volume II, p. 111, note 9, and on the asper, *ibid.*, p. 227, note 97.

<sup>74</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, *Avvisi delli avvenimenti del mondo per l'anno 1565*, fol. 1', a report from Istanbul dated 25 March (1565): "S' erano partite 20 galee sotto Rais per la volta di Negroponte per dar ordine alle provisioni, che il resto dell' armata usciria per tutto li 8 di Aprile, che sariano in tutto 129 galee, 2 galeotte che erano a Constantinopoli et due altre simili, et due galee che si aspettavano d' Algieri, che ancora non si sapeva ove detta armata andarebbe a spalmare, et ch' era voce che detta armata andaria all' impresa di Malta." Cf. also the Spanish *avvisos de Constantinopla* of 10 February and 25 March, 1565 (*Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 345-48). The grand master Jean Parisot de la Valette believed the Turkish naval preparations were almost certainly aimed at Malta (cf. his letter of 17 February to Philip II, *ibid.*, XXIX, 51-53).

The collection of so-called *avvisi* in the Vatican Library, Cod. Urbinate lat. 1038-1112, contains seventy-five volumes, covering the period from January, 1554, to December, 1648. The first five volumes (nos. 1038-1042) come down past Lepanto, to 1572. These five volumes were part of the news service maintained by agents of Ulrich Fugger, whose *bureau d' information* was clearly located in Venice, presumably in connection with the Fondaco dei Tedeschi at the Rialto. See above, Chapter 17, note 88.

The Turkish armada would soon be in the Aegean. Antoine Petremol was no less vigilant in sending information to the French court than was the Venetian bailie in dispatching his letters and the *avvisi* of the day to the Signoria. On 7 April (1565) Petremol wrote Catherine de' Medici that on 30 March the armada had departed for the West—one hundred and fifty vessels with oars, eight large galleasses or *mahonnes*, eight ships, and some smaller transports loaded with munitions. Besides Piali Pasha,

the regular captain of the sea, the Grand Seigneur has sent along one of his pashas named Mustafa to be his lieutenant general and chief of the enterprise, which they indicate as headed for Malta or La Goletta, according to what they will find as more convenient. The said Mustafa has orders from the Grand Seigneur that just as soon as he is off the Barbary coast or Provence, he is to send a man to the king [Charles IX] to pay his respects and to request action in the matter of the debt for which payment is claimed from his Majesty by Jean Micques, otherwise called Joseph Nasi [which was his name originally]. For this purpose the Grand Seigneur has sent me orders to accompany the letters which he is writing to his Majesty with some word of my own, a thing which I could hardly refuse to do, seeing the desire which I know his Highness has that the said Joseph Nasi should be satisfied.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Charrière, II, 782; cf. *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 349-50. Although various dates are given for the departure of the bulk of the Turkish armada (cf. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 320 and note 10), the thirtieth of March (1565) is clearly correct. The testimony of the Venetian bailie Vittore Bragadin confirms that of Petremol, as shown by Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 12'-13' [33'-34'], *al bajlo et proveditor general di Corfu, et proveditor general Barbaro*, doc. dated 26 April, 1565: "Per avvisi che habbiamo da bajlo nostro in Constantinopoli de 30 del mese passato intendo che l' armada di quel serenissimo Signor quel giorno s' era partita da Constantinopoli, sicome egli ci scrive havervene dato aviso anco a voi, delli progressi dellaquale perchè desideramo esserne da voi con diligenza avvisati havemo già commesso al proveditor nostro dell' armata Bragadino che 'l debbi lassarvi modo di frigate altra quelle che potrete ritrovare de li, acciochè possiate avvisare il capitano nostro da mare. . . ." The officials of Corfu were also to relay by land, *per la via di terra a Dulcigno et da Dulcigno a Catharo*, information about the westward movement of the Turkish fleet.

An *avviso* from the Bosphorus, which we owe to the Fugger news service, also gives 30 March as the date of the departure of the armada, and provides us with an abundance of picturesque detail (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 6): ". . . che alli 29 la mattina per tempo il generale dell' armata et Mostafà luocotenente erano andati a baciar le mani al Signore [Suleiman] et licenciarli, accompagnati dalli bassà et da tutti li signori della Porta, et presi li standardi si aviorono verso la marina, et montarono sopra le galee et partirono, et di poi s' erano partite altre galee a una et due alla volta talche s' erano partite quasi tutte eccetto 22 che erano restate per non esservi giunte per allhora le ciurme, et parimente li Rais d' esse s' erano fermati

Petremol also wrote du Ferrier on the same day, noting that the departure of the armada had come sooner than expected, and while it was the largest armada that had ever left Istanbul, it had also been attended by the greatest confusion. Actually only eight real galleys had left with the captain of the sea and the general. The others would follow as soon as they could collect the men to sail with them, "but if one may judge the end by the beginning, one can only expect confusion worse confounded." Of the one hundred and fifty vessels with the oars that had left port, according to Petremol, the vast majority were "les galliottes et fustes."<sup>76</sup> *Omnia principia difficillima*, but if we can believe Petremol (and he was an eyewitness), it was a poor start.

Maybe we should not believe Petremol, at least not that only eight true galleys left Istanbul on 30 March. We have a Fugger dispatch dated on the same day as Petremol's letters to Catherine de' Medici and du Ferrier (7 April). According to this *avviso*, the armada contained on the day of departure one hundred and twenty-nine galleys, ten ships, eight large galleasses, and some galliots and fustas, making a total of about one hundred and fifty vessels with oars. The same dispatch contains, however, the interesting and inaccurate news that the sultan had just had Giacomo IV Crispo, the duke of Naxos (1564–1566), beheaded.<sup>77</sup> Giacomo had, indeed, gone to Istanbul in an effort to preserve his rule over Naxos; he had lost his duchy, and now languished for five or six months in prison. He lived, however, to lay claim to the duchy again in 1571–1572 with the help of Venice, but died still dispossessed a few years later (in 1576), while Joseph Nasi bore the title to the ducal domain he never went to see.<sup>78</sup>

con intensione di starvi qualche giorno, il che havendo inteso il Signore haveva mandato fuori un bando che tutti quelli che si fossero ritrovati il giorno seguente sariano stati impiccati subito . . . " after which the commanders in question hurried about their business with all diligence. Cf. the similar account in Anton Francesco Girni Corso, *Assedio di Malta*, Rome, 1567 [see below, note 89], bk. iv, fol. 43'.

It was becoming increasingly clear that the Turkish "impresa" was being directed against Malta (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 7' ff., 11', 12, 14', 17', 18', 19'–20' ff., 26–27', etc.).

<sup>76</sup> Charrière, II, 783–84, letter dated 7 April, 1565.  
<sup>77</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 14' by mod. stamped enumeration, a report from Istanbul of 7 April, 1565: "Che alli 30 Marzo fini di uscire tutta l'armata al numero di 129 galee, X navi, 8 maone, et alcune galeotte et fuste, in somma da 150 legni da remo, et era andata ad impalmare. Che il Signore haveva fatto tagliar la testa al Duca di Nexia et di Milo, isolette del Arcipelago, suo territorio, et anco ad alcuni altri de' suoi . . ."

<sup>78</sup> R. Predelli, *Regesti dei Commemoriali*, VI, bk. XXIII, no. 160, pp. 327–28, doc. dated 6 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571);

In the meantime the Venetian Senate had finally chosen a captain-general of the sea, Marchio Michiel, who received his commission on 26 April (1565). He was reminded at the outset that the reasons for his election were "the preservation of our state and our desire and firm resolve to maintain the peace we have with the most serene Signor Turco." Michiel was to take care that the Venetian fleet now being put under his command should do no injury to the sultan's subjects nor damage to Turkish ships or territories. Provision had been made for the defense of Cyprus, Crete, and Corfu, and so at the approach of the sultan's naval armament the Venetian fleet (as the provveditore Filippo Bragadin had been instructed) was "to withdraw into the waters of Dalmatia."

Michiel and Bragadin must observe the movements of the Turkish armada,

which we are willing to hope will come as our friend, and we are apprising you [Michiel] that we have already sent to the [colonial] governments of Zante and Corfu gifts to present to the magnificent lieutenant Mustafa Pasha and the magnificent captain of the sea [Piali Pasha] as they pass through those islands of ours, but in the event the Turkish armada should be found to cause us damage, which we hope will not come about, we give you freedom and trust to your prudence to go with our fleet and to remain on hand to deal with the armada as shall seem best to you, taking care to do everything which you will perceive as required for the well-being and preservation of the state and of our interests.

If the worst came to worst, Michiel would have to use his own judgment in protecting the Venetian islands. This was not to be expected, however, and if the Turks attacked any place not belonging to Venice—and obviously they were going to attack some place—Michiel was to keep out of the fray and to avoid giving the Turks the least cause for suspicion. "You will have an eye solely on the security of the state and our possessions, and you will observe the same restraint with regard to the other armadas," i.e., of the Spanish, Hospitallers, Neapolitans, Sicilians, Genoese, or of whomever else the Turks might assail on land or at sea.

Among other funds Michiel received 14,947 ducats "per dar paghe all'armata nostra," the sum of 15,805 ducats having already been provided for wages for the officers and crews of the Venetian fleet. Any galley commander guilty of fraud or seeking illicit gain was to be severely punished,

Wm. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*, London, 1908, pp. 635–41, and *Essays on the Latin Orient*, Cambridge, 1921, repr. Amsterdam, 1964, pp. 173–74; and cf. Chas. [Karl] Hopf, *Chroniques grecoromanes*, Berlin, 1873, p. 482, general table.



"etiam ad esempio d' altri." Michiel was empowered to commandeer and arm such Venetian vessels as he might find necessary, and to open all letters addressed to the Signoria, "so that everything may be known to you, and you may be able to take steps in accord with the requirements of our interests." He had the authority to inflict capital punishment and to ban disobedient officers and crewmen from Venetian territories "da mar et da terra," and even from the city of Venice itself. If the Uskoks caused trouble, Michiel was to proceed against them, "castigando di severa punitione quelli che saranno presi talmente. . . ." The Ragusei were friends, and were to be so treated.<sup>79</sup>

The Turkish armada had set out. The eyes of Europe would be fastened upon it. Meanwhile in Istanbul the Venetian bailie Vittore Bragadin had been serving his time, and doing his duty. He had written with great insistence that he was suffering from a "grave indispositione," caused by the air on the Bosphorus, which one would have thought was much like the air in Venice. Vittore had served in the unwelcome post for less than a year—the supposed term was for two years—but on 17 April (1565) the Senate agreed to the election of a successor, "accio che stando longamente de li non venghi a perder la vita, con danno et ruina della sua famiglia." After a vote in the Senate and by formal election in the Maggior Consiglio a successor would be chosen, "who is to serve for two years, and may be chosen from any position, council, collegio, or office of government."<sup>80</sup> Nobody would want the job. The Turks were notoriously difficult to deal with when a crisis arose.

Agostino Barbarigo was elected Vittore's successor, but successfully pleaded (without penalty) his inability to go to Istanbul. In presenting his case to the Senate Barbarigo advanced "many and most just reasons" for his not being given the post, reasons relating to public policy as well as to his private life, which rendered him "unable" (*inhabile*) to go to Istanbul. Acting with perhaps unusual leniency the Senate went on record as willing "to preserve the person of our said beloved noble to

avail ourselves of his services on other occasions." Barbarigo had performed well in the past, and the motion was put to a vote "che sia accettata l'escusatione del predetto Ser Agustin Barbarigo, et che in loco suo sia fatta elezione di baylo in Constantinopoli. . . ." On the second ballot, by a vote of 158–22–9, the Senate acceded to Agostino Barbarigo's petition for exemption (on 21 March, 1565),<sup>81</sup> and so the important office on the Bosphorus went begging. In fact, as we shall see, it went begging for months. The weary Vittore Bragadin, who said he was sick, had no alternative but to live with the air of the Bosphorus where, to be sure, there had been more pestilence of late than on the lagoon of his homeland. And of course Busbecq has attested to the discomfort of life in Istanbul.

The Turks were always a problem. As early as 10 and 17 February and 2 March (1565) the Venetian Senate was trying to determine the sums to be spent for the purchase of such gifts as the Collegio should deem appropriate to give the general Mustafa Pasha and the captain Piali Pasha. The local officials at Corfu and Zante would make the presentations, with the usual expressions of friendship, when the Turkish armada reached the Ionian Sea.<sup>82</sup> The Turks liked gifts, but one could never tell: they might prefer pillage or conquest. The Senate, therefore, raised the military force on Corfu from 300 to 800 men, and took steps to add to the number of galleys available for service. To make assurance doubly sure they reinforced the defenses and increased the shipments of supplies to Cyprus as well as to Corfu, Zante, and other places.<sup>83</sup>

As everyone thirsted for news, needless to say Pius IV and the Curia Romana were vastly concerned with the approach of the Turkish armada. The papal nuncio in Venice, Cardinal Guido Luca Ferreri, bishop of Vercelli (1562–1572)—the see almost belonged to his family, for one Ferreri had succeeded another at Vercelli from the very beginning of the century—had been pressing the Signoria for news of the Turks "con molta instantia." As the doge and Senate wrote Marchio

<sup>81</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fols. 13'–14' [44'–45'].

<sup>79</sup> The text of Marchio Michiel's commission may be found in the Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 8'–11' [29'–32'].

<sup>80</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fol. 12 [43], doc. dated 17 April, 1565. The Senate voted to allow Bragadin his requested release from office *de parte 175, de non 18, non sinceri* 2. Cf. Chr. Villain-Gandossii, "Les Dépêches chiffrées de Vettore Bragadin . . ." *Turcica*, IX/2-X (1978), 58–61. Bragadin's successor, Giacomo Soranzo, was elected bailie on 2 June, 1565, but did not reach the Porte until 10 June, 1566 (1), when he took over from Bragadin.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fol. 1' [32'], doc. dated 2 March, 1565. On the practice of giving the Turks gifts, *occurrento passar l'armata Turchesca*, see Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 61' [87'], doc. dated 11 December, 1567; and note fols. 139'–140' [165'–166'], dated 18 September, 1568; *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 43'–44' [88'–89'], dated 16 August, 1569, and fol. 58' [103'], dated 29 September, 1569, *et alibi*. The gifts often consisted of lengths of fine cloth, especially velvet, satin, and damask, as well as glass works, confections, sugar, soap, and wax candles.

<sup>83</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fols. 1' ff. [32' ff.], 5 [36], 6 ff. [37 ff.], 24' ff. [55' ff.], 39' [70'].

Michiel, the recently elected captain-general of the sea, on 3 May (1565), Ferreri asked

that we should be willing to order that, whenever you have some news [*alcun aviso*] which may seem to you of importance relating to the progress of the Turkish armada, you must send word of it immediately to the ministers and agents of his Holiness at Ancona so that they can inform his Holiness and take such steps as may be necessary. Desiring, therefore, to gratify his Holiness as far as possible, in accord with the great reverence we bear him, we [i.e., the doge] with the agreement of the Senate tell you that when there comes to your notice any news of the aforesaid armada which seems to you to be of importance, you must through some man of yours—by word of mouth and without any letters from you—make known this news to the aforesaid agents and ministers of his Holiness. We do not want you to put anything in writing for those reasons of caution which you can easily appreciate. And so you will carry out what is thus our intention and our will.<sup>84</sup>

Pope Pius IV might worry, but presumably not the king of France. Petremol wrote Charles IX from Istanbul (on 17 May, 1565) that, as a result of the French request for assurance before the armada had left Istanbul, the Grand Seigneur had ordered Mustafa Pasha to see that the friends of the Porte, especially the French, suffered neither damage nor displeasure from the coming expedition. Petremol, however, was still uncertain whether the Turks' primary objective was to be Malta or La Goletta.<sup>85</sup> According to the Fugger agents, Pius IV had decided to raise 8,000 foot "in caso che l'armata Turchesca venisse in queste parti."<sup>86</sup> The day after Petremol wrote his letter to Charles IX, Pius gave vent to his concern about conditions in Europe and the hostility of the Turks, for whose prowess he entertained an awesome regard.

In a meeting of the consistory, held at S. Peter's on 18 May, Pius said that while many people generally thought "all the world was at peace"—aside from the wars between Norway and Denmark, the king of Poland and the Muscovites, Maximilian II and John Sigismund of Transylvania—he himself believed the whole of Christendom to be "in grandissimo moto." Maybe peace had been made between Maximilian and John Sigismund (it had not been), but it was the Turk, always the Turk, who

bore watching. Suleiman had put domestic sedition to rest, restored quiet to Asia Minor, and made up with the sophi or shah of Persia. He was secure on all sides, and it was clear "che è per voltar tutte le sue forze contra di noi." The sultan had put together a great armada. On 12 May it had been expected to leave Modon, where it had arrived some time before.

Pius noted sadly that the Corsicans were in revolt against the Genoese, "and that one cannot believe that this armada of such great size does not have some objective of importance." Since the sultan was at peace or had a truce with the other Christian princes, it was clear "that he must be coming to do harm to us or to the Catholic king [Philip II], that the armada was powerful, and the Turks valiant men, who fight for glory, for empire, and also for their false religion." They had nothing to fear, "considering our small resources and the division of Christendom." Pius noted that he had made available to Philip II a subsidy of 300,000 scudi a year [which, as we have seen, had been raised to 420,000 scudi or ducats on 2 March, 1562] to pay for sixty galleys which should serve for the defense of Christendom and for an expedition against the infidels. No king of Spain had ever been given such assistance. If Charles V had been alive, after such a demonstration of support he would have emerged from the monastery of his retirement and joined the sacred expedition that Pius had been hoping for and expecting. Pius had other complaints against Philip,<sup>87</sup> but in any event Charles V was no longer alive.

Pius knew that a large Turkish armada, sailing westward, could not be up to any good. He was uncertain as to its exact destination. Even as he was addressing the consistory, however, the uncertainty was removed. Very shortly one learned in Rome that Jean Parisot de la Valette, the grand master of the Hospitalers, had just sent a letter via Messina to the terrifying effect that on 18 May at 3:00 P.M. the Turkish armada had entered the harbor of Marsaxrocco (Marsaxlokk) at the southeast end of the island of Malta. The Turks were said to have come with 130 galleys, five ships, a "caravana," and 13 large galleasses. Dragut [Turghud] "Reis" was believed to be still in the

<sup>84</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>r</sup> [34<sup>v</sup>-35<sup>r</sup>], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 3 May, 1565. The Senate voted to send Michiel the letter de *l'iteris* 136, de non 2, non sinceri 2.

<sup>85</sup> Charrière, II, 785.

<sup>86</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 7<sup>r</sup>-8<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>87</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 270<sup>v</sup>-272<sup>r</sup>, entry dated 18 May, 1565. Pius IV also had various things to say about the sophi and Bayazid's revolt, Transylvania, Hungary, and other matters that we have dealt with above. Latin minutes of the consistory of 18 May are also given in this register at fols. 277 ff.

western Mediterranean with 20 galleys.<sup>88</sup> If the Turks were going to take Malta, they would certainly need Dragut, who had been the soul of their success at Jerba five years before.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>88</sup> For the report "che per liere del Gran Mastro di Malta alli 18 Maggio a hore 18 si scrive che l'armata Turchesca entrò nel porto di Marzo Sirocco in Malta con galee 130, navi 5, una caravana, et 13 maone. Draguto è restato con 20 vele in ponente . . . et questo avviso è venuto hoggi in Roma a hore 23 di Messina," see Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 19<sup>v</sup>-20<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>89</sup> The chief literary sources for the siege of Malta are Francesco Balbi di Correggio, who lived through the whole ordeal, and Antonfrancesco Cirmi Corso, who apparently landed on the island with Don García de Toledo's relief force on 7 September (1565). The work of the former carries his name on the title page in the Spanish form Francisco Balbi de Correggio, *La Verdadera Relación de todo lo que el año de MDLXV ha sucedido en la isla de Malta, de antes que llegasse l'armada sobre ella de Soliman Gran Turco, hasta que llegó el socorro postrero del Rey cathólico nuestro señor don Philippe segundo d' este nombre*, 2nd ed., Barcelona: Pedro Reigner, 1568, 131 fols., with a map of Malta. There is a somewhat free and rather awkward translation by Henry A. Balbi, *The Siege of Malta (1565)*, Copenhagen, 1961; it was published posthumously, and abounds in typographical errors, but is on the whole reliable. There is a freer translation with numerous omissions by Ernie Bradford (London, 1965).

An abridged Italian translation, ed. Fra' Enrico Montalto, *Diario dell' assedio di Malta*, was published in Rome in 1965 under the auspices of the Sovrano Militare Ordine di Malta. This translation of Balbi was presumably made from the first edition (1567), although it contains a full-page reproduction of the title page of the second (1568), from which it differs markedly in facts and figures. No worthwhile purpose is served by using Balbi's first edition, the second having been "per el mismo autor revista, emendada, y ampliada." The Montalto translation ends with an appendix containing 1,811 names of Hospitalers, gentlemen adventurers, mercenaries, and others who helped defend Malta against the Turks. This list was assembled from the works of Balbi, Cirmi, and Pierre Gentil de Vendôme (see below) as well as from Giacomo Bosio, *Dell' Istoria della sacra religione et illustrissima militia di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano*, 3 vols., Rome, 1594-1602, vol. III, bks. XXIV-XXXIII, esp. pp. 504-9, 574-75, 659-67, 711-12. Balbi's *Relación* was dedicated to Don John of Austria.

Anton Francesco Cirmi "Corso" (1520-1583?) was a cleric of the diocese of Nebbio on the island of Corsica. His work is entitled *Comentarii . . . ne' quali si descrive la guerra ultima di Francia, la celebratione del Concilio Tridentino, il soccorso d' Orano, l' impresa del Pignone, e l' Historia dell' assedio di Malta diligentissimamente raccolta insieme con altre cose notabili*, Rome: Giulio Accolto, 1567, 136 fols. (toward the end of the volume the foliation has been bungled by a careless printer). Cirmi sheds little or no light on the "last war with France" (culminating in the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis), the Council of Trent, the relief of Oran, and Don García de Toledo's occupation of Peñón de Vélez (on 6 September, 1564), which are all quickly covered in the first twenty-odd folios of his *Comentarii*. The work is really a history of the siege of Malta, and will henceforth be referred to as the *Assedio di Malta*. Although somewhat diffuse, the *Assedio* is almost as valuable as Balbi's *Relación*. It is a work of scholarship rather than an account of one's own experience. As Cirmi states in his Preface, "E nel descriver l' historia di Malta io mi trovo col soccorso che Don Garzia ultimamente

The siege of Malta, as we have just observed in a note, has been described by the adventurous Italian poet and gentleman-at-arms Francesco Balbi di Correggio, who lived and fought through every day of its duration. Despite the dangers and distractions of the siege, Balbi found time to keep a diary of events, which he soon published (in Spanish) in 1567 and republished, with corrections, in 1568 as *The True Account of All that Happened in 1565 on the Island of Malta*.<sup>90</sup> The course

diede, e per ritrar la verità di tutti quei successi, io stetti circa un' anno tra in Malta e in Messina, hora andando nell' uno ben riconoscendo i siti, et hora nell' altro luogo." His work was dedicated to Don Luis Requesens de Zúñiga, Philip II's ambassador in Rome from the end of September, 1563. On Cirmi's career, see the notice by M. C. Ciappina, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XXV (1981), 814-16.

A third contemporary source is Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, *Della Historia di Malta, et successo della guerra seguita tra quei Religiosissimi Cavalieri ed il potentissimo Gran Turco Sulthan Solimano, l' anno MDLXV*, Bologna: Giovanni Rossi, 1566. I have had ready access only to the French version of this text (Paris, 1567), ed. Hubert Pernot, *P. Gentil de Vendôme et Antoine Achelis: Le Siège de Malte par les Turcs en 1565, publié en français et en grec d' après les éditions de 1567 et de 1571*, Paris, 1910. Achelis was a Cretan poet, a native of Retimo (Rethymon); his work is a prosaic versification (in some 2,500 lines) of Vendôme's history of the siege; he also used Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, as shown by Giuseppe Spadaro, "Sulle Fonti dell'Assedio di Malta di Antonio Achelis," in the Greek journal *Ο 'Επιστολή*, IV (1966), esp. pp. 94 ff. His poem is of no historical value. Vendôme's work is brief, seventy-odd printed pages, and on the whole well informed. He dedicated his book to Cardinal Ippolito d' Este of Ferrara in a letter dated 4 December, 1565. As Vendôme states in this letter, during the period of the siege he was in the service of Giuseppe Cambiano, the ambassador of the Hospitalers in Rome [see Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta* (1567), fol. 47], where he collected the daily dispatches from Malta, Messina, and elsewhere, having thus a singular advantage in "la commodité . . . de pouvoir journellement entendre les choses advenues durant le siège de Malte, avec le grand désir que l' ay veu qu' on avoit universellement d' en sçavoir la vérité. . . ."

Most historians who have described the siege of Malta have made little use of archival materials. The "secondary" literature includes (after Bosio's *Istoria*, III, bks. XXIV-XXXIII, pp. 487-716): Raynaldus, *Ann. ecc.*, ad. Ann. 1565, nos. 8-12; the Abbé de Vertot, *Hist. des Chevaliers Hospitaliers*, 4 vols., Paris, 1726, III, 444-92, and IV, 1-87; Wm. H. Prescott, *History of the Reign of Philip the Second*, . . . 3 vols., Boston, 1855-58, II, 405-92 [who published just too early to have access to the invaluable Spanish correspondence of 1565 relating to Malta in the *Documentos inéditos*, XXIX (1856), and unfortunately failed to use Cirmi and Bosio]; Camillo Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana*, . . . Rome, 1897, pp. 423-36; Carlo Sanminiatielli Zabarrella, *Lo Assedio di Malta, 18 maggio-8 settembre, 1565*, Turin, 1902, a detailed study without notes; Ernie Bradford, *The Great Siege*, London, 1961; J. F. Gullimartin, *Guns powder and Galleys*, Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 176 ff.

<sup>90</sup> There is a brief notice by M. Cacciaglia of Balbi's career in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, V (1963), 363-64.

of the siege was followed from week to week with hope and apprehension throughout the entire length of the Italian peninsula.<sup>91</sup> Malta could be the stepping-stone to Sicily, and Sicily to the kingdom of Naples, where the Turks' year-long occupation of Otranto was always remembered.

The Hospitallers were ill prepared to face the huge Turkish armament which had descended upon them. Their loss of Rhodes (on 1 January, 1523) had driven them to the wall financially. When in 1530 they acquired Malta from Charles V, as we have seen, it was a defenseless, barren waste. They had had neither time nor money enough to construct such fortifications as one sees today at Malta—all these followed the siege of 1565. Some twenty years after settling into the dry, dreary island the Knights of the Order had built Fort S. Elmo on the northeast tip of "Mount" Sciberras (now the built-up area of Valletta and Floriana), at the entrance to the main inlets of Marsamuscetto and Grand Harbor. They had left undefended, however, the highland of Mount Sciberras itself as well as that of S. Maria, which rose to the north of the passageway into Marsamuscetto (Marsamxett). There are no mountains on Malta. From S. Maria the guns of Dragut Reis would rain down upon Fort S. Elmo. This little promontory (southeast of Sliema) is still called Dragut Point.<sup>92</sup>

The long promontory of Mount Sciberras divides the cove of Marsamuscetto from Grand Harbor. Projecting northward into the center of Grand Harbor were (and are) two spurs or smaller promontories, which were to be made famous by the siege. At the north end of the eastern spur stood Fort S. Angelo, behind which (to the south) lay the walled Borgo (the "Birgu," now called Vittoriosa). The majestic Fort S. Angelo of today postdates the siege. Along the southern wall of the Borgo were located the bastions of the "langues" of France, Provence, Auvergne, Italy, Aragon,

Castile, and Germany. In the southern part of the other (western) spur or small promontory, called Senglea or the Isola S. Michele, was Fort S. Michael. Between these two spurs of land jutting into Grand Harbor lay the Port of Galeys (the modern Dockyard Creek), the entrance to which was blocked by a great chain which stretched from the northern point of the Isola S. Michele to Fort S. Angelo.

To the south of these two smaller promontories, the Isola and the Borgo, where the walls were strengthened and the moats were deepened, was the area known as La Bormula. Here the Knights razed some of the houses after the siege began. This area (especially to the southwest) is now called Cospicua. Still farther south, enclosing the bases of the two small promontories, rose the heights of Corradino, S. Margherita, Calcaria, Salvador, and S. Caterina, from which the Turks threatened Fort S. Michael and the bastions along the southern wall of the Borgo. The layout and fortifications appear more complex when depicted in words than when drawn on a map. The Borgo, S. Michele, and La Bormula (together with S. Elmo) were the main centers of strife in the siege of 1565, just as their modern counterparts the "three cities" of Vittoriosa, Senglea, and Cospicua were to be the main targets in the siege of 1942-1943.<sup>93</sup>

The approach of the Turkish armada can easily be followed in the Spanish sources. On 16 May (1565) Don García de Toledo, now viceroy of Sicily and captain-general of the sea, wrote Philip II from Messina that the armada had reached Modon on 2 May "en número de 120 galeras, 20 galeotas, 7 naos, y 13 mahonas. . . . La fama ha sido siempre para emprender Malta ó la Goleta. . . ." By 18 May there was no longer any question as to the Turks' objective. The armada was sighted off the Maltese shore, and the islanders flocked into the Borgo behind the bastions of the Knights along the south wall.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Details of the siege, not always accurately reported, are given in the valuable series of contemporary *avvisi*, to which reference has been made, in the Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 30, 33-34, 35<sup>r</sup>, 44<sup>r</sup>, 50<sup>r</sup>, 60<sup>r</sup>-61, 63-65, 67, 70-72, 73<sup>r</sup>, 74<sup>r</sup>-75<sup>r</sup>, 76<sup>r</sup>-77<sup>r</sup>, 78<sup>r</sup>, 83<sup>r</sup>, 95<sup>r</sup>, 103<sup>r</sup>, 110<sup>r</sup>-113<sup>r</sup>, 131-32, 136. This register also contains numerous *avvisi* relating to Austria, Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia.

Until the arrival of Jean de la Valette's news (and similar reports) at the Curia, fearsome rumors spread abroad, as shown by a dispatch from Rome of 19 May (1565) with the erroneous statement that "qui s'è divulgato che l'armata Turchesca batte Brindisi, e chi dice Cavo d' Otranto, per relazione d' una fregata del clarissimo generale de' Venetiani, ma non si crede ancora" (*ibid.*, Cod. 1040, fol. 23).

<sup>92</sup> Fort S. Elmo was built after the Turkish attack on Malta in 1551 (Cirri, *Assedio di Malta* [1567], fols. 37<sup>r</sup>-38<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>93</sup> For all the topographical details of the siege, one should consult a map such as that given in Jurien de la Gravière's *Les Chevaliers de Malte*, "Fortifications de Malte pour servir à l' intelligence du siège de 1565." On the layout of the fortifications at Malta, cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxiv, pp. 490, 495, 499, and esp. bk. xxv, pp. 517-19, where those in command of all the defense posts are identified.

<sup>94</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 136, and cf. *ibid.*, pp. 107-8, 133-35, 152, 360-61, 362. The Spanish had been mobilizing troops and raising money for weeks (*ibid.*, pp. 85, 108-19, 124-25, 138, 141 ff.). The Grand Master de la Valette had recommended Don García's appointment to succeed Juan de la Cerda, duke of Medina Celli, as the viceroy of Sicily (Bosio, III [1602], bk. xxiv, p. 494).

<sup>95</sup> On the state of the fortifications of the Borgo, cf. *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 86-87, and on the arrival of the Turks, see,

As soon as they appeared offshore, the Turks headed straight for Marsascirocco, a large harbor five miles or so south of the Borgo, which was "safe from all winds except the scirocco," the south wind.<sup>96</sup> They were deterred from landing, however, by the sight of a large force which the grand master had dispatched to the scene. Skirting the southern shore of the island as far as Mgarr, where they anchored for the night, the Turks then returned to Marsascirocco, and on 19 May are said to have set 5,000 men ashore. Now, according to the *avvisi*, the first armed encounter took place, when a body of Christian horse and 300 arquebusiers from the Borgo, with at least a few Hospitallers, attacked the Turks, who allegedly lost 70 men. A Portuguese Hospitaller was killed as well as five soldiers, and a French Hospitaller [presumably Adrien de la Rivière] was captured when he fell from his horse. On the twentieth the Turks disembarked the remaining 20,000 men,<sup>97</sup> "mostly a rabble and a wholly inexperienced soldiery," at least in the opinion of five Christian renegades who had fled from the armada. The Turks also disembarked five pieces of field artillery, started digging trenches, and established an encampment in the open area "near a castle called Tordar," i.e., near the village of S. John and the spring of the Marsa, at the southern end of Grand Harbor.

The Turks were settling in rapidly. Their superior numbers, "rabble" or not, made offensive

action impracticable for the Hospitallers, who wisely chose to defend their strongholds in the hope of wearing out the Turks, since the latter were far from home and far from large-scale reinforcements. On Monday, 21 May, Mustafa Pasha reconnoitered the area south of the Borgo, looking down from the heights of S. Caterina. He did not get very close to the Borgo, however, because the Christian gunmen "played artillery" in his ears, and a body of horse made a successful skirmish, killing a number of the enemy, including a sanjakbey, "and captured a standard with little loss to themselves." On this day and the following, the Turks are said to have made their first move against Fort S. Elmo, intending to batter down its walls, shoot cannonballs at the vessels in port, and gain control over the entrance to the harbor.

According to the renegades, among whom was one from the "port of S. Maria," the Turks had not yet landed their heavy artillery. Obviously the Knights had a good deal to look forward to, but the renegades also had more cheerful news. The enemy had lost a great ship [at Nauplia], as the armada was making its way westward [from Istanbul to Negroponte, Athens, Nauplia, Modon, and across the Ionian Sea to Malta]. Apparently the ship was overloaded, for it was carrying 6,000 barrels of gunpowder, munitions, and as many as six hundred sipahis, of whom four hundred were drowned.<sup>98</sup>

Whoever was on hand in Malta, compiling the *avvisi* for Ulrich Fugger and the banking house in Augsburg, was observant and well informed. He reported that the Turkish armada contained in all 180 vessels, namely 120 galleys, 13 large galleasses (*maone*), five ships, and other galliots, but (as Petremol had written Arnaud du Ferrier on 7 April) they were for the most part badly manned, and the whole expedition was shot through with disorder. Dragut Reis had not yet reached Malta with his vessels, nor had those expected from Algiers yet arrived. The general of the land forces was Mustafa Pasha, as we know; the commander of the armada was Piali Pasha, "who was the general at Jerba."

The grand master of the Hospitallers, the Knights, and the Maltese had high hopes of a successful defense of their island. They were holding

*ibid.*, XXIX, 154–58, esp. 365 ff., a letter of the grand master of the Hospitallers, Jean de la Valette, to Philip II, dated 22 May, "... essendo giunta qui la sua armata [i.e., del Turco] alli XVIII del presente in numero di cento sessanta veze senza i vascelli che aspetta d' hora in hora de Dragut et de Algieri. . . ." Note also Don García's letter to Philip, dated at Messina on 25 May (*ibid.*, p. 372), according to which Dragut might add as many as thirty or forty vessels to the Turkish armada, and cf. Cigni, *Assedio di Malta* (1567), bk. iv, fols. 48 ff., and Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxiv, pp. 512–13.

<sup>96</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relacion*, fol. 32<sup>r</sup>; Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxiv, p. 514.

<sup>97</sup> As Philip II wrote Don García on 18 June, 1565, ". . . He entendido particularmente los que de nuevo se tenían de la armada turquesca, y como habían desembarcado y echado hasta veinte mill hombres en tierra y alguna artillería . . ." (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 221). On de la Rivière, see Cigni, *Assedio di Malta* (1567), bk. iv, fols. 49<sup>r</sup>, 51<sup>r</sup>, 51<sup>v</sup>. Cigni, bk. v, fol. 61<sup>r</sup>, went along with the assumption "che il campo de' Turchi arrivasse al numero di venti mila combattenti . . ." i.e., Cigni says the Turks had 20,000 combatants at Malta. Bosio, III, bk. xxiv, pp. 511–12, claims that there were 38,300 "combatenti" in the sultan's army at Malta "non ostante che 'l Cigni dica che fossero solamente 28 mila." If Cigni elsewhere gives the figure 28,000, I failed to record the fact in my notes. Bosio, *ibid.*, bk. xxv, pp. 520–21, 524, was moved by Adrien de la Rivière's capture and "martyrdom."

<sup>98</sup> See the *avvisi* given in the following note. Cigni, *Assedio di Malta* (1567), bk. iv, fol. 45<sup>r</sup>, says that 150 of the 600 *huomini da guerra* swam to safety, but that 8,000 barrels of powder and 13,000 cannon balls were lost, and cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxiv, p. 510.

in readiness 1,200 soldiers of diverse nations, about 500 Knights of the Order, and a large number of Maltese. They had also recruited some 4,000 arquebusiers,<sup>99</sup> among whom was the diarist of the siege, Francesco Balbi di Correggio.

<sup>99</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 24–25, a summary of dispatches from Malta of 25 May and from Messina of 26 May (1565): “Che l’armata Turchesca si cominciò a scoprire in Malta alli 18 Maggio con tempo prospero, et la maggior parte del tempo di giorno si trattene nel Porto Marzo Sirocco con qualche travaglio, facendo maretta et con gran pericolo di lei.

“A di 19 dicano che sbarcò 5 m. huomini in quella parte di Marzo Sirocco, con li quali attaccorno la scaramuzza li cavalli dell’isola, et 300 archibuggeri che uscirono del Borgo con alcuni Cavalieri, la qual durò assai, et restorono morti de’ Turchi sino a 70, et de’ nostri morì un Cavalier Portuguese et cinque soldati; et un Cavalier Francese fu preso vivo che cascò da cavallo. Alli 20 di s’imbarcò il compimento di 20 m. huomini, canaglia molta et molto malprattica gente, secondo che hanno detto 5 rennegati fuggiti in Malta, desimbarcò anco cinque pezzi d’arteglieria da campagna, et cominciarono subito a far trince et alloggiare in compagnia in campagna presso un castello detto Tordar.

“Alli 21 il bassà con 7 m. huomini andò a riconoscer il borgo per la parte di Santa Catherina, anchora che non s’accostasse molto, perchè l’arteglieria giocava, et vi si fece anco una buona scaramuzza, nella quale amazzarono molti de’ nemici et un sanguiecto, et presero una insegna con poca perdita loro; per quanto si dice nel quel giorno et nel seguente haveano cominciato li nemici per contra Santo Hermo, un bastione, con disegno di volerla battere, et tirar cannonate alli vasselli che sono in porto et diffendere l’entrata di quello; non haveano sbarcato anchora l’arteglieria grossa da batteria, s’è inteso dalli detti rennegati, fra li quali ben’è uno del porto di Santa Maria. Che li nemici hanno persa una nave grossa che andava con l’armata con 6 m. barilli di polvere d’arteglieria, monitione, et sino a 600 spachi, dell quali se ne aneggarono 400, et si perse tutta la robba. . . .

“Che erano in tutto 180 vasselli, cioè 120 galee, 13 maone, cinque navi, et altre galeotte, anchora che la maggior parte siano armate di trista gente, et mal al ordine. Non era anchora capitato Dragut con li suoi vasselli et altri di Algieri, et che il generale di terra Mustafa Bassà, et del mare Piali, che fu generale alle Gerbe. Che il gran Maestro et tutti stanno con grande animo di difendersi, et hanno sino 1,200 soldati di certe nationi et sino a 600 Cavalieri dell’Ordine con molta gente dell’isola, et 4 m. archibuggeri. . . .” and see, *ibid.*, fols. 26–27, 28.

Cf. the account in F. Balbi, *La Verdadera Relacion* (1568), fols. 22–37, who places the loss of the large Turkish ship with the (says) 700 sipahis (*espaies*) aboard at Nauplia (*La Verdadera Relacion*, fol. 24); says the armada sailed from Navarino to Malta in a week, from 12 to 18 May (fol. 25); notes the grand master’s appeal to Pius IV and Philip II (fol. 26); mentions, as vice-chancellor of the Hospitallers, Frey Martín de Rojas Portalarubio, whom we met at Trent (fol. 28); and gives, with differences to be sure, an outline of events from 18 to 21–22 May similar to that in the Fugger *avvisi* (fols. 31–36). On 12 June (1565) Petremol wrote du Ferrier from Istanbul of the loss in the Archipelago of the large Turkish ship, “. . . que par chemin en l’Archipelago une des plus grandes nefes, chargées d’hommes et munitions, estoit périée en mer, et plus de cinq cents hommes noyez” (Charrière, II, 789–90).

There is a detailed sketch of the Christian forces on Malta when the siege began in Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXV, p. 516.

One reason for the apparent disorder among the Turks was the sense of rivalry and hostility which had come about between the two pashas. Balbi states that when the armada had first come in sight of Malta, Mustafa Pasha had produced an imperial firman, “una carta particular del Gran Turco,” apparently granting him some special authority, which Piali Pasha heartily resented. Thereafter it was difficult for them to agree in council or to take counsel together.<sup>100</sup> Balbi thought that the Turks’ first error was to attack S. Elmo “before any other place,” and that their second error was not to wait for the arrival of Dragut Reis. They were going to take S. Elmo so that Piali could anchor his galleys in Marsamuscetto rather than in the southward bay of Marsascirocco. By 25 May they were engaged in the onerous task of transporting their heavy artillery from the armada to within reach of S. Elmo. In fact by this date they had already fired twenty-five to thirty rounds at the Fort from the artillery range they were setting up “sobre la montaña,” on Mount Sciberras.<sup>101</sup>

The grand master reinforced the garrison at S. Elmo, and stocked the Fort with gunpowder and provisions. The Turks began cutting a network of stony trenches south of the Fort, and constructed triangular wooden frames, which they filled with earth, to use as gabions or foundations for the guns they planned to train on S. Elmo. On Monday, 28 May, the bombardment of the Fort began in earnest. From their gun emplacements on Mount Sciberras, just southwest of the Fort, the Turks also shot across Grand Harbor at Fort S. Angelo and at the windmills of the Isola S. Michele.

Balbi, like the Vatican *avvisi*, reports day by day the minor as well as the major events of the siege.

<sup>100</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relacion* (1568), fols. 25–26, 35–36, 38, trans. H. A. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 40, 55–56, 60. Nevertheless, according to Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta* (1567), bk. IV, fol. 43<sup>v</sup>, on 29 March, the day before most of the armada left Istanbul, Sultan Suleiman had given Mustafa Pasha “la bandiera del generalato . . . ordinando à Piali che gli fosse ubidente.” Piali had married a daughter of Suleiman’s son Selim (*ibid.*, bk. III, fol. 41<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>101</sup> *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 369–70, and see, *ibid.*, pp. 379 ff.; Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IV, fols. 51<sup>r</sup> ff. By the morning of 31 May the Turks had eighteen pieces of artillery trained on Fort S. Elmo. On the Hospitallers’ peril and the plight of the garrison in S. Elmo, “massime arrivando Dragut con qualche forza davantaggio,” see, *ibid.*, XXIX, 387–90, a letter of 1 June, 1565, from the grand master to Don García de Toledo. The grand master sent Don García another worried warning on 3 June (*ibid.*, pp. 394–96): “Se vostra Excellentia ha intenzione de formar una armada potente, come ha designato, non sarà a tempo, perchè troverà molte cose fatte che non se porano poi remediar. . . .” What was needed was the immediate dispatch to Malta of ten or twelve thousand “good infantry.”

On 30 May the Turkish armada sailed from Marsascirocco northward along the east coast of the island to take on water at Salina and S. Paul's Bay. As the Turkish galleys passed S. Elmo, they hailed the garrison with salvos of cannon fire, which was returned from the Fort. The gunners at S. Angelo also addressed the commanders and crews of the Turkish galleys with greetings of fusillade. The defenders of Malta were still engaged in a day-and-night endeavor to improve and add to their fortifications. They would need them, for on Saturday, 2 June, Dragut Reis reached Malta with (says Balbi) thirteen galleys and two galliots of his own, together with thirty other vessels belonging to corsairs, adding some 2,500 men to the enemy's forces. Piali Pasha sailed out to meet him, conducting him to S. George's Bay, where Dragut established his headquarters. He was disappointed in the concentration upon Fort S. Elmo,<sup>102</sup> but had to go along with the plans he found in operation.

Had Dragut been on hand when the decision was made, he would have sided with Mustafa Pasha against Piali (according to Balbi), and attacked the "Old City," then known as Città Notabile, which henceforth we shall call by its current name Mdina. It is in the northwestern section of the island, and was the only "city" on Malta, unless one could so regard the Borgo, which was attached to Fort S. Angelo. Although walled, Mdina could easily have been taken.<sup>103</sup> The Turks could (and

would) have strengthened the fortifications, and established themselves in the only well-walled enclosure in the northern half of the island. They might well have seized the poor, lone fortress on the little island of Gozo, cutting off or certainly impeding communication and the movement of troops between Sicily and Malta. As it was, they would be hard-pressed to take S. Elmo. They could do so, but when they had done it, what would they have? The centers of Hospitaller resistance were S. Angelo, the Borgo, and the Isola S. Michele.

Meanwhile, if the Turks were employing their time unwisely in besieging S. Elmo, Don García de Toledo had no intention of risking the Spanish fleet—rebut at great cost since the disaster at Jerba in 1560—by a direct attack upon the Turkish armada. Although the grand master was constantly urging him to make the attack, Don García did not do so. He doubted "that the Turks are always in such disorder as the [grand] master claims." By the time he could arrive at Malta with a sufficient naval force, as he wrote Philip II on 2 June, the Turks would doubtless be very much in order and quite united. Don García kept Philip informed of his every intention as well as his every move. Although Don García was criticized for the long delay in sending aid to Malta, it was not his fault but Philip's that the Hospitallers would have to wait for months before the arrival of the Spanish to lend a helping hand against the Turks.<sup>104</sup>

After having waited upon Mustafa Pasha, Dragut Reis returned to S. George's Bay, and quickly set up a gun emplacement on the highland called the Hermitage of S. Maria ("Dragut Point") on the north side of the entrance to Marsamuscetto. He began the bombardment of Fort S. Elmo (on Sunday, 3 June). The garrison in the Fort was so distracted by the gunfire that they failed to observe the janissaries' approach to the ravelin or outworks to the southwest of the Fort. The Turks had dug trenches on the low (northeastern) slope of Mount Sciberras, from which the janissaries launched their attack upon the ravelin, whose defenders fled into the Fort. The soldiers in the garrison then tried and failed in a five-hour combat to retake the ravelin. As more Turks kept appearing on the scene, the Christians withdrew again into the Fort, which they almost lost by forgetting to raise the drawbridge. The Turks lost five hundred men in the battle for the ravelin, while "on our side as many as sixty soldiers and

<sup>102</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación* (1568), fol. 41': "Sabado a los dos llegó ala armada Dargut con treze galeras y dos galeotas suyas, y asta al número de treynta baxeles de otros corsarios, y traya en ellos al pie de dos mil y quinientos Leventes viniendo dela parte de poniente. Piali lo fué a encontrar, y puso su capitana en medio delas dos, y lo llevó ala cala de San Iorje, adonde tomó su posta. . . . Después se supo que en extremo peso a Dargut de hallar ya batiendo Sant Ermo, porque su intención era la misma que de Mostafa. . . ." The "Leventes," to whom Balbi refers (Ital. *Leventi*), were corsairs (*cf.* Cigni, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. iv, fol. 46'). Cigni, fol. 53', puts Dragut's arrival on 30 May, and says that he brought about 1,400 *persone da combattere*. Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, however, knows that Dragut reached Malta on 2 June (H. Pernot, ed., *Le Siège de Malte*, Paris, 1910, p. 13).

*Cf.* Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 28', a dispatch from Messina, dated 9 June, 1565: "Draguth era gionto all'armata con 12 galie, 3 galeotte. . . ." Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 25, believed or at least says that a military force of 28,500 fighting men sailed from the East to attack Malta, and that with the additions from Tripoli and Algiers the Turkish force rose to 48,000, not counting sailors and camp followers. It is obvious that the latter figure is a gross exaggeration. On the numbers of Turks, their galleys and other vessels, and the extent of their artillery, *cf.* Cigni, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. iv, fols. 46'-47'.

<sup>103</sup> *Cf.* Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 35'-36', and Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxv, pp. 532-33.

<sup>104</sup> *Cf. Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 173-74, a letter of Don García to Philip II, dated at Messina on 2 June, 1565.

twenty Knights were killed, aside from the many others who were wounded." Thereafter armed engagements with the Turks took place near Mdina, at Mosta, and in the area of Naxxar.<sup>105</sup> The months-long ordeal had begun.

Fort S. Elmo was shelled without letup both by Dragut Reis's four cannon at S. Maria (now also known as Tigné Point) and by the Turkish batteries set on mounds built against and upon the captured ravelin. The Knights and the other soldiers at S. Elmo repelled a heavy attack on Friday, 8 June. The Turks advanced at a furious pace in their initial drive, says Balbi, as though they were "full of *afión*" [opium]. It was clear that S. Elmo could not hold out for long against such assaults and against the continuous cannonade. Since the Turks had decided to concentrate upon the Fort, however, every day that it remained in Christian hands was another day gained for reinforcement of the defenses of the Isola S. Michele, the Borgo, and Fort S. Angelo.<sup>106</sup>

The stress and strain were almost as great in Rome as in Malta. The Knights needed help, and Pius IV was trying to find it for them by appealing to the princes, especially to those who might feel threatened by the Turkish advance. Thus on 7 June, 1565, Pius wrote Alfonso II d' Este, duke of Ferrara, that he had been informed by messenger and by letters from the grand master of the Hospitallers that the Turkish armada had indeed made Malta its objective. Also by this time Alfonso must have learned that the armada far surpassed

in the number of its ships all the fleets that the Turks had ever sent against the Christians. Besides a huge number of footsoldiers the armada had brought a vast array of the things needed for the siege and destruction of towns. The news had caused Pius endless distress,

for we realize in how great peril the well-being of Sicily and Italy will be put, and what great calamities threaten the Christian people, if (which God forbid!) the island [of Malta], so close to Sicily and encircled by so many ports, should come under the domination of the impious enemy.

In Pius's anxiety, therefore, to meet this danger and to preserve that Order of Knights which had always been a loyal guardian of the Christian commonwealth, he had immediately sent the grand master such aid as he could. Since in this crucial time, however, all the Christian princes must come to the assistance of the Order, and each one in accordance with his resources must help repel the common peril, Pius was turning to Alfonso—as to others—and ardently urging him in obedience to the Almighty and for their common safety forthwith to send men and money to the Hospitallers. The Order deserved well of Christendom. It desperately needed the wherewithal to resist the enemy.

The situation was frightening, and would brook no delay. The Hospitallers required of Alfonso as of the other princes money, soldiers, and gunpowder for the cannon. Help should be sent as soon as possible to Sicily, whence it would be conveyed to the grand master in Malta. The sooner Alfonso responded, and the more aid he sent, the more useful his contribution would be, and the more pleasing to God as well as to the Knights at Malta.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 41'-42", trans. H. A. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 64-67; Cigni, *Asedio di Malta*, bks. IV-V, fols. 53' ff., who begins the bombardment of Fort S. Elmo on 31 May. The grand master in his letter to Don García of 3 June, to which we have already referred (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 394), sets "our losses at 150, dead and wounded," and (like Balbi) estimates the Turkish losses at five hundred, ". . . per il che se vede assai chiaramente che non se curano de perder gente a migliaia [!] pur che possiano impatronirse de quella fortezza," which was certainly true. Note also the grim report given to Don García by the Hospitaller Ruffaello Salvago on 10 June (*ibid.*, XXIX, 396-404). The ferocious Turkish attack on 3 June was a great shock to the defenders of Malta.

<sup>106</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 43'-46", who says that the Turks advanced "con muy grande ánimo al principio como aquellos que venían arros de afión, que es cierta composición que tiene tanta fuerza que comida della poca cantidad quita los sentidos, y provoca a acometer sin razón a qualquiera peligro por temerario que sea!" (fol. 45'). Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXVI, pp. 538-54, on the siege of Fort S. Elmo from 1 to 10 June (1565), and note bk. XXVII, p. 562, "tutti dall' affione infuriati et imbestialiti."

Afión, affione, is Turkish for opium (*afyon*), an arabicized word from the Greek ῥό στυον (*poppy juice, opium*), a diminutive of ὁ ὄσος (*juice*): ὁ ὄσος τῆς μηκωσῆς is opium.

<sup>107</sup> Pius IV's brief may be found in the Arch. di Stato di Modena, Cancelleria marchionale poi ducale Estense, Estero: Carteggio di principi e signorie. Italia, Roma, Busta, 1300/15, no. 107: "Facti fuimus per nuncium et literas certiores a Magistro Hospitalis Sancti Joannis Hierosolimitani de adventu classis Turcurum in insulam Melitam, quae classis (ut te quoque audisse non dubitamus) cum numero navium omnes classes longe superat quas unquam Turcurum tyrannus adversus Christianos miserit, tum una maximis pedium copiis ingentem apparatus secum attulit rerum quae usui sunt ad expugnationem et excidia oppidorum. Gravissima is nuncius sollicitudine nos affectit. Etenim videmus quantum in periculum Siciliae et Italiae salus ventura sit quantaque calamitates populo imminet Christiano si (quod Deus avertat) insula tam Siciliae propinqua tot portibus cincta in potestatem impiorum holum venerit. Quapropter huic periculo obviam ire et Ordinem illum Militum qui semper firmum Christianae reipublicae praesidium fuit conservare cupientes nos ipsi quidem Magistro statim ea quae potuimus auxilia misimus. Quia vero tam necessario tempore omnes



On the same day (7 June) Pius appointed Niccolò Cavaliero of Sarzana as papal commissioner, "quem pagatorem vulgo vocant," to take charge of the payment of the troops he had decided to send to Malta, "a goodly number of soldiers to aid the Christians against the Turks who are besieging their towns." He gave the usual expression of confidence in Cavaliero's trustworthiness, diligence, and experience, allocating fifty ducats a month to cover his expenses and those of the servitors and agents whom he would take with him.<sup>108</sup> At the consistory of 18 May, to which we have already referred, Pius had stated that as soon as he had learned of the peril the Hospitallers were facing, he had sent them 10,000 scudi for the payment of troops. Just then they needed money more than soldiers.

Pius understood that Don García de Toledo, the viceroy of Sicily, had sent a relief force to Malta. Pius hoped that it might prove sufficient. In any event the Holy See would not fail to provide the Hospitallers with all necessary aid. If Malta were lost, things would certainly not go well in Sicily and Italy. Furthermore, if the Turks also took La Goletta [the outpost of Tunis] which, it was said, they planned to do after the reduction of Malta, "we should all be badly off." The fortress of La Goletta was a small place [and the Turks were to take it in 1574], so one had reason to fear. If successful in these ventures, the Turks would not only be too close to Sicily and Spain, but also to Rome. One would have to live always under arms.<sup>109</sup>

oportet principes Christianos illi Ordini subvenire et commune periculum pro viribus suis quinquam depellere, iccirco nobilitatem tuam his literis excitandam ac vehementer in Domino hortandam duximus ut divini obsequii et communis salutis causa tam benemerito de Christiana republica Militum Ordini is rebus egente quae sunt ad resistendum hostibus necessariae nulla interposita mora aliquod subsidium impertiat pecuniae, militum, et pulveris ad usum tormentorum bellicorum necessariis easque res in Siciliam mittat primo quoque tempore inde ad Magistrum eius Ordinis devehendas. Quas ei res quanto promptius et largius subministraris, tanto tuae nobilitatis officium opportunius, laudabilius, et Deo atque illi Ordini gratius erit. Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die VII Junii, MDLXV, pontificatus nostri anno sexto." Fear for the future of Sicily and Naples, "e per conseguenza l' Italia e la Spagna," was widespread (cf. Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. v, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>-63<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>108</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLII, tom. 22, "datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, etc., die VII Junii 1565, anno sexto."

<sup>109</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fol. 273 (and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 279<sup>v</sup>), doc. dated 18 May, 1565: "Che l' isola di Malta stava in grandissimo pericolo, che sua Santità havea dati alla 'Religione Gerosolimitana' 10,000 scudi per pagar

At the next consistory (on 27 May) Pius dealt with the Turkish landing at Malta, the siege of S. Elmo, and the plight of the Knights (*Equites in trepidato animo esse*). He referred again to the 10,000 scudi he had sent them. They had not asked for soldiers, and it seemed improper for him to send troops into another's domain—*indecens videbatur cum ea cura magis ad regem Catholicum pertineret*—for the custody of the island of Malta was the responsibility of Philip II whose father, the Emperor Charles, had given the island to the "Religion." Malta was also a sort of outpost of Sicily, which belonged to Philip. But now the Knights had requested troops, and he had made up his mind to send six hundred foot under Pompeo Colonna, for he would leave nothing undone which would contribute to the defense of Malta.<sup>110</sup>

On 8 June (1565) Pius made the formal appointment of Pompeo Colonna as "colonel" or rather "general"—there was a change of mind and title—of the six hundred Italian foot who were being sent to help defend Malta against the Turks. Colonna was also put in command of the troops already recruited (and still to be recruited) for service on the island with funds supplied by the Holy See. The levy of new troops was to be dispatched "quickly and with all diligence."<sup>111</sup> At

soldati, havendo essi desiderato più presto denari che soldati, che intendeva che da l' vicere di Sicilia erano stati mandati soldati, e che piegava Iddio che fussero abbastanza. Che sua Santità non è per mancare di dargli tutti gl' ajutti necessari, perchè se Malta si perdesse, anderiano a male le cose di Sicilia e d' Italia. Se anco pigliassero la Goletta, la quale si dice che assalteranno, e della quale si deve temere per esser piccolo luogo, tutti staremo male, perchè la vicinanza è così grande non solo alla Sicilia e Spagna, ma a Roma, che saria necessario star sempre in armi. . . ." The pope's allotment of 10,000 scudi to hire troops became widely known (Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. IV, fol. 477).

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 284, VI *Idus Junii*.

<sup>111</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLII, tom. 22, fol. 388, by mod. stamped enumeration: "Dilecto filio nobili viri Pompeo Columnae, domicello Romano: . . . Audito nuper a nobis Turcicam classem ad invadendam insulam Melitam accipuisse iamque oppugnationem illius locorum parasse atque incipisse, statim praeter ea quae illuc antea miseramus pecuniarum subsidia etiam aliquot militum cohortes ad ipsius insulae defensionem mittendas duximus. Cupientes autem strenuum et animi magnitudine praestantem virum eisdem militibus praeficere, ad te mentem nostram convertimus. . . ."

"Itaque de tua singulari virtute, nobilitate, et erga nos et Sedem Apostolicam fide ac devotione eximioque usu, quem te in re bellica habere novimus, plurimum in Domino confisi te sexcentorum Italorum pedum nostrorum, quos nunc ad eandem insulam in auxilium Christianorum celeriter omni diligentia adhibita proficisci iussimus, et praeterea omnium militum tam eorum qui iam illic ex pecuniis nostris conscripti sunt quam aliorum quos a nobis ad hanc ipsam expeditionem in posterum

the request of Philip II and the urging of Don García de Toledo, Pius released the able soldier Ascanio della Corgna from imprisonment in the Castel S. Angelo in order for him to serve against the Turks.<sup>112</sup> We have met Ascanio in earlier chapters. A nephew of Julius III and brother of Cardinal Fulvio della Corgna, Ascanio would make a substantial contribution to the lifting of the siege of Malta, where he was to cut a more conspicuous figure than Pompeo Colonna. Despite Pius's wish to see his troops dispatched "quickly and with all diligence," they would go with Don García to the embattled island in September.<sup>113</sup>

The Turks were increasing their efforts against Fort S. Elmo. They made attacks upon the crumbling walls on 10 and 15 June. A heavy assault came on the sixteenth, when some of the Knights told Balbi that even the galley slaves, the hired oarsmen, and the Maltese fought and died with as much courage "como qualquiera otra persona

de mayor estima," i.e., they died almost like gentlemen Knights of the Order itself. Two days later, on 18 June, Dragut Reis was to be seen in a rocky trench, directing the Turkish gunners to lower the too-high level of their fire. Upon his repeated insistence, as he stood with his back to the cannon trying to assess their effect upon the walls, at least one gunner seems to have aimed too low. His cannon ball detached a piece of rock from the scarp of the trench. It struck Dragut in the head. He fell to the ground, blood streaming from his mouth, nose, and ears. A Lombard renegade brought the news to the Borgo—cheerful news to the grand master—"que Dargut era muerto . . . y que el lo había visto, que estava hechando los sesos por la boca, nariz, y oydos de tal manera que no había remedio en su vida. . . ." The Lombard also told the grand master that if the facts were not as he told them, he could order him sent to the gallows.<sup>114</sup>

The Lombard did not lie. Dragut Reis never regained consciousness. He died five days later, on 23 June, one of the great maritime figures of the sixteenth century, ranking with or outranking both Khairuddin Barbarossa and Andrea Doria. The Hospitallers had never known a more daring opponent at sea, nor the Christians a more deadly enemy.

The besieging of Fort S. Elmo went on. The Turks had finally cut off the flow of men, munitions, and supplies from S. Angelo and the Borgo. On 22 June they launched their third great assault, confident of success, dismayed by their failure. According to Balbi, the attacks had lasted six hours, "y haver muerto al pie de dos mil Turcos y heridos casi dos tantos, se retiraron:" with nearly two thousand dead and almost twice as many wounded, the Turks withdrew. In the Fort, however, not a single person of authority was left; five hundred Christians had been killed; there were a hundred survivors, "most of them wounded, without munitions and without hope of assistance."<sup>115</sup>

S. Elmo was doomed. The Christians knew it. So did the Turks, and early on Saturday, 23 June, they began another assault. Four hours later they were pouring into S. Elmo. They killed most of the defenders of the rubble-strewn Fort. The cor-

mitti contigerit, colonellum [which word has been deleted] generalium cum omnibus et singulis facultatibus, potestate, iurisdictione . . . [etc.], auctoritate apostolica tenore presentium cum Dei nomine creamus, declaramus, constituimus, et deputamus. . . Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, etc., die VIII Junii 1565, anno sexto," and note, *ibid.*, fol. 389, a letter of the same date to Camillo de' Medici, *frater miles Hospitalis Sancti Joannis Hierosolymitani*, relating to Pompeo Colonna's appointment. A letter on the same subject—and the movement of papal troops—was addressed to Jacopo Appiano, commander of the Florentine galleys, on 13 June, 1565 (*ibid.*, fol. 400, and note fol. 401). Cf. *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 408, and Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, fols. 60, 63.

<sup>112</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 106<sup>r</sup>, and *Siege* (1961), p. 165. On Ascanio della Corgna's release from imprisonment and his warm reception by Don García de Toledo, who needed his help at Malta, note the *avisos* in Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 7<sup>r</sup>, 17<sup>r</sup>, 20<sup>r</sup>, 22<sup>r</sup>, 35, 37<sup>r</sup>, 47<sup>r</sup>, 57<sup>r</sup>, 70<sup>r</sup>, 73<sup>r</sup>; *et alibi*: "Che il signor Ascanio della Corgna era stato accarezzato molto dal signor Don Garzia, et lo teneva alloggiato in casa sua, consultandolo ogni cosa seco" (fol. 73<sup>r</sup>), and see, *ibid.*, fols. 78<sup>r</sup> ff.).

<sup>113</sup> Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vii, fol. 88, has high praise for Ascanio della Corgna, for whose release from the Castel S. Angelo to serve the Christian cause in Malta Pius IV had received appeals from the grand master himself; Prospero d'Arco, the imperial envoy in Rome; Cardinal Francisco Pacheco "in nome del Re Filippo;" and the Florentine envoy Averardo Serristori "in nome del Duca di Fiorenza."

Ascanio had been arrested by papal orders at the beginning of the year, as Carlo Borromeo had written Zaccaria Delfino, nuncio to Maximilian II: "Sua Santità ha posto in castello il Signor Ascanio de la Corgna per certi homicidii, de' quali egli è molto inditiato. Se a Dio piacerà ch' egli non sia colpevole, come tutti desideramo che non sia, non solo non haverà male alcuno, ma sarà più favorito che mai" (S. Steinherz, *Nuntiatursberichte aus Deutschland [1560-1572]*, II-4 [Vienna, 1914], no. 74, p. 277, letter dated at Rome on 20 January, 1565, and see also, *ibid.*, no. 75, p. 280).

<sup>114</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 48<sup>r</sup>-52<sup>r</sup>; cf. de la Gravière, *Les Chevaliers de Malte*, II, 26-28; on Dragut's death, note Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 45<sup>r</sup>, 54<sup>r</sup>, 57, 65<sup>r</sup>; *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 416; Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bks. v-vi, fols. 68<sup>r</sup>, 73<sup>r</sup>-74<sup>r</sup>; Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxvii, pp. 565-66, 576.

<sup>115</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 53<sup>r</sup>-54<sup>r</sup>.

sairs saved nine wounded Knights of various "languages," and although Mustafa Pasha demanded them, the corsairs kept them "to gain the ransom which each one could pay." And so the Turks had finally taken S. Elmo, as Balbi says:

After having wasted thirty days and more on S. Elmo, and eighteen thousand rounds of ammunition from their cannon and basilisks [the old cannon of the time, decorated with serpents], and having lost about six thousand men—their very best—among them Dragut and others of note, the Turks took [the fort] by force in the manner described, so that they had no reason to make much of a "fiesta" of a victory which had cost them so dearly!<sup>116</sup>

At least Piali Pasha's armada could now enter the protective cove of Marsamusetto, and it did so. The Turks transferred their cannon to the Marsa and the height of Corradino to direct their fire at the south and west walls of the Isola S. Michele (Senglea) and Fort S. Michael. Francesco Balbi, to whom we owe an eyewitness account of the entire siege, spent most of his time that summer as an arquebuser on S. Michele. On 29 June Mustafa Pasha sent an elderly Spanish slave to the Grand Master de la Valette, asking him to receive a Turkish cha'ush. Why? When pressed, the Spanish slave stated that the cha'ush would formally demand the surrender of the barren island. Mustafa hoped that the grand master would not hold out and require him to wreak the same vengeance on the defenders of S. Michele, S. Angelo, and the Borgo as he had done on those of S. Elmo.

<sup>116</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 55: "Después de haver los Turcos gastado treynta y mas dias sobre sant Ermo, y deziocho mil tiros de cañones y basiliscos, y haver perdido al pie de seys mil hombres, los mejores, y entre ellos Dargut y otros muy señalados, lo tomaron por fuerza dela manera contada, de modo que no tenían porqué hazer mucha fiesta de victoria que tan cara les havia costado!" Cf. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 84–87. On the fall of S. Elmo, note also Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bks. v–vi, fols. 68<sup>r</sup>–71.

According to an *avviso* of 14 July, 1565, from Istanbul (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 74<sup>r</sup>–75<sup>r</sup>): "Alli 20 giuigne qua un chiaus con una galeotta venuta da Malta, spedita dal bassà al Signore [Suleiman] con aviso della presa di Sant' Elmo, dicendo esservi morti solo mille Turchi et da 1,500 Christiani, et che facendo l'impresa di Malta sperava pigliarla in breve, et poi andar alla Goletta, il che havendo inteso quei populi corsero col Signore alla moschea a far oratione et limosina per l' anima di quelli che dicono essere iti in paradiso martiri. Il detto Signore ha spedito di poi 3 galeotte con biscotti et polvere per mandar all' armata. Nel Arsenalen continuano a lavorar 40 galere con gran diligenza. . . ." On the Turkish capture of Fort S. Elmo, note Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxvii, pp. 558 ff., 570–76, and on the plight of the Hospitallers and Maltese after the fall of the Fort, see the *Docs. indios*, XXIX, 247, 411–19.

Balbi has noted the atrocities of which Mustafa Pasha was guilty after the fall of S. Elmo. Even Piali Pasha accused him of cruelty. Mustafa offered the grand master a safe passage to Sicily for himself, the Knights, all the people, their property, and the artillery. De la Valette's answer was that anyone who came to him with such an offer would be hanged without mercy.<sup>117</sup> And anyone who accepted the promise of Mustafa Pasha would probably be a trusting fool. But the grand master had no intention of surrendering on any terms. It would have been the end of the Order, for he and the Knights had nowhere else to go.

Throughout the siege the Venetians, who were no friends of the Hospitallers, were trying to preserve friendly relations with the Turks. It was not an easy matter; some disturbance was always occurring. Vittore Bragadin, the bailie in Istanbul, had reported to the Signoria in a recent dispatch (dated 23 May, 1565) a very serious complaint just made by the sanjakbey of Clissa (Klis) against the Republic,

saying that the most serene Signor Turco's subjects in his sanjak [in southern Croatia] have been forcibly seized by our men and consigned to the oars on our galleys, together with many other accusations of evil import against our people.

Bragadin had sent a copy of the sanjakbey's statement (*arz*), which the pashas had obviously given him to pass on to the Venetian government. On 25 June the doge and Senate sent a copy of the sanjakbey's charge to Marchio Michiel, the captain-general of the sea, who was presumably aware of it, since he had been authorized to open all dispatches addressed to the Signoria.

Michiel was instructed to look into the whole matter very carefully. If the charge was true, the action must be justified [if, for example, the sultan's subjects had been guilty of piracy] or else proper punishment meted out to those who had been responsible for such an egregious and perilous blunder. The captain-general's investigation was to extend beyond the sanjak of Clissa. Any Turkish subjects whom he found at the oars on Venetian galleys [unless convicted of piracy or crime] were to be released immediately. Michiel

<sup>117</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 58<sup>r</sup>, 60<sup>r</sup>–61<sup>r</sup>; Cirri, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vi, fol. 74; Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxviii, pp. 581–82. Pierre Gentil de Vendôme puts the Spanish slave's approach to the grand master on 25 June (ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, p. 34).

was to inform the Signoria of what his inquiry revealed and what action, if any, he finally took.<sup>118</sup>

Although the Venetians were said to have rejoiced when Fort S. Elmo fell to the Turks, for they had had trouble with the piratical Hospitallers for generations, the Signoria certainly feared the possibility of Turkish success at Malta. The Venetians were hardly more worried than Pius IV was to see the Turks entrenched in the rocky island. Anyhow the Turks were not turning in a brilliant performance. All Mustafa and Piali had to show for the colossal expense of the expedition was the gravel pit to which they had reduced S. Elmo. Meanwhile what were the Christians in Sicily and Naples doing? The Spanish viceroy Don García de Toledo had promised the Hospitallers aid before the end of June,<sup>119</sup> but he could make no decisive move without Philip II's permission. Now it was almost July, and Don García was still assembling ships and galleys, collecting biscuit, and recruiting troops.

There were wild rumors afloat. Was Don García going to take advantage of the fact the sultan's armada was bogged down in Malta by moving across the Ionian Sea to attack Prevesa (Préveza) in Epirus and even the Morea? According to a story circulating in Istanbul, Sultan Suleiman had learned that a hundred Christian galleys were preparing to sail for Epirus and the Morea. He had, therefore, ordered the beylerbeys of those areas to stand ready to protect "all those islands" lining the approach to the Morea. Suleiman was also said to have ordered that sixty galleys be put in readiness for service "with all speed."<sup>120</sup> Don García was, to be sure, proceeding with his preparations, but his objective was the relief of Malta, not the capture of Prevesa or a landing in the Morea.<sup>121</sup>

During the sultry summer of 1565 the Turks were filling Pius IV's thoughts "tam in Africa et Pannonia quam alibi," for Maximilian II was at war with the Turks and John Sigismund, even as the Hospitallers were fighting for their lives at Malta. Malta was the major peril which the Church and Italy then faced. On 6 July a papal secretary prepared a brief for one Alfonso del Guerra, an Augustinian friar, to whom the pope had conceded the faculty of absolving Christians defending Malta against the Turks, of granting a plenary indulgence to those in *articulo mortis*, and of celebrating mass on a portable altar during the crisis of the Melitan siege.<sup>122</sup> Balbi speaks of this indulgence, *un iubileo plenissimo a culpa y a pena*, commenting on the clemency of the Church, and noting that there was no man or woman of adult years who would not seek to win it with the greatest devotion and with the firm hope and faith of going off to the glory of heaven if death should come during the siege.<sup>123</sup>

On Monday, 2 July, word came from Mdina that a relief force of seven hundred men had landed on the northern end of the island. They had come, under Juan de Cardona and Melchor de Robles, in two Sicilian galleys and in two belonging to the Hospitallers. Among them were forty Knights and twenty gunners. Setting out under Robles an hour before the sun had set (on 3 July), the company rode through the misty night from Mdina along the west coast in a half-circle to the "Port of the English" at the northwest slope of Mount Salvador. Here they were ferried across the inlet to the Bastion of Castile at the southeast

<sup>118</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 23<sup>v</sup> [44], *al capitano general da mare*, doc. dated 25 June, 1565, the vote to send to Michiel the instructions summarized above being *de literis* 210, *de non 0, non sinceri* 4.

<sup>119</sup> Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXIV, p. 500. Having no access to Philip II's letters to Don García, Bosio tends to hold the latter up to some opprobrium for the long delay in sending the Spanish forces and fleet to Malta. Also, however, he commends Don García's prudence (*ibid.*, bk. XXXI, pp. 651-52).

<sup>120</sup> According to a dispatch from Istanbul dated 29 June, 1565, "... Il Signore [Suleiman], havendo inteso che 100 galee de' Christiani erano per venire in Epiro et Peloponesso, cioè verso la Prevesa et la Morea, ha dato ordine alli beglierbei di quei confini che si debbino trovar ivi in arme per proveder a tutte quelle isole et di novo fa metter in ordine 60 galere con ogni prestezza . . ." (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 36<sup>v</sup>-37<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration).

<sup>121</sup> Don García had already assembled a force large enough to worry the Turks. By the beginning of July it was reported

"que en Mecina [Messina] avía ochenta galeras y sesenta navas para venir nos a soccorrer con todo el poder del Rey Cathólico de España don Felipe" (Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 67<sup>v</sup>, and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 80<sup>v</sup>, 105<sup>v</sup>)—Don García had eighty galleys and sixty ships ready to relieve Malta. See also, below, the *aviso* of 11 August, 1565.

According to a letter of Don García to Philip II, dated 5 July (1565), the Spanish fleet consisted of eighty-four galleys, while the Turks had ninety-five galleys and some ships at Malta (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 249-50).

<sup>122</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLII, tom. 23, fols. 14-16, by original enumeration, and note a somewhat similar brief for one Ambrogio de Castro of the Order of Beata Maria de Monte Carmelo, *ibid.*, fol. 38, dated 20 July, 1565.

<sup>123</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 70<sup>v</sup>: "... La Santidad de nuestro Señor Papa Pio Quarto nos embió también otro para nuestras ánimas, el qual fué un jubileo plenissimo a culpa y a pena y tan lleno de clemencia como suele la yglesia usar con sus hijos en semejantes casos de modo que no quedó hombre ni muger de edad para ello que no lo ganasse con devoción grandissima y con firma esperanza y fe de yr ala gloria, muriendo en la jornada."

corner of the Borgo. At times they had been in grave danger "passing so close to the enemies' trenches" (*por passar tan cerca delas trincheas delos enemigos*) but, according to Balbi, although the Turks actually heard the relief force go by, they did not attack (*pero fué Dios servido que, aunque fué sentido, no fuesse acometido*). When morning came, the relief force had reached safety within the walls of the Borgo. Without them, Balbi says, the besieged would not have survived. This was the third detachment of troops, *el tercero socorro*, that Philip II had sent to assist the Hospitallers,<sup>124</sup> the two earlier companies having reached Malta before the siege began.<sup>125</sup>

Footsoldiers and artillerymen were needed to man the walls of the Isola S. Michele (Senglea) and the Borgo. The new arrivals were more than welcome; they had come not a day, not an hour, too soon, for disquiet was mounting into dismay. By Tuesday, 3 July, the Turks had surrounded the Christian strongholds with at least twenty-five pieces of heavy artillery: six cannon, mounted on the height of S. Margherita, threatened the Bastion of Provence. Another six, at the Mandra a little to the south, were aimed at Fort S. Michael on the southern end of the Isola S. Michele. Four heavy pieces were set up in the vineyard of an old Maltese named Pablo Micho, who had taken refuge in S. Michele. Pablo's vineyard was just south of the Mandra; it overlooked the Hermitage of S. Margherita, and was well placed for the bombardment of the bastion commanded by Don Carlos Rufo at the southeast corner of the Isola S. Michele. Three or four other guns on the height of Corradino, of which one was a heavy basilisk,

were directed at the fortified post established at the west end of La Bormula, where numerous houses still stood. Finally, six heavy guns on the promontory of S. Elmo kept under fire the command post of Don Francisco de Sanoguera near the windmills on the northern end of S. Michele as well as the Hospitallers' prime fortress and possibly last refuge at S. Angelo.

By 5 July the Turks had added another dozen pieces of artillery to their several batteries. They were shelling the besieged day and night. By 8 July a large battery was being set up on Mount Salvador, leading the grand master to order the demolition of some houses between the Bastions of Castile and Germany (the latter of which jutted out into the Port of the English, on the southeast end of the Borgo). Houses provided refuge and concealment for attackers. Also the stones of which they were built were needed by the besieged to shore up their defenses. S. Michele was the weakest of the three centers of Christian resistance; the bastions of the Knights covered the approaches to the southern walls of the Borgo. S. Angelo was heavily fortified. The Turks would have to attack S. Michele along its west walls by water as well as by land. For this assault they were already assembling boats at the Marsa on the southwest (innermost) end of Grand Harbor, where they were largely encamped. On 8 July there were thirty boats, large and small, at the Marsa.

The Turks dragged the boats on rollers around the southwestern slope of Mount Sciberras, bringing them from the harbor of Marsamuscetto, now the anchorage for Piali Pasha's fleet. The grand master tried to protect the long west walls of the Isola S. Michele (Senglea) by having a line of thick piles driven into the water, "a good twelve or fifteen paces from one another and some ten paces from the shore [of the Isola]."<sup>126</sup> This was hard work of a week or more, for the line extended from the southern end of the Isola (the post of Melchor de Robles) to the northern end (the post of Francisco de Sanoguera). A heavy chain was stretched from pile to pile, forming a palisade strong enough to stop a galley being rowed at full speed.

A schoolboy could tell a great assault was in the immediate offing. All day and part of the night on Friday, 13 July, the Turkish guns shelled the post of Sanoguera, Fort S. Michael, and La Bormula. From the west walls of the Isola one could count

<sup>124</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>-63<sup>r</sup>; Cigni, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vi, fols. 76<sup>v</sup>-77<sup>r</sup>; and on the relief force under Cardona and Robles, cf. *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 214-16, 218, 239-40, 252-55, the last reference being to a letter of Don García to Philip II, dated 5 July: ". . . Aunque hayan entrado estos seiscientos hombres [Balbi says seven hundred], no son bastantes para defender al Burgo y San Miguel, estando tan falto el maestre [de la Valette] de gente como escribe, por haber perdido en San Telmo mil y quinientos hombres. . . . Era manifiesta pérdida de lo de Malta, no habiendo entrado la gente, y peligroso después de entrada, por el poco número al respeto de la falta que dentro hay." Also note, *ibid.*, XXIX, 277, 279, and Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, pp. 39-41. Balbi is responsible for the spelling *socorro*.

There is a detailed account of the dispatch of the relief force and its safe entry into the Borgo in Bosio, III (1602), bks. XXVII-XXVIII, pp. 559, 584-90, who gives the names of the more important persons in the "picciolo socorso," which had sailed from Sicily on 29 June (*ibid.*, p. 585).

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXIV, p. 510, under the date 8 May (1565).

<sup>126</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 67<sup>v</sup>-68<sup>r</sup>.

more than eighty boats now gathered at the Marsa. On the other side of the Isola the grand master had a bridge of barrels and boards towed into place to connect S. Michele with the Borgo. It went across the south end of the Port of Galleys. When the attacks came, reinforcements could be sent to the threatened Isola. The day-and-night bombardment continued through Saturday, 14 July, by which time the assembly of boats at the Marsa had grown into a fleet.

The great assault came the next day, Sunday, the fifteenth. Now the Turks had more than a hundred boats at the Marsa. Signal fires were lighted on S. Elmo across Grand Harbor and near the gun emplacement at the Mandra in the south. The attack was beginning. Three thousand of the better Turkish troops, "along with the corps d'élite of Dragut and King [Hassan] of Algiers," were rowed toward the Isola S. Michele. They wore long, loose garments, "jubhas," many being clad in cloth of gold, silver, or damask, with rich turbans. Armed with the muskets of Fez, fine bows, and scimitars of Alexandria and Damascus, they struck the length of the palisade from the post of Sanoguera in the north to that of Robles in the south, where the suburb of La Bormula began. The chain along the palisade held, and they had to wade ten paces to the shore of the Isola, soaking their flowing robes and their firearms. The defenders failed to use two mortars which were apparently ready for firing, but availed themselves of pikes, swords, and stones, especially stones. A soldier at Don Francisco's post inadvertently ignited a number of fireballs or grenades, burning a good many troopers standing nearby. Don Francisco was killed in the attack, and so was his nephew Don Jaime. The defense was clearly in serious trouble.<sup>127</sup>

Five captains and their men who had been standing by in the Borgo to provide relief now passed over the bridge of barrels and boards to S. Michele. Some went to the Fort at the south end of the peninsula, others to the threatened Spur, "al Espolón," at the northern trip. A low battery under the command of Don Francisco de Guiral, which the Turks had failed to note near the great

chain that stretched from S. Angelo to the northern Spur of S. Michele, sank nine large boats with eight hundred men aboard, "entre Janizaros y Leventes," before they could attempt a landing. The pashas had allegedly filled the boats with men who could not manage in the water "so that realizing their inability to save themselves by swimming they might fight more effectively."<sup>128</sup> The success of the low battery covering the deceptively easy approach to the Spur marked the turn of the tide, for the Turks were faring no better at the southern end of S. Michele. Melchor de Robles, with the soldiers at Fort S. Michael and from the post at La Bormula, according to Balbi, had stopped the advance of eight thousand Turks, catching them in a cross fire, so that none reached the top of the defenses alive. The Turks began to withdraw, first from the area of Fort S. Michael, and then tried to do so from the Spur. The attack had lasted five hours.

Many Turks were killed as they sought to leave the Spur at the north end of S. Michele. The boats from which they had landed had gone back to the Marsa. Their return was prevented by the guns at the Spur, at the Windmills just to the south, and at Fort S. Angelo. Balbi estimated the Turkish toll at four thousand, including those who were drowned, while "of our men two hundred [were killed], not counting the wounded, who were numerous." The defenders had acquired six Turkish standards, together with many scimitars, arquebuses, bows, and money, "both the Turks' own money and some of that which they had got at S. Elmo." Swimmers rescued a good deal of loot from the water beyond the grand master's palisade. Turkish purses were found to contain large quantities of opium (*mucho afiún*). In the sunken boats the Christians discovered ship's biscuit, barrels of fresh water, raisins, sugar, honey, butter, "and other things to eat," showing clearly that if the Turks had seized the Spur, they would have dug in for a while before attempting the harder tasks which lay before them.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vi, fol. 82<sup>v</sup>, says that the assault began on the night of 14 July, "perchè luceva la luna," also noting that "in questi giorni Assan Basciá, re d' Algieri, era venuto con vent' otto galeotte e due galee e circa a due mila persone da combattere, il quale allegramente fu veduto e da nemici molto accarezzato." Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxvii, pp. 592 ff. Hassan had arrived in Malta on 8 July, according to Bosio, with twenty-eight sail, including seven galleys, the other vessels being galliots, fuste, and brigantines.

<sup>128</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 72<sup>v</sup>-73<sup>r</sup>: "No es de maravillar que ninguno [i.e., de los Turcos] se salvase de tantos, porque los baxanes [the pashas], según después se supo, avían embiado a este assalto de mar todos los que no sabían nadar paraque, desconfiados de poderse salvar por aquella vía, pelessen mejor."

<sup>129</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>-75<sup>r</sup> (with reference to the opium on fol. 73<sup>r</sup>), trans. H. A. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 96-116, covers the period from 2 July through the fifteenth. For the great assault of 14-15 July, see also Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vi, fols. 82<sup>v</sup>-83<sup>r</sup>, and Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxix, pp. 601-8.

In Rome Pius IV was troubled by the costs as well as by the dangers of the Turkish invasions. As he provided money and troops to help the Hospitallers defend themselves at Malta, the imperial ambassador Scipione d' Arco had asked for 200,000 ducats to assist Maximilian II in his war with the Turks and with John Sigismund in Hungary and Transylvania. Pius acknowledged that the empire deserved even larger sums to use against the Turks, but for the present Maximilian must content himself with the 70,000 ducats which he would receive from the funds of the Holy See. If the Hungarian-Transylvanian war continued much longer, Pius said that he would probably send troops under his nephew Annibale von Hohenems [Cardinal Mark Sittich's brother] to assist Maximilian.

In the meantime Pius proposed to appoint a commission of four cardinals—Cicada, Montepulciano, Vitelli, and his nephew Mark Sittich—"to find the means of finding the said money" with which to pay the many troops needed for service in the unending war against the Turks. Pius dilated also on the terrible danger which had beset Malta, where more than a thousand men had been killed in the defense of S. Elmo. The whole island might fall to the Turks for lack of manpower, and the Spanish fleet, once united, would encounter no small peril in seeking the deliverance of the Hospitallers.<sup>130</sup>

If Pius IV was having trouble finding money, Philip II had just received a bonanza, if one could believe a dispatch from Brussels, for a Spanish courier had allegedly arrived in the Netherlands

with the news that the fleet of the Indies had brought 1,500,000 ducats' worth of gold to Seville. The money was supposed to be divided between his Catholic Majesty and certain merchants.<sup>131</sup> The Fuggers in Augsburg would be interested in that. More impressive was a dispatch from Istanbul, also dated in mid-July (1565), to the effect that the late grand vizir Ali Pasha had left four millions in gold, with 1,500,000 in "sultanines" [Turkish coins], not counting his jewels and pearls. Sultan Suleiman had taken Ali's slaves and horses, but left the rest of Ali's estate to his son.<sup>132</sup> Such reports, if not true, were at least *ben trovati*, and pleasanter to contemplate than the Hospitallers' ordeal in Malta, where the Turkish bombardment went on relentlessly.

In a long consistory, held at S. Marco on 22 August, Pius returned to the turmoil in Transylvania (*Pannonia*), and to the Turkish peril at Malta, which he told the cardinals had become worse than ever, as Cardinal Francisco Pacheco reported to Philip II (in a letter dated 2 September). The Turkish armada, according to Pius, was quite superior to the Spanish fleet. The Turks were fighting "for empire, glory, and religion." If the worst came to worst, Pius intended to die in Rome, and not seek shelter in Avignon, as Paul IV had once said he wanted to do. Provision must be made for the defense of the papal states. But money was the sinews of war (. . . *como nervo de la guerra era dinero*), and money he must raise:

He asked us to consent to a subsidy of 300,000 ducats which he wanted to levy on his vassals, to be paid in two years, like the one which had already been levied in his pontificate to redeem the jewels and pay the debts which Paul IV had left the Apostolic See. And he gave us the word of a good pontiff not to begin the exaction unless necessity compelled him more than at present. He only wanted this subsidy to be passed by the consistory, so that the merchants might understand that he had the wherewithal to make an agreement if he should start to deal with them [for a loan].

Pius said that he wanted to be in a position to aid the princes who applied to him publicly as well as those who appealed to him secretly. Some day

<sup>130</sup> According to a report from Rome of 14 July, 1565, ". . . [Il Papa] parlò anchora del sussidio che diede a lo imperatore con la venuta del Conte Scipione d' Arco, quale hebbe audienza et chiese in nome di sua cesarea Maestà 200 m. ducati in agiuto per la guerra contra Turchi, et disse che quella corona era meritevole di maggiore agiuto, ma che per adesso si contentava di darli 70 m. ducati, et che se la guerra andrà inanzi, vi manderà forse il Conte Anibale, suo nepote, con genti, et che per adesso deputera 4 cardinali, cioè S. Clemente, Montepulciano, Vitelli, et Alemps a trovar modo di trovar detti denari con questo patto che siano spesi per far tante genti per servizio della guerra contra Turchi, et non impiegati in presidii nè in montioni" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 47, by mod. stamped enumeration, and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 51-52).

Pius IV was gravely concerned with the siege of Malta, as indicated by the same *avviso* (*ibid.*, fol. 47): "Il Papa ha parlato anchora delle cose di Malta, dicendo che per la diffusion di Sant' Elmo sono morti più di mille huomini, et che finalmente dubitava che tutta l' isola non fosse per andar in mano de' Turchi, o per bisogno di gente o d' altro, et che anchora che l' armata del Re Cattolico si unisse, si correva grandissimo pericolo in arischiarla per soccorrer detto luogo." Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxiv, pp. 717-18, on the war in Hungary-Transylvania.

<sup>131</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 62<sup>a</sup>, a report from Brussels dated 18 July, 1565: "Hoggi è arrivato qua un corriere di Spagna con nova che è giunto a Siviglia la flotta dell' Indie et terraferma che haveva portato un milion e mezzo d' oro, parte per sua Maestà Cattolica et parte per particolari mercanti. . ."

<sup>132</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 71-72<sup>a</sup>, a report from Istanbul of 17 July, 1565: "Che s' erano trovati da 4 milioni d' oro di Ali Bassà doppo la sua morte, tra quali da uno e mezzo di sultanini senza le gioie et perle, et che il Signore [Suleiman] non haveva rettenuto se non li schiavi et cavalli, et il resto ha lasciato al figliolo di esso Ali."

he would name the latter. He wanted to help everyone as much as he could. He further declared, as Pacheco informed Philip II,

that we [cardinals] might be certain that if he had not aided your Majesty with the subsidy for the galleys, today you would not have an oar at sea which might defend us against the Turks, because your Majesty had sent to tell him that you would disarm the galleys which you had if you received no assistance.

Pius then turned to Pacheco, and asked him, "Is this not so?" Pacheco replied that everything his Holiness had said was very much so. The cardinals agreed to the subsidy of 300,000 ducats, to be collected in two years, reminding the pope that the people were overburdened, and requesting him not to impose the levy on them, unless he was driven to it. Pius assured them that only dire necessity would force him to have recourse to the levy.<sup>133</sup>

The Turks were now concentrating upon Fort S. Michael. The pashas appeared to have given up the idea of attacking the northern Spur of the Isola by water. They were beginning to have their boats dragged back overland to Marsamuscetto. The grand master, whose nephew Henri de la Valette was killed on 18 July, was doing everything possible to strengthen the fortifications of S. Michael and La Bormula. When the Turks started work on another gun emplacement along the northwestern headland of Mount Salvador,<sup>134</sup> the grand master added to the Bastions of Castile and Germany, for now the Turkish cannon would be firing across the inlet of Calcara. The Knights sank ships loaded with stone in the inlet; chains were strung from embedded anchors. It would be hard to assail the Bastions of Castile and Germany by water.

In the Borgo workmen produced gunpowder, fashioned cannonballs, and made incendiaries. They put powder in cotton bags covered with pitch. These bags could be ignited and thrown;

the powder caused small explosions; the pitch-soaked pieces of cloth scattered and burned for a long time. The Turks shot cannon, dug trench after trench, tried to mine the walls of S. Michele, and built more gun emplacements. By Sunday, 22 July, the long battery on Mount Salvador consisted of no fewer than thirty-eight pieces of heavy artillery, including four basiliisks. When all these guns were fired together, according to Balbi, they could be heard in Sicily at Syracuse and even at Catania. The Turks' ammunition seemed to be inexhaustible, for their batteries at S. Margherita, the Mandra, Pablo Micho's vineyard, and Corradino kept Fort S. Michael and La Bormula under constant bombardment.

By Tuesday, 24 July, the Turks had cut off the Hospitallers' communications with Mdina, "Città Notabile," and captured a vessel from Sicily with a Turkish-speaking Greek aboard, one George of Monemvasia. George had been employed to mingle among the Turks as a spy, and report back to Don Garcia de Toledo. His captivity put an end to what might have been a useful source of information. Anyhow the Turks' seizure of the ship was a sign of their vigilance at sea, while on land their guns were wreaking havoc on Fort S. Michael at the southern end of the Isola and on the Bastion of Castile at the southeast corner of the Borgo. The Grand Master de la Valette took up lodgings in a merchant's shop in the Piazza of the Borgo to be closer to the Bastion of Castile. At the end of July two long Turkish mines were discovered under the area of Fort S. Michael. It was a narrow escape from near disaster, but the Turks were driven out, and the tunnels were walled up with heavy masonry.

After a week of incessant bombardment the Turks made another serious assault upon Fort S. Michael. It came on Thursday, 2 August, and lasted four or five hours. More than twenty Turks reached the top of the wall at Melchor de Robles's post. They were driven back. Melchor's nephew Fernando was killed. Balbi declares that the Turks lost more than six hundred men in their failure to take the Fort. The defenders lost forty soldiers, including Don Carlos Rufo and a few other Knights of the Order. Nevertheless, the Christians' position was beginning to look hopeless. The walls of S. Michael and those of the Bastion of Castile were in danger of being almost leveled. When on 6 August one Francisco de Aguilar, an experienced, shrewd, and well-informed Spanish soldier, deserted to the enemy, and was joyously received by Mustafa Pasha in his tent at Calcara, the grand master and the Knights had every reason to fear

<sup>133</sup> *Docs. inédites*, XXIX, 471-73; Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 294'-296'. Note also Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 77', a report from Rome of 25 August, 1565: "Mercurio [22 August] in consistorio sua Santità disse che voleva porre un sussidio a tutto lo stato ecclesiastico di 400 m. [sic] ducati da esser pagati in doi anni, et non li spenderà se non sarà bisogno. . . ." Cardinal Gabriele Paleotti, to the pope's marked displeasure, left Rome to avoid having to subscribe to the bull levying the impost on the papal states (*ibid.*, fol. 105'), per non sottoscrivere la bolla sopra il sussidio di 400 m. [sic] ducati. We have often cited Paleotti's *Acta Concilii Tridentini* in the preceding chapter, where see note 271.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. vi, fol. 85'.



catastrophe. And where was the aid which the viceroy Don García de Toledo was supposed to send? The viceroy's illegitimate young son Fadrique had been killed at Francisco de Sanoguera's post on 15 July. How would the Turks employ the information which de Aguilar was bound to give them?<sup>155</sup>

The answer to the latter question at least came quickly. One of the greatest Turkish assaults of the entire siege came the day after Francisco de Aguilar ran off to join the enemy as his erstwhile comrades-in-arms, suddenly perceiving his intention to desert them, fired at him from the bastions along the southern walls of the Borgo. An hour before dawn on Tuesday, 7 August, the defenders of the Hospitallers' citadels could see the Turks on Corradino moving en masse toward Fort S. Michael, while others were being brought in boats from Marsamusetto to Mount Salvador for an assault upon the Bastion of Castile. As day broke, if we can believe Balbi, some eight thousand Turks launched an attack upon Fort S. Michael, and another four thousand assailed the Bastion of Castile. There were the usual shouts, the beating of drums, the blare of trumpets, answered by the guns of the besieged from their threatened walls. Besides the muskets, arquebuses, and small cannon mounted on the walls, the besieged had fireballs ready to throw and cauldrons of boiling pitch which might serve more than one purpose.<sup>156</sup>

The Turks' main drive was against Fort S. Michael from which, if they could take it, they would have the whole Isola S. Michele under their control. The post of Melchor de Robles, therefore, and that of Don Bernardo de Cabrera at the west end of La Bormula bore the brunt of the Turkish onslaught. In these two areas, which stood at the so-called "fronte dell' Isola di S. Michele," the Turks also suffered the heaviest casualties from the Christians' incendiary missiles. The assault upon the Bastion of Castile was equally dangerous, however, and there was an hour or so when it was feared that the Turks might break into the bastion. Jean de la Valette, along with the Knights and reserves who remained in the Piazza, awaiting calls to points of danger, rallied to the support of the defenders of the bastion. Only when the danger

had passed, could the grand master be induced to retire from the place where he had taken his stand (says Balbi), "en el qual avia mas de veynte muertos." The attacks of 7 August lasted for nine hours, from daybreak until the afternoon. An odd and unexpected event then led to the Turks' hasty withdrawal from the endeavor which they had assumed would result in their seizure of the Isola S. Michele.

While the attacks upon the outposts of Fort S. Michael and the Bastion of Castile were being savagely pressed by the Turks, the cavalry force in Mdina had set out, as it used to do, to reconnoiter and to see whether it might not inflict some damage on the Turks. There were about a hundred horse, all told, accompanied on this occasion by about as many foot. Meeting no Turks along the way—they were all under the walls of S. Michele and Castile—they ventured as far as the Marsa, the main Turkish encampment. Upon their arrival they saw the grand assault in progress. The sick and wounded in the tents at the Marsa were virtually without protection, being cared for by non-combatants. The Christians killed everyone they could find in the camp, raising the cry "Victoria! Socorro!"<sup>157</sup> Victory! Help has come!

Some Turks on S. Elmo were the first to notice the tumult. Soldiers and sailors, quickly forming a task force, set out in some boats for the Marsa, attracting the attention of those engaged in the attacks upon the Isola S. Michele and Castile. The little squadron hardly went more than a hundred paces, however, when in apparent fright the would-be warriors turned around and headed for S. Elmo and the safety of the armada at Marsamusetto. They had obviously overestimated the numbers of the noisy Christians who were slaughtering their fellows at the Marsa. Word of the massacre reached the trenches. It must be a large Christian relief force. The attacking Turks were afraid of being taken in the rear. They began leaving their trenches and outposts, first from under the Bastion of Castile, exposing themselves to the arquebus fire from the Bastion of Auvergne. When the Turks who were assailing S. Michael's saw the retreat of the task force at S. Elmo, they were at a loss what to do. As they became aware of the many Turkish casualties at the Marsa, however, panic seized them, for a rumor spread through their ranks that there were a thousand times more Christians than there were (. . . que

<sup>155</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 75'-90', trans. H. A. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 117-39. On the Turkish assault of 2 August and Francisco de Aguilar's desertion on the sixth, note Bosio, III (1602), bks. XXIX-XXX, pp. 621-22, 626.

<sup>156</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 90', and on Francisco de Aguilar, cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VII, fol. 96'.

<sup>157</sup> Or as Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 91', 92', and elsewhere, spells it *Socorro*.

uno de los nuestros eran mil). The besieged took up the cry "Victoria, victoria! Socorro, socorro!"

As the Turks began to discover their costly mistake, the Christian horsemen each took on a footsoldier behind him, and rode off to Mdina "sin perder un hombre." Their raid had saved the Order of S. John of Jerusalem. The Turks' humiliation was extreme. The sultan's entire army had quailed at the advent of a mere handful of unbelievers. Mustafa Pasha blamed the admiral Piali for the hasty withdrawal of the little squadron which had set out for the Marsa. Piali declared that he had received an *aviso* to the effect that the Christians had landed a large force on the island, and that he had to look to the safety of his armada, "because he knew that the sultan set a higher value on it than on three armies like this one!" (*porque sabía que la preciava mas el gran señor que a tres exercitos como aquel*).<sup>138</sup> Piali was merely doing what Don García was doing. They were both taking care of their masters' fleets.

The gory, grueling business of the siege continued. Men were killed, others maimed. The Turks laid three ambushes (on 8 August), in which to catch the Christian horsemen of Mdina the next time they sallied forth, but they lost fifty men in the venture, while the Christians lost twelve soldiers and thirty horse. Such small engagements were a waste of Turkish time. Melchor de Robles, one of the heroes of the siege, was killed by gunshot at his post on Saturday, 11 August. After the great Turkish attack on the seventh, the Grand Master de la Valette rejected a proposal that the Knights retire into the well-built fortress of S. Angelo, for S. Michele might well fall to the Turks, after which the Borgo would prove indefensible. If de la Valette fell, he intended to fall forward. He seems, however, to have made no mistakes during the whole four months of the siege. Perhaps we are somewhat misled by Balbi. We have seen that Antoine Petremol thought poorly of the Turkish preparations for the expedition, and seemed to doubt whether the Turks

were likely to be successful, whatever their objective should prove to be.<sup>139</sup>

De la Valette ordered that the sacred relics and other valuables should be stored for safekeeping in Fort S. Angelo. He then had the bridge removed which connected the fortress with the Borgo, restoring the channel between them. The Knights would seek to preserve neither their Order nor their lives by abandoning the Maltese and the mercenaries who had been fighting with them side by side. There would be no withdrawal from the Borgo to S. Angelo, at least not yet. The Turks continued to dig trenches, erect small ravelins of defense, and bombard the southern reaches of S. Michele and the Borgo.

According to an *aviso* dated Saturday, 11 August, Philip II had been deeply disturbed by the fall of S. Elmo. One can well believe it. On Wednesday, 8 August, a courier had passed through Rome with letters from Valladolid dated 28 July. The courier had been sent to Don García de Toledo, viceroy of Sicily and Philip's captain-general of the sea, allegedly with orders forthwith to render all assistance to the Hospitallers or face the penalty of disgrace. Don García was to employ all his forces, according to the *aviso*, without worrying about the risk to the fleet or possible peril to the kingdom of Sicily.

It did not sound like the cautious Philip and, to be sure, he had issued no such orders. Actually he had written Don García on 27 (not 28) July, directing him to send aid to Malta only if it could be done without evident danger to the Spanish fleet. The preservation of the fleet was more important than the dispatch of aid to Malta. If the island should fall, which God forbid, there would be other means later on to recover it!<sup>140</sup> Throughout the entire

<sup>138</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 90<sup>r</sup>-92<sup>r</sup>, who puts the Turkish losses before S. Michael's on 7 August at more than two thousand "sin los que estavan heridos, que fueron doblados," and before the Bastion of Castile at more than two hundred of their more outstanding men. As for the Christians, "de nuestra parte en todas partes murieron setenta hombres, pero fueron muchos mas los heridos"—seventy dead, and many more wounded. On the events of 7 August, see also Cirni, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VII, fols. 96<sup>r</sup>-98<sup>r</sup>; Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, pp. 52-53; and Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXX, pp. 627-30.

<sup>139</sup> Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 783-85, letter of Petremol to Arnaud du Ferrier in Venice, dated 7 April (1565): "Mais si on doit juger la fin par le commencement, on ne peut espérer que confusion de confusion. . . ." Cirni, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fol. 101<sup>r</sup>, puts Melchor de Robles's death from an arquebus shot "about the twelfth of August": the grand master had been much impressed by Robles, because he had worked hard and honorably, and was devout to the point that "negli assalti haveva portato un crocifisso in mano, essortando i suoi a più animosamente combattere." The crucifix was Robles's baton. Cf. Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, p. 58, and Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXX, pp. 633-34.

<sup>140</sup> For the text of the *aviso* of 11 August, see below, note 143. Philip II's letter of 27 July, 1565, to Don García may be found in the *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 310-17, ". . . y asi os mandamos que pudiéndolo hacer sin evidente peligro de perder las galeras, cuya conservación importa mas que hacer el dicho socorro, porque en caso que Malta se perdiese, lo que Dios no

siege Don García had kept Philip fully informed, sending him all the relevant news reports (*avisos*, *avisos*), all copies of letters received from the grand master, and any other information which might assist the king in making decisions. Don García could land some troops and supplies on Malta. He could not risk the Spanish fleet, not yet. Don García's reputation was suffering from the Spanish failure thus far to launch out against the Turks, and he knew it, but the vacillation was not his. It was Philip's.<sup>141</sup>

Don García had sent aid to Malta,<sup>142</sup> not enough, but he was still trying to marshal his forces, and Philip II (in his letter of 27 July) still forbade a direct attack upon the Turks. Letters from Messina of 5 August brought the news to Rome that Don García had sent his ships with all their "apparato" to Syracuse. Vincenzo Gonzaga, the prior of Barletta, was in charge of the ships. Don García and his lieutenants were also awaiting the return of some ships which had been sent to Palermo for biscuit. Giannandrea Doria was expected with twenty-seven galleys and four thousand infantry from Tuscany, under the command of Chiappino Vitelli, "a brave lot, the greater part of whom are nobles." They were to be sent with the fleet to Malta immediately without waiting for the troops being recruited in Urbino, in which case the commanders would use three thousand Germans to be collected from the local garrisons. The relief force was going to move quickly, especially since everyone had been reassured by Ascanio della Cornia, who had been out to take a look at Malta and the Turkish armada. Ascanio had declared, upon his return, that it would be easy to disembark men on Malta in three or four

stages, and that eight to ten thousand infantry would be enough to raise the siege.<sup>143</sup>

In Malta the Turks were as tired as the besieged, but surely Mustafa Pasha must try a few more large-scale attacks, and he did so after preliminary strikes at the Borgo and Fort S. Michael on 18 and 19 August. Determined to break the Christian defenses in one place or the other, as Cirmi says, Mustafa launched on 20 August "due assalti li più furiosi et lunghi che potesse." The first assault was one of the fiercest of the entire siege—directed against both the Isola S. Michele and the Bastion of Castile—and it lasted five long hours: "Este assalto de la mañana fué uno de los mas feroces assaltos que en todo el sitio nos diessen los enemigos."<sup>144</sup> The Turks' fire power now did

<sup>143</sup> As reported from Rome on 11 August (1565), "Mercore di notte passò di qua un corriero che vien di Spagna con diligenza, con lettere di 28 [of July] da Vagliadoli, et è quello che portò la nova della perdita di Sant' Elmo, la quale era dispiaciuta grandemente a sua Maestà, et el Re subito intesa aveva fatto far oratione pubblicamente, et lei s'era confessata et comunicata, et di poi subito spedito detto corriero al signor Don Garzia con commissione expressa che sotto pena della sua disgratia soccorresse Malta con tutte le sue forze, non havendo risguardo di arisarche [sic] l'armata nè di metter in pericolo il regno, quantunque fosse inferiore di forze, rimettendosi alla volontà del Signor Iddio, nel quale sperava che li donarebbe la desiderata vittoria.

"Per lettere di Messina di 5 si è inteso che alli 27 del passato il signor Don Garzia aveva mandato le navi con tutto l'apparato a Siracusa, capo et governatore di esse il prior di Barletta [Vincenzo Gonzaga], et le galere seguitavano anch'esse, nè aspettava altro che il ritorno d'alcune navi mandate a Palermo per biscotto et del signor Giovanni Andrea Doria con 27 galere et 400 [sic] fanti di Toscana sotto il signore Chiappino Vitello [Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 106', refers to Chiappino Vitelli's having enlisted 4,000 Tuscan foot, as do Don García in a letter to the duke of Florence, dated 5 July, 1565 (*Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 264); Cirmi, in the *Assedio di Malta*, bk. VII, fols. 87', 90', et alibi; and Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXIX, p. 616C, et alibi], gente bravissima et la maggior parte nobili, per inviarsi subito con l'armata a soccorrer Malta senza aspettar le genti d'Urbino, tardando alquanto di comparere, nel qual caso si servirà di 3 m. Alemanni, cavati di quei presidii, et in questo userà ogni celerità tanto più essendo stato assicurato dal signor Ascanio della Cornia, qual era stato a riconoscer Malta et l'armata nemica, et ritornato disse che era facile il poter sbarcar le genti in quell'isola in tre o quattro parti, et che con otto overo X m. fanti messi in terra li bastava l'animo de levar quell'assedio. . ." (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 70-71', and note, *ibid.*, fols. 73, 78' ff.).

Vincenzo Gonzaga, the prior of Barletta, was the son of the famous Ferrante (Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. VI, fol. 79'). On Giannandrea Doria's twenty-seven galleys, note also Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxi, p. 653AB.

<sup>144</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 99'; Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fols. 102 ff.; Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, pp. 59-61; Bosio, III (1602), bks. xxx-xxxii, pp. 641-49.

quiera, habrá otros medios para tornarla á recuperar! . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 312). Philip's policy was determined entirely by caution, and he frequently expressed confidence in Don García's "prudencia y experiencia" (*cf. ibid.*, XXIX, 220 ff., 243-44, 265 ff.). Philip had every intention of helping the Knights when all the necessary preparations had been made (*ibid.*, pp. 226 ff.). Don García always awaited his orders (p. 250). On the problem of sending aid to Malta, because "la perdita d'essa [i.e., of the Spanish fleet] sería molto maggiore che quella dell'Isola di Malta," see also Cirmi, *Assedio di Malta*, bk. VII, fol. 87'.

The sultan, on the other hand, dispatched aid to the pashas on Malta in August and September (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 798, 802), but it was too late. I should perhaps note that in a Spanish context I have retained the word *aviso*, in Italian *avviso*.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española*, II (Madrid, 1896), 81 ff. After the siege, however, the Hospitaliers were careful to shield Philip II from criticism (*cf. Bosio*, III (1602), bk. xxxiv, p. 721C).

<sup>142</sup> *Cf. Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 218, 240, 419-22.

more damage to the shattered walls than their seemingly best efforts had done on any previous occasion. They renewed their attacks for three hours in the afternoon, and returned with a vengeance the following morning, the twenty-first. The Bastion of Castile was barely held. The promise of winter, however, was just beginning to fill the atmosphere. The scirocco was giving way to the tramontana, the north wind from "beyond the mountain." Heavy rains fell, preventing the effective use of firearms and cannon. The grand master drew on the Hospitallers' large store of finely-made crossbows, which the Turks could not match.

On the last day of August a Maltese, whom the Turks had captured at the beginning of the siege, escaped from a galley in Piali Pasha's armada. He told the grand master, and announced the fact in the Piazza, that the Turkish losses had been greater than the besieged had ever imagined. Sixty galleys lacked the requisite numbers of sailors and oarsmen. Hunger had become a problem—and disease.

Although the Turks went on with the bombardment, and made attacks upon the walls, their strength was clearly diminishing. They were quietly withdrawing guns from their emplacements and re-embarking goods of value. On Friday, 7 September, there was a great commotion among the Turks in the valley of Calcara and at Corradino. The watchmen at S. Angelo had seen a Turkish galliot enter the harbor of Marsamuscetto. A gun was fired from S. Elmo's. Something was afoot. The galliot had come from the direction of Gozo as fast as sail and oar could carry her.

Presently curious onlookers saw from the Bastions of Germany, England, and Castile—all facing the "Port of the English"—a Turk alight from a small boat. He mounted a horse, and fell off, whether from clumsiness or agitation. Rising from the ground, "he put his hand to a scimitar he was carrying, and cut up the horse's legs."<sup>145</sup> That done, he was escorted to Mustafa Pasha's tent at Calcara. Obviously he had brought news of large moment. In no time the Turks left the trenches. Some headed for Rinella Bay, where boats were already on hand to convey them to Marsamuscetto. Others made for Corradino. They would reach the armada by way of the Marsa and Mount Sciberras. Shortly thereafter some thirty-five Turkish galleys, with sails afloat their mizzen-

masts, pulled out of Marsamuscetto to cover the mouth of the harbor.

The lookouts at S. Angelo and on the Bastions of Auvergne and Provence now understood the reason for the Turks' excitement. They had caught sight of the Spanish fleet—or part of the fleet—which had already landed men on the northern part of the island.<sup>146</sup> The besieged, no longer the besieged, climbed upon the parapets. There were no Turks in the trenches or at the batteries to shoot at them. The Turks were packing tents and carrying baggage to the ships. Their panic was obvious. Balbi thought that if the Christians had had two thousand men, they could have captured the Turkish artillery. The Spanish galleys, firing salvos of assurance, sailed past the Hospitaller citadels, and began veering north toward Sicily.<sup>147</sup>

The Turkish galleys moved back into the cove of Marsamuscetto, where they landed men to continue the task of packing guns and tents. They worked so hard and so fast that by the next day only the two large pieces of artillery were left at La Bormula, where the Turks had burned their platforms. The grand master assumed that if Don García's fleet had indeed landed a relief force, as seemed likely (and was the case), it would presumably take action at once. He was prepared for a sortie to add to the Turks' discomfort, but the Spanish did not attack, and the Knights did not venture out into the field that night, although they did destroy the empty Turkish trenches under the walls of Castile.

When on Saturday morning, 8 September, the bells of the Hospitallers' church of S. Lorenzo rang, it was not as a call to arms but for a pontifical high mass of thanksgiving. It was the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin. Later on that day, a renegade came within the Hospitallers' lines to report that the Spanish fleet had indeed landed a relief force. He believed it to be a large one, although it was being bruted about among the Turks that

<sup>146</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 104': "Ya en este tiempo [about noontime on 11 September] Sant Angel y los dos baluartes de Albernia y Provença descubrieron la armada del poderoso y cathólico rey de España Don Felipe segundo d' este nombre. . . ." Cf. *ibid.*, fols. 114'-115'.

<sup>147</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 104", and cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fol. 119': ". . . per divertire li Turchi . . . e per metterli in timore delle nostre genti di terra e dell' armata nostra di mare, e per assicurare i nostri che il soccorso era sbarcato, Don Garzia fece una gran garzara d' artiglieria, e seguì il suo camino verso Sicilia."

<sup>145</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 104'.

it contained no more than four thousand men. The grand master ordered the arming of three galleys which had been kept in protected anchorage under the walls of S. Angelo. There were still alleged to be two thousand Turks in the houses of La Bormula, where they were trying to save one of their big guns. As night fell, the news came from Mdina that Don García had himself commanded the galleys which had landed the desperately needed troops. It was also learned that Philip II's half-brother Don John of Austria, then twenty years of age, had wanted to go with Don García's fleet to Malta but, being held up in Barcelona for many days without transport, he was recalled to the court by Philip. Don John would get his chance to strike at the Turks.

Francesco Balbi later learned, and has recounted, how Don García had assembled fifty-eight galleys and numerous ships at Syracuse, where on 25 August (1565) he had embarked the Spanish and Italian troops which raised the siege of Malta. Among them were 6,000 Spaniards, 1,700 from the regiment (*tercio*) of Lombardy, 2,800 from that of Naples, and apparently the entire regiment of Sardinia. There were also some new recruits from Spain, although most of this group remained in Sicily. Besides these, 1,500 Italians were put aboard the galleys; they were from among the 4,000 troops Chiappino Vitelli had raised in Tuscany. After some delay Don García set sail for Linosa "so that by noon of the following day [27 August] he got within thirty miles of Malta."<sup>148</sup>

Giannandrea Doria had been reconnoitering in a galley off Gozo and the northern part of Malta in preparation for Don García's dispatch of the relief force. The latter had planned to wait at Linosa (west of Malta, near Lampedusa) until he had heard from Giannandrea's scouting mission. Don García did not reach Linosa, however, for a strong wind drove him westward to Pantelleria, where the Spanish fleet was held up by a severe storm (on 28 August). There was fear that most of the fleet might be lost. The rain was a deluge. The sky was black "with horrible thunderclaps and flashes of lightning" (*con muy orribles truenos y relampagos*). The troopers cursed their fate and Don García. Anyone of them would have preferred to take on four Turks than to fight against such a terrible tempest. Galleys lost their beaks (*espolones*)

as well as some of their oars and skiffs (*esquifes*). But the storm passed, as storms do, and the fleet made the island of Favignana (on 29 August), off the west coast of Sicily (eleven miles southwest of Trapani) "sin perder galera."<sup>149</sup> Having repaired his galleys at Trapani, left the sick behind, and taken on water, Don García headed again for Linosa, where he found two or three men whom Giannandrea Doria had left behind with a letter.<sup>150</sup> Don García could do nothing about the weather, but it was a disquieting start.

Don Álvaro de Sande, the hero of Jerba and the friend of Busbecq, had been given the high command of the relief force. Aside from being a Spanish noble, Don Álvaro must have known more about how to deal with Turks on an island than perhaps anyone in the fleet. Ascanio della Corgna, who had joined the duke of Alva when Paul IV had gone to war with Spain, was appointed a co-commander. Philip II had full confidence in Ascanio, and wanted him consulted on all decisions of importance. Pompeo Colonna was appointed captain-general of artillery. Paolo Sforza was made commissioner general.

From Linosa, Don García had sailed toward Gozo in the vanguard of twenty galleys, of which eight were Spanish (as Balbi and Cirmi identify them), two Savoyard, three Florentine, three in the charge of Don Álvaro de Bazán, two Genoese, and two belonging to the Hospitaliers. Don Sancho de Leyva, anxious to take vengeance on the Turks for the hardships and humiliations of Jerba, followed with nineteen galleys—seven from Naples, four from Florence, two assigned to Bazán, the *Seraphina* of Spain, the "flagships" (*capitanas*) of Stefano de' Mari and Giorgio Grimaldi, and three belonging to the Lomellini of Genoa. Don Juan de Cardona brought up the rearguard with eight Sicilian galleys, eight belonging to Giannandrea Doria, and three other vessels.<sup>151</sup>

<sup>149</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 112', and cf. Don García's letter to Philip II from Favignana, dated 30 August, 1565 (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 470), "habiendo llegado algunas galeras maltratadas," although no galleys were lost. Note also, *ibid.*, pp. 503-4, and Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fol. 111: "Questa burasca veramente fu molto dubbiosa e molto horrenda, e se bene parecchie galie restarono si può dire senza naso co li sproni rotti," nevertheless the galleys made Favignana safely. On the storm, cf. also Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXII, pp. 677-78.

<sup>150</sup> Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bks. VIII-IX, fols. 112', 115'.

<sup>151</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación* (1568), fol. 113': "Dada don García esta orden, partió de la Linosa habiendo dado las patentes de sus cargos a don Álvaro y a Ascanio, y en la de cada

<sup>148</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 106, 112', and cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fols. 105, 110'-111' and ff.

In accordance with earlier planning, one Martínez de Olivencia had lighted signal fires on the eastern shore of Gozo. As Don García approached the island from the west with the vanguard of the fleet "at the fourth hour of the night" (almost 11:00 P.M.), he could not see Martínez's beacons, for the sea was rising. The beacons were supposed to give an indication of where and how many Turkish vessels were in waters to the westward. When these plans were first made (on or just before 24 August),<sup>152</sup> Don García had expected to sail from Sicily past Gozo to the northern shores of Malta, but many events and many days had intervened. Procedures had had to change. Owing to the darkness, the rearguard under Don Juan de Cardona lost track of Don García, who had gone around the north end of Gozo—avoiding the "canal de Malta . . . tan indiabado"<sup>153</sup>—to pick up Martínez's signals on the eastern shore. Failing to find Don García at the appointed time and place, Cardona twice sent out a frigate to look for him. Both efforts failed to discover his whereabouts. Proceeding through the channel between

Gozo and Malta, however, past the islet of Comino (on the morning of 4 September) Cardona found Don García. The fleet was thus reunited. Nevertheless, it was a disturbing mishap, for they had lost a fine chance to land their troops under the cover of darkness.<sup>154</sup>

Cardona remained with Don García aboard the latter's galley, as the fleet headed back toward Sicily to escape detection by the Turks who, however, became aware of their presence and purpose off Cape Passero. Despite further confusion, Giannandrea Doria found Don García at Pozzallo, some miles to the west of Cape Passero, and told him that Martínez was on Gozo, the approach to Malta was clear, the defenders of S. Michele and the Borgo were still standing fast, and the deliverance of Malta from the Turks was still possible. Balbi and Cirmi paint a bolder picture of Giannandrea Doria than is suggested by the sources depicting his performance at Jerba and later at Lepanto.<sup>155</sup> If Don García feared to risk the fleet by attacking the Turks at Malta, Doria offered to go to the beleaguered island with his own galleys. Allegedly moved by Doria's example, Don García gave orders to proceed. After contending with a near mutiny of the disconcerted troops, on Thursday evening, 6 September, the fleet again set out for Malta.

As the first galleys hove in sight of Gozo, Martínez de Olivencia lit his coastal fires. At dawn on the seventh the fleet entered Mellieha Bay at the northwest peak of Malta. After alerting Pedro Mesquita, the military governor (*capitán de armas*) of Mdina, and sending out boats to reconnoiter, Don García began landing the troops, as he informed Philip II (in a memorandum prepared on the same day), "twelve miles from the enemy's armada." Don García says that he put ashore 9,600 soldiers "without the loss of an oar."<sup>156</sup> According to Balbi, the whole operation required only an hour and a half. Cirmi claims that it took only an hour, "che secondo il giudizio comune in alcun tempo mai di quella [pretezza] non fu veduta maggiore, percióche nello spatio d' un' hora

uno nombrava primero para quien era, el llevaba la vanguardia con veynte galeras, las ocho de España, dos de Savoya, tres de Florencia, tres de don Álvaro de Bazán, dos de Genova, y las dos de san Juan.

"Don Sancho de Leyva llevaba la batalla, con dezinueve galeras, siete de Nápoles, quatro de Florencia, dos de Bazán, la *Seraphina* de España, las capitanas de Mari y Jorge Grimaldo, y las tres Lomelinas.

"Era de retraguadía don Juan de Cardona con ocho galeras de Sicilia, y ocho de Juan Andrea, y tres centurias." Cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fol. 116<sup>r</sup>. Paolo Sforza was a member of the family of S. Fiora, which (as we have discussed at length) had had so much trouble with Paul IV (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 124, "Pablo Esforza"). He had, like Chiappino Vitelli, recruited Florentine troops for Don García (*ibid.*, XXIX, 81, 96–97). On Stefano de' Mari, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 106–7.

Prominent among the defenders of Malta were the Knights of S. Stephen, a military Order founded by Cosimo I, duke of Florence. According to the brief of Pius IV of 1 October, 1561, authorizing the foundation of the Order, its purpose was declared to be "ad Dei laudem et gloriam ac fidei Catholicae defensionem *marisque Mediterraneae ab infidelibus custodiam et tuitionem*," i.e., against the Turks and the Moslem corsairs (cf. the *Statuti, capitoli, et constitutioni dell' Ordine de' Cavalieri di Santo Stefano* . . . , Florence: Giunti, 1595, which begins, pp. 3–4, with Pius's brief of authorization).

J. F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys* (1974), p. 192, seems to believe that Don García's "final relief expedition contained only some 28 galleys."

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 105<sup>r</sup>–106<sup>r</sup>; *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 458–59, a letter of Don García to Philip II, dated from on board his galley "sobre Zaragoza," i.e., off Syracuse, on 24 August, 1565.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 249.

<sup>154</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 113, and Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fols. 116<sup>r</sup>–117<sup>r</sup>, whose texts are very similar. Cf. Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxi, pp. 685–86.

<sup>155</sup> From Syracuse on 8 September (1565) Doria sketched his movements from 23 August to 7 September in a letter and a report (*relación*) to Philip II (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 494–501), and cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fols. 111 ff., 117.

<sup>156</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 484.

sola ciò maravigliosamente fu esseguito!"<sup>157</sup> Don García came ashore briefly, and then re-embarked to return with the fleet to Sicily to take on board the troops which had been recruited in the duchy of Urbino. They were awaiting transport in Messina.<sup>158</sup>

Meanwhile, in Malta, Ascanio della Corgna had set out with some horsemen to take stock of their surroundings and to choose a site for their first encampment, to which the large stores of munitions they had brought from Sicily had to be conveyed. In the heat of day it was hard going, for della Corgna's chosen camp site was four miles from their place of landing, within easy reach of Mdina. The troops did not leave the camp, once they had settled into it, until all the munitions had been stored in Mdina, which task was not finished until Monday, 10 September. The Turks who had been established in La Bormula had just burned the houses, and abandoned the big gun, to which Balbi refers more than once.

Upon learning of the arrival of Don García's relief force, the pashas Mustafa and Piali had assembled their tattered hordes on the promontory of S. Elmo under the cover of their fleet in the harbor of Marsamuscetto. Soldiers and others now came to the Borgo from Mdina. It was safe to move about, with all the Turks apparently at S. Elmo. Encouraging word spread through the depleted Christian ranks in S. Michele and the Borgo that the Catholic king had stripped the garrisons of Italy to send the flower of Spanish soldiery to drive the Turks from Malta, "assí los soldados de todas naciones como los cavalleros aventureros, porque venía la flor de todos los soldados viejos españoles, qu' el Rey Cathólico tenía en todos los presidios de Italia."<sup>159</sup> The popular estimate of their numbers was nine to twelve thousand men. Those who had been standing on the battered ramparts for almost four months could not believe that Don García had landed so many men. Monday, 10 September, was their fourth day on Malta. They had made no move against the Turks, and it remained Balbi's opinion that they would never

have done so, had the Turks not forced action upon them.<sup>160</sup> He was doubtless right, because Philip II wanted to avoid doing battle with the Turks.

Later on, Ascanio della Corgna explained to Balbi the predicament of the relief force. If the newly-arrived and still unsettled troops lost their biscuits and munitions, they might be in worse straits than those who still had the cover of S. Michele and the Borgo.<sup>161</sup> Also Don García's purpose was to break the Turkish siege by a show of force without risking the Spanish soldiery of whom the king had continual need. With the relief force on Malta, the Turks would have to give up the siege. Finally, between the Christians' encampment, now in the suburb of Mdina, and the Borgo to the east there were nine miles without water except for the creeks at the Marsa, which the Turks must have taken steps to prevent their using.

Considering the heat of the noonday sun, it was better not to add thirst to the Turkish peril.<sup>162</sup>

<sup>160</sup> The major events of the siege from 8 August through 10 September (1565) are covered in Balbi's *Relación* (1568) in some fifty pages (fols. 95<sup>v</sup>-118<sup>r</sup>), with lists of the *aventureros* and Hospitaliers, who sailed from Sicily to the relief of Malta (fols. 106<sup>v</sup>-111<sup>r</sup>), trans. H. A. Balbi, *Siege* (1961), pp. 147-74, who transfers the lists to the end of his book. Cirri, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. VIII, fols. 105<sup>v</sup>-110<sup>r</sup>, 125<sup>v</sup>-128<sup>r</sup> (fols. misnumbered by printer's error), also gives long lists of the *venturieri* as well as of the *Cavallieri* of the Orders of S. John and S. Stefano. One suspects that almost all those mentioned, who were still alive in 1567-1568, would buy copies of both Balbi's *Relación* and Cirri's *Asedio*.

<sup>161</sup> Note Cirri's observations in this connection (*Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fols. 119<sup>v</sup>-120<sup>r</sup>), and cf. in general Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXIII, pp. 694 ff. Cirri had come to Malta with the relief force (see above, note 89), from which point his account becomes that of a witness to the events he describes, but the flow of his narrative does not alter. Bosio was himself in Malta, as he tells us, in 1574 and 1578, being sent there "per negotii alla detta Religione [i.e., the Hospitaliers] importantissimi" (*ibid.*, bk. XXXII, p. 696B). Cirri also became deeply involved in the affairs of the Order, as Bosio himself notes (*ibid.*, bk. XXXVIII, p. 809BC, ad ann. 1568).

<sup>162</sup> A courier from Messina, who arrived in Rome on or just before 19 September, brought the following inaccurate report concerning the activities of Ascanio della Corgna and the problem of the Christians' access to the water at the Marsa (Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 103<sup>v</sup>-104<sup>r</sup>): "... Tutte le particolarità non si sanno anchora, ma s' intende che essendo li nostri sbarcati alli 7, il signor Ascanio della Cornia andò alli 8 a combattere l' acqua dove Turchi in numero di 1,500 vi erano in guardia, et attaccatasi la scaramuccia combatterono con tanto sforzo et valore che acquistarono l' acqua con grandissima mortalità de' Turchi, li quali non sapevano che li nostri fossero sbarcati nell' isola senon dopo che furono scoperti, et avendo anchora inteso il bassà per un caramuloso, che gli era giunto, che il signor Don Garzia era ancor lui discosto da loro X miglia con la sua

<sup>157</sup> Cirri, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fol. 118, but Pierre Gentil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, pp. 67-68, says that 8,300 footsoldiers were landed "in less than five hours." Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXII, pp. 690-91, also states that there were 8,300 men in the relief force.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. *Docs. inédites*, XXIX, 501-2, a letter of Don García to Philip II, dated 9 September, 1565, and Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 98<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>159</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 116.

The armchair strategists among the besieged, who now had their first chance in four months to sit down, could devise various ways in which an attack by four thousand arquebusiers could have produced chaos among the Turks, and delivered their artillery to Jean de la Valette, who was hoping to acquire it. But, then, as Balbi concedes, although men are always discussing past events—and who can stop them from doing it?—they may well misjudge their commanders, who are not required to reveal the instructions their princes have given them.<sup>163</sup> Certainly Don García was in no position to make known the letters which Philip II had sent him.

At Piali Pasha's prodding, according to Balbi (and contrary to Piali's advice, according to Cirmi), Mustafa decided to take the offensive against the relief force under Don Álvaro de Sande and Ascanio della Corgna. The Christians were now encamped in a "borgo" of ruined houses outside Mdina. They had been having a hard time, as Cirmi tells us, living on ship's biscuit and water and sleeping on the bare ground "all' offesa dell' aria notturna" until Ascanio had moved them to Mdina. Their new lodgings were "sopra la Città," on an easily defensible highland.<sup>164</sup> It was Tuesday, 11 September (1565). As the hour of encounter came on, the disorder among the Christians almost kept pace with that among the Turks. In the initial skirmish to take possession of a hillock (*una certa montagnuola*) on which, says Cirmi, there were a little church and a windmill, the Turks were worsted. The hillock was about a mile east of Mdina. Having seen the Turks' "vile" retreat from the hillock, the Christian arquebusiers advanced to cries of "Sant' Iago! Vittoria! Vittoria!"<sup>165</sup>

Balbi and Cirmi extol the heroism and the exploits of Álvaro de Sande, Chiappino Vitelli, Bernardino de Cardenas, Pompeo Colonna, della Corgna, and a number of others, including Vincenzo Gonzaga, the prior of Barletta. As the sun rose, the temperature became intolerable, "and

the heat was so great," declares Balbi, who had gone to Mdina, "that I must say that during the entire siege I never felt it so much as I did that day, and Christians as well as Turks could hardly keep to their feet from fatigue, heat, and thirst, of which some simply died."<sup>166</sup> With many of the Turks in flight, the conflict moved northward toward S. Paul's Bay (the Qala ta San Pawl). The Christians fought with a vengeance and presently, by late afternoon, Mustafa Pasha gave orders for his battered troops to retreat to the bay.<sup>167</sup>

Meanwhile Piali Pasha had withdrawn with the Turkish armada from the harbor of Marsamuscetto. As arranged with Mustafa, he had gone along the northern coast of Malta—past S. Julian's, S. George's, and Salina Bays—to the inlet of S. Paul's, where under the protecting gunfire of his galleys he embarked as many men of the defeated army as he could. The Turks were said to have suffered 1,500 casualties in the "battle," of which Álvaro de Sande sent Philip II an account on 14 September.<sup>168</sup> The siege of Malta was over.

As night fell on 12 September, the vessels of the Barbary corsairs (held up a whole day by stormy weather) headed for Algiers and Tripoli, and the sultan's armada began its eastward voyage to Istanbul. Balbi states that the Turks had lost 35,000 men "en la empresa de Malta," ten or

<sup>163</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 119.

<sup>164</sup> Bosio, III (1692), bk. XXXIII, pp. 699-701, who emphasizes the rivalry and disagreements as to strategy between the cautious Ascanio della Corgna and the more adventurous Álvaro de Sande. Like most battle scenes this one is confusing. The Turks and Christians vied for possession of two hillocks, one with a tower and the other with a windmill (Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 119), *una montañeta, en la qual havia una torrezilla* and also *un alto, adonde avia una casa y un molino*.

<sup>165</sup> *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 509-10, 513-16, and esp. pp. 521-24, Álvaro de Sande's account of 14 September, 1565. Cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. ix, fols. 121'-124', who implies there were 16,000 Turks in the "battle" (fol. 121'), of whom more than 1,000 were killed (fol. 124'), although he reports Mustafa Pasha as lamenting the loss of more than 2,000 men (fol. 124'), while some thought that the Turkish casualties had reached 3,000. Pierre Genil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, pp. 69-70, puts them at "more than 1,500."

<sup>166</sup> According to the report given in Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 106', *per lettere del Borgo di Malta di 13 Settembre, 1565*, "our men" displayed such force and fury in the encounter with the Turks "che senza niuno agiuto di corsalietti gli ruppero et fecero voltar le spalle di maniera che con la strachozza che i nemici havevano del camino et con l' estrema volontà de' nostri che diservevano di combattere fecero tanta mortalità che avanti che li Turchi arrivassero alla loro armata, che stava aspettandogli in certa parte dell' isola, furono morti più di mille Turchi, et presi da 300 et di quelli che si buttarono in acqua et strachi se ne affogarono assai, et de' nostri non ne morirono tre huomini." Cf., *ibid.*, fols. 103'-104'.

armata, Turchi si posero in fuga. . . ." On the Turkish vessel mentioned in the text of this report (*caramusul*, Turk. *karamusul*, named from the village of Karanlisel on the Gulf of Izmit in northwestern Turkey), see the *Nouveau Glossaire nautique d' Augustin Jal*, rev. ed., Paris, 1978, pp. 219-20.

<sup>165</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 117': "Pero todavía aunque los hombres discurs[an] siempre de los successos passados (lo qual no se puede vedar a nadie que no lo haga) no por esto perjudican a los generales, pues no saben ni la orden que de sus principes tenían ni sus desuños, ni son obligados a hazer dellos partícipes a todos"—which was true enough.

<sup>164</sup> Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. ix, fol. 120.

<sup>165</sup> Cirmi, *ibid.*, bk. ix, fols. 121'-123'.



twelve thousand more, perhaps, than the entire expeditionary force. Balbi's figure is too high. He also says that the Turks "had used up more than 130,000 rounds [of gunpowder] both from their cannon and basilisks—when I left Malta, there had already been collected in S. Angelo 65,000 cannonballs, all of cast iron [*la balas . . . todas de hierro colado*]."169

At the hour of vespers on Friday, 14 September, Don García de Toledo, viceroy of Sicily and captain-general of the sea, arrived back in Malta with some of the fleet. All the galleys flew their pennons; that of Don García's *real capitana*, the royal flagship, was "un crucifixo muy devoto." He entered Grand Harbor to the welcoming salvos of the guns at S. Elmo and S. Angelo plus those on the Bastions of Auvergne and Provence. Jean de la Valette, the grand master and a group of Knights, "both those of the relief force and those of the Order," received Don García with all solemnity at a landing pier by Fort S. Angelo. De la Valette stepped into the viceroy's skiff as it reached the pier. He embraced Don García and Giannandrea Doria, greeting thereafter Don Juan de Cardona, who had conveyed Melchor de Robles's relief force of 700 men to Malta at the beginning of July. He then received with the open arms of gratitude other nobles, among them Don Álvaro de Bazán, captain of the Spanish galleys, and Don Sancho de Leyva, captain of those of Naples, "y después de mano en mano a todos los caballeros que en la armada venían conforme a las calidades de sus personas."

All the besieged could now eat and drink to their satisfaction, for supplies had come with Don García's fleet (and perhaps some food had come out of hiding). Prices were high, but Balbi and his fellows did not think so. During the siege they had been paying two ducats for a hen—when they could find a hen—and a single egg had cost a *real* and a half. "As for other, more delectable things, I must remain quiet, because they were not to be found for any amount of money." The evening of 14 September closed with a banquet of thanksgiving, to which Don García and the governor of Gozo contributed "many refreshments."<sup>170</sup>

After the banquet de la Valette and Don García conferred most of the night, and the latter issued

orders for the immediate embarkation of the Neapolitan and Sicilian troops. The Spanish captain-general sailed at nightfall on Saturday, the fifteenth. Thereafter he followed the Turkish armada as far as the Aegean. Meanwhile on 11 September, the day the Turks gave up all hope of taking Malta, the Grand Master Jean de la Valette wrote his two benefactors, Pius IV and Philip II, adding a postscript to each of the two letters (on the thirteenth). The pope received the longer letter, and God the chief credit for the deliverance of Malta.

As de la Valette wrote Pius, the Turks had despaired of success after their months-long effort to take the island. Their supplies were almost exhausted, and winter was coming. They had already been packing their goods and chattels bit by bit, when suddenly on 7 September the Catholic fleet of seventy galleys appeared, and landed eight to nine thousand men "to help us." Thereupon the Turks gave themselves over to embarking their artillery and the rest of their belongings with such fury that the soldiers of the relief force, not being able so quickly to store their provisions and munitions within the walls of Mdina, which was some miles inland from their landing place, could not take such effective action as they might have against the Turks' "famished and diminished army, separated into so many batteries."

De la Valette made it clear, of course, that the numerous Spanish and Italian soldiery of the relief force could not afford the risk of losing their supplies and munitions, which was quite true, although if they had been able to move rapidly against the Turks, they might have surrounded them [in the ruins of Fort S. Elmo]. Even so, God had not allowed the Turks to get away without being chastised by the relief force because the Turks, being informed of the Christians' arrival, ventured out into the island ten thousand strong, while their armada went from the haven of Marsamuscetto to S. Paul's Bay. At this point, however, "our men" put the Turks to flight, inflicting such a defeat upon them

that they chased them into the water to the very prows of their galleys, killing more than 1,500 of them. Now our men are encamped about the said bay with the resolution not to allow them again to set foot on this island. . . . Truly it has been the work of our Lord God, because He has reduced the many troops [of the Turks], and increased our slender numbers in order that so many thousands of souls should not be lost, for whose defense no one of us has sought to spare his own life.

Of the five hundred Knights of the Order who were on hand when the siege began, three hundred

<sup>169</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 121", and cf. Cirmi, *Asedio di Malta*, bk. IX, fol. 125, misnumbered.

<sup>170</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 122; Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXIII, p. 706. Don García had been anchored off Syracuse (Zaragoza) on 13 September (*Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 516), preparing to return to Malta.

were now dead, the rest in large part wounded and maimed. However,

His Divine Majesty be praised and thanked that in the time of your Holiness He has sent us this victory. . . . The weather which has detained the boat for Sicily until the present, the thirteenth [and hence delayed the dispatch of the grand master's letter], has also kept the enemy's armada here until last night, when it left for the Levant, with no less shame than loss, for which may our Lord God be forever praised!<sup>171</sup>

At the same time (11–13 September) de la Valette or a secretary penned an expression of gratitude to Philip II. He acknowledged that the ar-

<sup>171</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fols. 106<sup>v</sup>–108<sup>r</sup>,  *copia d' una lettera del Gran Maestro di Malta al Papa scritta alli XI Settembre et gionta in Roma li 22 detto*: After stating that he is certain the pope, "come benigno pastore," must be anxious to learn of the victory of the Knights over the Turks, de la Valette takes the first opportunity to inform his Holiness "che il nostro Signor Dio mi ha fatto de liberarci da così lungo et potentissimo assedio, perchè disperati li nemici dell' espugnatione di questo luogo, benchè ridotto a grandissima estremità, vedendosi l' inverno sopra con poche vettaglie cominciavano già a ritirare le loro bagaglie a poco a poco, quando sopraggiungendoli alli 7 di questo la vista dell' armata Cattolica al numero di 70 galere, la quale veniva a sbarcare in terra l' esercito di 8 ovvero 9 m. huomini in nostro soccorso, si dettero con tal furia ad imbarcar l' artellaria et tutto il resto che li nostri, non possendo così presto ritirar dentro la città che è fra terra, e loro vettaglie [sic] et monitioni sbarcate, le quali erano molto necessarie a metter in sicuro per il pericolo che pendendo ne habrebbe potuto succedere a tanto numero di gente, non poterono fare quelle fationi che contra un esercito affamato et diminuito, separato in tante batterie, che da per tutto ne tenevano circondati habrebbono potuto fare, ma nostro Signor Dio non ha voluto lasciarli partire senza essere castigati anchora da questo soccorso, perchè avvisati d' esso hebbero prouisione di farli vedere hoggi in numero di X m., mentre tutta l' armata di mare levandosi da Marzo Musetto andò alla Cala di San Paulo, et i nostri venendoli sopra, li posero in fuga et rotta tale che li cacionero in acqua sino alle prore della galere, amazzandone più di 1,500.

"Hora li nostri sono accampati sopra detta Cala con ressoluzione di non lasciarli più mettere il piede in quest' isola. . . . È stata veramente opera di nostro Signor Iddio, ch'è lui ha diminuito le molte forze [de' Turchi], et ha accresciuto le nostre poche accion che si perdessero tante migliaia d' anime, per difesa delle quali niuno di noi ha sparmata la vita propria, così li 500 nostri Cavalieri che qui si sono ritrovati, de' quali ne sono morti 300, et il resto feriti et stropiati la maggior parte, sia lodata et ringratiata sua Divina Maestà che in tempo di vostra Santità ci ha mandato questa vittoria. . . . Li temp' che hanno ritenuto questa barcha per Sicilia sino al presente, che siamo alli 13, ha ritenuto anchora l' armata nemica qui sino alla notte passata che parti alla volta de Levante, non con minor vergogna che danno, che nostro Signor Dio sia sempre lodato! Humilissimo seruo di vostra Santità, Fra Gio. de Valetto." The text of the grand master's letter was printed (there is a copy, from the Riant collection, in the Houghton Library at Harvard [Ott. 199-6, no. 12]), and apparently received a wide circulation. Much altered, the text appears also in Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXIII, pp. 703–4, where it is dated 11 September.

rial of Don García's troops had been decisive in effecting the Turks' rapid departure, and declared that he could hardly find the appropriate words in which to convey the Hospitallers' thanks to his Majesty, i.e., the thanks of the few Hospitallers who had survived the siege: "Yo no sé con que términos poder decir ni significar la merced grande que vuestra Majestad ha hecho á esta Religion [i.e., the Order] en mandarla socorrer, y ha sido tanto mayor quanto era grande el peligro en que estábamos los pocos que hemos quedado vivos. . . ."<sup>172</sup> Without Spanish aid Malta would certainly have fallen. Without the six or seven hundred men who had come under Juan de Cardona and Melchor de Robles at the beginning of July, the Borgo and Fort S. Michael (as Balbi says) could not have held out. But Don García's troops had come late, almost at the last hour. There was a strain of resentment in the grand master's gratitude.

Don García was pleased with himself and with the recent course of events. The siege of Malta had been lifted. The Spanish fleet was unimpaired; the loss of Philip II's soldiery had been slight. He had followed Philip's orders; the Spanish maneuvers had been successful. From on board his galley off Syracuse on 13 September, by which time the Turkish armada was "ten miles at sea," Don García got off a letter to the king's secretary Francisco de Eraso. He was trying to take advantage of the Spanish victory. As he informed Eraso,

I am sending [a letter] to tell his Holiness that since this fleet has performed with such good effect, it seems to me that by way of reward he ought at once to send his Majesty the five-year subsidy [*quinquenio*] because, to give it in this manner, it will be more fully appreciated than if his Majesty has to request it. [His Holiness] is the man to do it in a moment if he is not getting over his happiness [in the good news]. . . .<sup>173</sup>

Pius IV had been, like many Italians (and Spanish) of the day, almost terrified by the Turkish siege of Malta. As Cardinal Francisco Pacheco wrote Philip II (on 14 September), Pius had given orders that he was to be awakened at any hour that Don García's report concerning events in Malta should reach Rome. Pacheco had just received the dispatch, at midnight, and sent his secretary to the Vatican Palace with all Don García's information—the Christian forces had landed at Malta; Pacheco placed his faith in the Almighty that

<sup>172</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXIX, 517–19.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIX, 515–16.

victory lay ahead. The papal five-year subsidy (*quinquennio*) to maintain the Spanish galleys against the Turks and corsairs would soon expire. Philip, of course, wanted it renewed: "Yesterday I received your Majesty's dispatch of the 24th of last month," Pacheco now wrote,

and I have spoken to the pope. In order not to detain the courier, I shall not go further than to say that if the pope does not send your Majesty the five-year subsidy . . . , he will be acting in ugly fashion. I shall arrange it with him. If he does not do it, I shall tell him my opinion quite frankly. Until I report to your Majesty how I have managed with him, do not send to ask him for it. . . .<sup>174</sup>

Cardinal Pacheco sent the pope another dispatch concerning the relief of Malta on the night of 19 September, and the following day Pacheco and the Spanish ambassador Don Pedro de Ávila went to the Vatican Palace. Don Pedro had time to say a word of good cheer or congratulation to the pope, and then withdrew, for Pacheco had told him that he wished to speak to the pope alone. Pius was in a bad mood, complaining of the gout, but he saw Pacheco, who told him that now was the time to honor and encourage Philip II to undertake still greater enterprises. And certainly it was time to rejoice in the victory at Malta. Obviously the pope could make clear the gratitude of Christendom by granting Philip the five-year subsidy, making him "un presente del quinquenio." Pius reacted, as Pacheco wrote Philip (on 23 September), "as if I were shooting at him with an arquebus." This was not the time, he said, to deal with any such matter, but rather to give thanks to God for the defeat of the Turks. Pacheco urged Pius to read Don García's letter, requesting the pope to send Philip the *quinquennio* "by way of a reward." With reluctance Pius read the letter. Turning to Pacheco, he said, "Send it to him? I'll be doing enough if I give it to the king when he asks me for it, let alone send it to him!"<sup>175</sup>

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIX, 525–26, letter of Cardinal Pacheco to Philip II, dated at Rome on 14 September, 1565.

<sup>175</sup> *Docs. inédits*, CI (1891, repr. 1966), 106–7, letter of Pacheco to Philip II, dated at Rome on 23 September, 1565. Raynaldus, *Ann. eccl.*, ad ann. 1565, no. 12, knows from the diary of Cornelius Firmanus, the new master of ceremonies at the papal court [Arm. XII, tom. 31], that the news of the Christian victory at Malta reached Rome on 19 September. Cornelius Firmanus was the cousin of Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, the "Firmanus" of the foregoing pages; they were both nephews of the older master of ceremonies Joannes Franciscus Firmanus of Macerata, to whom they owed their appointments (see Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II [1911], pp. CIX, CXII). There is an abridged text of Cornelius Firmanus' *Diaria Pii Papae IV, Pii Papae V, Gregorii Papae XIII*, 548 pp.,

When Pius emerged from his set-to with Pacheco, he summoned the dozen cardinals who were on hand. When they were seated, he began to address them, thanking God for the deliverance of Malta and praising the valor of the Knights of the Order. He made no reference to Philip II, nor to the Spanish army, nor to Don García's fleet. The Spanish were stunned. In Don Pedro de Ávila's opinion, if there had been Turks present, they would have lamented the pope's discourtesy. Had Don Pedro not been a witness to the papal performance, he could not have believed it.<sup>176</sup>

The siege of Malta had been an exciting, fearful drama. Few events of the stormy century ever caught such widespread attention or evoked such admiration, at least in Europe, as did the success of the Hospitallers and the Maltese in defending their island against almost four months of Turkish assault. The grand master's letter of 11–13 September was known in Rome by the twenty-second, and Pius ordered celebrations for the following day. They were to start with a procession to S. Giovanni Laterano. On the evening of 23 September the usual bonfires of rejoicing were to be lighted, but the Fugger agent in Rome, who prepared a report on the twenty-second, noted that he had just been told the Romans were not going to wait for the following evening. They were already running about, getting ready to light their fires.<sup>177</sup> The age had not provided many opportunities to make merry over a Turkish defeat.

At nightfall on Saturday, 15 September (1565), as we have noted, Don García had set out to follow the Turkish fleet as far as the Aegean. He was back in Messina by 19 October,<sup>178</sup> when he wrote

in the University of Pennsylvania Library. MS. Lea 428. Only a page and a half is given over to Pius IV's reign, however, and the entry of 19 September has been omitted.

<sup>176</sup> J. J. von Döllinger, *Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen und Culturgeschichte*, I (Regensburg, 1862), no. 198, p. 629, letter of Pedro de Ávila to Philip II's secretary Gonzalo Pérez. Pius IV had acquired an extreme dislike of the Spanish, reacting against Philip II's ceaseless demands and constant interference in ecclesiastical matters. On 30 November (1565) Pacheco had occasion to write Philip of an especially unpleasant encounter with Pius (*ibid.*, I, no. 203, pp. 640–61): ". . . El Papa dijo mal de estos estatutos de España y que eran contra derecho y que trañian revueltas las iglesias. . . . Volvíase a mi . . . y dije que si el Rey quería ser Rey en España que el quería ser Papa en Roma!" Let Philip be king in Spain; Pius intended to rule in Rome.

<sup>177</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 105, doc. dated 22 September, 1565; cf. Pierre Genil de Vendôme, ed. Pernot, *Le Siège de Malte*, p. 71, with which Vendôme closes his account of the siege, and Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXIII, pp. 714–15.

<sup>178</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXIII, p. 714d, notes that Don García had arrived back in Messina on 15 October (1565).

Philip II's secretary Erasmo, "El viaje de Levante ha sido trabajoso. . . ." By this time Don García had become annoyed with the Grand Master de la Valette, who was not giving the Spanish their due credit and recognition for rescuing the Hospitallers and the Maltese from the disaster which had faced them in S. Michele and the Borgo but for the troops which Philip II had finally allowed to be sent to Malta.<sup>179</sup>

In the meantime (on 17 September) five galleys of the Order had carried the troops recruited in Lombardy back to Sicily, along with a number of distinguished soldiers, including Don Bernardino de Cardenas and Ascanio della Corgna. In looking back on the siege, Balbi reckoned that "more than 2,500 soldiers of all nations lost their lives, and 7,000 Maltese, counting men, women, girls, and boys, as well as 500 slaves of the Order."<sup>180</sup> He seems to have entertained no doubt as to the accuracy of his figures, and he was equally sure that "after Almighty God, his Majesty [Philip II] has been the one who has saved Malta and all Italy too from the proud power of Sultan Suleiman."<sup>181</sup>

News that the Spanish fleet had broken the Turkish siege of Malta had reached Istanbul by 5 October (1565). Details were still lacking, but enough had become known to evoke Sultan Suleiman's "grande colère et facherie." So Antoine Petremol, the French agent at the Porte, wrote Charles IX on 7 October. He had been trying for two days to get an audience with Mehmed Sokolli,

<sup>179</sup> *Docs. inédits*, XXIX, 542-47: "El maestre me parece que non contentándose con la parte que de la jornada le cabia, ha querido como francés [!] tirárselo á sí todo sin acordarse que con las fuerzas de su Magestad se le dieron mil hombres en dos veces, y sin la tercera que con tan gran suma de dinero como se ha gastado por ello aventuró su Magestad F' armada y ejército de tierra por socorrerla. . . y paréceme que no ha hecho mas mención del socorro que su Magestad ha hecho en tantas veces como si fuera cosa que se pudiera encubrirse. . ." (p. 545). There had been no little difference of opinion between de la Valette and Don García from the beginning of the siege (*cf. ibid.*, XXIX, 201 ff.), and there was certainly no love lost between them thereafter (Bosio, III [1602], bk. xxxiii, p. 704, and *cf. bk. xxxv*, pp. 739-41).

As the Turkish armada made for the Aegean, the Venetian Senate ordered Marchio Michiel, the Republic's captain-general, to see that the Venetian galleys were disarmed, i.e., that he should let the mercenaries go (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 34' [55']), and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 35' [56'] and 36 [57], docs. dated in late September and October, 1565).

<sup>180</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fols. 122', 128'.

<sup>181</sup> Balbi, *La Verdadera Relación*, fol. 123': ". . . Después del Omnipotente Dios, ha sido su Magestad el que ha librado a Malta, y aun a toda Italia, del sobervio poder de Soltan Soliman."

the grand vizir, who asked him to be patient until the pashas could learn more about "how things have gone at Malta." Suleiman knew that part of the Turkish armada had withdrawn toward the Morea. He did not want it to return to the Bosphorus, but to stay where it was in case Philip II's fleet should seek to enter the Archipelago. The sultan, vexed beyond words, wanted fifty galleys armed within a month to defend the islands of the south Aegean.

Suleiman was assuming that the rest of his naval forces could be put in order by the spring. Petremol thought it would be difficult, even though work were to go on day and night in the arsenal. In this connection or for some other reason

the Grand Seigneur has had a survey made of all the houses of the Christians and Jews in Constantinople to find out how many persons are in them and whether they own or rent these houses, a thing which had never been done in this country.

The survey caused uneasiness, since it was assumed that Suleiman might require each house (or household) to provide one man or more to serve as oarsmen on the galleys, "for from now on he is having all the poor Christians detained who had bought their freedom by their past servitude, and God grant that he not do still worse!"

More definite news came on the evening of 13 October, and seemed to change the sultan's mood. Petremol wrote of it to Arnaud du Ferrier, the French ambassador in Venice. The armada could now return to Istanbul. Suleiman still wanted, "chose du tout impossible," to send fifty galleys into the Archipelago within a month. He had not relaxed his religious policy, and had just refused the Greeks permission to gather their grapes. In fact he had ordered them to uproot their vines, make no more wine in the future, and dump out the little wine they had already made as well as the wine which remained from the year before. "We shall be constrained to drink water in the future." Voilà! That was the way things were, and likely to get worse,

according to the mood of these barbarians, who will perhaps want to avenge themselves on the poor Christians who are here because of the blow they have received at Malta—they are threatening to cut them all in pieces.

Owing to the fury of the people Petremol remained in his house with his family. He hoped the rage of the rabble would pass in a few days.

In Istanbul they were awaiting the return of Mustafa Pasha, who should arrive shortly with

sixty galleys, "namely those which are disarmed and remain out of use." Piali Pasha was carrying on at sea with the rest of the armada, about eighty galleys, until the arrival of certain other galleys, including those being got ready in the arsenal, which would require oarsmen and soldiers. Seven ships and two "caramousalis" had just landed from Chios. They were loaded with sick and wounded. Meanwhile it appeared that Mustafa might face nothing less than the loss of "his head or his estate" as a result of the charges being leveled against him by those who blamed him for the failure they had suffered at Malta.

Petremol looked forward to learning how Mustafa would defend himself and impute blame for the failure to Piali. As the two pashas exchanged accusations, it would seem that one of them should fall into disgrace. Mustafa, however, was a near relative of Sultan Suleiman; Piali was the son-in-law of "Sultan" Selim. Maybe they would both escape the imperial anger. At any rate Suleiman was doing all he could to put together "une plus puissante armée" in order once more to strike at Christendom when the spring came.<sup>182</sup>

A report from Istanbul dated 23 October (1565) suggests that in the higher circles at the Porte there was less distress about the setback at Malta than there was in the streets, where one grieved over the death of a husband, a son, or a brother. The chief losses suffered in the expedition were not in precious galleys, but merely in replaceable men (*poichè tutto [il danno] consiste nella mortalità delle genti*). In the streets, however, one could still entertain hope of recovering the husband, son, or brother, even if maimed. Besides the seven ships and two caramussalini which had brought the sick and wounded (who had first been taken to Chios), some more ships and another caramussalino seem to have come directly from Malta with a multitude of wounded.

According to the Fugger informant on the Bosphorus, this last group of wounded owed their lives to a Spaniard, who had also saved the sultan's ar-

mada. Three days before Don García de Toledo's departure from Messina to land the Spanish and Italian troops on the island the Spaniard had himself left Messina to warn Mustafa or Piali Pasha of the advent of Philip II's fleet, "et che [il bassà] avesse buona cura della sua armata." The Spanish renegade had now come to Istanbul, "and he has become a Turk, and the Signore [Suleiman] has made him captain of a galley, having set him up with a commission of thirty aspers a day."

Who can say how much truth there was in this report? In any event the Fugger informant added the more verifiable fact that "the plague is very severe here in Pera. People are dying at the rate of two hundred a day, and many Venetian merchants are dead."<sup>183</sup> Indeed, yes. The French agent Jean Dolu had died of the plague. Did it also carry off Antoine Petremol, whose dispatches end abruptly in October?

If the Venetians were not overjoyed by the Hospitallers' successful defense of Malta, they were certainly relieved that the Turks had not ensconced themselves in the island stronghold. The news of the Turks' enforced abandonment of the siege had spread through the canals and campi of Venice by the last week of September (1565). It was not until 3 November, however, that the doge and Senate wrote Antonio Tiepolo, their ambassador at Philip's court, to convey their congratulations to his Catholic Majesty. The relief force which Philip's fleet had brought to Malta had earned him an immortal glory "con sommo beneficio de tutta la Christianità."<sup>184</sup> When the ambassador expressed the Signoria's joy in Philip's "gloriosa empresa," however, he was also to press for the continuance of "li privilegii nostri nel regno di Napoli," without the impost of a recent levy which would virtually annul the privileges which Venice had received from Charles V in the treaty of Bologna.<sup>185</sup>

Westerners expected Sultan Suleiman to try to lighten the Turkish humiliation at Malta by the success of a still larger expedition, whether by land

<sup>182</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 804-6, letters of Petremol to Charles IX, dated 7 October, 1565, and to Arnaud du Ferrier, dated 15 and 25 October. These are Petremol's last dispatches from Istanbul. In the West it was apparently being said that Suleiman would not tolerate defeat at Malta: If the armada returned to Istanbul "senza vittoria di quell' impresa, havebbero fatto tagliar à pezzi tutto quell' esercito, facendogli havere nel proprio sangue la macchia della vergogna!" (Bosio, III [1602], bk. xxx, p. 636CD). Bosio, *ibid.*, bk. xxxiv, p. 722C, was well aware of Suleiman's ban on wine "sotto pena della vita."

<sup>183</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 127.

<sup>184</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 37' [58'], all' *ambasciador in Spagna*, doc. dated 3 November, 1565, *de literis* 185, *de non 1, non sinceri* 0.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 74, fol. 37' [58']; cf. fol. 45' [67'] and Reg. 76, fol. 17' [58']. On the treaty of Bologna, signed on 23 December, 1529, which (among many other provisions) granted the Venetians freedom of trade in the kingdom of Naples in return for their surrendering to the pope the two cities of Ravenna and Cervia and to the Emperor Charles their holdings on the Adriatic coast of Apulia, see above, Volume III, Chapter 9, p. 332.

or sea, in the spring of 1566. Maximilian II was keeping his eyes on the roadways leading into Hungary and Transylvania. The Venetians were always watching the sea-lanes of the eastern Mediterranean, where their island domains of Cyprus and Crete would be exposed to Turkish attack whenever the Signoria's peace with the Porte should fail. Venice would try to preserve the peace, but what about the Turks? On 29 November (1565) the doge and Senate wrote the colonial government at Candia that Vittore Bragadin, the baillie in Istanbul, had written them of the Turkish preparations for an armada for the coming year.

The sultan wanted everything in order as early as 15 March, which suggested the likelihood of some major naval effort. The government at Candia was ordered, therefore, immediately to arm the ten galleys at Crete and to see that they were provided with proper manpower. These galleys must be ready to go to Venetian-held Corfu to join the Republic's fleet before the Turkish armada set sail from Istanbul. If the date of the armada's leaving port were to be later than mid-March (as seemed likely), the baillie would so notify the officials at Candia. The ten galleys in question must, in any event, reach Corfu on time. The Signoria would accept absolutely no excuse for failure.<sup>186</sup>

On the same day (29 November) the Senate set about supplying grain, ship's biscuit, and munitions to the island stronghold of Corfu, *quella importantissima fortezza*, for the use of the local garrison and the Venetian fleet. The Senate also renewed the condotta of one Melchior Lussy, *colonnello della gente sguizzara*, for a period of six years or of four years if the Signoria should so choose.<sup>187</sup> The Turkish descent upon Malta had spread alarm throughout the Italian peninsula.

Pope Pius IV had reached the end of a notable reign. After several recoveries from apparently serious illnesses, it was clear by Saturday, 8 December, 1565, that he lay on his deathbed, *gravissime aegrotans*, as twenty-eight cardinals gathered in a general congregation in his chamber. With their consent he gave almost 200,000 scudi to his nieces and nephews, including 100,000 scudi to Annibale de Altemps [von Hohenems]. He also decreed that the Sacred College should set aside

25,000 scudi to assist poor cardinals, to help with the coming conclave, and to meet various inevitable expenses. Having attended to other business, he commended the Church to the cardinals, gave them his last benediction, "et tandem admittit eos ad osculum manus et oris." The next day, Sunday, 9 December, he died about 7:00 P.M. in his apartment in the Borgia Tower.<sup>188</sup>

News of Pius's demise would arouse anxiety in every responsible churchman in Italy, Germany, and central Europe. Who would be the next pope? As Stanislaus Hosius wrote Gian Francesco Comendone, when he first received word of the pope's death, a successor to Pius was needed, whose *magna virtus* could help the Church weather the storms and tempests of the times.<sup>189</sup>

Pius IV has left many a mark behind him. He made some important additions to the Vatican Library, took a further step in the formation of the Vatican Archives, and renewed and rebuilt the University of Rome. Most of all, he was a builder. The archival records of papal construction during his reign are among the fullest to be found for the entire sixteenth century. At the Vatican he finished the long, majestic Cortile del Belvedere, building on its north, highest level the imposing

<sup>188</sup> Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 34, fols. 305'-306', by mod. stamped enumeration: "... Die dominico, 9 Decembris, 1565, hora secunda noctis Papa Pius IV obiit in cameris suis Turris Borgiae." Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 576-77. In January, 1565, Annibale de Altemps had married Ortesina Borromeo, the half-sister of Cardinal Carlo (*ibid.*, VII, 569-70); their marriage had been celebrated by a tournament in the still unspoiled Cortile del Belvedere at the Vatican (*ibid.*, VII, 587; Thos. Ashby, "The Giostra of 1565," in the *Papers of the British School at Rome*, II [1904], 83-85).

<sup>189</sup> Hosius's letter to his fellow cardinal, Comendone, is dated 28 January, 1566, *ex castro mo Heilsbergk*: "Allatum est huc sanctissimum dominum nostrum Pium Quartum ex hac vita migrasse quumvis ego nullas adhuc ea de re literas habui nisi quod V Idus Decembris [9 December] Roma[re] scriptas accepi quibus animam agere scribentore, sed quicquid sit, si verum est, minime oportuno tempore nobis ereptus est neque parvam animo meo mors illius perturbationem attulit. Faxit Deus ut aut falsus hic rumor sit aut alium electum cito videamus, qui possit in his tempestatibus et procellis quibus miserandum in modum iactantur magna nobis virtute succurrere. . . . Nam hic rerum in orbe toto Christiano status moram longiorem non fert. . ." (Lettere di principi, vol. XXIV, fol. 119, by mod. stamped enumeration). Hosius was especially worried about conditions in Germany: the Curia Romana had little faith in Maximilian (*cf. ibid.*, fols. 121 ff.). Note also the letter of Adam Conarski, bishop of Poznań, lamenting the death of Pius IV (*ibid.*, vol. XXVII, fol. 126, dated 27 January, 1566, and *cf. fol. 134*).

<sup>186</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 40'-41' [61'-62'], *al regimento de Candia*, doc. dated 29 November, 1565, *de literis 177, de non 2, non sinceri 3*.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 74, fols. 41'-43' [62'-64'].

"Nicchione" [now in the Cortile della Pigna], and had the huge Cisterna dug in the area of the (later) Cortile di S. Damaso. He provided for various paintings in the Sala Regia, the Sala Ducale, and other Sale in the Apostolic Palace. His best-known and most beautiful contribution to the art and architecture of Rome is certainly the Casino or Villa Pia in the Vatican Gardens. Pius restored parts of the Aurelian Wall, and expended large sums on the fortifications of the Castel S. Angelo and the defenses of the Città Leonina.

During the half-dozen years of Pius's pontificate several of the city gates were redone, beautified as well as strengthened, and the layout of streets was altered to bring more order into the urban labyrinth. The water supply was much improved. Pius rebuilt several historic palaces and numerous churches. He continued work on S. Peter's, and constructed *ex fundamentis* the church of S. Maria

degli Angeli, in the baths of Diocletian, where he now lies buried. His attention, however, was not confined to Rome. He had towers and other fortifications built from Civitavecchia to Ostia, Anzio, and Terracina as a protection against the Turks and corsairs, and looked to the defenses of Anagni and Bologna, Ancona and Ravenna.

Unlike his predecessor Paul IV, who was forever raging and ranting, Pius IV was cool, level-headed, and as tolerant as a pope could be in the era of inquisitorial dominance. Paul's reign had brought the Church—or at least the Holy See—close to wreckage. Pius reset the sails and altered the course, aided by his quiet, upright nephew Carlo Borromeo. With the latter always at his beck and call, Pius reconvened the Council of Trent, and with near wizardry he brought it to a successful close. The Church still owes Pius IV a large debt.

## 20. PIUS V, SPAIN, AND VENICE; THE TURKS IN CHIOS AND THE ADRIATIC; THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS

THE TRANQUILLITY of Pius IV's reign survived him. Throughout the conclave which elected his successor the city remained calm. There was no rioting, no rejoicing—as there had been after Paul IV's death—and no looting and no vandalism. Cells were hastily constructed at the Vatican in the Sala Regia, the Sale or Halls surrounding the Cortile della Libreria Vaticana, the Borgia Tower, and the Hall beneath the Salone di Costantino—seventy cells for seventy living cardinals,<sup>1</sup> although everyone knew that there would be numerous absences. After the usual novena of mourning and masses the cardinals then in Rome, forty-eight in number, entered the conclave at about 3:00 P.M. on Wednesday, 19 December, 1565. Late in the evening on the twentieth the conclave was closed. As other members of the Sacred College arrived in the city, the number of cardinals in the electoral assembly rose to fifty-three. It was reduced to fifty-two on 6 January, when the young Cardinal Francesco Gonzaga died. Although attempts were made by the princes to effect the election or exclusion of certain aspirants to the tiara, the princes' efforts at interference—and Philip II showed a singular restraint—were less strenuous than they had been at the conclaves from which Julius III and Pius IV had emerged as popes.

The guardians of the conclave and the cardinals themselves maintained a stricter enclosure than had been observed for decades. There were almost no fraudulent conclavists carrying messages in and out of the conclave. No one could enter or leave by the well-walled doors and windows. It was expected to be a long conclave, with many candidates and several factions. As the conclave began, Cardinal Francisco Pacheco wrote Philip II that his confrères Ippolito d' Este and Giovanni Morone were generally regarded as having entered a race for the papal throne. They were, however, running along different paths. D' Este was negotiating publicly and assailing his fellow cardinals face to face to ask for their votes, "cosa que no solo escandaliza al Collegio mas a toda Roma!"

He claimed to have twenty votes, but Pacheco could not find them. In fact Pacheco believed that d' Este would get no votes beyond those of his French supporters and some friends, not numerous enough when put together to make him pope. But when he allied himself with some of the older cardinals who also had their eyes on the tiara, he would be able to bring about the exclusion of his enemy Morone.

In characteristic fashion d' Este had been maligning Morone, reminding everyone that the latter had been charged with heresy before the Inquisition, and that he had been prepared to seek the Lutherans' return to the Church by granting them the chalice and allowing the marriage of priests. Morone was not negotiating. He apparently felt that he had earned the support and gratitude of Pius IV's nephews, but Pacheco feared that such were Carlo Borromeo's scruples that he might not exert himself and might "let his creatures go where they wanted." Pacheco and Borromeo had agreed that the cardinals must elect a worthy pope "muy en servicio de Dios y util de la su Iglesia." Borromeo wished to see one of his uncle's cardinals elected pope. Pacheco expressed approval, and they went on to names: Borromeo suggested Ugo Boncompagni [then papal legate in Spain], Marc' Antonio da Mula, and Gian Francesco Commendone. Pacheco thought the first two a good idea, "and the third, Commendone, I do not know, and I think he is [too] young."

Pacheco tried to enter into confidence with Borromeo "to this effect, that either we should elect a worthy person from among his people if we could or—not being able to do so, and I believe it will be impossible, because the oldsters will not go along with such new cardinals—we should take on one of the persons whom your Majesty has preferred. And I believe that it will be a much easier thing to draw him to [Clemente Dolera, cardinal of] Araceli than to [Giovanni Ricci, cardinal of] Montepulciano." Indeed, yes, Borromeo despised Ricci.

Alessandro Farnese had arrived in Rome, full of assurances to Pacheco that he wished to serve the interests of Philip II, but with every intention of seeking the tiara himself. Pacheco was sure, however, that Farnese had no chance, at least in the coming conclave, but that eventually he would

<sup>1</sup> For the arrangement and the assignment of the cells, see Franz Ehrle and Hermann Egger, *Die Conclavepläne*. . . , Bibl. Apostolica Vaticana, 1933, pp. 22-24 and esp. plans nos. VI [a preliminary sketch], VII-VIII.



join Borromeo to elect one of the older cardinals [which in fact he was to do]. In any event Pacheco feared that Ippolito d' Este's maneuvering might prolong the conclave for a whole year.<sup>2</sup> There was no shrewder or more alert observer in Rome than Francisco Pacheco, but he was wrong. It was to be a short conclave.

<sup>2</sup> Luciano Serrano, ed., *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede durante el pontificado de S. Pio V*, 4 vols., Madrid [but printed in Rome], 1914, I, no. 29, esp. pp. 52-54, letter of Pacheco to Philip II, dated at Rome on 20 December, 1565. When Pius IV, who (as we have observed) had become hostile to Philip II and his Spanish agents, had finally decided in favor of the precedence of France over Spain in matters of ceremonial protocol, Philip had withdrawn his ambassador Don Luis de Requesens from Rome. Philip then asked Requesens for an evaluation of each cardinal's chances of election at the next conclave, which in view of Pius's illnesses might not be very far in the future. From Genoa on 5 January (1565) Requesens sent Philip appraisals of or comments on more than fifty cardinals (J. J. I. von Dollinger, *Beiträge*, I [Regensburg, 1862], no. 181, pp. 571-88, on which cf. *Pastor, Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII [repr. 1958], 12-14).

While observing "que no es Papa el que mas amigos tiene, sino el que menos enemigos" (Döllinger, I, 579), Requesens has some interesting information to impart concerning one cardinal after another—their age, nationality, experience, reputation, political affiliations, wealth or poverty, friends and enemies, attitude toward Spain, etc. He dismisses Pisani, Cesi, Madruzzo, von Truchsess, Fulvio della Corgna, Saraceni, Corni, Salvati, and many others, but has the highest regard for Morone, owing to the latter's strength and experience. Requesens was suspicious of Morone, nevertheless, for he seemed almost inscrutable (*pero contra ello hay que es tenido por hombre muy hondo y doblado y que jamás muestra lo que tiene en el pecho . . .*). His chance of election was certainly diminished by the charge of heresy, because of which some members of the Sacred College remained quite hostile.

Requesens feared Alessandro Farnese, who could hold the Spanish responsible for his father's murder, and who had been well treated by the French (*y a la verdad yo le tengo por peligroso, porque tiene un ingenio inquieto, y de los que aquí llaman ingenios gallardos*). One must beware also of Alessandro's brother Ranuccio (d. 29 October, 1565). The pro-French Ippolito d' Este was much to be feared, *lleno de mal francés en el alma y en el cuerpo* (Döllinger, I, 582). He was rich, and knew how to spend his money, *que gasta la mayor parte de su hacienda en sostener cardenales pobres* [?], *y por esta via tiene prendados y obligados a muchos aun de los que son servidores de vuestra Majestad!* But Requesens was not a prophet, for although he believed the times required a pope like the inquisitor Michele Ghislieri, he did not give the dour theologian much of a chance: *Es teologo y muy buen hombre . . . y a mi juicio es el cardenal que en los tiempos de agora mas convenría que fuese Papa, pero pienso que no tendrá voto para ello, porque le tienen por riguroso, y los otros cardenales quieren que el Papa sea buen compañero . . .!* (*ibid.*, I, 579). Anyhow, if the opportunity presented itself, Requesens thought that Philip should support the candidacies of Giovanni Ricci, Clemente Dolera, and Ghislieri, "although the election of the last I assume to be impossible" (*ibid.*, I, 586). On Requesens' career in Rome, note Isidro Clopas Batlle, *Luis de Requesens, el gran olvidado de Lepanto*, Martorell, 1971, pp. 75 ff.

Carlo Borromeo might have created a pope if he had exercised a strong discipline over the cardinals whom his uncle Pius IV had appointed. There were more than two dozen of them, and Borromeo had a half dozen or so other supporters.<sup>3</sup> When the conclave had reached fifty to fifty-three electors, thirty-four or -five votes constituted a two-thirds majority. On 19 and 20 December, even before the formal closure of the conclave, an effort to elect Morone by "adoration" failed; the Borromeisti had supported the attempt; if Morone and his partisans had worked harder and been more determined, it might have succeeded. But the grand inquisitor Michele Ghislieri and Paul IV's cardinals were unalterably opposed to Pius IV's friend and confidant Morone, although he had steered the Council of Trent to a successful conclusion.

Frenzied maneuvers were carried on during the night of 23 December by Morone's supporters to secure his election. Cardinals unaccompanied by their conclavists were wandering around the electoral halls, *alii sine luminibus nec omnino vestiti*, all engaged in breathless negotiations. The master of ceremonies, Cornelius Firmanus of Macerata, has described the never-to-be-forgotten night and the failure of Morone's last chance to become pope:

But if that night the aforesaid most reverend Morone had been taken into the [Pauline] Chapel, he certainly would have been the pontiff, for his adversaries were terrified. Their faces became as white as linen, and at the beginning they did not know what to do. But when they had had time to arrange for [Morone's] exclusion before the scrutiny could be held—either because such was the will of God, Whose secrets it is not ours to know, or because his hour had still not come—they did indeed manage a complete and safe exclusion. In the morning, moreover, before the day had dawned, the cardinals were all for voting for the pontiff, desiring with all haste to come to the Chapel to finish the business. They belabored me forthwith to ring the bell for mass so that the scrutiny could be held quickly. . . . The mass was said according to custom, and then the scrutiny was

<sup>3</sup> Some two weeks after the close of the conclave Francisco Pacheco wrote Philip II, in a general reappraisal of the election (Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I, no. 42, p. 95, dated 22 January, 1566). "El Cardenal Borromeo entró en el conclave con el mayor sequito de cardenales que nunca tuvo sobrino de papa, porque los presentes, hechos de su tío, pasavamo de XXX." Pius IV had created forty-six or -seven cardinals, of whom forty were still living when the conclave opened—or rather was closed—on 20 December (1565), on which see Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, 111 (1923), 36-42. The nomination of one of Pius IV's appointees, the Venetian Daniele Barbaro, seems never to have been published.

held, in which the aforesaid most reverend Morone received 26 votes and three *accessus*, which the most reverend Sforza, Orsini, and Vercelli gave him.<sup>4</sup>

Twenty-nine votes were not enough. Morone accepted the defeat with dignity and composure. The pro-French Ippolito d' Este, whose campaign for election had "scandalized not only the College but all Rome," did not have a chance. The Spanish ambassador Requesens had returned to Rome after Pius IV's death, arriving on 21 December, the day on which Philip II wrote him that his only wish was for the election of an upright pope who would defend the faith and keep the peace, especially in unhappy, war-torn Italy.<sup>5</sup> But a diplomat could read between the lines of his master's letter, and hear what he did not say. Requesens and his fellow Spaniards moved quietly. They made no attempt to repeat Vargas's extraordinary antics which, considering the close confinement of the conclave, would have been much more difficult. They did not conceal, however, their opposition to d' Este; they could moderate their enthusiasm for Farnese, but would find Ricci, Dolera, and Ghislieri quite acceptable. Borromeo remained opposed to Ricci, and spoke of his failings so openly "that he did him great harm." Nevertheless, Ricci garnered thirty votes, and Pacheco believed that if the election had been delayed for another two days, Ricci would have ascended the throne despite Borromeo.<sup>6</sup> Borromeo also had

nothing in common with Alessandro Farnese, who tried in vain to enlist his support.

On the morning of 4 January (1566) a Spanish courier arrived in Rome, as Requesens wrote Philip II a week later, and "se echó una voz por Roma que vuestra Majestad nombrava solo un subiecto para papa, y que este era el Cardenal Alexandrino:" The rumor spread through the city as well as the conclave that Philip had named his candidate, the cardinal of Alessandria, i.e., Michele Ghislieri. Requesens claimed the rumor was an invention of Ippolito d' Este's henchmen, "y pensaron con ella amotinar todos los cardenales." Their purpose was to vex and upset all the cardinals in order to turn them against Spain. Ghislieri was the inquisitor, and it was said that Philip wanted to establish the Inquisition in all his states. Requesens appeared at the door of the conclave the next day, denouncing the report as malicious and asserting that Philip had named absolutely no one as his choice for election to the Holy See.<sup>7</sup>

In the early morning darkness of 5 January—Cornelius Firmanus says at 5:00 A.M. (*summo mane hora XII<sup>a</sup>*)—there was another rumpus in the sequestered halls in the Vatican Palace. Borromeo and his followers had brought forward the name of the learned Guglielmo Sirleto, who was perhaps the only member of the conclave who did not want to be pope, but Borromeo mismanaged an effort to secure Sirleto's elevation by adoration. Had he alerted Sirleto's friend and admirer Alessandro Sforza, who was indignant at not being informed in advance, and had he enlisted the support of Farnese, who probably realized by now that his hopes were doomed, who knows what might have come of Sirleto's unwilling candidacy? As it was, however, nothing came of it.<sup>8</sup>

The list of possible candidates was becoming shorter and shorter. Boncompagni's absence in Spain had removed a strong contender. Marc' Antonio da Mula and Gian Francesco Commendone, both Venetians, were passed over; Morone had been excluded by a formal scrutiny, and Dolera's candidacy was getting nowhere. Despite Spanish approval and the strong support of Duke Cosimo de' Medici, Ricci was also excluded. There was a strong prejudice against princely candidates.

<sup>4</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 22–23, and append., no. 1, pp. 621–22, which gives the text from the diary of Cornelius Firmanus, who had become master of ceremonies on 22 August, 1565, as noted in the diary (Arm. XII, vol. 31, fol. 1, cited by S. Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II [1911], p. CXII). Cornelius was named bishop of Osimo on 15 January, 1574, and died on 4 July, 1588 (*ibid.*, II, pp. CXII–CXIII). The three additional votes (*accessus*) were tendered by Cardinals Alessandro Sforza di S. Fiora (d. 1581), Flavio Orsini (also d. 1581), and Guido Luca Ferreri (d. 1585). Pacheco also describes the exciting night of 23 December in his letter to Philip II of 22 January (Serrano, I, no. 42, p. 96).

<sup>5</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I, no. 30, pp. 55–59, dated at Madrid on 21 December, 1565: Requesens must know, according to Philip II, "que mi intención en las elecciones pasadas siempre ha sido y agora también lo es que se haga en persona que tenga el zelo que se deve al servicio de Dios nuestro Señor y a mirar por el bien universal de la cristiandad y pacificación della . . . y que así mismo tenga fin a conservar la cristiandad en paz, unión y conformidad, y señaladamente a Italia, que siempre que ay guerra ha sido y es tan afligida, de que nos ha dolido y duele en extremo" (*ibid.*, p. 56). In an audience "a la puerta del conclave" on 23 December Requesens told the cardinals much the same thing, as stated in his long letter to Philip of 30 December, in which he also dilates at length on the current maneuvers in and out of the conclave (*ibid.*, I, no. 31, esp. pp. 62–63, 65–72).

<sup>6</sup> Serrano, I, no. 42, pp. 96–97.

<sup>7</sup> Serrano, I, no. 39, pp. 82–83, letter of Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 11 January, 1566.

<sup>8</sup> Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 29–30, and append., no. 1, pp. 622–23, the text of Firmanus's entry in his diary under 5 January. Sforza was the head of the Florentine party, which had been supporting Ricci, whose chances of election were also fading fast.

Ippolito d' Este had been eliminated, but what of the rich and popular Alessandro Farnese? His friends had mustered twenty-eight to thirty votes. There was a restrained but desperate tone to his pleas for votes, for (as Requesens wrote his king on 3 January) Farnese realized that it was now or never (. . . *tanto mas que si no lo era agora, sabía que no lo sería nunca*).<sup>9</sup>

Paul III Farnese had made Giannangelo de' Medici a cardinal (in 1549), and a decade later Alessandro Farnese had assisted in his election as Pius IV. The families of Borromeo, von Hohenems (Altemps), and Serbelloni owed their fortunes entirely to Pius. Despite the apparent ingratitude, Carlo Borromeo finally made it clear to Alessandro that he was not going to support his candidacy "this time." He urged Alessandro to join him in the election of a worthy pope. Having no alternative, Alessandro proposed four of their confrères—the Theatine Bernardino Scotti, archbishop of Trani;<sup>10</sup> the Minorite Clemente Dolera, known as the cardinal of Araceli; the grand inquisitor Michele Ghislieri, "il Alessandrino;" and Giovanni Ricci of Montepulciano. Borromeo chose Ghislieri. Within two hours they had gathered votes enough to assure his election.

On the afternoon of 7 January (1566), between 2:00 and 3:00 P.M. (*inter horam 21<sup>am</sup> et 22<sup>am</sup>*), according to Cornelius Firmanus, all the cardinals went to Ghislieri's cell [it was no. 52 in the Borgia Tower], "and they led him almost unwillingly and by force to the Pauline Chapel." After some disagreement and confusion as to the best way of achieving their august purpose, they decided "quod publica voce danda essent vota per quemlibet cardinalem, et ita fieri deberet electio." When the clamor had died down, they took their accustomed seats in the Chapel, and old Cardinal Francesco Pisani, dean of the Sacred College, rose and cast the first voice vote. Morone followed him, then Cristoforo Madruzzo; Farnese voted next, and then Tiberio Crispi and all the rest. Once more a pope had been elected without a formal "scrutiny" of written ballots, which was not even

held after the general declaration *publica voce*, although Firmanus thought it should have been done "without prejudice to the election." When the last voice vote had been cast, the cardinals all rose, and approached Ghislieri; the dean Pisani asked him whether he accepted election by the Sacred College. He stood for a brief while without answering; when pressed, he replied simply, "Mi contento su." In recognition of his debt to Borromeo, Ghislieri took the name Pius V. It was an odd choice; he and Pius IV had disliked each other. Ghislieri was a creature of Paul IV, whom he resembled in some ways, and it has often been said that he should have called himself Paul V.<sup>11</sup>

That evening, 7 January, Requesens, Borromeo, and Pacheco all wrote Philip II to inform him of the near miracle of Pius V's election, "a thing which," in Requesens' words,

no one thought would happen, although in my judgment he deserved it more than anyone else in the College—he has been aided and favored by your Majesty's party, but certainly his election is the work of God alone.

When the door of the conclave was opened, Requesens was among the first to enter to kiss the new pope's foot "in the name of your Majesty." Borromeo expressed satisfaction in the election of Ghislieri as "a person of that zeal and piety . . . long known to your Majesty," and Pacheco gave Pius IV's nephews credit for an election which, it was rightly being assumed, would redound to the advantage of Spain: "Cardinals Borromeo and Altemps have made him [pope], though he was harshly dealt with by their uncle—I say it was they who made him, for it lay in their hands to exclude him. . . ." Borromeo had furnished his fellow cardinals with an example to follow in years to come.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Unlike Paul IV, however, Pius V promised not to be a nepotist, as Requesens wrote Philip II on 11 January, 1566 (Serrano, I, no. 39, p. 87): "Dixome también el Papa que estuviese seguro que él no importunaría a vuestra Majestad ni a otro príncipe porque hiziese merced a sus deudos, a los quales avia mandado que no viniesen aquí [i.e., to Rome], y que aunque eran muy pobres, no pensava darles estado ni grandezca ninguna sino hazerles limosna, como a los otros pobres."

<sup>12</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I, nos. 34–36, pp. 77–80, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 39, pp. 84–85. Having dealt at some length with the notable conclaves which elected Julius III and Pius IV, I have reduced to what seems like an appropriate length my account of the shorter and less interesting conclave of Pius V. In this connection, however, it should be observed that the letters of Philip II, Cardinal Francisco Pacheco, and Luis de Requesens, published by Serrano, I, nos. 29–38, 42–43, pp. 51–81, 95–101, are of prime importance.

Note also the excerpts from the Acta Consistorialia given in

<sup>9</sup> Serrano, I, no. 33, p. 75, and note, *ibid.*, no. 32, pp. 72–73, Requesens' letter to Philip II dated 31 December, 1565, and cf. no. 39, p. 83. With the death of his cousin Guido Ascanio Sforza di S. Fiora (on 6 October, 1564) Farnese's ablest opponent had passed from the scene, but shortly before the conclave he had lost a vote and a strong supporter in his brother Ranuccio, who had died on 29 October, 1565 (Benno Hilliger, *Die Wahl Pius' V. zum Papste*, Leipzig, 1891, p. 86).

<sup>10</sup> On the differing views concerning the Theatine Scotti, see Serrano, I, no. 31, pp. 68–69, Requesens' letter to Philip II of 30 December, 1565.

For months before the conclave which elected Pius V, and for years thereafter, the Turks were a fearsome concern to the Curia Romana as well as to the Spanish court. Cardinal Ugo Boncompagni had been sent to Spain by Pius IV on a legation to deal with several problems, three of which were particularly important—the imperial diet summoned to meet at Augsburg in January (1566), Maximilian II's war in Transylvania and the likelihood of a Turkish campaign against him, and the plight of the Knights Hospitallers now almost defenceless in the ruins of their erstwhile fortifications. Mark Sittich von Hohenems (Altemps) had described his papal uncle's alarm in a letter to Boncompagni on 14 November (1565). Pius IV had planned to send to the diet at Augsburg "some personage of greater dignity and condition" than a mere nuncio to see that no action was taken at the diet which might be prejudicial to the faith. Pius had wanted Philip also to send a suitable envoy to the diet as another defender of orthodoxy against the possibility of further religious vagaries in the Empire.

Along with his anxiety about the diet Pius [IV] had been concerned to send Maximilian assistance "accìo possa resistere a la guerra di Turchi." Pius looked to Philip also to help

in accord with his power and greatness, and this not only because of the concern which all the Christian princes have in a war of this kind against an enemy of God and the faith—and one so powerful as this [sultan] is—but also because of the natural obligation which his Catholic Majesty has toward his brother. . . .

The two sovereigns were first cousins. The pope feared that if Maximilian saw himself abandoned by the other princes, he might be induced to make some peace or truce with the Turk "unworthy of the name and dignity of a Christian prince and detrimental to the public good."

Malta was the third item worrying the pope, "perhaps no less important than the two aforesaid," for the Borgo and Fort S. Elmo were in ruins. Unless they were rebuilt and fortified, they would remain a prey to whoever chose to attack them. The Turk would return. The grand master had sent an emissary, one Count Broccardo, to the pope to appeal for aid. From Rome Broccardo would go on to Spain to seek help. Pius [IV] had been so moved by the peril which the Knights were facing that he had resolved to give them twenty-five thousand ducats, and had made a thousand immediately available, to begin the long task of rebuilding. He had also promised the grand master three thousand infantry for the coming summer. Since this was not enough, however, on 12 November (1565) Pius had called together all the ambassadors of the princes and certain cardinal protectors of the Order like Francisco Pacheco and Ippolito d' Este to set forth the grand master's desperate need. The princes should help; they shared the Turkish threat with the Knights. Most of all, Philip II should help. Everyone present praised Pius's response to the Hospitallers' need, and promised to do what he could.<sup>13</sup>

Upon receiving von Hohenems' letter of 14 November, Boncompagni sent the nuncio Gianbattista Castagna, archbishop of Rossano (and later Urban VII), to Philip II in order to take up with him the three issues raised by the pope. Castagna has described his audience with Philip in a letter to von Hohenems dated 18 December, by which time Pius IV was dead. Philip declared that he could not send a Spanish grantee to Augsburg. He would have to give further consideration to whether he would send an envoy to the diet or help the pope attain his objective in some other way. Philip did assure Castagna, however, that he would not fail Maximilian. As for Malta, the se-

Van Gulik, Eubel, and Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia catholica*, III (1923), 42, and see Benno Hilliger, *Die Wahl Pius' V. zum Papste*, Leipzig, 1891, esp. pp. 68 ff. on the cardinals in the conclave, and pp. 107–52 on the conclave itself; Paul Herre, *Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II.*, Leipzig, 1907, repr. Aalen, 1973, pp. 103–28, who depends largely on Hilliger; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVII, 1–45, with append., nos. 1–3, pp. 383–91, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 3–35, with append., nos. 1–3, pp. 621–26, who gives portions of Cornelius Firmanus's diary relating to the conclave.

In his report to the Venetian Senate on 14 June, 1563, Girolamo Soranzo had made some astute observations on the cardinals and the coming conclave (Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV [1857], pp. 96–104), and in the summer of 1565 Giacomo Soranzo also gave the Senate his views concerning the cardinals and the conclave that would follow Pius IV's death (*ibid.*, pp. 133–44).

<sup>13</sup> Serrano, I, no. 18, pp. 28–30, letter of von Hohenems to Boncompagni, dated at Rome on 14 November, 1565. Boncompagni had arrived in Barcelona in October (*ibid.*, no. 17, pp. 25–26), and gone on to Madrid, where he was given a ceremonial reception on 13 November.

There was some disagreement in the Sacred College as to whether the pope should send a legate to the coming diet of Augsburg, but on 23 January, 1566, Pius V appointed Gian Francesco Commendone his legate to the diet (Serrano, I, no. 44, pp. 103–4; I. P. Dengel, *Nuntiatursberichte*, II-5 [1926], no. 11, pp. 36–38 and ff.). Desirous of securing concession of the chalice for the laity and marriage for priests to help solve his political problems, Maximilian II was disappointed in the election of the intractable Pius V. On Fra Broccardo Persico, commendator of Cremona, who was undertaking the mission to Rome and Spain "at his own expense," see Bosto, III (1602), bk. xxxiii, p. 709D.

curity of which was of the highest importance to his several states, Philip expressed his gratitude to Pius [IV] for his aid to the Knights, "dicendo che non lassará di darli aiuto in tutto quello che potrà"—he would not fail them either.<sup>14</sup>

On 28 December the Venetian ambassador was granted a public audience at the door of the conclave. He gave the cardinals such news as he had from the Levant, "certificandoles que vendría este verano la armada del Turco mas poderosa que el pasado." The sultan would send a larger armada than ever into western waters when the summer came. The cardinals must hasten their election of a pope!<sup>15</sup> Everyone was warning everyone of the Turkish menace.

The new pope would have to help meet it. Philip II was preparing for it, as he wrote Requesens on 18 January, for he was ordering the recruitment of eleven or twelve thousand German mercenaries and "a good number of Italians." These troops,

plus the old Spaniards whom we are keeping in our kingdoms [especially Naples and Sicily], we are planning to put in defense of that part of Christendom which, it is believed, our common and everlasting enemy plans to attack, especially Malta. . . .

The resistance of the Knights had angered the sultan, and strengthened his resolve to take the island. Requesens would remind the Sacred College—and the new pope—of Pius IV's promise to aid the grand master and the Knights "with men and money."<sup>16</sup>

Philip II could depend upon the new pope's producing "men and money" against the Turks. Pius V had hardly been elected when Requesens could write Philip that Pius had already made a grant of the "quinqueno," the five years' subsidy to be levied on ecclesiastical revenues in Philip's Spanish realms. On 11 January Requesens wrote Gonzalo Pérez, Philip's secretary, that the previous quinqueno had cost the king at least 15,000 ducats "rent," drawn from vassals in the kingdom of Naples, as well as 12,000 ducats in pensions for the nephews of Pius IV, derived from sources in Spain, besides the money spent in sending ministers to conduct the negotiations that were always required. This time the subsidy had not cost a single maravedí!<sup>17</sup> The quinqueno was intended, at least as far as the Holy See was concerned, to help keep the Spanish fleet in readiness against the Turks. There is constant reference to the menace of the Turks and to Philip II's preparations against them in the detailed dispatches of Raymond de Rouer, sieur de Fourquevaux, whom Catherine de' Medici had recently sent as the French ambassador to Philip's court. Fourquevaux was much interested in the then current discussions of a league of the Empire, Spain, and France against the Turks, "les trois principales couronnes de Chrestienté," but France was in serious trouble, and was, as usual, at peace with the Porte.<sup>18</sup>

courroux que son armée soit esté repoulcée de Malte" (*ibid.*, no. 4, pp. 6-7, letter dated at Madrid on 3 November, 1565).

In a letter of 16 January (1566) Philip II instructed Thomas Perrenot de Chantonnay, his ambassador in Vienna, to inform the Emperor Maximilian that he was going to send 1,000 Spaniards, "soldados viejos," 2,000 Germans, and 3,000 Italians to Malta (*Documentos inéditos*, CI [Madrid, 1891, repr. Vaduz, 1966], 119). Philip planned to send larger forces to La Goletta, "visto que la fortificación que de nuevo habemos mandado hacer, no está aún para se poder defender" (*ibid.*, p. 120). Chantonnay was the brother of Antoine Perrenot, Cardinal Granvelle. He had been Philip's ambassador to the French court, but was transferred to Vienna in 1563, for which Granvelle thanked Philip in a letter of 10 December of that year (L. P. Gachard, ed., *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, 5 vols., Brussels, 1848-79, I, nos. 80, 174, pp. 211, 274, and cf. no. 200, p. 291, et alibi).

<sup>17</sup> Serrano, I, no. 40, p. 90, and note no. 62, pp. 152-54; Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II (1966), 332; Modesto Ulloa, *La Hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II*, Madrid, 1977, p. 607-8. As the French ambassador in Madrid observed more than once, Philip II's hundred galleys were endlessly expensive to maintain (cf. Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 9, p. 19).

<sup>18</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, nos. 2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 17, pp. 3, 7-9, 11-13, 20-21, 24, 26, 31, 39, 41, 42-43, 47-48, 49-50, docs. dated from 20 October, 1565, to 4 February, 1566.

<sup>14</sup> Serrano, I, no. 26, pp. 45-46, letter dated at Madrid on 18 December, 1565. As one waited for an available courier, there was often a delay in the dispatch of letters. The news of Pius IV's death reached Madrid on 27 December, and Castagna's letter of the eighteenth was never sent. Cardinal Boncompagni hastened from Madrid to Barcelona to board a frigate for Rome, as Raymond de Rouer, seigneur de Fourquevaux, the French ambassador to the Spanish court, wrote Catherine de' Medici on 17 January, 1566: "Il s'en va en grande, ains certaine espérance d'estre Pape, et avoit telle haste de sortir de Madrid qu'il ne tint compte prendre congé de la Roynel" (M. l'Abbé Céléstin Douais, ed., *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux, ambassadeur du roi Charles IX en Espagne, 1565-1572*, 3 vols., Paris, 1896-1904, I, no. 15, p. 46). Boncompagni did, however, take formal leave of the king (*ibid.*, I, no. 11, pp. 36-37).

<sup>15</sup> Serrano, I, no. 31, p. 67.

<sup>16</sup> Serrano, I, no. 41, p. 94. On 6 January, 1566, M. de Fourquevaux wrote Charles IX that Philip II was planning to send 3,000 Germans and 5,000 Spanish and Italians to Malta "se loger et fortifier sur ung lieu éminent qu'il y a sur la montagne de Saint Elme" (Douais, *Dépêches*, . . . I, no. 13, pp. 42-43). As for the anger of the sultan over the failure of his forces at Malta, Fourquevaux informed Catherine de' Medici that "l'on craignit icy bien fort que le Turc fera, l'an prochain, ung merveilleux effort par mer et par terre, s'il ne meurt de

Despite the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis and the marriage of Charles IX's sister Elizabeth to Philip II, there was little harmony between France and Spain. The French had been trying to set themselves up in Florida, where two groups of Huguenots had gone to establish colonies (1562–1565), but the Spanish commander Don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés had destroyed their one remaining garrison at Fort Caroline (on 21 September, 1565), killing the French captain Jean Ribault and massacring several hundred of his compatriots when their vessels were wrecked in a storm. M. de Fourquevaux seethed with indignation as the facts became known. In the court at Madrid there was more rejoicing over the butchery of the poor French, some of whom had been "sans armes et mourantz de fain," than if the Spanish had won a victory over the Turk, for they were frank to say that Florida meant more to them than the island of Malta. In Fourquevaux's opinion Pedro Menéndez was more of an executioner than a true soldier. The Turks had displayed no such inhumanity when they had taken Castelnuovo [on 7 August, 1539] and Jerba [in 1560], and barbarians though they were, they had never been guilty of such cruelty.<sup>19</sup>

The Spanish justified the massacre of the French in Florida because the latter were all Huguenots. But there were many Huguenots in France, and although the French court seems to have been somewhat less moved by Pedro Menéndez's bloodshed than Fourquevaux was, there were few persons of authority in Paris who would go far out of their way to help remove the Turkish menace from Philip II's Mediterranean states. The Spanish, however, were looking for an ally. They had one in Pius V, but the Holy See possessed few galleys. In a letter of 22 February (1566)—one of the letters in which Fourquevaux inveighed against the Spanish butchery in Florida—Philip II was said to be turning to Venice.

The French ambassador had just been informed

that Philip II was now trying to induce the Signoria to join him in a league against the Turks. He was alleged to be offering the Venetians "quatre villes en Itallie," although Fourquevaux did not know whether these towns were in Lombardy or in Apulia. Be that as it might, Antonio Tiepolo, the Venetian ambassador resident at the Spanish court, had always assured Fourquevaux that the Signoria would never break with the Turks. "They are very disturbed here [in Madrid]," Fourquevaux adds,

by the seizure of Porto Vecchio in Corsica, which was effected by colonel Sampietro [Corso], who was aided by six Turkish gallies, and they are much afraid that the whole Turkish armada may come to the said island after having struck again at Malta.<sup>20</sup>

Sampietro Corso, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, was a Genoese rebel, a protégé of the French, a good friend of the Turks, and an enemy of the Spanish, the virtual masters of Genoa.

In France Protestantism had reached a peak of power in 1566. Catherine de' Medici's devious policies had produced widespread distrust and suspicion, as the Guises stood in opposition to the Montmorencys, the Châtillons, and the Rohans. The Huguenot preachers were active in Flanders, adding political unrest to doctrinal deviation. Protestant dissidents from the Netherlands found hideaways in France, where news of the Spanish massacre of the Huguenots in Florida added fuel to religious flame. If Catherine was a trickster, so was Philip II, who conspired with his cousin Maximilian to help effect the imperial recovery of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, a shady business in which Charles de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, played a treasonous role.

The siege of Malta had diverted Philip's attention from the Protestants in the Netherlands—once more the Turks had aided Protestantism—but he would soon turn to their suppression and the obliteration of heresy. If the leaders of the various French factions, except perhaps for the Guises, would not assist Philip to protect his domains against the Turks, the French were sympathetic to the Hospitallers, whose heroic defense of their island stronghold had won the admiration of Protestants as well as Catholics throughout Europe.

According to a dispatch dated 29 January (1566) of D' Oysel de Villeparisis, the French ambassador in Rome, the new pope Pius V and the

<sup>19</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, nos. 19, 21–26, 28–29, 43, 56, et alibi, pp. 52 ff.: ". . . Et ceste court s' en est plus resjoye que si ce fut pour une victoire obtenue contre le Turc. Car aussi ont ilz dict et dient que la Floride leur importe trop plus que Malte" (p. 56): "Lesquels Espaignolz ont monstré leur pousse sur gens désarmez, mortz à demy de fain, renduz et requerantz qu' on les print à mercy. Laquelle inhumanité ne fut pas usée par les Turcs aux vieux soldatz qu' ilz prindrent à Castelnuovo et aux Gerbes, ne jamaïs barbares usèrent de telle cruauté" (p. 61). The letters referred to are dated at Madrid from 11 February to 9 April, 1566; they are addressed to Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici. Cf. Jas. W. Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France*, Chicago, 1909, pp. 299–300.

<sup>20</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 23, pp. 61–62, letter of 22 February, 1566, to Charles IX.

Curia had been duly informed of the liberality of the French crown, which had allegedly given the Hospitallers 140,000 *livres*, "chose qui a esté grandement louée et estimée de tout le monde." Philip II was said to be prepared to send 6,000 men to Malta under the command of Ascanio della Corgna, and he had given the Knights 50,000 *écus*' worth of supplies and munitions. In Rome one was well aware that Sultan Suleiman was making "grandz préparatifz par mer et par terre." His recruitment of land forces was, it was believed, the beginning of a campaign against Hungary. His naval preparations might well be against Malta, however, and the pope had urged D' Oysel de Villeparisis to plead the Hospitallers' cause with Charles IX, "telling me that if they are hurt today, you could feel it tomorrow."

D' Oysel de Villeparisis informed Catherine de' Medici in a letter of 18 February (1566) of Philip II's proposed levy of 10,000 Landsknechte as well as "another commission of 8,000 Italians under four colonels." Some of these troops would be sent, along with Spaniards, to Malta, La Goletta, and Sicily, but such were the reports of Turkish preparations that D' Oysel de Villeparisis thought the fate of Malta might be hanging in the balance. In his opinion the Hospitallers, standing in the devastation of their fortresses, might well not be able to maintain themselves, "unless they receive much assistance, and that in time."<sup>21</sup>

In March (1566) the French ambassador in Rome was sending Charles IX gloomy assessments of the Hospitallers' chances of holding out on Malta, for the grand master had written his envoy to the pope, Count Broccardo, that it looked as though he would be forced to retire to Sicily, "seeing that the aid, victuals, and ammunition, which have been promised him, are not coming in time, and that his fortresses are in terrible shape." Philip II's assurance of six thousand men had now been reduced to three. If Malta had to be abandoned, it would not be the grand master's fault. In D' Oysel de Villeparisis's opinion leaving soldiers "en deux places assez mauvaises," presumably S. Elmo and the Borgo, was like abandoning them to be devoured by the wolves. It was to invite disaster, for "it is to be feared that the

enemy is much stronger than we by sea, his galleys and galliots better equipped than ours, and his crews quite superior. . . ." The Emperor Maximilian was alarmed at the prospect of the Turkish invasion of Hungary, and had appealed to Pius V for the aid which his predecessor had promised, "which was 200,000 *écus*, of which at his death he had already paid 50,000." Maximilian now wanted the remainder, "à quoy sa Sainteté monstre en termes généraux d' estre assez bien inclinée."<sup>22</sup>

A month or so later (on 29 April, 1566) D' Oysel de Villeparisis wrote Charles IX from Rome that Jean de la Valette, "le grand maistre de la Religion de Malthe," appeared to have changed his mind about withdrawing to Sicily. Work was proceeding with all diligence on the fortifications. To please the Spanish and to keep Don García de Toledo quiet, the Hospitallers had passed a decree to the effect that every year the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September) or the eve thereof (the seventh)—the date of the Spanish landing in force on Malta—should be commemorated as a "solemnity" in memory of the relief force sent by Philip II and led by Don García. As for the three thousand men whom Pius V had promised for the current year, the captains were all ready, awaiting the papal command. Pius, however, had not yet ordered the recruitment of the troops for Malta. He wanted to be sure of what Philip II was going to do, and to see that the Spanish forces were actually on the way. If the Turkish armada should come as quickly as some newsmongers would have it, it would find Malta virtually without defense. In Rome there were reports of bonfires of rejoicing over "la defaite de noz gens à la Floride," and the Spanish were still fussing over the problem of ceremonial precedence at the Curia.

According to the last reports from the Levant, the sultan seemed in no hurry to send the Turkish armada westward, at least not for an attack upon Malta. In fact the papal levy of three thousand troops for the defense of Malta had clearly "all gone up in smoke." Now Hungary was the main concern, and Pius V had promised to hire four thousand men for as long as Maximilian's war with the Turks might last. The estimated cost was sixteen thousand *écus* a month, which would amount to some fifty thousand *écus* by August. Before the latter sum had been spent, however, Pius would give orders for the provision of further funds. In the meantime, for better or worse, adventurous

<sup>21</sup> D' Oysel de Villeparisis's dispatches are given by Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 808, notes. Later on, in a report of 10 March, 1566, he writes that despite the news of Turkish preparations, "on ne voit rien trop eschauffé du costé d' Espagne," but Pius V would see that the aid which he had promised the Knights would be ready when they wanted it.

<sup>22</sup> Charrière, II, 808-9, notes.

young Frenchmen were streaming into Italy on their way to Malta, which might be as good for the reputation of France in Europe as it was likely to be damaging to French commerce in the Levant.<sup>23</sup>

Although it had become ever clearer as the weeks passed that the next great Turkish offensive would be into southern Transylvania and Hungary, the Turkish armada might still come westward to launch an attack on Malta or (with Sampietro Corso's co-operation) to assail the Genoese on Corsica. We have dealt in the preceding chapter with Suleiman's venture into Hungary, his thirteenth and last campaign, in the course of which he died at the siege of Sziget (Szigetvár) during the night of 5–6 September, 1566. While the fateful siege was under way, M. de Fourquevaux addressed a letter to Charles IX from Segovia (on 18 August): His Majesty should be pleased with the Grand Seigneur's determined "entreprise" into Hungary, for if there were peace on the eastern front, the German rabble [of mercenaries] would be returning to France, "ayant aprins les voyes et sentiers d' icelluy et gousté la friandize des despoilles de voz subjectz," picking up choice pieces of plunder at the expense of Charles's harassed subjects.<sup>24</sup>

Five days later Fourquevaux took pen in hand again,

Sire, I have learned nothing new since my last letter of Monday, the eighteenth of this month, except that I have been told on good authority, as a great secret, that the Emperor [Maximilian] has promised the Catholic King [Philip] upon his return from Hungary to wage as heavy warfare against the Lutherans as he can. Since this cannot be understood as against the Germans, for he would not even dare to have thought of that, it must needs be against the Netherlands or against others nearby

—namely, the Huguenots in France.<sup>25</sup>

One cannot believe everything the ambassadors write to their sovereigns. They often report rumors, and are wrong. But the ambassadors were not stupid; even a mistaken rumor might have a certain validity. It was clear that not only were the French caught in the middle between Spain and the Porte as far as their Mediterranean trade was concerned, but they were also caught midway between Philip and Maximilian as far as Metz, Toul,

and Verdun were concerned. Philip had less to fear from a Franco-Turkish entente than his father Charles V had had, for France was falling into chaos, and now there was less entente left between France and the Porte.

If by this time Philip II had little to fear from the French, nothing was more obvious than his uneasiness over the Turks. He was, of course, not alone. The apprehension would last until after Lepanto. It assailed the Vatican as well as the ducal palace in Venice. Most of all perhaps, it invaded the Spanish kingdoms of Sicily and Naples. When Antonio Tiepolo, the Venetian ambassador to Philip's court, returned home, and in August, 1567, gave his report to the doge and Senate, he dwelt on the reasons for this fear. The island of Sicily provided Philip with an annual revenue of 600,000 ducats, but this was not enough to cover the costs of 3,000 Spanish troops, the garrisons of the fortresses, twelve galleys, and the defense of La Goletta, not to speak of payments to the viceroy and the officials on the island. Every year Philip had to find an additional two to three hundred thousand ducats to meet these expenses.

The chief advantage of Sicily was the grain which the island produced. Once the granary of Rome, it now kept Genoa and various places in Spain well supplied. King Philip made a good deal of money from the grain trade, over which he kept control. If this worked to the disadvantage of the merchants, it also caused a loss to the people, who had to lower the price of grain in order to sell it. The islanders had also to bear "many other new burdens." Due consideration was not given to their traditional privileges, "which are of the same nature as those of Aragon, of which kingdom the island is a dependency." The Sicilians were

all so disaffected and desperate, nobles as well as commoners, that if they were not held in check by force, every place being full of Spaniards, and if they had a powerful prince to whom they might turn for support, one would certainly see some important changes!

Furthermore, Sicily was hardly safe from external attack. Syracuse and Trapani, to be sure, one with a large harbor, the other with a beautiful beach, were so strong that it would require considerable force and a good deal of time to take them. On the other hand, Augusta had a fine harbor; Catania, an excellent beach; and Faro di Messina, also a good harbor; but these places were without a fortress. Military experts who knew them thought they could easily be captured. If the sultan's armada should attack the east coast of

<sup>23</sup> Charrière, II, 810–11, notes.

<sup>24</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 44, p. 109.

<sup>25</sup> *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 46, p. 114, letter dated 18 August, 1566.



Sicily, the Turks would find the harbors and the undefended beaches highly convenient,

nor would it be difficult to take possession of Messina, the chief city on the island, which lies beneath the hills in such fashion that the whole city to the very base of its walls could be battered by artillery. With Messina lost, or Catania fortified by the enemy, which could be done in short order, the rest of the island would be in a bad way!<sup>26</sup>

Tiepolo went on to note that La Goletta, Oran, and Peñón de Vélez, "tre luoghi in Barberia," were an expense to Philip II, but his possession of these places was of the greatest advantage to Italy as well as to Spain. Otherwise they would have become pirates' nests but, as it was, Philip could land as many men and supplies as he chose "per far maggior progresso in quelle parti." From Peñón, that is, he could land troops on the Moroccan coast as well as protect shipping in the far-western Mediterranean. Oran was an entrance into western Algeria if Philip chose to move into "those parts," while at La Goletta he had a foothold in the Gulf of Tunis. Tiepolo saw no point in discussing Sardinia. It was almost deserted, more of a financial burden than a benefit. The same could be said of the islands of Majorca, Minorca, and Ibiza (Mallorca, Menorca, and Ibiza), "le quali pure sono cosa che non merita particolare discorso."

Considering Philip II's access to the gold, silver, pearls, "and diverse other goods" in the New World, as well as the vast revenues he derived from the Spanish kingdoms, why did he maintain only sixty-five armed galleys of his own? As everyone knew, Philip rented galleys as he needed them (and as we have seen in connection with the sieges of Jerba and Malta). Very well, "I shall tell you what I have heard said by persons of repute at that court," where Tiepolo had spent thirty-one months: Philip thought that it was unnecessary to maintain more than sixty-five galleys, and it could well be to his disadvantage to do so. He could hardly hope to rival the "greatness of the Turk's armada." The sultan could always surpass him. Experience had shown, for example, that when Charles V had had sixty galleys, Sultan Suleiman had produced a hundred. Now that Philip himself

could muster a hundred galleys, Suleiman's armada had risen to two hundred. Why encourage the sultan to increase his naval strength and add to his power to strike at Philip's maritime possessions?

There was, to be sure, another reason for limiting the number of Spanish galleys. All the oarsmen on Philip's galleys were slaves and convicts, of whom there could never be enough to man any large number of galleys. It would not be possible quickly to put on the benches free men such as Venice employed to row the galleys, for the Spanish were not accustomed to such service. Besides, everyone was aware of the ill treatment of the *galeotti* aboard the Spanish galleys, where they died of every sort of affliction. Whatever the period for which one might be condemned to the Spanish galleys, even if for only a year, he never had the slightest hope of being set free, especially if he had proved a strong oarsman. Such was the Spaniards' fear of the oar that no amount of gold would suffice to recruit free men for the benches.<sup>27</sup> Everyone in the Senate, however, who heard or read Tiepolo's discourse knew full well that the Republic was also having no end of trouble to find able-bodied oarsmen, and that convicts (*condannati*) filled the benches of many a Venetian galley.

For generations the Turks as well as the corsairs had caused a grave disquiet along the coasts of southern Europe. With reason or without, the sultan might break with the Venetians, disrupting their eastern trade, cutting their lines of communication with Crete and Cyprus, and halting their importation of grain from the area of the Black Sea. If war broke out, the Venetian baillie in Istanbul was in a painful predicament. Even in times of peace he had an unenviable position, which many of those elected to the post had tried to avoid, often paying a heavy penalty for their declination. Any westward movement of the sultan's armada might, whether by Turkish design or Venetian accident, result in a hostile encounter. From Jerba to Malta the Turco-Spanish war had increased tension throughout the Mediterranean. The Venetians were gravely concerned about Corfu, Crete, and Cyprus, and their merchants on the Golden Horn now went about their business on tenterhooks.

Vittore Bragadin was still serving as baillie in Istanbul. After the lapse of months, however, following Agostino Barbarigo's escape from the unwanted office, Giacomo Soranzo finally accepted

<sup>26</sup> Tiepolo, "Relazione di Spagna [1567]," in Eugenio Albreri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. I, vol. V (1861), 136-37: "... il rimanente dell' isola non avrebbe riparo." The Turks had already burned Augusta to the ground in mid-July, 1551, on which see above, Volume III, Chapter 13, pp. 539a, 554a.

<sup>27</sup> Tiepolo, *Relazione di Spagna*, *ibid.*, pp. 137, 140-41.

the charge at the beginning of November, 1565. But he had no intention of traveling overland, which was always beset with perils. Pleading illness and the inability to ride horseback, he requested transportation to and from Istanbul by galleys. The Senate granted the concession by a large vote. Three galleys would convey him to the Dardanelles. One of them only would enter the Sea of Marmara, and take him to Istanbul. The other two would remain at the entrance to the Dardanelles until the first galley had rejoined them, "in accord with what has usually been done when our bailies go to Constantinople with galleys. . . ."<sup>28</sup>

After seventeen months as bailie, Giacomo Soranzo wanted to return home, pleading ill health ". . . per causa delli molti et continui viaggi suoi, et specialmente dopo che s' attrova in quel baylaggio." The motion for his relief from the post was put before the Senate on 28 July, 1567, so that he should no longer remain on the Bosphorus "in peril of his life," for by the time his successor could arrive at the Porte, the statutory term of two full years would certainly have been reached. Despite Soranzo's years of service to the state, however, before his unpleasant sojourn as bailie in Istanbul, the Senate did not allow him to cut short his tenure of office, rejecting his petition in two separate votes (140–29–2 and 130–43–1).<sup>29</sup>

It was only on 10 January, 1568, that the Senate voted to authorize the election of a successor to Soranzo, and thus to allow his return to Venice.<sup>30</sup> Alvise Grimani was then designated bailie to the Porte, after the usual delays,<sup>31</sup> but his election raised procedural and constitutional problems. Marc' Antonio Barbaro was next chosen for the post, and on 19 May (1568) Soranzo was informed that Barbaro would be leaving for Istanbul about the end of July,<sup>32</sup> which assurance proved to be a trifle optimistic.<sup>33</sup> Barbaro's commission is dated

12 August (1568),<sup>34</sup> after which (like all elected bailies) he would delay his departure as long as possible. In time, of course, Barbaro would seek "con instantia" to persuade the Senate to look to the election of his successor.<sup>35</sup> This he did at the beginning of the year 1570, a good time for any Venetian to leave Istanbul.

The life of many a diplomat living far from home has been as troubled by personal worries as by cares of state. Early in February, 1566, the Venetian Senate considered Vittore Bragadin's problem. He had sent the Signoria letters describing the causes of his distress. Shortages of goods and the progressive inflation in Istanbul had raised prices sky-high. Bragadin had been hard-pressed "per la grandissima carestia di tutte le cose necessarie all' uso humano." The cost of wine was not the least of his concerns "owing to the strict prohibition which has been put into effect over there by order of the most serene Signore." Bragadin was spending more than half his entire allowance on wine alone. There were those who thought that he should not have to put up with such financial hardship, for (like so many bailies in Istanbul) he was suffering from a "serious infirmity."

What was more to the point, perhaps, was the fact that Bragadin had but slender resources, and he had to provide for six children, two sons and four daughters. He had served the state well as bailie, and it was suggested that the Signoria should show some measure of gratitude to a faithful servitor of the Republic. Earlier in the day a motion had been approved in the Collegio (by a vote of 20–3–0) to make Bragadin a present of one thousand ducats

at the rate of six lire and four soldi to the ducat, so that being made aware of our sympathy and generosity he should have the means of maintaining himself for the rest of the time he has to stay in the office of bailie without such great concern and loss to his poor family.

The motion of the Collegio, however, apparently failed of passage in two successive votes when

<sup>28</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fol. 70<sup>r</sup> [101<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 5 November, 1565, the vote allowing concession of the galleys being +160–5–5, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fols. 120<sup>r</sup>–121<sup>r</sup> [151<sup>r</sup>–152<sup>r</sup>], 125<sup>r</sup> [156<sup>r</sup>], 127<sup>r</sup> [158<sup>r</sup>], 134<sup>r</sup> [165<sup>r</sup>], and 170<sup>r</sup> [201<sup>r</sup>]. A letter in the Venetian Documenti turchi, dated 23 November, 1566, records Soranzo's payment of 500 ducats to the Porte "per conto della pensione dell' isola del Zante." On 22 July, 1567, he paid the 8,000 ducats "pension" for Cyprus. There are various other documents relating to Soranzo in this collection, including further such payments.

<sup>29</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 36 [62], doc. dated 28 July, 1567.  
<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 38, fol. 66<sup>r</sup> [92<sup>r</sup>], the vote being +168–0–1, doc. dated 10 January, 1568 (Ven. style 1567).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 38, fols. 86<sup>r</sup>–87<sup>r</sup> [112<sup>r</sup>–113<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 3 April, 1568.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 38, fol. 98<sup>r</sup> [124<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 38, fols. 116<sup>r</sup>–117<sup>r</sup> [142<sup>r</sup>–143<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>34</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, 5 unnumbered fols., *ad finem*, which register contains numerous letters to both Soranzo and Barbaro.

<sup>35</sup> The Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Regs. II–IV, which cover the 1560's and 1570's, are fat tomes with (unfortunately) unnumbered folios, making citation by date alone necessary. In each of these registers the earliest documents come at the end, the latest at the beginning, of the bound volume.

<sup>36</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 86 [131], doc. dated 21 January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569).

brought before the Senate<sup>36</sup> where money was more likely to be allotted to gifts for Turkish admirals and pashas than to rewards for the performance of one's duty to the state.

There was some point to the policy of the Venetian Senate in its expenditure of limited funds. If the Genoese on Chios, the mahonesi, had lavished presents on Mehmed Sokolli Pasha, the grand vizir, they might have held their island for another decade or so. Sooner or later, however, the Turks would doubtless have ousted them. In any event four years before the Venetians had to face the Turks on Cyprus, Piali Pasha received orders to land troops on Chios. By this time (1566) the Genoese dominion over the island had lasted exactly 220 years, ever since the admiral Simone Vignoso had taken possession of Chios in the eventful summer of 1346.<sup>37</sup> Conditions on Chios had been unstable from the early years of the occupation, and after the fall of Constantinople to Mehmed II the Genoese future on the island was always uncertain.

After nine or ten generations of Genoese governance, such as it was, Chios had fallen (by the 1550's and '60's) to a low level of unease and discontent. Lawlessness had overtaken the island as the inevitable consequence of the clashes, feuds, and rivalries of the podestà, the bishops, and the mahonesi. The government of the island was more or less in the hands of the mahonesi, who were conducting the affairs and collecting the revenues of Chios until the Signoria could pay off the Republic's debt to the mahona or joint-stock company of the shareholders whose forebears had financed Vignoso's seizure of the island from the Greeks.<sup>38</sup> Conditions were especially bad for the fourteen years preceding the Turkish takeover of the island.

The Genoese government had long maintained a proud but restrained interest in Chios, knowing full well that if the Turks should move against the island, there would be nothing the Signoria could possibly do. The Turks had been content with a tribute of some 10-12,000 ducats a year at no cost or trouble to themselves. The island's economy was run-down. Every year the mahonesi had a desperate struggle to raise the tribute. Anyhow

there would be a limit to Turkish tolerance. In Chios there was always a problem. After the ousting in 1552-1553 of the Genoese podestà Franco Sauli, whom the Turks objected to as a "foreigner" (*forestiero*), the doge and governors of the Republic had sent two commissioners (*commissarii*), Giovanbattista Gentile and Baldassare Giustiniani, to represent the Signoria until another podestà could be named.

The two commissioners were soon at hopeless odds with the local inquisitor as well as with the mahonesi. Paul IV was angered by the steps taken against the inquisitor "to the great prejudice of the holy, orthodox, and catholic Church," which (he said) could well bring about "la total rovina di quella isola."<sup>39</sup> Trouble was the Chian order of the day, and when a new podestà, Giovanbattista Giustiniani, was formally appointed (about the beginning of the year 1558), contention increased. We must pass over the details, which are not entirely clear. Things did begin to look better, however, after the appointment early in 1562 of another podestà, Vincenzo Giustiniani, but the odd interlude of peace and quiet did not last long.

Vincenzo's cousin, Timoteo Giustiniani, was named bishop of Chios (on 14 April, 1564), but instead of the relationship leading to increased harmony, the usual strife received an added impetus. Now, as often in the past, contention was renewed between podestà and bishop, between lay and ecclesiastical courts, and between the adherents of civil governance (finally called the *pretoriani*) and the advocates of ecclesiastical authority (*vescovani*).<sup>40</sup>

The ties between the home government and the mahonesi had been loosened during the long years in which the latter had secured exemptions, privileges, and positions (in the mahona) for themselves and their families. Until the Republic paid off the debt of more than two centuries, which from the early years of Turkish hegemony in the Aegean it had no intention of doing, there were limits to the extent the Signoria could interfere in Chian affairs. During the four years that Vincenzo Giustiniani served as podestà on the island he apparently never received an official reply to any of the dispatches and appeals he sent to the

<sup>36</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 37, fol. 126 [157], doc. dated 5 February, 1566 (Ven. style 1565), the votes in the Senate being 149-53-9 and 136-60-10, but without the upright crosses indicating the passage of a motion.

<sup>37</sup> See Volume 1, pp. 206-7.

<sup>38</sup> On the mahona and the mahonesi of Chios, see Volume II, pp. 143-46 and esp. pp. 322-24.

<sup>39</sup> Philip P. Argenti, *Chios Vincta*, Cambridge University Press, 1941, doc. no. 27, pp. 69-70.

<sup>40</sup> Argenti, *Chios Vincta* (1941), pp. LXIX-XCII and docs. 21-45, pp. 51-108, dated from 24 March, 1552, to 2 March, 1566; *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese . . .*, I (1958), 353-67. The history of the mahona is full of "Giustiniani," for all shareholders added the name to their own surname.

Genoese government. While the idea of "empire" (*imperio*) was still attractive to the governors of the Republic, they were not going to involve themselves in any expense or inconvenience to exercise such authority as they were supposed to have on the island. Why bother? Complaints and quarrels were without end on Chios. The Turks might step in at any time, and Genoa obviously lacked the men and money to defend so distant and divided a land against the all-powerful Porte.

The grand vizir, Mehmed Sokolli, is said by a contemporary source to have been hostile to the Chians, even requiring them on one occasion twice to pay three years' arrears of their tribute (*il compimento di tre carachii*), because he had ordered the treasurer at the Porte to withhold their receipt for payment: "Fu fatto il pagamento senza tal ricevuta, la quale non potendo mostrare a sua Altezza [i.e., to Mehmed himself], benchè li dicessero haver compito, fu bisogno pagare un' altra volta!"<sup>41</sup> It is not impossible. Sokolli had various reasons for annoyance with the Chians, not the least of which was his notorious dislike of the Hapsburgs, those in Spain as well as those in Austria. From the summer of 1528, when Andrea Doria had entered the service of Charles V—and had thrown in his lot with Spain—Genoa had become in effect a dependency of the Hapsburgs.

The French had been expelled from Genoa in September, 1528. The government was reformed, and the trappings of a patrician republicanism were restored, but Andrea Doria, then the prince of Melfi, remained the dominant figure in the city-state. In the 1560's the Genoese, who felt the pressure of French enmity, were the loyal clients of Philip II, to whose fleet Giannandrea Doria had added his own galleys both at Jerba and at Malta. Despite the direct intervention of the Porte in Chian affairs (in 1534 and 1552) the mahonesi quite properly regarded their island as being under Genoese sovereignty. The Turks looked upon the Chians, who paid them tribute, as subjects of the Porte.

In the mid-Aegean, just off the Anatolian coast, Chios was strategically located to keep watch on the comings and goings of Turkish galleys, which often put into port on the island. Like the Venetians in Crete and Cyprus, who were always sending reports to the doge and Senate, the mahonesi of Chios undoubtedly and inevitably supplied in-

formation to the Genoese government, which passed it on to Philip II's court and to his viceroys in Naples and Sicily. Chios was also a refuge for Christian slaves who had managed to escape from their Turkish masters. Sometimes as many as five hundred Christians a year regained their freedom via Chios, where there was a "slaves' office," to the indignation of the Turkish owners, who carried their complaints to the Porte.<sup>42</sup>

According to an *avviso* or newsletter from Augsburg (dated 4 May, 1566), which had had its origin in the Fugger news agency in Venice, the mahonesi of Chios had fallen three years in arrears in the payment of their tribute (or *kharā*) to the Porte.<sup>43</sup> Under orders from the sultan to investigate the mahonesi's failure to pay the *kharā*, Piali Pasha had sailed from Istanbul in early April, 1566, with an armada of perhaps some 80 galleys with 3,000 janissaries and 4,000 sipahis aboard. On Saturday, 13 April, he anchored his galleys off the Anatolian coast between the Turkish villages of Karaburun and Chesme (Çeşme), just opposite the entrance to the port of Chios on the eastern side of the island. With excessive courtesy he declined to enter the harbor lest he disturb the Christians' religious services on Easter Sunday, the fourteenth. A Turkish armada paid at least one official visit to Chios each year, and Turkish galleys often stopped along the way. Such visits always caused some uneasiness on the island, but there was apparently something about Piali's correctness and consideration which increased the islanders' apprehension.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, doc. 48, p. 124: The Turks had cause for annoyance, "perchè a Scio [Chios] era l' ufficio de' schiavi, de' quali ogni anno ne fuggivano, quando più e quando meno, et talvolta cinque cento l' anno, di modo che l' ufficio li metteva in recato, et benchè alle volte li loro patroni sapessero che li lor schiavi fussino a Scio, niente di manco non li potevano far altro, per il che ricorrevano alla Porta, querelandosi contra li signori di Scio. . . ."

On Mehmed Sokolli's ill will toward the mahonesi, cf. Giacomo Bosio, *Dell' Istoria della sacra religione et illustrissima militia di San Giovanni Gerosolimitano*, 3 vols., 1594-1602, III, bk. XXXVI, pp. 756-57, who maintains that Sokolli induced Suleiman to take Chios (and put all the mahonesi to the sword, which was not in fact to be done) "per haver introdotto nella Città di Scio presidio del Rè di Spagna, per haver dati avvisi e soccorsi a Malta, e perchè facevano fuggire e rubbavano tutti gli schiavi Christiani a' Turchi."

<sup>43</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vincita*, pp. XCIV-XCV, and no. 49, p. 129, who thinks the newsletter came from Aosta, although it is clearly labeled "d' Augusta." On the Fugger news letters from Venice and Augsburg, cf. above Chapter 17, note 88. According to the order given Piali Pasha by Sultan Suleiman on 7 Ramadan, A. H. 973 (28 March, 1566) to look into the reasons for the mahonesi's failure to pay, the arrears amounted to 30,000 ducats (*ibid.*, no. 75, pp. 186-87).

<sup>41</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vincita*, p. XCIV, and doc. 48, p. 124, an anonymous letter (written after March, 1567), apparently from a mahonesi to a member of the Genoese government.

After two formal invitations to put into the harbor and come ashore, Piali Pasha said that, when Sunday was over, he would of course come, "and that he intended to stay three or four days to relax in the gardens" (*et ch' el voleva stare tre o quatro giorni per solazzar alli giardini*). On Monday morning, 15 April, the entire armada entered the harbor with salvos of guns and greeting, "con la solita gazara," and the Chians fired three rounds of artillery in welcome. Two of the *signori mahonesi* went aboard Piali's flagship to learn that on Tuesday he would go for a walk in the garden of Chrina.

When a dozen *signori* went out to his galley the next day, however, they learned that he had already gone ashore in a frigate, having landed at the mills of S. Tommaso. From there he had gone on horseback to Varvassi, "dove sono belli giardini," and then walking along the riverbank, he went up to the summit of Santi Quaranta. Here the dozen *signori deputati* finally caught up with him. Together they walked along the hills which rose above the city of Chios. Piali was accompanied by several sanjakbeyes, an engineer, and a number of soldiers of obvious importance. Doing his best to be pleasant, "mostrando sempre allegra chiera," he finally told the *signori* that he could not go on, for he had acquired a slight stomachache.

Returning by way of Palioastro, past the mills of Chandilla, he was saluted by artillery fire when he reached the fortress. He rode along the moat, obviously observing the ramparts. At length he came to the harbor, where he embarked at the wharf of Mestraria with another salvo of artillery. The *signori deputati* went back to the Palace, where they described what had taken place to the podestà Vincenzo Giustiniani and the governors, who set about making plans for Wednesday, 17 April.<sup>44</sup> So far so good, or so it seemed.

<sup>44</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vineta*, no. 48, pp. 118–19, the anonymous letter written after March, 1567, the best source for the Turkish occupation of Chios, and see Argenti, ed., *Hieronimo Giustiniani's History of Chios*, Cambridge, 1943, bk. IX, pp. 219 ff. The author of the latter work, Girolamo Giustiniani, was the son of Vincenzo, the last podestà of Chios. He describes the conqueror of Chios, if we may call him such, as "il generale Piali Bassa di nazione ungaro, huomo di natura barbaro et ferocce, et molto nemico a miseri christiani, benchè egli fusse da parenti christiani nato, et alivato già nella fede catholica et christiana" (*ibid.*, bk. IX, pp. 219–20). He says Piali's armada was made up of "300 galleys and numberless other boats."

The anonymous letter puts the size of the armada at 123 galleys (*Chius Vineta*, no. 48, p. 118, line 4); Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVI, p. 757A, says that Piali appeared in the Chios Canal "con 120 galere." The report of one Battista Ferraro, dated at Istanbul on 2 May, 1566, puts 3,000 janissaries and 4,000

The next morning Piali Pasha sent word that he was leaving Chios, but before his departure he wished to discuss a matter of importance with the podestà and the twelve *signori governatori* of the island. According to Bosio, however, Piali had already sent ten to twelve thousand men into the city, with scimitars concealed beneath their long robes, "under the pretext of buying clothes, cloths, and other things that soldiers needed."<sup>45</sup> Presently six senior members of the governing board came to wait upon the pasha, saying "that they represented the government." Piali refused to receive them. The podestà and all twelve governors, he said, had paid official visits to other pashas on other occasions. They must do no less for him. He had been their friend, and had not expected such a listless response to his request. The podestà and the governors saw no escape, but they were worried, "sapendo il cativo animo che Meemeth [Sokolli] Bassà havea contra essa isola."

Mehmed had recently sent a cargo of grain to Chios in charge of a Genoese renegade, "whom he had trusted fully," but the rascal had sold the grain, and run off with the proceeds. Mehmed Pasha had complained to the *signori* who, acting with all diligence, had caught the renegade, and turned him over to the Turks who had come to Chios on Mehmed's ship. Fearing that he would be put to death, the culprit had escaped again, and had not been found. Mehmed was highly indignant, "threatening the aforesaid signori and fulminating against them." The Chian governors then sent an emissary to Istanbul to assuage the angry pasha and to make financial amends. But had their emissary succeeded in reducing Mehmed's wrath?

With fear and reluctance the podestà Vincenzo Giustiniani and the twelve governors went out to Piali Pasha's flagship. As they came on board, he rose, embracing the podestà and saluting his nervous colleagues. He bade them be seated. They sat down. He remained standing as though lost in thought. They inquired of his health. Of course they had been glad to come, they said, although

signaphis aboard Piali's armada of 80 galleys (*Chius Vineta*, no. 46, p. 109). On the other hand, one Marco Giorgio "della Cruz," who arrived at Gallipoli (on the Gulf of Taranto) on 11 July, 1566, having come from the Levant, reported that Piali's armada consisted of only 25 galleys, and that Sultan Suleiman had not left Istanbul [for the Hungarian campaign] until he had learned of Piali's occupation of Chios (*ibid.*, no. 58, pp. 139–40, and *cf.* introd., p. xcvi, note 3, where Argenti has assembled references to the size of Piali's armada). Della Cruz apparently claimed to be a papal agent.

<sup>45</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVI, p. 757C.

a podestà and all twelve governors had never before paid such a visit to any pasha. They had wanted to please him, certainly not to offend him. What did he want of them? They were ready to obey his every command.<sup>46</sup>

Thereupon, though speaking gently, Piali Pasha accused the mahonesi of spying, harboring slaves and corsairs, failing to pay the "tribute," and furnishing information to the Christian enemies of the Porte. According to the account of Girolamo Giustiniani, the podestà Vincenzo's son, Piali then read an imperial firman ordering appropriate punishment for the treacherous mahonesi: "Le accuse et querelle de' musulmani nostri fedeli sono contra voi infinite—perciò siate voi esclusi dalla gratia nostra: A coloro che volentariamente peccano, a essi doppia pena et doppio castigo merita." Sultan Suleiman had, therefore, sent his slave Piali, "from whom by word of mouth you shall learn our will." Giustiniani gives a long and unlikely text of the signori mahonesi's reply to Piali claiming, with a good deal of Christian moralizing, innocence of all the charges he had leveled against them.

When Lazaro Giustiniani, the oldest of the governors, suggested that they be given a written copy of the sultan's firman that they might have it available for their defense at the Porte, Piali became angry, and dismissed the governors from his presence. He confined them to the middle of his galley, while he took counsel with his officers on the poop deck. The governors were then arrested, and taken into custody two by two to other galleys.<sup>47</sup> Giustiniani says that Piali demanded, in addition to the tribute, a large sum of money which the mahonesi did not owe the Porte, and threatened, if they did not pay, "to put the city to fire and sword."

Bad news travels fast. In the city of Chios men were converging on the Palazzo from everywhere, "with great fear and almost out of their minds, tears in their eyes." The Turks taunted them with abusive gibes. There were threats, and blows were struck, perhaps on both sides, as the desperate Chians assembled in the piazza. They were all excited, not only nobles, but citizens and commoners as well, "even women of every rank and condition," who were running through the streets in utter madness, some offering the Turks money, others giving them gold chains, silver vases, and all sorts of precious things, as though they could

in this way somehow set free their island, "which they saw falling into servitude."<sup>48</sup>

Although Piali Pasha is said to have expressed regret in having to undertake his harsh mission to Chios, he gave the mahonesi three days to pay the tribute and, apparently, to meet his other demands also. One source puts the tribute (plus Piali's additional demands?) at fifty thousand ducats, and notes that when the mahonesi asked for a six months' reprieve, Piali immediately "disembarked with three to four thousand soldiers, entered the fortress, and took possession of the island in the name of the Gran Signore."<sup>49</sup>

Another source states that as soon as Piali had the lords of the mahona aboard his galley, the troops that he had sent ashore advanced upon the Chian fortress of which they easily took possession, giving Piali the expected signal. The standard of the city was cut down. The crescent took its place. As usual, when the Turkish armada had come to Chios, chosen officers of the janissaries had gone into the city to see that the inhabitants were not molested. When Piali landed, he gave orders that the troops should take over the gates of the city. Turkish horsemen ranged through the streets, "commanding the Turks under penalty of the gallows that they should do injury to no Christian." The frightened inhabitants were assured they had nothing to fear, but they must not venture out of their houses. Punishment awaited only those who had disobeyed the dictates of the Signor Turco. Piali, clad in white brocade, rode through the city to make sure his troops were doing no damage. Two Turks were hanged *pour encourager les autres*. Piali slept ashore that night, his troops being spread throughout the city.<sup>50</sup> In minor details the sources are in obvious disagreement, but one thing was clear: the Republic of Genoa and the mahonesi had lost Chios.

The next day, Thursday, 18 April (1566), Piali Pasha went to the cathedral church, where he had the statuary and paintings destroyed, seized all the gold and silver vessels, demolished the altars, and sent the church bells hurtling to the ground. He did the same thing at S. Domenico and at the Madonna delle Grazie, which he turned into mosques "alla Turchescha." Although he left the

<sup>46</sup> Argenti, *Hieronimo Giustiniani's History of Chios*, bk. IX, pp. 225–26, 229 ff.

<sup>49</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vinceta*, no. 46, p. 109, letter of Battista Ferraro to Pantalone Marciano, dated at Istanbul on 2 May, 1566.

<sup>50</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vinceta*, no. 48, pp. 120–21; cf. *ibid.*, pp. CVII–CVIII, and Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxvi, pp. 757E–758A.

<sup>46</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vinceta*, no. 48, pp. 119–20, the anonymous letter written after March, 1567.

<sup>47</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxvi, p. 757DE.

cathedral to the Christians, he had torn or broken to pieces all the objects and ornaments employed in their religious services, as the Venetian bailie Vittore Bragadin wrote the doge and Senate (on 25 April, 1566), "to the infinite distress of the poor Christians who stood by as spectators of the frightful sight, and found it necessary to remain quiet."<sup>51</sup>

On Friday, 19 April, Piali summoned all the Giustiniani, i.e., all the mahonesi, to the Palazzo. They came in fear of their lives. Piali told them to be seated, "which in reverence they dared not do," until the bishop Timoteo and other elders had sat down. With a bow and three arrows in hand, Piali asked the mahonesi whether they were prepared to yield to the will of the Gran Signore. They replied that they had always been his slaves. His orders were ever in their minds. Piali observed that he too was the sultan's slave, and always obeyed his every command. Having gone through this ritual of obedience three times, Piali rose to his feet, and gave the bow and three arrows to an attendant.

Turning to the mahonesi, he declared, "My dearest lords, God knows to what extent my heart is filled with sadness, and how I feel for you. . . ." He had known, he said, and suspected nothing when, aboard his flagship with the armada ready to sail, he had suddenly received the sultan's orders from Mehmed [Sokolli] Pasha. There had been no time to remonstrate. He could only "shrug his shoulders," and carry out the orders, which he had done with the least ill will he could.

And I swear to you by the head of my Signore and by the sword with which I gird myself that I have not done nearly as much as I was ordered to do—you must, therefore, be of good heart, for I shall not fail to do as much as I can on your behalf.<sup>52</sup>

Piali Pasha then requested and was given the "conventions, pacts, and privileges which these Giustiniani had with the Signor Turco." The pacts recalled the mahonesi's possession of the island [from 1346] with the right to coin money, with the arms of the Giustiniani, in gold, silver, and copper. The Giustiniani were bound by the so-called conventions each year to pay the Gran Turco 600,000 aspers or 10,000 ducats, while he would protect them from their enemies, and provide them with grain and foodstuffs. Ships, trad-

ers, and travelers were to be protected in Chian ports. If on occasion the Giustiniani should lack the means of paying the tribute (*kharāj*, *carachio*), "because of bad times," the Signor Turco would allow them to fall three, but no more than four, years into arrears (*li havessi ad aspettare tre, sino in quatro carachii*). If payment was still not made, the Gran Signore would send someone to Chios to look into the matter and officially to inform the Giustiniani that in the event of their unwillingness or inability to make payment, they must surrender the island to him. Only for such non-payment or for treason (*laesa maiestas*) could they lose the island, but now Piali retained the inscribed texts of the pacts, "because they had not been observed" (*perchè non fusseron visti*)—and so that others might not see them.<sup>53</sup>

Following an honorable tradition, Piali announced publicly that if anyone had been wronged or injured by the Giustiniani, he should appear to state his case and have justice done (*per rihaver il suo*). No one came to him or to his staff with a complaint against the mahonesi (although many a protest against their misgovernment and self-seeking had gone to Genoa over the years), "but rather," says our chief source, "all the people went to his Excellency, and interceded for the Giustiniani, asking him not to treat them badly, for without them they would all be lost." Piali declared, however, that he had just sent a frigate to Istanbul which had returned with the sultan's decision—the leading mahonesi should all be put to death (*che li primati fusseron tagliati in pezzi*), and the others sent into exile at Caffa (Feodosiya). When the people appealed to him to use his good offices at the Porte on behalf of the mahonesi, he said that he was quite content to do so, but allegedly the Giustiniani did not have money enough to meet the costs—"una spexa eccessiva"—of sending another frigate to Istanbul to bring back the sultan's answer. Apparently public contributions met the expense involved, and Piali "sent or pretended" to send another frigate to the Porte.

When the second frigate was said to have returned, Piali made known the fact that Sultan Suleiman was going to spare the lives of the podestà and the twelve *governatori mahonesi*, but they must "go into exile," which would soon mean confinement at Caffa. The others might ransom or redeem themselves as "slaves" for a thousand, or at

<sup>51</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vincita*, no. 62, p. 150.

<sup>52</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vincita*, no. 48, p. 121; cf. *ibid.*, p. CIX, and nos. 46, 52, pp. 109–10, 130–31; Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVI, p. 759A.

<sup>53</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vincita*, no. 48, p. 122, and on *le conventioni, patti, et privilegii che essi Giustiniani havavano col Signor Turcho*, cf. *ibid.*, nos. 71–75, pp. 180–87.

least five hundred, ducats apiece. To raise the money they had to arrange what were called "sales" of their houses, gardens, and vineyards to Piali, "and thus for the forty-seven days that his Excellency remained at Chios he looked to the mulcting of the poor Giustiniani, now in one way, now in another, without injuring anyone." The three years' tribute, however, still had to be paid. The lesser mahonesi, therefore, asked that the twelve governors (*li dodici signori*) be allowed to come ashore to consult with them as to where and how the money was to be found.

With Piali's consent the erstwhile governors of Chios, still wearing their velvet robes of office and velvet hats, "vestiti da senatori," were brought back from the galleys. With iron chains on their feet they were marched through the midst of the Turkish infantry drawn up in arms. Between the fortress and the borgo the governors conferred with their lesser and now more fortunate colleagues. It is not clear whether any means was devised for paying the tribute. In any event the podestà Vincenzo Giustiniani and the twelve *signori mahonesi*, together with their families and eighteen (or twenty-two) boys between the ages of ten and twelve, were shipped off to Istanbul in Kusani Bali's twelve galleys. The boys, all scions of the clan (*albergo*) of the Giustiniani, were assigned to the sultan's harem, i.e., the Old Seraglio (Topkapı Sarayı) overlooking the Sea of Marmara.

The podestà and the twelve governors were quickly sent on to Caffa where, according to an imperial firman, "a fit lodging shall be prepared for each of them, and . . . no one shall hinder them from following each his business or profession." Their exile lasted about a year. In the spring or summer of 1567 they were ransomed, at the intercession of M. de Grantrie de Grandchamp, the French ambassador to the Porte, for the modest sum of six thousand ducats.<sup>54</sup>

Under orders from Sultan Suleiman, Piali Pasha forthwith turned the island of Chios into a Turkish province (*sanjak*) with the usual administration of a governor, a *kadi* (judge), a *subashi* (chief of police), and a captain of the *asapi*. He also issued a proclamation that all craftsmen were to open their

shops; they need have no fear that anything would be taken from them. Piali left five galleys at Chios to guard the island under the new governor or *sanjakbey*, Gazanfer Beg, whom Bosio describes as a Hungarian renegade. Fearing lest the wealthier Chians, "essendo buoni et Cattolici Christiani," would take flight and leave the city without its abler inhabitants, Piali forbade anyone to emigrate without permission, "sotto pene gravissime." After turning over to Gazanfer Beg a force of some five hundred janissaries and two hundred sipahis to guard the island, says Bosio, Piali "came with the Turkish armada into the western seas" (*con l'armata Turchesca alla volta di questi mari se ne venne*).

"Thus the beautiful and pleasing island of Chios," to quote Bosio again,

remained under the authority of the infidel barbarians, and the poor mahonesi were despoiled, robbed of their state. Their calamity gave rise to great compassion and sorrow among Christians, for the loss was widespread, because these lords [of Chios] had in fact been rendering a great service to the Christian commonwealth, not only informing our princes with greathearted consideration and diligence of every preparation, every deceitful peril, and every move which the Turk might make against them, but each year they used to free a large number of Christians from the harsh, cruel servitude of the barbarians, ransoming many Christians entirely at their own expense.<sup>55</sup>

We have cited more than once a letter of 2 May, 1566, which the Genoese agent or merchant Battista Ferraro wrote one Pantaleone Marciano, sending him the news from Istanbul. Aside from giving Marciano various details concerning Piali Pasha's expedition to Chios, Ferraro notes that a report had reached the Bosphorus of how Michael Czernowicz, Maximilian II's erstwhile envoy to the Porte (at the turn of the years 1564-1565), had fallen into disgrace at the imperial court. It was

<sup>54</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxvi, p. 759AB; Argenti, *Chius Vineta*, no. 46, pp. 109-10, letter of Battista Ferraro to Pantaleone Marciano, dated at Istanbul on 2 May, 1566, and see *ibid.*, esp. nos. 48, 58, 62, 81. On Turkish officialdom, cf. Volume II, p. 329, note 50; for the administration of Chios under the Turks, see Argenti, *op. cit.*, pp. cxxxvii ff.; and on the source of the quotation from Bosio, note, *ibid.*, p. cxix.

Incidentally, in the course of the perennial warfare against the Turks in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Venice, then in alliance with Austria, occupied Chios from 12 September, 1694, to 21 February, 1695 (Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians* [1694], London, 1935, esp. pp. xxix-xxxvi, lvi-lxviii, and docs. nos. 10 ff., pp. 42 ff.). Except for this brief interlude the Turkish domination of Chios lasted until 1912.

<sup>55</sup> Argenti, *Chius Vineta*, no. 48, pp. 122-23, and nos. 46, 56, 65, 66, 77-78, pp. 111, 138-39, 162, 159-60, 189. On the edifying tale of how the children of the Giustiniani preferred martyrdom to service as Moslems in the Seraglio, see, *ibid.*, pp. cxiii-cxvi. There may be more than one element of truth in the legend (*ibid.*, doc. no. 70, p. 177), which certainly originated soon after the Turkish seizure of Chios (Bosio, III [1602], bk. xxxvi, p. 758CD).



said in fact that he had been obliged to leave the court, "and that he will go to live in Rome." Ferraro also adds that it was being stated with certainty in Istanbul that Sultan Selim, who was soon to succeed his father Suleiman, had just bestowed the duchy of Naxos upon João Miquez, "the Marrano," alias Joseph Nasi, who was to pay an annual tribute of four thousand ducats for his possession of what had been for more than three and a half centuries the major Frankish state in the Archipelago.<sup>56</sup> Just as the Crispi now lost Naxos with its dependent isles, so were the Sommaripa swept from Andros and Zia, while the Gozzadini had to give up the island of Siphnos. In 1566–1567 only the Venetian island of Tenos was still in Latin hands.

The Turks had inevitably associated Chios with Genoa, which had become a Spanish dependency.

<sup>56</sup> Argenti, *Chios Vincta*, no. 46, pp. 110–11; Wm. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*, London, 1908, pp. 635–41; P. Grunbaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi, duc de Naxos*, Paris and The Hague, 1968, pp. 89–94; and note Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII (Rome, 1963), no. 106, p. 203, a letter of Giannantonio Fachinetti, the papal nuncio in Venice, to Cardinal Michele Bonelli, dated at Venice on 12 April, 1567, at which time Giacomo IV Crispo, the exiled duke of Naxos, was in Venice.

Giacomo Crispo (Crispi) had gone to Istanbul in an effort to save his island domain. On his arrival at the Porte he was placed in confinement for some months, but was later released. After taking Chios, as we shall note, Piali Pasha went westward with the Turkish armada into the Adriatic; on his return he took over the island of Naxos (for Joseph Nasi) no less easily than he had occupied Chios. In 1571 Giacomo IV regained Naxos for a short while with the aid of the Venetian fleet. Nicolò Gozzadini, who had lost the island of Siphnos (Sifanto), also got back his petty lordship in 1571, and the Gozzadini managed to retain it until 1617, when the Turks finally ousted the family.

As for Joseph Nasi, he was an early Zionist. As the French agent Antoine Petremol wrote the Sieur de Boistailié, the French ambassador in Venice, "Le Sieur [Vincent] Justiniani [also a French agent] est de retour de Sultan Sélîm, où Micques [Nasi], qui estoit allé là quelque peu avant, luy a usé de ses tours judaïques, et n' a rien oublié pour luy préjudicier; il attend la mesme venue du Grand Seigneur pour rebrousser chemin. Ledit Micques a eu permission du Grand Seigneur, confirmée de Sultan Sélîm et de son fils, Sultan Murat, de pouvoir bastir une ville au dessous de Saphet [Safad, Zefat], sur le rivage du lac de Tybériade, en laquelle ne pourront habiter autres que Juifs, et de fait propose pour ce renouveau commencer son chef-d' oeuvre par là, dessaignant, ainsy que l' on juge, de se faire roy des Juifs: Voilà pourquoy si instamment il demande argent de France!" (Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 735–37, letter dated at Istanbul on 13 September, 1563). As we have already noted, Nasi had long been trying to collect the large debt which the French owed him. His plans to rebuild Tiberias in order to establish a "homeland" for the Jews, for which Petremol says he wanted the money, did not succeed. Cf. *ibid.*, III, 80–81, 83 ff.

Twenty years after the Turkish occupation of the island, Girolamo Giustiniani, son of the podestà Vincenzo (who had entered the service of France after his release from Caffa), wrote a history of his native island. Girolamo also made the connection of Chios with Spain. Having become pro-French, Girolamo was opposed to the Genoese government of his time as well as to the Spanish monarchy. Spain might be riding the crest of the wave, but she could well sink. France would rise to the surface again. The Genoese had better beware: "Franza non è anchora estinta: anchor che Spagna fiorisse, vi repentirete!"<sup>57</sup>

In reviewing the plight of his Chian compatriots, Girolamo wrote with some bitterness,

If the general of the Catholic king [Philip II], Don García de Toledo—may God forgive him!—had used diligence, as was fitting, the Chians would not have fallen into that calamity. Without doubt he could easily have shattered and sunk the Turkish armada which, in its vulnerability, was hardly able to escape his grasp at the time of its return from Malta when the siege had been raised.<sup>58</sup>

Girolamo Giustiniani may well have been right, but (we must say it again) Don García was merely following orders, for Philip II would not risk the Spanish fleet in what he regarded as an unnecessary encounter with the Turks. There were the usual varying reports of naval preparations in Istanbul, but as the spring of 1566 came on, it was clear that Suleiman was going to press the offensive against Maximilian II in Hungary and Transylvania. It seemed likely, therefore, that if he sent his armada into Italian waters, it would be a much smaller undertaking than that of the previous year but of course, the Turk being the Turk, one could never be sure.

At the beginning of his reign Pius V had granted Philip II a renewal of the *quinquenio*, the five years' ecclesiastical subsidy (which had ended in August, 1565), as we have seen, and now Pius had become somewhat less worried about the defense of Malta, Sicily, and the kingdom of Naples than he was about conditions in Austria-Hungary. The *quinquenio* fell on all the Spanish clergy; it was supposed to produce 420,000 ducats every year. Excluded from the general levy to make up the subsidy were the cardinals and the Orders of Santiago and S. John of Jerusalem. The Spanish

<sup>57</sup> Argenti, ed., *Hieronimo Giustiniani's History of Chios [Istoria di Scio]* (1943), p. 328.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

clergy paid a high price for the maintenance of Philip's fleet against the Turks. They groaned under the charge, and protested to the popes, who had to moderate their own financial expectations from the Spanish kingdoms. Pius IV had been a spender, especially on buildings, and his successor was short of funds, or at least he thought he was.

The Spanish ambassador, Don Luis de Requesens, kept his master well informed concerning the *acta et facta* of the Curia Romana. In a dispatch of 18 March (1566) he notes,

The pope told me, after having ordered the brief to be sent [which had authorized the *quinquenio*], that with the coming of the Turks into Hungary the emperor was asking him for aid, and that he did not have a *real*, as he surely does not, also that he would not like to burden the people nor to sell the little property still remaining to the Church. In the event it became necessary he said that your Majesty should help him so that he could aid the emperor, or that your Majesty should aid the emperor. . . . I answered him with general words, declaring that your Majesty would not prove lacking in anything which might be of service to God and his Holiness and be a benefit to the emperor. . . .

When the occasion arose, however, Philip should remind the pope that the Holy See had in effect left the defense of Christendom to him.

It was clear to Requesens that the popes could do more than they had done to help ward off the Turkish menace. They could get more men and money from the papal states. There was little, to be sure, that they could do militarily. Pius IV had put six hundred men on the road to Malta the year before. What good were they? They had melted away before they even got to the island. Very likely the same thing would happen to the three thousand papal troops being levied for the present year. Wherever the Turk struck, at least in the Mediterranean, Philip had to meet him, "as your Majesty has always done." Fifteen hundred Spanish troops were worth more than any papal levy of three thousand, for the latter would have few experienced soldiers among them. Also the pope's ministers would soon set about fleeing them (*y sus ministros les hurtan infinito*). The pope could spare himself the cost of assembling such troops by granting Philip concessions [such as the *quinquenio*] "from which your Majesty might derive a much larger benefit for himself and also for all Christendom than one gets from these [papal] relief forces."

Requesens does state, however, that this line of reasoning (*esta razón*) would carry more weight with other popes than with Pius V. Others would probably be less scrupulous in making concessions,

and would be on the lookout for something for themselves and their families (*y tendrán mas pretensiones particulares*). Pius V was not only poor but, alas, he had no intention of taking advantage of his opportunities. He did not want to impose such taxes in the papal states as his predecessor had levied, nor was he interested in making the dataria productive. He could pick up 100,000 ducats by the further exploitation of his predecessor's pension-fund (*monte*), but he would not do so, nor would he sell for more than 80,000 ducats a place which Pius IV had detached from an abbey "for the purpose of selling it." In fact the pope had given the place in perpetuity to the Office of the Roman Inquisition to help the inquisitors meet their expenses. One had found out of late that Pius IV had alienated and sold 183,000 ducats' worth of properties belonging to the Apostolic See, and that during the six years of his papacy the dataria had yielded him 1,255,000 ducats, not to speak of many other sources of income, "and of all this one sees no other result than the buildings in Rome."

Giovanni Ricci, the cardinal of Montepulciano, had told Requesens that he had proposed to Pius V the imposition of tithes on ecclesiastical incomes in Italy, as popes had sometimes done in needy circumstances. Pius would not listen to him. Ricci added, moreover, that the previous pope (Pius IV) had informed him that he had not levied such tithes

so that your Majesty should not ask him for part of the tithes of the kingdom of Naples and of the state of Milan, since it was customary for princes to demand a share when the popes imposed tithes.<sup>59</sup>

Popes were bound to have money, however, for they needed it. Even the pious successor of the spendthrift Pius IV would have to raise money. When Requesens discovered that, if Pius V did not spend his money on useless troops, the Hospitallers might get some of the money, he revised his estimate of the value of papal recruitments. Thus, only a month after his expression of contempt for the papal recruits, Requesens wrote Philip II (on 18 April, 1566) that Jean de la Vallette, the grand master, had assured both Pius V and the Hospitallers' ambassador in Rome "so many times that the Turkish armada would not come" that his Holiness seemed to have given up

<sup>59</sup> L. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede*, I (1914), no. 62, esp. pp. 154-55, letter of Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 18 March, 1566.

the thought of raising troops. Now Requesens found the idea disturbing. He did not doubt that the grand master believed what he said, that the troops would not be needed.

More than this, however, Requesens suspected that de la Valette's intention was to get Pius to spend on the fortifications of Malta the twenty-five or thirty thousand scudi which the troops might have cost. Requesens was not so sure of the grand master's prediction, which the Hospitallers' ambassador apparently kept repeating at the Curia. The pope would do better, in Requesens' opinion, to spend some money on troops than to run the risk of the grand master's being wrong. Recent reports from the viceroys, confirmed by those from Venice, were worrisome. Requesens had just sent these *avisos* to the pope, with whom he would have an audience on 19 April.

The allies were obviously not in full agreement as to the best ways to spend their available funds in defending themselves against the Turks. As Requesens stated in his letter of 18 April to Philip II, he would urge Pius V to recruit more troops, and I have told the ambassador of the Order that for his part he should do the same, although he goes about it much more lukewarmly than I should like. During these last days he has begun disbanding here [in Rome] a company of three hundred men, who had been enlisted at the expense of the Order. He says, however, that in Naples and Sicily all the men have been mustered necessary to reach the figure of three thousand which the [grand] master offered to maintain at his expense although, as I have written your Majesty, I do indeed suspect that they will be far fewer than that, and yet the pope's troops will be raised if the ambassador presses him, for in this context I have always found the best of good will in his Holiness.

In Requesens' view it was the Hospitallers who were upsetting the apple-cart. When they had told the papal commander Pompeo Colonna that his troops were no longer necessary, he had dismissed some captains and certain others whom he had been holding in readiness. Indeed, Colonna had shown Requesens a letter two weeks before, in which he was prepared to offer the Emperor Maximilian his services with a troop of five hundred horse. Colonna had asked Requesens whether Philip II would be pleased with this idea. If not, he would not propose it to the emperor. The Spanish ambassador replied that Philip regarded his cousin Maximilian's concerns as his own, "mayormente siendo contra el Turco que era el enemigo comun," but that he must warn Colonna to make his offer to the emperor dependent upon the pope's needs. If in the meantime the pope

should want to raise troops owing to some "new report from the Levant," Colonna must put his commitment to the Holy See before any other. And of course Colonna agreed, assuring Requesens that he would only offer himself to the emperor "if he should not be required here."<sup>60</sup>

The reports from Istanbul may have been disquieting to the Spaniards in the Neapolitan kingdom but they were less so, apparently, to the Signoria of Venice. Piali Pasha's armada had sailed out of Istanbul on 30 March (1566), and pulled from Gallipoli on 7 April, moving down the Anatolian coast to Chios, with the results we have just witnessed. Although Piali was expected to come westward, the Signoria was no more alarmed than the Hospitallers. The Senate saw no need of stationing more than two galleys at Corfu, although as always the Venetian commanders in the Adriatic and the Ionian Seas would remain on the alert.<sup>61</sup> According to the usual instructions (which we have noted many times), the galleys of the Serenissima must try to avoid anything that resembled an encounter with the Turks at sea. It could go without saying—but it was said anyway—that, if need be, Venetian possessions would be defended.<sup>62</sup>

On 29 March M. de Fourquevaux had written Charles IX from Madrid that at the Spanish court Philip II and his advisors were apparently convinced that the Turk would bring his full strength to bear upon Hungary, and that he would send out no more than eighty galleys "to protect the Archipelago." Although the Spanish commander Álvaro de Bazán had been instructed to recruit two thousand Spanish infantry "to arm his galleys," he had now been ordered not to do so.<sup>63</sup> Obviously the Spaniards, in Madrid at least, were no more worried than the Hospitallers at Malta by the thought that a large-scale Turkish expedition might be on its way to attack them.

No one in Europe was more attentive, however, to the Turkish news than Philip II and Don García

<sup>60</sup> Serrano, I, no. 75, pp. 184–85, letter of Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 18 April, 1566. In a letter of 2 July to Philip II, Don García urged that no Spanish galleys be sent to Jean de la Valette at Malta "para que ayuden á la fábrica de la nueva ciudad." The construction of Valletta was already under way. If the galleys were so used, wrote Don García, "será la total destrucción dellas y el verdadero camino para no tener galeras" (*Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 315, and cf. pp. 335–36). Don García was no more eager than Requesens to aid the Hospitallers at the expense of the Spanish.

<sup>61</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>–63<sup>r</sup> [83<sup>v</sup>–84<sup>r</sup>], *al provviditor dell'armata*, doc. dated 9 May, 1566, and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 63<sup>r</sup> [84<sup>r</sup>].  
<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, fols. 67 [88], 71<sup>v</sup>–72<sup>r</sup> [92<sup>v</sup>–93<sup>r</sup>], 75<sup>v</sup> [96<sup>v</sup>], and note esp. fols. 76 [97] and 84<sup>r</sup> [105<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>63</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 26, p. 64.

de Toledo, his captain-general of the sea and viceroy of the island kingdom of Sicily. In letters of 16 and 26 March (1566), as well as by the dispatch of other *avisos*, Don García had sent the king the then current news from the Levant. In answering the viceroy on 9 May Philip noted that it was generally being accepted as fact "that the Turk will not arm more than a hundred or a hundred and twenty galleys this summer for the protection of his own lands,"<sup>64</sup> which lay in the Levant. The Turkish campaign into Hungary would give the Spanish and the Hospitallers the necessary respite to look to the fortifications of La Goletta and Malta.

The Spanish correspondence is full of money and troops, galleys and cannon, victuals and munitions. The primary concern was defense against the Turks and the Barbary corsairs. Thus from Madrid on 1 June Philip sent Don García an inquiry as to whether it might not be wise to keep sixty galleys in the harbor of Brindisi "for the security of Apulia." The galleys would serve also to protect Sicily and Malta, should the Turks get out of hand. A naval armament of such proportions could break the Turkish habit of raiding Christendom at will every year. The sixty galleys could wreak some havoc in the Turk's own lands, especially when his armada made its annual return to the Bosphorus. Such a force would be an inspiration to the Greeks, who might in fact be moved to revolt against the Turk. Its movements in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas would enhance the reputation of Spain, especially since both the Venetians and certain other princes were dealing in friendly fashion and doing business with the Turk and his subjects.<sup>65</sup>

Stationing sixty galleys at Brindisi as a *point de départ* for action against the Turkish armada (whenever it appeared in western waters) might have been a good idea, but it was never carried out. In the meantime, however, where was Piali Pasha, and what was he doing after the occupation of Chios? On 19 June (1566) Don García de To-

ledo sent Juan Zanoquera from Messina eastward with two galleys "to pick up news of the Turkish armada" (*para tomar lengua de la armada turquesa*). Don Juan did not get much beyond the islands of Cephalonia and Zante, and was back in Messina by Friday, 28 June. Although at the mid-point of his voyage he had received reports of the approach of Piali's armada, he wanted to verify the facts for himself, and finally he was able to do so.

When some of the sailors tried to persuade him that they had indeed seen the armada, and that it appeared to be a large force, Zanoquera replied that he had not seen it, "y les dije que yo no era venido para dar relación por vista de otros." In such bright sunlight, he said, the sailors could not have seen the armada. But at an hour after mid-day sailors in a lookout waved a banner as a signal that they had definitely sighted Piali's armada. Then Zanoquera could see it himself, six miles away. He tried to count the galleys. He could not do so. The sun was too strong. Nevertheless, he judged it to be "a hundred galleys, give or take a half-dozen more or less" (*cient galeras sin haber cuatro ó seis mas ó menos*). That was what he wanted to know; now it was time to leave, and in a hurry!

As he sailed from an island cove toward Zante, men aboard the vanguard of the armada caught sight of his galleys. Gunners in the vanguard fired a shot, "which is a signal to give chase." Then a large galley fired a second shot, and began to pull out from the rearward of the armada, advancing upon Zanoquera under full sail. Three other galleys followed two miles behind it; and three miles behind them another four galleys came on rapidly. With these four a great galley, which the Christians took to be Piali Pasha's flagship, was joining in the chase. Drawing in the sails and struggling at the oars against a strong northwest wind (*el maestral*), Zanoquera's men—and the galley slaves—pulled and sailed their way out of danger between the islands of Zante and Cephalonia. It was a close race, but as night fell on Tuesday, 25 June, they were sixty miles from Zante. As Zanoquera's galleys moved through the Ionian Sea toward Sicily, the Turks gave up the chase, for Piali was going into the Adriatic. Zanoquera arrived back in Messina as day was dawning on 28 June, coming as fast as he could "para dar aviso al Sr. Don García."<sup>66</sup>

Later that day Don García sent Jean de la Vallette word of Zanoquera's scouting mission, "Today,

<sup>64</sup> " . . . La Correspondencia de Felipe II con Don García de Toledo y otros, de los años 1565 y 1566," *Colección de documentos inéditos*, XXX (1857, repr. 1966), 232, and cf., *ibid.*, pp. 239-40, 243, 262, 266, 278-79, 284, 310.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 271-72. On 4 June, 1566, Don García wrote Philip II's secretary Francisco de Eraso that twelve thousand men would not be enough to defend Malta against the Turks, "y si se meten en el Burgo y San Miguel, serían perdidos . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 276-77). The Spanish were giving a good deal of thought, men, and money to providing an adequate defense for Malta (*ibid.*, pp. 295 ff., 301 ff., et alibi).

<sup>66</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 306-10.

Friday at the tenth hour of the morning [7:00 A.M.], as the Italians reckon time, there arrived here Don Juan Zanoquera, whom I had sent eastward with two galleys under orders to track down the [Turkish] armada and see with his own eyes how large it is." Zanoquera had first discovered the armada on the day of the nativity of S. John (24 June) near the Strophades, about twenty-eight miles southeast of Zante, and encountered it again on Tuesday afternoon, the twenty-fifth. The Turks had opened fire on him, and pursued him for some ninety miles. Don García informed de la Valette that Piali Pasha had 106 galleys and seven galliots, having sent eight galleys to Istanbul with the prisoners he had taken at Chios.

"Also I believe, although I could be mistaken in this, that the armada is headed neither for Malta nor for La Goletta. . . ." Don García was awaiting the arrival in Messina of the galleys of Álvaro de Bazán and those of Savoy, which he knew had already left Genoa. He suggested that de la Valette should send the Hospitallers' two galleys to Messina. Then the Spanish fleet would have ninety galleys, and within a short time Don García was sure that he could arm another twelve or fifteen. "That is the situation. If I should get more news, I shall send word to your most illustrious lordship."<sup>67</sup>

On 9 July (1566) Don García sent Giannandrea Doria with a dozen galleys to report on the progress of the Turkish armada which, as Giannandrea soon learned at Otranto, now entered the "canal" of Corfu on the tenth.<sup>68</sup> Ten days later Don García wrote Philip II that Piali Pasha had, as expected, entered the Gulf, i.e., the Adriatic. Giannandrea had returned with the news (on 18 July), and Don García now sent him with two well-armed galleys to Genoa to bring back the funds needed to pay off certain troops of infantry which were being discharged. Giannandrea's informants claimed that they had counted 140 sail in the armada. As usual, however, others had different figures, 100 galleys and 20 galliots.<sup>69</sup> There was a rumor afloat that Piali intended to sail the length of the Adriatic, going as far as Fiume (Rijeka).<sup>70</sup> In any

event Malta and La Goletta were in no danger, and one could let the unnecessary troops go.

From Chios the Turkish armada had moved slowly westward, tarring the keels and taking on provisions at Navarino and Modon. By mid-July (1566) it was moving up the Albanian coast from Corfu to Durazzo (Durrës). According to Bosio, Piali Pasha put ashore about eight thousand Turks on the Cimera, the coastal region of Albania between Corfu and Valona (Vlorë). Bosio identifies Cimera as a "già antica e celebre città dell' Albania" but, celebrated city or not, the Cimeriotti were, as he says, a rough, proud people, who frequently harried their neighbors in Turkish territory. Also the Cimeriotti were no longer willing to pay the Turkish tribute. As the Turks landed, the Cimeriotti retired into the rugged mountains, "in which their country abounds," and here they quietly massed their forces. When the Turks, who saw nothing to fear, had moved too far inland, and were marching with little order, the Cimeriotti suddenly descended on them, killing many of them and forcing the others to seek the shore and re-embark in a hurry.<sup>71</sup>

While still in the canal of Corfu, Piali Pasha had sent a cha'ush in a galliot to Venice to reassure the Senate that, although he had entered the Adriatic—the "Gulf of Venice"—with the Turkish armada, he had no intention of harming in any way the subjects and lands of the Signoria. His sole purpose was to take action against the king of Spain and against the Austrian enemies of the sultan. Piali in fact sent the Senate a copy of his instructions. He seems to have moved back and forth a bit, putting into Prevesa (Préveza) to make repairs on his galleys and to get more oars, and then resuming his progress up the Dalmatian coast. Many observers had come to the conclusion that Piali was going to try the same trick on the Ragusei as he had played on the Chians. Drawing close to Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi), at the northwest inlet to the Bay of Cattaro (Kotor), he indicated that he wished to enter the port of Ragusa (Dubrovnik). In a letter to Philip II, dated at Messina on 2 August, Don García noted "que la armada del Turco ha entrado en el Golfo de Venecia y llegado á Castilnovo."<sup>72</sup>

The Ragusei, made wary by the fate of the Chians, were even more attentive to the Turks

<sup>67</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 310–11, "en Mesina á XXVIII de junio de 1566," and *cf. ibid.*, pp. 316–17, 324. Philip II was planning to add to the fortifications of Naples and of Otranto (*ibid.*, p. 317).

<sup>68</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 319–20, 323, 332. Doria arrived back in Messina on 18 July (*ibid.*, p. 331).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 328, 329–30, 332–33.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 334.

<sup>71</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVII, p. 773A, and on Piali Pasha's landing on the Cimera, "la Chumarra," *cf. Serrano*, I, no. 134, p. 347.

<sup>72</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 339.

than was Don García. They quickly took up arms, directing their cannon toward the twin inlets into their well-fortified harbor (the Gradska Luka), and sent word to Piali Pasha that if he needed water and supplies, he should make the fact known. The Ragusei would willingly provide water and supplies, but Piali should not otherwise think of entering the harbor. The armada would not be well received. Without insisting, Piali then sailed north from Castelnuovo toward Fiume (Rijeka) and Trieste, "cities of the house of Austria," whose proximity to Venice caused some measure of alarm on the Rialto. The Venetians had not issued any sort of call to arms "in order not to show distrust," but when the Turkish armada had got well into the Adriatic, the Signoria had armed more galleys, enlisted six thousand infantrymen, and elected Girolamo Zane as "general" of the Venetian fleet.<sup>73</sup>

Pius V addressed two briefs on 2 and 3 August (1566) to Don García, informing him that the Venetians, as usual in times of peril, had just elected a "general of their fleet," and had armed many galleys besides those which the Signoria always kept in readiness to guard their lands "so that they now have ready about one hundred galleys." Anxious for the well-being and safety of all Christians, as he says, Pius urged Don García to assemble all his armed galleys and proceed immediately to the coast of Apulia, to Brindisi or Otranto or (if he preferred) to Ancona. Don García should take this opportunity which God had given him to destroy the enemy's armada. Speed and diligence were required. They must strike while the iron was hot, for "from now on you cannot get a finer or more favorable opportunity to lay waste or at least repress this frightful and cruel enemy."

In his second brief (of 3 August) Pius wrote Don García that although he realized the Venetians were not yet prepared "to break with the Turk," nevertheless the presence of the Spanish fleet could make them reconsider the situation. Although obviously disturbed by the Turks' aggressiveness in the Adriatic, the Venetians could

hardly be expected to move, "unless they had the Catholic fleet nearby."<sup>74</sup>

The Turks had indeed been aggressive. An *avviso* of 1 August from Ascoli Piceno soon became known to Don García as well as to Pius V. According to the reporter,

At this time, the fifth hour of the night [about 1:00 A.M.], the news has reached me that the armada of the infidels has made a landing about twenty miles from here, and that they have burned Francavilla [al Mare] along with five other villages belonging to the lord duke of Atri. The Turkish horse have now ventured as far as Villamagna, a place some distance from this area, so that not only the lord duke in Atri but all his people in this region are living in terror. This present report is in line with the same news I have already written your most illustrious lordship [to the effect that in the armada are] 150 sail.<sup>75</sup>

On 7 and 8 August Don García answered Pius V's two briefs, acknowledging also a similar letter of appeal from Pius's nephew Michele Bonelli, now known as the Cardinal of Alessandria. His replies were mere rhetoric. Pius's election had been, he said, the greatest gift which Christendom could possibly have received in those troublous times. Under so holy a pontiff as Pius and so Catholic a king as Philip II, Don García hoped to see greater successes than those which Pius was seeking, although, to be sure, they were great enough. Don García claimed to have taken all necessary precautions; he had provided garrisons to protect the people. He had little hope, however, of the Venetians' joining their naval armament to the Spanish fleet, whatever provocation the Turks might give them, "even though they may see me on those shores." Don García could not respond to the pope's appeal, for Pius must know that the Turkish armada was composed of 150 sail, against which he could oppose only ninety.<sup>76</sup>

Don García tried always to anticipate his sovereign's wishes and to obey his orders, and Philip

<sup>74</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 341-42, 344-45.

<sup>75</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 345, "avviso venuto d' Ascoli del primo d' agosto 1566." The person to whom the report was sent is not clear, certainly not to Pius V, who would not be addressed as "vostra signoria illustrissima." See also Pius's letter to Giambattista Castagna, the papal nuncio at Philip II's court, dated 3 August (1566), in Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I, no. 116, p. 299, and *cf. ibid.*, no. 124, pp. 320-21.

<sup>73</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVII, pp. 773B-774A, and see esp. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I, no. 124, pp. 320 ff., a letter of Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 13 August, 1566. Requesens says that Piali Pasha reached Ragusa on 24 or 25 July. For the most part the report of Requesens is in accord with the account in Bosio, at least as far as Piali's appearance at Ragusa is concerned. Girolamo Zane received the alto as general of the fleet on 4 August, 1566, on which see Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII (1566-1569), Rome, 1963, no. 31, p. 88, and note, *ibid.*, no. 33, p. 91.

<sup>76</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 342-43, 346-47, and on 7 August (1566) Don García wrote Philip II, "Yo creo cierto que venecianos serán mas tardos en ejecutar que en hablar, tanto mas no habiéndolos el Turco hasta agora apretado ni descontentado en cosa pública" (*ibid.*, p. 348). *Cf.* also Requesens' letter of 16 August from Rome to Don García (pp. 376-79).

II frequently expressed approval of the actions or the do-nothingness of "nuestro capitán general de la mar y visorey de Sicilia." On the whole, however, contemporaries (including his own subordinates) did not always entertain a favorable opinion of his activities. As we have observed, Jean de La Valette's admiration for Don García was limited. While Piali Pasha's forces were terrifying the Italian villagers from Atri to Villamagna—inland from Pescara and Francavilla—Sancho de Leyva sent Philip II's secretary Francisco de Eraso on 9 August (1566) an expression of his own dissatisfaction with the way things were going. Don García then found himself without troops and oarsmen enough to man the Spanish fleet, although it seemed advisable to him to go to Brindisi "to see what the Turkish armada is doing, which in my opinion," wrote de Leyva, "it was better to have done two months ago!"

Don García had sent de Leyva to La Goletta on 30 July to remove the troops of the Neapolitan regiment (*tercio*) stationed there and bring them back to Sicily to put them aboard the fleet. De Leyva had reached La Goletta on 4 August. Work on the new fortifications had apparently been going slowly. The troops and the local inhabitants were both disaffected. Life in La Goletta was all work and danger and discontent. The truce with the king of Tunis had now reached the date of expiration. At some risk de Leyva had conferred at length with the king to give him some hope that it might be extended while Philip II reconsidered it.<sup>77</sup>

The day before (on 8 August) Sancho de Leyva had described conditions at La Goletta (La Goulette) in a letter to Philip II. The Spanish outpost stood on the sand bar which lies between the Lake and the Gulf of Tunis. The garrison was an important part of the Spanish defense system in the mid-Mediterranean. In his letter of 8 August de Leyva describes his meeting with the king of Tunis (in a garden at Carthage), which ended in a private conference of two and a half hours: The king was very friendly, wanted to negotiate a "perpetual peace" with Philip, and was anxious to give the latter evidence of his "lealtad y verdad." Up to now Spanish officers had apparently been making peace or war as they chose, but the king of Tunis was never sure whether or not they were acting in accord with Philip's wishes. The people of La Goletta were not only discontented, but for the

most part were so desperate "that if the Moors would receive them, most of them would go over to them." Among the troops, desertions were a daily occurrence.<sup>78</sup> Although, as we saw at Jerba, de Leyva was given to complaint, there can be no doubt that La Goletta was in a sad state. Some years later (in 1574) it would fall to the Turks.<sup>79</sup>

Although the Venetians and the Spanish were obviously the most disturbed by Piali Pasha's venture into the Adriatic, the French were watching his movements with more than a casual interest. On 3 September (1566) Raymond de Rouer, sieur de Fourquevaux, the French ambassador at Philip II's court, wrote Charles IX from Segovia:

Yesterday, Sire, there arrived here a courier who left Rome on 14 or 15 August. He has brought the news that the Turkish armada—after having taken and sacked Francavilla, Vasto [*Legasi*], and another little town on the coast of the Abruzzi, without making any attempt upon Pescara or the fortress of the latter port—went on to Ragusa, where it stayed for a short while. It then entered the Gulf of Venice, and may be at Capodistria [*Cano d' Istria*], coasting along the territories of the emperor's brothers, where the Turks have done as much damage as they could, assisted by a large number of other Turks on land. Don García has embarked the Spaniards at Malta and put them aboard the galleys, having resolved to follow the armada, which is in a bad way as far as troops and crews are concerned.

The Turks lost three galleys which had to land on the shore of the Abruzzi, where there is no port. Don García has discharged the German regiment, which he had sent to Malta, inasmuch as the season will be unfavorable from now on for the Turks to navigate. It is up to the Venetians to be on guard against the Turks, who are so close to their city, and I think it a dangerous thing that they should be acquainting themselves so closely [with the area] by approaching to within less than forty leagues [of Venice].<sup>80</sup>

The western Mediterranean was even more unsafe for the Turks than for Christians. In a dispatch of 20 August (1566) Don García informed Philip II that the count of Altamira had arrived in Messina a week before, having captured eight Turkish vessels along the way. He had freed a large number of Christians who had been aboard. His haul had included more than three hundred

<sup>77</sup> *Docs. inédits*, XXX, 358–59, letter dated at Palermo on 8 August 1566.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 350 ff.; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 371–72, and Serrano, I, no. 125, p. 325. The king of Tunis was abu'l-Abbās Ahmad III ibn-Muhammad VI (1542–1569).

<sup>79</sup> Wm. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, 2 vols., London, 1883, II, 76–87.

<sup>80</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I (1896), no. 50, p. 123, and on the Turks' loss of "three or four galleys," note *Docs. inédits*, XXX, 389.

Turks, two of the Algerians' larger ships, and a couple of their best captains.<sup>81</sup> Don García now had some more galley slaves, who were always needed, for they often succumbed to their daily toil of hardship.

The Turks had dangers to face aboard the armada and even in Istanbul, for Philip II had just been conspiring with one Gianmaria Renzi, a Genoese, who had already gone to the Turkish capital twice on surreptitious missions for the Spanish. Renzi had convinced Philip that he was in collusion with some important Christian renegades who wished to return to their faith and to enter the king's service. Philip approved of Renzi's plans to enlist the co-operation of these renegades to foment a mutiny in the Turkish armada. They might well escape with some galleys which they would turn over to the Spanish. Renzi was also planning to burn down the Turkish arsenal at Istanbul and destroy the galleys there. The adventurous Renzi would soon be in touch with Don García, who was to assist him in any way he could, and who must be on the alert to profit by any success which Renzi might achieve.<sup>82</sup>

For various reasons Don García did not move into the Adriatic, as Pius V had wanted him to do. For one thing, he did not believe that the Venetians would take any action against Piali Pasha's armada, whatever they might have been telling the pope.<sup>83</sup> Although toward the end of August the armada was expected to come back to Prevesa,<sup>84</sup> Piali stopped at Valona, where he began the extensive preparations for the long return voyage to the Bosphorus. By the end of September the Venetians could begin disarming their own galleys.<sup>85</sup> The danger had passed. The armada was soon in the Ionian Sea, headed for Istanbul.

Writing some thirty years after these events, Giacomo Bosio (d. 1627), the official historian of the Hospitallers, went astray in his account of the

Turks' Adriatic expedition of 1566. Although a valuable source and on the whole reliable, Bosio sometimes failed to abide by the old adage *quod non est in actis, non est in factis*. He depicts Don García as busy, during Piali Pasha's expedition, trying to unite the Spanish, Sicilian, Neapolitan, Genoese, and Hospitaller naval units (*tutte le galere di sua Maestà Cattolica e de' confederati suoi*) into a line of defense against the Turks, which was indeed the case. Bosio states, however, that Don García hoped the Venetians would now yield to anger and resentment, for he assumed that Piali's thrust so deeply into the so-called Gulf of Venice was a gross violation of the Signoria's pacts and capitulations with the Porte. He says that Don García thought Venice would accept the "bella offerta" which he now made the Signoria through the mediation of Pope Pius V, the handsome offer being the union of the "Catholic fleet" with that of Venice against the Turks.

Don García declared, according to Bosio, that by adding one fleet to the other, eighty-five to ninety well-armed galleys could be put to sea immediately. The fact is, as Don García wrote Philip II on 22 August (1566), the latter's fleet alone contained "eight-five galleys, including the three belonging to the Order [of the Hospitallers] and the two belonging to the [grand] master."<sup>86</sup> The combined fleets of Spain and Venice, "al numero di 85 o di 90 galere ben' armate[!]," Don García allegedly asserted, being much stronger than Piali's armada[!], could shut it up in the Adriatic and easily destroy it. Don García then set about preparing to put the alliance into effect in such conspicuous fashion that many persons believed it to be an accomplished fact, "con volontà et ordine di sua Maestà Cattolica."<sup>87</sup>

Bosio did not have our access to the official correspondence of 1566—the letters of Pius V, Philip II, Don García, Luis de Requesens, Francisco de Eraso, Sancho de Leyva, and others, drawn from the Archives of Simancas and of the duke of Medinasiona (and published in the *Documentos inéditos*, XXX)—and Bosio went wrong. Lacking the facts, he made them up, as many another historian before and after him has done.<sup>88</sup>

The alliance of the Holy See, Spain, and Venice would come, but not yet. A deep sense of fore-

<sup>81</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 382.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 386–88, a letter of Philip II to Don García, dated at Segovia on 20 August, 1566.

<sup>83</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 388, 390.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 392, 395.

<sup>85</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 74, fol. 87<sup>r</sup> [108<sup>r</sup>], al *proceditor dell'armata*, doc. dated 28 September, 1566: "Dalle vostre de 26 del presente havemo inteso che l'armata Turchesca era ancora alla Valona, et fra dui giorni devea partir per Levante, però vi commetto col Senato che havuto voi certo aviso che la detta armata sia partita da quel loco et inviata verso Levante, debbate mandar a disarmar quelle galie che per avanti vi ordinassimo, et laudamo la prudente deliberation vostra di non haver voluto fino al presente disarmarle per esser ben certo della partita di detta armata. . . ."

<sup>86</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, XXX, 388.

<sup>87</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XXXVII, p. 774AB.

<sup>88</sup> On the colorful career of Giacomo Bosio, who died in his eighty-third year on 2 February, 1627, see G. de Caro, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XIII (1971), 261–64.



boding had already begun to invade the Venetian Signoria, which in its fear of the Turk would inevitably move closer to the Holy See and Spain. The Venetians had been attending to the defenses of Cyprus, Crete, Corfu, and their Dalmatian possessions. The Turks were well aware of the fact. The Venetians had also been looking after their military personnel. During the reign of Pius IV, the Senate had been vigorously defending the person and the property of Sforza Pallavicini, against whom Pius was taking action. Pallavicini's name had been anathema at the Curia Romana for almost fifteen years, ever since his participation (as we have seen) in the murder of Brother George Martinuzzi. But Pallavicini had long been in the employ of the Venetians, whom he was faithfully serving as "governator nostro generale," and who were beginning to need him more than ever.<sup>89</sup>

Sforza Pallavicini's military contract (*condotta*) was due to expire on 28 February, 1567, but after the recent appearance of the Turkish armada in the northern Adriatic, few members of the Senate were willing to see one of their ablest and most reliable soldiers leave the service of the Signoria. On 7 and 12 October, 1566, the Senate took action to renew his contract for another five or (at the discretion of the Signoria) seven years,

che con il nome del Spirito Santo l' illustrissimo Signor Sforza marchese Pallavicino sia ricondotto per governator general delle genti di questo eccellentissimo Dominio con li honori, preheminentie, et dignità solite delli altri governatori del detto Serenissimo Dominio. . . .<sup>90</sup>

On 26 October (1566) we find Pallavicini concerned with the fortifications of Udine,<sup>91</sup> which after Suleiman's recent expedition into Hungary was a source of obvious concern to the Senate. In March of 1567 we find Pallavicini advising the Signoria on the fortifications of Cyprus and Crete,<sup>92</sup> Venice's prize possessions in the Levant.

Although the Signoria had tried to protect Pallavicini's property from Pius IV's nepotistic grasp, Pius had seized Pallavicini's castle and lands at Castel S. Arcangelo to the bitter indignation of the Venetians. Pius IV seems to have bestowed the estate upon his nephew Count Annibale von Hohenems (Altemps). Now, however, under Pius V the Venetians again exerted themselves, and "many difficulties having been overcome," as Paolo Tiepolo, the Venetian ambassador to Rome (1565-1568) reminded the doge in his *relazione* (of 12 March, 1569), "it was brought about that [S. Arcangelo] should be restored to the lord Sforza Pallavicino, governor-general of the armed forces of your Serene Highness."<sup>93</sup>

The Venetians had not fared well under Suleiman the Magnificent, who (as we have noted more than once) had died at the siege of Sziget (Szigetvár) in early September, 1566, during his invasion of Hungary. There was no reason to assume they would do any better under the new sultan, Selim II "the Soft." They must look to Cyprus and Crete which, lying in the eastern Mediterranean, were not only within easy reach of Istanbul, but were surrounded by Turkish forces in the Morea, southern Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. As the Venetians moved southward along the Adriatic, they were always exposed to possible Turkish attack from Valona and Prevesa (near the Strait of Otranto). They did not need Sforza Pallavicini's advice to try to make both Cyprus and Crete as self-sufficient as possible, for one could never tell whether or where the Turks might attack. Every year there were hundreds of men at work in the arsenal at Istanbul. Would the Turkish galleys go on a peaceful circuit of surveillance from one eastern port to another? Would they come westward to attack the coasts of Sicily and the kingdom of Naples? Or would they remain in the Levant to attack Cyprus or Crete?

At a meeting of the Venetian Senate on 24 March, 1567, it was decided that foundries must be established both at Famagusta in Cyprus and at Candia in Crete in order to cast the cannon necessary for the defense of the islands. The foundries would also make it possible to recast useless into useful pieces of artillery. Stoves and grindstones should be prepared to make and dry the powder [from saltpeter (potassium nitrate), charcoal, and sulphur]. Everything should be done as

<sup>89</sup> On the Venetians' vigorous defense of Sforza Pallavicini against Pius IV and their representations on Pallavicini's behalf at the imperial court, see the *Sen. Secreta*, Reg. 74, fols. 23<sup>v</sup>-24<sup>r</sup> [44<sup>v</sup>-45<sup>r</sup>], *al illustrissimo governator nostro generale*, docs. dated 23 July, 1565, which are concerned with "le parole che l' pontifice havea dette contra la Eccellentia vostra [Pallavicini] cosi per causa della morte del quondam Cardinal Fra Giorgio [Martinuzzi] come in materia del Castello Sant' Arcangelo. . . ." Castel S. Arcangelo was Pallavicini's property, which Pius had recently ordered papal forces to take over.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 74, fols. 87<sup>r</sup>-89<sup>v</sup> [108<sup>r</sup>-110<sup>v</sup>], and *cf.* R. Predelli, *ed.*, *Regesti dei Commemorativi*, VI (Venice, 1903), bk. xxiii, no. 120, pp. 312-13.

<sup>91</sup> *Sen. Secreta*, Reg. 74, fol. 90<sup>r</sup> [111<sup>r</sup>], and *cf.* fols. 25<sup>v</sup> [46<sup>v</sup>] and 29<sup>r</sup> [50<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fols. 4 ff. [26 ff.], *et alibi*.

<sup>93</sup> Paolo Tiepolo, "Relazione di Roma [12 March, 1569]" in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), p. 177.

soon as possible. Along with each foundry and each stove, at Famagusta and at Candia, two so-called grindstones should be made. Master founders, approved by the Collegio, would have to be sent to the islands. The expenses were to be met by taking a thousand ducats each from the fifty thousand appropriated for the defense of Cyprus and the twenty thousand for that of Crete, the funds in question being used for this and for no other purpose.<sup>94</sup> Some months later the armed forces on Cyprus, *fanti et bombardieri*, were also increased.<sup>95</sup>

For the defense of the islands an adequate supply of gunpowder would of course be indispensable. Distance was a problem, however, and to the senators, who were always counting ducats, so was the expense. To look ahead for a moment—as events in the thirteen months' war of Cyprus (1570–1571) will soon make clear—the provisioning of the remote island would leave much to be desired. Venice would send more men and more money to Cyprus, but perhaps it was impossible to send aid enough. Pietro Valderio, the viscount of Famagusta, whose unpublished and apparently unknown *Guerra di Cipro* seems to contain the best eye-witness account of the siege of Famagusta, tells us sadly that the defenders of Cyprus, of whom

he was one, were “in the wolf's mouth,” for the Turks were only six hours from their shores!

The Senate, reckoning the cost, the distance, and the possibility of failure, not only was to send no great relief force to Cyprus, but (coming back to the senatorial resolution of 24 March, 1567) could not even keep the Venetian forces on the island provided with enough gunpowder. In his day-to-day account of the siege of Famagusta, Valderio notes in an entry under 22 July, 1571—the war of Cyprus ended eight or ten days later with the fall of Famagusta to the Turks—that some supplies had come via Apulia which were collected and sent to the grindstones “to make powder.” The Christians, however, lacked both charcoal and saltpeter, two of the three components of gunpowder, “which was,” says Valderio, “the salvation of the enemy and our ruination.”<sup>96</sup>

As the Spanish were building galleys in Barcelona and Naples, and the Venetians were strengthening their forces in Crete and Cyprus, it was important that the Christian dealers in contraband should not be adding to the Turkish store of arms. By the bull *Consueverunt Romani pontifices*, published on 27–29 March, 1567, Pius V repeated the age-old excommunication and anathema of those who sold or exported to the Turks and other enemies of Christendom “horses, arms, iron, steel, and all other kinds of metal as well as the implements of warfare, hemp, rope, and the like.”<sup>97</sup> The Venetians, of course, would rather deal with the Turks than fight with them, for war was costly, and the Levantine trade remained profitable. Nevertheless, problems were constantly arising in Istanbul, and letters in Turkish were always being sent to the Signoria. At least some Venetians had to learn Turkish in order to serve the Republic

<sup>94</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fols. 14<sup>v</sup>–15<sup>r</sup> [40<sup>v</sup>–41<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 24 March, 1567: “Di quanta importanza sia che nelle isole nostre di Candia et Cipro vi siano fatte delle fondarie affine che in ogni occasione si possa gettar l'artellaria necessaria per la defensione delle dette importantissime isole et parimente delle stufte et masene [i.e., *macine*, grindstones] per asciugar et far le polvere, et essendo conveniente provvedere del denaro acciochè quanto prima sia dato principio a così necessaria opera, l'anderà parte che per autorità di questo Consiglio sia preso che per cadauna delle dette isole di Candia et Cipro sia fatta una fondaria con tutte le cose necessarie accio che in ogni improvviso bisogno si possi far quelli pezzi d'artellaria, che saranno bastevoli per la conservazione delle dette isole, come per gettar li pezzi inutili et farne di buoni, et etiam siano fatte per cadauna delle dette isole due masene et una stufia per asciugar et far le polvere come di tempo in tempo occorrerà il bisogno . . .” to achieve which purpose experienced workmen should be sent to the islands, “li quali siano maestri di fonder, da esser approvati prima per il Collegio nostro con intervento et ballottatione di essi provveditori sopra le fortezze, et perciò delli ducati cinquantamille destinati in Cipro siano estratti ducati mille per far la detta fondaria, masene, et stufte [should apparently be *sing. stufia*] in Famagosta, et delli ducati vintimille destinati in Candia siano parimente estratti ducati mille per far l'istessa opera nella città di Candia, liqual danari non possono esser spesi in altro, et di essi debba li detti rettori tener conto distinto et particular et mandarlo alli provveditori nostri sopra le fortezze secondo la forma delle leggi in questa materia. +De parte 168, de no 15, non sinceri 9.”

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 38, fol. 38<sup>r</sup> [64<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 23 August, 1567; fol. 52<sup>r</sup> [78<sup>r</sup>], dated 25 October; fols. 57<sup>r</sup>–58 [83<sup>r</sup>–84], 72 ff. [98 ff.].

<sup>96</sup> *La Guerra di Cipro scritta da Pietro Valderio, visconte della città di Famagosta in quel tempo, come chiaramente si raccoglie dalla storia medesima, copiata la seconda volta da N. N. l'anno 1753*, in the Biblioteca Comunale di Treviso, MS. ital. 505 (S3-105-F), p. 157: “Si dava principio a ricuperar carghi di Puglia da tutti dove s'attrovassero, et questa carica fu data a me, dove subito spediti gli officiali, li quali ne anno ritrovato una quantità, et l'abbiamo mandati alle mazine per far polvere, che eravamo alla fine. La mazinga non mancò di lavorare, ma alli continui tiri venissimo al manco, onde che era una miseria in una tanto lontana isola situata in bocca al lupo, che in sei ore da terra e luoghi inimici avevano quello che desideravano—nè più carboni aveamo nè men salnitro, che fu salute dell' inimico e rovina nostra.” On the shortage of gunpowder, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 127–28, 143–44, and on Valderio, see below, Chapter 21, note 18.

<sup>97</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Roma, Busta 1300/15, no. 123, text printed “apud haerces Antonii Bladi, Camerac Apostolicae impressores, 1567.” The bull was republished on 15 April, 1568 (*ibid.*, no. 133).

as dragomans at the Porte and to translate the letters received from the sultans.

Two young Venetians were supposed to be sent to Istanbul every five years to learn Turkish. Thus on 24 March, 1567, the same day that the Senate provided for the production of gunpowder at Famagusta and Candia, one Matteo Marucini, then about twenty-two years of age, was selected for a bursary or fellowship on the Bosphorus. He was a young man of great promise. He was also the brother of Lodovico, the Venetians' "dragoman grande" at the Porte. Under his brother's discipline and tutelage Matteo could not only learn how to speak, read, and write Turkish but also how to negotiate, *il modo del negoziare*, with the Turks, which (as every baillie knew) could sometimes be difficult. It would not be many years, one assumed, before the Signoria could begin using Matteo as a dragoman "to the advantage of our affairs."

As expected, therefore, the Senate voted to send him to the baillie in Istanbul by whatever route or means of travel the Collegio should deem appropriate. Matteo would live, at the expense of the Signoria, in the baillie's household; he would receive as a stipend fifty ducats a year, at the rate of six *lire* and four *soldi* per ducat. The baillie would pay the stipend, "just as he does for the other young men who are there for this reason." For the first year, however, Matteo would receive his fifty ducats' stipend in advance so that he might "put himself in order for his departure."<sup>98</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 38, fols. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>r</sup> [39<sup>v</sup>-40<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 24 March, 1567, *de parte* 187, *de non* 1, *non sinceri* 2, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 22<sup>r</sup> [48<sup>r</sup>], a resolution of the Senate dated 26 April (1567), noting that two young men should be sent to Istanbul every five years to learn Turkish.

Among similar texts, see also Sen. Secreta, Reg. 71, fol. 40<sup>r</sup> [60<sup>r</sup>], from the commission of Marino di Cavalli, *designato baylo a Constantinopoli* (*ibid.*, fols. 37<sup>r</sup> ff. [57<sup>r</sup> ff.]), doc. dated 4 June, 1558), *de parte* 183, *de non* 0, *non sinceri* 1: "Si ritrovano appresso il predecesor tuo doi giovani mandati ivi da noi per imparar la lingua turca in execution della parte del Senato nostro de 22 febraro 1550, liquali accioche possono continuar ad imparar, tenrai in casa, facendo loro le spese secondo la disposizione di essa parte, delquali ne hai havuto copia, procurando con ogni diligentia che attendano ad imparar legger, scriver, et parlar bene nella detta lingua Turca, accioche da loro possiamo haver quel servizio che desideramo. . . et parimente farai che con ogni cura et sollicitudine attendano ad imparar a legger et scriver nella lingua nostra vulgar accioche riuscendo bene el sopradetto idioma Turco sappiano anco tradur bene et elegantemente le scritte che accaderano farsi, dandone aviso di tempo in tempo per lettere tue del frutto che farano, accioche possiamo proveder sicome farà di bisogno per il buon servizio nostro."

Incidentally, after some two years' study of Turkish in Istanbul, Matteo Marucini [or Maurocini] became ill, and was

While the Venetians were becoming more apprehensive about the Turks, they were also annoyed with the Spanish, who had recently imposed taxes (*nova gravezza*) on Venetian merchandise in the kingdom of Naples, "contrary to the privileges granted our nation by the most serene predecessors of his Catholic Majesty."<sup>99</sup> They also had a bone to pick with the Spanish over the boundaries of the duchy of Milan.<sup>100</sup> Pius V and Philip II were wrestling with a larger problem, larger even than the Turks. It was heresy.

Lutheranism had been bad enough, worse than enough, but now Calvinism was spreading into the anti-German areas of eastern Europe. Calvinism was also moving into England and the Netherlands. Philip was appalled by the Netherlanders' addiction to this heresy. Shortly after his election to the papal throne Pius wrote Philip (on 24 February, 1566),

We could not, should not, and would not fail to grant your Catholic Majesty the *quinquennio* for the support of your galleys, but we do advise and pray you to appoint as ministers to collect the subsidy discreet ecclesiastics, who will not cause the clergy a larger aggravation than must needs be, so that the cries of the oppressed may not pierce the divine ears and do your Majesty greater damage than the Turkish armada.

allowed to return to Venice "per rissanarsi della sua infirmità." The assumption was that after his recovery Matteo would go back to the Turkish capital "per continuar ad imparar detta lingua," with a gift of sixty scudi from the Signoria (Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 88<sup>r</sup> [133<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 25 January, 1570 [Ven. style 1569]).

Matteo's departure for Istanbul was apparently delayed, however, for when after the war of Cyprus and the battle of Lepanto, Antonio Tiepolo was chosen to go as baillie to the Porte, his commission (dated 9 June, 1573) contained the following item: "Vederai dalla copia che ti havemo fatta dare la deliberatione del Senato nostro di 30 del mese passato [30 May, 1573] circa il ritornare a Constantinopoli delli fedeli nostri, Matthio Marucini et Marchio Spinelli, per continuare a imparare la lingua Turca, la quale eseguirai . . ." (Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnumbered folio). It would seem that Marucini, like Spinelli, may have sat out the war, in Venice.

On the *interpreti della lingua turchesca* in Cyprus (in 1565), see Sen. Mar, Reg. 37, fol. 22<sup>r</sup> [53<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>99</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 133<sup>v</sup>-134<sup>r</sup> [150<sup>v</sup>-151<sup>r</sup>], *all'ambassador in Spagna* [Antonio Tiepolo], docs. dated 16 and 23 December, 1564.

<sup>100</sup> The commission of Sigismondo di Cavalli as ambassador to Philip II, replacing Antonio Tiepolo, dated 29 March, 1567 (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 11<sup>v</sup>-12<sup>r</sup> [33<sup>v</sup>-34<sup>r</sup>]), illustrates the Republic's continuing concern "in materia di confini con lo stato di Milano. . . et particolarmente nel negotio delle nove imposte nel regno di Napoli. . ." The Senate was much disturbed by the "new imports" levied on Venetian merchants in the Neapolitan kingdom (*ibid.*, fols. 32-33<sup>r</sup> [54-55<sup>r</sup>], 72<sup>r</sup> ff. [94<sup>r</sup> ff.]).

Pius wished that Philip would send an envoy to the diet, which was just getting under way at Augsburg, for he had sent a papal legate [Commendone] and nuncios to the diet "per riparar quanto possemo i dani de le pouere anime alienate da la vera luce." He thanked Philip for retaining Luis de Requesens, the *comandador maior di Castiglia*, as the Spanish ambassador in Rome. No ambassador could be more pleasing than Requesens, owing to his "rare qualities." But Pius's chief concern was heresy: "In France and Burgundy there is a fearful growth of the plague of heresy, and we believe there to be no quicker remedy than that your Catholic Majesty should go there [to the Netherlands] in person."<sup>101</sup>

In the spring of 1566 a storm was brewing in Flanders. Every informed person knew it, including Pius V, who kept insisting that Philip II should go in person to the Netherlands to calm the turbulent waters.<sup>102</sup> He did not go. On 10 August the storm broke out with a destructive fury that perhaps only religious animus can produce. The violence soon spread to Zeeland, Holland, and Frisia. Churches, convents, and monasteries were ravaged everywhere. Graven images, paintings, chalices, reliquaries, stained-glass windows, vestments, and manuscripts were destroyed. The artistic losses were enormous.

On 12 August, before the news of the almost incredible outburst had reached Segovia, Philip II wrote Requesens at length about Pius V's concern "sobre las cosas de Flandes," the necessity to defend the faith, and the provision that must be made for the well-being and preservation of his states in the Netherlands. Philip dealt with a number of things, especially the petition, "la Requête," which the Netherlandish nobles had presented to the regent Margaret of Parma in Brussels [on 5 April, 1566], demanding "the abolition of the Inquisition in all the states [of the Netherlands] and the moderation of the ordinances issued by my

lord the emperor [Charles V], who is in glory, and demanding a general pardon. . . ."

Yes, Philip knew the evil in the northland was increasing. The "conspirators" were again asking with great insistence for an assembly of the Estates General. It was no time for a meeting of the Estates. He had ordered the governors of the provinces in the Netherlands to prohibit and prevent both the assemblies (*juntas*) and the endless preachments (*predicas*) of the Protestants. Taxation must provide the funds for the recruitment of 3,000 horse and 10,000 foot in Germany. Philip was writing to various persons in the Netherlands to help Margaret of Parma as the good and loyal servants they were and ought to be. The German troops to be raised would be put at Margaret's disposal. Philip was looking for a route to the Netherlands other than the "western sea" for, with the winter coming, a voyage to the northland would be most inconvenient. But he certainly would go to the Netherlands "para el remedio y reparo de todos los males y trabajos que ay en [aquellas partes]."

He would seek to secure religious conformity without recourse to arms, if he found it possible to do so, for war could well mean the total destruction of the Netherlands. But, whatever might be the result, Philip intended to restore his rule and his religion. "And so you can assure his Holiness," he wrote Requesens, "that before allowing the slightest damage to our faith and the service of God I would lose all my states and a hundred lives if I had them, for I do not intend—nor am I willing—to be a lord of heretics."<sup>103</sup>

Philip addressed another letter to Requesens on the same day (12 August) more or less in answer to a papal brief (of 16 July) which he had just received. The pope had again urged him to proceed without delay to Flanders. Philip answered as Pius's most obedient son, well aware that the

<sup>101</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, 1, no. 54, p. 131, letter of Pius V to Philip II, dated 24 February, 1566, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 62, pp. 156–57, a letter of Requesens to Philip, dated at Rome on 18 March. With reference to the above quotation I should perhaps state that as usual I follow the source, using *quinquennio* in Italian and *quinquenio* in Spanish.

<sup>102</sup> *Cf.* Serrano, 1, no. 92, p. 235, a letter of Cardinal Michele Bonelli to Gianbattista Castagna, the papal nuncio in Spain, dated at Rome on 9 May, 1566: ". . . Onde sua Santità giudica che saria molto a proposito, anzi necessaria più presto, la presenza di sua Maestà in Fiandra per questo conto—altramente può aspettar in breve d'intender qualche nuova di mala digestione da quei paesi. . . ." See also Requesens' letter to Philip II, dated at Rome on 4 July (1566), *ibid.*, no. 109, pp. 278–79, and *cf.* no. 116, p. 299.

<sup>103</sup> Serrano, 1, no. 122, pp. 312–17, letter of Philip II to Requesens, dated at the Park of Segovia on 12 August, 1566; a summary of this letter may be found in L. P. Gachard, ed., *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas*, 5 vols., Brussels, 1848–79, 1, no. 448, pp. 445–46. Philip was said to be planning, on the advice of the duke of Savoy, to embark at Barcelona, sail to Nice, and pass thence via the county of Burgundy and Lorraine to the Netherlands. He would avoid the western route by sea for fear of "the English and other corsairs" (Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, 1, no. 43, p. 104, letter to Charles IX, dated at Segovia on 11 August, 1566). Fourquevaux believed that Philip would not seek access to the Netherlands through France for various reasons, "mais la principale pour la crainte qu'il auroit que quelque huguenot lui donnast une pistollade en trahison" (*ibid.*, no. 44, pp. 105, 109, letter to Charles, dated 18 August).

pope's message was the consequence "de su muy grande y sancto zelo y del ferviente animo y espíritu con que tracta lo que toca a la religión y fe cathólica." He shared the pope's concern in every way, he said; he had been, and he was, fully informed on the painful subject of Flanders. Coming around, however, quickly to "the delay and tardiness that his Holiness wishes to impute to me for not having myself gone sooner to the said states [in Flanders]," Philip declared that serious matters had required his residence in the Spanish realms.

He would certainly not seek to avoid either hardship or danger, but his Holiness must give due thought to the distance of Flanders and the hostility of the neighboring areas, "que con tanto estudio y diligencia los solicitan y procuran de promover y esforzar este fuego que está ally tan encendido." Philip's going to Flanders would not have the effect which Pius seemed to believe. Not at all. He must go with the fullness of royal authority—he must go with an army. Everyone must know that the costs of such an expedition would be immense,

and that likewise his Holiness must consider the many other important obligations and duties which I have in the maintenance and protection of my realms in the ceaseless warfare which I carry on against the infidel [Turks] in defense of Christendom and in the public interests of the Catholic faith.

Among Philip's countless expenses, as Requesens was to remind the pope, was the aid which he had given Charles IX "para aquietar las cosas de la religión en su reyno," i.e., against the Huguenots. He had also to maintain his "frontiers" in Africa as well as the long coastlines of the Neapolitan kingdom and Sicily. His royal patrimony was exhausted, his subjects impoverished. He needed more funds, more "gracias," from the pope and the Holy See, for the cause he was working for and defending was "esta causa de Dios y de su honor y de su sancta fe y religión."<sup>104</sup>

That Philip II would need an army to buttress his authority in Flanders was only too evident when the news of the Netherlandish revolt which broke out on 10 August (1566) reached the Spanish court. He could not go through France, at least not with an army; also the French had been angered by the massacre in Florida, and (as we have just observed in a note) Philip feared the possibility

of assassination by some Huguenot. On 18 August, however, M. de Fourquevaux wrote Charles IX that Philip was recruiting three thousand horse (*reîtres*) and eight thousand infantry in Germany. If Philip would have trouble reaching the Netherlands, apparently his troops would not, for Fourquevaux understood that the king was moving five or six thousand Spanish and seven or eight thousand Italians from Naples and Sicily to the rebellious provinces.

It would take some time, for Don García de Toledo would have to transport them to La Spezia and Genoa. Then they would go through the duchy of Milan and Piedmont, and head for Franche-Comté through the Valle d' Aosta. This would take them close to Geneva; they would have to remain on the alert, for such proximity would alarm the Swiss. At any rate,

I shall say, with the confidence of being pardoned, that your Majesty ought to regard it as an advantage and make use of the fact that the Grand Seigneur of the Turks is stubbornly persevering in his Hungarian expedition, for otherwise the German rabble [now on the eastern front] is all the more to be feared—if things calm down there, they are going to return to your kingdom, having learned the ways and byways of getting there and having tasted the delights of plundering your subjects.<sup>105</sup>

It would take a good deal of money as well as time to transfer thousands of troops from Naples and Sicily to the Netherlands. While Piali Pasha was operating in the Adriatic, the Algerians were harassing Spanish shipping in the western Mediterranean.<sup>106</sup> Bad news reached the Spanish court at the wooded Park of Segovia both from the coast of the Abruzzi and from Flanders at about the same time.<sup>107</sup> Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, the duke of Alva, was said on 21 September (1566) to be distressed to the point of despair "pour la dilation et longueur dont le Roy Catholique use sans remédier aux désordres de Flandres,"<sup>108</sup> but on that date Piali was still at Valona on the Adriatic. It was Alva himself, however, who explained to Fourquevaux (on 3 December)

<sup>105</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 44, pp. 105-6, 109. The quoted text has also been referred to above, note 103. The papal-Spanish correspondence is full of references to and plans for Philip II's going to Flanders; there are too many such letters to make citation useful, but note Serrano, I, nos. 134, 140, 144-45, 150, pp. 341 ff.

<sup>106</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 50, pp. 121-23.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, I, no. 51, pp. 125-26.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, I, no. 57, p. 133, and cf. no. 59, p. 139: "Le Roy veult envoyer le duc d' Alve en Flandres devant luy. . . ."

<sup>104</sup> Serrano, I, no. 121, pp. 308-12, and on Philip II's ever-lasting need of money and his unending demands on Pius V, see Modesto Ulloa, *La Hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II* (1977), pp. 608 ff., 623 ff.

how the attacks which the Turk had made upon Christendom last year and this year, as well as certain other reasons, have kept the Catholic King from being able to put a stop to the excesses of some of his subjects in the Netherlands.<sup>109</sup>

Although the Venetians were still going their own way, the affairs of Turkey and the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary and Spain were becoming inextricably intertwined. The relations of the Holy See with Spain were the closest, but the lingering charge of heresy against Bartolomé Carranza de Miranda, the archbishop of Toledo, was a source of friction. Carranza had been arrested in 1558; in 1564 he appealed to Pius IV for a trial in Rome; his case looms large in the diplomatic correspondence of 1566. Pius V had insisted upon Carranza's being sent to Rome for trial, and finally toward the end of the year Philip gave way. On 23 November (1566) Castagna could write Cardinal Bonelli that on 1 December Carranza was supposed to be released from the prison, "where he has been for so many years." He would be sent under guard (and with two inquisitors) to Cartagena to embark for Rome when the weather became fit for navigation. The Carranza affair would be settled. Pius was also annoyed, however, by the refusal of Philip—and the viceroys of Sicily and Naples—to allow the bull *In coena Domini*, with its assertions of papal authority, to be published in Philip's various realms without the *exsequatur*, i.e., the king's permission. Without the *exsequatur* in fact all bulls were held up (by the *retención*), and secular authority prevailed in all cases in which appeal was made from ecclesiastical sentences.<sup>110</sup>

Despite problems of authority and jurisdiction, which involved the Holy See in disputes with almost every state in Europe, Pius V appreciated the necessity of avoiding strife. Distressed as he was by the widespread heresies in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and eastern Europe, the Turks weighed equally on his mind. On 14 November (1566) Pius's cardinal-nephew and secretary of state, Michele Bonelli, wrote Gianbattista Cas-

tagna in Madrid that the pope saw an alliance of the Christian princes as the only means of saving Europe from catastrophe. Castagna must make every effort to convince Philip II "to join with the Emperor [Maximilian II] and with France for the defense of all Christendom and of their own states in particular." Unless such a union, *causa sancta et necessaria a questi tempi*, could be achieved, his Holiness foresaw the "manifest ruin of Germany and of Italy, and then piece by piece of all the rest." Reports had reached Rome that the new tyrant in Istanbul, Selim II, was planning an attack upon Vienna in the spring of 1567.<sup>111</sup>

On the same day Requesens drafted a letter to Philip II concerning the two banes of papal existence, the heretics and the Turks. Suleiman's expedition into Hungary had been a fearful business. Cardinal Alessandro Farnese had persuaded the pope that he must try to effect a union of the Christian princes against the Turk, and that he should at the same time prevail upon each prince to root out all heresies in his realm. Pius had then appointed a commission of five cardinals—Morone, Farnese, Granvelle, da Mula, and Commendone—to undertake the necessary negotiations. Granvelle and Requesens had discussed the matter at length, however, and they saw small likelihood of the French either breaking with the Turk or joining the Holy See against the Huguenots. In fact there were too many Huguenots in the royal Council and in the government of France, and one could not expect much of Catherine de' Medici.<sup>112</sup>

At Madrid in mid-December Castagna took up with Philip II the pope's urgent plea that the Christian princes awaken from their perilous slumber, and form a union "contra questo comune inimico il Turco." The sultan's power was so great "that no one by himself alone can resist it." A league of the princes would not only be a defense for the

<sup>111</sup> Serrano, I, no. 151, pp. 384-85.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, I, no. 152, p. 386. The commission of five cardinals could get nowhere, for the French were resentful of not being represented, especially since Granvelle was a member of Philip II's Consejo de Stado (*ibid.*, I, no. 168, p. 434).

Pius V was uncomfortably aware of Cardinal Farnese's papal ambitions, but was not at all able to keep him out of the limelight. In a confidential conversation with Luis de Requesens in late September, 1567, Pius said that if he were Philip II, he would never entrust any castles to Ottavio, duke of Parma, "as long as [his brother] Cardinal Farnese was alive" (*ibid.*, II [1914], no. 89, pp. 221-23, letter of Requesens to Philip, dated at Rome on 13 October, 1567, a revealing text). Pius's reference to "castles" relates to Piacenza and its dependencies, which Philip was still withholding from Ottavio and Margaret of Parma who, incidentally, had never got along well together.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 63, p. 147, a letter to Charles IX, dated at Madrid on 9 December, 1566.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 280-85 and ff., 302-9, 312-25, and on Carranza, note Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, I (1914), nos. 142, 150, 154-55, 159-60, 163, 165, pp. 371 ff., and II (also 1914), nos. 4, 29, 36, 39, 44, 49, pp. 13, 78 ff. Carranza arrived in Rome on 28 May, 1567. On the bull *In coena Domini*, see, *ibid.*, I, no. 164, pp. 415 ff. Numerous studies relating to Carranza have appeared in recent years, those of J. I. Tellechea Idigoras being especially valuable.

numberless poor souls in Christendom threatened by the Turk, "which alone should be enough to move them," but would also constitute the best defense for their own states. As usual Philip listened politely; as usual he gave no definite answer. He was impressed with the pope's "saintly zeal," but the proposed union was a matter of such great importance that he must of course give it due consideration. He would respond later.<sup>113</sup>

Indeed the response came with surprising rapidity, a week or so later. The king's spokesman was the duke of Alva:

The said duke declared in short that his Majesty praised very highly the saintly zeal and most commendable desire [to help] which his Holiness shows toward the Christian commonwealth and its princes. He likewise gives his approval to the plan for a league and union, but just as taking this step would be a good thing and laudable—when one saw that thereby he could with good effect achieve a defense against the enemy—so in his Majesty's opinion to take it at the wrong time and out of season would be harmful and reprehensible. At the present time his Majesty considers that any such negotiation for a league would not only not be useful, but would be very dangerous and damaging. It would not be useful because such undertakings should [only] be attempted when the princes have their forces unimpaired, secure, and confident. Now these forces are weak, divided, and suspect.

Philip II, as Alva observed, had an urgent "enterprise" lying before him in Flanders, "where one part of his forces lay." Now, in order not to lose these entirely, he must use the other part of his forces against them, i.e., the regiments of Lombardy, Naples, and Sicily must be sent against the rebellious Netherlanders. As for Charles IX, Alva said that his kingdom was so divided and corrupt that he could not aspire to help others before he had managed to help himself. He could not think of defending another's house as long as he was not master of his own.

Turkish attacks from the outside were less dangerous than the internal evil, the *male intestino*, of heretics and rebels. Philip II would always be ready, as Alva assured Castagna, to join with other Christian princes for the public good when they had achieved stability in their own domains, and when he had taken care of his Flemish problem. Alva divested himself of "these and many other weighty words." Furthermore, Alva cautioned Castagna (and through him the Holy See), as the nuncio wrote the cardinal-nephew,

that one must deal with this business of Flanders, as was done in Germany, i.e., in such fashion that it should not appear that we are embarking on a campaign because of religion, but rather for the state—not against heretics, but against rebels—for he thinks that in this way one can take from the Germans, the English, and others the chance to take action under the pretext of defending their faith.<sup>114</sup>

Philip II and the duke of Alva were quite right. There was no point in making an anti-Turkish alliance with Maximilian II, who could hardly take care of himself; as for Charles IX, he could not take care of himself, and shaky though it might be, the Franco-Turkish entente still existed. Alva had not mentioned Venice, which was still the major maritime power in Europe. Always suspicious of the Hapsburgs and at odds with Pius V over the Inquisition, the Signoria would continue to play solitaire. On 27 December (1566) Requesens wrote Philip from Rome that

by way of Venice we have learned here that the French ambassador to the Turk had had the word of the father [Suleiman], now confirmed by the son [Selim II], that this coming year he would send an armada to Corsica, and [that] if he should take it, he would dispose of it as the French wished.<sup>115</sup>

One need not take the report seriously, but just suppose the Turks did attack Corsica (as Sampietro Corso had been urging them to do), could one imagine the Venetians' employing their galleys to help ward off a Turkish attack upon Corsica, which was claimed by Genoa, a dependency of Spain?<sup>116</sup> It is obvious why Venetian membership in an anti-Turkish league was not considered seriously. If Piali Pasha had attacked Venetian strongholds along the Dalmatian coast during the summer of 1566, Don García de Toledo would not have moved a galley to help defend them. It would take some doing to make Venice and Spain allies against the Turks, but in fact it would be done.

The Turks were, however, always one of Philip II's major considerations in dealing either with the safety of Spanish shipping on the Mediterranean

<sup>114</sup> Serrano, I, no. 167, pp. 424–28, a letter of Castagna to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Madrid on 23 December, 1566.

<sup>115</sup> Serrano, I, no. 168, p. 433.

<sup>116</sup> In a letter of 25 November, 1566, Cardinal Bonelli had written Castagna that a league of the Christian princes in Pius V's opinion would make for "the defense and security of all Christendom and of the states of his Majesty in particular" (Serrano, I, no. 156, p. 398), i.e., the coasts of Naples, Sicily, and Spain, and the Spanish strongholds on the North African coast, but the Venetians would rather use their galleys to protect Cyprus, Crete, and Corfu, in which the Spanish had little interest.

<sup>113</sup> Serrano, I, no. 165, p. 419, letter of Castagna to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Madrid on 15–17 December, 1566.

or with the maintenance of royal authority in Flanders. Thus on 18 December, 1566, his sister Margaret of Parma, the governess of the Netherlands, wrote Philip that Count Louis of Nassau (a younger brother of William of Orange) had sent to Germany to summon some Lutheran preachers to Antwerp. Despite Margaret's efforts to prevent their coming, four such preachers had entered the Netherlands but, if true, there was worse news than this. Whether fact or rumor, it was being said that the anti-Hapsburg confederates and the Lutheran and other sectaries were going to demand of the emperor, at the coming diet of Augsburg, that he intercede with Philip not to enter the Low Countries with an army. If they failed to persuade the emperor to do so, they would seek to prevail upon the German electors to refuse him all assistance against the Turks, "under the pretext that they will have to guard their lands and properties against the king's troops." Margaret did not believe this and other rumors, but trouble was brewing in the northland at an alarming rate.<sup>117</sup>

Certainly the revolt in the Netherlands had become Philip II's chief problem, and it remained so until the end of his reign. It was, as Alva had told Castagna, a *male intestino*. As for the Turkish menace, Alva had declared it to be "non però di molta importantia." The Flemings in Madrid advised the king against sending an army into Flanders "to avoid the ruination of his own lands and towns." Since it had become clear, however, that Philip was determined to send Alva with an armed force into the rebellious Low Countries before he went northward himself, the Flemings urged Philip first to have Alva's rival and opponent Ruy Gómez go to Flanders, "where he is much loved and much trusted by the count of Egmont, the prince of Orange, and others."

Gómez, they hoped, could appease the lowland princes, put loyal men in important positions, and take possession of the ports, so that the king might easily make his way to Flanders by the "ocean sea," and disembark where he chose. Many members of the king's Council, as Castagna informed Cardinal Bonelli, agreed with this advice, but as of mid-December (1566) apparently no decision had been reached. In any event Alva was to go to Italy "to get the army ready." Under the circumstances the advocates of a peaceful solution to the Flemish problem were availing themselves of Pius V's earlier appeal to Philip to go himself to the Nether-

lands "with compassion and not with fire and sword," for thus could he set matters aright and not make them worse.<sup>118</sup>

It would be easier to make things worse than to set them aright. The Netherlands had been on the whole reasonably well governed by a succession of three women—Charles V's aunt Margaret of Austria (d. 1530), his sister Mary of Hungary, and his daughter Margaret of Austria-Parma. The rule of the last was quickly approaching its end. The Low Countries were seething with unrest and indignation. First of all, the Netherlanders hated the Spaniards, and could not abide the swaggering presence of Spanish soldiers. They had also been objecting violently to the subdivision of the three old Netherlandish archbishoprics of Tournai, Arras, and Utrecht into three new archbishoprics and fifteen episcopal sees. The new ecclesiastical structure would cost much more. It was also seen as a means of stamping out the heresies rife in the Netherlands and, presumably, of introducing the Spanish Inquisition.<sup>119</sup> Compassion was not likely to obliterate heresy. Philip would try "fire and sword."

The duke of Alva would indeed have to go to Italy, as Castagna said, "preparando lo exercito," for (according to Fourquevaux) Philip II was conscripting ten thousand foot in Spain "under thirty ensigns." Presently they would be embarked for Lombardy, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily to man the garrisons, from which his Majesty planned to take the same number of "vieux soldatz Espaignolz" to send to Flanders.<sup>120</sup> The recruitment of troops, the purchase of supplies, and the assembling of galleys, however, could easily arouse the suspicion that such preparations might be intended for a purpose other than that being announced.

The duke of Alva, that "master of sham and concealment," had spoken so often of the coming expedition to Flanders, which was said to be the reason for getting ready a powerful fleet, that doubts arose in Fourquevaux's mind. Ambassa-

<sup>117</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, 1, no. 505, pp. 492-93.

<sup>118</sup> Serrano, I, no. 165, pp. 420-21, letter dated at Madrid on 19 December, 1566, and cf. Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, 1, no. 538, pp. 519-20, with Gachard's note.

<sup>119</sup> On the slow start and the problems involved in creating the new bishoprics in the Netherlands, note Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, 1, nos. 14, 26-27, 29, 38-41, 45, 57, 59, 62, 67, 69, 83, 90, 103, 107, 121, 153, etc., pp. 185 ff. The portrait which Gachard, *ibid.*, 1, pp. CLXI-CLXIV, has drawn of Margaret of Austria-Parma seems to be a fair one.

<sup>120</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, 1, no. 63, p. 148, letter dated 9 December, 1566, and cf. Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, 1, no. 500, p. 487, letter of Philip II to Requesens in Rome, dated 26 November, 1566.



dors were paid to be skeptical but, then, consider the Spanish naval armament. When one added the new galleys which had been built at Barcelona to those of Malta, the Holy See, Florence, Genoa, and Savoy, Philip II had command of 130 galleys or more, not to speak of all the transports to carry horse and foot, munitions and victuals. Stores of supplies had been piling up in diverse ports all year. And what was really the Spanish objective? "I believe, Sire," wrote Fourquevaux, "that it is Algiers, but the business is being carried on with great secrecy." In any event Charles IX would be well advised to see that the coasts of Provence and Languedoc were well garrisoned, "notwithstanding the fact that it seems to me incredible and impossible that the said lord king [Philip], who describes himself as so much your friend, should ever have thought of invading any territory belonging to you, Sire." Certainly, however, one should see that the port of Marseille was provided with a goodly number of galleys.<sup>121</sup> Just in case.

M. de Fourquevaux was unduly suspicious. The preparations being made by Philip II and Alva were directed against Flanders. By a letter patent, dated at the royal villa at Aranjuez (on the left bank of the river Tagus) on 15 April, 1567, Philip appointed Alva his captain-general "ad provinciam Belgicam," directing him to suppress the tumult, scandals, conspiracies, and rebellion in the Low Countries. Alva was to seize, shackle, and punish *debitis ac legitimis poenis* all who were guilty of such treason, including the Knights of the Golden Fleece, despite the privileges and exemptions attending their Order.<sup>122</sup>

After a round of doing this and that, Alva had hurried off to Cartagena, where he arrived on 25 April. He quickly embarked all the troops and all the victuals he found there. He was disappointed that an expected one hundred thousand ducats had not arrived from Seville. On the twenty-sixth he wrote both Philip II and the latter's secretary Francisco de Eraso. In order to lose no time he planned to sail that night. Most of the galleys were ready. He would leave twelve of them behind to wait for the money, and bring it to him later. The money would be safe, and so would the galleys,

"so full of soldiers." Annoyed by the precise, extensive details of his orders, Alva wrote Philip another two letters from Cartagena on 27 April, where he was held up a day, because the hundred thousand ducats had just come. They were loaded aboard the galleys, "and within three or four hours with God's help we shall be on our way."<sup>123</sup>

Alva was one of the great soldiers of the century, unimpeded by conscience or compassion. Very shortly Margaret of Parma would warn Philip II of the disastrous consequences likely to attend Alva's appointment to the Netherlands; he was odious enough, she said, to make the entire Spanish nation hated.<sup>124</sup> Nonetheless, when Alva moved, he moved quickly. Despite a storm and an attack of gout in one foot—why was every male then suffering from gout?—by 4 May Alva had reached Mataró, just northeast of Barcelona. The Spanish galleys then moved up the coast to Palamós, and on the sixth Alva wrote Philip II from Cabo de Creus. He landed at Savona on the seventeenth, and wrote Philip from Genoa on 24 May.<sup>125</sup> From Genoa, where the entertainments did his gout no good, Alva hurried northward to Alessandria and thence to Asti; entering Asti on 6 June, he waited there three or four days for the arrival of at least two bodies of troops. His progress was slowed by illness, a fever so great that he could not leave his bed for a chair, "and my physician protested loudly that if I set out again, I should be risking my life." He remained quiet for eight days; the fever left him on 13 June, and on the seventeenth he departed for Turin.

Now he met the duke of Savoy, Emmanuel Philibert, with whom he spent an hour. The duke made Alva "grandes ofrecimientos en el servicio de vuestra Majestad," and declared himself most willing to go with him through Savoy and even all the way to Flanders. Alva was at Rivoli, just northwest of Turin, on 19 June, and soon thereafter at Novalesa, north of Susa. At Novalesa he awaited the arrival of the main body of his troops, whom he had set on the march in three divisions to make

<sup>121</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 63, p. 151, letter dated at Madrid on 9 December, 1566.

<sup>122</sup> "Negocios de los Países Bajos: Cartas de Felipe II, de su hermana Margarita. . . gobernadora de los Países Bajos, del Duque de Alva y de otros sobre cosas pertenecientes á aquellos Estados," in the *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, IV, pt. 2 (Madrid, 1844, repr. Wiesbaden, 1964), 344-49.

<sup>123</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, IV, 349-58. In a letter of 4 May, 1567, Philip II responded to some of Alva's reasons for dissatisfaction with the specificity of the instructions he had received (*ibid.*, IV, 358-59). Cf. Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 559-63, p. 530. Alva and his troops would be transported to Genoa in Giannandrea Doria's galleys (Serrano, II, no. 33, p. 87, doc. dated 7 April, 1567).

<sup>124</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, no. 611, p. 556, letter dated at Antwerp on 12 July, 1567.

<sup>125</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, IV, 360-63, letters of Alva to Philip II, dated 6 and 24 May, 1567.

it easier to provide lodgings and to avoid some of the hazards of too large concentrations of soldiers. As the drive toward Flanders continued, Alva took command of the vanguard; the Prior Don Hernando, of the main force; and Chiappino Vitelli, whom we have seen at Malta, of the rearguard.

A delegate of the "four Catholic cantons" of Switzerland had already assured Alva of their good will and their desire to serve his Spanish master. Alva had by this time received "many and diverse reports" that the French were enlisting 6,000 Swiss mercenaries. They were getting the bands ready to take the road to Dauphiné (to protect the French border), but Alva was sure that they had not been recruited to pick a quarrel with him. In any event Alva also decided to raise 6,000 Swiss in the Catholic cantons. In writing to Philip II on 28 June (1567) Alva asked his Majesty to send to Flanders in the first ships that were to leave the Bay of Biscay about 4,000 pikes, because his infantry had few, although he seemed to think that he had enough arquebuses.<sup>126</sup>

Although Pius V had been unwilling (in late November, 1566), after conceding the *quinquenio*, also to grant Philip the *Cruzada* and certain other "graces" he had asked for,<sup>127</sup> he eventually yielded to Spanish pressure and to Philip's repeated assurances that he would go to Flanders after Alva's arrival there. On 15 July, 1567, Pius granted Philip the subsidy known as the *excusado*, a tithe on every third household (*una domus post duas*) in every parish in the kingdoms of the Spains and the adjacent islands. This diversion of one third of the general tithe to the king was to begin on 1 January, 1568, and was to last for five years, another sort of *quinquenio*. The reason for authorizing the *excusado*, aside from the costs of the army of horse and foot that Philip was going to send into Flanders, was the great expense he had been put to "pro tuitione religionis Christianae contra immanissimum Turcarum tyrannum."<sup>128</sup> By this time Pius was less concerned with the exercise of compassion than with the suppression of heresy.

We seem to be well informed concerning the numbers of the troops Alva was now leading toward Flanders. According to a contemporary record, there were 1,250 light horse and mounted arquebusers, 2,000 foot of the regiment (*tercio*) of Lombardy, 3,500 of the regiment of Naples, 1,800 of the regiment of Sardinia, and 1,500 of the regiment of Sicily—a total of 10,050 armed men. Leaving Asti (allegedly on 25 June), after their order of march had been determined, they soon got ahead of Alva, and reached Brussels on 9 August, according to the text in question.<sup>129</sup> At any rate Alva wrote Philip II from Luxembourg on 8 August,<sup>130</sup> and arrived in Brussels on the afternoon of Friday, the twenty-second, accompanied by his body-guard and gentlemen-in-waiting. There was no welcome, no public reception.

Unencumbered by heavy artillery, Alva's ten thousand troops, Spanish and Italian, mostly infantry, had marched rapidly—through the Col du Mt. Cenis, through Savoy into Franche-Comté, thence into Lorraine, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.<sup>131</sup> Everyone had known that as Alva's forces went from Savoy into Franche-Comté, they would pass within eight or ten leagues of Geneva. Pius V had seen the presence of a Spanish army within easy striking distance of Geneva as a splendid opportunity to destroy that nest of Protestant vipers. Philip II had declared, however, "that now is not the time to attempt the enterprise of Geneva. . . ."<sup>132</sup>

Obviously it would be advisable to wait, but the opportunity of an army in the Netherlands should not be lost. As the cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli had written the nuncio Gianbattista Castagna in Madrid (on 29 April, 1567) the latter must again ask Philip II "per beneficio della religione" not to discharge the army when he had settled matters in the Netherlands. He should then turn

<sup>126</sup> *Docs. inédits*, IV, 367-73, a letter of Alva to Philip II, "de Sanct Juan de Moriana, 28 de junio de 1567."

<sup>127</sup> Serrano, I, no. 158, pp. 403-4, and cf. *Docs. inédits*, IV, 341.

<sup>128</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, II (1914), append., pp. 524-25. As for Philip II's oft-stated promise to go to Flanders, on 12 July, 1567, just three days before the papal grant of the *excusado*, Philip was writing to Rome to Cardinal Granvelle (who would pass the word on to the pope) that he would go by sea to Flanders as being less roundabout than the Italian route (*Docs. inédits*, IV, 374, and cf. Serrano, II, no. 77, pp. 200-1).

<sup>129</sup> *Docs. inédits*, IV, 382-83, and note Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, II, no. 68, p. 180, a letter of Castagna to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Madrid on 22 August, 1567: "A courier had just reached the Spanish court from Flanders, 'il qual porta lettere del Duca d'Alba de li X del presente da Lucimburg con avviso che già l'esercito era dentro in Fiandra due giornate più adentro di Lucimburg senza nissuno ostacolo né difficoltà, et caminando il Duca la volta di Bruselles. . . .'"

<sup>130</sup> *Docs. inédits*, IV, 379-81.

<sup>131</sup> The French ambassador in Madrid had informed Charles IX in a letter dated 9 December, 1566, what the route would be (Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 63, p. 149), and what other route would a Spanish army be likely to take between Lombardy and the Netherlands?

<sup>132</sup> Serrano, II, no. 50, p. 131, a letter of Castagna to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Madrid on 8 June, 1567, and cf. Gachard, *Correspondence de Philippe II*, I, no. 603, p. 552.

to the "enterprise of Geneva," which would be rendering a great service to the Church. Also Geneva had long been an asylum for rebels from his Majesty's states—Spain, Italy, Brabant, and Flanders—as well as from France, Savoy, and Germany. It had long been a center of conspiracy against the Catholic princes. If Philip's troops drove these rebels and refugees from Geneva, they would have a hard time finding another place "nel quale potessero convenire tante lingue, con tanta libertà e commodità de vivere." If Philip had been planning, however, when the Flemish affairs were settled, to let the army in the Netherlands go to serve the Emperor Maximilian II against the Turks, Pius would not seek to interfere but, clearly, he would prefer to see the regiments of Lombardy and Naples employed against the Genevans rather than against the Turks.<sup>133</sup> The Holy See, Geneva, and the Netherlands, Spain, the Empire, and the Turks, they were all caught up together in an international labyrinth.<sup>134</sup>

Alva had reached Brussels, as we have stated, on Friday afternoon, 22 August (1567), with no demonstrations of welcome from either the populace or the Netherlandish princes. He went directly to the palace, where the regent Margaret of Parma awaited him. As he began to mount the stairs, the captain of Margaret's guard and her archers halted the ascent of Alva's halberdiers. There was an awkward, dangerous moment, as both archers and halberdiers took their weapons in hand. The captain of the guard then told the duke that orders had been given that his halberdiers should not come up the stairs. Alva replied that they would do as Madame ordered,

and the duke of Alva's guard halted therewith and retired, and he entered and spoke to Madame in the chamber, where she has her bed, and where she is accustomed to give audiences. She was standing, and moved neither forward nor back. . . .

We owe this account of Alva's meeting with Margaret of Parma to a letter which Miguel de

Mendivil, an artillery officer, wrote Philip II from Brussels on 29 August (1567), a week later. He informed the king—and us—that Alva advanced to meet Margaret "with as much courtesy and reverence as one would approach our lady, the queen." As he spoke with Margaret, he remained with his head uncovered, although she kept telling him to replace his hat. Finally he did so, and they stood talking for a good half hour, as Margaret leaned against a table. According to Mendivil, Alva was the very model of courtly manners; Margaret was cool, rigid, more so than when she dealt with Egmont "and these other lords here."

There was much dissatisfaction among Margaret's councilors as well as among others that Alva should have been allowed to enter Brussels "without making him show the letters of authority [*poderes*] which he brought from your Majesty." Madame, they said, should request these commissions without further delay. In fact the Council decided to demand them of Alva on the following day. Mendivil was so advised. He informed Alva, who summoned the president of the Council, and sent him off with a letter from Philip II as well as with texts of his commissions. When the councilors had seen them, they were "todos muy lastimados," all most aggrieved. So was Margaret, who was telling all and sundry that she wished to go home—to Italy—"because of the affronts your Majesty has put upon her."

Mendivil reported to Philip, perhaps without exaggeration, the Netherlanders' discontent and disaffection with the Spanish. Some of Margaret of Parma's servitors as well as the Netherlandish lords, captains, officials, and others were all in a rebellious mood,

saying that they have been let down and dishonored because of these Spaniards, and that now the latter want to subjugate them, ruin them, tyrannize over them, and a thousand other things of this sort, stated so openly and shamelessly that the whole business is a great scandal and a danger.

The worst offender appears to have been a Franciscan friar, Margaret's confessor and preacher, for last Sunday [24 August], preaching to her in the palace chapel, he dealt with almost nothing else in the entire sermon but that the Spaniards were traitors and thieves, ravishers of women, and that the country which put up with them was completely destroyed, all with such dreadful violence and evil that he deserved to be burned.

When protest was made to Margaret that the preacher should be punished, she reluctantly ordered him to leave Brussels. As for the president

<sup>133</sup> Serrano, II, no. 37, pp. 95-96, and *cf.* *ibid.*, nos. 47, 51, 56, 73, 83, 115, 194, pp. 119-20, 133, 151, 190, 211, 277-78, 444.

<sup>134</sup> In a letter of 12 July, 1567, Philip II told Requesens, his ambassador in Rome, that the nuncio Castagna had been pressing "three points" on him (Serrano, II, no. 61, p. 166): "El primero fué que su Santidad deseava mucho que se destruyesse Geneva, . . . el segundo . . . que convenia mucho el juntarnos todos para la defensa del Turco y bien de la religion, . . . el tercero fué volverme á solicitar en lo de la liga contra el Turco. . . ." *Cf.* *ibid.*, II, no. 73, p. 190, a letter of Requesens to Philip, dated at Rome on 13 September, 1567.

of the privy council [Viglius], he said the friar did not deserve punishment "for having preached the truth!"

Finally, word had now come from Italy that Margaret's husband Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma and Piacenza, her son Alessandro (who would also become governor-general of the Netherlands about a dozen years later), and her brother-in-law Cardinal Alessandro had all written her "that she ought to retire and give up the government since your Majesty has sent the duke of Alva." Margaret had already written Philip II, asking for leave to go.<sup>135</sup> From Madrid on 13 October (1567) Philip wrote her, granting "vostre si grand désir de vous retirer," and at the end of the year she left the Netherlands. Alva replaced her as regent.<sup>136</sup>

Alva had hardly arrived when the bitter complaints began. The Spanish were guilty of one atrocity after another. Word was that they were confiscating everything, "saying that all who have property are heretics, and have to lose it." It was said that the plague was ravaging their encampment, and dysentery as well. Many of them were dying. It was also said that they had brought more than two thousand whores with them, "so that we shall have no lack of whores, considering those we already have." The Sicilian infantry reached Brussels on 25 August. Every Netherlander must place his hope

in God and the king, but at least one claimed to have faith in the lord duke of Alva, "a virtuous, illustrious, experienced, sage, and prudent personage."<sup>137</sup>

Revolt was mounting in the Netherlands and so was the emigration of thousands of the abler citizens, who carried their wealth and skills to England, France, and Germany. And their exodus continued despite the harsh measures Philip II soon took to prevent their escape from the Spanish tyranny.<sup>138</sup> On 9 September (1567) the prominent dissidents Lamoral, count of Egmont, the victor at S. Quentin and Gravelines, and Philippe de Montmorency, count of Hoorn, admiral of the fleet which had taken Philip II from the Netherlands back to Spain (in the fall of 1559), were both arrested in Brussels, and thereafter imprisoned in Ghent. Alva immediately sent a courier to Requesens in order that the latter might inform Pius V, who was pleased that a "remedy" had now been found for the religious ills of the Low Countries.<sup>139</sup> Condemned by Alva's "Council of Blood" in early June, 1568, they were promptly beheaded in the main square at Brussels.

Apparently the news first reached Rome by way of Venice, at the same time as it was reported that the Turkish armada was known to have set sail, "and the Venetians were hastening to put their

<sup>135</sup> *Docs. inédits*, IV, 397-404, letter of Miguel de Mendivil, "contador de artillería del ejército de Flandes," to Philip II, dated at Brussels on 29 August, 1567. Castagna wrote Cardinal Bonelli from Madrid on 8 September (Serrano, II, no. 72, p. 189). "S' intende che prima che si sieno veduti, è stata alcuna discordia tra Madama et il Duca d'Alba circa l'alloggiamento de li soldati et de la persona propria del Duca. . . ." Ottavio Farnese was in Rome for two or three days between 6 and 9 September (1567), during which time he told Requesens "que Madama le avia scripto que pensava venirse muy presto a Italia, y que le parecia por sus cartas que estava descontenta, y señaló el disgusto que avia tenido de la yda del Duque de Alva. . ." (*ibid.*, II, no. 73, pp. 193-94, Requesens to Philip II, dated 13 September, an interesting letter).

There is a summary of Mendivil's letter of 29 August in Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, no. 631, pp. 567-69. On Margaret of Parma's dissatisfaction and distress, *cf.*, *ibid.*, I, nos. 584, 635, pp. 540-41, 570-71, et alibi.

<sup>136</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 658, 662, 685-86, pp. 583, 584, 601, and II (1851), *append.*, no. CXIX, pp. 651-52. The commission appointing Alva "à ladicte régence et gouvernement général de nosdicts Pays-Bas" was signed by Philip II "de nostre main" on 8 October, 1567 (*ibid.*, II, no. CXVIII, pp. 650-51). Margaret wrote Philip from Luxembourg on 12 January, 1568. She would be on her way to Milan by way of Switzerland as soon as the German Reiter, who were a dozen leagues from Luxembourg, and the Protestant prince of Condé, who was only three leagues away, would assure her a free passage (*ibid.*, II, no. 715, p. 6).

<sup>137</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 627-28, pp. 565-66, letters of Jean de Hornes and Jean de Pennants, dated 25 and 26 August, 1567.

<sup>138</sup> On 2 October, 1567, Philip II moved against those who were fleeing the country, "desconfiándose de nuestra gracia y bondad [I]se van fugitivos y transportan sus bienes y familia, abandonando su país y patria, de que se consigue su propia ruina y perdición. . . ." and he decreed "que no puedan transportar por agua ni por tierra sus bienes muebles ó mercaderías con intención de retirarse y ausentarse del dicho país, so pena que serán tenidos por culpados y sospechosos de las revueltas y desórdenes que han acaesido los dias pasados. . ." (*Docs. inédits*, IV, 440-41), i.e., death and the confiscation of property. On the flight from the Low Countries, especially to England, as early as January, 1566, see Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, no. 351, p. 392.

<sup>139</sup> Serrano, II, no. 87, p. 216, a letter of Requesens to Philip II, dated at Rome on 29 September, 1567: "Su Santidad está con salud. . . y ha tomado mucho contentamiento de la prisión de los Condes de Agamón y Horna, y de los demas que en los Estados de Flandes se prendieron a los 9 deste, pareciendole que se comienza ya a poner remedio en lo que ally conviene, especialmente que el Duque me avisó desto con un correo proprio para que diesse dello quenta a su Santidad. . . ." *Cf.*, *ibid.*, II, no. 89, p. 221, and nos. 94, 103, pp. 241, 263; see esp. *Docs. inédits*, IV, 416-21, 423-27; and note Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 637-38, pp. 572-74, and nos. 645, 653, pp. 576-77, 580-81. On Alva's disregard of the privileges supposedly enjoyed by the Knights of the Golden Fleece, see, *ibid.*, I, nos. 647, 655, pp. 578, 581-82.

galleys in order." Pius was afraid that the armada was headed for Ragusa, "que sería mala vezindad para toda Italia." He had also received reports that the armada was a likely threat to Ancona, which even he did not believe. So Juan de Zúñiga, who had replaced his brother Requesens as the Spanish ambassador in Rome, wrote Philip II on 25 June (1568). Two weeks later, in a dispatch of 9 July, Zúñiga could inform Philip that Pius had been greatly pleased to see the sentences pronounced against Counts Egmont and Hoorn "and the account of the way in which they were carried out." Alva had sent copies of the sentences and the *relación* of the executions to Cardinal Francisco Pacheco, who had passed the material on to the pope.

The Venetian ambassador, however, had said it seemed to him that too much blood had been shed in Flanders. All the world knew of Egmont's services to the Hapsburgs. If only he and Hoorn had done something to merit such punishment! Pius V had replied with annoyance that since Philip II had ordered the punishment, they must have deserved it. Shortly afterwards, when he had received copies of their sentences, he sent them to the ambassador, who excused himself with a shrug of the shoulders since, as he put it, he had not known the charges.

One always looked forward to the latest news from the Rialto, where the agents of Ulrich Fugger often shared their *avvisi* with the Signoria. The baillie in Istanbul was vigilant, and so were the Republic's officials in Cyprus and Crete. On the basis of reports from Venice, Juan de Zúñiga could reassure Philip II (in his dispatch of 9 July) that the Turkish armada was not to be feared after all, at least not for the year 1568. *No viene tan poderosa*. Eighty Turkish galleys had been halted at Chios by the plague. Six had been lost in a storm. The revolt in Arabia was continuing; the sultan would have to give it his attention. The peace which had been made between the Poles and the Muscovites had also put the sultan on guard. He had sent troops to their borders. Zúñiga believed, in the light of all this, that no "very powerful" armada was coming westward on any "great enterprise."

The Turks had armed their galleys solely for defense, from fear of the Spanish fleet. They were well aware that his Majesty had named Don John of Austria his captain-general of the sea, and were afraid that in the first year of his command he might attempt "some enterprise in their lands." It could be, of course, that with eighty galleys at sea, plus those of the corsairs, they might come westward "to rob what they could, knowing [now

that your Majesty's galleys are scattered." The Venetian ambassador was apprehensive, and had just sent his secretary to Zúñiga to inquire whether Don John was bringing galleys to Italy:

I told him that your Majesty had sent the lord Don John in pursuit of the armada of Algiers which usually sails out to attack the fleet coming from the Indies. When this was over and done with, I did not know what your Majesty would order him to do.<sup>140</sup>

The Turks were always a worry and an expense, even when they had not embarked on a campaign against Hapsburg Hungary or on a naval expedition into the western Mediterranean. The previous winter, for example, when one could only guess at the Turks' springtime plans, Maximilian II's ambassador, the baron von Dietrichstein, had asked Philip II for the assessment which the estates of the Empire had laid upon the Netherlands (as a part of the Empire) "for the war against the Turk," for Maximilian was still at armed odds with the Porte. The amount specified was 130,616 florins. By a letter of 18 December, 1567, Philip instructed Alva to pay the sum requested, from local funds if possible, otherwise from the money which had been sent from Spain.<sup>141</sup>

Alva had seized Egmont and Hoorn, charging them with the crime of *laesa majestas*—treason—"el caso de *trahison* que dicen en francés." Egmont and Hoorn were Knights of the Golden Fleece. So was William, prince of Orange, who had been too wary to fall into Alva's treacherous snare. According to the indictment against William, however, he had been the chief author and instigator of the revolt, for it was said to be common knowledge, confirmed by the testimony of creditable witnesses, "que Guillermo de Nassau, principe de Orange, fué principal autor y promovedor de toda la conspiración, conjuración y rebelión que en estas provincias se hizo contra la real Magestad y la prosperidad de la república. . . ." William's lieutenant and fellow warrior for freedom from Spain was his brother Louis of Nassau.<sup>142</sup> The Emperor

<sup>140</sup> Serrano, II, nos. 173-74, pp. 402-405, letters of Zúñiga to Philip II, dated at Rome on 25 June and 9 July, 1568. On Zúñiga's replacement of his brother Requesens as Spanish ambassador to the Curia Romana, note, *ibid.*, II, no. 105, 107, pp. 265-66, 267-68. On 10 December, 1567, Pius V had expressed, in a brief to Philip II, pleasure and hope in the latter's appointment of his young brother Don John of Austria as commander of all the royal fleets (*ibid.*, II, no. 109, pp. 269-70).

<sup>141</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, no. 703, p. 612.  
<sup>142</sup> *Docs. inédits*, IV, 428-39, 447-51: "Y por la misma causa el mismo principe [William of Orange] principalmente sobornó al Conde Ludovico de Nassau su hermano para que por él se hiciese aquella detestable conjuración de algunos nobles que él

Maximilian II had intervened (on 19 and 20 October, 1567) on behalf of both Egmont and Hoorn.<sup>143</sup> It had done no good.

Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alva, was now regent and governor-general of the Netherlands as well as captain-general of Philip II's armed forces. His reign of terror was well under way. In the Netherlands the Spanish were beginning to fall into a morass. They would never get out of it. We shall conclude this chapter, however, without falling into the morass with them. Despite all his promises to return to the Netherlands, Philip II never did so. Alva's rule lasted for six years (1567-1573). He was followed by Luis de Requesens (d. 1576), Don John of Austria (d. 1578), and Alessandro Farnese (d. 1592), the last being the ablest of all the governors-general of the Netherlands. Years of warfare, stagnancy, and attempts at conciliation lay ahead, but early in 1579 the future seemed to become discernible. On 5 January of that year, with the formation of the league of Arras, the Catholic "Malcontents" of the south broke away from the northern provinces, reasserting their adherence to Catholicism and their obedience to Philip II. The northerners then entered (on 23 January) into the famous Union of Utrecht,<sup>144</sup> and when by the end of 1585 Farnese had taken Flanders and Brabant, Spain and the Holy See had won in the south and lost in the north.

The Spanish did not give up their claim to the northern provinces. After a truce of a dozen years (1609-1621),<sup>145</sup> the war was resumed. The Dutch in the United Provinces were determined to main-

tain their independence, and they did so. Although the Spanish took Breda in 1625—an event commemorated by Velázquez in his well-known painting now in the Prado in Madrid—the city was recovered by the house of Orange in 1637. Another dozen years passed, however, before Philip IV of Spain and the Estates General of the United Provinces made peace by the treaty of Münster in Westphalia (on 30 January, 1648)

après le long cours des sanglantes guerres, qui ont affligé par tant d'années les peuples, sujets, royaumes, et pays de l'obéissance des seigneurs Roy des Espagnes et Estats Généraux des Provinces-Unies du Pays-Bas.

By the very first article of the "perpetual peace" which was now signed between the king of the Spains and the emissaries of the Estates the complete and absolute independence of the Protestant Low Countries (*libres et souverains estats*) was recognized by Philip IV for himself and his heirs forever.<sup>146</sup> The foundations had been laid not only for the modern state of the Netherlands but also (from 1830) of Belgium.

Although the revolt of the Netherlands was a serious and became a costly distraction, the attention of Philip II and his councilors (often at odds with one another) was not quickly diverted from the Mediterranean. When the Spanish and Italian troops were withdrawn from Lombardy and Naples, Sicily and Sardinia—to be sent into Flanders—they were immediately replaced by new recruits from Spain.<sup>147</sup> Furthermore, as we have seen, Philip still had command of 130 galleys or more to employ against the Turks if need be.<sup>148</sup> From the far West the Spanish could not strike at Turkey nor could the Turks, despite help from the Barbary corsairs, make much of an impress upon the Spanish coasts. The Italian peninsula and Sicily were apparently less vulnerable than they had been in the earlier 1550's, for the Spanish had become better organized and, even with Flanders to worry about, Philip had fewer distractions than his father Charles V had had. The Hospitallers were refortifying their island stronghold of Malta,

ellos llamaban "Compromiso," con la cual obligando entre sí sus vidas y haciendas contra la administración de la justicia y seguridad de la república, juraron de asistir unos á otros contra el Rey, al cual acusaban como á barbaro, tirano y opresor de la libertad. . . ."

The authors and signatories of the "Compromise" had presented Margaret of Parma with the petition and protest known as the "Request" on 5 April, 1566, "la requête contre l'inquisition et les placards" (Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 364-70, 373-74, pp. 400-11), one of the first serious steps toward outright rebellion.

<sup>143</sup> Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, I, nos. 668-69, p. 588. Granvelle was sympathetic toward Egmont (*ibid.*, I, nos. 674, 681, pp. 595, 599).

<sup>144</sup> J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. V, pt. 1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), no. CLVIII, pp. 322-33, "traité d'union et d'alliance perpétuelle entre les pays, provinces, villes et membres de Hollande, Zelande, Utrecht, etc. qui depuis, à cause de ce traité, furent appelées les 'Provinces-Unies,' fait à Utrecht le 23 Janvier 1579," with addenda.

<sup>145</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. V, pt. 2 (1728), nos. LXIII, LXVI, esp. LXVIII, LXXX, pp. 94-95, 97-98, 99-102, 119-20.

<sup>146</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. VI, pt. 1 (also 1728), no. CCXXXI, pp. 429-41, esp. pp. 429-30.

<sup>147</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I (1896), no. 63, p. 148, doc. dated at Madrid on 9 December, 1566: ". . . Le dicit Seigneur Roy fait une levée de dix mil hommes de pied en ce royaume souz trente enseignes, lesquelz s'embarqueront de bref pour aller en Lombardie, Naples, Sardaigne et Sicille entrer aux lieux et places en garnizon, d'où sa Majesté fait tirer pareil nombre de ses vieulx soldatz Espaignolz. . . ."

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, I, no. 63, p. 151.

and were putting to sea again. While the Turks had taken pleasure in their destructive raids upon Italy and Sicily, they had also found them expensive. Except for some slaves and the satisfaction of injuring an enemy, the raids had brought the Porte small profit.

After the death of Sultan Suleiman, Maximilian II's war with the Turks slowed down well-nigh to a halt, and his friendly overtures to the Porte received an almost neighborly response. On 21 September, 1567, three imperial ambassadors—the Belgian Albert von Wyss, the Styrian Christoph Teuffenbach, and the Croatian Anton Verantius, bishop of Erlau (Eger) in northern Hungary—were well received in an audience by Sultan Selim II. Thereafter over a period of five months Maximilian's spokesmen had fourteen sometimes difficult sessions with the grand vizir, Mehmed Sokolli. To win his favor they had been equipped with gifts of no small value to present to him—four thousand ducats, four silver beakers, and a watch.<sup>149</sup>

According to the provisions of the last Austro-Turkish treaty the grand vizir was to receive 2,000 ducats a year, and the sultan an annual "gift" (not of course a tribute) of 30,000 ducats, along with twenty gilded beakers and two or three watches. The second vizir was to be offered for his assistance 2,000 ducats, two gilded beakers, and a watch; the third vizir, 1,000 ducats and two silver beakers; and each of the other three vizirs, 1,000 ducats a year. The dragoman Ibrahim Beg, the Polish renegade whom Busbecq had befriended, was to be given 500 ducats, and the second dragoman Mahmud, a German, 300 ducats. The imperial envoys were likewise to make a present of 2,000 ducats to Joseph Nasi, the Jewish duke of Naxos, whose word carried weight with his friend Sultan Selim.

There were hard nuts to crack in the negotiations. Maximilian had instructed his envoys not to agree to the demolition of the fortifications of Veszprém, Tata, and Tokay, but to try to get the Turks to destroy their strongholds at Berence and in the town of Babócsa in southwestern Hungary. There were conflicts of interest over the Hungarian-Transylvanian frontiers, and the division of the peasantry in the disputed areas under

cultivation. Besides all this the envoys were to do their best to see that neither France nor Venice was included in the projected treaty, although France had been almost an ally of the Porte, and Venice had had no conflict with the Turks since the "capitulations" of 1540. But the sultan had other interests and other problems than the war with Maximilian, and finally on 21 February, 1568, a peace was signed between the Empire and the Porte, largely on the basis of a *status quo ante*, a more favorable settlement perhaps than the Austrian envoys had expected.

The treaty was for eight years. It left Maximilian and his brothers Ferdinand and Charles in possession of their territories in Hungary, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, with the understanding that they should not intrude upon the Turks in Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. The high contracting parties undertook to prevent all persons of high estate and low, from voivodes to brigands, from breaking the peace. Robbers were to be punished, and their proceeds restored to the rightful owners. Escaped slaves and deserters were to be returned. Disputes between the two powers were to be settled by arbitration. The persons of ambassadors and members of their entourage were to be secure from detention or assault. Should the peace be broken, the ambassadors and the members of their suite could return, without molestation, to their principals. They could receive in their own dwellings dragomans and couriers, and choose their places of residence, according to their preference, in Istanbul or north of the Golden Horn in Galata. The unresolved problems of the frontiers and the division of the peasantry would be submitted to the study and decision of a commission of the two parties. The sultan would receive *munere honorario* 30,000 Hungarian ducats every year from the emperor.

Three days after Maximilian's envoys thought that fundamental agreement had been reached, Mehmed Sokolli had made three further demands: 1) that France, Venice, and Poland should be included in the treaty; 2) that Maximilian should be referred to in the treaty as the friend of the sultan's friends and the enemy of his enemies; and 3) that the peasants who dwelt within the areas to be divided should be allotted to the two powers according to the register of taxes of the Ottoman finance minister Khalil. The envoys rejected the first demand, which Mehmed Sokolli seems to have made at the request of Granrre de Grandchamp, the French ambassador to the Porte. They also declined to accept the second as having no precedent in Austro-Turkish relations, and as for the third,

<sup>149</sup> As we have had more than one occasion to note, the Turks were always pleased to receive clocks—and watches, which might be set in rings or in the hilts of daggers—on which cf. O. Kurtz, *European Clocks and Watches in the Near East*, London and Leiden, 1975, pp. 22 ff.

they said that both parties had just agreed to refer the matter to a commission.

The grand vizir gave way, apparently without an argument. Clearly Selim II and some of his advisors, especially Joseph Nasi, wanted peace. Mehmed Sokolli had doubtless included France to please M. de Grandchamp. Sokolli did, however, refuse the envoys' request for a giraffe for the imperial menagerie. No, the Turks had only one giraffe. They needed it to get their horses accustomed to the towering creature, so they would not take fright. The Transylvanian envoys arrived too late to block or modify the treaty, which was a setback for John Sigismund Zápolya. On 20 March (1568) Verantius and Teuffenbach left the Ottoman court at Adrianople for Vienna, accompanied by Ibrahim Beg, the dragoman who had presented Maximilian's father Ferdinand with Sultan Suleiman's ratification of the previous Austro-Turkish treaty at Frankfurt am Main in November, 1562.<sup>150</sup>

While Philip II was engaged in the Netherlands,

Selim made the eight years' peace with the Emperor Maximilian. The reports from Istanbul had suggested that there would be no Turkish armada in western waters in 1568.<sup>151</sup> Selim was at peace with Persia and with Poland. There was nothing mysterious about Maximilian's desire to exclude France, Poland, and Venice from the treaty. He wanted to avoid complications. To be sure, the French ambassador in Istanbul, M. de Grandchamp, was afraid that Maximilian, at peace with the Porte, might go to war with France for the recovery of Metz.<sup>152</sup> France was still caught up in the second war of religion, but presently Charles IX would marry Maximilian's daughter Elizabeth. The Poles were hard to deal with, and as Sigismund Augustus was nearing the end of his reign, Poland was in some disarray. The emperor had been fighting not only with the Turks but also with John Sigismund of Transylvania, the son of Isabella of Poland. As for the Venetians, the Hapsburgs never had any use for them.

From Madrid on 8 May (1568) M. de Fourquevaux wrote Charles IX,

Here it is said that the Turk and the emperor have made a truce for eight years, in which your Majesty has been included by the Turk, and likewise the Venetians and the Transylvanian, but as far as this king [Philip II] is concerned, he has not wanted the said emperor to have him included, for he desires neither peace nor truce with the Grand Seigneur. . . .<sup>153</sup>

Obviously Fourquevaux's information was not entirely accurate. Leaving aside France, however, for the Turks were always friendly with France, why was Mehmed Sokolli concerned about the inclusion of Venice in the treaty? He was, indeed, far more favorably inclined toward Venice than toward the Hapsburgs, but Venice had actually just renewed her peace with the Porte.

Sokolli clearly believed, however, in the light of current opinion at the Ottoman court, as we shall see, that it was important to stress the fact of peace between Venice and the Porte. He was anxious to help preserve that peace by having the sultan subscribe to two formal pacts with the Republic within less than a year. Perhaps the Hapsburg envoys understood his motive. They did not want Venice included in the treaty.

<sup>150</sup> Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (1828, repr. 1963), 512-17, trans. J.-J. Hellert, VI (1856), 312-19; cf. Sam. Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, VI (1857), 265, and new ed., VI (1974), 186; on Ibrahim Beg's presentation to Ferdinand of Sultan Suleiman's ratification of the treaty of 1562, with which in an earlier chapter we have dealt at length, see Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, *Omnia quae extant opera*, Basel, 1740, repr. Graz, 1968, pp. 429 ff. Maximilian's ambassadors, Anton Verantius and Christoph Teuffenbach, had arrived in Istanbul on 26 August, 1567 (Charrière, *Négociations*, III, p. 14b, note). Albert von Wyss was already in the city. Serious discussions with Mehmed Sokolli presumably began after the ambassadors' ceremonial audience with Selim II, which von Hammer dates on 21 September (not 1 September, as given in Hellert). Agreement had been reached by 17 February, and the treaty was signed on 21 February, 1568; I take it, therefore, that the negotiations lasted exactly five months (not seven, as von Hammer says). Cf. in general Gustav Turba, ed., *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe (Dispaeci di Germania)*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1889-95, III, nos. 177-78, 180, pp. 393-94, 400 ff. (with notes), 416-17. Verantius (Vrančić) was a native of Šibenik (Sebenico). In 1570 he became archbishop of Gran (Esztergom), and died on 16 June, 1573; on his career, note Michael B. Petrovich, "The Croatian Humanists and the Ottoman Peril," in *Balkan Studies*, XX (1979), 263-65, and "The Croatian Humanists . . .," *Journal of Croatian Studies*, XX (1979), 28-30.

On 30 March, 1568, by which time the imperial envoys had not yet reached Vienna with Selim's ratification of the peace of 21 February, we find Maximilian still appealing to Pius V for help against the Turks (W. E. Schwarz, *Der Briefwechsel des Kaisers Maximilian II. mit Pabst Pius V.*, Paderborn, 1889, no. LXXV, pp. 99-101). There had been of course several earlier appeals to Pius (cf. *ibid.*, nos. XV, XVII-XVIII, XXVII), but such requests for money and troops continued after ratification of the peace, for Maximilian did not trust the Turks (see, *ibid.*, no. LXXIX, esp. pp. 106-7, and note nos. LXXXIV and CXVI).

<sup>151</sup> Writing to Charles IX on 26 December, 1567, however, M. de Fourquevaux did cite a report from Sicily that in the spring of 1568 the Turks would certainly attack Apulia (Douais, *Dépêches*, I, no. 119, p. 311), which of course did not happen.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 14-15, notes.

<sup>153</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 130, p. 351.



## 21. VENICE, CYPRUS, AND THE PORTE IN THE EARLY YEARS OF SELIM II (1566-1570)

THE VENETIAN SIGNORIA knew no greater satisfaction than when the gladsome news came from Istanbul that the sultan had ratified the articles of peace between the Republic and the Porte. The last peace had been made on 2 October, 1540, when (as we have seen) the Venetians were obliged to pay Sultan Suleiman an indemnity of 300,000 ducats to make amends for the war they had lost and, more distressing still, they had had to surrender both Nauplia and Monemvasia. When the old warrior died, what would his successor Selim II do? To the infinite relief of the Senate, he had confirmed the peace on 24 June, 1567. He did require, however, that when the Venetians captured at sea corsairs and pirates (*corsari e levanti*), who were Turkish subjects, they must surrender them "safe and sound to the Sublime Porte," where they would receive condign punishment. This the Venetian ambassador Marino di Cavalli and the bailie Giacomo Soranzo (1566-1568) agreed to do,<sup>1</sup> and promptly notified the Signoria.

On 26 July (1567) the Doge Girolamo Priuli and the Senate informed Antonio da Canale, provveditore of the Serenissima's fleet in eastern waters, as well as the colonial authorities of Cyprus, Crete, Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, Cattaro, Curzola, Lesina (Hvar), Spalato, Traù, Sebenico, Zara, the island of Pag, and other Venetian outposts that letters dated 1 July from Cavalli and Soranzo in Istanbul had brought news of the sultan's confirmation of the "articles of peace" between Venice and the Porte. Venetian officials must, therefore, continue to treat all the sultan's subjects "not otherwise than our own."<sup>2</sup> There may have been some

doubt in Venice as to the "rigorous punishment" (*gagliardo castigo*) the sultan promised to mete out to the Turkish corsairs, but Cavalli and Soranzo had had to accept the Turkish assurance. The Signoria, however, was justifiably suspicious of Selim, for they had long known that he was no friend of the Republic.

The Mediterranean was alive with Turkish corsairs and Barbary pirates. They also entered the Adriatic, the Venetian "Gulf," where they were a fearful menace to the short-haul traffic along the Dalmatian coast. Some six weeks before Selim II's confirmation of the Veneto-Turkish peace, the doge and Senate had written a letter of joyful commendation to Gianbattista Benedetti, commander of a Cypriote galley, for pursuing, fighting, and capturing the fusta of the Turkish corsair Suleiman Reis, "who has caused immense losses in this our Gulf." The letter praised the valorous Benedetti's noble performance, which had brought great satisfaction to the Senate and high honor both to him and to his family.<sup>3</sup> The tone of elation

tion del Turco," which was going to cost the Signoria 150,000 scudi and a good deal more, while it left the Turk "una porta aperta di poter ad ogni suo piacere rompere la capitolazione" (Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII [Rome, 1963], no. 139, p. 255). Facchinetti was the nuncio in Venice from May, 1566, until the end of June, 1573. In after years Facchinetti was to be elected pope as Innocent IX on 29 October, 1591, and he died on 30 December of the same year. Stella's publication of his dispatches from Venice is an important addition to the history of the Republic during the years before and after the Turks' conquest of Cyprus and their defeat at Lepanto.

<sup>1</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 24' [50'], doc. dated 10 May, 1567, *al sopracomito* [Zuambattista] Benedetti de Cipro: "Havemo veduto in lettere del capitano nostro in Colfo con quanto valor vostro et delli homeni della vostra galea have longamente seguita, combattuta, et presa la fusta de Suliman Rays corsaro, qual havea fatti grandissimi danni in questo nostro Colfo, però se siamo mossi a farvi le presenti col Senato per laudar l'animo, prudentia, et virtù vostra, confermandovi che così honorata impresa è stata di nostra grande satisfatione et di molto honor vostro et della vostra famiglia a noi carissima per la fede et meriti soi verso il stato nostro. De literis 158, de non 13, non sinceri 11."

On Benedetti, note also, *ibid.*, Reg. 38, fol. 60' [86'], and for the capture, off the island of Crete, of another fusta belonging to a corsair named Haydar, a Christian renegade, see Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate to the bailie in Istanbul, dated 11 June, 1569. Haydar had been unfortunately successful in his attacks upon Venetian shipping, and the bailie was instructed to inform Mehmed Sokolli Pasha in detail concerning "le scelerate et impie operazioni del detto corsaro."

<sup>1</sup> J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, vol. V, pt. 1 (1728), no. LXXVI, pp. 140-41, and cf. R. Predelli, *Regesti dei Commemoriali*, VI (Venice, 1903), bk. XXIII, no. 121, p. 313. On the peace of 1540, see above, Volume III, pp. 448-49.

<sup>2</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 28'-29' [50'-51']: "Per lettere dell'ambassador et bailo nostri in Constantinopoli de primo del mese presente siamo avvisati della confirmatione delli capitoli della pace fatta per sua Maestà, di che n'è parso necessario darvene aviso, commettendovi col Senato che conforme all'intentione et voler nostro et alla buona amicitia che siamo per conservar con detta Maestà debbiate continuar in ben trattar tutti li sudditi sui non altrimenti che li proprii nostri. . ."

<sup>3</sup> On 2 August, 1567, Giovanni Antonio Facchinetti, bishop of Nicastro (1560-1575) and papal nuncio in Venice, wrote Cardinal Michele Bonelli of "la sottoscrizione della capitola-

in the letter, which was approved by the Senate and sent in the doge's name, is unusual. Suleiman Reis was a notable corsair. The news of his capture must have reached Istanbul well before the sultan's final confirmation of the treaty. For years, however, the Turks had been insisting that all corsairs who were Turkish subjects must be turned over to the Porte for punishment.

The Turks were almost as opposed to robbery at sea as the Signoria was, but they always objected strongly to the Venetians' putting the sultan's subjects to death on charges of piracy. The Senate was loath to turn captured corsairs over to the Porte, for their punishment was uncertain, especially when they had access to large sums of money, but caution was the basis of much Venetian policy. In mid-June, 1562, for example, although the captain of the Gulf received the congratulations of the doge and Senate for seizing two piratical fuste, he was told not to execute any captured Turks "without our express orders," and he was even told not to pursue those who had escaped from the fuste.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 14' [31'], doc. dated 16 June, 1562. Corsairs were not to go free, however, although Venetian commanders must adhere to the letter of the Signoria's treaty with the Porte, which Selim II emended to the annoyance of the Venetians: In his commission as provviditore of the fleet Filippo Bragadin was instructed that if he ran across armed fuste, "che fussero di corsari sudditi di esso serenissimo Signor, li tratterai da corsari, eseguendo contra di loro quello che si contiene nel capitolo che parla in questa materia, se veramente fussero corsari, et non sudditi al predetto Signor Turco. Ma di altra natione, li tratterai da corsari . . ." (*ibid.*, Reg. 73, fol. 17' [34'], doc. dated 6 July, 1562, and note fol. 19' [36']), as well as the instructions in Girolamo Contarini's commission as "captain of the guard of Cyprus," *ibid.*, fol. 42' [59'], doc. dated 4 January, 1563 [Ven. style 1562], and in Marco Michiel's commission as "captain of the guard of Candia," fol. 62 [79], doc. dated 19 June, 1563, *at alibi*).

Nevertheless, Venetian commanders did away with Turkish corsairs (including those of the Barbary coast) when they caught them, which led to an angry protest from the Porte in November, 1563, as the bailie Daniele Barbarigo reported to the Signoria, leading the doge and Senate to warn Filippo Bragadin on 18 December (1563), ". . . perchè intentione nostra firmissima è che li capitoli della pace predetta siano da ciascun ministro et rappresentante nostro osservati et eseguiti inviolabilmente, ci è parso necessario farvi le presenti col Senato [the letter, as usual, was sent in the doge's name] commettendovi che, quando nell' avvenir vi occorre prender alcun legno di essi corsari, debbate far tener vivi tutti quei Musulmani che saranno rimasti dopo il combatter et presa di quel tal legno acciò che in execution del capitolo, delquale ne haveste già copia con la vostra commissione, possono esser mandati all' Eccelsa Porta, et da quella castigati, secondo che ricerca la giustizia, volendo che il simile facciate osservare da cadauno sopracomito et ministro vostro che da voi fusse mandato in alcun servizio o viaggio. Simile a tutti li altri capi. De literis 188, de non 5,

Marino di Cavalli had been elected ambassador to the Porte on 21 October, 1566, to congratulate Selim II on his accession to the Ottoman throne and to procure the new sultan's renewal of the so-called capitulations or capitulation of peace. Cavalli had not been expected to leave for Istanbul before February (1567), as Giovanni Antonio Facchinetti, the bishop of Nicastro and nuncio in Venice, wrote Cardinal Michele Bonelli.<sup>5</sup> When Cavalli did go in March, he took with him the usual gifts of fine cloths and brocades. Although well received upon his arrival at the Porte at the beginning of May,<sup>6</sup> his troubles began soon thereafter, leading to his arrest on 10 July on a warrant obtained by certain Jewish creditors of one Joseph d' Aaron de Segura.

Aaron had secured a "huge alum contract" from the sultan, and shipped the alum with other merchandise to Venice, where he had gone bankrupt to the extent of "many thousands of scudi." His creditors had seized his available properties. The sultan declared himself Aaron's creditor for such a large sum for the alum that the sequestration of the property fell far short of the claim. The Porte demanded that the Signoria either return all Aaron's "mercantia" in Venice, including the alum, or pay his debts. Aaron was in Venice in August (1567), and was arrested. In the meantime Cavalli had been obliged to give surety for 100,000 scudi to gain his own release in Istanbul.<sup>7</sup>

The Signoria was furious, and ordered that Marino di Cavalli should be arrested upon his return, instructing the *avogadore* to deal with his case on the grounds that he had exceeded his authority, which was merely to accept the sultan's subscription to the capitulation. The sultan had accepted the treaty, with modifications, Cavalli having been unable to alter the amendment relating to the return of Turkish corsairs to the Porte. Although according to the capitulation, Cavalli should not have been detained, he could hardly be held accountable for that. According to certain letters in

non sinceri 3" (*ibid.*, Reg. 73, fol. 91' [108'] and *cf.* fol. 95' [112'] and Reg. 74, fols. 23' [44'], 26 [47]). All corsairs were not "Turks" (some were French, as noted, *ibid.*, Reg. 72, fols. 96'-97' [117'-118'], 103 [124]), but the Turkish problem was the serious one.

<sup>5</sup> Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII (1566-1569), Rome, 1963, no. 56, p. 124, doc. dated 26 October, 1566. The Turkish corsairs were bound to be a major problem when Cavalli went to Istanbul (*ibid.*, VIII, no. 82, pp. 164-65).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, nos. 84, 93, pp. 167, 184, and *cf.* nos. 86, 89, 91, 113, esp. no. 121, pp. 226-27.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 123, 131, 135, 137, pp. 231-32, 244, 251, 253, and esp. no. 141, p. 258, on Cavalli's arrest.

Hebrew sent from Istanbul, intercepted and deciphered, Cavalli was said to have accepted money from Jews at the Porte under suspicious circumstances. As the nuncio Facchinetti made clear, however, "One does not believe that this is true, but if the Signoria should verify the fact, Messer Marino would be in danger of losing his life, for he has few relatives and his family is quite new."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the apparent renewal of peace with the Turks, obviously the news from the Bosphorus was far from reassuring. The Cavalli affair was bad enough, but was worse in the offing? On 7 August (1567) the doge and Senate wrote the *regimenti* of Cyprus and Crete that letters from Istanbul dated on and before 12 July made it seem likely that the year 1568 was going to see a huge Turkish armada ready for action. Carpenters were at work on galleys in the arsenal, *in terra et in acqua*. The Turks had had fifty cannon cast, "and a goodly number of smaller pieces of artillery." Venetian officials must, therefore, add "diligence to diligence" in making certain that the fortifications for which they had the responsibility were secure, and that the garrisons were well stocked. They must of course keep an eye on the Turks, and report back to Venice every item of information which they might regard as "degno di nostra intelligentia."<sup>9</sup>

The Turkish armada was not to venture into the Adriatic in 1568, but no one could be sure. In any event toward the end of August (1567) it was said in Venice that Marino di Cavalli had already reached the island of Zante on his return journey. The Cavalli affair was debated in the Collegio and the Senate. Some members of the Senate wanted to recall the bailie Giacomo Soranzo, even if he could be accused of nothing more than cowardice, but a large majority voted not to remove him from office. It was decided, however, "dopo gran discussione," to send another ambassador to Istanbul, and old Girolamo Zane was elected, his commission to be determined by the Collegio. Zane was to protest Cavalli's arrest by the Turks, as contrary to the capitulation, and somehow to effect the annulment of Cavalli's giving surety for 100,000 scudi for Aaron de Segura's debts.<sup>10</sup> The

terms of the commission having been arranged, on 13 September (1567) the Senate voted to send Zane off to the Turkish court "with all possible speed." As ambassador to the Signor Turco, Zane was to receive for his expenses 1,200 ducats in gold for six months, "two hundred ducats a month," for which he was not to be required to render an account upon his return home.<sup>11</sup>

In late October letters from Istanbul brought the news that Cavalli's commitment to the Porte had been annulled. Zane, who was then in Istria, was told to remain there until a *cha'ush*, who was being awaited in Venice "from hour to hour," should come from the Porte. It was being said on the Bosphorus that the Turkish armada would certainly embark on a large-scale expedition in the spring of 1568, whether against Cyprus or Malta, Oran or Peñón de Vélez.<sup>12</sup>

Presently the *cha'ush* came, and was received by the Collegio on the morning of 31 October (1567). The next day Giannantonio Facchinetti wrote Cardinal Bonelli it was assumed the *cha'ush* came as a result of the debt for which Cavalli had been arrested in Istanbul. Although his guarantee of 100,000 scudi had been set aside, the sultan was indeed the creditor of the bankrupt firm of Aaron de Segura and his partners, and he wanted reimbursement according to the terms of Aaron's contract for the alum, which had been delivered to Venice. Facchinetti believed that the Signoria would have to satisfy the Porte at least to the extent of the stipulated price of the alum.<sup>13</sup> In the meantime, upon his return from Istanbul, Cavalli had been arrested, and as his trial was beginning, Girolamo Zane returned to Venice on 6 March. Facchinetti was vigilant in his reports to Rome concerning Cavalli, until on 22 May (1568) he could write that the unhappy man had been finally and completely absolved of the charges made against him: "Hoggi Messer Marino Cavalli è stato assoluto di larghissimo giuditio!"<sup>14</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, no. 143, pp. 260-61, letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 16 August, 1567, and *cf.* nos. 145, 146.

<sup>9</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 29 [51]; and note, *ibid.*, fol. 57 [79], and *cf.* Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII (1963), nos. 145-46, pp. 264, 266, *et alibi*.

<sup>10</sup> Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII, no. 148, p. 269, a letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 6 September, 1567, and for Cavalli's arrival at Zante, *ibid.*, no. 146, p. 267.

<sup>11</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 46<sup>v</sup> [72<sup>v</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 13 September, 1567, and note, *ibid.*, fols. 48<sup>v</sup> [74<sup>v</sup>], 50<sup>v</sup> [76<sup>v</sup>], and *cf.* Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, nos. 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, pp. 273 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 162, pp. 292-93, letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 25 October, 1567, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, nos. 166, 176, pp. 298, 315. On the *cha'ush*, see below, note 135.

<sup>13</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 164, p. 296, letter dated 1 November, 1567.

<sup>14</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 227, p. 388, and *cf.* nos. 158, 162, 191, 195, 197, 223, 225, pp. 286 ff. Cavalli denied having taken money from the Jews, and evidence was produced that they had apparently tried unsuccessfully to bribe him (*ibid.*,

There were almost as many rumors afloat concerning the Turks, Spanish, French, Austrians, and Netherlanders as there were galleys in the Mediterranean. The diplomatic dispatches of 1567–1568 are full of the rumors. Most of them were ill-founded. Some of them are interesting. Thus on 13 November (1567) M. de Fourquevaux wrote Charles IX that Selim II was arming forty galleys at the port of Suez “on the Red Sea” to send to the aid of a king of Sumatra. It would be a good idea, he thought, to humble the proud Portuguese and break up their trade with the East Indies. Also the French would get spices on better terms at Alexandria and the other Turkish ports in Syria.<sup>15</sup> The Venetians would have been still better off, for Portuguese enterprise had been putting a crimp in their spice trade for decades.

There was an unease in Venice, fed by reports from Istanbul as well as by hearsay from elsewhere. Life went on, of course, from day to day, but the Venetians' Moreote past was always catching up with them, and usually cost something. The Signoria made some effort to provide for its former subjects, especially those who had served the state, and suffered at the hands of the Turks. On 13 September (1567), for example, the Senate voted an entitlement or expectancy (*espettativa*) to one Constantine—son of the late Demetrius Calogierà of Nauplia—who had been enslaved by the Turks “in the time of the siege of that city.” Constantine had at long last escaped from the Turks, and was now appealing to the Senate, which voted him an expectancy to one of the offices (paying three to four ducats a month) reserved for natives of Nauplia and Monemvasia. A limited number of such positions might be had in Venice as well as in the Signoria's colonial possessions. Constantine was to receive the first such expectancy to become vacant after prior commitments of the same sort had been met. He was given this consideration both as a reward for his merits and as compensation for his lost property.<sup>16</sup>

VIII, no. 160, p. 290, doc. dated 18 October, 1567—Cavalli had arrived back in Venice on 11 October). On Cavalli's career, cf. A. Olivieri, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, XXII (1979), 749–54, with a good bibliography which, oddly enough, does not include Aldo Stella's *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII (1963). For Zane's return to Venice, cf. Stella, VIII, no. 205, p. 357.

<sup>15</sup> Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, I, no. 109, pp. 288–89.

<sup>16</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 46<sup>r</sup> [72<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 13 September, 1567, + *de parte* 145, *de non* 17, *non sinceri* 9, and see, *ibid.*, fol. 49<sup>r</sup> [75<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 29 September, the interesting case of one Michael of Nauplia, “il quale essendo fuggito dalle mani d' infideli, et ridotto alla fede Christiana, desidera farsi sacerdote!”

A year later (on 29 September, 1568) the Venetian Senate approved the concession to Giacomo of Zante, son of the reverend priest Constantine Lazaro, of one of the churches which lay within the Signoria's right of bestowal (*juspatronato*) on the island. Giacomo was to receive the first church to become vacant “after all the other expectancies have been met which have been granted up to now.” It was to be understood, however, that Giacomo would not have access to one of the churches reserved for ordained monks (*sacerdoti calogieri*), for these must be kept for the said monks (*καλόγερους*), “as we are advising the provviditore and councilors of our island of Zante.”<sup>17</sup>

There had also been an unease in Cyprus—for years in fact, as Pietro Valderio, the viscount of Famagusta, was soon to recall. The Cypriotes' troubles were of their own making, the consequence of their pride, dishonesty, blasphemy, and complete neglect of all virtue. They led lascivious lives, and were guilty of unbridled disobedience to their lords. But there was little to be said for the lords themselves, who tyrannized over and abused the poor souls in the outlying villages. The lords could have found remedies for the social ills of Cyprus, says Valderio, but they had no desire to do so. It was inevitable that God should intervene, and take the lovely land away from its unworthy lords, “and that we other miserable creatures should be driven to wrack and ruin, some of us to become prisoners and slaves, others cut to pieces and plundered. . . .”

Amid the harbingers of doom, why could one not see what lay ahead? Valderio tells us that the island had suffered from famine for the four or five years between 1556 and 1560, and that in the latter year Nicosia had been rent by religious controversy between the Greeks and Latins. In the fall of 1566 a tornado had struck Famagusta, killing many people. Its force was so great, *un tal orribile sion*, that it demolished houses and uprooted trees, carrying them off together (according to Valderio) for the distance of a whole mile. Soldiers were lifted up into the air as they walked through the streets. One of them, named Gregorio, was borne aloft and carried through the air for more than two hundred yards. When he returned to earth, instead of thanking God for the kindness which had saved him, he began at the top of his voice to curse His very name.

<sup>17</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 145<sup>r</sup> [171<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 29 September, 1568, + *de parte* 147, *de non* 10, *non sinceri* 4. The granting of such expectancies was a common practice (*ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 73<sup>r</sup> [118<sup>r</sup>]).

On 29 October, 1567, a windstorm of such fury had descended upon the harbor of Salines, on Larnaca Bay, as to sink twenty vessels loaded with cargoes "worth a treasury." The year 1568 brought such a terrible malady to the island of Cyprus that 30,000 children died, "and the same thing happened to the small animals." There seemed to be no end to the calamities assailing the Cypriotes, for Famagusta was severely shaken by three earthquakes at the sixth, ninth, and eleventh hour of the night on 13 October, 1569. No one was safe, whether in the house or in the countryside. It was as though the world were falling into an abyss. At the first hour of the day, moreover, when all the Christian clergy, *tanto latini quanto greci*, were assembled in a solemn procession, "another earthquake came in such cruel fashion that we all believed ourselves to be perishing on the spot, shut up in the roadway of SS. Pietro e Paolo, for the street is narrow and the houses very high, but our Lord God rescued us." The church of SS. Pietro e Paolo was (and still is) in the western part of the walled city of Famagusta, behind the Moratto Bastion.

Meanwhile on the evening of 26 August (1569) in Nicosia a miserable mob, *una setta di canaglia*, as Valderio describes them, assailed the vice-lieutenant of the city, Costanzo Gritti, with improper words in abusive tones. The reason was that they had found no bread ready in the piazza. They had, indeed, almost laid siege to Gritti in the Palazzo Regio. He told them they should take their complaints to the provveditore, an honorable gentleman named Antonio Bragadin, known as "the Handsome," *et veramente bello di costumi et d'ogni virtù*. Thus the rabble went off to Bragadin's house. When the guard would not allow them to enter, some of the wretches began to throw stones into the balconies and at the doors of the house. Bragadin was then conferring with the leading men of Nicosia, and if they had not gently and dexterously persuaded the mob to retire by the promise of having bread made for them, the worthy Bragadin would have been killed, although maintaining the supply of bread was actually not his responsibility. A few months later Bragadin died anyway, as Valderio gloomily notes, adding up the evil omens which foretold the disaster that was coming to Cyprus.<sup>18</sup>

The doge and Senate were always advising and instructing, investigating and commanding their colonial officials, who served for two or three years in office, returned home, and were usually sent elsewhere. They rarely stayed in one place long enough to acquire an adequate understanding of its needs and resources. From Cyprus to Crete, Corfu to Sebenico, Venetian administration was inefficient and wasteful. It was also corrupt; on the whole it had always been corrupt. As one reads the documents, it is pleasant to find instances of a superior competence, even in a ship's carpenter. The Senate was also pleased when on 20 December, 1567, it rewarded Giovanni Piccolo, who had contrived a new way of building galleys, less expensive and more efficient than the generations-old method which had been employed in the Venetian Arsenal "up to now." Piccolo, who knew the starboard from the portside, had been praised by the provveditori and galley-commanders as well as by the "admiral" and overseers of the Arsenal. For the apparently signal contribution he had made to Venice's commercial and naval well-being, Giovanni Piccolo had his daily wage raised from twenty-four to thirty soldi, which (the Senate hoped) would also be an inspiration to other workmen to be on the lookout for improvements.<sup>19</sup>

---

a participant in the events he describes, especially the long siege of Famagusta. Like other late sixteenth-century historians of the war, Valderio gives us dates which miss the mark by a day, a week, or more. N.N., the copyist of the Treviso MS., pp. 221-22, warns us, moreover, that while he used the original text, then in Cyprus, it was badly written in a poor hand; the paper was worn-eaten, making the manuscript hard to read. He often had recourse to conjecture, not the least of his difficulties being that the ink had so faded "that it seemed to be water." The authenticity of Valderio's account is beyond dispute, but one could wish that the copyist (for all his apology) had tried more carefully to decipher the dates, identify pages clearly out of order, and indicate apparent gaps in the text. The account is valuable, however, for the hitherto unknown data it gives us. Another copy of Valderio's *Guerra di Cipro* is also to be found in the Bibl. Comunale di Treviso, MS. ital. 726.

On the omens which God sent "to foretell this destruction of Cyprus," cf. the account of Angelo Calepio, a Dominican priest of Nicosia [see below, note 94], trans. C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cyprica*, Cambridge, 1908, repr. New York, 1969, pp. 142-44, who does better than Valderio in relating the religious strife on the island, gives some attention to the swarms of locusts, the tornado at Famagusta, the numerous earthquakes, the ceaseless noise of locust birds, cranes, and geese in flights from Syria, and "lastly He sent us the comet of November, 1569, whose tail pointed down towards Cyprus, a clear sign of the sword of God."

<sup>19</sup> Sen. Mar., Reg. 38, fol. 62<sup>r</sup> [88<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 20 December, 1567: "Il novo modo di fabricar galee con molto spargano et di maggior fortezza di quello che fin' hora si è usato di fare, ritrovato dalla diligenza et peritia del fedel nostro Zuanne de Francesco Piccolo, marangon della casa no-

<sup>18</sup> *La Guerra di Cipro scritta da Pietro Valderio, visconte della città di Famagosta in quel tempo, come chiaramente si raccoglie dalla storia medesima, copiata la seconda volta da N.N. l'anno 1753*, in the Biblioteca Comunale di Treviso, MS. ital. 505 (S3-105-F), pp. 4-9. Valderio's memoir of the war of Cyprus appears to be unknown. Its importance is obvious, being the account of

It was one thing to be a ship's carpenter, another to command the Venetian fleet. After three years as "provveditor dell' armata nostra," Antonio da Canale had written the doge and Senate, urgently requesting his replacement. Canale had discharged his important duties with prudence and valor, in the opinion of the Senate, which on 7 February, 1568, voted that a successor should be elected, with the usual salary; Canale's successor might be removed from any office in Venice (or in any colonial government of the Republic) in order to free him for the "provveditorato dell' armata." The said successor could not refuse the post without incurring "all the penalties which have been decreed against those who refuse embassies to crowned heads." The senatorial decision and choice of a new provveditore would as usual remain subject to electoral confirmation by the *Maggior Consiglio*.<sup>20</sup>

Antonio da Canale had shown himself as a man who could be depended upon to render "fruitful service" to the state.<sup>21</sup> Giacomo Celsi was chosen to replace Canale as provveditore of the fleet. His commission, dated 7 January, 1569, directed him carefully to observe "li capitoli . . . della pace che habbiamo col serenissimo Signor Turco in materia di armate, di navilli, et [di] navigatione."<sup>22</sup> Some six weeks later, on 15 February (1569), Lorenzo Bembo received his commission as provveditore generale of the so-called "kingdom" of Cyprus,<sup>23</sup> where he died on 1 January, 1570,<sup>24</sup> after an in-

spection of the island's vulnerable coastlands along with Astorre Baglione, whose defense of Famagusta against the Turks was to make him famous. When war with the Turk was imminent, Canale's name was again brought before the Senate (on 20 March, 1570) by those who wished to see him reappointed as provveditore of the fleet. Although the motion was apparently not passed (with ninety-four votes),<sup>25</sup> Canale was in fact soon re-elected, and served with Giacomo Celsi as his fellow provveditore of the fleet in the disastrous confusion of the coming war.<sup>26</sup>

The unease of the Signoria was slowly becoming alarm. On 14 February, 1568, the doge and Senate wrote Sigismondo di Cavalli, their ambassador to Philip II, and Paolo Tiepolo, ambassador to Pius V, of the work being devoted to building up the Turkish armada, presumably in the arsenal at Istanbul. Along with these letters, they sent Sigismondo di Cavalli and Tiepolo the reports from the Bosphorus relating to "le preparazioni che con molta solitudine et diligencia vengono fatte dal Signor Turco di armata." The Turkish preparations

---

tured by the Turks at Famagusta, also wrote (in 1573) an account of the siege of the latter city, in which he gives 30 December as the date of Bembo's death, on which note Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, III (Cambridge, 1948), 864, 950, 1154. The literary sources are full of such minor discrepancies in dates; where possible, I have depended on the more reliable official documentary evidence. On Angelo Gatto, see below, Chapter 23, notes 3 and 4.

<sup>20</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 64-65<sup>r</sup> [85-86<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 897, 913, 919-20, 930. Antonio da Canale was also known as Canaletto. He figures prominently in Facchinetti's dispatches to Rome (Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX [Rome, 1972], nos. 189, 192, 199, 216, pp. 273, 276, 283, 306, et alibi).

<sup>22</sup> On the distinguished career of Astorre Baglione (Baglioni), of whom we shall have more to say, see G. de Caro, in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, V (1963), 197-99. Lorenzo Bembo seems to have escaped the editors of the *Dizionario biografico*. Antonio da Canale (Canal) did indeed render "fruttuoso servizio" to Venice; see the sketch of his life by F. Fasulo, *ibid.*, XVII (1974), 636-37. Giacomo (or Jacopo) Celsi, also an important figure in the war of Cyprus, is the subject of an excellent, brief article by F. Colasanti, *ibid.*, XXIII (1979), 471-75, with a surprisingly full bibliography.

<sup>23</sup> These commanders of the Venetian forces stand out in all the literary sources, e.g., in the *Commentari della guerra di Cipro e della lega dei principi cristiani contro il Turco di Bartolomeo Sereno*, ed. the Monks of Monte Cassino, Cassino, 1845, bk. 1, pp. 41-42, 47-48. Sereno was present at the battle of Lepanto, and retired in 1574 into the Benedictine abbey of Monte Cassino, where he took the vows (in 1576), and wrote his account of the war with the Turks (*ibid.*, pp. xxv ff.). On the chief literary sources for the war of Cyprus, cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1149-55, who knows nothing of Pietro Valderio.

---

stra dell' Arsenal, laudato et approbato dalli proveditori et patroni nostri all' Arsenal et dall' armiraglio et protti di quello, si come dalla sua supplicatione et risposte hora lette si è inteso merita che dalla benignità del stato nostro per dar anco animo a gli altri d' invigilar al beneficio delle cose nostre sia abbracciato et riconosciuto, però l' andrà parte che per autorità di questo Consiglio sia concesso al predetto Zuanne de Francesco Piccolo soldi sei al giorno presso li vintiquattro ch' egli ha sì che per l' avvenire habbia soldi trenta al giorno da essergli pagati nel medesimo modo et dell' istessi danari che gli sono pagati li altri vintiquattro. . . +153, l. 25. *1567 XI Decembris in Collegio*: +15, 0, 1."

<sup>20</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 38, fol. 71<sup>r</sup> [97<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 7 February, 1568 (Ven. style 1567), the vote being +167, 5, 0.

<sup>21</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 111<sup>r</sup> [128<sup>r</sup>], 113<sup>r</sup> [130<sup>r</sup>], 117<sup>r</sup> [134<sup>r</sup>], and Reg. 74, fols. 56 ff. [77 ff.].

<sup>22</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 103 ff. [125 ff.], doc. dated 7 January, 1569 (Ven. style 1568), and on Celsi, cf. Sen. Mar, Reg. 38, fols. 73<sup>r</sup> [99<sup>r</sup>], 108<sup>r</sup> [134<sup>r</sup>], 124<sup>r</sup> [150<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>23</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 108 ff. [130 ff.], doc. dated 15 February, 1569 (Ven. style 1568).

<sup>24</sup> According to Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 18-19, Lorenzo Bembo arrived in Cyprus on 26 April, 1569, and died on the following 1 January (i.e., Ven. style, *al primo Genaro 1569*). Angelo Gatto, who was wounded and cap-

were such that they should be the concern of all the Christian princes.<sup>27</sup>

As bailies and envoys returned to Venice from Istanbul, they gave reports (*relazioni*) to the doge and Senate of their mission to the Porte, usually dwelling on the Turks' rise to greatness, the customs of the Ottoman court, the ranks of its officialdom, the stipends of the sultan's "slaves," the modes of dress, the sultan's income and expenses, and the wide extent of his empire. When Marino di Cavalli gave his report as the ex-bailie in the latter part of 1560 (seven or eight years before he got into the trouble we have described above), he said that it would be a waste of time to repeat what his predecessors had said, for their texts were often available in print as well as in manuscript. Although little had changed at the Porte, Venetian commerce was on the downgrade, owing to competition from the Jews and to the sultan's old age and his simplicity of dress. Suleiman had lost all interest in luxury and, as required by Islamic law, he now dressed only in wool and camel. The court followed suit.

According to Cavalli, Venetian trade with the Porte had fallen to an annual level of some 150,000 ducats in such items as silks, woollens, glass, white lead, and certain other wares, and amounted to no more than 130,000 ducats a year in salted meats, poultry, leathers, cordage, alum, "e simili." Silk caftans, presented as gifts to the sultan, were sold, so that too many would not pile up, and so that they might be turned to profit. What would be shameful for an ordinary person to do, was all right for a prince. All this could change, however, when the sultan changed, and Suleiman was an old man.

Venetian merchants maintained ten or twelve commercial houses in Istanbul, with little hardship and small gain to themselves, for they did everything through Jewish middlemen. They bought wool from the Jews, had it made into cloth, gave it back to the Jews, who then resold it and made a good profit. The Venetian merchants did the same sort of thing with alum [used in tanning hides and dyeing cloth], camel, and all the rest, making only half of what they might if they did the work themselves. Cavalli wondered, too, about the ex-

tent to which Jews were sailing "like Venetians" in the Republic's ships and galleys. Although the Turks paid no heed to the Jews, Cavalli believed that this was not in accord with the Republic's peace with the Porte. Strangely enough, Cavalli was to get caught in Aaron de Segura's bankruptcy.

Cavalli had spent a full twenty-four months in Istanbul (1558-1560), where he had certainly discussed the Cypriote problem with Venetian merchants, various travelers, and others. The faraway island had been a source of anxiety as well as of expense to the Signoria ever since Selim I had overrun Syria, Palestine, and Egypt in 1516-1517. For years Venice had paid the Ottoman sultan, like the Egyptian sultan before him, an annual tribute of 8,000 ducats for possession of the island, thus recognizing but never defining some sort of Turkish interest in, if not suzerainty over, Cyprus. The wonderment was that Suleiman in these past forty years had never tried to add Cyprus to his other conquests. Cavalli was doubtless expected to say something about Cyprus in his *relazione*, and he did so, but it must be admitted that (like other bailies in their reports to the doge and Senate) he would have done better to contemplate the past (or the present) than to try to assess the likelihoods of the future. Turning to the Doge Girolamo Priuli, Cavalli said:

The kingdom of Cyprus is well provided for, as I understand, and it could not be taken [by the Turks] in a year because of the fortresses which are there, and because there is great peril in trying to maintain an army on an island in winter, for it can be besieged by ships and galleys. The Turks are well aware that whenever they should make war on your Serene Highness, you would be aided by Spain and by the emperor, and so they would always be weaker, [even] in seapower. If they had suspected that Rhodes might have received help, they would never have embarked on that enterprise—so great is the danger of descending upon an island with a large force and not be master of the sea. The French would not have taken Corsica if it had not been for the Turkish armada. The Gran Signore will not, therefore, again risk his person on an island, and without him there is little a pasha could do, as has been seen [in the campaigns] in Hungary, which never became anything of importance unless the Gran Signore was there in person.

Cavalli entertained no apprehension about Crete, Cephalonia, Corfu, and Zante, nor about Cattaro, Traù, Sebenico, and Zara on the Dalmatian coast. He was very reassuring. Although he had just stated that Venetian trade with the Porte had declined, Cavalli proceeded to inform the doge and Senate that the Gran Signore would

<sup>27</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 61<sup>r</sup> [83<sup>r</sup>], *oratori nostro apud regem Catholicum*, doc. dated 14 February, 1568 (Ven. style 1567). *Similes [litere] scripte fuerunt oratori apud summum pontificem, 4 de literis 202, de non 2, non sinceri I. Cf., ibid., fol. 69<sup>r</sup> [91<sup>r</sup>], and Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, VIII, no. 199, p. 347, a dispatch of Faccinetti to Rome, also dated 14 February.*

not make war on Venice "without cause," for he would feel the "great loss" of revenue from the tolls and imposts laid on Venetian merchants, for neither the French nor the tradesmen of other nations could ever take up the slack and make up such a loss.<sup>28</sup>

As Venetian merchants with their Jewish associates made their usual voyages between Italian and Levantine ports, so did the corsairs, who often flew false pennants, pretending to be Venetian or Spanish, French or Turkish, depending on the circumstances of the hour. When the movements of a galley or a galliot excited suspicion, one often tried to board it to make sure it had a right to fly the fleur-de-lis or the star-and-crescent. Almost inevitably the result was conflict. Despite the ever-lasting sameness of the instructions which Venetian commanders received to observe "the articles of our peace with the most serene Signor Turco," the naval officers of the Republic could become as ill-tempered as the Turks. If the Porte wanted war with Venice—the reverse was unlikely to be the case—one had only to wait a while to find a violation of the "capitoli della pace."

On 20 August, 1563, M. de Boistaillé, the French envoy to Venice, wrote Catherine de' Medici that a *cha'ush* had just come from the Grand Turk, demanding an explanation for the seizure of one of his galleys by the Venetians. A number of Turks had apparently been killed in the encounter, and the sultan was demanding a heavy payment "pour chacune teste de Turcs qui furent lors tuez. . . ." It could lead to a serious break with the Porte, the envoy said, but the Signoria was "quite expert" in such negotiations, and the Venetians would find a peaceful solution "if they can."<sup>29</sup> One would not have to wait long for another such occurrence.

The next record of a similar grievance came only three months later. This time Cyprus was involved. On 19 November (1563) Antoine Petremol, the French agent in Istanbul, sent M. de Boistaillé word of the "grandes querelles et plaintes"

which had been raised at the Porte against the Venetians, who were alleged to have taken and sunk certain (presumably Turkish) galliots during the past summer. Furthermore, the Hospitallers of Malta—as enterprising as any corsairs in the Mediterranean—had seized "several Turkish vessels coming from Tripoli and Alexandria." The Hospitallers had then withdrawn into one of the ports of Cyprus. The sultan was furious. He summoned the Venetian bailie [Daniele Barbarigo] to answer the demands of several claimants who had suffered losses. He also ordered the Turkish "general of the sea" to get 150 galleys ready for service for the coming spring. It was assumed that an invasion of Cyprus was now in the offing, a step which Selim and his sons-in-law, including Piali Pasha, were urging on the sultan. Suleiman's old age might delay any such undertaking, "and the prudence of the Venetians, who have been informed of the situation by their bailie, will turn it aside."<sup>30</sup>

We have already noted Petremol's letter of 25 November, 1564, to Charles IX concerning Suleiman's vast preparations for a naval expedition in the spring of 1565. The Turks were said to be getting ready 150 galleys and 150 galleasses, "or mahonnes as they call them," as well as transports for horses and munitions. Some thought the attack would be upon Malta; others believed the expedition would be directed against Apulia, "but most people assume it will be against the island of Cyprus." The suspicion that Cyprus would be the Turks' objective was strengthened by the fact that Suleiman had been sending munitions, "tant d'artillerie que autres choses nécessaires," to a castle he had built on the Anatolian shore opposite the island. All the pashas, except the first [Ali], were urging the expedition upon the sultan, "especially the pasha of the sea [Piali], who has married one of the daughters of Sultan Selim." The great armada might well set sail against Cyprus when the spring came unless the aged sultan yielded to Ali Pasha's advice to take life easy or unless the wariness of the Venetians, "auxquels touche l'affaire," could succeed in diverting it.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Marino [di] Cavalli, "Relazione dell' impero ottomano [1560]," in Eugenio Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti, ser. III, vol. I* (1840), pp. 274-75, 282-84. Despite Cavalli's assurances, the Senate set about adding to the fortifications of Crete in March, 1562 (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 1'-4' [18'-21'], and ff.) as well as to those of the "kingdom of Cyprus," *il regno di Cipro, uno della principati et più importanti membri del stato nostro (ibid., fols. 3' [20'], 41' ff. [38' ff.], 48' ff. [65' ff.], 61' ff. [78' ff.], 93' [110']), and cf. Reg. 75, fols. 4 ff. [26 ff.]*.

<sup>29</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, II, 738b, note.

<sup>30</sup> Charrière, II, 743-44. One wonders whether it was known at the Porte that on 10 August, 1563 (three months before Petremol's letter) the Venetian Senate had reduced, as an act of special favor to the grand master of the Hospital, the customs duties to be paid on the export of iron and lumber by the Knights of Malta, who were then making frequent purchases of such critical materials (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fol. 72' [89']), presumably for the construction of galleys and the manufacture of weapons to be used against the Turks.

<sup>31</sup> Charrière, II, 768, and *cf.*, above, Chapter 19, p. 838.



Petremol was not alone in believing that the Turks would seek to take Cyprus. In a letter of 29 December, 1564, Leonardo Contarini, the Venetian ambassador in Vienna, reported to the Doge Girolamo Priuli an interesting exchange he had just had with Maximilian II. The emperor had asked whether Contarini had received "alcuno aviso da Costantinopoli." The latter having replied that he had not, Maximilian told him he had very recently been informed that when the spring came, a "grossa armata turchesca" would set sail. It would presumably not attack the domains of Philip II, for the latter had too large a fleet in readiness for action. In Maximilian's opinion the terrible Turks would fall upon Cyprus—"Quel Cipro," he cried, "quel Cipro è molto vicino et gli sta molto negl' occhi!"<sup>32</sup> Petremol had assumed that Suleiman was himself going to lead his *grande armée* against Cyprus. On both counts he was mistaken, for Suleiman was not to go on the expedition, and (Maximilian was wrong too) the Turkish objective was of course not to be Cyprus, but Malta.

The attempt to take Malta had failed, and Suleiman died the following year on his last, futile invasion of Hungary. When Selim II succeeded his father as ruler of the Ottoman empire, he was anxious to restore the Turks' prestige and renew their reputation for conquest. Many a senator must have recalled old Bernardo Navagero's *relazione* of February, 1553, which he had delivered about two months after returning from his long term as bailie at the Porte. Navagero had painted a gloomy portrait of Selim. The latter, he said, made a pretense of being a just and worthy person, but often showed himself as cruel and avaricious. He was given to debauchery, and would drink so much wine as to lose all reason. But, alas, as Navagero had then observed, the wheel of fortune might make Selim the sultan,<sup>33</sup> and now, indeed alas, it had done so.

<sup>32</sup> G. Turba, *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe*, III (1895), no. 142, p. 289.

<sup>33</sup> Navagero, *Relazione* [1553], in Albèri, *Ambasciatori veneti*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 76, 78-79: "Ma potrebbero però esservi diversi accidenti della fortuna che lo [i.e., l' imperio] facessero cascare sopra Sultano Selim. . . ."

Later on, Andrea Badoer (Badoaro), having just returned from Istanbul, where he had been the Venetian ambassador for confirmation of peace with the Turk in 1573, gives a far worse (almost incredible) picture of Selim twenty years later (*Relazione*, also ser. III, vol. I, pp. 360-61): "Questo sultan Selim è uomo di statura piccola, d' età d' anni cinquantatré, di molto debole complessione per i continui disordini che usa, si di donne come nel vino, di cui beve moltissimo. D' aspetto

In Istanbul the bailie Giacomo Soranzo kept the Venetian Signoria well posted. By a letter or letters of 1 January, 1568, he reported to the doge and Senate that at a recent audience Mehmed Sokolli Pasha, *il magnifico bassà*, had told him how every day "many complaints" were coming to the Sublime Porte relating to things that were happening in Cyprus. They were a source of extreme vexation to Sultan Selim, Sokolli had declared, and would result in "great disturbances." The Signoria must, therefore, send orders to Venetian officials in the kingdom of Cyprus to remove all cause and occasion for such complaints. The response of doge and Senate was immediate. In a dispatch of 7 February, "because we hold this matter much at heart," the colonial government in Nicosia and Francesco Barbaro, the provveditore generale of Cyprus (1566-1568), were instructed to see that no more such complaints reached the Porte, "levando tutte le occasioni dalle quali potessero nascer ditte querele et perciò facendo ogni bon trattamento alli sudditi di quel serenissimo Signor." They must treat the sultan's subjects well, and remove all reason for such complaints. On the same day similar orders were approved by the Senate, to be sent to Marco Michiel, the captain of Famagusta.<sup>34</sup>

Every time the subject of Cyprus came before the Senate—and it did so constantly—one thought of the cost of its defense and the fact of its distance. On 5 December (1567) the Senate had decided to add 1,000 infantry to the 3,000 already sent to Cyprus. On 27 January (1568) they changed their minds "per non far questa spesa senza bisogno," but now on 12 February they returned to their

è bruttissimo e di tutte le membra sproportionato in modo tale che pare a giudizio universale più simile ad un mostro che ad un uomo, massimamente avendo tutta rovinata ed arrostita la faccia, si dal soverchio vino come dalla gran quantità d'acquavite che usa di bere per digerire; a talchè per opinione mia credo che sia per essere di pochissima vita [and Badoer was right, for Selim died the following year]. Nè solamente è uomo di questa natura, senza alcuna notizia delle buone arti, ma appena gli son notici li caratteri delle lettere! È rozzissimo negli discorsi, mal pratico negli affari e molto alieno dalle fatiche, a talchè lascia tutto il peso di sì gran governo sopra le spalle del pascià primo visir [Mehmed Sokolli]. È avaro, sordido, lussurioso, incontinent, ed infine precipitoso in ogni sua azione. . . ."

<sup>34</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 58' [80'], *regimini Cipro et provisorii generalis Barbaro ibidem esistenti*, doc. dated 7 February, 1568 (Ven. style 1567): *Simili al capitano di Famagosta. + De literis 197, de non 1, non sinceri 0*. Lists of the captains of Famagosta [or Cyprus] and of the provveditori generali of Cyprus may be found in Louis de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, 3 vols., Paris, 1852-61, repr. Famagosta, 1970, III, 849-52.

resolution to send the troops to Cyprus "for reasons well known to every member of this Council," i.e., the Senate.<sup>35</sup> Two days later (on 14 February) the Senate voted overwhelmingly to send 2,000 infantry to Cyprus, in addition to the 1,000 previously in question, as well as another 1,400 infantry to Crete.<sup>36</sup>

There were always those in the Senate willing to face the risks of warfare to maintain the power and prestige of the Republic. There were also those who would seek by negotiation to maintain peace at almost any price. The receipt of letters from the bailie in Istanbul, however, and even of *avvisi* from the agents of the Fuggers in Venice could alter the views of senators whose minds and emotions were not always in concert. On 19 March (1568) they reduced the proposed dispatch of 3,000 infantry to Cyprus to 2,000, also lowering the number of troops to be assigned to the custody of Crete.<sup>37</sup> Although they were a parsimonious lot, those senators, the basic question was, Could Venice afford, could she find money and manpower enough, to hold Cyprus against a Turkish invasion? One can only wonder at the decision, made eight months later (on 18 November, 1568) to reduce the troop of *stradioti* on Cyprus from 800 to 500, as being sufficient "al bisogno di tenir difese quelle marine da corsari et far l' altre fazioni che potessero occorrer in tempo di guerra," enough to guard the Cypriot coasts against corsairs and to take whatever other steps might be necessary in time of war!<sup>38</sup>

At the beginning of the year 1568 the peace of Dalmatia was upset by incursions of Turkish horse into Venetian territories, "with loss to our subjects," and on 21 February the rectors of Zara (Zadar) and the *provveditore generale* of Dalmatia were warned that many well-armed Turkish horse were still active in areas of Venetian jurisdiction "with the design and intention of causing even much greater losses."<sup>39</sup> At any rate the Senate doubtless took comfort from the fact that Sforza Pallavicini, a name which has appeared and reappeared so often in these volumes, was then in Zara, looking to the fortifications.<sup>40</sup>

It was disturbing, however, to learn how troublesome the Turks in Clissa (Klis) were making themselves, for Clissa was a mere five miles from the important Venetian station at Spalato (Split).<sup>41</sup> When the Turco-Venetian war came in 1570, the Venetians were to be especially hard-pressed in Dalmatia,<sup>42</sup> where Count Giulio Savorgnan (who had designed the fortifications of Nicosia in Cyprus, and presided over their construction in 1567) was to serve as the Republic's "governor-general of the militia."<sup>43</sup> The so-called war of Cyprus was not confined to Cyprus.

Every chancery in Europe must have been aware of Selim II's extensive naval preparations. As the Venetians feared for Cyprus, Pius V thought it possible that the Turks might strike again at Malta. On 28 February, 1568, an *avviso* from Rome carried the news that Pius was allowing the recruitment of 1,500 foot "per diffensione di Malta." He was also helping to pay their wages, for he had recently given the Hospitallers 10,000 scudi worth of jewels which had been confiscated from Matteo Minale, Pius IV's treasurer, who seems to have done away with some of the papal financial records. Minale was to be sentenced to the galleys for life. Thousands of scudi belonging (or not belonging) to Minale had been discovered in Genoa, and only the day before (27 February) a papal decree had been published, requiring anyone, who knew where other monies or properties of Minale might be found, now to reveal their whereabouts.<sup>44</sup>

Although the Signoria was still far from giving serious consideration to joining the Holy See and Spain in a league against the Turks, the Senate was beginning to pay court to the Hapsburgs. Selim had just ratified the treaty with the Emperor Maximilian, which would free the Porte for some other venture. Venice had given no assistance either to Maximilian or to the Hospitallers in their

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fols. 93-95' [115-117].

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 110' ff. [131' ff.].

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 112'-113' [133'-134'], 114' [135'], 118' [139'], and Reg. 77, fol. 82' [103'].

<sup>44</sup> *Bibl. Apost. Vaticana*, Cod. Urb. lat. 1040, fol. 517' by mod. stamped enumeration, a Fugger dispatch from Rome dated 28 February, 1568: "Per il rumore dell' armata del Turco il Papa ha concesso licentia che si possano fare nel stato ecclesiastico 1,500 fanti per diffensione di Malta, alli quali ancora darà parte delle paghe con tutto che li di passati habbi donato a quella Religione X m. scudi di gioie del Minale, il quale è stato rimesso in secreta carcere per causa che in Genova si sono scoperti molti suoi migliaia di scudi, et hieri si è pubblicato un bando che chi sa dove si trovi altri suoi beni proprii, denari, et robbe gli debba palesare." On Minale, cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 54.

<sup>35</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 57' [79'], 58' [80'], 59' [81'].

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fols. 60'-61' [82'-83'].

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fols. 66-67 [88-89], and cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 209, p. 363.

<sup>38</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 101 [123], doc. dated 18 November, 1568, and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 102' [124'], 102" [124'].

<sup>39</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 63' [85'], *alli rettori di Zara et provveditor general in Dalmatia*, doc. dated 21 February, 1568 (Ven. style 1567).

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fol. 64' [86'].

struggles with the Turks, and Spain had shown no interest in joining Venice in the anti-Turkish league that Pius V had been advocating.<sup>45</sup> If Selim should move against Cyprus, to whom could Venice turn for help but to Pius and to Philip II? Pius had no galleys, however, for the small papal fleet had been lost at Jerba.

When the Venetian ambassador to the Spanish court, Sigismondo di Cavalli, informed the doge and Senate that Philip had appointed his half-brother Don John of Austria, then twenty-one years of age, as captain-general of the Spanish fleet, they wrote Don John a letter of fulsome praise (on 22 April, 1568) "con nostra grande satisfatione et contento d' animo." Only good could come of Don John's supernal qualities of mind and spirit. Venice bore him "molta affectione et benevolentia," for he was the son of the renowned Emperor Charles V, "truly the friend of our Republic" (which Charles in fact had never been). The road to honor and glory had been opened up to Don John, and the doge and Senate prayed that the Almighty would guide him to the goal he sought "with satisfaction to his Catholic Majesty."<sup>46</sup>

After this almost rapturous letter of congratulation to Don John of Austria on his appointment to supreme command of the Spanish fleet, it is sad to have to note that the Archbishops at the Frari show that the Venetians kept the Porte informed of Don John's movements during the summer of 1568.<sup>47</sup>

On the same day that the Senate endorsed the letter of congratulation to Don John (22 April, 1568), it also approved a dispatch to the colonial government of Crete with the reassuring news that letters from the baillie Giacomo Soranzo in Istanbul, written on 13 March and received in Venice on 6 April, had reported that all seemed quiet on the Ottoman front "so that one can hope the present year will pass without further travail or dis-

turbance."<sup>48</sup> About three months later (on 3 July) the doge and Senate wrote Friedrich III, count palatine of the Rhine, in answer to an inquiry, that it was their understanding that the Emperor Maximilian had made a "peace or rather truce" with the Porte for eight years. Maximilian had in fact confirmed the peace in Vienna a few weeks before, as the Signoria must have known. As for the Turkish armada, they told the count palatine, some eighty galleys had sailed from "Byzantium" to certain ports and islands in the Aegean. What course it might take later, "we cannot say for certain."<sup>49</sup> But if the armada should enter the Adriatic (as in 1566), the Venetian naval commanders would of course be instructed (as indeed they were) to avoid all contact with it.<sup>50</sup> To the obvious relief of the Signoria, the armada did not get so far west as the Adriatic. By 1 September the Senate could assume that the sultan's eighty galleys were returning to Istanbul.<sup>51</sup>

Three days later (on 4 September, 1568) the Doge Pietro Loredan wrote the provveditore of the Venetian fleet,

In order that you may know our will with regard to disarming the galleys of Candia we do, with the Senate, inform you that when you shall have received certain word that the Turkish armada has passed Cape Malea [of Lesbos, not of southeastern Morea] to return to Constantinople, you are to order the disarming of the said galleys under the guidance and with the assent of the commander of the galley slaves.<sup>52</sup>

Disarming galleys meant removing oarsmen and mercenaries. It saved money, and one could do it when the Turk was quiet. The Senate liked to save money, tried to keep the Turk quiet, and always sought the means to do so. Thus at this time the doge, as voted by the Senate, sent orders to Marco Querini, "captain of the Gulf" (the Adriatic), to protect Turkish as well as Venetian subjects from the attacks and raids of the Uskoks.<sup>53</sup> Insofar as the Uskoks of Segna (Senj) recognized anyone's jurisdiction over them, it was

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Paul Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg (1570-73)*, I: *Vorgeschichte und Vorverhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 35 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 72<sup>r</sup> [94<sup>r</sup>], *illustrissimo D. Ioanni Austriaco serenissimi regis Catholici classis capitaneo generali dignissimo*, doc. dated 22 April, 1568, + *de literis* 207, *de non S*, non *sinceri* 1.

<sup>47</sup> See the letter of the doge and Senate, dated 31 July, 1568, to the baillie in Istanbul, which letter is to be found in Senato, *Deliberationi Constantinopoli*, Reg. III, fol. unnumbered, *ad finem*. Although the Turks were glad to receive news from the West through the Venetian bailies, they objected to the Signoria's sharing the *avvisi* from Istanbul with the ambassadors of the European princes (Stella, *Nunzi. Venezia*, VIII, no. 19, p. 69, a letter of Facchinetti to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Venice on 29 June, 1566).

<sup>48</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fol. 72<sup>r</sup> [94<sup>r</sup>], *al regimento di Candia*.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fol. 82<sup>r</sup> [104<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fol. 87<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 75, fol. 92<sup>r</sup> [114<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>52</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fols. 136<sup>v</sup>-137<sup>r</sup> [162<sup>v</sup>-163<sup>r</sup>]. Loredan was doge from 26 November, 1567, to 3 May, 1570. Galley slaves, *li homini condannati alla cathena*, were supposed to man the oars only on galleys which had been designated to receive them, and not on others, "as has sometimes been done" (*cf.* in general Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 17<sup>r</sup>-19<sup>r</sup> [34<sup>r</sup>-36<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>53</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 156<sup>v</sup> [182<sup>v</sup>], and, *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 42<sup>r</sup> [87<sup>r</sup>].

that of the Austrian Hapsburgs, who felt no large distress at their harassment of Venetians and Turks.<sup>54</sup>

The reports that eighty galleys had sailed from Byzantium to certain ports and islands in the Aegean had some substance. Pietro Valderio relates that when the Turks had more or less decided upon the "enterprise" of Cyprus, Selim II sent Piali Pasha into Nicomedia to see to the making or outfitting of galleasses (*maone*) and galleys. Lala Mustafa Pasha went out to gather forces, especially for the land army. Ali Pasha was ordered to go to Cyprus under the guise of wanting to load his galleys with timber in the Gulf of Alexandretta or Lajazzo, *il Colfo della Giazza*, and take the timber to Alexandria in order to send it on to the Red Sea for the construction of galleys that would go to India. Ali also spread word that the armada, which everyone knew was being fitted out in Istanbul and elsewhere, would be sent to Spain to help the Moriscos. The army was being prepared for service against the sophi of Persia.

Suddenly the news came to Famagusta from Paphos on 8 September, 1568, that a large number of Turkish galleys had appeared off shore under Ali Pasha, *il loro bassà generale*, who would not allow his men to do damage anywhere, claiming that he had come as a friend. He was on his way to Lajazzo, and would go to Famagusta to get a pilot who knew the area of the Gulf of Alexandretta. Marco Michiel, then the captain of Famagusta, took the appropriate steps to safeguard the city and to receive Ali with the usual courteous gesture of a worthwhile present.

On the tenth Ali's armada of sixty-four galleys rounded Cape Greco at the southeast corner of the island of Cyprus. Michiel summoned Geronimo Greghetto, whom Valderio was soon to succeed as viscount of Famagusta; he also summoned Valderio, who was provveditore of the city at the time, as well as Zorzi Squarcialupi and Dr. Soliman di Rossi. Off they went in Anzolo Surian's galley "with a fine present of a thousand plasters in a silver bowl," along with a dozen loads of meats, refreshments, and other things. They boarded Ali's galley, and made the presentation "with the accustomed ceremonies."

Valderio then notes that Ali Pasha "asked me whether it was true that we were rebuilding the

city of Nicosia, and turning it into a fortress. I answered him, saying that it was true, to which he replied, 'To what purpose?' Ali went on to say that their Venetian lordships were merely throwing their money away, for they were the most serene sultan's "brothers and friends." Certainly there was no need to distrust the sultan, and no need to fear Philip [II]—whom everyone knew to be no friend of Venice—for if Philip made a move against Cyprus, the sultan would want to defend the island in order not to have such an enemy so close at hand. Valderio acknowledged that his Turkish lordship was quite right. The Venetians did not at all doubt what he said, but because so many of the poor in the "kingdom" of Cyprus had no means of support, their rulers had to assist them "so that the miserable creatures could live and support their children." All the building in Nicosia was designed to provide employment for those who needed it. Ali seemed pleased with Valderio's answer, and changing the subject, he requested a pilot, and "I said that we would do this for him as an act of courtesy when we returned to the city."

One of Ali Pasha's sons entered the harbor with Valderio and his companions. The young man was accompanied by six or eight captains "and other important persons to the number of thirty." They were all duly presented to Marco Michiel, the captain of Famagusta, and (there was apparently no tactful alternative) they were shown the fortress from one place to another "to our great distress." The next morning when the Turks came ashore to get water, "with the pasha incognito among them," they went by the arsenal, where (says Valderio) the pasha did as much spying as he wanted. Venturing south of the walls of Famagusta, they went to the hills, "dove sono le sepulture degli Ebrei." At Ali's side was always one Josef Attanto of Tripoli, who for his misdeeds had been condemned to the oar by a podestà of Famagusta. Having served for five years, Attanto had escaped, and gone to Istanbul. Being an engineer, he had now come to Cyprus with letters from the Venetian bailie with the request that he be allowed to go through the island to find "four beautiful columns" which were needed for a structure which Attanto was building for the sultan. Using this pretext, says Valderio, the scoundrel was spying in every nook and cranny that he chose.

Attanto had stayed a while at Famagusta "at his good pleasure," and after going around the island he had returned in ten days, saying that he had found no columns to serve his purpose. When Ali Pasha was ready to depart, and was given a Turkish or Greek pilot, Josef Attanto left Cyprus with

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 245, p. 409, a letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 10 July, 1568, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 10, 81, 91, 101, 111, pp. 53, 162, 178, 196, 210, et *alibi*. Lala Mustafa Pasha is not to be confused with the commander of the Turkish land forces at Malta in 1565.

him. Within a few days they learned in Famagusta that Ali had not gone to the Gulf of Alexandretta, but had returned to Istanbul, capturing a boatload of Famagustan soldiers along the way. Ali gave the sultan a report of all he had seen at Famagusta (and of everything that Josef Attanto had learned at Nicosia), "offering himself as ready to undertake the expedition." At a meeting of the pashas plans for an invasion of Cyprus were discussed. Mehmed Sokolli was said to be opposed to the idea, but Lala Mustafa Pasha urged it upon the sultan, "and so the war was decided upon, but secretly and among themselves."<sup>55</sup>

We have already referred to Marco Querini, captain of the Gulf, who was to play a large part in the coming war with the Turks. Fate and their own prominence were to assign even more conspicuous roles to Sebastiano Venier and Girolamo Zane in the events of 1570–1571, making their names known throughout Europe and the Levant. Venier was appointed special provveditore generale at Corfu on 19 June, 1568. He was especially to oversee matters relating "to the custody and security of this city and island," lightening the burdens of the Corfote bailie and the regular provveditore, who were caught up in their manifold duties "relating to civil and criminal justice."<sup>56</sup> In November, 1569, we find Venier serving as one of three Venetian commissioners to meet with certain Hapsburg representatives to try to settle some of the problems which were always arising along the "confines" of Friuli, where the frontiers were themselves in dispute.<sup>57</sup> On 17 June, 1570, Venier was elected provveditore generale of the Venetian "kingdom" of Cyprus, and was officially informed of his new charge five days later.<sup>58</sup>

To Girolamo Zane's misfortune, he was again elected captain-general of the sea, being required actively to assume command of the Venetian fleet on Thursday, 5 August, 1568, along with Giacomo Celsi, who had recently been elected Antonio da Canale's successor as provveditore of the fleet. Canale would soon join them, however, as would thirty galley commanders with their crews.<sup>59</sup>

A resolution of the Senate, passed on 12 August, 1568, emphasized the vast importance of certain items of business "che di tempo in tempo sono trattati dalli bayli nostri in Constantinopoli." The bailies addressed dispatches of a most critical nature not only to the Signoria, but also to the rectors of the colonial governments and to naval officers of the Republic. For the most part these communications were written in cipher, "which requires much time and much labor." The bailie's secretary ought, therefore, to have an assistant who should be drawn from the state chancery (*uno coaggiutore della cancellaria nostra*). Such appointments had been made in the past, and now Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the newly-appointed bailie to the Porte, had requested the Signoria to provide him and his secretary with such an assistant. The secretary might become ill, and illness often did beset the Venetians in Istanbul. An accident might befall him, and then who would prepare the dispatches in cipher?

Texts of such importance should only be entrusted to a "persona publica et fedele" who, acquiring the requisite knowledge and experience at the Porte, would inevitably be useful to the Signoria as well as to the bailie. By a sizable vote, therefore, Marc' Antonio Barbaro and his successors were authorized hereafter to take with them an appropriate assistant, to be chosen from the chancery and paid by the Signoria.<sup>60</sup> When in Feb-

Hieronimo Zane, cavalier et procurator, eletto capitano generale da mare, però l'anderà parte che col nome del Spirito Santo il detto capitano general da mare debba metter banco zobia [i.e., giovedì] prossima, che sarà alli cinque del mese futuro, et insieme con lui debbano metter banco il diletto nobel nostro Giacomo Celsi, eletto provviditor dell'armata, et li trenta governatori [galley commanders] eletti per questo Consiglio, li quali debbano armare vinti di zurme [i.e., ciurme] di terra ferma et dieci di quelle di questa città, secondo che fu deliberato per questo consiglio. . . . Cf. *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 105<sup>v</sup> [150<sup>v</sup>], 106<sup>v</sup> [151<sup>v</sup>], docs. dated 20 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569).

Celsi's commission as provveditore is actually dated 7 January, 1569 (see above). There was often a considerable lapse of time between election and the issuance of the electee's commission, and a further lapse of time before he—usually reluctantly—sailed from Venice. Zane did not actually receive his final, formal commission as captain-general of the sea until 18 April, 1570, on which see below, but the well-informed Facchinetti knew on Saturday, 19 June, 1568, that Zane would probably be reappointed, as indeed he was on the following day (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, nos. 236, 239, pp. 398, 401).

<sup>60</sup> Sen. Mar., Reg. 38, fol. 128<sup>v</sup> [154<sup>v</sup>], doc. dated 12 August, 1568, the vote in favor of the resolution being +180, 7, 8. Barbaro left Venice for Istanbul six days later, on 18 August (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 270, p. 428, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 281, 297, 302, et *alibi*). Apparently complete copies of Barbaro's letters to the doge and Council of Ten, covering the entire period of his bailiaggio, are preserved in two large volumes in the Bibl. Nazionale Marciana (Venice), MSS. It. VII, 390-91 (8872-73), *Registri di lettere scritte dal clarissimo Signor*

<sup>55</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 13-18. On the Moriscos' revolt in Spain, see below, p. 946. Mehmed Sokolli and Piali Pasha were enemies (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, nos. 191, 195, pp. 338, 343, et *alibi*).

<sup>56</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 79<sup>v</sup>-80<sup>v</sup> [101<sup>v</sup>-102<sup>v</sup>], and see, *ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 61-62<sup>v</sup> [82-83<sup>v</sup>].

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 33<sup>v</sup> [54<sup>v</sup>], and note Sen. Mar., Reg. 39, fol. 40<sup>v</sup> [85<sup>v</sup>].

<sup>58</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 107 [128].

<sup>59</sup> Sen. Mar., Reg. 38, fols. 124<sup>v</sup>-125<sup>v</sup> [150<sup>v</sup>-151<sup>v</sup>], resolutions of the Senate dated 31 July, 1568: "È a proposito delle cose nostre non tardar più ad espedir il diletissimo nobel nostro

ruary, 1570, Barbaro had to send his secretary Alvise Buonozzo to Venice, as we shall see, with the Turkish cha'ush Kubad, who was on his way to demand of the Signoria the surrender of Cyprus, Barbaro was glad to have with him in Istanbul "an assistant from our chancery."<sup>61</sup>

Jean Parisot de la Valette, grand master of the Hospitallers, died on 21 August, 1568. Having

*Marc' Antonio Barbaro, dignissimo bailo in Costantinopoli a sua Serenità, . . .* His first letter is dated at Zara on 21 August, 1568, as Barbaro was on his way to the Porte; the first volume (the latter part of which is in a parlous state) ends with a letter dated at Pera on 9 April, 1570, and the second with a letter dated also at Pera on 25 July, 1573. Dr. Benjamin Arbel of Tel Aviv University first called my attention to these volumes.

Barbaro seems to have managed the usually difficult journey to Istanbul more easily than his suite. From Pera on 10 October, 1568, he wrote the doge (*ibid.*, MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fol. 2<sup>o</sup>). "Gionsi io Marc' Antonio in questo loco il giorno di San Francesco [i.e., on Monday, 4 October], et se ben per gratia di Dio et per li buoni tempi ho fatto questo viaggio in assai pochi giorni che quasi non c' ha lassato sentir le molte incommodità sue; però non si può che tutti di casa mia non habbino patito grandemente per li mali et pessimi alloggiamenti che si trovano et per il convenir spesse volte dormir al sereno et in terra, del che ne ho già veduta l' esperienza, perchè in dui giorni tutta la mia famiglia si è risentita di flussi et di febre che in questo principio m' è stato d' infinito travaglio et incommodo: pure ringraziata la divina Maestà io, quasi solo, mi son preservato sano. In questa mia entrata, di ordine del magnifico Mehemet Bassa, son stato honorato per rispetto della Serenità vostra con qualche dimostrazione che ha ecceduto anco la solita et ordinaria, et similmente dal clarissimo bailo, mio predecessore, son stato ricevuto con quel più di honore et di cortesia che si poteva aspettar in queste parti, frutti soliti della sua generosità et infinita amorevolezza. . . ."

Among Barbaro's first problems were the "Jews of Aaron de Segura" (see, above, pp. 924-25), for which note, *ibid.*, fols. 12<sup>o</sup>, 16<sup>o</sup>-17, 44<sup>o</sup>, 47, 83<sup>o</sup>, 92<sup>o</sup>-93<sup>o</sup>, and MS. It. VII, 391 (8873), fols. 48<sup>o</sup>, 52<sup>o</sup>, 71<sup>o</sup>, 447<sup>o</sup>, et alibi.

<sup>61</sup> On Marc' Antonio Barbaro, who with his elder brother Daniele, ambassador to England (1548-1550) and patriarch-elect of Aquileia, built the Villa Maser, see Chas. Yriarte, *La Vie d' un patricien de Venise au seizième siècle*, Paris, 1874, pp. 173-235, who has here dealt with Marc' Antonio's mission to Istanbul, his negotiations for peace, and his subsequent *relazione* or report to the Senate, for which see Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. III, vol. I (1840), pp. 299-346.

On the nature and importance of the ciphered reports of a bailie during this period, see the article by Christiane Villain-Gandossi, "Les Dépêches chiffrées de Vettore Bragadin, baille de Constantinople (12 juillet 1564-15 juin 1566)," *Turcica*, IX/2-X (1978), 52-106, to which we have referred in an earlier chapter. On the functions of the bailie at the Porte, note also Villain-Gandossi, "Les Attributions du baille de Constantinople dans le fonctionnement des échelles du Levant au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," in *Les Grandes Escales*, Brussels, 1972, pp. 227-44 (Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin), and cf. in general the summaries of Turkish documents (*firmans*) from 1527 to 1592 in Villain-Gandossi, "Contribution à l' étude des relations diplomatiques et commerciales entre Venise et la Porte ottomane au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle," in the *Südost-Forschungen*, XXVI (1967), 22-45; XXVIII (1969), 13-47; and XXIX (1970), 290-301 [with an index].

awaited the election of his successor, the Italian Pietro del Monte, the doge and Senate sent del Monte on 12 October, 1568, an expression of the great displeasure which they said they had felt "per la perdita d'uno così savio et valoroso signore." They extolled the glorious memory which de la Valette had left behind him, and certainly his defense of Malta against the Turks was one of the great exploits of the century. But del Monte's letter to the Signoria, dated 6 September, had brought happiness and consolation to Venetian hearts, for del Monte had informed them of his election to the grand magistracy of the Order of S. John. Having had trouble with the Hospitallers for unending years, the doge and Senate were especially gratified by the new grand master's assurance of the Hospitallers' "intention and promise not to allow the galleys and other armed vessels of their Order to come into our [territorial] waters."<sup>62</sup>

De la Valette had been a shrewd administrator as well as an adroit commander. More than a year before his death, he had come to the conclusion that the island of Cyprus was doomed. He had, therefore, secured the passage of a decree in the chapter general of the Order to the effect that ways must be found to exchange the Hospitallers' properties on the island for estates in the kingdom of Naples or in Sicily. His next step was to instruct Giuseppe Cambiano, the ambassador of the Order in Rome, to negotiate with Cardinal Alvise Corner (Cornaro), the gran commendatore of Cyprus, the means of making such exchanges or selling the Order's properties on Cyprus "con maggior utile e vantaggio della Religione." Cambiano was to see to it that the exchanges and sales should redound no less to the advantage of the cardinal than to that of the Hospitallers. And all this was to be done "with good grace and papal authority."<sup>63</sup>

As far as the Hospitallers were concerned, once they had unloaded their Cypriote possessions, the island could sink into the sea, and the Venetians along with it. As the Turkish attacks began, however, public opinion combined with their own aversion to Islam to force the Hospitallers to take steps to help repel the invasion. But although the reputation of the Order had risen, its effectiveness had declined. The Knights had suffered terrible

<sup>62</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 75, fols. 95<sup>o</sup>-96<sup>o</sup> [117<sup>o</sup>-118<sup>o</sup>], *al reverendissimo gran maestro della Religione di S. Gioanne Hierosolimitana*, doc. dated 12 October, 1568. On de la Valette's last illness and death, see Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxviii, pp. 816-18 and ff., who gives a full account of the election of del Monte as his successor (*ibid.*, bk. xxxviii, pp. 821-23).

<sup>63</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. xxxviii, p. 797C, ad ann. 1567.

losses of dead and wounded during the siege of Malta, and now all their resources were going into the reconstruction of their fortifications. The siege had been utterly exhausting, and de la Valette's death had a deleterious effect upon the Order. In mid-July, 1570, the Hospitallers lost some eighty Knights in an encounter with the Algerian corsair Uluj-Ali (Occhiali) off the southern coast of Sicily. They also lost two or three galleys loaded with wine and foodstuffs which Francesco di S. Clemente, their unwise "general of the galleys," was trying to deliver to Malta at all costs. Certainly the costs were high. Bosio gives the names of more than sixty Knights "among those taken as slaves or killed."<sup>64</sup>

If the Venetian Signoria could expect little assistance from the Hospitallers, there could be no doubt that one Astorre Baglione would be worth more than his weight in gold, should current rumors prove true that the Turks would attack Cyprus. On 21 August, 1568—the day Jean de la Valette died—the Senate voted to send Baglione to replace the soldier-engineer Count Giulio Savorgnan as governor-general of the militia in "our kingdom of Cyprus." Savorgnan had been working for almost a year on the (still unfinished) fortifications of Nicosia. As a gesture of appreciation for the past services of Baglione, then general of the Republic's light horse, and as an expression of their confidence in his future efforts, the Senate voted Baglione a gift of five hundred ducats on 6 November, 1568, as he was getting ready to leave for Cyprus.<sup>65</sup> Baglione was to prove one of

the heroes—one of the two outstanding heroes—in the coming siege of Famagusta.

One by one the names of those who served to figure in the war of Cyprus make their appearance in the Venetian documents of 1568–1569. As the summer of 1568 came on, however, it was quite clear that the Turks, who were having trouble with the Arabs as well as with the Muscovites, were not going to make an attempt that year upon Cyprus. As the winter approached, the Senate voted (on 20 November, 1568) to reduce "superfluous expense" by cutting down on the mercenary soldiery in the capital city of Nicosia, in the harbor town of Kyrenia, and in the important citadel of Famagusta. The sources contain many complaints about the stradioti and other mercenaries who were sent to Cyprus. They got married, acquired children, and even turned to the cultivation of the soil, which was the end of their usefulness as soldiers. It was felt in the Senate that the money being spent on the mercenaries in question could better be used "in altre provisioni per quel regno più necessarie." With the lapse, therefore, of the two years' term for which the Greek soldiers in Famagusta had been hired, their contracts were not to be renewed. The troops in the regular garrisons in Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta were to be more widely and effectively employed. Such at least was the Senate's decision.<sup>66</sup>

At the beginning of 1569 the Ottoman authorities at Alexandria were holding in custody certain vessels and merchandise belonging to the French and to others who traded under the French flag in Levantine ports. The ships and goods had been seized as payment or part payment of the 150,000 écus or ducats which the French ambassador M. Grantrie de Grandchamp acknowledged that his master Charles IX owed Joseph Nasi, the duke of Naxos. Strident complaints were soon coming from Egypt, however, that such actions would ruin the port of Alexandria and the commerce of the entire region, "and that this port has been free, from the time of the Mamluks, to all the nations of the world." The oriental-western trade was the only means whereby the residents of the area could live and pay their tribute to the sultan, "and

<sup>64</sup> Bosio, III (1602), bk. XL, pp. 854–60, and cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 909–10. By the beginning of the 1560's relations between Venice and the Hospitallers had improved somewhat.

<sup>65</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fol. 155' [181'], resolution of the Senate dated 6 November, 1568: "Dovendosi espedir l' illustre Signor Astor Baglione, general nostro de' [cavalli] leggieri, accio che possa andar per governor general della militia del regno nostro di Cipro in luogo del magnifico conte Julio Savorgnan si com' è stato deliberato per questo Consiglio a XXI del mese d' agosto passato, è conveniente usare verso di lui quello ch' è stato fatto ancora in una tal occasione verso gli altri, però l' anderà parte che all' illustre Signor Astor Baglione soprannominato siano dati denari della Signoria nostra in dono ducati cinquecento per l' effetto sopradetto, +145, 19, 2. In Collegio existente in Senato die supradicta +26, 0, 0." Cf. *ibid.*, fols. 173' [199'], 175' [201'], and *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 78' [123']. Astorre was also allowed to take with him his nephew Federico "per capo delli fanti . . . con ducati vinti di stipendio per paga, come hanno li altri capi . . ." (Reg. 38, fol. 175' [201']). Baglione did not leave Venice until mid-March, 1569 (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 359, p. 504). On 20 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), the Senate voted to send Savorgnan as governor general della militia nostra into Dalmatia (*ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 106'–107' [151'–152'], 108' [153']).

<sup>66</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 38, fols. 157'–158' [183'–184'], doc. dated 20 November, 1568. The Senate was worried about the heavy expenses which the Signoria had been facing for several years (*ibid.*, fol. 160 [186]), but far heavier expenses lay just ahead. The Turks' troubles with the Arabs were naturally of great interest to Venice and to the nuncio Facchinetti (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, nos. 115, 195, 218, pp. 218, 343, 375, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 223, 227, 231, 242, 249 [also mention of the Muscovites], 256, 263, 274, 284, 286, 287, et alibi).

... if this were taken from them, they could do so no longer." From Istanbul on 14 March (1569) Granterie de Grandchamp could report to the king that the Turks had released the ships, men, and merchandise belonging to the other nations, "and have retained only those of your subjects, amounting to the sum of 42,000 ducats in all."<sup>67</sup>

Later on in the year (on 19 July) a French financial agent, Claude du Bourg de Guérines, arrived in Istanbul to negotiate a renewal of the "capitulations" of the old Franco-Turkish treaty of commerce. Du Bourg was well received at the Porte, and worked so quickly that by 30 August he could inform Charles IX that the sultan had ratified the treaty; according to its terms restitution (or at least partial restitution) was to be made to the French of the goods and vessels sequestered at Alexandria.<sup>68</sup> Du Bourg had been named as French agent to the Porte in 1563 to replace Antoine Petremol, but his appointment had been cancelled. A born intriguer and a troublemaker, du Bourg became involved in international complications that remain difficult to unravel.

In his report to Charles IX of 30 August (1569) du Bourg states that Mehmed Sokolli spoke with approval of the proposed marriage of his French Majesty with Elizabeth, a daughter of Maximilian II who, as a result of the recent eight years' peace between Austria and the Porte, had become a "bon amy" of the Turks. During du Bourg's August meetings with Mehmed, the latter also discussed Charles's younger brother Henry [III], duke of Anjou, "et au regard de mondit seigneur le duc vostre frère, le dit bassa m' a ouvert un autre party:" In a memorandum concerning his mission to Istanbul which du Bourg prepared in Venice some months later (on his way back to France), he explained the "party" which the grand vizir had suggested to him. Mehmed pointed out that Sigismund Augustus, king of Poland, was without heirs [although he had been married three times]. According to Mehmed, at least as recounted by du Bourg, the Polish nobility had designated Sigismund's sister [Anna] as successor to the throne. Mehmed, therefore, proposed that Henry of Anjou should marry the aging Anna, and succeed the Jagiellonians as king of Poland.

<sup>67</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III (1853, repr. 1965), 60–61, 66 note.

<sup>68</sup> Charrière, III, 65–71, with notes. Mehmed Sokolli also taxed du Bourg with the return to Istanbul of the "femme turque, . . . dont sa mère fait icy une grande clameur et importunité" (pp. 71–72), with which years-long problem we have dealt above.

It is odd that the Turks should have been among the first to think of Henry as a candidate for the Polish throne, but he was in fact to be declared king of Poland on 11 May, 1573, by the electoral diet at Warsaw.<sup>69</sup>

Du Bourg apparently found the Turks very amiable. Now that Philip II's third wife, Elizabeth of Valois, was dead, Mehmed seemed to look benignly on the prospect of Philip's marrying Maximilian's daughter Anna, as Charles IX took her sister Elizabeth of Hapsburg as his wife. What was happening to the Turks? Did they really approve of this union of Austria, France, and Spain? Had the sultan lost his mind? Was this all "un jugement de Dieu pour la subversion de l'empire des Othomans?" Or did it mean that the sultan would be less afraid of Philip if one of Philip's allies was Charles, a friend of the Turks, and the other was Maximilian, now bound to the eight years' peace? Was this policy of sudden friendliness toward the West designed to free the Turks to proceed against the Persians and the Muscovites? Or was the sultan disarming the three chief powers of Christendom so that he might strike at Venice and take possession of the kingdom of Cyprus? The Hapsburgs were no lovers of Venice. Maybe they would attack Venice in the rear "en la terre ferme" while the Turks invaded Cyprus. These were the questions which du Bourg was mulling over in Venice in the spring of 1570 as a result of his sojourn at Istanbul the preceding year.<sup>70</sup>

In the meantime reports had been flowing westward of the great armament the Turks were building. In his dispatch of 14 March (1569) the French

<sup>69</sup> As is well known, owing to his brother Charles's death (on 30 May, 1574), Henry did not remain king of Poland very long, but succeeded to the French throne (cf. M. L. Cimber and F. Danjou, eds., *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France*, 1st ser., vol. IX [Paris, 1836], pp. 137–54). On 16 September, 1569, the doge and Senate wrote the bailie in Istanbul, "Non v' habbiamo già molti giorni significato alcuna nova per non vi esser stata l'occasione. Hora vi dicemo che 'l serenissimo re Catholicò ha concluso matrimonio con la prima figliuola del serenissimo imperator, et il re Christianissimo ha parimente concluso matrimonio con la seconda figliuola di sua cesarea Maestà, le quali per quanto s' intende a primavera anderanno a marito, et il serenissimo re di Portogallo, figliuolo della sorella di sua Maestà Catholica, ha concluso matrimonio in una sorella del re Christianissimo . . ." which news the bailie was to pass on to the Turks (Senato, *Deliberazioni Costantinopoli* [Secreta], Reg. 4, fols. 17'–18' [26'–27']).

<sup>70</sup> Charrière, III, 72–80, esp. the notes. The contract for Philip II's marriage to Maximilian's daughter Anna is given in Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-1 (1728), no. LXXXV, pp. 175–78, and that for Charles IX's marriage to Elizabeth, *ibid.*, no. LXXXVI, pp. 178–79.



ambassador de Grandchamp had expressed the view that they would attack Otranto, "au commencement de la Pouille," opposite Turkish-held Valona, only sixty to eighty miles away. Piali Pasha, supported by Joseph Nasi and other renegades, was allegedly urging upon Sultan Selim an expedition against the Spanish in Apulia. The Turkish preparations "for the coming year" included, according to de Grandchamp, the construction of sixty *parandariae* (*parandrées*), "vessels which can carry thirty horses each," as well as the construction of fifty galleasses (*mahonnes*), which could carry no end of supplies, munitions, and even horses. The Turks were restoring all their old galleys, and building new ones "in diverse places." They planned to move into Apulia some 60,000 horse and 200,000 to 300,000 foot, "which would be easy for them if they were not opposed."<sup>71</sup> At any rate it is clear that M. de Grandchamp was impressed with the extent of the Turkish preparations.

Throughout the spring of 1569, despite the Turks' grandiose plans for the coming year, their activities at sea were largely confined to the dispatch of some thirty galleys (and various transports) to the Black Sea "alli confini de Moscoviti" and a like number to patrol the Aegean.<sup>72</sup> The Venetians always regarded the Black Sea as a good place for Turkish galleys, and they had no objections to the Aegean patrols since they helped rid the sea of corsairs, who were a perpetual nuisance, and were even then a cause of renewed concern in the Adriatic.<sup>73</sup> But the question always asked on the Rialto was, What about next year?

If Jean de la Valette could look upon Cyprus as lost as early as 1567, can we regard the Venetians as less farseeing? Hardly. Luis de Requesens had written Philip II from Rome (on 24 October, 1567) that Pius V had just told him he did not expect the Signoria to respond favorably to a papal appeal to send France further assistance against the Huguenots, "for he knows that a few days ago the Venetians with great urgency requested the most Christian queen [Catherine de' Medici] to pay them the 400,000[!] ducats which they had loaned the crown. . . ." They needed the money for the defenses of Cyprus "y en otras partes." On

the following day (25 October) Facchinetti, the nuncio in Venice, wrote the cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli that many Venetians still blamed French connivance with the Turks for their loss of Nauplia and Monemvasia in 1540. Requesens appears, however, to have misunderstood the pope. The Venetians were doubtless asking for repayment of two loans they had made the French, amounting to 200,000 ducats. The French ambassador had just appeared before the Collegio, and presented a request in Charles IX's name for a further loan of 400,000 scudi, which the Signoria had declined.<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, the Venetians had learned or thought they had learned that, after they had loaned the French "another 100,000 ducats" [the total does seem to have been 200,000], the latter were trying to make them lose the island of Corfu. If France were actually collapsing, the Venetians might provide some aid against the Huguenots as a counterweight to Spain, for they would not want Philip II to become the sole arbiter of French affairs. But as the nuncio had written Bonelli a month before (on 27 September, 1567), the Signoria was demanding immediate payment of [at least] 100,000 ducats, which were much needed "for their fortifications."<sup>75</sup> The loan was not repaid, and so the money was never applied to the fortifications of Cyprus, although the Signoria spent a good deal on them. Six months after the fall of Famagusta, the Senate was still seeking repayment of the 200,000 scudi or ducats which the king of France owed the Republic.<sup>76</sup>

But in the spring of 1569, as we have seen, the waters of the Mediterranean were being ruffled only by corsairs. Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the Venetian baillie in Istanbul, had assured the Signoria on 12 March that the Turkish armada would not "go out for this year." A month later (on 16 April) the doge and Senate wrote the colonial government of Corfu to reduce the number of hired troops on the island unless they should receive "another dispatch to the contrary from our baillie" which, however, seemed unlikely. Of the four hundred foot on the island they were to choose the

<sup>71</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, VIII, no. 162, pp. 292, 293.

<sup>71</sup> Charrière, III, 59.

<sup>72</sup> *Bibl. Apost. Vaticana*, Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, *Avvisi del mondo dell' anno 1569*, fol. 46<sup>r</sup>, entry di *Constantinopoli*, 2 *Marzo*, and cf. de Grandchamp's letter of 14 March in Charrière, III, 58-59.

<sup>73</sup> *Sen. Mar. Reg.* 39, fol. 3<sup>r</sup> [47<sup>r</sup>], *al capitano nostro in Colfo*, doc. dated 19 March, 1569.

<sup>75</sup> Luciano Serrano, ed., *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede*, 4 vols., Madrid, 1914, II, no. 94, pp. 239-40, Requesens' letter of 24 October, 1567, with extracts from the Venetian nuntiatione, dated 27 September and 25 October, in the notes.

<sup>76</sup> *Sen. Secreta*, Reg. 78, fol. 59 [81], docs. dated 25 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571). The French loan was supposed to be repaid in six years.

best, reducing the number to three hundred; they should let the others go, providing them with the usual ship's biscuit and transportation home, in such fashion as might be found convenient.<sup>77</sup> The waters were calm, but the borderlands of Dalmatia and Albania were not. We have already noted the Turkish raids into Dalmatia at the beginning of 1568. Such clashes along the frontier did of course occur from time to time, but now things seemed to be taking a turn for the worse.

The Signoria had just received a letter from Sultan Selim, protesting the Venetian presence in certain specified areas along the confines of Dalmatia and Albania. On 11 June (1569) the doge and Senate answered in a letter of remonstrance to the sultan. The lands in question had belonged to Venice "for ever so many years," as could be shown by past treaties which earlier sultans had ratified. It could also be proved by authentic texts, as the bailie Barbaro would make clear to the Sublime Porte. The sultan's claim to these Venetian territories was unwarranted. It was all the work of troublemakers, "persone desiderose di novità," who had no regard for the Venetians' true friendship for the sultan. Since his Majesty possessed such a great empire, surely he did not want to take the lands of his friends. The doge and Senate asked, therefore, that his Majesty should order his sanjakbeys and other ministers in the borderlands of Dalmatia and Albania "to desist from these disturbances," leaving the Republic's subjects in the peaceful possession of lands they had owned for "ever so many years without even the slightest difficulty or disturbance."<sup>78</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fols. 9<sup>r</sup>-10<sup>r</sup> [53<sup>r</sup>-54<sup>r</sup>], *al reggimento di Corfu*, doc. dated 16 April, 1569, the vote being +180, 4, 1.

<sup>78</sup> Since this letter is one of the first striking evidences of the new anti-Venetian policy at the Porte, it seems worthwhile to give the text (Senato, Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnumbered fol., *al serenissimo Signor Turco*, letter dated 11 June, 1569): "Recevessemo questi prossimi giorni l' honoratissime lettere di vostra imperial Maestà, dalle quali habbiamo inteso quanto ella ci ha scritto circa li nostri confini di Dalmatia et Albania, onde in risposta diciamo a vostra Maestà che havendo noi per tanti et tanti anni quieti et pacificamente posseduti tutti essi confini, si come ancor appar per diverse capitulationi fatte con li serenissimi suoi predecessori et ultimamente confirmate da vostra Maestà, et chiaramente constà per scritture authentiche et per il bailo nostro sarà dimostrato alla sua Eccelsa Porta, siamo certi che queste difficultà siano mosse da persone desiderose di novità et che forse non hanno in consideratione la buona amicitia che tenemo con lei, sapendo noi, ance essendo certissimi, che possedendo vostra Maestà un imperio tanto ampio, quanto è li suo, ella non voglia quello ch' è delli suoi amici, come le siamo noi veri et sinceri, però la pregamo che con suo nobilissimo commandamento voglia ordinar alli sanzacchi et altri suoi mi-

As Pius V shared the Venetians' increasing fear of the sultan's next move, he was also, like the Venetians, beset by corsairs. A Fugger news dispatch, dated 6 July (1569), reported that corsairs had just seized "some boats which were coming to Rome, among which there was one loaded with wine for the pope, with thirty persons aboard, whom the corsairs have offered to ransom at one hundred scudi each." The poor friends and relatives of the captives had appealed to Pius for help. He offered "25 ducati per homo," and negotiations were begun. In the meantime, however, Giannandrea Doria had sailed south along the Lido di Roma with twenty-four galleys and 1,500 Spanish soldiers. At the Curia it was being assumed that Doria must have taken the corsairs' fuste.<sup>79</sup>

The agents and associates of the Fuggers were vigilant in collecting the news, which was transmitted through Venice to the banking house in Augsburg. A dispatch of 30 July (1569) brought word that Giannandrea Doria passed along the Tyrrhenian coast "the other day" past Civitavecchia and Naples, heading for Sicilian waters, to add his galleys to those of the island kingdom and Malta. The reason was to track down and attack the eighteen galliots of certain corsairs who were operating, presumably, out of Algiers.

At the same time one had learned that Don Per Afán de Ribera, the duke of Alcalá, viceroy of Naples, had expressed regret to Cardinal Bonelli that one could not export horses from the kingdom without a license from Philip II. The viceroy's dictum had been evoked by the fact that the archbishop of Naples had given Bonelli a beautiful horse. Pius V and Alcalá were at loggerheads over the latter's refusal to allow the bull *In coena Domini*, with its extreme assertions of papal authority, to be published in the kingdom without the *exsequatur* or royal permission. Alcalá's refusal to allow the removal of the horse does seem like a petty gesture, but was no doubt of some interest to contemporaries. The dispatch of 30 July closes with the information that "the pope has given 3,000 scudi to the Order at Malta to assist in the con-

nisti alli detti confini che cessino da queste novità, lassando che li sudditi nostri possedano quello che già tanti et tanti anni senza alcuna pur minima difficultà overo disturbo hanno pacificamente posseduto, et che si come sarà conforme alla grande giustitia che respelnde in vostra imperial Maestà et alla buona et sincera amicitia che havemo con lei, così ci sarà gratissimo— et li anni suoi siano molti et felicissimi. +199, 1, 0."

<sup>79</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, *Avvisi del mondo dell' anno 1569*, fols. 105<sup>r</sup>-106<sup>r</sup>, doc. dated 6 July, 1569.

struction of the new city which they are building on that island."<sup>80</sup>

Pius V's difficulties with the duke of Alcalá did not ease the way to the anti-Turkish league which Pius had been seeking, but there were other, larger impediments to the pope's longed-for union of Venice and Spain against the Porte. Philip II's counselors believed that formation of the league advocated by the pope, the "grand inquisitor," would be certain to incite the German Protestants against both Spain and the Empire. The Protestants would assume that the "unión sagrada" was directed against them rather than against the Turks. They were already aiding and abetting the rebels in Flanders, and creation of the Catholic league would tend to make the revolt in the north-land an international, religious conflict, whereas Philip and the duke of Alva insisted upon regarding it as secular treason within the Spanish-Hapsburg domains.<sup>81</sup>

As for the Venetians, they had long had their differences with the Austrian Hapsburgs over Friuli, and feared Philip's domination in Italy. Also, of course, if the Signoria should join a Spanish alliance, it would mean *eo ipso* a break with the Porte, and expose Cyprus and Crete to the inevitability of Turkish attack. For almost thirty years Venice had remained at peace with the Turks by giving money and gifts to the pashas, furnishing them with information concerning the Christian powers, and paying the sultan an annual tribute of 8,000 ducats for Cyprus and of 500 for Zante. Venice could tolerate Turkish incursions along the borders of Dalmatia and Albania, as she had done for generations, but if the Turks landed in force in Cyprus or Crete, she would seek allies wherever she could find them. Obviously the powerful king of Spain would be the best ally. If Pius V could organize a league of the Empire, France, and Spain against the Porte, Venice might join it. Cath-

erine de' Medici, however, was unlikely to give up the French entente with the Porte. Maximilian II was as cautious as the Signoria; also, like Venice, he now had peace with the Turk.

What, then, could Venice do, as the clouds were darkening the sky in 1569? She could do as she had been doing, that is, add to the fortifications of Crete and Cyprus. A good deal had already been spent on the defenses of Nicosia, and on 23 July (1569) the Senate voted to deposit 5,000 ducats "nella cassa delle fortezze da mar." The money would be dispensed by the provveditori to Marc' Antonio Bragadin, who had been recently elected captain of Famagusta. The Venetians, for reasons well known, would never forget Bragadin. As captain of Famagusta, he was now to consult with others and to study the memoranda and plans which the soldier-engineer Count Giulio Savorgnan had left behind concerning the fortifications of Famagusta, and then Bragadin was to spend the 5,000 ducats on such safeguards as would brook no delay and were "most necessary for the security of that fortress." Another 1,000 ducats were to be made available to Bragadin to spend on lodgings for his soldiers, and the provveditori of the Arsenal were directed to give Bragadin 100 shields and 200 lances.<sup>82</sup> If in view of the assumed peril (which many believed lay ahead) these expenditures seem niggardly, we must take note of a letter that the nuncio Facchinetti addressed to Cardinal Bonelli at this time: "Yesterday evening it was pointed out in the Senate that the Republic faced expenses of 400,000 scudi more than its income was likely to be."<sup>83</sup>

As the Venetians knew well from past experience, the costs of war were high, and as usual when

<sup>82</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 37' [82'], doc. dated 23 July, 1569, "essendo a proposito delle cose nostre continuare la fortificazione della città nostra di Famagosta," the vote being +190, 2, 0; also see, *ibid.*, fol. 78' [123'], doc. dated 18 December, 1569, urging diligence and all speed to complete the defenses at Famagusta, and, *ibid.*, fol. 79' [124'], *et alibi*.

There is a description of the island of Cyprus and its fortifications in Ascanio Savorgnan, *Relazione della copiosa descrizione delle cose di Cipro co' le ragioni in favore o contra diverse opinioni et delle provisioni necessarie*, Bibl. Naz. Marciana, Cl. XIV, cod. L11 (4327), fols. 9-57, with much emphasis on the difficulties of strengthening the defenses of the island "non solo per la poca abbondanza delle materie, ma anco per l' inertia, pigrizia, et poca industria di questi huomini" (fol. 32'). Savorgnan was especially gloomy about finding the "diversi rimedii" which the fortifications of Famagusta required (fols. 38'-50'); on the requirements for the protection of Friuli from Turkish incursions, see the notes of Giulio Savorgnan and Girolamo Martinengo, *ibid.*, fols. 140 ff.

<sup>83</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX (1972), no. 49, p. 97, letter dated at Venice on 20 July, 1569.

<sup>80</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 125', report from Rome of 30 July, 1569. Pius V also had trouble with Venice over publication of the bull *In coena Domini* in the territories of the Republic (Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 116, pp. 242-43).

<sup>81</sup> Luciano Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia, y la Santa Sede (1570-1573)*, 2 vols., Madrid, 1918-19, I, 36-37, and cf. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, II, no. 37, p. 95, a letter of Cardinal Bonelli to Gianbattista Castagna, the nuncio in Madrid, concerning Alva's objections to Pius V's efforts to effect a league of the Christian princes against the Turks "con dir che li protestanti o confessionisti prenderiano ombra che tal lega fosse fatta contro di loro et unirsi con i rebelli sotto prenta religione delli Stati Bassi di sua Maestà Cattolica."

confronted by the Turkish menace, they appealed to the pope for concession of the tithes to be levied on the clergy in the domains of the Republic. On 3 August (1569), however, the cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli wrote Giannantonio Facchinetti, the nuncio in Venice, that his Holiness did not believe the Venetians were as yet hard-pressed enough to justify their laying hands on the resources of the Church. There was no reason for the Signoria to be surprised by the pope's rejection of their request, as Facchinetti would have to explain to milords of Venice.<sup>84</sup> The Collegio would hear Facchinetti courteously—and sadly—but the Signoria would persist in its efforts to secure the tithes. Seven months later the pope would agree that the Venetians were hard-pressed enough to justify laying hands on the Church for money, and the right to collect the tithes would be granted.

Giannantonio Facchinetti kept the Curia as well informed concerning the Turkish news as he could. Occasionally he probably picked up copies of dispatches from the Fugger agents, who were obviously to be found at the Fondaco dei Tedeschi, at the Rialto. He does not mention them, however, and most of his information certainly came from the Signoria. A week after Bonelli had instructed Facchinetti to inform the Signoria that Pius V would not grant the tithes, the nuncio sent to Rome (on 10 August, 1569) the latest news from the Bosphorus. The Turks were hard at work building up provisions and equipment for their army as well as for the armada. They were constructing the usual transports, *palandarie et maone*, which might carry munitions, horses, and a large number of some newfangled catapults. These catapults would take two-pound balls, and could be transported by muleback. They would not be used to shoot balls, however, but "winged" missiles. Eyewitnesses had allegedly seen these preparations, but it was still uncertain whether the Turk intended to send out his armada [in the spring of 1570] or whether all this activity in the workshops was merely to re-equip the arsenal, which had fallen into the doldrums.

The rebellious Moriscoes in Spain had sent agents to the Porte to ask for help against Philip II. There were doubtful reports that the sopher or shah of Persia was dead [Tahmāsp I died in 1576, after a reign of more than fifty years], but it would seem that either he was dead or his eldest son had seized the reins of government in Persia, for the

frontiers of the kingdom were in a tumult of arms. The Turk had held a public divan, "which they call a divan on horseback," with troops drawn up in order, "a divan which on the whole is never held except when they are about to embark on some expedition of importance." At the divan the sultan had spent a good deal of time with Lala Mustafa Pasha, which suggested some decline in Mehmed Sokolli's influence. On the other hand, the agha of the janissaries, who was hardly a friend of Mehmed, had been removed from his command, which was given to one of the latter's sons-in-law.<sup>85</sup> It would seem, then, that Mehmed's position as the grand vizir was still secure.

As the Venetian government was casting about for money for men, munitions, and provisions, the Senate had cause for indignation (on 16 August, 1569) in the dismal news that the wheat crop of 1567, stored in pits at Famagusta, *formenti infossati*, had spoiled. How could the rectors of the city have been so careless! The Senate approved highly of the suggestion that from time to time ship's biscuit should be made from the store of wheat, and sold at the going price to those aboard ships entering the bay of Famagusta. With the money thus realized, one could keep buying new supplies of wheat. In what condition were the harvests of 1565 and 1566, also stored in pits? In the future one must be less wasteful, more provident.<sup>86</sup> If it was not corruption, it was carelessness. Such was the nature of Venetian administration.

The harvests had been bad during the year 1569, and the Senate had increased the food allowance for the free men aboard the galleys from 6 soldi, 8 piccoli *per diem* to 8 soldi "per head." The additional four piccoli had been authorized until 7 November, but since near-famine conditions still obtained, on 19 November the Senate voted the continuance of the increased allowance for the next two years, so that the galley commanders could meet the rising costs of food.<sup>87</sup> It is small wonder

<sup>85</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 60, p. 109. Paolo Paruta places the "divan on horseback" in November, 1569, and defines it as a hunt on which the sultan was accompanied by the chief pashas, "uscendo fuori della Città con li suoi principali Bascià alla caccia," and (like almost all the contemporary historians) dwells on the hostility which both Lala Mustafa and Piali Pasha felt for Mehmed Sokolli (*Storia della guerra di Cipro*, Siena, 1827, bk. 1, pp. 16 ff.).

<sup>86</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 45 [90], *al capitano di Famagusta et proveditor general di Cipro et successori*, doc. dated 16 August, 1569. On the near famine of 1569, note Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 21.

<sup>87</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 73' [118'], doc. dated 19 November, 1569: "... l'anderà parte che la sopradetta deliberatione di accrescer la spesa di bocca a soldi otto al giorno per testa a

<sup>84</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 55, p. 104; Arch. Segr. Vaticano, *Nunz. Venezia*, vol. VII, fol. 2' by mod. stamped enumeration.

that the Senate was vexed by the spoilage of the wheat stored in the grain pits at Famagusta.

The shipyards of Barcelona and Genoa, Naples and Messina had added to Philip II's naval strength by building and refitting galleys and transports. The corsairs of Algiers and Tripoli were causing his commanders more concern than were possible movements of the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean. The Spanish were not much worried about the Venetians' conceivably losing Cyprus. The Venetians could fend for themselves; they had not lifted an oar at Jerba or Malta. The threat to Cyprus, however, had quickened the pace of naval construction in the great Arsenal at the western end of Venice. At least the Signoria was trying to quicken the pace.

Work had been lagging at the Arsenal for some time, but on 10 September (1569) the Senate took action. The skilled workers (*le maistranze*), who were paid by the day, were not getting done nearly as much as one had every right to expect, considering the large number employed. A majority of the Senate believed that the fault lay with the foremen or overseers (*proli*) who, having obtained their positions, kept them for life, and thereafter showed themselves "assai fredri nel servizio et beneficio delle cose publiche." It was an old question, Do those with tenure keep on their toes? The Senate decided that hereafter all overseers, elected in the usual way, should hold their posts for only five years. In the future every time an overseer had finished his five-year term of office, "if he shall have borne himself well and faithfully, and shall have worked for the public good," he might be continued in his post for another five years by the Collegio on the basis of a two thirds' confirmatory vote by the *provveditori* and *patroni* of the Arsenal, "and in this fashion thereafter from time to time."<sup>88</sup>

cadauno scapolo delle galee nostre sia prorogata per anni doi prossimi: +141, 2, 1." The Venetian lira (pound) was worth 20 soldi (shillings) or 240 pence. The *lira di grossi*, a money of account, stood for 240 large silver pennies (*grossi*, groats); small transactions and lesser sums were reckoned in the *lira di piccoli*, which denoted 240 small, debased silver pennies. The *soldo di piccoli*, referred to in the text, was worth 12 small pence. On the Venetian coinage, note F. C. Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic*, Baltimore and London, 1973, pp. 148-50, and on the hiring of crews and their wages, *ibid.*, pp. 364-69. The treatment of Venetian coinage is quite disjointed in the invaluable work of Friedrich von Schrötter, *Wörterbuch der Münzkunde*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1930, with brief entries under *grosso*, *grosetto*, *piccolo*, *lira Tron* and *Moconigo*, and *dukat* (*zecchino*).

<sup>88</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fols. 55<sup>v</sup>-56<sup>r</sup> [100<sup>r</sup>-101<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 10 September, 1569, the vote being +114, 59, 26.

Shortly after the Senate had limited an overseer's tenure of office to five years there was a serious fire in the Arsenal. During the night of 13-14 September (1569) a powder magazine exploded, causing the conflagration. It might have been a disaster except for the valiant and successful efforts of some of the employees to check the blaze. Having criticized them as laggards on 10 September, the Senate had nothing but praise for them on the nineteenth. The employees' daring and quickness of response to the emergency deserved more than commendation, and the Senate decided, on the basis of evidence provided by the *provveditori* and *patroni*, that 237 carpenters, 30 makers of oars and other masters, and 79 caulkers should now be given two soldi a day, one more than the usual single soldo they would have normally received on working days.<sup>89</sup>

In a letter to Bonelli of 14 September Facchinetti puts the explosion at between 1:00 and 2:00 A.M. (*tra le 6 e 7 hore*). It caused a tremendous stir. Some thought it was an earthquake, some that the day of judgment had come, others the disaster prophesied by an Armenian charlatan. Many houses were ruined, and many churches damaged,

<sup>89</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 57<sup>r</sup> [102<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 19 September, 1569: "Essendo conveniente riconoscer con la solita gratitudine della Signoria nostra quelli homeni della maistranza della casa dell' Arsenal nostro che si sono adoperati nel pericolo del fuoco ultimamente occorso al loco della polvere del detto Arsenal, prestando con le persone loro con molta prontezza et ardire quella servitù che ricercava l' occasione, l' andrà parte che a tutti quelli della detta maistranza intervenuti nell' effetto sopradetto, li quali furono marangoni numero dusentotrentasette, remeri et altri ufficiali numero trenta, et calafadi numero settantunove, si come per le note et polizze tenute et presentate dalli proveditori et patroni all' Arsenal appare, siano dati soldi doi al giorno per uno di più del soldo suo ordinario li giorni che entreranno nella casa nostra dell' Arsenal predetto, et ciò non ostante altra deliberatione che fusse in contrario. +173, 5, 8."

According to a resolution of 28 September (*ibid.*, fol. 57<sup>r</sup> [102<sup>r</sup>]), "Essendo necessario rifar il muro dell' isolotto et i volti et coprir i coperti della casa nostra dell' Arsenà caduti et rovinati per causa dell' incendio della polvere, seguito i giorni passati in detta casa, l' andrà parte che sia data facultà allii proveditori et patroni nostri all' Arsenal di poter far rifar et coprir le dette cose rovinate con quelli modi che loro parerà il meglio per beneficio della Signoria nostra, et per tal effetto siano di danari della Signoria nostra dati ad essi proveditori et patroni ducati cinquemila a parte a parte, secondo che farà bisogno. +200, 2, 2."

On the building of galleys, costs, and employees (*marangoni*, *calafati*, and *remeri*) in the Arsenal at Venice, see Ruggiero Romano, "Aspetti economici degli armamenti navali veneziani nel secolo XVI," *Rivista storica italiana*, LXVI (1954), 39-67, and Frederic C. Lane, *Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance*, Baltimore, 1934, and cf. the articles reprinted in Lane, *Venice and History*, Baltimore, 1966, pp. 143-88, 269-84.

including the church and convent of S. Maria Celeste as well as the churches of S. Francesco della Vigna, Toresti, and S. Domenico. Of the last three S. Francesco suffered the most, being nearest the Arsenal (and its façade had to be rebuilt in 1569–1572). The Venetians were fortunate, however, for there had been no wind. The fire had not spread. As far as the Arsenal was concerned, only buildings where the munitions were stored and about fifty paces of the wall surrounding the enclosure were ruined. The overall damage was thought not to exceed some 30,000 scudi. No one yet knew who was responsible, "l'autore et causa di questo male non si sa per ancora."<sup>90</sup> Very shortly, however, rumor would have it that agents of Joseph Nasi, duke of Naxos, or saboteurs in Turkish employ had ignited the powder magazine, and set the fire.<sup>91</sup> In any event the Senate had wanted, and circumstances seemed to require, increased production in the Arsenal. The boost in wages would encourage the carpenters, caulkers, and others to work harder. Also the Senate finally got around to taking care of the Serenissima's seamen, and building the projected naval hospital at Corfu.

On the way from Venice to Crete and Cyprus lay the important island of Corfu, which was to remain a Venetian possession until 1797. By action of the Senate on 20 May, 1566, it was decided to build a naval hospital on the shore near the city of Corfu. To help provide the necessary funds the

Senate had ruled that each oarsman (*galeotto*) in the Serenissima's fleet, convicts as well as free, should be taxed one soldo at each payment of wages. Most oarsmen aboard Venetian galleys and fuste were free, although increasing use was being made of the "condannadi." The unmarried were to be taxed two soldi. Oarsmen were paid about ten lire di piccoli a month, with twenty soldi to the lira. Convicts received at least something. The hospital had never been built; the money had been collected, and used for other purposes.

The Senate, therefore, returned to the subject on 16 September, 1569, "so that one should not fail to do so good a work." Thus in accordance with the resolution of more than three years before, the Senate now voted that orders should be sent to the baillie and provveditore generale of Corfu and also to the provveditore of the fleet "that the said hospital should be begun." Funds available for the purpose should be used, and the collection of soldi from the oarsmen should be continued, falling impartially on all those serving on the rowers' benches.<sup>92</sup>

While Joseph Nasi alias "Micques" was pressing his claim for 150,000 scudi upon the French crown—dishonestly according to Charles IX's ambassador Grantrie de Grandchamp—the Turks were openly acknowledging as early as October, 1569, the certainty of their attacking Cyprus. As de Grandchamp informed Charles in a lengthy, fact-laden dispatch,

I have wanted to add a further item of which Mustafa Pasha has recently spoken to me, a matter which the cha'ush has confirmed, namely that sooner or later their master must take on some good and easy enterprise, and that it was impossible for him not to descend upon Cyprus. He is no longer willing to see the Venetians so powerful, and added thereto is the fact that he has had reports enough about how they have been tying themselves ever more closely to the king of Spain. But as for him [Mustafa], he had not been of the opinion that this plan should be very far advanced without knowing whether your Majesty or M. de Savoie would not put forward some claim for themselves, all the more so because if this kingdom [of Cyprus] is governed by the Turks, it will immediately fall into wrack and ruin, and it would be better to give and entrust it to some Christian prince, a friend of theirs, who would declare himself their vassal, and draw from the kingdom a good tribute of 200,000 or 250,000 ducats a year. One can easily see his example in the poor little island of Chios, which used to yield

<sup>90</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 74, pp. 124–25, and cf. Faruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 21–23.

<sup>91</sup> Charrière, III, 88b, note; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 883–84; P. Grunbaum-Ballin, *Joseph Nasi, duc de Naxos*, Paris and The Hague, 1968, p. 142; esp. Bartolomeo Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro e della lega dei principi cristiani contro il Turco*, ed. the Monks of the Abbey of Monte Cassino, Cassino, 1845, bk. 1, pp. 16–17; and cf. Giovanni Pietro Contarini, *Historia delle cose successe dal principio della guerra mosca da Selim ottomano a' Venetiani fino al di della gran giornata vittoriosa contra Turchi*, Venice: Francesco Rampazetto, 1572, fol. 2.

Two weeks after the explosion in the Venetian Arsenal, a terrible fire broke out in Istanbul at about 8:00 P.M. on Wednesday, 28 September (1569), devastating the Jewish quarter in the city, concerning which the baillie Marc' Antonio Barbaro wrote the doge from Pera on 1 October (MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fols. 192<sup>v</sup>–195<sup>v</sup>): "Il danno che ha causato questo memorabil incendio è stato infinito et incredibile, et spzialmente fra Hebrei, perchè non essendo in tutto Constantinopoli restate due case di detti Hebrei che non si siano abbruciate, habitando loro in questo circuito che si è abbruciate, . . . et molti anco hanno perduto tutto quello che havevano, in modo che hora è lacrimosissima vista veder tante infelici et numerose famelie di putti et donne di Hebrei et Turchi andar per le strade piangendo et cridando con poco o niente substantia da potersi sustentare. . . ."

<sup>92</sup> Sen. Mar., Reg. 39, fols. 56<sup>v</sup>–57<sup>r</sup> [101<sup>v</sup>–102<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 16 September, 1569, the vote being +181, 1, 4.

70,000 or 80,000 scudi in revenue to the lords who held it, and which now turns out to be so deserted and ruined that it will be necessary to go to expense hereafter rather than get anything out of it.<sup>95</sup>

Mustafa Pasha's statement to de Grandchamp was apparently intended to please Catherine de' Medici and widen the breach with Spain. If he could whet the ambition of Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy to press a defunct family claim to Cyprus, he might remove him from the side of Venice and Spain. Angelo Calepio has noted in his account of the siege of Nicosia that Selim II was building a mosque and a school at Adrianople (Edirne), but "according to their law Selim could not endow the building[s] he proposed to erect from the revenues of the [Ottoman] empire or from his treasury." Furthermore,

their mufti [Abu Sa'ud al-Amadi], whom they reverence as their pope or chancellor, persuaded the emperor that he ought not to build a mosque before he had accomplished some warlike enterprise against the Christians, to the extension of the faith and the empire, as his ancestors had done. . . . Thus was he to acquire an income for his mosque.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Charrière, III, 84, 87, letter of de Grandchamp to Charles IX, dated at Istanbul on 16 October, 1569. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 881–82, seems not to have read this passage very carefully. He also misdates the letter.

<sup>94</sup> Angelo Calepio, *Vera et fidelissima narratio del successo dell'espugnatio et defensione del regno di Cipro* [written in 1572, and published in Stefano Lusignan, *Chorografia et breue historia universale dell'isola di Cipro*. . . al 1572, Bologna: Benaccio, 1573, on which cf. Émile Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, IV (Paris, 1906, repr. Brussels, 1963), no. 693, p. 181], trans. Claude D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cyprica: Materials for a History of Cyprus*, Cambridge, 1908, repr. New York, 1969, p. 125. Calepio was a Dominican friar. He wrote accounts of the siege of Nicosia (which he went through) and that of Famagusta at the request of his fellow Dominican Étienne de Lusignan, who incorporated them in his *Chorografia*.

A decade after the Turkish conquest of Cyprus and defeat at Lepanto, Lusignan's work reappeared as *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre et des roys, princes, et seigneurs, tant payens que Chrestiens, qui ont commandé en icelle*. . . par R. Père F. Estienne de Lusignan de la Royale maison de Cypre, *lecteur en Théologie, aux Frères Prescheurs, de present à Paris: Composé premièrement en italien et imprimé à Bologne la Grasse et maintenant augmenté et traduit en français*. Paris: Guillaume Claudière, 1580, repr. Famagusta [actually Brussels]: Les Éditions l'Oiseau, 1968, with Calepio's accounts of Nicosia and Famagusta comprising the last part of the volume (pp. 231 ff.), and cf. Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique*, IV, no. 745, pp. 228–30.

Étienne de Lusignan was apparently vicar of the bishop of Limassol from 1562 to 1568. Bernardo Sagredo, who was the Venetian provveditore generale in Cyprus (1562–1564), speaks of Étienne disparagingly in his report to the Senate (L. de Mas Latrie, *Hist. de l'île de Chypre*, III [1855, repr. 1970], 543). On Étienne, see esp. W. H. Rüdiger de Collenberg, "Les Lusignan de Chypre," *Εστρησι τοῦ Κύπρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, X (Levkosia, i.e., Nicosia, 1979–80), 251–52.

That Selim II had to do something for the faith was widely known. Meanwhile the Venetians were lamenting Turkish atrocities,<sup>95</sup> looking to the defenses of Famagusta,<sup>96</sup> and accepting the offers of those who volunteered to go to Cyprus to meet any possible Turkish attack.<sup>97</sup> Thousands of ducats were sent posthaste to the island to add to the fortifications of Famagusta and especially of Nicosia. The bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro kept up the flow of disquieting reports from the Bosphorus, which led the doge and Senate to issue further warnings to the government of Cyprus, the captain of Famagusta, and the provveditore generale of the kingdom. They also declared they were sending, in three ships, another thousand infantry to be divided between Nicosia and Famagusta. Venetian officials on the island of Crete were advised of the Turkish naval preparations, directed to arm the locally available galleys, and alerted to get ready for the dispatch of some four hundred infantry to be divided between Candia and Canea.<sup>98</sup>

The year 1570 was beginning with doubt as well as trepidation as far as the Venetians were concerned. On 28 January the Senate approved the text of a letter which the doge was to send to Sigismondo di Cavalli, the Venetian ambassador to Philip II, relating to the "preparatiō d'armata che si fanno in Constantinopoli." Everyone agreed that the sultan's armada would be large and strong, but opinion was divided as to its objective. Some still thought that the Turks would head for Malta, while others believed that they were going to attack Cyprus. Whether or not as a ruse to mislead observers, the Turkish admiral (*capitano del mar*), presumably Piali Pasha, was known to be studying the sea route to Spain, and especially the precise location of Cartagena and conditions in the port, which could be easily reached across a narrow stretch of the Mediterranean from Algiers.

<sup>95</sup> Sen. Mar., Reg. 39, fol. 75' [120'], doc. dated 26 November, 1569.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 78'–79' [123'–124'], doc. dated 18 December, 1569.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 107'–108' [152'–153'], doc. dated 22 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569).

<sup>98</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 38'–39' [59'–60'], docs. dated 25 January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569). As Barbaro wrote the Signoria from Pera on 20 December, 1569 (MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fol. 254'), "Le voci e li romori che questi apparati siano per le cose di Cipro si vanno ogni' hora più aggrandendo, etiamdo da persone di considerazione. . . ." and note, *ibid.*, fols. 258 ff., concerning the rumors "che detta armata sia per l'impresa di Cipro. . . ." although there were also those who thought "che questa armata debbi andar in Candia." From January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), "le voci com' uni stanno al solito sopra la impresa di Cipro" (fol. 262', et *alibi*).

The people in Istanbul were saying prayers and pressing for assistance to be sent to the Moriscos of Granada, who had been in revolt for more than a year. The doge also informed Cavalli "che il mufti, che è come il loro papa, persuade il Signor che per conto di religione è obligato soccorrere detti Mori." In Istanbul it was being said that the Turkish armada would sail for Spain, and attack Cartagena in order to take possession of the port. Cavalli was to pass this word on to Philip II in private, *da solo a solo*, asking him not to reveal Venice as the source of this information. The Turks' intention, once the great armada had left port, was a matter of importance to all Christendom, as Cavalli would emphasize to the king, and every prince whose lands touched the Mediterranean should keep himself informed and take the necessary precautions in time, as Venice had already begun to do.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 39 [60], *all' ambasciator in Spagna*, doc. dated 28 January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), which letter was to be sent to Cavalli by a vote in the Senate + *de literis* 197, *de non* 5, *non sinceri* 5. Cavalli was replaced as the Venetian ambassador to Philip II by Leonardo Donado [Donato, Donà] whose commission, dated 21 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), may be found, *ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 46<sup>r</sup>-47<sup>r</sup> [67<sup>r</sup>-68<sup>r</sup>]. Donado arrived at the Spanish court in late April, 1570. In after years he was elected doge of Venice (1606-1612), occupying the dogado during the Republic's contest with Pope Paul V Borghese. On Donado's career before his election as doge, see Federico Seneca, *Il Doge Leonardo Donà*, Padua, 1959, who has made extensive use of the Archivio Donà dalle Rose in the Palazzo Donà on the Fondamenta Nuove in Venice.

There is a long account of the Moriscos in Sir Wm. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, 2 vols., London, 1883, I, chaps. VI-XII, pp. 113 ff., and note the observations of Braudel, in *La Méditerranée*, II (1966), 359-64. The chief literary sources for the history of the revolt are by the contemporary diplomat (then in disgrace) Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, well known as a book-collector (*Guerra de Granada . . . contra los Moriscos de aquel reino, sus rebeldes*, in Cayetano Rosell y López, ed., *Biblioteca de autores españoles*, XXI [Madrid, 1852], IX-XII, 65-122), and by the soldier Luis del Marmol Carvajal, also a contemporary (*Rebelión y castigo de los Moriscos de Granada*, *ibid.*, pp. XII-XIII, 123-365).

On the Moriscos in 1569-1570, see the dispatches of Raymond de Rouer, sieur de Fourquevaux, in l'Abbé Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux (1565-1572)*, 3 vols., Paris, 1896-1904, II, nos. 179, 182, 192, 196, 197, etc., pp. 78 ff. On 31 October, 1569, Fourquevaux had written Charles IX "qu'il est venu avis des visrois d'Oran et de Mailloque que les ambassadeurs desd. Morisques qui avoient esté envoyez demander secours au Turc sont esté rapportez en Alger sur deux galères accompagnées de quatre chaoux que led. Turc a envoyé . . . les assuerer qu'ilz seront secouruz au printemps" (*ibid.*, no. 197, p. 128). On Fourquevaux's dispatches, note also Henry de Castries, ed., *Les Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc de 1530 à 1845*, I (Paris, 1905), 293 ff.

The nuncio Facchinetti reported from Venice that the Turkish armada would consist of 130 galleys, "ma queste 130, congiunte co' legni de' corsari, faranno armata formidabile." Nev-

The Venetians were indeed following the advice which Sigismondo di Cavalli was instructed to give Philip II. On 31 January (1570) they informed their commanders and councilors on the island of Cyprus that the Turkish preparations in Istanbul had made them decide to add 2,500 infantry to the 1,000 the Senate had already voted on, so that presently the Cypriote forces would be strengthened by 3,500 men. Galleys were being readied and armed, for the Senate was determined to overlook nothing. Every material and moral resource would be employed in the defense of the Republic's subjects and possessions, especially those at Cyprus. Everyone was aware of the colossal expenditures which Venice had made to secure the safety of the island and its inhabitants. The Senate was certain, therefore, that the Cypriote feudatories, knights, and faithful subjects of the Republic, *da noi amati come proprii figliuoli*, would not fail to do their part in dealing with any emergency which might lie ahead.

The Signoria had already provided the defenders of Cyprus with ample artillery, gunpowder, cannonballs, and other necessary munitions, as well as cannoners, *maestri et scolari*, and another dozen cannoners were on their way to Nicosia, with a like number on the way to Famagusta. The local authorities must see to the supply of foodstuffs and fodder. Thirty galleys would be armed in the Arsenal at Venice, where another hundred were being held in readiness, besides those already in service with the fleet and those which would be armed in Crete.<sup>100</sup> The need to supply the latter island with men and money was causing no less

ethless, the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli had told the baillie Marc' Antonio Barbaro that the naval armament was not being aimed at the Venetians, and it was common talk in Istanbul that the armada would sail to help the Moriscos in Spain (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 123, pp. 186-87, letter dated 21 January, 1570, and note, *ibid.*, no. 124, pp. 188-89, dated 24 January).

On the Moriscos, Cyprus, and the Ottoman empire, see Andrew C. Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-Century Spain," *American Historical Review*, LXXIV (1968), 1-25, esp. pp. 13 ff. Attention has recently been called to the Moriscos' earlier appeal to Sultan Bayazid II (1481-1512) after the promulgation of a royal edict (in 1501) requiring their conversion to Christianity or departure from Spain. In choosing the latter alternative, they had to abandon all their property [James T. Monroe, "A Curious Morisco Appeal to the Ottoman Empire," *Al-Andalus*, XXXI [Madrid and Granada, 1966], 281-303, with the text and translation of a poem in Arabic].

<sup>100</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 40<sup>r</sup>-41<sup>r</sup> [61<sup>r</sup>-62<sup>r</sup>], *die ultima Januarii*, and see, *ibid.*, fols. 44<sup>r</sup>-45<sup>r</sup> [65<sup>r</sup>-66<sup>r</sup>], 77<sup>r</sup> [98<sup>r</sup>]. The Senate also voted to send 30,000 ducats to Cyprus, half to Nicosia and the other half to Famagusta, to pay the infantry already on the island and the troops still to come.



apprehension in the Senate than the possible plight of Cyprus.<sup>101</sup> The loss of Crete would be a disaster, cutting off the way to Cyprus. Corfu must also be protected.<sup>102</sup> It was an important port of call on the route to the two great islands in the eastern Mediterranean.

Facchinetti wrote at length to Bonelli (also on 31 January), describing in some detail the Signoria's plans to have 150 light galleys and ten heavy galleys ready by the end of March. Ten heavy galleys were more important than forty light ones. Sixty *governatori di galere* had been appointed, ten for the heavy and fifty for the light galleys. Twelve to fifteen thousand men had to be transported to Cyprus. There were 180,000 people on the island, according to the nuncio, of whom 100,000 could be protected in Nicosia, 40,000 in Famagusta, and the rest could either seek refuge in the mountain fastnesses or be removed from the island. If the Turks attacked Cyprus or Crete, the Venetians might assail them in the Morea or Greece or even move against Alexandria in Egypt.

Although Facchinetti entertained more than a little doubt concerning what he understood to be the Signoria's plans to deal with Turkish attacks on Cyprus or Crete, he did note that the sultan's galleys were built "with little skill," and that their crews and mariners were not adept at combat. If God would forgive the Christians their sins, and the Turks be defeated, the sultan would have a hard time remaking his armada because of a lack of the necessary materials, and so he might conceivably lose a good part of his empire. Facchinetti shared the Venetians' hope that such considerations might deter the sultan and his pashas from invading either Cyprus or Crete.<sup>103</sup>

By the end of January, then, the Senate was acting on the somber *avvisi* and admonitions which the bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro had been sending from the Porte. Other bailies in earlier years had sounded such warnings, and yet when the sultan's armada had put to sea, it was not the outlying possessions of Venice that the Turks had attacked, but rather the Neapolitan kingdom, Sicily, and Malta. At any rate the Turks had not assailed the Venetian colonies and outposts since the peace of 1540, not even when Piali Pasha had brought the armada into the Adriatic in 1566. There were those in the Senate who hoped, and some who

believed, that maybe Malta or Cartagena was really going to be the Turkish target. Perhaps the retrospective wisdom of the historian makes him exaggerate the sense of foreboding in the Senate, but the precautions being taken to increase the Venetian naval armament far exceeded the usual response to the usual alerts from Istanbul.<sup>104</sup> At the same time the Senate was taking long strides to re-equip the fortress at Famagusta, the fleet in the Adriatic, and the defenses of Zara, Antivari, Cattaro, Cephalonia, and Zante, and (as we have said) those of Corfu and Crete.<sup>105</sup>

Girolamo Martinengo was soon to be sent to Famagusta with 2,000 foot.<sup>106</sup> Martinengo came of a family which had long served Venice, and on 11 March (1570), eighteen days before his departure, the Senate voted to make him a gift of 2,000 ducats.<sup>107</sup> According to Calepio, Venice

despatched with all speed Signor Hieronimo Martiengo with three thousand men [*sic*]; but the general died off Corfu, and less than that number arrived in Cyprus. They were intended to garrison Famagosta, and carried with them the body of Martinengo. The whole capital [Nicosia] went forth to receive it, and with bitter wailings

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 91' [136'], resolution of the Senate dated 31 January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), and cf. Paruta, *Storia di guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 23 ff.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 92 ff. [137 ff.].

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 96' [141'], 97' [142'], 116' [161'], 117' [162'].

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 124' [169'], resolution of the Senate dated 11 March, 1570: "Ha aggiunto il magnifico Domino Hieronimo Martiengo alla singolare prontezza sua di voler andare a servire la Signoria nostra nella fortezza nostra di Famagosta, conducendo seco domille boni soldati, così grave interesse delle sue facultà in questa honorata attione che conviene alla munificenza della Signoria nostra di usare verso la persona sua qualche amorevole dimostrazione, però l'anderà parte che delli danari della Signoria nostra siano dati in dono ad esso magnifico Domino Hieronimo Martiengo duca di domille . . . +182, 2, 1." The motion had been cleared in the Collegio by a vote of +22, 0, 0. It was not an ungenerous gesture, considering Venetian expenses as the Signoria prepared for war, on which note, *ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 130' ff. [175' ff.].

When he offered to go to Famagosta or wherever it would best serve the Signoria, Martinengo undertook to raise 2,000 infantry in fifteen or twenty days "et per maggior espressione dell' animo suo di condur seco ancora quell' unico figliuolo che si ritrova"—and to take his only son with him. When Martinengo appeared before the doge, his offer of service was gratefully accepted, but he was not to take his son along, so that if something should happen to him, "almeno resti in queste parti la imagine di lei, amato da noi come proprio figliuolo" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 39' [60'], doc. dated 31 January, 1570 [Ven. style 1569], a text which also caught the attention of J. R. Hale, ". . . The Venetian Army," in Gino Benzoni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, p. 167). On Martinengo, note Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, nos. 130, 152, 161, 163, pp. 199, 221-22, 233, 236, et alibi.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 41'-44' [62'-65'], 47'-50' [68'-71'], 51 [72].

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 72'-73', 75'.

<sup>103</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 127, pp. 191-93. After the disastrous defeat at Lepanto, however, the Turks rebuilt their fleet with surprising alacrity.

bore it to the church of S. Sophia. They waited a little to rest the foot soldiers, and then marched to Famagosta, carrying with them in a coffin their general's remains.<sup>108</sup>

The cathedral church of S. Sophia, built largely in the thirteenth century, was converted into a mosque after the Turkish conquest. The major surviving monument of the Latin regimes in Cyprus, its appearance has been sadly altered by earthquakes, the passage of time, and the addition of two towering minarets. Long known as the Mosque of Ayia Sophia,<sup>109</sup> in 1954 the mufti of Cyprus changed its name to the Selimiye, in honor of Selim II.

As Martinengo was getting ready to sail, crewmen were being recruited in the Dalmatian islands of Pago (Pag), Brazza (Brač), and Curzola (Korčula), and from the coastal towns of Spalato (Split), Sebenico (Šibenik), and Traù (Trogir).<sup>110</sup> Measures were being taken to protect the island of Tenos in the Aegean, *la fidelissima comunità di Tine*.<sup>111</sup> In the Veneto and Friuli, Dalmatia and Greece the Signoria was looking for manpower, oarsmen and soldiers, to man the great galleys in the Venetian fleet. Barbers were needed as well as bombardiers.<sup>112</sup>

On 4 February (1570) the doge and Senate wrote the baillie in Istanbul that since the coming year would see the fleets of "diverse princes" at sea, the Signoria was increasing the Republic's naval forces by an appropriate number of galleys. The captain-general of these forces would be Girolamo Zane, "one of our chief senators," who understood what the Signoria wanted, "which is to preserve our good and sincere peace with his Majesty [Selim II]." Zane would employ every effort and every means to avoid any offense or any act of aggression against the Turks, with whom the Signoria desired peace and friendship. But Venice must be sure that the sultan and the pashas would observe a like attitude toward her. The baillie was, therefore, directed to seek an audience with Mehmed Pasha, the grand vizir, to request that the sultan give orders to the captains of his armada "in the most efficacious fashion" to avoid all offense and discord as far as Venice and her

subjects were concerned. As soon as the baillie had seen Mehmed, he was immediately to write the Signoria the results of his audience.<sup>113</sup> Until the first shots were fired, and the first Turkish troops landed on Venetian territory, the Signoria would try to preserve "our sincere friendship" with the sultan, but the tone of the doge's letter of 4 February makes clear that the Senate now placed small confidence in the prospects for peace.

The French agent Claude du Bourg de Guélines, who had negotiated a treaty with the Porte (of which the French ambassador in Istanbul had disapproved), arrived in Venice on 16 January, 1570, and promptly wrote to Charles IX the next day. Du Bourg was accompanied by Mahmud Beg, a well-known dragoman and "l'ambassadeur du Grand Seigneur." They had left the Bosphorus on 1 November (1569), and traveled in leisurely fashion to Ragusa, whence they were borne in three Venetian galleys to Istria, and thereafter conveyed to the lagoon.<sup>114</sup> The French ambassador de Grand-

<sup>113</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnumbered folio, letter to Marc' Antonio Barbaro, dated 4 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569): "Intendendosi che l'anno venturo deveranno ritrovarsi sul mare armate de diversi principi, noi così per servar l'istituto nostro de molti anni come per conforto e consolazione de' sudditi nostri, oltre li presidii ch'ogni anno solemo mandar nell' isole et luoghi nostri da mare, habbiamo deliberato d' accrescer l'armata nostra d' uno conveniente numero di galee, al governo della quale manderemo uno de'li principali senatori nostri, il qual è il diletissimo nobel nostro Hieronymo Zane, cavalier et procurator, il quale come ben conscio della mente et volontà nostra, ch'è di conservare la buona et sincera amicitia nostra con quella Maestà [Selim II], procurará con ogni studio et cura possibile di schivar tutte quelle cose che potessero apportare alcun disturbo, desiderando come veramente facemo di perseverare et perpetuarci in essa buona amicitia, sperando, ance volendo esser certi ch' il simile sarà osservato dal canto di sua Maestà, et alli capitanei et rappresentanti suoi, che haveranno il governo della detta sua armata, saranno da lei datti ordini et commissioni tali che non seguirá scandalo né disordine alcuno conforme alla buona mente sua, il che vi commettemo col Senato che con officio conveniente debbate comunicare al magnifico primo visir, pregando sua Magnificenza che alli detti capitanei et rappresentanti suoi voglia operare che sia data la detta commissione et ordine in forma efficacissima, et di quanto haverete eseguito in questo proposito, ci aviserete subito per lettere vostre. +198, 3, 11."

<sup>114</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 99-100, letter of du Bourg to Charles IX, dated at Venice on 17 January. Facchinetti puts Mahmud Beg's arrival on the lagoon on the evening of the seventeenth, and states "che era mandato in Francia per discolpar mons. de Purgh [du Bourg], ch'è con lui, et gravare mons. de Grancians [de Grandchamp] ch'era rimasto ambasciatore del Re Christianissimo in Constantinopoli: Ma, quel che si sia, è cosa molto perniciosa che detto chiaus passi in Francia, ove potrà veder le miserie di quel regno. . ." (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 122, p. 185, Facchinetti to Bonelli, letter dated at Venice on 18 January, 1570).

<sup>108</sup> Calepio, *Vera et fidelissima narratione*, trans. C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (1908, repr. 1969), p. 126; Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* (1580, repr. 1968), pp. 240-41.

<sup>109</sup> On the cathedral church of S. Sophia in Nicosia, see George Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 1918, pp. 64-80.

<sup>110</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 101' [146].

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 101'-102' [146'-147].

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 103'-104' [148'-149].

champ had written Charles IX in extreme annoyance that "du Bourg a tiré des capitulations comme celles des Venitiens," the terms of the capitulations being (in de Grandchamp's opinion) a detraction from the grandeur and dignity of the French crown.<sup>115</sup> The two Frenchmen had been at bitter odds in Istanbul, where du Bourg had been playing fast and loose with the Turks, while de Grandchamp reviled the agent "pour la légèreté de son cerveau."<sup>116</sup>

Mahmud Beg had brought a letter from Selim II to the Signoria. The doge and Senate sent their answer to the bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro, who would transmit it to Mehmed Sokolli to present to the sultan. Since Mahmud had brought Selim's letter to Venice, the doge had also given him a text of the Senate's reply to send or carry back to the Porte. These two identical letters to the sultan were of course sealed. Marc' Antonio, as was usually done, was to receive a copy of the sultan's letter and the doge's answer, so that he might know how to deal with Mehmed Sokolli if the latter brought up any question relating to this correspondence. If the grand vizir did not mention these letters, neither should the bailie. These details appear in a letter of the doge—and Senate—to the bailie, dated 8 February, 1570. Its dispatch was approved by 163 votes in the Senate. It was the last letter to be written in the doge's name to the bailie Marc' Antonio<sup>117</sup>—the last, that is, until 8 March, 1571, more than a year later.

Mahmud Beg was a person of some importance, for he had indeed been sent as the sultan's ambassador to Venice, and there was no question but what he intended to continue into France "la douceur du chemin" which du Bourg says they had enjoyed from Istanbul to Istria. But in France the

so-called third war of religion was still in progress—the Huguenots had been defeated at Jarnac and Moncontour in 1569, but the peace of S. Germain would not be made until August, 1570.<sup>118</sup> By this time it had become clear that the Venetians, who had loaned Charles IX 200,000 ducats for his struggle with the Huguenots, were facing a war with the Turks. Charles needed the support of Philip II and also of Pius V, while the latter was trying to bring Spain and Venice together into a league against the Porte.

Du Bourg had sown seeds of dissension between Mehmed Sokolli and Grantrio de Grandchamp, "to whom we have given the full charge of our affairs in the Levant," as Charles wrote Sokolli on 9 February, 1570. As of that date Charles did not know where du Bourg was, having not yet received his letter of 17 January. In fact Charles actually requested Sokolli to arrest the rascal, and turn him over to de Grandchamp, who would send him back to France.<sup>119</sup>

Claude du Bourg would defend himself, but Charles forbade him to bring Mahmud Beg and the eight or nine Turks in his suite into France. Du Bourg's performance in Istanbul and the pleasantries of his journey with Mahmud to Venice had been scandal enough.<sup>120</sup> Charles need not have worried about Mahmud's coming to France, however, for at the beginning of March (1570) the Signoria ordered the arrest of Mahmud and of all the Turks attending him. The sultan's ambassador was confined to the dwelling, "where he is at present." Guards were posted at his doors, and no one was allowed to speak with him without the permission of the Collegio. Also the diplomatic allow-

From Pera on 15 October, 1569, Marc' Antonio Barbaro had written the doge concerning the dragoman Mahmud Beg, "che va hora in Francia . . . [e] parlerà col Re Christianissimo di questo fatto di Cipro" (MS. Ital. VII. 390 [8872], fol. 209<sup>r</sup>, and cf., *ibid.*, fol. 227<sup>r</sup>, et alibi). In a letter of 3 November Barbaro returned to the "magnifico et honorato Signor Mamut Bei, dragomano di questa Eccelsa Porta, personaggio veramente molto stimato da cadauno per le sue virtù" (fol. 225<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>115</sup> For the commercial and other concessions which Claude du Bourg managed to wring from the Porte, see Selim II's grant of 18 October, 1569, in Ignaz de Festa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane*, I (Paris, 1864), 91–96.

<sup>116</sup> Charrière, III, 90–91, letter of de Grandchamp to Catherine de' Medici, dated at Istanbul on 16 October, 1569. Mahmud Beg was said to be a Greek, a native of Trebizond.

<sup>117</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unum. fol., letter to Marc' Antonio Barbaro, dated 8 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), and on Mahmud Beg, note Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, nos. 70, 83, 123, 127, pp. 120, 136–37, 187, 195.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 366–75. The Venetian Senate was well aware that Mahmud Beg, "dragomano del Signor Turco, [è] destinato per la corte del Re Christianissimo insieme con uno personaggio francese [Claude du Bourg] con le loro famelgie in tutto al numero di bocche vintidoi" (Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fols. 100<sup>r</sup>–101<sup>r</sup> [145–146]).

The Huguenots were interfering with Venetian shipping in the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay, on which note Rawdon Brown and G. C. Bentinck, *Cal. State Papers*. . . . *Venezia*, VII (1890), no. 473, pp. 445–47. For the peace of S. Germain, which was published on 11 August, 1570, see Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V, pt. 1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), no. LXXXIX, pp. 180–83.

<sup>119</sup> Charrière, III, 96–97, notes, text of Charles IX's letter to Mehmed Sokolli, dated at Poitiers on 9 February, 1570. The rift which du Bourg had caused between Mehmed and the French ambassador was well known (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 70, p. 120, Facchinetti to Bonelli, letter dated at Venice on 3 September, 1569, and note, *ibid.*, no. 124, p. 189, letter dated 25 January, 1570).

<sup>120</sup> Charrière, III, 99 ff., notes.

ance of ten ducats a day was taken from him. On the evening of 4 April (1570) Mahmud with two Turkish attendants of his choice was removed from Venice to Verona, where all three were to remain prisoners until the war of Cyprus was over. The other Turkish members of Mahmud's suite were kept in prison at Venice, as were other Turkish and Jewish subjects of the Porte.<sup>121</sup>

Meanwhile on 11 February (1570) Giovanni Michiel, Venetian ambassador to the imperial court, had written the Signoria from Prague of an audience he had just had with Maximilian II "circa li apparati di guerra che per il Signor Turco sono fatti per l' impresa di Cipro." Since Maximilian had allegedly shown an extreme benevolence toward Venice in discussing the Turkish threat to Cyprus, the doge and Senate instructed Michiel two weeks later to thank his Majesty, praise the wisdom of his observations concerning the Turks, and inform him that the Signoria had sent strong garrisons and loads of munitions "to our islands in the Levant and to Dalmatia." Venice had also prepared a powerful fleet, "and we are certain that, in the event [of the Turkish attack] occurring, we shall be aided and supported by his imperial Majesty."<sup>122</sup> That was unlikely, but (as we

have seen) as early as December, 1564, Maximilian had warned the Venetian ambassador that the Turks had their eyes on Cyprus.

Dispatches from Istanbul of 21–25 January (1570), which reached Venice a month later, continued to emphasize the activity going on in the Turkish arsenal, where the "captain of the sea," presumably Piali Pasha, was constantly in evidence, always bringing pressure to bear upon the workmen. Mehmed Sokolli, the grand vizir, whose desire to avoid war with Venice has perhaps been exaggerated, was also paying frequent visits to the arsenal, along with the other pashas, "per dar ordine alle cose più importanti." All the best carpenters and craftsmen had been taken away from their work on "ships and other boats" to give their skills entirely to finishing the galleys. It was generally agreed that the sultan's armada would sail on time, i.e., in the spring, and it would be "molto et molto potente." Everyone on the Bosphorus affirmed the fact that it was going to Cyprus, "although it was also being said that the first pasha [Mehmed Sokolli] was inclined to favor sending aid to the Moriscoes who had risen in revolt in Spain—such aid had been sought by one Ibrahim of Granada, who was in Constantinople." Very likely thirty or forty galleys would sail before the main body of the armada. Word had spread that men would be sent to Alexandria to pick up powder, and others would go to the Barbary coast to create the suspicion that, after all, the armada might be moving westward.

Sigismondo di Cavalli, who was still serving as the Venetian ambassador in Spain, was directed to relay all these *avvisi* to Philip II, emphasizing the fact that "this armada will be the greatest and the most powerful which has ever sailed from Constantinople." The Christian princes whose lands reached the Mediterranean must bear the danger in mind, and consider the consequences of allowing the Turks to look upon their armada as "mistress of the sea" without even a suspicion that others were making even greater preparations to meet their challenge. Cavalli was to tell Philip the Signoria was convinced that Philip—like Venice—

<sup>121</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol., a resolution of the Senate dated 6 March, 1570: "Che per li rispetti ben noti a cadauno di questo Consiglio, Mamut Bei, dragomano, quale è in questa città nostra, sia trattenuto insieme con li suoi nell' alloggiamento, ov' al presente si ritrova: Et gli siano poste guardie in modo ch' egli non possa partire, et non gli possa esser parlato da alcuno senza licentia del Collegio nostro, et sia oltre di ciò preso che li cecchini dieci al giorno gli siano levati. +112, 22, 72."

A month later, by a resolution of 4 April, the Senate decided (*ibid.*, unnum. fol.): "Essendo conveniente che Mamut Turco sia tenuto sotto buona custodia, l' andrà parte che l' sia mandato questa sera con dui della sua famiglia, quali a lui parerà, in uno degli castelli della città nostra di Verona, ove quelli rettori nostri giudicherano che l' possa esser meglio custodito, dovendo essergli deputato per il viver di tutti tre loro Turchi quel tanto che al Collegio nostro parerà, et li altri Turchi della sua fameglia che resterano in questa città siano posti sotto guardia con i altri Turchi et Hebrei sudditi Turcheschi. +177, 6, 9."

On Mahmud Beg's arrest, see also Stella, *Nunzi Venezia*, IX, no. 156, p. 226, letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 5 March, 1570, and cf. Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 44–45. Mahmud was imprisoned in the castle of S. Felice at Verona.

<sup>122</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 50<sup>v</sup>–51<sup>r</sup> [71<sup>r</sup>–72<sup>r</sup>], *all' ambasciatore appresso l' imperator*, doc. dated 25 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 52<sup>r</sup> [73<sup>r</sup>, almost the same text] and 53<sup>r</sup> [74<sup>r</sup>]. There are frequent references to Giovanni Michiel's presence at the imperial court in Ignaz Philipp Dengel, ed., *Nunziaturberichte aus Deutschland*, II, vols. 5–6 (Vienna, 1939–52). Giovanni [Zuane] Michiel was succeeded as resident ambassador to Maximilian II by Giovanni Correr, whose commission is dated 2 June, 1571 (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 96<sup>v</sup>–98<sup>r</sup>

[117<sup>r</sup>–119<sup>r</sup>]). Giacomo Soranzo was named a special envoy to Maximilian in the spring of 1570 (*ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 85<sup>v</sup>–87<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>v</sup>–108<sup>r</sup>], commission dated 27 April, 1570). Cf. Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 147 ff.

The Venetian ports along the eastern shore of the Adriatic required a vigilant watch (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 53<sup>v</sup>–55<sup>r</sup> [74<sup>v</sup>–76<sup>r</sup>]), the commission of Francesco Barbaro as provveditore generale in Dalmatia, dated 4 March, 1570, and note esp. fols. 55<sup>v</sup>–56<sup>r</sup> [76<sup>v</sup>–77<sup>r</sup>]).

was making such preparations "with every effort and diligence." Venice was in fact striving to put to sea "the greatest fleet that we have ever produced at any time." Cavalli would of course report Philip's reaction to all this with the haste the Signoria expected of ambassadors in times of crisis.<sup>123</sup>

In Rome on 25 February (1570) Michele Surian, the Venetian ambassador to the Curia, received from the hands of an express courier a new set of dispatches from Istanbul, "que confirmavan la venida de la armada del Turco sobre Chipre." Juan de Zúñiga sent Philip II a report from Rome three days later. The Venetians had now renewed their appeal to the pope to give them authority to collect the tithes from the clergy in Venetian territories. On 27 February Pius V summoned a consistory to deal with the matter, "and decided that it was proper to grant them the grace they sought." Some cardinals declared that now was the time to bring about a league between Spain and Venice against the Turk.<sup>124</sup> The tithes or *tasse* would yield 100,000 gold ducats, but the nuncio Facchinetti believed, now that the Venetians were entering upon war with the Turks, "they will be spending no less than two and a half million gold ducats a year."<sup>125</sup>

At the consistory of 27 February, however, Antoine Perrenot, cardinal de Granvelle, had spoken in strong derogation of the Venetians, maintaining that one could put small confidence in

them. What help had they given Philip II when the Turkish armada had attacked his states? If the armada returned to Malta or La Goletta, the Venetians would merely follow their own interests. Let the Turk attack Cyprus; then the Venetians would have to break with him. Granvelle, Philip's friend and counselor, would not help negotiate a Veneto-Spanish league. Cardinal Comendone, a Venetian, spoke in strong opposition to Granvelle, bitterly recalling the price Venice had paid when she was allied with Spain in the war of 1537-1540.

In his letter to Philip of 28 February, the day after the heated consistory, Zúñiga added the interesting fact that an Italian merchant who lived in Lyon in France, a correspondent of Granvelle, had written the latter "the other day" that he had learned from a person much involved in French affairs "that the cha'ush whom the Turk was now sending to the most Christian king [Charles IX] has orders to ask that he be willing to negotiate a peace between your Majesty [Philip] and the Turk."<sup>126</sup> Without Spain to worry about, Selim II would have the Venetians in Cyprus entirely at his mercy, and this was quite conceivably the reason why Claude du Bourg wanted to take Mahmud Beg to France.

When Surian had shown Pius V the dispatches relating to the Turks (which he had received from Venice), Pius directed him to write the members of the Signoria immediately, "esortandoli da sua parte a far lega col Re Cattolico." That same day Surian sent off a courier to Venice. He received a reply on Saturday, 4 March, whereby the Signoria authorized the pope (and their ambassador) to negotiate with his Catholic Majesty the alliance which Pius had been seeking from the beginning of his reign. On Monday, 6 March, Pius summoned Don Luis de Torres, "cherico della sua Camera Apostolica," and told him that he wanted to send him as nuncio extraordinary to Philip II to secure his adhesion to the anti-Turkish league. De Torres accepted the mission.<sup>127</sup> We shall return to him shortly.

<sup>123</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 52 [73], all' *ambassador in Spagna*, doc. dated 27 February, 1570 (Ven. style 1569). The baillie Barbaro was well aware of the current rumors in Istanbul that Mehmed Pasha disapproved of the proposed attack upon Cyprus, preferring to employ the Turkish armada in an expedition to assist the Moriscos in Granada. As Barbaro informed the doge in a letter of 21 January, 1570 (Ven. style 1569), "Qua si ragiona publicamente etiamdo fra persone di consideratione che 'l predetto magnifico Mehemed Bassà si habbia sempre contraposto all' impresa di Cipro, et che anco per ciò fra lui et Mustafà Bassà vi siano passate parole di qualche alteratione, dicendosi ch' esso magnifico Mehemed vorebbe et favorisse più presto il soccorso di Mori di Granata, et essendo hora qua come procurator et solcicator di predetti Mori, quell' Ibraino Granatino, che fu già in quella illustrissima città [Venice], par ch' egli sia stato coadiuvato molto dal magnifico bassà in presentar supliche al Signor per conto del soccorso di detti Mori . . ." (MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fol. 275).

<sup>124</sup> Speaking of cardinals, we may note, incidentally, the assentment of almost every member of the Sacred College which Zúñiga prepared for Philip II on 23 September, 1569; the text is given in Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 75, esp. pp. 151-59, and cf. no. 74. In his roll call of the College, Zúñiga tried to appraise the chances of election to the papacy of each one in the event of Pius V's death.

<sup>125</sup> Stella, *Nunzi Venezia*, IX, no. 156, p. 227, letter dated 3 March, 1570, and note, *ibid.*, nos. 151, 154; cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 550-51, and Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 30-31.

<sup>126</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III (1914), no. 116, pp. 243-44, letter of Zúñiga to Philip II, dated at Rome on 28 February, 1570, and on the consistory of 27 February, see Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 549-50, and note Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 48 ff. On Granvelle, cf. A. Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto*, Turin, 1931 [for which work see below, note 146], pp. 25-29.

<sup>127</sup> Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto* (1931), pp. 10-11. On 8 March, 1570, however, Facchinetti wrote Bonelli from Venice that the pope must press the Venetians to enter

In March, 1570, as a tone of grave anxiety marked the day-long sessions of the Senate, provision was made to send more men, munitions, and supplies to the Greek islands as well as to Cyprus. On the sixth of the month a resolution of the Senate ordered the provveditori and patroni of the Arsenal to send by the first available ships various "robbe" to the captain of Famagusta, as requested by Girolamo Martinengo, "who is going as governor of that fortress." Payment of 815 ducats was authorized for the "robbe" which Martinengo wanted, including equipment for artillery, ladders, pitch, resin, lanterns, asses, heavy rope, two thousand terracotta cooking pots, large sieves for grain, and other items known to be in short supply at Famagusta.<sup>128</sup> If it was not one thing, it was another. The agenda for the Senate were prepared in the Collegio, which had too much work to do as a consequence of the "Turkish war." On 9 March, therefore, the Senate voted to authorize the election of "three of our honorable nobles as executors of the resolutions [*deliberationi*] which have been passed, and which will be passed by the said Council [i.e., the Senate] in matters relating to the sea." The three nobles were to have the same authority as the Collegio in putting the senatorial resolutions into effect.<sup>129</sup>

---

the league. To be sure, they wanted to see the league formed if war with the Turk was inevitable, "ma se il Turco volesse o per doni o per altro cessar da travagliarli, non sariano forse malcontenti!" (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 159, p. 230).

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fols. 120 ff. [165 ff.], and note fols. 116<sup>r</sup> ff. [161<sup>r</sup> ff.].

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 119<sup>r</sup> [164<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate, dated 9 March, 1570: "Le deliberationi che si fanno per questo Consiglio nelle occorrenze presenti della guerra Turchesca in materia delle cose da mar sono di tal qualità et importantia che richiedono una pronta et presta esecuzione, alla quale poi che quelli del Collegio nostro, occupatissimi nelle consultationi che occorrono a questi tempi, non possono attendere con quella esatta diligenza che si conviene, è a proposito proveder per altra via (si come altre volte è stato fatto) che quanto viene deliberato per questo Consiglio sia con la debita prontezza et celerità eseguito, però l'anderà parte che de presenti elegger si debbono per questo Consiglio tre honorevoli nobili nostri in esecutori delle deliberationi che sono stà fatte et che accaderanno farsi per detto Consiglio in materia delle cose da mar, i quali nell' eseguire le dette deliberationi habbino quell' istessa autorità che ha il Collegio nostro . . . +189, 3, 8." Anyone declining to serve as a member of this executive triumvirate for a full year was to be fined 500 ducats in cash (*sotto pena di ducaati cinquecento da esser scossa in contanti*).

In the meantime crewmen had been arriving in Venice, having been recruited for the twenty galleys then being armed, but some of the galleys were not ready to receive them. Consequently the men had no lodgings, and they could not be paid until they were aboard the galleys (*ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 122<sup>r</sup> [167<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 10 March, 1570). Venice had become a bit of a madhouse.

There was no longer any doubt about the "Turkish war." On 9 February, 1570, M. de Grandchamp wrote Paul de Foix, who had replaced Arnaud du Ferrier as French ambassador in Venice,

Monsieur, I have written you so much that has been contrary to everyone else's opinion that now you can decide whether God has given me more insight into these people, after the twenty years I have spent among them, than you have believed, as you can see from the demand which the Grand Seigneur is sending the Signoria to require [the Venetians] to give him Cyprus whether they like it or not.

This was the end of the friendship between the Republic and the Porte. The Turks had been deceiving themselves, however, as to their preparations for the projected expedition, for the fact had come to light that more than thirty-five of their galleys were in a ruinous state, and would not be able to sail. As for their transports (*palanderies*), they could not assemble the number they needed. They would have to have more time.

In de Grandchamp's opinion the Turks had reason to fear a bold opponent (*quelque cerveau résolu*), who could bring them to a sorry end, "which could only cause us great distress, owing to the friendship we bear them." However this might be, de Grandchamp wanted to tell Paul de Foix that Alvisé Buonrizzo, "bearer of the present letter," had been chosen to accompany the cha'ush Kubad to Venice and to vouch for the seriousness of the "harangue" the cha'ush would deliver to the Signoria. De Grandchamp recommended Buonrizzo, whom he had always found "si affectionné à la nation française," to de Foix as one to whom the French were under great obligation for his friendship and helpfulness.

Above all, do me this favor—use your influence to see that this poor fellow does not return here to die a slave in the hands of these people. . . . I cannot write you any more, as much for the shortness of time as for the outrageous order which the pasha has given the bearer [Buonrizzo] not to carry any letters of mine! After a fashion I have finished this letter to you in all haste. I forgot to tell you that all the Venetian ships have been seized, and their merchandise also, and a thousand other details which I leave to the bearer.<sup>130</sup>

This is de Grandchamp's last extant letter from Istanbul.

---

<sup>130</sup> Charrière, III, 101–4. De Grandchamp's first experience of the Turks went back to 1551 when he had accompanied the French envoy Gabriel d' Aramon upon the latter's return to Istanbul.

As the cha'ush or state messenger Kubad was slowly approaching Venice, the doge and Senate sent off a letter dated 17 March (1570) to Giovanni Michiel, their ambassador at the imperial court. At the same time they wrote to Sigismondo di Cavalli, whose successor as the Republic's ambassador to Philip II—Leonardo Donado—would doubtless reach the Spanish court some time after the arrival of their letter. Michiel and Cavalli were advised that the cha'ush "ha commissione di dimandarne l' isola nostra di Cipro, et non volendo noi cederla d' intimarne la guerra"—surrender Cyprus or face war with the Porte. The ambassadors were to tell Maximilian and Philip that the cha'ush would receive the answer which such an unjust and dishonest demand required. A letter of 6 February from the bailie Barbaro in Istanbul had stated that Sultan Selim II was himself going into the arsenal and the armory to hasten the start of the expedition. Galleys had been slipping out of the arsenal stealthily at night, two or three at a time, and by now the larger part of the armada had already left the Turkish capital.

The ambassadors were also instructed to inform Maximilian and Philip that Venice would defend her honor and reputation. The Signoria was putting together the largest possible fleet. The illustrious commander Sforza Pallavicini, onetime servitor of the late Emperor Ferdinand, would go with the fleet, with a large force of infantry. Michiel was to tell Maximilian of the hope being cherished in Venice that his imperial Majesty would respond to the present emergency for the well-being of Christendom. Maximilian should know that the Turks had intercepted a raft of letters being sent between Venice and Istanbul.<sup>151</sup>

When the Senate met the day after authorizing the doge and Collegio to send Maximilian and Philip the letters we have just noted, it decided by an almost unanimous vote (+195, 1, 1) that at long last Girolamo Zane should set sail. He had been elected captain-general of the sea in the summer of 1568, for the Senate had assumed that he would know how to preserve the dignity and guarantee the security of the state. The Senate now designated Monday, 27 March (1570), the day after Easter, as the time for him to receive the standard of S. Mark "with the usual solemnity," and depart soon thereafter with the galleys then ready in Venice.<sup>152</sup> Yes, the war had begun in earnest, as the doge and Senate informed Giacomo Celsi, provveditore of the fleet. Witness the Turkish attacks "along our borders in Dalmatia, Albania, and elsewhere." It was the sultan who had broken the peace, "and broken the oath and pledge he had given our Signoria." While being warned to see to the defense of the Republic's towns, ships, and subjects with his accustomed diligence, Celsi was also instructed finally to take the offensive against the subjects and officials of the Porte, "come è questa di aperta guerra, trattandoli da nemici. . . ." Similar letters were sent to other Venetian commanders at sea and to the rectors (and other officers) of Zara, Sebenico, Traù, Spalato, Lesina, Curzola, and some thirty other Venetian possessions.<sup>153</sup>

On 27 March (1570) the doge and Senate wrote Leonardo Donado, who reached the Spanish court early in May, that the cha'ush had arrived in Venice on the twenty-fifth. He had presented to the Collegio the sultan's demand for Cyprus, was answered with short shrift, and summarily dismissed.

<sup>151</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>-63<sup>r</sup> [83<sup>v</sup>-84<sup>r</sup>], all' ambasciador appresso l' imperator, doc. dated 17 March, 1570: "Siamo avvisati esser arrivato a Ragusi per venir in questa città un chiaus [a cha'ush] del Signor Turco, havendo tolto in compagnia per securtà della sua persona il secretario del baÿlo nostro in Constantinopoli, et per quanto ci viene anco scritto dal medesimo secretario, esso chiaus ha commissione di dimandarne l' isola nostra di Cipro, et non volendo noi cederla d' intimarne la guerra, il che vi commettemo col Senato che dobbiate comunicare a sua Maestà cesarea, dicendole che ad esso chiaus serà da noi fatta quella risposta che ricerca una così ingiusta et inonestà dimanda.

"Di più anchora siamo avvisati per lettere del baÿlo nostro in Constantinopoli di VI del passato [6 February] che si continuava con ogni diligenza in solicitar l' espeditione dell' armata, et ch' il medesimo Signor Turco andava per questo effetto nell' Arsenal e al luogo dell' artiglieria, et fino al principio di esso mese di Febraro cominciavano a uscir nascosamente di notte le galee a due o tre alla volta, et si confirmava che questa serà la maggior armata che sia uscita di Constantinopoli, liqual avvisi comunicarete medesimamente a sua Maestà cesarea, affirmandole che per difesa del stato nostro et per honor et ripu-

tatione della republica Christiana noi attendemo con ogni accurata diligenza a ingrossar l' armata nostra quanto più potemo, sopra laquale anco facemmo andar l' illustrissimo Signor Sforza Pallavicino, nostro governatore generale, con buon numero di fanti [3000, in fact, as shown in fol. 59<sup>r</sup> (80<sup>r</sup>)], et in questo proposito direte potersi sperar che sua Maestà cesarea per il grado et autorità, che meritiissimamente tiene, non sia per mancar al beneficio della Christianità nella presente occasione, et le direte che sono stati intercetti dalli ministri Turcheschi molti spazzi di lettere nostre che andavano et venivano da Constantinopoli. De l'iteris 190, de non 5, non sinceri 0."

A similar letter, with the same date, went to the Venetian ambassador in Spain (*ibid.*, fol. 63, and note fols. 67<sup>v</sup> ff.). The Venetians were now trying to wipe out differences, especially over the town of Marano, with the Hapsburgs (fols. 82<sup>v</sup>-83<sup>r</sup> [103<sup>v</sup>-104<sup>r</sup>]). Marano had been a bone of intermittent contention between Venice and Vienna since 1543-1544.

<sup>152</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 132<sup>v</sup> [177<sup>v</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 18 March, 1570, passed by a vote of +195, 1, 1.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fols. 138<sup>v</sup>-139<sup>r</sup> [183<sup>v</sup>-184<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 25 March, 1570, and on Turkish raids into the area of Zara, cf. Stella, *Nuov. Venezia*, IX, no. 154, p. 225.

Donado was sent a copy of the doge's reply to the cha'ush to give the king.<sup>134</sup> The letter which Kubad had brought to Venice, offering the Signoria the alternatives of surrendering Cyprus or facing the "cruellest war on all fronts," was brief and to the point. It soon became widely known throughout the Mediterranean, and Pietro Valderio (writing in 1573?) inserted a copy of it in the early pages of his history of the Cypriote war.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 68<sup>r</sup> [89<sup>r</sup>], *all' ambasciator al serenissimo re Catholico*, doc. dated 27 March, 1570: "Il chiaus mandatovi dal Turco per farne la domanda che vi scrivessemo per le nostre di 17 dell' instante giorno terzo giorno [which would be 25 March] in questa città, alquale fattolo venir dalla propria galea, che lo ha condotto, et intesa la sua dimanda havemo di subito data la risposta che vederete dalla qui inclusa copia, et l' havemo licentiato, laqual resolutione et risposta nostra, vi commettemo con il Senato che debbiate comunicar a sua Catholica Maestà . . ." and *cf. ibid.*, fol. 85<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>r</sup>], from the commission of Giacomo Soranzo, recently elected a special envoy to Maximilian II, dated 27 April, and note fol. 99<sup>r</sup> [120<sup>r</sup>].

According to Calepio, trans. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, p. 126, "On February 11 Cubat Chawush was despatched as ambassador to Venice. He carried letters and, accompanied by Luigi Bon Rizzo, secretary to the bailo, arrived at Venice at the beginning of April [sic]. The Signory gave him a most spirited answer, and dismissed him, as was meet. . . ." *Cf. Serrano, Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 129, 135, pp. 279–80, 288–89, letters of Zúñiga to Philip II, dated at Rome on 22 March and 10 April, 1570.

<sup>135</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 22–23: "Selim, sultan ottoman, grande imperatore de' Turchi, re delli re, et signor delli signori, ombra d' Iddio, signor del paradiso terrestre et di Gierusalem, alla Signoria di Venezia: Vi domandiamo Cipro, qual ci darate per volontà o per forza, e non irritate la nostra terribil spada, perchè vi moveremo guerra crudelissima in ogni parte, e non vi confidate nel vostro tesoro, perchè lo faremo correre come un torrente, e guardate di non ne irritare." *Cf. Hill, Cyprus*, III, 888, who translates the text from a late-sixteenth century copy in a Rawdon Brown MS. in the Public Record Office, G. and D. 25/4, and note Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cypriischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 21–23.

On Kubad's appearance before the Collegio, where "he spent less than a quarter of an hour," *cf. Stella, Num. Venezia*, IX, no. 170, p. 244. Facchinetti thought that Kubad had arrived on 27 March. Note the contemporary account of the Venetian noble Francesco Longo (d. 1582) in Agostino Sagredo, ed., "Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano, imperator de' Turchi, e giustificazione della pace con lui conclusa," in the *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (Florence, 1847), no. 17, pp. 13–14. Writing some time after the war of Cyprus, Longo sometimes lapses into error, as when he says that "in fine dell' anno 1569 [il Turco] mandò qui Cubat Chiaus con sue lettere a dimandar Cipro ed intimare la guerra." On Kubad, "il quale due anni addietro per altro negozio era stato in Venezia," see also Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 48–56, 60–61. Kubad had had a pleasant time on the lagoon on an earlier mission to Venice in 1567, and had told the Venetian bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro of his appreciation of the doge's courtesy, "la memoria che tiene delli favori et cortesie ricevute da vostra Serenità, mentre che per il negotio delli Hebrei si fermò in quella illustrissima città [i.e., Venice],"

Everyone in Venice was alive to the importance of Kubad Cha'ush's mission, including the agent of Ulrich Fugger, who sent a news report to Augsburg on 27 March. According to this report, the galley *Suriana* had arrived the day before, bringing the "chiaussio," the secretary Alvise Buonrizzo, and the bailie Barbaro's son [also Alvise]. The galley had stopped at the Lido, but at first only Buonrizzo had disembarked, "and they say that yesterday after dinner he had an audience with the Signori Savi." On 26 March, which was Easter Sunday, when the doge and other members of the Signoria went to the church of S. Zaccaria in the procession of indulgence (*al perdono*), the red standards were carried before them, "which they say is a sign of the outbreak of war." Pietro Sanudo, who was going as captain to Padua, carried the symbolic sword. On the morning of the twenty-seventh a crowd of nobles assembled at the church of S. Moise, and crossed the Piazza to attend mass at S. Mark's, after which the Doge Pietro Loredan gave Girolamo Zane his baton of high command as captain-general of the sea.

Zane was then accompanied to his galley, with the standard of the Serenissima borne aloft, by the members of the Signoria, the clergy of S. Mark's, all the commanders of the galleys, a host of nobles, and a company of halberdiers. While the procession moved toward the Bacino, a thousand infantrymen stood at attention in the Piazza S. Marco, a hundred of them being recruits of Giulio Savorgnan, of whom some were going to Zara and the rest to Candia. A salute was fired, "una bella salva." When Zane reached his flagship, and the standard was mounted, "all the galleys, which numbered about thirty, fired a wonderful salvo of artillery." Zane departed immediately, "and went to dine at the Lido, and it is believed that tomorrow morning he will receive his commission, and will leave with twenty galleys—the other ten will go in eight days."<sup>136</sup> As always, however, there would be some delay.

Another *avviso* from Venice, dated 30 March, brought the Fuggers the following news:

Yesterday morning the ships for Cyprus set sail with the lord Girolamo Martinengo and the two thousand soldiers being sent to Cyprus. Tonight the illustrious [captain]

on which see Barbaro's letter of 15 October, 1568, to the Doge Pietro Loredan in the collection of Barbaro's dispatches to Venice in the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana (*cf. above*, note 60), MS. Ital. VII, 390 (8872), fol. 8<sup>r</sup>. Kubad had gone to Venice because of Aaron de Segura's debts to the Porte.

<sup>136</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 246, report dated at Venice on 27 March, 1570, and see Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, pp. 36–41, 47.



general of the fleet and the distinguished provveditore generale of Dalmatia departed with some galleys. The cha'ush has also gone, on a galley to Ragusa. The secretary has remained here. It is said that a [special] envoy will be elected to send to the emperor, and also an envoy to Poland.<sup>157</sup>

Thus according to the testimony of a reliable reporter, who like Facchinetti was in Venice at the time, Zane left the Lido on the evening of 30 March, and sailing slowly down the Dalmatian coast, he reached Zara (Zadar) on or about 13 April.<sup>158</sup> Illness among his oarsmen and infantry as well as other problems would detain Zane and the fleet at Zara for two months, as he waited in vain for arms for his soldiers and for the galleys of his allies.<sup>159</sup>

Throughout the months of March and April, 1570, the letters of the Doge Pietro Loredan to the Venetian ambassadors in Spain, the Empire, France, and Savoy, as well as to the naval commanders and other officials of the Republic, become increasingly repetitive on the score of the Signor Turco and his huge armada.<sup>160</sup> In seeking to depict from week to week the course of events and the mounting tension in the Senate, we are likely, almost unavoidably, to reflect this repetition in our account. The mobilization of the Turkish forces on land was thought to be hardly less for-

midable than that at sea. We have observed Pius V, *mosso dal Spirito Santo*, in his prolonged efforts to persuade Venice to enter a "lega et unione con il serenissimo Re Catholico." The nuncio Gianantonio Facchinetti, however, found the Signoria consistently reluctant to commit itself to an anti-Turkish alliance with Spain, whose interests lay in North Africa, not in the Levant. From the Holy See the Venetians had been seeking men, money, and munitions, always turning a deaf ear to Facchinetti's pleas for an alliance which might oblige Venice to defend La Goletta, Oran, or even Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera—all Spanish possessions on the coast of North Africa.<sup>161</sup>

As the cha'ush Kubad traveled westward, and as war was seen to be inevitable, the Signoria changed its mind. On 10 March (1570) the doge finally wrote the Venetian ambassador at Philip II's court in high approval of Pius V's long-standing proposal

that the forces of his Catholic Majesty should be united with ours in order to oppose the fury and power of the Turks, to which we have readily assented because of our desire for the universal good, and because we hope that the Lord God has turned His compassionate eyes toward Christendom, and that He is willing at this time to repress the audacity of the infidels.<sup>162</sup>

Speed was now of the essence. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, Michele Surian, must first conclude an agreement with the pope as a prelude to the triple alliance of the Holy See, Venice, and Spain, "and in order that time should not be lost, for every small delay could be damaging, we are sending to Rome a commission and mandates sufficient to settle such details as will be necessary for this union."<sup>163</sup>

In Rome the prospect of war was causing a commotion. According to a news dispatch of 18 March (1570) decrees had been issued to the effect that all the Knights of Malta must do their part,

<sup>157</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 248<sup>r</sup>, report dated 30 March, 1570. On 29 March Facchinetti reported to Rome (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 170, p. 244). "Hieri l' altro [27 March] fu dato lo stendardo al generale. . . . Credo che partirà fra doi giorni per Zara, e delle 80 galere, che s' haveano d' armar qui, se ne sono di già messe in ordine di tutto punto 65, rimanendone XV solamente, che fra XV di, alla più lunga, andranno bene armate a trovare il generale. . . ." By the end of April, says Facchinetti, "ne saranno fuori unite insieme 140 sottili." On 1 April he wrote Bonelli that "il generale partì per Zara; il chiasu [Kubad] se n' andò similmente" (*ibid.*, IX, no. 172, p. 249).

The secretary Alvise Buonrizzo remained in Venice, and was sent to Naples in the summer of 1570 to negotiate with the viceroy, the duke of Alcalá, "per servizio della Signoria nostra." Buonrizzo seems to have spent some three years in Naples (presumably with some interruption to return to Venice) from September, 1570, to October, 1573, for which years his dispatches are both interesting and important. See Nicola Nicolini, "La Città di Napoli nell' anno della battaglia di Lepanto dai dispaeci del residente veneto," in the *Archivio storico per le province napoletane*, LIII (n.s. XIV, 1928-29), 388-422. On Buonrizzo's activities in Naples (in 1571-1572), see the Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 42<sup>r</sup>-43<sup>r</sup> [64<sup>r</sup>-65<sup>r</sup>], 53<sup>r</sup> [75<sup>r</sup>], 58 [80], 80 [102], 86 [108], 152<sup>r</sup>-153<sup>r</sup> [174<sup>r</sup>-175<sup>r</sup>], 161<sup>r</sup>-162<sup>r</sup> [183<sup>r</sup>-184<sup>r</sup>], 168 [190], 172 [194], 175<sup>r</sup> [197<sup>r</sup>], and 177<sup>r</sup>-178<sup>r</sup> [199<sup>r</sup>-200<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>158</sup> Cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 898.

<sup>159</sup> Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 66 ff. Contrary to the statement in Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, p. 48, the Venetian fleet did not leave port "molto bene in ordine. . . con ogni buon augurio."

<sup>160</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 55<sup>r</sup>-89<sup>r</sup> [76<sup>r</sup>-110<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 146, pp. 215-16, a letter of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 22 February, 1570, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 547-48.

<sup>162</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 57<sup>r</sup> [78<sup>r</sup>], all' *ambasciatore in Spagna*, doc. dated 10 March, 1570.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 57. On Pius V and his desire for Veneto-Spanish naval co-operation against the Turks, note also *ibid.*, fols. 58-59<sup>r</sup> [79-80<sup>r</sup>], 82 [103], 85-86<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>r</sup>-107<sup>r</sup>], 94 ff. [115 ff.], 98<sup>r</sup> [119<sup>r</sup>], 102<sup>r</sup> [123<sup>r</sup>]. Venice needed grain to make ship's biscuit for her "armata così numerosa" (fols. 57<sup>r</sup>-58<sup>r</sup>). Sforza Pallavicini offered to sail with the Venetian fleet "nell' occasione delli presentati moti Turcheschi" (fol. 59<sup>r</sup>), note also fols. 65-66<sup>r</sup>, 96 [117], and cf. Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 126 [171], docs. dated 14 March, 1570. On Pallavicini, note Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, nos. 168, 170, pp. 242, 246, docs. dated 22 and 29 March, et *alibi*.

and this morning a brief was published in which the pope orders all the Knights . . . to go during the course of the month of April [to Malta] to present themselves to their grand master, under penalty of losing their revenues [commende], so that they may go to this war.

The Venetian ambassador Surian stated that he could hardly deal with the mass of "lords and gentlemen" who were coming to him with offers to serve at their own expense as "soldiers of fortune" (*venturieri*) in the coming war. Apparently Surian's chief problem was finding an appropriate place for them aboard the Venetian galleys. There was a rumor afloat in Rome that Cosimo I de' Medici had offered the Signoria a large measure of assistance.<sup>144</sup>

Despite the objections of the Emperor Maximilian, Pius V had raised Cosimo to the rank of grand duke of Tuscany by a bull dated 27 August, 1569, which had been published the following 12 December in a ceremony at the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence. Three months later (on 5 March, 1570) Pius had placed the grand-ducal crown on Cosimo's head at a solemn convocation in the Sistine Chapel. While Maximilian was publicizing his opposition to Cosimo's elevation, Philip had not yet given expression to his own disapproval of the pope's bestowing the new title on Cosimo. Another *avviso* from Rome of 18 March, however, contained the news that "on Thursday [16 March] Monsignor de Torres . . . left here for Spain, sent by the pope to give the Catholic king an account of the coronation and title of the grand duke of

Tuscany and to exhort his Majesty to enter into the league with the Venetians."<sup>145</sup> Luis de Torres, then in his thirty-seventh year, was the chief clerk of the Camera Apostolica, in which position he had impressed the pope, who chose him for the mission to Spain because he was a Spanish noble. Although Cosimo de' Medici's new title long remained a bone of contention, and Don Luis was to try to reassure Philip II that the pope was not seeking to usurp the authority of princes by awarding him the title, the important thing was to persuade Philip to enter the anti-Turkish league with the Venetians.<sup>146</sup>

Don Luis de Torres left Rome on 16 March (1570). Nuncios sent their reports to the cardinal secretaries of state, not to the pope, and Torres' first letters to the cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli were sent from Siena and Cascina on 18 and 19 March.<sup>147</sup> On Tuesday, 21 March, after being held up for a day by stormy weather, Torres arrived in Genoa, where he found that the Doge Paolo Moneglia Giustiniani and the Signoria were

<sup>144</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 249, of *Roma li 18 Marzo [1570]*. On the many volunteers offering their services to the Venetians, see Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 59–60. Paruta speaks in general terms. More specifically, however, see Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 98, *Al nome de Dio et della gloriosa Vergine Maria A.D. 1569 et 1570. Nota di personaggi così forestieri come del Dominio che hanno offerto fanti all' occasione della presente guerra Turchesca*: "Illustre Signor Sforza Pallavicino, governor general, fanti numero 5,000; il Signor Paulo Oro, fanti no. 8,000; il Signor Girolamo Martinengo, fanti no. 2,000; il Signor Pietro Paulo Mignanelli, fanti no. 2,000; il Signor Alovisio Martinengo, per lettera di 29 zenaro 1569, fanti no. 1,000; il Signor Don Cesare Caraffa, fanti no. 1,000," etc., etc., with a list of thirty names of "personaggi" who were undertaking to raise 62,000 foot, as well as a list of thirty-four "capitani così forestieri come del Dominio," who offered to raise 14,600 foot "nella presente guerra Turchesca," making a total of 76,600 infantry to be available for the war of Cyprus.

Like most such figures, these are suspect. Cf. the similar list of those "who offered to raise troops" in Gio. Pietro Contarini, *Historia delle cose successe dal principio della guerra mossa da Selim ottomano a Venetiani fino al di della gran giornata vittoriosa contra Turchi* (1572), fols. 63–71, who says that Paolo Orsini offered to raise 4,000 (not 8,000) infantry, and gives a total of 58,000 troops to be raised by such volunteers.

<sup>145</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 249, dispatch dated at Rome on 18 March [1570]. On the papal-imperial controversy caused by Cosimo de' Medici's promotion to the grand-ducal title, see Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVIII, 268–81, 285, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 477–86, 488, and (among other sources) Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, pp. 52–53. On the grand-ducal coronation and Cosimo de' Medici's presence in Rome, see the ceremonial diary of Cornelius Firmanus, of which there is an (abridged) copy in the Library of the University of Pennsylvania, Lea MS. 428, the relevant entries being on pp. 280–96.

<sup>146</sup> A. Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto nel carteggio diplomatico inedito di Don Luys de Torres, nunzio straordinario di S. Pio V a Filippo II*, Turin, 1931, pp. 10–13, 17, 37 ff., 54 ff. Before he became grand duke of Tuscany, Cosimo de' Medici was duke of Florence and Siena; the emperor claimed suzerainty over Florence, and Cosimo was Philip II's vassal (as we have seen) for the city and area of Siena. On the stir caused by the pope's concession of the grand-ducal title to Cosimo, note Serrano, *Correspondenza diplomatica*, III, nos. 92, 96, 100, 107, 111, 114–15, 118, 120, 131, 136, *et alibi*, and on Luis de Torres' mission to Spain, *ibid.*, nos. 119, 122, 128, pp. 251–52, 261, 275–76, *et alibi*.

The pope's instructions to Torres, which were prepared by the cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli, may also be found in Serano, III, no. 127, pp. 268–75, docs. dated 12 and 15 March, 1570. They are chiefly concerned with the necessity of the anti-Turkish union of Spain and Venice. "et facendosi questa unione, ella sarà sicura et stabile—né deve il Re temere de Venetiani né essi del Re, mancando hoggidi i sospetti delli tempi passati: L' una parte et l' altra è invasa da Turchi, et il comune pericolo deve fargli amici . . . et confidenti" (*ibid.*, p. 272). Cf. Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), appendix, no. 11, pp. 427–31, and in general Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cypriischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 70 ff.

<sup>147</sup> Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto* (1931), pp. 69 ff.

providing the Venetian ambassador Leonardo Donado (Donà) with passage in a galley that was going to Spain. There would be some delay in his departure, because the Genoese believed it a bad omen (*per mal augurio*) to embark on a voyage during holidays. Easter would come on 26 March. Torres and Donado got together at the house of Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador to the Republic of Genoa, with whom Torres was lodged. The nuncio and the Venetian ambassador now had much the same purpose in going to Spain. Haste was necessary, and they requested the Signoria to hurry the departure of the galley.

Torres was assured that, to please his Holiness, the doge and governors of Genoa would do their best. The keel of the galley was tarred "con molta furia," as Torres wrote Bonelli on 23 March, and provisions put aboard for the voyage. He hoped to sail that night, but he and Donado were delayed for two or three more days. While in Genoa Torres tried to determine the number of Philip II's galleys in Italian waters. Counting two Savoyard galleys and two belonging to Genoa, Philip had twenty-three in the area as well as fifteen Neapolitan and ten Sicilian galleys. Torres believed that the Hospitallers could be counted on for four galleys, and the new grand duke Cosimo for six light and two heavy galleys. The total was sixty galleys. Although the twenty-three galleys at Genoa would sail very shortly for the Spanish outpost at La Goletta,<sup>148</sup> Philip still had at his beck and call, apparently, a considerable force which he could quickly set in motion against the Turks.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>148</sup> Dragonetti de Torres, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–80, letter of Torres to Bonelli, dated at Genoa on 23–24 March, 1570, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, pp. 82–83, 103. Don Diego de Guzmán de Silva had been chosen as Philip II's ambassador to Venice, but since the Spanish ambassador to Genoa had died recently, Guzmán had been ordered to remain in Genoa until he could be replaced. He remained in Genoa for a year (Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 97, 106, pp. 208, 221). On the relations of Torres and Donado and the first stage of their mission to the Spanish court, see Mario Brunetti and Eligio Vitale, eds., *La Correspondencia da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà*, 2 vols., Venice and Rome, 1963, I, nos. 4–14, pp. 5–25, docs. dated from 22 March to 11 May, 1570.

<sup>149</sup> According to Sigismondo di Cavalli, the Venetian ambassador to Spain, Philip II possessed 56 galleys of his own (26 of Spain, 20 of Naples, and 10 of Sicily), and was leasing 24 others (10 of Giannandrea Doria, 4 of the Lomellini, 4 of the Centurioni, and 2 each of the Mari, the Sauli, and the Grimaldi), making a total of 80 galleys. Although financial terms might require adjustment here or there, another 20 galleys might be added from allied states (Savoy, Florence, Genoa, Malta), giving Philip a naval militia of some 100 galleys (Cavalli, "Relazione di Spagna [1571]," in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. I, vol. V [1861], pp. 171–72).

Torres' letters place him at Marseille on 29–30 March, at Barcelona on 8 April, and "di qui seguerò domattina," as he wrote the nuncio Giambattista Castagna, who was then at Cordova, "con l' aiuto di Dio, il mio viaggio." Torres was at Ariza, twenty miles or more southwest of Calatayud, in mid-April. Traveling rapidly, he reached the Spanish court at Cordova on 19 April; two days later he had a long and memorable audience with Philip II, who received Castagna at the same time. Although Torres got down to business without a moment's delay, dilating at length on the Turkish danger, and Philip heard him "con allegra faccia e molta attenzione," his Majesty said that conclusion of the proposed league with Venice [and with his Holiness] would have to be deferred, because he was going with the court to Seville. The next day, on 22 April, Torres dined with Philip's chief minister, Cardinal Diego Espinosa, who told him that the king was prepared to accede to Torres' two most immediate requests—first, he would order that the available galleys be assembled at Sicily under Giannandrea Doria, who was to obey the pope in all matters, and secondly, he would write both to Don García de Toledo, viceroy of Sicily, and to Don Per Afán de Ribera, the duke of Alcalá, viceroy of Naples, to provide the Venetian fleet with victuals in accordance with the resources of the two kingdoms.

The gist of Torres' argument had been that neither the Venetians nor the Spanish forces, acting alone, were a match for the Turks. Together, however, and with the addition of the papal and Hospitaller galleys, they might put to sea a fleet of more than 250 galleys, a strength which the Gran Turco could not equal. They could take the offensive and do the Turks no end of damage. One of the principal reasons for the Gran Turco's breaking with Venice had been his assumption that the Signoria would have no hope of union with Spain, for he believed that Philip would be so caught up in the wars with the Netherlanders and the Moriscoes of Granada

that he will not be able to attend to both the one and the other, and yet it will not be in keeping with the power and greatness of his Majesty that the results should prove to be in accord with this assumption of the Turk.<sup>150</sup>

<sup>150</sup> On Torres' itinerary to the Spanish court at Cordova, *cf.* Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto*, pp. 82–83, 87, 90–91, 94–97, and on his effectiveness in dealing with Philip II, Cardinal Espinosa, the secretary Antonio Pérez, and the members of the Council of State, see, *ibid.*, pp. 97–115, Torres' lengthy letter to Bonelli, dated at Cordova on 24 April (1570).

The union of Spain, Venice, and the Holy See to do battle with the Turk quickly became the main concern of Philip's Council of State, the Venetian Signoria, and the Roman Curia. On 1 April (1570) the Doge Pietro Loredan and the Senate wrote the Venetian ambassador at Philip's court—Cavalli was still there—that the latest dispatches from the Levant indicated the pashas planned to attack not only Cyprus but also Corfu to prevent the union of the Spanish and Venetian fleets. The ambassador was to convey to Philip and his councilors the Senate's conviction that nothing could be more important, as the war was beginning, than that the two fleets should come together as soon as possible. It was, therefore, to be hoped that the king would now order his naval armament into Sicilian waters, so that by adding its strength to that of Venice the allies might take effective action "per disturbar li disegni del commune inimico."<sup>151</sup>

As the Venetians looked forward fearfully to the inevitable costs of the war, they kept trying with limited success to secure repayment of the loan of 200,000 scudi, which they had made to Charles IX of France and his mother Catherine de' Medici. The Venetian ambassador in France, Alvise Contarini (who had been at his post for almost a year), was to bring whatever pressure he could upon their most Christian Majesties to meet their obligation to the Republic, which now had such dire need of the money.<sup>152</sup> By 7 October (1570), after the fall of Nicosia, to which we shall come in due course, the Signoria had received no

more than 11,807 ducats by letters of exchange from Lyon.<sup>153</sup> It was difficult to bring pressure upon royal debtors and, with another hard year ahead, the Venetians were looking to the grain fields of Provence and Burgundy for ship's biscuit for the fleet.<sup>154</sup>

The Venetians, says Sereno, were opening up every road that led to money. Eight new Procuratori di S. Marco were created, each of whom gave the Signoria 20,000 scudi in cash in the guise of a loan. The procuratorship was the highest dignity in Venice after the office of doge. Young nobles of at least eighteen years of age were admitted to the *Maggior Consiglio* by the payment of one hundred scudi. This was below the statutory age but, as Paruta says, they became eligible to vote for all magistrates. Public properties were put up for sale, and taxes and imposts of all sorts were increased. At the Mint or Zecca (now the south end of the Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana) officials accepted deposits "to the great advantage of those who brought in gold and silver," according to Paruta, "and in various other ways one tried to collect funds from every source." By such means, it was said, 300,000 scudi were raised.<sup>155</sup>

Men were in shorter supply than money. The Signoria found it hard to put infantry enough aboard the galleys and other ships which were supposed to go to Corfu, Crete, and Cyprus. Besides the numerous troops in the Dalmatian garrisons and in those on a score of islands belonging to Venice, at the beginning of April (1570) the Senate was wrestling with the recruitment and distribution of some 18,000 troopers, not counting other levies and not counting the 2,000 men who had sailed with Girolamo Martinengo at the end of March.<sup>156</sup> On the whole it was apparently

Torres dates his audience with Philip on 21 April (p. 99), Sigismondo di Cavalli puts it a day later (p. 96). On the concessions made to Torres, note Philip's letter of 24 April to his ambassador Zúñiga in Rome and Torres' own letters of the same date to Pius V and Bonelli, in Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 139-41, pp. 295-99, and see Torres' memorandum to Philip 11, *ibid.*, III, no. 152, pp. 324-29, doc. dated at Seville on 4 May, 1570. Cf. Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), pp. 45-46; Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 32-36; Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 84 ff.

<sup>151</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 69<sup>r</sup> [90<sup>r</sup>], *all' ambasciatore appreso il Re Catholico*, doc. dated 1 April, 1570; of the Senate's letter of 4 April to Maximilian II, *ibid.*, fols. 71<sup>r</sup>-72<sup>r</sup>, and note fol. 76.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 69-70<sup>r</sup> [90-91<sup>r</sup>], *all' ambasciatore appreso il re Christianissimo*, doc. dated 1 April, 1570, and note fol. 90 [111]. As of mid-June the Senate expected the first instalment of the French debt to be paid, and arranged for transmission of the funds to Venice (*ibid.*, fols. 104<sup>r</sup>-105<sup>r</sup> [125<sup>r</sup>-126<sup>r</sup>]). Alvise Contarini's commission as Venetian ambassador to France, replacing Giovanni Corner, *uguale deo*, *havendo finito il suo tempo, venir à reparare*, is dated 27 April, 1569 (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 4 ff. [25 ff.]).

<sup>153</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 11 [32].

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 17 [38<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>155</sup> Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, p. 47; Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 60; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 899.

<sup>156</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 149<sup>r</sup> [194<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 4 April, 1570: "Dovendosi dar spedizione a quel numero de fanti che sia bastanza per metter sopra l' armada, l' anderà parte che oltre li fanti tremille espediti sotto l' illustre Signor Sforza Pallavicino, governor generale, et li milleottocento che si dovevano far da comunità et altri secondo le loro offerte che sono state accettate da questo Consiglio, l' illustre Signor Paulo Ursino debba far fanti millecioquecento per montar sopra le galle grossi et sottili o altri gran armati sotto quelli capi da esser per lui nominati et con quel stipendio per essi capi che parerà al Collegio nostro. Li altri fanti fino al numero de undemillesettecento [11,600] siano distribuiti come qua sotto . . . [upon which are given the names of certain infantry commanders and the number of troops under them]. +164, 2, 5."

harder to find oarsmen than infantry, and on 9 April the Senate declined an offer of horse and foot from one of the German dukes in search of adventure.<sup>157</sup> As the year wore on, money became almost as difficult to find as oarsmen, and the costs of the fleet became ever more burdensome.<sup>158</sup>

On 18 April (1570) Girolamo Zane was voted his formal commission as captain-general of the sea "in questo importantissimo tempo et occasione della guerra con il Turco." He was instructed to remain in Dalmatian waters until the Senate could send him the galleys which were still being armed, and to await the arrival of Sforza Pallavicini, the "governor general," and the officers who would soon join him with 12,000 infantry and with the 1,500 "sappers" or "pioneers" (*guastadori*), whom the Senate had decided to put aboard the fleet. Zane must keep in close touch with the rectors of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Cerigo, and Crete, and obviously he was to watch the "andamenti et progressi" of the Turkish armada, especially of the galleys which had recently left Istanbul.

As captain-general in a time of crisis, Zane received the usual rights of commandeering and arming any galley, fusta, or ship he needed, of opening any and all letters addressed to the Signoria, and of punishing galley commanders and others who disregarded the prohibitions against trade or who sought in any way to defraud the state of public funds. The struggle to prevent corruption was everlasting and often unsuccessful in Venice and especially in the colonies, where surveillance was more difficult.

Zane was to maintain the galleys, their tackle, and all equipment in as good condition as possible. The troublous times were consuming oars, sails, and armaments at two or three times the normal rate, *il doppio et forse il triplo di quello che si soleva consumar ad altri tempi!* The extent of the "consumption" induced by the troublous times is illustrated by the fact that Zane now received the sum of 145,167 ducats for expenses.<sup>159</sup> It was a

bottomless pit. A few months later (on 31 July) the Senate voted to send him another 25,000 ducats "per le spese che li occorreno per giornata per l'armata nostra."<sup>160</sup>

Pius V had also been looking for money, and so had Philip II. It was reported from Rome on 29 April (1570) that his Holiness was determined to furnish the Venetians with all possible aid "per la guerra contra Turchi." To start with, he was supposed to arm fifteen galleys, of which he would appoint a commander who would be subject to the Venetians' captain-general Zane. The papal commander might be either Cardinal Alvise Corner (Cornaro) or Gianfrancesco Commendone, both Venetians; if his Holiness stepped outside the Curia, however, the command of his galleys might be given to the Roman Marc' Antonio Colonna. Cardinal Michele Bonelli had just held a "congregatione" in his house, to which the Roman barons had been summoned. Bonelli had told them that the pope wanted them to provide men to serve as oarsmen and the money to pay them, i.e., he wanted four men from every hundred of the households (*fuoichi*) of their vassals. The pope would provide the oarsmen with food to the extent of two scudi a month as well as monthly wages of another two scudi, but in any event no household would be taxed for more than one scudo a year.<sup>161</sup>

Philip II had, to be sure, agreed to make supplies and munitions available to the Venetians from the stores in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. He had also ordered Giannandrea Doria (as he had promised Torres) to assemble the available galleys in Sicily. It was clear, however, that Philip would not send his fleet against the Turks, and would not join the league with Venice, until the pope granted him the "sussidio" (*el subsidio*) and the "cruzada" that he had been seeking unsuccessfully for months.

On Pallavicini, note Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 121 [142], and on the colossal costs of the Venetian fleet, cf. fol. 125 [146], and, *ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 1' [22']. After the Turkish capture of Nicosia, Pallavicini requested and was granted leave to return to Venice (Reg. 77, fol. 28 [49]). Oars, sails, and weaponry continued to be "consumed" at two or three times the normal rate (*ibid.*, fol. 51' [72']), doc. dated 30 January, 1571 [Ven. style 1570].

<sup>160</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 204' [249'].

<sup>161</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 270', *avviso* of 29 April, 1570. Earlier in the month it had apparently been decided that the pope should spend 12,000 scudi a month for six months to "arm" or maintain the galleys he was putting at the service of the Venetian Signoria, and Cardinal Giovanni Ricci was holding "congregationes" in his house to devise ways of finding the money (*ibid.*, fol. 255', doc. dated 5 April).

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 151' [196'].

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 39, fol. 237' [282'], and esp. fol. 243' [288'], doc. dated 14 November, 1570.

<sup>159</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 78'-80' [99'-101'], docs. dated 15 and 18 April, 1570. The Senate had some difficulty deciding upon certain details in Zane's commission which need not detain us here. Grains for ship's biscuit were a constant and very serious problem (*ibid.*, fols. 81 [102], 89' [110']), and illness quickly beset the oarsmen, 200 of whom had to be replaced (fol. 93 [114]). Zane seems now to have been joined by one Don Francesco Giuara, a Neapolitan knight of Malta, *essendosi trovato nell'ultimo assedio di Malta*, who had volunteered for service against the Turks (fol. 81' [102'], and cf. fol. 84' [105']).

Philip and his councilors found union with the Venetians difficult, for they had no faith in the self-seeking Signoria.<sup>162</sup> But Philip was persistent, and so were his representatives in Rome. At length on 22 May (1571) the ambassador Juan de Zuñiga could write Philip that, although the league had still not been concluded, Pius had agreed to the concession of both the *cruzada* and the *subsidio* at an audience he had had with his Holiness a week before.<sup>163</sup>

A few days after the news dispatch of 29 April, 1570, in which it was said that Pius V was getting ready to arm fifteen galleys, another report (of 3 May) represents him as "resolved to arm twenty-four galleys for the service of the Venetian Signoria." Twelve of these galleys were supposed to reach Ancona in a few days. His Holiness was in a financial quandary, owing to "such excessive expenses." He had to find money, "and therefore the promotion of cardinals is regarded as certain—according to the common opinion the number will be from ten to twelve. . . ."<sup>164</sup> The news dispatch of 3 May (like that of 29 April) was prepared by a Fugger agent in Rome for transmission to Venice and thence to Augsburg. The agent was well informed, for two weeks later (on 17 May) in his third and last promotion Pius created sixteen cardinals.<sup>165</sup> According to Sereno, each of them paid 30,000 ducats for his red hat.<sup>166</sup> In any event Charles

d' Angennes, bishop of Le Mans and the French ambassador in Rome, was among them. He assumed the title Cardinal of Rambouillet, and his letters to Charles IX from the Curia Romana are an important source for the history of the troubled years 1570–1571.<sup>167</sup>

In fact in early May (1570) Rambouillet wrote Charles that

the pope is firmly resolved to aid the Venetians to the fullest extent of his power in this war against the Turks, and he is expecting very soon the hulls of twenty-four galleys which are being sent to Ancona so that the pope, in accordance with his promise, may arm and maintain them—I do not know how he will make out, not because of the expense, but because of the lack of seamen whom he can recruit in this state. As for the expense, his Holiness is preparing to be able to meet it, if it is not excessively large. In the first place he has taken over the office of chamberlain [*l' estat de camerlingal*], having deprived his nephew Alessandrino of it, and he has sold it for 68,000 gold scudi to Cardinal [Alvise] Corner. Many persons have wondered about it, but he has wanted to start with his own nephew, so that neither the office-holders nor others could complain if, in a war of such importance and for a cause so just, he should put some tax on them. As I understand it, his Holiness might well have got 20,000 or 25,000 scudi more for the office of chamberlain, but he has never wanted to see it in the hands of a cardinal-prince or a Roman.

Perhaps recruitment would not be so difficult, after all, for already the roads to Ancona were full of mercenaries seeking employment against the Turks. Rambouillet could also inform Charles that a courier from Sicily had just brought the news to Rome that Selim II's fleet would contain at least 170 galleys, that Piali Pasha had set sail with the first one hundred galleys on St. George's day (23 April), and that Ali Pasha would soon be following with the other seventy, "le tout pour l' entreprise de Cypre."<sup>168</sup>

Toward the end of May (1570) the Venetian Senate voted to send another forty infantry to protect the island of Pag, where the salt flats and warehouses were exposed to Turkish raids from the nearby town of Obrovac,<sup>169</sup> the westernmost

<sup>162</sup> On Philip's efforts to secure concession of the financial "graces" he sought, especially the *cruzada*, see Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 71, 77, 80, 83, 87, 117, 119, 124, 128, 134, pp. 145 ff. There was little love lost between Spain and Venice, as Castagna wrote Cardinal Bonelli from Cordova (on 25 April, 1570): Philip might be willing to oblige the pope, "ma circa la conclusione della Lega sua Santità potrà essere prevenuta et apparecchiata a due cose: una di dare aiuto a questo Re, et qui non si trova cosa che sia più a la mano nè più utile nè più grata che la Cruciatia; l' altra che vi è assai poca amorevolezza verso li Signori Venetiani per non haversi voluto mai muovere in aiuto d' altri, et molto manco confidenza che ogni volta che potessero uscire de la guerra non lo facciano volentieri, lassando l' impresa sopra altri et mirando solo all' interesse proprio. . . ." (*ibid.*, no. 143, p. 304–5). On the financial "graces" which Philip was trying to get in 1569–1570, cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 554, and M. Ulloa, *La Hacienda real de Castilla* (1977), p. 611.

<sup>163</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV (1914), no. 132, p. 295: "[Su Santidad] nunca avia querido hazello hasta en la audiencia que tuve con él a los 16 deste, que me ofreció de dar ahora la cruzada y el subsidio aunque la liga no se hiziese. . . ."

<sup>164</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 1, fol. 269<sup>r</sup>, *avviso* dated 3 May, 1570, and on the pope's twenty-four galleys, note Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 149, p. 316.

<sup>165</sup> Van Gulik, Eubel, Schmitz-Kallenberg, *Hierarchia Catholica*, III (1923), 43–44, and see esp. Acta Consistorialia, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 36, fols. 67<sup>r</sup>–68<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>166</sup> Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, p. 51, which is very doubtful.

<sup>167</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III (1853, repr. 1965), 112 ff., 143 ff., and see Chas.-Martial de Witte, "Notes sur les ambassadeurs de France à Rome et leur correspondance sous les derniers Valois (1556–1589)," *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, LXXXIII (1971), 106–8.

<sup>168</sup> Charrière, III, 113, and cf. Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, p. 51, for other papal efforts to raise money.

<sup>169</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 180<sup>r</sup> [225<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 27 May, 1570, the vote being +185, 0, 1, and note in general the report which Giovanni da Lezze, provveditore generale of Dalmatia, read in the Senate on 17 February,

stronghold of the Turks during their century and a half in Dalmatia (1527–1685). The Venetian fleet was still at Zara in the northern Adriatic, but on 30 May the Senate approved the text of a letter to the captain-general Girolamo Zane, informing him that word had now come from Michele Suriani, their ambassador in Rome, to the effect that Pius V had just ordered Giannandrea Doria to join the fleet of the Catholic king to that of the Republic. Philip's fleet would consist of "at least fifty-five galleys with at least a hundred good soldiers aboard each galley." (The Venetians usually sent out sixty soldiers to a galley.) The four galleys of the Hospitallers were supposed also to be added to the naval forces of Venice and Spain. The Senate took pleasure in the knowledge that the galleys of the Hospitallers would be under the command of the prior of Messina, Fra Pietro Giustinian, a Venetian noble.

The galleys were to assemble at Corfu. It would hardly be fitting for Philip's galleys to reach Corfiote waters before those of the Signoria. Zane was, therefore, to set the Venetian fleet in order "with every exact diligence," and press on to Corfu for the union of the chief naval armaments of Christendom. Zane would know how to serve the Republic, with God's help, "havendo per principal il batter l'armata Turchescha!"<sup>170</sup>

Pius V was also supplying galleys, as we have seen, and a large part of the oarsmen and others who were going aboard the papal vessels had already arrived in Ancona. Pius had acted quickly. His allies should act quickly. As the doge and Senate cautioned Donado, their ambassador at Philip's court, in an urgent letter of 10 June (1570)—and he was to pass the warning on to the king—they must not allow "the enemy's armada to go roving freely through the sea, to embark on any undertaking it might choose, as much against the states of his Majesty as against our own."<sup>171</sup>

The pope was moving quickly, and so were the Venetians, too quickly for Philip II, who usually took a long time to make up his mind. In a formal statement, however, to which the royal seal was attached on 16 May, 1570, Philip gave full powers to Cardinals Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle and Francisco Pacheco de Toledo, along with his am-

bassador Don Juan de Zúñiga, to negotiate a "league, confederation, and union with the most illustrious Republic of Venice," the purpose being to resist and oppose, to attack and invade the Turk, the common enemy of Christendom.<sup>172</sup> On the same day Philip wrote Zúñiga that although he yielded to Pope Pius's just exhortation to join the proposed league, he could only do so "sobre el fundamento del socorro y ayuda que su Santidad me ha de hazer por medio de las gracias que se le proponen. . . ." The pope must grant him the financial "graces" he needed or he would be powerless to move. To assist Zúñiga and the royal commissioners in their negotiations with Venice and the Holy See, Philip sent a copy of the terms upon which the holy league of 1537 had been formed.<sup>173</sup> In another letter to Zúñiga, Philip indicated that while he was prepared to accept the league, his commissioners must make certain of the *cruzada* and other financial concessions.<sup>174</sup>

On 16 May Philip also wrote the pope, commending the latter's wisdom for advocating a league of the Christian princes against the power, insolence, and ambition of the Turk, which was increasing with every passing day. Wishing to satisfy his Holiness, he had decided to enter the league under the terms he had explained to the nuncio, Don Luis de Torres. His representatives in Rome—Zúñiga, Granvelle, and Pacheco—would confer with the Venetians and with those whom his Holiness would select for the deliberations.<sup>175</sup> Zúñiga and his confrères received the most detailed instructions. First of all, facing such heavy financial burdens (in Flanders and elsewhere), Philip needed the financial concessions from the papacy. The league was to be against the infidels. The Turk was the chief infidel, but there were others, "such as the king of Algiers, the governor of Tripoli, and he who holds Tunis." Every problem was anticipated, and provided for; after all, as every Hapsburg knew, when one dealt with Venice, he must be on the alert.<sup>176</sup>

From Seville on 18 May (1570) Sigismondo di Cavalli and Leonardo Donado wrote the Signoria that Philip II had not yet ordered his fleet to join that of Venice. Among his reasons were that it did

<sup>172</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 153, pp. 330–31.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, III, no. 154, pp. 331–33.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, III, no. 155, p. 335, and *cf.* no. 156.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, III, no. 157, pp. 337–39.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, III, nos. 158–60, pp. 339–51, docs. dated 16 May, 1570. Since 19 January (1570) "the who holds Tunis" was Uluj-Ali, known in the West as Occhiali, the so-called king of Algiers, who had just expelled the pro-Spanish ruler (Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II [1966], 364–65).

1571, in Simeon Ljubić, *Commissiones et relationes venetae*, III (Zagreb, 1880), no. XXXIII, pp. 249–67, esp. p. 258 (Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium, XI).

<sup>170</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 98<sup>r</sup> [119], at *capitiano general da mar*, doc. dated 30 May, 1570, and *cf.* fols. 100<sup>r</sup> [121], 101<sup>r</sup> ff., 105. On Giustinian, the prior of Messina, note, *ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 34 [55].

<sup>171</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 102<sup>r</sup> [123].

not seem proper for the Venetian captain-general, Girolamo Zane, to issue commands to Giannandrea Doria, the captain of the galleys of Spain, Naples, and Sicily, and that it was not in keeping with his royal dignity that the Venetian fleet should be so much larger than his as to cast it into the shadow. In replying to their ambassadors' letter the doge and Senate declared (on 10 June) that such was the common cause of Christendom against the Turk that everyone aboard the allied fleets would have but one desire and a single will, the assumption being that there would be no conflict of command. Although the Venetians could by themselves hold out for some time against the Turkish forces, it would be perilous. Maneuvers at sea were time-consuming; one could not easily advance or retreat as one chose. One might find himself forced into combat at a disadvantage or obliged to let the enemy slip away to do as he pleased. The ambassadors must try to persuade Philip to order Doria's fleet to join that of Venice to avoid such sad alternatives which could bring either loss or shame to Christendom.<sup>177</sup>

When Philip II's three deputies and the Venetian ambassador Michele Surian had all received their commissions and instructions, Pius V summoned them to an audience on 1 July (1570). He made a "long discourse" on the sad state of Christian affairs and on what had to be done as a prelude to lessening God's wrath for their sins. A league and union of the Christian princes, especially of Philip and the "Serenissima Signoria" of Venice, was going to be necessary "to repress the insolence and fury of that dog [the Turk] and not to allow him to go on gaining further strength." Pius spoke of the threatened kingdom of Cyprus, which must be kept in Christian hands, for it was the only avenue of approach to the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher.

Pius said that when the league had been concluded between Philip and the Signoria, the Emperor Maximilian would be invited to join it, as first in authority among the temporal princes. While the articles of the projected league could not be put into effect for the year 1570, the fleets of the Catholic king and the Signoria could be put together, and they would be strong enough not

only to resist the Turk but to subdue him. Pius then closed with the usual pontifical, crusading peroration—if his personal presence would in any way serve the cause, he would happily join the Catholic host, and be among the first to die "for the glory of God and the well-being of the Christian commonwealth."

On 2 July Pius presented Philip's representatives and the Venetian ambassador with a draft of the terms on which the league might be based, "la forma delle capitulationi," which had been composed by a commission of cardinals. It was agreed that the terms or capitulations of the holy league of 1537–1538 should be the basis of their negotiations, "la Lega senza tempo et perpetua." It was a grandiose abstraction,

which was approved by the Venetian ambassador in order not to foment the suspicion which many persons have that the Signoria wanted to form the league for no other reason than to save time and for no other purpose than to have the help of the king's fleet.

Endless discussions of the manifold details and difficulties which stood in the way of another holy league began on Tuesday, 4 July.

The negotiators were called upon to consider the dangers brought about by the coming Turkish attack upon Cyprus [the sultan's forces landed at Limassol and Salines on 1–3 July], the shortness of time available to meet the emergency, and the question of who was to bear how much of the burden and costs of an expedition against the enemy. Without papal concession of the *crusada* and the *excusado* Philip II could not afford to enter the league and take the offensive against the Turks, according to the Spanish, for he required the immediate financial returns from these "graces" to keep his galleys at sea. Philip also wanted Pius to revoke the exemption from these imposts which had been granted the mendicant orders and certain ecclesiastical corporations. If Spain helped Venice in the eastern Mediterranean, Venice must help Spain in North Africa. There were many problems; it was heavy sledding all the way.

Who was to be the commander-in-chief? There was general agreement that it should be Don John of Austria, but who should be second in command? How should conquered territory be divided? Should ecclesiastical censures be directed against any member that let down the allies by making peace with the Turks? The emperor should be invited to join the league, and what other princes? The Venetians wanted the league to concentrate its attention immediately on Cyprus. Cardinal Granvelle, who was very hard to deal with, and

<sup>177</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 103' [124'], *alli ambasciatori in Spagna*, doc. dated 10 June, 1570, and cf. Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 65–66. The letter of Cavalli and Donado, dated at Seville on 18 May (1570), has been published by Mario Brunetti and Eligio Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà (1570–1573)*, I (1963), no. 17, pp. 30–31 (Fondazione Giorgio Cini).



the Spanish were more concerned with taking action against Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis. The discussions—numerous, intense, and heated during July—went on for months, with sometimes prolonged interruptions, but failed to achieve formation of the league.<sup>178</sup>

There was small likelihood that the Emperor Maximilian would enter the league, for his eight years' peace with the Porte still had a half-dozen years to run. Sigismund Augustus of Poland could not afford to become embroiled with the Turks. He was having trouble enough with the Muscovites. Pius V could hardly appeal to Elizabeth, queen of England, whom he had excommunicated and deposed (on 25 February, 1570).<sup>179</sup> As far as she was concerned, the island of Cyprus scarcely existed. The French had been friends of the Turks for almost two generations. Also, like Elizabeth, Catherine de' Medici wanted somehow or other to push the Spanish out of the Netherlands. No Franco-Spanish league was possible. Charles IX could not be persuaded to join Venice and Spain against the Turks; in fact Charles had offered to try to make peace between the sultan and the Venetians.<sup>180</sup> Despite the election of Alvise Mocenigo, the leader of the war party, as doge of Venice (on 11 May, 1570), it was widely believed that the Venetians were searching for a way to avoid war with the Turks.<sup>181</sup>

Less than a month after his election Mocenigo

(and the Senate), on 3 June, wrote the Venetian ambassadors at the courts of both Maximilian II and Philip II that a Turkish state messenger (*chiaus*), who had left Istanbul on 16 April, was responsible for spreading rumors from Buda "that an accord was being negotiated with us [at the Porte], and that our bailie had recovered his freedom." The rumors were an utter falsehood and fraud, a Turkish device to arouse the suspicions of the Christian princes and detract from their willingness to join the anti-Turkish union the pope was promoting. Although Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the bailie in Istanbul, had contrived secretly to send some letters from the Bosphorus, he had written absolutely nothing "per nome de Turchi," nor had any communication of any sort (*pratica o commercio*) been addressed to the Turks from Venice since 4 December (1569), "which today is a full six months ago."

The Turks had broken the peace with Venice, which they had sworn to observe only a short while before, and the Senate was resolved to have nothing to do with them. Maybe it looked as though the bailie had been set free in Istanbul. The Turks might appear to have ended his imprisonment to give an air of verisimilitude to their malicious reports of a "pratica d' accordo" and to stir up suspicions among the Christian princes. The imperial and Spanish courts could rest assured, however, that the bailie was being closely guarded by the Turks, as were the Venetian merchants, who had been imprisoned, and whose goods had been sequestered from Istanbul to Syria and Alexandria.<sup>182</sup>

The lords of the lagoon were justly alarmed. They were suspected. Zúñiga wrote Philip II from Rome on 20 June (1570) that, as he understood it, the Venetians no longer had any desire to see the league put into effect, "and I believe that they regret having proposed it," for they were almost certain of suffering defeat during the summer that lay ahead, and so were thinking of reaching an accord with the Turk, and of having done with the league.<sup>183</sup> As the Venetians became increasingly dissatisfied with the negotiations, which were dragging on in Rome, they did look for the means of ending the war which had begun in earnest when Piali Pasha entered the Aegean with some eighty galleys in April (1570). Through the sum-

<sup>178</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-1 (1728), no. xci, pp. 184-200; Michele Surian's diary of the negotiations from 2 July to 21 November, 1570, also in Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro*, *append.*, no. 1, pp. 393 ff.; Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 175-76, 179, 181, 182, 183-84, 185, 186-87, 189, 191, 194-95, 202-3, 207, pp. 388-490, and IV, nos. 20, 26, 29, etc., pp. 52 ff.; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570-1573)*, I (Madrid, 1918), 85-94; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XVII, 382-99, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 561-74.

<sup>179</sup> Rawdon Brown and G. C. Bentinck, *Cal. State Papers . . . Venice*, VII (1890), no. 475, pp. 448-51, and cf. J. B. Black, *The Reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603)*, Oxford, 1959, pp. 166 ff.

<sup>180</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 171, pp. 379-80, a letter of Zúñiga to Philip II, dated at Rome on 5 June, 1570, and cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 89<sup>v</sup> [110<sup>v</sup>], doc. dated 2 May, 1570.

<sup>181</sup> On Alvise Mocenigo's election, cf. Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 63; H. Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*, III (1934, repr. 1964), 54; S. Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, VI (1857), 283; and esp. the letters of Facchinetti to Bonelli, dated 6 and 13 May, in Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, nos. 187, 189, pp. 269, 272. It was commonly said that, as leader of the peace party, the Doge Pietro Loredan had preferred to lose Cyprus "piuttosto che perder l'amicizia del Gran Turco" (Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* [1845], bk. 1, p. 48).

<sup>182</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 99-101 [120-122], docs. dated 3 June, 1570.

<sup>183</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 180, p. 401, and *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 86.

mer and fall of that fatal year the baillie Marc' Antonio Barbaro, who was not a member of the war party, did unofficially discuss possible terms of peace with the pashas. Why not? Peace would have to be made sometime, and in the baillie's opinion, the sooner the groundwork was laid, the better.

In Venice the nuncio Fachinetti continued to have misgivings about the Signoria. He was well aware of the Venetians' reliance upon the Levantine trade, and had no doubt of their desire to reach an accord with the Gran Turco. On 26 August (1570) he warned Cardinal Girolamo Rusticucci, who was then handling the affairs of the Vatican secretariat of state "mostrando che tutti i principi conoscono quanto importa a questa Repubblica il commercio di Levante, et che perciò debbono sospettare ch' ella, potendo, cercherà accordarsi col Turco. . . ." <sup>184</sup> A month or so later (on 20 September) Fachinetti wrote Rusticucci that the pope could take it for granted "che il bailio in Constantinopoli è stato et è di continuo tentato d' accordo." Concerned with the toil and trouble of war—and its sad outlook—the Signoria had not instructed the baillie to desist. But they were reluctant to give the least countenance to his negotiations, for experience had shown that no accord with the Turk would carry the assurance of their safety. If the baillie's activities caused the Christian princes to distrust and abandon them, the Venetians knew that they would lose Cyprus. If a safe and sensible opportunity arose to make peace with the Turk with some guarantees as to the future, they would certainly take it, "for the cost [of the war] is becoming too burdensome for them, and this city cannot maintain itself without trade with the Levant." <sup>185</sup>

Whatever the limited financial and unlimited spiritual resources of the Holy See could do to assist the Venetians against the Turks was being done. In a brief of 10 June (1570) to Girolamo Zane, *classis incliytae Venetorum reipublicae capitaneus generalis*, Pius V authorized the nomination for service aboard the Venetian galleys of as many secular and regular priests as might be necessary to provide for the religious needs of all the soldiers

and sailors setting out against the Turks. <sup>186</sup> On the same day Marco Loredan, bishop of Nona (Nin) in Dalmatia, was issued the "faculty" of absolving *militantes contra Turcas* and granting them, under the usual conditions, a plenary indulgence for all their sins. <sup>187</sup> And on the following day (11 June) Marc' Antonio Colonna, the duke of Paliano, then thirty-five years of age, received his commission as captain-general of the fleet of his Holiness and of the Holy See "against the Turks, who are undertaking a great war for the destruction of the Venetians and of all Christians."

Colonna was to be given a monthly stipend of 600 scudi, at the rate of ten silver groats (*pauli*) to the scudo, plus the usual provision for twelve chosen soldiers, commonly called "lanze spezzate," and twenty-four halberdiers, the latter to serve as his bodyguard. With his appointment as captain-general, Colonna received all the customary rights, privileges, honors, and jurisdictions, with authority over all the commanders and soldiers aboard the papal galleys: "Therefore, my son, you will strive to act and discharge this responsibility, which we willingly entrust to you, with such diligence and dispatch that you will prove equal to our and to all men's great expectation of you." <sup>188</sup>

<sup>186</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Sec. Brevia, Reg. 14, fol. 212, by original foliation.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 14, fol. 213: "Cupientes pro nostri pastoralis officii sollicitudine animam quorumcumque Christianifidelium, praesertim in istis Dalmatiae partibus, adversus perfidissimos Turcas Christianae fidei hostes militantium sui pugnantium saluti opportune consulere, tibi . . . [etc.] auctoritate apostolica tenore praesentium licentiam concedimus et facultatem. . . ." Copies of this brief and that alluded to in the preceding note may be found also, *ibid.*, Reg. 15, fols. 126–27, by mod. stamped enumeration.

<sup>188</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 14, fol. 176, by original foliation, brief dated 11 June, 1570, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 177. I have followed the archival copy of Colonna's brief of appointment rather than the text given by Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI: *Marcantonio Colonna alla Battaglia di Lepanto [1570–1573]*, Rome, 1887, pp. 12–13, note, whose text differs somewhat from the archival copy, which (for example) assigns Colonna a bodyguard of twenty-four, not twenty-five, halberdiers, etc. A copy of the brief of 11 June addressed to Colonna may also be found in the Sec. Brevia, Reg. 15, fols. 106–107, by mod. stamped enumeration. The brief merely put into writing certain details relating to Colonna's command as captain-general of the Church.

Colonna's appointment had come a month before the brief: "Agli 11 di Maggio de 1570, dopo aver il Cardinal Colonna solennemente cantato la messa pontificale dello Spirito Santo nella solita Cappella papale, [sua Santità] gli diede di sua mano le insegne del generalato con lo stendardo grandissimo di damasco rosso . . . col motto già da Dio . . . In hoc signo vinces" (Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro [1845]*, bk. I, p. 46.

<sup>184</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 240, p. 336. The cardinal-nephew Bonelli, who was secretary of state, was ill for some time (*ibid.*, IX, no. 213, p. 302, letter of Rusticucci to Bonelli, dated at Rome on 8 July, 1570). Rusticucci served in his place.

<sup>185</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 253, p. 352, and on the Spanish distrust of Venice, *cf.* Francesco Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, Arch. stor. italiano, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 16–17.

Charles de Rambouillet was not so sure that all was going well. In a dispatch of 5 June (1570) he had apprised Charles IX of the fact that Pius had decided to make Colonna the commander of his galleys: "I think he will be leaving [for Venice] in eight or ten days, and I fear that the number of his Holiness's galleys could not be so large as one was hoping." The league against the Turk did seem to be progressing. The pope's commission to help with the negotiations consisted of Cardinals Morone, Bonelli, Cesi, Grassi, Aldobrandini, and Rusticucci.

The Venetians were making a lot of noise, but (at least in Rambouillet's opinion) they were arming very slowly. They conducted their affairs with the greatest secrecy, and it was widely believed in Italy that they were seeking an accord with the Turks. Pius was very active, "but in my opinion to very little effect, arming no other galleys than those which the Venetians are furnishing, of which only four have appeared at Ancona, entirely stripped, in very poor condition, and quite without rigging." Most of Philip II's galleys were in Sicily under the command of Giannandrea Doria, who was said to be "le meilleur homme de mer qui soit à son service." Thus far Doria had received no orders to add his galleys to those of Venice.<sup>189</sup>

According to a news dispatch from Venice, Pallavicino Rangone was being sent to Famagusta with a thousand ducats on Saturday, 17 June,

and note Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 170, p. 376).

On 15 May (1570) Franciscus Ballionus, *noster et Apostolicae Sedis notarius*, was appointed commissioner-general of the papal galleys (Sec. Brevia, Reg. 14, fols. 164-65, by original foliation, and Reg. 15, fols. 102-3, by mod. stamped enumeration).

Although, as Michele Ghislieri, Pius V had received the red hat from Paul IV Carafa (on 15 March, 1557), and had been a friend of the Carafeschi, he appreciated Colonna's ability and integrity. Colonna, as we have seen, had taken the field against Paul IV, and had been the enemy of the Carafa family. Under Pius IV de' Medici, another enemy of the Carafeschi, Colonna had secured the restoration of his lands and rights (on 17 July, 1562), on which see Fabio Gori, "Paolo IV ed i Carafa," *Archivio storico, artistico, archeologico e letterario*, II (1877-78), 315-17, and Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XV, 175-76, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 139-40.

<sup>189</sup> Charrière, III, 115-16. In his report to the Venetian Senate, given probably in late February, 1571, Sigismondo di Cavalli said of Giannandrea Doria ("Relazione di Spagna," in Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. I, vol. V [1861], p. 174): "Dei capi che comandano nell'armata di S. M. Cattolica senza dubbio Gian Andrea Doria è il più intelligente e pratico della professione per il molto tempo che ha navigato da sé e sotto il principe suo zio, ma fino ad ora non si è veduto in lui quella prudenza che si ricerca per un generalato; onde e per questo, e per qualche altra sua imperfezione, crederò che difficilmente sia per avere tal carico."

1570. (When he reached Crete, however, he would decide to go no farther.) Sebastiano Venier was made provveditore generale of the island of Cyprus, and word came from Rome that Marc' Antonio Colonna had received the baton for command of the papal galleys. Colonna was expected to arrive in Venice shortly. Reports from Corfu and Zante indicated

that one still did not know for certain where the Turkish armada was (although it was said to be at Negroponte), that in the Morea all the sipahis were ready to be embarked aboard the armada, and that the Turks in those [two] places were beset with great fear.

In fact many of the Turks were fleeing into the woods, and the Jews along the shores had also fled inland. Furthermore, "they say that the pope has written the lord Giannandrea Doria, and sent him the Catholic king's command that he must proceed immediately to Corfu with his galleys to unite them with the Venetian fleet. . . ."<sup>190</sup>

The news dispatch was of course that of a Fugger agent, and as usual he was correct. On 9 July Pius V sent off a brief to Pietro del Monte, the grand master of the Hospital, informing him that "during these past days we wrote our beloved son Giannandrea Doria that he should unite the galleys he had with him as soon as possible with the Venetian fleet." Unfortunately, however, as Pius told del Monte, Doria could not manage this as quickly as had been hoped, "owing to certain difficulties" (*ob quaedam impedimenta*). Nevertheless, Pius wanted del Monte to send the Hospitaller galleys to Corfu at the very first chance he had in order that they might operate with the papal galleys under the command of Marc' Antonio Colonna.<sup>191</sup>

Pius V assured the Venetian ambassador in Rome, "in accord with the orders and dispatches which had come from the most serene Catholic king," that he had sent a brief to Doria, directing him to add the "fifty or so" galleys under his command to those of the Venetian fleet.<sup>192</sup> And Pius

<sup>190</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fol. 285, *avviso* from Venice of 19 June, 1570, and cf. Facchinetti's letter to Rusticucci of 5 August (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 231, p. 324): "Il signor Pallavicino Rangone insieme col clarissimo messer Sebastiano Veniero, provveditore di Corfù, erano stati spediti dal clarissimo generale [Zane] sopra due buonissime galere per far pruova d'entrare in Famagosta—è riputata impresa quasi impossibile . . ." for the war of Cyprus was already under way.

<sup>191</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 14, fol. 238, by original foliation, brief dated 9 July, 1570. A copy of this brief may also be found, *ibid.*, Reg. 15, fol. 139.

<sup>192</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 108 [129], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 22 June, 1570, and cf. Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 68.

had done so, being misled by fair words of duplicity. When Luis de Torres had dined with Cardinal Diego Espinosa at Cordova on 22 April (1570), Espinosa had told him, as we have stated, that Philip II was prepared to grant two of the requests which Torres had made in the pope's name, i.e., to order a rendezvous of the royal galleys in Sicily under Giannandrea Doria, who was to obey the pope's every command, and to write the viceroys of Naples and Sicily to provide the Venetian fleet with supplies to the extent they found them available.<sup>195</sup> If this had been merely the courteous parlance of the court, Torres would have understood it as such. Nevertheless, Philip had not instructed Doria to obey his Holiness's every command.

Cavalli and Donado notified the Signoria (in a letter of 25 May, 1570) that Philip had indeed not given them any pledge that he would require Doria to unite the Catholic fleet with that of Venice. Philip had, however, ordered that provisions be made ready, apparently for his own forces as well as for those of the Signoria; he had also promised Cavalli and Donado to make his decision known presently. It would be some time before the fleets could come together.<sup>194</sup>

Confused by Doria's failure to obey "his every command," Pius inquired of Granvelle, Pacheco, and Zúñiga, as they wrote Philip II from Rome (on 26 June, 1570), "whether Giannandrea Doria would go with your Majesty's galleys to effect a union with the Venetians at Corfu." It was their understanding, they had told him, that Doria could only have received orders to assemble the king's fleet at Messina, "in conformity with his Holiness's request." Pius replied that he had been assuming Doria would add the royal galleys to those of Venice, "and not to do so would be the loss of a great opportunity." Philip's representatives then declared that if one studied the instructions which Torres had been given, he would find that his Holiness had only asked that the king's

galleys be gathered at Sicily (*no hallaría que su Santidad huviesse pedido otra cosa*).<sup>195</sup> They were glad,

<sup>195</sup> Only a literal-mindedness born of insincerity could interpret Torres' instructions in this fashion. First of all, when Torres was received in audience by Philip II, "gli esporrete accuratamente quel tanto che la Santità sua vi ha commesso a bocca . . ." but of course the word-of-mouth directions which Torres received from the pope were not put into writing, nor were the messages which he conveyed orally from pope to king. Torres was indeed to ask Philip to assemble the fleet at Messina, "che voglia quanto più presto inviare le sue galere verso Sicilia in quel più numero che può," and there should be some sixty galleys "per le concessioni de frutti ecclesiastici in Spagna, fattegli in tempo di Pio IV." But the whole purpose of Torres' mission was to bring about "una lega tra quella Signoria [di Venezia] et la Maestà Catholica, così a difesa comune come ad offesa, la qual lega sia perpetua o a tempo, come parerà più expediente. . . ."

Torres must make Philip see "questa unione et lega per buona, utile, santa et necessaria." In the pope's name Torres was to negotiate "l' unione tra Venetiani et il Re Catholico," for separately they could not defend themselves against the Turk, but together the Venetian and Spanish fleets would be too much for the Ottoman armada. Philip should bring his galleys together at Sicily "ad intercessione del Papa et a soccorso de Venetiani, et ciò servirà per occasione et principio di legar per sempre con Venetiani sua Maestà Catholica, con cui maggior vantaggio potrà poi stabilirsi il tutto." And finally Philip "dovrebbe congiungersi con Venetiani, ateso che le due forze loro congiunte sono bastanti con tener armata continua ad assecurar la Christianità per mare dalle forze del Turco, il che non può farsi per altra strada" (Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 127, pp. 268-73, docs. dated 12 and 15 March, 1570; Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* [1845], append., no. II, pp. 427-28, 429-31, with some textual differences).

In the light of these quotations from Torres' instructions, I find it easy to understand the pope's perplexity that Doria, who was to obey him "in tutto e per tutto," was still making no move at the end of June (1570) to effect a union of the royal galleys with those of Venice. In fact a month before this, on 20 May, Bonelli had written Fachinetti in Venice "che sua Maestà si contenta che 50 galere delle sue vadano a congiungersi con quelle de' Signori Venetiani verso Sicilia" (Stella, *Nunci Venezia*, IX, no. 194, p. 277). Such was the understanding at the Curia Romana of Torres' letter of 24 April, cited above.

While Serrano joins his Spanish forebears in declaring "the truth is that the pope never expressly asked for anything but that the king's galleys should be brought together in Sicily, and not [to unite] with those of the Venetians to go to the Levant against the Turk" (*Corr. dipl.*, III, 406, note), Serrano does acknowledge that there can be no possible doubt but that Philip II and his councilors understood perfectly the purpose of Torres' mission [and how could they fail to do so], but adhering to the written text of his petition, "they pretended not to have understood it, and . . . managed a delay of about two months" (*La Liga de Lepanto*, I [1918], 73, and cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 916, note 3).

Philip did not agree to the union of his fleet and that of Venice until 13 July (see below), after which he wrote Granvelle, Pacheco, and Zúñiga on the fifteenth (Serrano, *Corr. dipl.*, III, no. 196, p. 458), "Havemos visto todo lo que nos hemos escrito sobre el punto de la junta de nuestras galeras con las de su Santidad y Venecianos, y la causa porque a Juan Andrea

<sup>194</sup> Dragonetti de Torres, *La Lega di Lepanto*, pp. 104-5, Torres' letter to Bonelli, dated at Cordova on 24 April, 1570: ". . . cioè di ordinar che l' armata si congiunga in Sicilia e con ordine a Gio. Andrea, a cui si dà questo carico, che in tutto e per tutto obbedisca ai comandamenti e agli ordini di nostro Signore [Pius V], e similmente si scrive ai vicere di Napoli e Sicilia che provvedano l' armata Veneziana di vettaglie, secondo le forze di detti regni."

<sup>195</sup> Sena, *Secreta*, Reg. 76, fol. 108 [129]. The text of Cavalli and Donado's letter, dated at Cordova on 25 May, is given in M. Brunetti and E. Vitale, *La Correspondencia da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Domà*, I (1963), no. 19, pp. 33-36, where see esp. p. 34.

however, to tell the pope that they had written to Doria, asking him to effect a union with the Venetian fleet at Corfu, if doing so would be consistent with the orders he had received from his Majesty. In the meantime they could only write their king, and hope that the Venetians would proceed successfully against the Turks,<sup>196</sup> for they were well aware that if the Signoria reached an accord with the Porte, the full force of the Turkish armada would doubtless be directed against Philip's states on the Mediterranean.

The captain-general Zane left the port of Zara (Zadar) with seventy light galleys on 12 June, moving on to Lesina (Hvar), where he added six large galleys and some ships to his naval strength. From Lesina he sailed down the coast to the Bocche di Cattaro, the modern Bay of Kotor (*Kotorški Zaljev*), and thence to Corfu, making no attempt on Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi) or Durazzo (Durrës).<sup>197</sup> His galleys were shorthanded, and the crews and soldiers wracked by typhus fever. To add to Zane's discouragement, on 22 June the doge and Senate sent him the gloomy news from Cavalli and Donado. Now, however, Zane was ordered to proceed to Corfu—

despite all this, we wish that on the basis of the reports which you will have, when you arrive at Corfu, of the movements of the enemy's armada, you may be able to push on with our fleet to some other strategic place, whether ours or the enemy's. . . .

Zane should then take such chances and opportunities as God would give him, being guided by the advice of Sforza Pallavicini, *governator nostro general*, and his two other colleagues, Giacomo Celsi and Antonio da Canale, both of whom were *provveditori* of the fleet. The Senate also sent Pius's brief (of 10 June) granting a plenary indul-

gence "to all those who die on this expedition fighting against the infidels." Zane was to publish the brief, so that all aboard the fleet might be inspired toward a greater effort. Sermons should be preached on the importance of this indulgence. In the meantime 40,000 ducats had been made available, one half for Crete and the other half for Famagusta, "for payment of the infantry."<sup>198</sup> Philip II's continued indecision and failure to order his fleet to join forces with that of Venice were, as one can easily imagine, a source of extreme annoyance and distress to the Senate.<sup>199</sup>

Marc' Antonio Colonna, as captain-general of the papal galleys,<sup>200</sup> arrived in Venice toward the end of June.<sup>201</sup> Two weeks later (on 11 July, 1570) he wrote Philip II from the lagoon that there was no news of the Turkish armada, nor had the Signoria yet been advised that the Venetian fleet had reached Corfu. The last reports concerning the Turks said they had the plague aboard. As for the fleet which Zane commanded, it consisted of 145 galleys, 11 great galleys, one galleon, and 20 ships. The 145 galleys, however, included 22 from Candia, which had not yet joined the fleet. Besides the usual oarsmen and others, *la gente ordinaria*, there were 12,000 infantry. Fortunately the typhus fever (*la infirmità di petecce*) had ceased.<sup>202</sup>

As if typhus fever were not enough, the oarsmen aboard the Venetian galleys were plagued by the cruelty of their officers. The doge and Senate were certain that Zane had not failed to give orders that *le genti da remo* should be "well and kindly treated, so that they can serve us with strength and in good spirits." That, at least, is what they

<sup>196</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 108 [129].

<sup>197</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 115 [136].

<sup>198</sup> Cf., *ibid.*, Reg. 76, fols. 105' [126'], 108' [129'], and cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, nos. 206, 209, 212, 216, 218, 220, pp. 294, 297, 301, 306, 308, 310.

<sup>199</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 116' [137']. On 27 June (1570) the Senate voted "che siano fatte le spese al predetto signor et sua famiglia mentre ch' egli starà in questa città nostra" (Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 194' [239']). Cf. Guglielmini, *Marina pontificia*, VI (1887), 24-26.

<sup>200</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 192, p. 447, and on the losses caused by the pestilence in the Venetian fleet, cf. Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 73-74. ". . . talché non terminò questa crudele pestilenza che tolse la vita a ventti mila uomini dell' armata veneziana, e tra questi a molti gentiluomini veneziani, padroni di galee, e ad altre persone d' onoratissima conditione."

According to Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, p. 47, the Venetian fleet contained 137 galleys (not counting the twelve being armed for the pope), eleven galleasses, one galleon, fourteen "ships" (*navi*), and seven fustes, and cf. Francesco Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, in *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 14, 24.

no se ordenó los días passados mas de que se juntasen con todas las galeras en Sicilia, fué porque ni se pidió mas desto de parte de su Santidad" (cf., *ibid.*, nos. 197-98, pp. 461, 463, letters dated 15 July, 1570).

<sup>196</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 181, pp. 405-6, letter of Granvelle, Pacheco, and Zúñiga to Philip II, dated at Rome on 26 June, 1570.

<sup>197</sup> Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), pp. 68, 73, who by a slip of the pen says that Zane left Zara "alli dodici di Luglio," and Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, p. 18, who also mistakenly says that "a principio di luglio il general Zane si levò da Zara con l'armata. . . ." but for the date see Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, pp. 49-50, and cf. Hill, *Cyprius*, III, 911. The Turks had taken Durazzo from the Venetians on 17 August, 1501, on which note H. J. Kissling, "Zur Eroberung von Durazzo durch die Türken (1501)," *Studia Albanica Monacensia*, Munich, 1969, pp. 23-31.

wrote the captain-general (on 22 June, 1570), but unfortunately some of the sick and injured had another tale to tell when they returned to Venice after being dismissed from the fleet. Some of these poor wretches had been clubbed and kicked and crippled by the *officiali* of the galleys, and now they were laying their grievances before the provveditori in Venice. They had not complained while they were still with the fleet for fear of receiving even worse treatment, "il che ne ha portato dispiacere grande." The doge and Senate, therefore, instructed Zane to order the galley commanders (*governatori et sopracomiti*) to see that the crews were well treated and well taken care of, "so that at other times they may all the more willingly return to our service." There was no suggestion of punishment, however, for those who had mistreated the seamen, one of whom had had an eye knocked out.<sup>203</sup>

It is small wonder that the *galeotti* often pretended illness and injury to escape the harsh misery of service at the oars.<sup>204</sup> But there was a good deal of illness, despite Colonna's assurance to Philip II that "la infirmità che vi era di peccie è cessata;" unfortunately for the Venetians there was a terrible continuance of "l' influsso di tante malatie et morti nell' armata nostra."<sup>205</sup> Conditions were worse aboard the galleys than in the garrisons, but the Signoria's troops in Dalmatia seem also to have been badly treated on occasion and to have lacked food.<sup>206</sup>

Colonna had gone to Venice to arm four of the pope's twelve galleys, of which Venice had supplied the hulls. The other eight were being fitted out in Ancona. Upon his arrival Colonna had immediately encountered the difficulties standing in the way of negotiating the league, as he explained in his letter of 11 July to Philip II, especially the Signoria's reluctance to include Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers as objectives of the league's offensive action. Colonna proved to be an effective diplomat, for

although they are persuaded your Majesty will insist that the expedition against Algiers should be among the first, nevertheless yesterday evening in their Council of 250 members, whom they call the "Pregadi" [the Senate], they did yield. Because I knew that the members of the

Collegio, who first take up and discuss the agenda, were raising objections in this matter, I employed every means possible to win them over, as I have done, so that when they put the motion to the Pregadi without objection, it passed without further difficulty.

Colonna got along very well with the Venetians although, to start with, they had not approved of his appointment as captain-general of the papal galleys, having preferred either Commendone or Corner for the post. Money had also been a problem, for (despite earlier reports) Pius V was providing subsidies for only a dozen galleys, "so that it seems to these Signori their share [of the costs] would remain unduly large." The result was that Colonna was less than pleased with the galleys he received from the Signoria, old hulls refitted and refurbished: "Ho havuto difficoltà grande ad armar queste galere." Nevertheless, he clearly joined the Signoria in hoping for the union of the Venetian and the "Catholic" fleets in August and September.<sup>207</sup>

Colonna left Venice immediately after 22 July,<sup>208</sup> on which day the doge advised Zane,

As for the union with the Spanish galleys, we cannot tell you anything certain. The Maltese galleys should be with you shortly. The illustrious lord Marc' Antonio Colonna is now entirely ready with the galleys armed in this city, and those which have been armed in Ancona are in the same state [of readiness]. This evening his illustrious lordship is on the point of departure, to come to join you where you are. . . . We wish, when the said illustrious lord does join you, that you do him every honor and show him every sign of friendship. Our idea and that of the Senate is that you must give him the higher dignity of captain-general and representative of his Holiness, but in matters of importance you must take command, making him, however, share in your deliberations.<sup>209</sup>

In an engagement or an emergency at sea the Senate naturally wanted their own captain-general to give orders to their galley commanders. Marc' Antonio Colonna was without naval experience. One reason for Pius V's assigning the papal galleys to Colonna was the fact that he was Philip II's subject in the duchy of Paliano. In fact Colonna

<sup>203</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 109<sup>v</sup> [130], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 22 June, 1570, *de literis* 166, *de non* 6, *non sinceri* 0.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 110 [131].

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 124<sup>v</sup> [145<sup>v</sup>].

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 111 [132].

<sup>207</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 192, pp. 446-47, and on Colonna's appearance before the Collegio, cf. Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 26-27.

<sup>208</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 203<sup>v</sup> [248<sup>v</sup>]. On 22 July, 1570, Facchinetti wrote Rusticucci, "Il signor Marc' Antonio se n' è andato questa sera con le galere al Lio [i.e., the Lido], et se 'l tempo lo servirà, partirà questa notte, se non quanto prima . . ." (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 222, p. 312). Colonna had worked hard, and won the full confidence of the Signoria.

<sup>209</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 121<sup>v</sup> [142<sup>v</sup>].

owed Paliano to Philip, as we have seen in our account of the fall of the Carafeschi—to whom Cardinal Michele Ghislieri, now the pope, had been sympathetic—and it seems clear that Colonna's appointment as captain-general of the Church was intended as an inducement to Philip to join the league.<sup>210</sup> Although Philip was somewhat annoyed that Colonna should have accepted the charge without consulting him, from the Escorial on 15 July (1570) he sent his dutiful subject an expression of satisfaction in his appointment, telling him that he had now ordered Giannandrea Doria to take the [forty-nine] galleys which had been brought together in Sicilian waters and add them to the papal and Venetian galleys. Also Doria was to obey Colonna and follow the papal standard. On the same day Philip wrote Don García de Toledo to the same effect.<sup>211</sup>

To Cardinal de Rambouillet's extreme annoyance, an impenetrable secrecy had concealed all details of the negotiations for the league. Since there was no hope of including the French, Rambouillet had not been privy to what was going on. "It is almost impossible to discover anything . . ." as he complained to Charles IX (on 17 July, 1570). "Some people informed me this morning, as a certainty, that the league has been concluded, but I shall have to see it published before believing it, and should it come about, God knows how long it could last." The ministers of the Catholic king were making impossible demands of the Venetians, who were to endorse no accord of any kind with the Turks for ten years. They were to replace at their own expense all the vessels which Philip might lose for the duration of the league, whether by combat or by the mere "fortune of the sea." Also they must assist his Majesty "in all the seas as well as in that of the Levant, and numerous other like demands." The king's ministers were trying to extort from the pope "graces" which his Holiness had never been willing to grant them [at least not to such an extent], such as the *crusada* in Spain, the *exsequatur*

in Naples, "et aultres telles choses." As for the important question of who was going to be commander-in-chief of the combined fleets, the persons most frequently mentioned were Don John of Austria and Guidobaldo II della Rovere, the duke of Urbino.<sup>212</sup> Time would show Rambouillet's judgment to be sound.

Març' Antonio Colonna left Venice in late July. When he arrived with the pope's twelve galleys at Otranto (on 6 August), he found Philip's letter of congratulation upon his appointment and the reassuring news that Giannandrea Doria was to serve under him and under the papal standard.<sup>213</sup> As Michele Surian, the Venetian ambassador in Rome, reports in his account of the negotiations still in progress upon which the pope was building his hopes for the league, on 27 July (1570) a courier arrived from Spain, bringing word of Philip II's long-delayed decision "che l'armata del Re si congiungesse con quella della Signoria sotto l'obediencia del generale del papa."<sup>214</sup> Doria must add the king's galleys to those of Venice, and put himself at Colonna's orders.

Although there was still no league, Pius was delighted by the apparent progress. He was now willing to grant the king the financial graces—the *crusada*, *sussidio*, and *excusado*—but Zúñiga feared that the bulls of concession would contain many new features (*muchas novedades*) which, by adding or omitting certain words, "might very much lessen the substance of what has hitherto been assured us."<sup>215</sup> If concession of the graces would really secure Philip II's naval support against the Turks, they could not be granted too quickly.

During the two months or so that Zane had spent at Zara, he had had a hard time trying to feed his ailing forces, for the Turks had occupied the hinterland. When Almorò Tiepolo received

<sup>210</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 116–17.

<sup>211</sup> Guglielmotti, VI, 29. On 5 August, 1570, the Doge Alvise Mocenigo wrote Colonna in recognition of his allegedly supreme command in the coming expedition, ". . . però volemo per queste nostre pregare l' Eccellenza vostra siccome facemo con ogni affetto ad accelerare con ogni diligenza la sua andata in Levante per ritrovare ed unirsi con la detta armata nostra . . . perchè con questa presta unione Ella [i.e., Colonna] può molto ben conoscere che darà compita consolazione alla Santità Sua desiderosa sopra modo del bene e della riputazione della Republica Cristiana e del comodo nostro . . ." (Achille Geniarelli, "Della Guerra di Cipro e della battaglia di Lepanto . . ." *Il Saggiatore*, III [Rome, 1845], 170–71, on which cf. below, note 230, *ad finem*). Colonna left Venice on 24 July.

<sup>212</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-1 (1728), no. XC1, p. 192b.

<sup>213</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 204, p. 479, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 566–67.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, no. 176, pp. 394–95 (with note 2), a letter of Zúñiga to Philip II, dated 9 June, 1570.

<sup>211</sup> Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 30–31, with the text of Philip II's letter to Colonna, *del Escorial a XV de julio 1570*: "A Don Juan de Zúñiga mi ambaxador [in Rome] escrivo que os de cuenta de la resolución que he tomado en que Juan Andrea se vaya a juntar con las galeras de su Santidad y con las de la ilustrísima republica de Venecia con las que antes se le había ordenado que tuviese juntas en el nuestro reyno de Sicilia, y su obediencia y signa el estendardo de su Santidad. . . ." Cf. Herre, *Europäische Politik im Cyprischen Krieg* (1902), pp. 123 ff.

his commission on 20 July (1570) as "captain of the fuste," he was warned to keep an eye on the Venetian fortress at Novigrad (on the south shore of the Novigradsko more), some miles inland from Zadar.<sup>216</sup> Cattaro (Kotor) was also seriously threatened, as the *provveditore generale* of Dalmatia would understand from the recent reports which the doge and Senate were sending him.<sup>217</sup> The castle of S. Niccolò at Sebenico (Šibenik) must be made secure against Turkish assault.<sup>218</sup> Farther south, along the coast, the Albanians were courageously showing "la devotione et fede" in supporting Venice against the Turks,<sup>219</sup> which was very helpful but, up north, the Turks were always prepared to make attacks closer to home, in Friuli.<sup>220</sup>

The attacks were not all one-sided (mostly, however, they were to be so), for on 30 June (1570) Marco Querini, the captain of the Gulf, seized and destroyed the Turkish outpost at Brazzo di Maina on the middle prong of the southern Morea. Three weeks later the doge and Senate wrote him of the satisfaction they took in the news of his success.<sup>221</sup> In the coming months, however, until the day of Lepanto, the Venetians were to know neither satisfaction nor success, as the Turkish invasion of Cyprus went its relentless course.

On 22 July, just before Girolamo Zane, the captain-general, sailed with the fleet from Corfu to

the anchorage at Suda Bay, the best harbor on the island of Crete, the doge and Senate sent him the long-expected news. The entire Turkish armada, carrying the forces which had been recruited in Anatolia and Syria, had sailed under two pashas "toward our kingdom of Cyprus." Having fostered the sultan's desire to possess Cyprus, the two pashas were determined to seize the island, which Zane and his fleet must defend, with or without the support of their papal and Spanish allies, "above every other thing." Aside from the island's "usefulness" and the reputation which Venice derived from possession of it, the loss of Cyprus would do the state no end of damage, "from which may the Lord God deign to protect us, should some untoward event occur."

The Senate was sure that the enemy would meet stalwart resistance on the island, "havendo noi fatte le molte provisioni per la sua difesa." Although one could have confidence in the local nobility and in "our other subjects who are so well disposed," also in the soldiers and in the leadership on the island, "nevertheless, on the other hand, considering the enemy's great power, we cannot be completely sure." Whatever the Signoria's determination to carry on against the Turks, there is an almost wistful tone in this dispatch to Zane: "There is nothing more doubtful than the outcome of great undertakings, like this defense of a kingdom so far away and under attack by an enemy so close and so powerful. . . ." Yielding, however, to the judgment of Zane and his advisors, the Senate was quite prepared for immediate, offensive action. Using almost the same words as in their letter to Zane of a month before (22 June), they declared "that you ought to push on to those places, whether ours or the enemy's, where it shall seem best to you, and resolve to do what the Lord God will show you to be of most benefit to Christendom and to our affairs. . . ."<sup>222</sup>

Two pashas had indeed sailed with the Turkish armada "toward our kingdom of Cyprus," and Charles IX was soon informed of the details by one Joseph Justinian, who left Istanbul on 12 July, and prepared a report at Venice on 19 August (1570). Justinian had been sent by Selim II and Mehmed Sokolli to take to France the Turkish answer to letters which Charles had written concerning Claude du Bourg's return home. He was also to try, while in Venice, to secure the release of Mahmud Beg, the sultan's second dragoman

<sup>216</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 118<sup>r</sup> [139], doc. dated 20 July, 1570: ". . . Tu sai di quanta importantia sia alla città di Zara et suo contado, seben hora occupato da nemici, la fortezza nostra di Novegradi: però a questa volemo che debbi sempre havere l'occhio et procurar la conservatione. . . ." Cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 912.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 119<sup>r</sup> [140], and see in general Reg. 77, fols. 1<sup>r</sup>-3<sup>r</sup> [22<sup>r</sup>-24<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 2 September, 1570, 13<sup>r</sup> ff. [34<sup>r</sup> ff.], 30<sup>r</sup>-31<sup>r</sup> [51<sup>r</sup>-52<sup>r</sup>], 32<sup>r</sup> [53<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 54<sup>r</sup> [75<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 7 [28], 9<sup>r</sup> [30<sup>r</sup>], al *bajlo* et *provveditor general di Corfu*, and cf. fol. 64<sup>r</sup> [85<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 73<sup>r</sup>-74<sup>r</sup> [94<sup>r</sup>-95<sup>r</sup>]. The Venetians always feared the Turk's entry into Friuli, "come ha fatto spesse volte nell' altre guerre, abbruggando il paese et portando via grandissimo numero d' anime" (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 172, p. 248, and note, *ibid.*, no. 303, p. 417).

<sup>221</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 121<sup>r</sup> [142], al *capitano in Colfo*, doc. dated 22 July, 1570: "La nova che ci havete data della presa da voi fatta della fortezza del Brazzo di Maina è stata da noi intesa con molto contento et satisfatione di animo, havendo noi veduto con quanta celerità et con quanto giudicio et valore sia stata principata et condotta a buon fine. . . ." and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 121<sup>r</sup>-122<sup>r</sup>, and Reg. 77, fols. 13 [34], 17 [38], docs. dated 14 and 21 October, 1570. On Marco Querini, called "Stenta," cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 897-98, 913-14, and on the Venetian seizure and destruction of the little fortress at Brazzo di Maina, "detto il Porto delle Quaglie," cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 222, p. 312, and Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 78-80, who puts the assault on Maina on 29 June.

<sup>222</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 120 [141], letter of the Doge Alvise Mocenigo and the Senate to Girolamo Zane, dated 22 July, 1570; cf. also, *ibid.*, fol. 123<sup>r</sup> [144<sup>r</sup>], and Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 201<sup>r</sup> [246<sup>r</sup>].



and envoy to the Signoria, who had been detained as a spy and hostage the preceding March, and was now in confinement at Verona. Sokolli had planned to send a Turk to Venice to demand that Mahmud be set free, but the French ambassador Grantrie de Grandchamp had dissuaded him. Why lose two dragomans? De Grandchamp had a hard time persuading Sokolli but, finally succeeding, he recommended Justinian, who undertook the mission. According to Justinian, when Kubad Cha'ush had returned to the Porte with the Venetians' peremptory answer to the Turkish demand for Cyprus, "le Grand Seigneur et premier bassa se trouverent fort estonnez," and completed their preparations in hasty confusion.

Justinian reported from Venice

that on 17 April Piali [Pasha] set out with about eighty galleys so badly manned and amid such fright that if the fleet of these lords [the Venetians], instead of strolling about at Zara, had gone on to Negroponte, their fleet would either have defeated that of the Turk or compelled it to return in haste.

Thereafter Ali, the kapudan pasha, set sail "with a goodly number of galleys" which, when reckoned with the coastguard, came to about 160 vessels. On 17 June Piali and Ali had come together with their forces at Satalia (*Setelye*, Adalia) on the Gulf of Antalya in southwestern Anatolia. Here they should have found 34,000 men, 12,000 of whom should have been cavalry, "all ready immediately to go on in the galleys and transports to Cyprus." Finding no one, however, they sent complaints in all haste to the sultan, who dismissed the beylerbey of Caramania, who was supposed to have assembled the land army. About a week later (on 23 June) a messenger reached Piali that the land army would soon arrive. When Justinian left Istanbul on 12 July, "the Grand Seigneur had still received no word that his forces had gone on into Cyprus."<sup>223</sup>

Details relating to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, whether of numbers of men or of galleys, vary a good deal in the sources. Dates are sometimes carelessly recorded and at variance with the facts. One encounters the same difficulty in seek-

ing to describe the ill-fated expedition led by Zane, Colonna, and Doria. The archival sources are more reliable, if less picturesque. After 1572–1573 there was a flood of postwar "journalism," much of it the work of participants in the events they describe which, however, does not mean that they are in accord as to dates or facts. Whether Piali Pasha left the Bosphorus on 17 or 23 April (1570), he attacked the fortress on the island of Tenos (in early May)<sup>224</sup> which, as we have said above, the Venetians had fortified. His failure to take the island proved costly, but after picking up supplies and tarring his keels at Negroponte, he sailed on or about 28 May for Rhodes, where a few days later Ali Pasha joined him with the other half of the sultan's armada.

Joseph Justinian was "a gentleman of Chios, who claims to be a relative of the most illustrious lord cardinal [Vincenzo Giustiniani];" Fachinetti reports that he arrived in Venice on the evening of 22 August, which seems to be off by a few days. Justinian was about fifty years of age, according to the nuncio; having become ill in Venice, he had to delay his departure for France by about two weeks. On 23 August (1570) Fachinetti wrote Cardinal Rusticucci, ". . . Dell'armata del Turco riferisce [messenger Josepho Giustiniano] che Piali Bascia uscì prima a' XIII d' aprile, malissimo all'ordine, con 87 galere [but according to a dispatch of Marc' Antonio Barbaro, dated 14–15 April, Piali Pasha ran into a bit of a storm, and had to return to the arsenal at Istanbul, for his galleys were in miserable shape, on which note Moritz Brosch, *Geschichten aus dem Leben dreier Grossväter*, Gotha, 1899, p. 9], et che Ali Bascia uscì di lì a pochi giorni con altro numero di galere et fuste, che però fra tutte non passavano 160 vele et, congiunte anco con le galere della guardia ordinaria di Rhodi et d' Alessandria, tutta l'armata non poteva giungere a 200 galere, se ben con fuste et altri vascelli passerrebbe questo numero di legni. Che il Turco havea ordinato che al porto di Sitalia [Satalia, Adalia], alli 17 di giugno, si dovessero trovare XII mila cavalli et 30,000 fanti per traghettare in Cipro con altre genti designate per l'impresa di quell'isola; ma che alli 17 non si trovò gente alcuna, onde Piali per lettere ne fece gran querele col Turco, se ben di lì a 8 giorni scrisse poi che le genti cominciavano a giungere. Che in Constantinopoli fin alli XII, ch' egli partì, non si sapeva che l'armata turchesca havesse sbarcato gente in Cipro" (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 239, pp. 334, 335).

On the whole such evidence, despite inevitable discrepancies, is more trustworthy than the so-called literary sources, which differ wildly in their estimates of the size of the Turkish armada, on which see Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 895, note, who thinks that the armada "comprised, probably, about 350 sail," which seems too high a figure.

<sup>223</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 209, p. 298, letter of Fachinetti to Bonelli, dated at Venice on 1 July, 1570: ". . . L'armata Turchesca mise in terra V mila fanti per espugnare Tini, isola di questi signori, che dopo haver dato tre o quattro assalti al castello furono ributtati con molta perdita loro, onde detta armata partì et si divise. . . ." A week later it was reported that the troops of eighty galleys had assailed the garrison at Tenos (*ibid.*, IX, no. 214, p. 303, and *cf.* no. 218, p. 308). The governor of Tenos was one Girolamo Paruta, a relative of the historian Paolo, who also describes the assault on the island (*Storia della guerra di Cipro* [ed. 1827], bk. 1, pp. 85–87).

<sup>223</sup> Charrière, III, 131–32. We have already noted that on 8–12 May (1570) Charles d'Angennes de Rambouillet had written Charles IX, *ibid.*, III, 113, "que l'armée du Grand Seigneur seroit pour le moins de CLXX galères, et que le jour Saint-Georges [23 April] Piali-Bassa estoit sorty avec les cent premières, et devoit estre bientost suivy de septante autres commandées par Ali-Agap, le tout pour l'entreprise de Cypre." Cf. Gio. Pietro Contarini, *Historia delle cose successe dal principio della guerra mossa da Selim ottomano a Venetiani fino al di della gran giornata vittoriosa contra Turchi* (1572), fol. 5'.

In early June the two pashas, Piali and Ali, sailed together for the Bay of Antalya—or that of Finika, a bit to the south, just west of Cape Geli-donya (Khelidonia)—where they failed to find the men and horses they had expected. But the host was soon assembled, and on 27 June the armada made for the western shores of Cyprus. Rounding Cape Arnauti and sailing past Paphos, the pashas made a first landing at the southern port of Limassol on 1 July, and on the third they set the land army and artillery ashore at Salines, the salt flats along the western shore of Larnaca Bay. Some three weeks later, between 24 and 26 July (1570), the army slowly made its way—now under Lala Mustafa Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the expedition—to the city of Nicosia, the capital of the island. Setting up his cannon on the rising slopes to the south and southeast of the city (opposite the bastions of Tripoli, Davila, Costanzo, and Podocataro, which figure prominently in all accounts of the siege), Mustafa began the conquest of Cyprus.<sup>225</sup>

As Mustafa Pasha was beginning his northward march from the shores of Larnaca Bay to Nicosia, Girolamo Zane was beginning his voyage from Corfu to the island of Crete, where he arrived on 4 August. The Venetian fleet, however, was not to be so gainfully employed as the Turkish army. The fleet was worn with disease and demoralized, and the Signoria was concerned about the possible results of divided leadership. On 26 July (1570), as the Turks were establishing their encampments to the southeast of Nicosia, the Senate approved the text of a ducal letter to Zane. Although the Venetian fleet was supposed to be joined by the papal galleys under Colonna, the Catholic galleys under Doria, and at least some belonging to the Hospitallers, "all auxiliary forces sent to aid and assist us," the doge cautioned Zane that he must retain full command of the allied expedition.

Zane must of course include Giannandrea Doria no less than Colonna in all important deliberations. When it came, however, to the important matter of precedence, "alla precedenza del luogo," Giannandrea must give way to Colonna, for the latter was the captain-general of his Holiness.

Nevertheless, if Zane saw that Giannandrea, "come capitano della Maestà Catholica," wanted the place next to Colonna on all formal occasions, Zane was to let him have it. Protocol must not frustrate the purpose of the fleets, which was "the well-being of our state," i.e., to save Cyprus from the Turks. Colonna had left Venice on the evening of 24 July with the four galleys which had been armed for him in the Arsenal. He was stopping at Ancona to add the pope's other eight galleys, and would then sail eastward to join the Venetian fleet "as soon as possible." The doge was now sending Colonna word that the welcome news had just reached Venice that Philip II had ordered the "Catholic fleet" under Giannandrea to join that of the Signoria.<sup>226</sup> When Zane received the doge's letter, he was still at Crete, and would have long to wait before Colonna and Doria were to reach him there.

On the same day (26 July, 1570) the doge and Senate wrote Giannandrea Doria the news which he later claimed not yet to have received himself. They informed him that their ambassadors in Spain, Cavalli and Donado, had dispatched a courier at midday on 13 July<sup>227</sup>—Philip II was then at the Escorial—with a letter to the effect that his Catholic Majesty, "to please the pope and also to render assistance to our Republic," had decided to order his most illustrious lordship to set sail with all his [forty-nine] galleys, and in God's name "to come together with our fleet." Letters to that effect were supposed to be sent from the Escorial to Giannandrea "on the night of that same day" (13 July). Knowing well Giannandrea's valor and being certain of his desire to assist Venice as well as the Christian commonwealth, the doge and Sen-

<sup>226</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 123<sup>v</sup> [144<sup>v</sup>], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 26 July, 1570, with the information that Colonna sailed from Venice "terza sera," the evening of the twenty-fourth, and *cf.* Fachinetti's letter of 26 July to Cardinal Rusticucci, in Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 225, pp. 315–16.

<sup>227</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *Corrispondenza dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà*, I, no. 30, pp. 58–60, letter dated at Madrid on 13 July: "Laudato sia nostro signor Dio! Questa è per dar improvvisamente una buonissima nova alla Serenità vostra [i.e., the Doge Alvise Mocenigo]. La quale è che il serenissimo re ha risoluto di commettere al signor Gioan Andrea che, con tutte le galere che si ritrova seco in Italia, si vadi a giuntar con quelle della Serenità vostra. . . . Gli dispacci del re che daranno l'ordine sopra ditto al signor Gioan Andrea tuttavia si scrivono dal segretario [Antonio] Pérez et si manderanno questa notte a firmar dalla mano del re all' Escuriale et domani poi, per quello che ci vien affermato, saranno inviati con diligenza in Sicilia. . . . Noi non sappiamo, serenissimo principe, fin hora la commissione che sarà data a Gioan Andrea di quello che haverà da fare doppo che si haverà congiunto con l'armata della Serenità vostra per la buona intelligentia con il general nostro. . . ."

<sup>225</sup> Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* (1845), bk. 1, pp. 53–54, 55 ff.; Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 82 ff., 88, 92 ff., 99 ff.; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 892–96, 958 ff., 966 ff., and see Gio. Pietro Contarini, *Hist. della guerra mossa da Selim ottomano a' Venetiani* (1572), fols. 7<sup>v</sup>, 8<sup>v</sup>–9, 10–11<sup>v</sup>. The major events of the Cypriote war of 1570 and the failure of the Christian fleets even to reach the island are most easily studied in the straightforward, factual account of Contarini, in whose footsteps Hill has followed closely (*cf.* *Cyprus*, III, 1151–52).

ate would not ask him to obey the king's order with all haste and diligence, for they knew full well that he would gladly do so of his own accord.<sup>228</sup>

Philip II had finally ordered Giannandrea Doria to add the royal galleys to those of Venice and the Holy See. The trouble was, Philip said, that the nuncio Don Luis de Torres had only asked for the assembly of the galleys in Sicily, not for the union of the fleets.<sup>229</sup> One might disbelieve a royal ally,

but not dispute him. There was, however, another factor—one of overriding importance—which was still unknown to Pius V and Marc' Antonio Colonna and to the Signoria and Girolamo Zane: Just as Philip had forbidden Don García de Toledo to make a direct attack upon the Turks during the siege of Malta five years before, so now he gave Giannandrea secret instructions to preserve the royal fleet and during the current year 1570 to avoid encounter with the Turkish armada.<sup>230</sup>

<sup>228</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 122' [143'], *al capitano dell'armata Catholica*, doc. dated 26 July, 1570, de literis 124, de non 7, non incerti 46. The Venetian courier had conveyed the news (of Philip II's decision to join his fleet to that of Venice) from the Escorial or Madrid to Venice in twelve or thirteen days (*cf. ibid.*, fol. 123' [144']). The news reached Rome on 2 August:

"Questa mattina habbiamo ricevute lettere dal nostro ambasciator in Roma de 2 del presente con aviso che quel giorno era ivi giointo il corrier di Spagna che porta l'ordine del serenissimo re al Signor Gio. Andrea Doria che immediate levi le genti che sono in Sardegna et si congiogna coll'armata nostra all'obediencia del generale di sua Santità, il qual corrier non era stato intratenuo in Roma, se non due sole hore, ma era stato subito espedito al suo viaggio. . . ."

The Venetian ambassador in Rome also wrote that the Sardinian troops were already aboard Philip's galleys, which were well provided with munitions, foodstuffs, and all other necessities. The galleys at Messina were also all in order, and so could join the Venetian fleet in a few days (*ibid.*, Reg. 76, fol. 124' [145'], *al capitano general de mar*, doc. dated 5 August, 1570).

<sup>229</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, III, nos. 196–98, pp. 458 ff., cited above, letters dated 15 July, 1570. Philip thus explained "las causas por que no se havia ordenado a Juan Andrea mas de que se juntasen en Sicilia con todas las galeras, que fué porque no se nos pidió mas de parte de su Santidad por Don Luys de Torres . . ." (no. 197, p. 461).

<sup>230</sup> Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI (1887), 45–46, note 37, has assembled the evidence, which is quite convincing (*cf. Hill, Cyprus*, III, 905, who used the 1862 edition of Guglielmotti's work); Francesco Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano, in the Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 18–19, says, "Fatta in Candia l'unione dell'armata cristiana [to which we shall come in the following chapter], Giovanni Andrea Doria si mostrò sempre difficile d'andar alla difesa del regno di Cipro, ed addusse molti impedimenti. . . . Egli in Candia disse che nella commissione del re vi era una riga di suo pugno che dovesse mirare allo stato dell'armata Viniziana, e che la non era ad ordine. . . ." i.e., Philip II had added a line in his own hand to Doria's instructions—he was not to fight the Turks, for the Venetian fleet was in no condition to assist him. As Longo also observes, however, the Turkish armada was in even worse condition than that of Venice, "e se li nostri andavano innanzi, si otteneva certa vittoria: Due cause, disse il signor Marc' Antonio Colonna, mossero Giovanni Andrea a non voler andar innanzi. La prima che ebbe commissione dalli ministri del re di non combattere per modo alcuno. . ." (*ibid.*, p. 21).

While Longo wrote what the world was saying, Colonna stated in a letter to Cardinal Rustucci in November, 1570, "The Venetian general [Zane] has shown me a letter which came from Ragusa to the effect that, to put it briefly, Pagano Doria [whom illness then detained in Ragusa], Giannandrea's brother, offered to make a wager that there would be no combat

with the enemy's armada, because Giannandrea had orders from his Majesty not to engage in such for this year. . ." (Guglielmotti, VI, 46, note). Colonna told the viceroy of Naples the same thing in a letter dated at Corfu on 28 November (*ibid.*). Guglielmotti also cites, however, a letter of Don García de Toledo to Luis de Requesens, dated at Pisa on 1 August, 1571, ". . . parendimome que es bien que no sepan Venecianos por buen respecto que ministro ni en á donde su Majestad tracie de que no se pelee, porque saben despues aprovecharse de esta y de otras cosas menores" (*Documentos inéditos*, III [1845, repr. 1964], 9) which, while indicative of Spanish policy, has nothing to do with Doria's performance on the expedition of 1570.

In his own account of the ill-fated expedition of 1570, which he prepared for Philip II, Colonna describes the difficulties caused by the king's secret instructions to Doria (*Relazione di Marc' Antonio Colonna alla Maestà del Re. . . intorno a quel che avvenne in quest'armata. . . fino a' 27 settembre, quando le armate [i.e., the Christian fleets]. . . si divisero*, in Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro* [1845], append., pp. 437, 438): "Questo è tutto quello che occorre, siccome vostra Maestà potrà per bocca di ciascuno ascoltare. . . . Veda però vostra Maestà quanto mal a proposito allegando Giovanni' Andrea di aver comandati particolari di vostra Maestà disgustasse l'animo dei Veneziani, a me esponesse per il rovescio il volere della vostra Maestà. . . . e fare il volere di vostra Maestà tanto inonestamente. E posto che Giovanni' Andrea aveva fermamente in animo di oprar altramente da ciò ch'io stimava, l'avesse almen fatto senza trascorrere in parole tanto disamorevoli alla presenza de' Signori Veneziani. . . . Or credami vostra Maestà come sopra niun'altra cosa più mi dobe la condotta di Giovanni' Andrea, quanto sul darmi a credere che vostra Maestà intorno a questo affare avesse a lui affidati segreti che a me non palesò, il che io avendo di certo per falsissimo, non aggiusterei fede ad uomo del mondo."

On Giannandrea Doria's defense of his odd procedures and his lack of co-operation on the expedition of 1570, see the texts published by Achille Gennarelli, "Della Guerra di Cipro e della battaglia di Lepanto, documenti tratti dagli Archivi Colonna e Caetani," *Il Saggiatore: Giornale romano di storia, letteratura, belle arti, filologia e varietà*, II (1844), 289–95, 335–38, 358–65, and III (1845), 26–31, 169–74. Having no confidence at all in the ultimate success of the expedition, Doria had asked Philip II (in a dispatch from Messina, dated 11 August, 1570) for authorization to disobey Marc' Antonio Colonna, the titular commander of the Christian armada, if he saw that the Spanish fleet was likely to get "lost" (Aldo Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega' prima della battaglia di Lepanto," *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, XIX [1965], 385). Doria disliked Colonna, feared the corsair Uluj-Ali, and would have much preferred to employ the Turks' preoccupation with Cyprus to try to occupy Tunis.

## 22. THE FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION OF 1570 AND PIUS V'S ATTEMPTS TO FORM THE ANTI-TURKISH LEAGUE

THE CHRISTIAN expedition of 1570 to save the island of Cyprus from the Turks was to be one of the notable failures of the century. After two futile months at Zara (Zadar) on the Dalmatian coast—from 13 April to 12 June—the captain-general Girolamo Zane had removed the seventy galleys of the Venetian fleet to Corfu, where he arrived on 23 June. A week later (on 30 June), as we have seen, Marco Querini destroyed the Turkish fortress at Brazzo di Maina, "called the Port of Quails," on the central promontory of the southern Morea.<sup>1</sup> Shortly afterwards, however, Sforza Pallavicini and Sebastiano Venier failed in a perilous attempt to take the Turkish castle at Margaritio on the Greek coast "seven long Italian miles" inland, opposite the southern tip of the island of Corfu. Pallavicini and Venier put some five thousand men and four pieces of heavy field artillery aboard fifty galleys. Setting out on 3 July, they disembarked their men and artillery on the following night.

Pallavicini ventured inland with an engineer and some colonels, "to reconnoiter," says Gianpietro Contarini, "and to examine the site of the fortress." It quickly became clear that the *impresa* was not going to be "so easy as had been depicted," for the castle was much farther inland than Pallavicini had been told. As provveditore generale of Corfu, Venier was anxious to oust the Turks from the castello, but Pallavicini found the roads impossible, and the Turkish castello was on the top of a hill. Fifty soldiers were enough to defend it, for the Venetian heavy cannon could not be transported along the roads leading to the hill. The Turks might send their garrison assistance, catching the Venetian force flat-footed. The enterprise had to be abandoned, to Venier's annoyance; the men and cannon were re-embarked on 7 July.<sup>2</sup> The fiasco at Margaritio was

discouraging and, alas, it seemed likely to set the pace of the whole expedition.

Ten months later, when the expedition of 1570 was all over and done with, Sforza Pallavicini addressed an *apologia* to the Doge Alvise Mocenigo. It is dated at Venice on 27 April, 1571, and deals in some detail with the sad course of events of the previous year. Although the doge had expressed satisfaction in the way Pallavicini had met his responsibilities throughout the expedition, the governor-general of the Venetian land forces was well aware that he had been severely criticized, "pur sapendo io che alcuni hanno publicato molte cose aliene della verità in pregiudizio mio." He dwelt on the poor preparations for the whole naval campaign, the illness of the oarsmen and soldiers, the long delay at Zara, and the difficulties created by the divided Christian high command,

del tardare nostro tanto a Zara ne fu causa l' aspettare che giungesse tutta l' armata con tutte le monitioni necessarie et l' ordine della Serenità vostra di partirsi, che così diceva l' eccellentissimo generale [Zane] havere in commissione da lei—partimmo finalmente multiplicando ogni hora più le infirmità dell' armata. . . .

Zane had been instructed not to attack Turkish strongholds along the Adriatic coast lest the enemy should pour more troops into Dalmatia. In his long memorandum to the doge Pallavicini rehearses the hapless itinerary of the Venetian fleet from Zara to Lesina (Hvar), Bocche di Cattaro (the Gulf of Kotor), and finally to Corfu, following orders "di non tentare cosa alcuna in Colfo [the Adriatic] per non tirare qualche grosso capo de nemici in Dalmatia." At Corfu the Venetian high command halted again—for an entire month—"amidst the dead and dying." There was a lack of oarsmen on the Venetian galleys. One did not know the whereabouts of the Turkish armada, "which was stronger than ours." The great galleys and ships had not arrived at Corfu with the needed munitions, as had been expected, nor (says Pal-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above, Chapter 21, note 221.

<sup>2</sup> Gio. Pietro Contarini, *Historia delle cose successe dal principio della guerra mossa da Selm ottomano a' Venetiani fino al di della gran giornata vittoriosa contra Turchi*, Venice: Francesco Rampareto, 1572, fols. 5<sup>r</sup>, 8, 9<sup>r</sup>-10<sup>r</sup>; Bartolomeo Sereno, *Commentari della guerra di Cipro e della lega dei principi cristiani contro il Turco*, ed. the Monks of the Abbey of Monte Cassino, Cassino, 1845, bk. 1, pp. 54-55; Paolo Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro*, ed. Siena, 1827, pp. 74-78, in much detail. Cf. Pietro Bizarro (Bizarus), *Cyprium bellum inter Venetas et Selymum, Turcarum im-*

*peratorem*. . . . Basel, 1573, p. 90, who confuses Marco Querini with the less well-known Marc' Antonio Querini, on whom cf., below, pp. 1004-5. On Bizarro (also Bizarro), note the article in J. S. Ersch and J. G. Gruber, *Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Wissenschaften u. Künste*, X (repr. 1970), 287. I have not found Bizarro's *Cyprium bellum* of much value.

lavicini) had Marco Querini, captain of the Gulf, kept his galleys with those of the fleet. In fact Pallavicini reviewed all the frustrations of the year 1570, including the discomfiture he had shared with Sebastiano Venier when they could not take the Turkish castle at Margaritio.<sup>3</sup>

While at Corfu, as Pallavicini notes in his defensive *mémoire* to the doge, Zane gave two of the best galleys to Venier to go to Cyprus, "as he said he wished to do." Two other galleys were assigned to go with Venier as far as Scarpanto (Kárpáthos) so that, having acquired news of the whereabouts of the Turkish armada, they might report back to the Venetian fleet in the Cretan port of Suda, and "thus having left [Corfu] on 27 July, we arrived in the port of Suda on the last day of the said month." Along the way they had picked up oarsmen at Cephalonia and Zante. From the latter island on 1 August Zane sent a report to Venice, which the Signoria did not receive until 25 August.<sup>4</sup> There had been a full month of wasted time

and wasted manpower at Corfu, from 23 June to 23 July; the careful Contarini quite correctly gives the latter date as the time of Zane's departure from Corfu. Contarini also says that Zane and the Venetian fleet were at Modon on 2 August, and touched at Porto Picorna on the fourth, when they reached Suda Bay in western Crete.<sup>5</sup> Pallavicini's dates are not always to be relied upon; his memory failed him every now and then. He was interested in the important facts and failings of the expedition, not in petty chronological detail. He was a soldier, not a historian.

There were still more sick and dying at Suda where, says Pallavicini, the Venetian fleet was worse off than ever. Venier did not reach Cyprus; he got no farther than the island of Naxos (*Nexia*). Ship's biscuit was low. The fleet needed "si huomeni da spada come da remo." Pallavicini proposed that while the fleet was being supplied with more men and provisions, the Venetian high command might equip seventy or eighty galleys or more if it could be managed, and send them into the Archipelago, "dove si fosse potuto far più danno alli nemici et far quel tanto che il tempo et l' occasion avesse portato." Although Pallavicini's idea of attacking the Turks in ill-defended places in the islands and along the shores of the Aegean seemed to win approval, letters arrived from the doge before it could be put into effect: The papal and Catholic fleets would come in due time, and Zane was ordered to rebuild his fleet with soldiers and oarsmen "accioche unite insieme queste armate si potesse senza perder tempo andar contra gli nemici"—then the three fleets could together sail for Cyprus.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Pallavicini's *apologia* may be found in the Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 80–90, *Difesa e narrativa del Signor Sforza Pallavicino sopra tutti i progressi dell'armata venetiana contra Turchi l'anno MDLXX*. It is dated, *ibid.*, fol. 90<sup>r</sup>, "in Venetia il dì 27 d' Aprile MDLXXI." On the lack of success at Margaritio, Pallavicini says, "M'incamimai con l'ecellentissimo general Veniero, che era meco per riconoscere il detto Castello e la strada che vi era: trovai che dal mare sino al detto castello vi erano sette miglia grosse italiane. . . ."

The approach to the castle, after a stretch of good road, became impossible for the artillery, and "sariamo stati a grandissimo pericolo di lasciar vi non solo l'artegliaria ma anche la maggior parte senon tutta della gente che era meco, la quale era il nervo di tutta l'armata [nostra] . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 83). There is a careless seventeenth-century copy of Pallavicini's *Difesa e narrativa* in Cod. Urb. lat. 851, pt. 2, fols. 300–337, and another with some of Pallavicini's letters to the Signoria in the Bibl. Correr (Venice), Cod. Ciocagna 3596, "Memorie antiche del Regno di Cipro," which volume lacks continuous foliation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 1, *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 2 September, 1570: "Ricevessemo a XXV del mese passato [25 August] le lettere vostre de primo dal Zante, et per esse con nostra satisfatione habbiamo inteso quanto per voi è stato operato alla Cefalonia prima, et poi in quel loco, per haver homini da remo per bisogno et servitio dell'armata nostra et la partita vostra per Candia, dove volemo esser certi che haverete ritrovato preparato quel numero de homini da remo et da spada che sarà stato necessario per essa armata. . . . Per avvisi da Napoli et da Roma fin 27 del passato intendemo ch' il Signor Gio. Andrea Doria alli XX con le sue galie al numero di cinquanta si ritrovava a Gallipoli et era per congiogersi con quelle del pontifice che erano in Otranto [sic], havendosi l'una et l'altra armata fornita delle cose necessarie et stavano per partire per andar verso Levante a congiogersi con voi. . . ."

Illness continued to be serious in the Venetian fleet, and was a source of worry to the Senate (*ibid.*, fols. 7<sup>r</sup>–8<sup>r</sup> [28<sup>r</sup>–29<sup>r</sup>]). Zane was thought to have taken, with the Senate's approval,

the "valorosa risolutione d' andar a ritrovar et combattere l'armata inimica" (fol. 9<sup>r</sup> [30<sup>r</sup>])—the resolution may have been there, but Zane was not "to find and fight the enemy's armada." Communications were obviously slow between the Venetian commanders and the home government. As late as 8 September the Senate believed that Zane was still on his way "con tutta l'armata [the Venetian fleet] per andar verso la città di Candia et poi a Capo Salomon per passar in Cipro" (fol. 17<sup>r</sup> [38<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>5</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 10. Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 66, thinks that Zane reached Suda on 23 July. On 22 July Zane had written the Signoria that he had already suffered the loss of almost 6,000 men: "erano morti da 3,000 galeotti et quasi altrettanti soldati," but he hoped to rebuild his manpower in Cephalonia, Zante, and Candia, on which see Aldo Stella, ed., *[Nunziatura di Giovanni Antonio Facchinetti,] Nunziature di Venezia, VIII-X (Rome, 1963–77)*, IX (1972), no. 251, p. 324, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, no. 240, p. 337. There are unhappily frequent references in the documents to *soldati et galioti morti et amalati* (*cf.* Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fols. 314<sup>r</sup>–315<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>6</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 84<sup>r</sup>–85<sup>r</sup>.

In Venice and Rome meanwhile one looked for money, the sinews of war; money produced men, even oarsmen, who were always in short supply when crises came. The Venetians were still not making very extensive use of slaves at the oars. Pius V had only a dozen galleys on the expedition. The Holy See had been, however, put to immense and intolerable expense for many years (as Pius informed Duke Alfonso II d'Este of Ferrara in a brief dated 28 July, 1570), now against the heretics and now against the terrible Turks. There was no respite. Once more a Turkish advance must be repulsed. The pope's contribution to the current expedition had drained the Apostolic Camera. Pius thus had no alternative to the imposition of six tithes upon all ecclesiastical revenues throughout the whole of Italy! As collector-general of these tithes Pius had appointed the Venetian Cardinal Alvise Corner, *noster et Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae camerarius*. In fact Pius had sold the office of papal chamberlain to Corner a few months before (for 68,000 scudi), also for the campaign against the Turks.<sup>7</sup> Like other princes in Italy Alfonso was urged to assist the local collectors in gathering the funds "in order that we may be able to meet the pressing necessities in time."<sup>8</sup>

On 19 August (1570) the Doge Alvise Mocenigo and the Senate wrote Girolamo Zane of their satisfaction in having learned of his departure with

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Chapter 21, p. 960b.

<sup>8</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Roma, Busta 1300/15, no. 145: "Immensi atque intolerabiles sumptus quos complures iam annos modo adversus haereticos, nunc contra immanissimos Turcas, facere coacti fuimus, et in praesentia ad propulsandum ipsorum Turcarum impetum amplius subire compellimur adeo Camerae Apostolicae facultates exhauserunt ut sex integras decimas omnium fructuum ecclesiasticorum in omni Italia existentium imponere nobis necesse fuerit. Earum autem collectorem generalem dilectum filium Aloisium Cardinalem Corneliolum nostrum et Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae camerarium constituimus, prout ex nostris confectis literis plenus constat. . . Nobilitatem tuam hortamur in Domino atque studiosè ab ea petimus ut Camerae nostrae Apostolicae procuratoribus et exactoribus quotiescunque ab illis fueris requisitus in dictis decimis ab omnibus tui domini personis ecclesiasticis sine mora suo loco et tempore exigendis omnem tuum favorem et auxilium promptè ac libenter praestare sicut tuis magistratibus et officialibus mandare efficerique velis ut ministri ipsi nostri re iuxta nostrarum literarum tenorem confecta pecunia quae ex eis rediguntur ad manus eiusdem camerarii nostri vel cuius ipse mandaverit quamprimum transmittere possint ut urgentibus necessitatibus in tempore succurrere valeamus. Erit id et tua praesentibus probitate magnopere dignum, ingruentibus vero periculis valde opportunum et nobis vehementer gratum. Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum sub annulo piscatoris die XXVIII Julii, MDLXX, pontificatus nostri anno quinto." Similar briefs were sent to other Italian princes.

the fleet from Corfu for Candiote waters, for now he could presumably go on to Cyprus. The Senate had just received letters from Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the Venetian bailie then under house arrest in Istanbul. These letters, dated from 4 to 10 July, brought the news that the sultan's armada was about to sail for Cyprus "et venir a ritrovar la nostra." The Senate was placing its hopes in the grace of God and the competence of Zane that everything was in order and everyone was ready to meet the Turk, "così de homini da remo come da spada."<sup>9</sup> In Cyprus nothing was in order, and no one was ready to meet the Turk.

Owing to his confinement, the bailie Barbaro had limited access to information in the Turkish capital.<sup>10</sup> His letters of 4–10 July were behind the march of events. As we know, the Turks had landed at Limassol and Salines on the southern shore of Cyprus on 1 and 3 July. While Zane and the Venetian fleet were sailing from Corfu to Crete, as we have also noted in the preceding chapter, Lala Mustafa Pasha was moving northward from Salines on the western shore of Larnaca Bay to Nicosia, the capital of the island of Cyprus. The Turks were there to stay. According to Contarini, Lala Mustafa's army then consisted of 4,000 horse, 6,000 janissaries, 4,000 sipahis, "and many adventurers, of whom one cannot determine the number." At the same time Lala Mustafa sent 500 horse to begin the siege of Famagusta, although the Turks intended to concentrate first upon Nicosia. The Venetian commander on the island—who was, unfortunately for the Venetians, destined to be the defender of Nicosia—was the Signoria's incompetent "lieutenant" Niccolò Dandolo, *luogotenente di Cipro*.<sup>11</sup>

Following instructions from the Signoria, Zane set about securing reinforcements for the Venetian fleet, "and to this effect he sent out the distinguished captain of the Gulf [Marco Querini] with twenty galleys," as Pallavicini tells us, "so that going into the Archipelago he might try to pick up as many oarsmen as possible." Querini returned with three hundred oarsmen, "essendosi insieme svaligiata l' isola de Andro con esser stato

<sup>9</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fol. 130<sup>v</sup> [151<sup>v</sup>], *al capitano nostro general da mar*, doc. dated 19 August, 1570, which text also gives 23 July (not the twenty-seventh, as Pallavicini says) as the date of Zane's leaving Corfu.

<sup>10</sup> Although under house arrest, Barbaro was twice summoned to confer with Mehmed Sokolli in the week preceding 28 June (1570), and received permission "to go to the gardens and the greenhouse" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fol. 324<sup>v</sup>).

<sup>11</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 10.

compresso molte altre brute cose et condotte via molte giovani, come credo che la Serenità vostra haverà inteso. . . ." The rapine and rapacity of Querini's forces against the Greek Christians on the Turkish-held island of Andros had outraged not only the Greeks of the Archipelago but also those of Candia, who became disaffected and unco-operative.<sup>12</sup>

Giannandrea Doria's galleys, their keels tarred and prepared for action at Messina, were joined by the Neapolitan galleys under Álvaro de Bazán, the marquis of Santa Cruz, on 8 August (1570), the day on which a courier brought Doria a dispatch from Philip II, ordering "that he should set out to unite with the fleet of his Holiness, and that he should obey the lord Marc' Antonio Colonna." Although Doria had been ready to leave Messina by the end of July, and was only waiting for Bazán's arrival, he did not sail until 12 August. With the wind behind him (*in poppa*) and excellent weather, according to an anonymous contemporary, he needed only two days to get to Otranto, where Colonna awaited him. He took eight days to do so, however, reaching Capo d' Otranto only on 20 August. Guglielmotti, Serrano, Quarti, Hill, Stella, and others have described in some detail Doria's malingering and the difficulties which Colonna and Zane found in trying to deal with him.<sup>13</sup>

Doria saw no advantage to Genoa in saving the

island of Cyprus for the Venetians. He did not believe that an expedition far into the Levant was in the best interests of the king of Spain, who should be trying to seize Tunis while the Turks were bogged down in Cyprus. Doria was a good Genoese, pro-Spanish and devoted to Philip II. He was not unlike Philip; they understood each other. Philip appreciated his loyalty, and liked him. Doria's plight and his problems have become clearer as a result of Aldo Stella's inquiry into Doria's private correspondence in the Archivio Doria-Pamphili in Rome. Although Doria certainly lacked Philip II's religiosity, the fact is that neither one of them was a crusader.<sup>14</sup>

Doria, *patri Neptuno similis munere, mente, manu*, was hardly an attractive person. Guglielmotti has described him as tall and slender, dark and deformed, with a pointed head and short, frizzly hair; flat-nosed, with deep-set eyes and a swollen upper lip, Doria had "the air rather of an African corsair than of a Genoese gentleman." He was, nevertheless, a man of acute intelligence with a vast experience of the sea; the best sailor of his time, and only in his thirty-first year, he had already mastered the art of "steering his bark according to the meridian of Madrid."<sup>15</sup> Vastly annoyed "che obbedisse al Sig. Marcantonio Colonna"—for Colonna knew nothing of ships and the sea—Doria carefully avoided making the slightest sign of deference to the papal captain-general, who was supposed to be commander of the Christian expedition to prevent the Turkish seizure of Cyprus. Doria had forty-nine galleys in his charge. As Colonna later wrote Philip II, "nonetheless I rendered him the honor of addressing him as general, which I knew to be more appropriately applied to the Venetian commander [Zane], because he had under his authority a full one hundred and forty galleys."

On the morning of 21 August (1570), since Doria had not paid him a visit, Colonna went aboard the Genoese flagship. Doria acknowledged that he had received Philip's instructions "to sail under the banner of the holy father," but at the same time, according to Colonna's report to Philip,

<sup>12</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 85; Sereno, *Commentari* (1845), pp. 66–67; Paruta, *Storia della guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), p. 80.

<sup>13</sup> Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI: *Marcantonio Colonna alla Battaglia di Lepanto [1570–1573]*, Rome, 1887, pp. 47 ff.; Luciano Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570–1573)*, 2 vols., Madrid, 1918–19, I, 174 ff.; Guido A. Quarti, *La Guerra contro il Turco in Cipro e a Lepanto (1570–1571)*, Venice, 1935, pp. 191–92, 199, 238–40, 256–57; Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, III (Cambridge, 1948), 916 ff. Incidentally, as I have already noted, Hill used the 1862 edition of Guglielmotti's *Marcantonio Colonna*. The work of the anonymous contemporary, alluded to above, was published by Achille Gennarelli, *Informazione di quanto è successo nell' infrascritta Armata dopo che s' intese esser mente di S. Maestà Cattolica che le sue galere si unissero con quelle di S. Santità*, in *Il Saggiatore*, III (Rome, 1845), 27–31.

Although Doria felt that it was beneath his dignity to obey his "friend" Colonna, as he wrote someone at the Spanish court in Madrid, he would of course do as Philip II wished: ". . . Farò il volere di sua Maestà et farò conoscere di quanto giovamento sarà stato il suo soccorso" (Mario Brunetti and Eligio Vitale, eds., *La Correspondence da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà [1570–1573]*, 2 vols., Venice and Rome, 1963, I, no. 39, p. 86). Cf. Stella, *Nunziature di Venecia*, IX (1972), nos. 233, 244–45, pp. 325, 342–43.

<sup>14</sup> On Doria's (I think) not entirely unreasonable objections to the whole expedition of 1570, see Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega' prima della battaglia di Lepanto," *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, XIX (1965), 378–402, and one must always bear in mind Doria's secret instructions from Philip II (*cf. above*, Chapter 21, note 230).

<sup>15</sup> Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 47–48; cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, pl. x, opp. p. 904, and Sir Wm. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, 2 vols., London, 1883, I, 318.

Doria insisted that he had "the obligation of preserving intact the fleet of your Majesty." Doria declared, moreover, that the season was already too far advanced to reach Candia without grave risk, and that his fleet was in no condition "to sustain the impetus of war, and he advanced still other difficulties which impeded him from fulfilling the orders of your Majesty." Although after further objections Doria agreed to go on to Candia, he demanded that a frigate be sent to Zane, so that the latter might bring the Venetian fleet back to Zante as a defense against the enemy. In answer to this the Spanish commander Álvaro de Bazán pointed out that the Venetian fleet had already reached Candia, and that the Turkish armada was seven hundred miles away at Salines in Cyprus. There was no need of such defense. In any event Colonna asked for and received a frigate from Bazán to send to Zane with the request "that he dispatch some galleys for our security," whereupon Doria complained that Colonna had turned to Bazán for the frigate rather than to him. It is not clear whether the frigate reached Crete, but it is certain that Zane sent no galleys to Zante.

Despite all this, as Colonna stated in the long account he prepared for Philip II five weeks later,

on 22nd [of August] we left [Otranto] with the 49 galleys of your Majesty and the 12 of his Holiness, and sailed to Suda, the harbor of Candia [i.e., Crete], where we found the Venetian fleet on the last day of August, and all this was done despite Giannandrea who, for fear of being discovered, went so far out to sea that he could hardly make the landing in Candia. . . .<sup>16</sup>

Girolamo Zane returned to Suda from the city of Candia, where he had been looking for oarsmen, on the same day as the papal and Catholic fleets reached Crete. Pallavicini recalled the whole month of August as having been passed in utterly futile maneuvers. On Friday, 1 September, the commanders of the Christian forces gathered to take counsel in a meeting at which there were present, as Pallavicini recalled, Colonna and Doria; Álvaro de Bazán and Juan de Cardona, Philip II's Spanish commanders; the Venetian provveditori Giacomo Celsi and Antonio da Canale; and the aged Zane, the captain-general of the Venetian

fleet. At this meeting Pallavicini expressed the view that it would be unwise to go to Cyprus, for they could hardly take the enemy "unawares" (*all'improvviso*), they were not prepared for an assault, the season was getting late, and Doria had made it clear that he could not remain with the allies beyond the end of September. They could neither go ashore to break the siege of Nicosia nor assail the Turkish army from the sea. The enemy was well supplied with foodstuffs. Bad weather might be expected at any hour, and when the storms came, disaster would come with them, for "non si poteva aspettar altro che la total rovina della nostra armata."

There were differences of opinion in the council, concerning which (says Pallavicini) the doge had long since been informed. Nevertheless,

only the most excellent general [Zane] and the distinguished lord provveditore Canale stood firm in the decision that we ought to go on to Cyprus, showing us a letter from your Serenity and the most excellent Senate, in which the command was given that after the union of the pontifical and Catholic fleets with ours, and after the strengthening of our own fleet with soldiers and oarsmen, we must push on to find the enemy's armada, destroy it, and free the kingdom of Cyprus. In the council nothing was concluded except that we should go [from Suda] to Candia to finish the reinforcement of our fleet as soon and as well as we could, and in Candia the resolution would be made of what had to be done next. At the aforesaid council it was also decided on the motion of the most excellent lord Colonna and the lord Giannandrea Doria that the distinguished captain of the Gulf [Marco Querini] should go to the island of Cyprus and bring back, by any means possible, reliable news of the enemy's progress, since we had not been able to learn anything of importance from the two galleys which had already been sent out.<sup>17</sup>

Having asked the captain-general Zane not to attend a meeting on 3 September (1570), Colonna assembled aboard his flagship Giannandrea Doria; Don Álvaro de Bazán, the marquis of Santa Cruz, general of the Sicilian galleys; Don Juan de Cardona, general of the Neapolitan galleys; Gianfrancesco di Sangro, the marquis of Torremaggiore; Don Carlos de Ávalos, a member of one of the chief Spanish families in Italy; and Sforza Pallavicini, commander of the Venetian land forces. To this array of military and naval talent Colonna added his own lieutenant and relative Pompeo Colonna. There were also others present. The papal general, as so-called commander-in-chief,

<sup>16</sup> *Relazione di Marc' Antonio Colonna alla Maestà del Re . . . intorno a quel che avvenne in quest' armata . . . fino a' 27 settembre, quando le armate [cristiane] . . . si divisero*, in Sereno, *Commentari* (1845), append., pp. 431-33; see the *Manifesto del sig. Marcantonio Colonna per sua giustificazione, in Il Saggiatore*, II (1844), 336-37; and note Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega,'" pp. 387-88.

<sup>17</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narratio*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 85<sup>v</sup>-86<sup>r</sup>.



asked them to give free expression to their opinion as to whether the Christian fleets should continue their eastward voyage and settle the Cypriote issue by force of arms.

Giannandrea spoke first, and was opposed to the idea, for (as he said on several occasions) the season was getting too late, and when they got beyond Crete, they could take shelter in no harbor to which they would have access. The Venetian galleys, he said, were almost empty, owing to the pestilence. The Turkish galleys were full of excellent soldiers. The two armadas, Christian and Turkish, were about equal in the numbers of their galleys. If the Christian forces moved into the Levant to do battle with the Turks, the alternatives would be the destruction of the only fleets in Christendom or a disgraceful retreat to save their vessels and their hides. Doria would, of course, be ready to do battle if the Venetian fleet were in a state of readiness, which it was not. Also he must return to Sicily at the end of the month. Cardona agreed with Doria's contention that it would be a mistake to go on with the expedition, but Álvaro de Bazán, almost scorning their timidity, declared that they were honor-bound to go on and face the Turks.

Pallavicini thought it would be inadvisable to try immediately to save Cyprus. He had another plan which he later put in writing, and to which we shall come shortly. Now there was a threefold division in the council, for Doria, Bazán, and Pallavicini all found supporters to agree with them. Obviously it was time for Colonna to state his views. Lamenting the lack of concord in the council, he was especially annoyed that Doria, whose weeks of dallying had brought them to this pass, should allege the lateness of the season as an impediment to their advance. They were all at ease, secure in the bay of Suda, but the infidels were waging war in Cyprus. The capital city of Nicosia had already sustained fifteen assaults,<sup>18</sup> he is alleged to have said, and the Venetian general Zane had been waiting in Crete for no other reason than the promised aid they were supposed to be bringing to him. Action was needed, not words. They had not come to Crete to witness a Turkish triumph, to suffer insults, to see Christian blood

shed with impunity. It would have been better not to come than now to turn back. They must do what the pope and the king of Spain had sent them to do—they must help the Venetians, who had thrown their entire fleet of 140 sail into the war, and were exposing their state to a dreadful peril.

The season was no more nor less advanced, Colonna said, than "today, the third of September." There was time to go to Cyprus, to engage the Turks, and to return in fifteen days—that is, well before the end of the month, within the time the lord Giannandrea said that he could stay with them. No harbors in which to take refuge? Famagusta was still open to them; so were Limassol, Paphos, the bay of Larnaca, and Kerynia. Yes, the Venetian fleet had suffered great losses by illness and death, but it had been refurnished with sufficient manpower in Crete. All the sailors and oarsmen were Christian (or so Colonna now asserted), and when needed, they could put down the oar and take up arms. The Christian fleets, when put together, amounted to 205 ships of the line [in a moment we shall count them]. The enemy had only 150. No, the papal and Spanish forces ran no risk in following the Venetians to Cyprus. The Turkish armada was strewn in helpless disorder along the shore. In one resolute blow the Christians could destroy it. With God's help, going on with this just war against the faithless Turkish dogs, Colonna was certain that victory would be theirs, just as it had been at Malta five years before.<sup>19</sup>

Thereafter the generals moved the fleets from Suda Bay to the city of Candia, where the Venetians tried to improve their forces and the fitness of their galleys as best they could. Another council was now held in Candia, at which Girolamo Zane still persisted, as Pallavicini reported to the doge, in wanting to put into effect the commission of your Serenity, which he considered an express order to continue to Cyprus, notwithstanding the fact that he had been persuaded otherwise by the reasons advanced . . . by the distinguished Celsi and by me . . .

Neither Celsi nor Pallavicini believed that the Venetian fleet was in condition "to break the

<sup>18</sup> This would seem to be part of Guglielmotti's rhetoric (*Marina pontificia*, VI, 61), for Nicosia had not sustained fifteen assaults by 3 September, and on that date Colonna could not have had the faintest idea of how many assaults the Turks had made on the city. The fifteenth assault came on 9 September, and carried the Turks over the walls and through the gates of Nicosia.

<sup>19</sup> For better or worse I have here followed Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 58–64, as has Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 920–21. On the diverse opinions expressed at Suda as to whether the Christian fleets should go on to Cyprus to meet the Turks, note Sereno, *Commentari* (1845), p. 67; Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, Arch. stor. italiana, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, p. 19; and esp. the contemporary account in Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fols. 352<sup>v</sup>–353<sup>r</sup>, an *avviso* from Suda, dated 5 September, 1570.

enemy armada and free the kingdom of Cyprus." Like Celsi, Pallavicini had expressed his opinion by word of mouth; he wished also to put it into writing (and hence the present text, dated at Venice on 27 April, 1571). At length, however, the generals all agreed, including Doria, to follow Zane to Cyprus and meet the Turkish armada. Marco Querini, who had been sent out on 6 September to acquire news of the Turks, had not got beyond the island of Scarpanto, and had nothing worthwhile to report. It was decided that he must go back again to learn with some certainty how the Turks were faring, "but this time he still did not pass beyond the island of Rhodes, nor did he bring back anything of larger moment than the first time. . . ."<sup>20</sup>

In the meantime, as Contarini informs us, Piali Pasha had sailed with a hundred galleys from Salines to Rhodes. About 20 August he sent five galliots to Crete (*l'isola di Candia*) to get news of the Christians. The Turks put men ashore, and captured five islanders,

from whom they learned that the Venetian fleet was on the island alone, and was in terrible condition because of the great loss of life it had suffered [owing to the pestilence], but that it was waiting for the Spanish fleet, without which it could not leave the island. With such news Piali forthwith returned to Salines at Cyprus toward the end of August.<sup>21</sup>

Now that the Spanish fleet and the dozen papal galleys had joined the Venetians on the island of Crete, the question still remained whether the Christian forces would move on to Cyprus.

At the first council of the Christian generals in Suda, Giannandrea Doria had asserted that if their fleets had been all in order, there would surely have been no better nor more honorable course of action than to set themselves on the road to Cyprus as soon as possible. His Catholic Majesty's fleet had been and was prepared for combat. An overall review of their ships of the line, however, and of the rank and file of their soldiery was essential because, as he had occasion to emphasize two weeks later, "every day was making me more certain that the lack of troops [*genti*] in the Venetian fleet was all too evident."

The enterprise on which they were engaged was of the highest importance to all Christendom. But the Venetian fleet had never been in order; for his first arrival in Otranto, Doria was well aware

of the fact. The crews and troops had been vastly diminished by the pestilence (*per cagione delle infermità*). On 4 September Doria had sent Don Juan de Cardona to inform Colonna that he could only remain in eastern waters until the end of the month. (Colonna already knew it, having mentioned the fact in the meeting of 3 September.) Thus at the time, said Doria, there were still twenty-six days to go. If the Venetians had been prepared, and if the expedition could have got properly under way, they could have met the Republic's objective, for in good weather from Crete to Cyprus was a voyage of less than six to eight days (. . . *dà tempo di puotersi fare in manco di sei o vero otto dì*).<sup>22</sup>

A Genoese, Doria had no love for the Venetians. Also of the forty-nine galleys over which he had command twelve were his own property. He was renting his galleys, a large part of his patrimony, to Philip II at an annual charge of what was apparently reputed to be 10,000 scudi each. It would have been a large sum, 120,000 scudi a year—if the figure were correct, which it was not—but Doria had to maintain his galleys and pay his crews. Actually, however, as we shall see, Doria was receiving only 6,000 scudi a year for each of his dozen galleys, only 72,000 scudi a year. And the risks were great, a fact which Doria never forgot.<sup>23</sup>

The various councils and conferences which the leaders of the Christian armada held on land and on board the flagships made starkly clear the extent of their disunion. There was a division of opinion even within the Venetian high command, for Zane and the provveditore Canale were all for pressing on to Cyprus, while Sforza Pallavicini had the support of Celsi, the other provveditore, in his proposal to draw the Turks from Cyprus by attacking them at vulnerable points in the area of

<sup>20</sup> Achille Gennarelli, ed., *Primo Manifesto tra il Sig. Marc' Antonio Colonna illustrissimo et il Sig. Andrea Doria, in Il Saggiatore*, II (1844), 290-91. Doria's text, *ibid.*, pp. 289-94, was dated at Sitia in western Crete on 16 September, 1570.

<sup>21</sup> It seemed unfair to the anonymous author of the *Informazione di quanto è successo nell' . . . armata, in Il Saggiatore*, III (1845), 30, that Philip II should hire Doria's galleys only for such service as involved no risk, "per il qual' effetto sua Maestà le paga e dà soldo ordinario che costa alla Maestà sua Cattolica ciascuna galera X milia scudi l'anno, et le sue proprie non li costano X milia e sono meglio armate."—Philip's own galleys did not cost him 10,000 scudi a year, and they were better armed than Doria's. Note Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 48, who believed the *Informazione*; cf. Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 74, and Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 921. For the fact that Doria received only six, not ten, thousand scudi a year for each of his galleys, see below, p. 997b.

<sup>20</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 86<sup>v</sup>-87<sup>v</sup>; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 12<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>21</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 12<sup>v</sup>.

their own capital. Although apparently always well-disposed toward each other, Zane and Pallavicini had been much at odds as to the best means of breaking the siege of Nicosia. Anxious to present his argument in full (and to have a written text thereof as an aide-mémoire), on 12 September (1570) Pallavicini wrote Zane a long letter, which seems to be still unpublished. He had told Zane what he thought was the most effective way to remove the Turks from Cyprus; in fact he had done so, he said, "several times and especially in the presence of the most illustrious lord Marc' Antonio Colonna and of the distinguished provveditori of the fleet." Their objective was to free the kingdom of Cyprus and force the Turks into combat "without any disadvantage to ourselves." They must meet their obligations to Venice and to the rest of the world. Pallavicini asked Zane in friendly fashion to accept his difference of opinion with the good will which his esteem for Zane deserved.

Bringing the fleets together and heading for Cyprus might well seem "the quickest and most certain way" of engaging the Turks, but Pallavicini believed there was "un' altro modo più certo di sforzar il nemico di venire alla battaglia et con più ragionevole speranza di vincerlo." There was of course no time to write the doge and Senate and await their reply. Rather than a direct attack upon the Turks at Cyprus, Pallavicini advocated going through the Archipelago and striking at the Dardanelles. They might open up the strait into the Sea of Marmara, post a guard on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and open fire upon Istanbul or wherever else might be more effective and might do greater damage to the Turk.

It would be a serious mistake in Pallavicini's opinion to proceed to Cyprus. The Turks were entrenched in the island. A powerful army of horse and foot was laying siege to Nicosia, which was thirty miles from the sea. The Turks had an abundance of supplies. If Nicosia should fall, said Pallavicini, so would the rest of the island, "and in short order" (*con un poco di tempo*)! Why should the Turks risk a naval battle when already they held victory in their grasp on land? The Christians could not possibly put ashore troops enough for a successful encounter with the Turks. The Christians' approach to Cyprus would be followed inevitably by a perilous retreat, with the Turks picking at them from behind. The Turks had almost as many galleys as did the Christian fleets, and they had also "galeotte e fuste, navi, maone e palanitarie, e gran quantità di caramussolini." Their vessels made up in numbers what they lacked in qual-

ity, and they could put aboard them the best of the soldiery they had at Nicosia.

A naval engagement would be unduly risky for the allied forces. Going to the Dardanelles, however, where the Turks had no such large concentration of manpower, would make it possible to do them the greatest damage in the shortest time. If the Turks came with most of their armada to halt the allies' advance, obviously *ipso facto* the siege of Nicosia would be broken. Pallavicini was certain, however, the Turks would not do that. Their investment in the siege was too great; they would want to carry it on to success. Consequently they would have to leave a considerable part of their armada and their troops under the walls of Nicosia. Having disposed of that part of the Turkish armada which came to meet them at the Dardanelles, the Christian fleets could then not only proceed to the liberation of Cyprus but possibly to some other great achievement. Such was Pallavicini's opinion "up to now," being aware so far of nothing likely to make him change his mind. He was of course open to a better idea, and would exert his best efforts to put into effect whatever plan might be adopted.<sup>24</sup>

After conferring and wrangling for two weeks (1-13 September, 1570) the three generals put aboard the galleys their munitions, soldiers, and oarsmen. According to Contarini, it took them three days to go from Candia (*Iraklion*) to Sitia in eastern Crete, where they arrived on the sixteenth,

on which day Querini returned with the certain news that the Turkish armada was at Cyprus, and that Nicosia was still holding out—the news gave our men a great lift, encouraging them to continue their voyage. Having reached Sitia, the last port on the way to the Levant, the generals wanted personally to make an inspection of the galleys. Here the general Zane "disarmed" three galleys, besides the two he had disarmed at Candia, in order to strengthen his other galleys.

To "disarm" a galley meant to remove the soldiers, oarsmen, artillery, and munitions. Apparently neither Colonna nor Zane wanted to hold a review of the troops and galleys. Doria insisted upon it, and Contarini acquired a text of the muster ( *rassegna*) at Sitia.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Letter of Pallavicini to Zane, dated aboard his galley at Candia on 12 September, 1570, in Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 91<sup>v</sup>-93<sup>r</sup>, and cf. Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, VI (1857), 297-98, and new ed., VI (1974), 208.

<sup>25</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 13<sup>v</sup>-14<sup>r</sup>. Colonna describes the review of the three fleets, but mistakenly dates it on 21 September (it took place on the sixteenth); oddly enough, he dates

Various figures were given by contemporaries for the numbers of galleys and other ships in the three fleets, but on the whole these figures all lie within the same range. Contarini provides the names of the captains of the 12 papal galleys, and lists 45 (not 49) galleys as being in the Catholic fleet at Sitia on 16 September (1570). As for the Venetian fleet, he puts 30 galleys directly under the captain-general Zane, 25 under Pallavicini, 20 under Giacomo Celsi, 19 under Antonio da Canale, 16 in the rearguard under Santo Tron, and 12 in the vanguard under Marco Querini, including in each case the commander's flagship (*capitana*), adding up to 122 Venetian galleys. The Venetians also had 11 galleasses (*galee grosse*) under Francesco Duodo, the great galleon called the *Fausto*, and 10 *navi* with four small galleys (*galeonici*) under Pietro Tron, making a total of 148 galleys, galleasses, and other vessels. When we add, therefore, to this Venetian total the 12 papal and 45 Catholic galleys, we find that Contarini reckoned the three Christian fleets at 205 ships of the line.<sup>26</sup>

When the fleets sailed eastward from Sitia on 17 September, according to Colonna's report to Philip II, "several galleys and ships had been disarmed for the better reinforcement of the rest, and thus the [whole] fleet was composed of 180 galleys and 12 galleasses, i.e., 192 galleys, plus six large ships."<sup>27</sup> A month later Giannandrea Doria wrote Juan de Zúñiga, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, that when the Christian fleets left Sitia they had 180 galleys, 11 galleasses, one galleon, and five ships (*navi*).<sup>28</sup> If Colonna and Doria could agree

the departure of the fleets from Sitia on the nineteenth, but they sailed eastward on the seventeenth (*Relazione di Marc' Antonio Colonna*, in Sereno, *Commentari* [1845], *append.*, pp. 434-35).

<sup>26</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 16'-19'. On 16 September (1570) Doria had insisted that the Turkish armada then consisted of 175 galleys, 20 other vessels propelled by oarsmen, 100 *caraculusiani*, 10 galleasses (*maone*), and eight ships or *navi* (*Primo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 293).

<sup>27</sup> *Relazione di Marc' Antonio Colonna*, in Sereno, *Commentari* (1845), p. 435, where (as stated in note 25) Colonna apparently misdates the fleets' departure from Sitia by putting it a day or so late.

<sup>28</sup> Giuseppe Molini, ed., *Documenti di storia italiana*, 2 vols., Florence, 1836-37, II, no. CCCLVII, p. 481, dated at Corfu, 13 October, 1570, on the return voyage. When Doria writes that "partessimo di Settia a' XIII del passato [i.e., 13 September] . . ." his memory for dates may not be as poor as Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 926, note 6, assumes. The text of Doria's letter comes from a seventeenth-century MS. (cf. Molini, II, 439), and the date "XIII" is very likely a copyist's error for "XVII." According to Sereno, *Commentari* (1845), p. 68, the three fleets amounted, all told, to 210 ships of the line—184 galleys, 11 galleasses, one galleon, and 14 *navi*. Cf. Francesco Longo, *Successo*

on nothing else, they could at least agree on the number of galleys in the Christian armada.

Contarini has given us a careful breakdown of the numbers of footsoldiers (*fanti*) in the three fleets. There were 1,100 men on the papal galleys, and 3,500 (he says) in the Catholic fleet, which was an assemblage of galleys from Spain, Genoa, Naples, and Sicily. As usual, being a Venetian, he was most interested in the forces of his own government, which he puts at 16,995, but his figures add up to precisely 17,000 men.<sup>29</sup> Doria claimed the Venetian galleys were undermanned. He, Cardona, and Bazán had inspected the Venetian fleet on 16 September. Bazán had found the galleasses "ben' all' ordine," but as many as sixty Venetian galleys lacked a full third of their crews. They averaged only eighty men to a galley "among soldiers and mariners, good and bad."<sup>30</sup>

When Doria showed reluctance to proceed, Colonna reminded him that he had waited at Otranto a full fifteen days for his arrival with the Catholic galleys. Another fifteen days had been

*della guerra fatta con Selim*, in *Arch. stor. italiana*, *append.*, to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 14, 18; Gennarelli, in *Il Saggiatore*, II (1844), 293-94 note, 358; Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI (1887), 63, 67-68; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I (1918), 80; Hill, *Cyprus*, III (1948), 921, 923, notes; Stiella, *Nunci Venezia*, IX, no. 269, p. 373, a letter of the nuncio Facchinetti in Venice to Cardinal Rusticucci in Rome, dated 21 October, 1570.

<sup>29</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 14'-16'. In his tabulation of infantrymen on the Venetian galleys and other vessels, Contarini assigns in round numbers 3,000 men (actually 2,995) under 14 captains and two sergeants major in Pallavicini's company, 1,500 (actually 1,534) to Colonel Paolo Orsini, 1,000 (actually 976) to Colonel Ercole Pio, 1,000 (actually 1,003) to Colonel Alessandro Zambecari, 500 (actually 553) to Colonel Pietro Paolo Magnatello, 500 to Colonel Ottaviano Dami, 400 to Colonel Antonio Martinengo, and 600 to Count Antonio da Thiene and Ruberto Santoni—a total, as Contarini says, of precisely 8,561 foot soldiers, the italicized figures being the relevant ones.

To these Contarini adds 1,600 *fanti* from Brescia, Verona, and Salò, 565 (actually 570) *fanti* provided by "adventurers and gentlemen" (*senturieri e gentiluomini*), 1,632 recruited from Corfu, Canea, and Candia. He apparently includes the captains and colonels among the *fanti*. In any event the total (8,561 + 1,600 + 570 + 1,632) is 12,363 soldiers. We must add to these the 23 gentlemen with Colonna, whose names are given in the tabulation, and 14 others in the Venetian fleet, whom Contarini also identifies.

With the 3,500 *fanti* aboard the Catholic galleys and the 1,100 *fanti* aboard the papal galleys—plus the 37 gentlemen—we reach the grand total of exactly 17,000, not the 16,995 which Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 923, gives us. Since Contarini has been so precise in his enumeration of the soldiery aboard the fleets (although the *fanti* of his gentlemen add up to 570, not the 565 he says, which misled Hill), why should we not be even a bit more precise?

<sup>30</sup> *Primo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 292, 293.

spent at Candia. Philip II's own reputation was at stake, for it would not become so great a prince to send a fleet to assist the Venetians, and then be unwilling to risk it. His Catholic Majesty was exposing, according to Colonna, 49 galleys to possible loss, but the Venetians had at stake 120 galleys, six ships, and 12 galleasses, not to speak of their islands and maritime possessions. Failure to proceed with the expedition would mean not only the loss of Christian lands and cities, but also the loss of the opportunity to meet the Turks in force, which was the very reason for forming a league against the Turks, "una lega tanto utile alla Christianità."

Defeat was certainly no foregone conclusion. The Turks never had more than 165 galleys. The Christian host had 180 galleys, 12 galleasses, and six ships such as the enemy could not match. What was more, Occhiali (Uluj-Ali) and the other corsairs had not joined the Turks at Cyprus. Although the allied fleets did not have all the manpower necessary, the Catholic galleys were well manned, and so was the papal squadron. The captains of the Christian fleets, "con tanta nobiltà," provided the Christian forces with a leadership of extraordinary capacity. They must go on.<sup>31</sup>

Colonna's reference to "a league so useful to Christendom" was a trifle vague. Although Philip II had sent Doria into eastern waters, ostensibly to assist the Venetians against the Turks, there was still no league. For obvious reasons the Venetians were now firmly resolved to take their place and do their part in the anti-Turkish league that Pius V was promoting, but they had been disturbed by certain articles in the proposed text of the naval alliance. As they wrote Leonardo Donado (Donà), their ambassador in Spain, on 14 August (1570), Philip's representatives in Rome, while doing their duty, had been seeking an undue advantage for their sovereign, employing more sharpness than was consistent with the tasks which lay ahead. The doge and Senate were convinced that Philip in his dedication to the Christian cause,

<sup>31</sup> *Risposta di Colonna al primo manifesto di Gio. Andrea Doria, in Il Saggiatore*, II, 337-38, reprinted in Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 71-73. The captain-general Zane was prepared to offer Doria, through Colonna (as the latter reported to Philip II), a deposit of 200,000 ducats for the surety of his galleys, but Colonna declined to do so, since such an offer would be an offence to Philip's commanders. ". . . que èl quería ofrecer a Juan Andrea, para seguridad de su persona y de sus galeras, un depósito de doscientos mil escuinos de Venecia, y Marco Antonio lo estorbó que no lo hiciese, diciendole que se hiciera agravio a la armada de vuestra Magestad y a sus ministros" (cited by Guglielmotti, VI, 66).

as well as "per la grandezza et generosità dell' animo suo," would be quite willing to form a league like that which had united his father Charles V with the Signoria in 1537. In the text of the pact which had recently come from Rome, however, certain articles of the projected agreement had been left in doubt and indecision, "li quali non solamente possono debilitar l' intentione principale, che die indur a far la lega, ma vengono espressamente a contraddirle. . . ."<sup>32</sup>

As his Catholic Majesty, Philip II doubtless believed it his duty to fight the Turks, but considering the costs of the war in the Netherlands, he could not risk his Spanish-Italian fleets. If he lost it, he would have trouble replacing it, even though Leonardo Donado (Donà) had just written the Senate from Madrid (on 16 August, 1570) that

in these first days of August there have arrived in Seville both of his Majesty's fleets from the Indies, i.e., the fleet from Peru and that from New Spain [Mexico]. . . . Between the two of them they bring, in gold and silver, more than five million gold [scudi], of which one million, one hundred thousand belongs to the most serene king, the other four millions to individuals, but of these [four millions] there will be at the king's service that share which it will seem advisable to him to take. . . .<sup>33</sup>

Even if Donado was not overestimating the loot in gold and silver from the Indies, Philip's strongholds along the coast of North Africa would be exposed to immediate attack, should Doria lose the royal fleet. At best, it took a long time to build a fleet and to provide it with the necessary manpower. But a final question remains, did Philip—no Hapsburg was ever a friend of Venice—really want to save Cyprus and help maintain the power and prestige of the Republic?

About midnight on 17 September, 1570, the Christian fleets began weighing anchor at Sitia, and set out toward the Turkish-held island of Rhodes. With so many galleys and other vessels in the fleets, obviously they did not all get started within an hour. When Doria, Contarini, and Sereno put the fleets' departure on 17 September, they may be less exact than Pallavicini, who dates it on the eighteenth. Doria had had to yield to Colonna's arguments and to the pressure of opinion in the Christian host. He was near despair;

<sup>32</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 76, fols. 128 ff. [149 ff.], *an ambasciatore in Spagna*, doc. dated 14 August, 1570, and note, *ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 10 [31].

<sup>33</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, eds., *La Corrispondenza da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà, 1570-1573* (1963), I, no. 36, p. 73.

time was passing. All along he had been wanting to expel the Moslems from Tunis rather than to waste these precious weeks in the Levant.<sup>34</sup>

The captains and crews stood not upon the order of their going. They went at once, spending little more than a day at Sitia, just long enough to hold the review of the galleys and to take on water and provisions. Pallavicini says they left in utter confusion.<sup>35</sup> Contarini and Sereno have given us the apparent order of their going, with Marco Querini in the vanguard and Santo Tron in the rearguard.<sup>36</sup>

As the three fleets were moving from Candia to Sitia, on 15 September the Turkish commander Kaya Chelebi had captured a boat with five Christians aboard on its way from Cape Salamone, the easternmost promontory on the island of Crete, to the Gulf of Sitia. Kaya was told by his captives that the Christian fleets were now united, "and that they were getting ready to come to Cyprus, whereupon he returned forthwith to Cyprus," where he arrived on 23 September. Turning his captives over to the three pashas—Piali, Lala Mustafa, and Ali—Kaya told them what he had learned. As at Malta five years before, Piali feared for the Turkish armada. The papal and Spanish galleys had joined those of the Venetians, who must have had

ample time to replace the soldiers and oarsmen they had lost to the pestilence.

Lala Mustafa and Ali persuaded Piali, however, that it would be unworthy of the sultan not to meet the enemy head-on. Accepting their advice, therefore, Piali disembarked all the slaves and "useless people" he had on board. He then put in order "tutte le galee di gente Turchesca et artiglierie," and leaving at the "gardens of Famagusta" his galleasses (*maone*), transports, *caramusalini*, and other boats, he made for Limassol. But as his men were getting ready, they suddenly saw sails out to sea. Believing the Christian fleets had finally arrived, the Turks "tutti confusi" set themselves in line for combat. Presently they recognized the sails to be those of *caramusoli* (Turkish *karāmusāl*) coming from Anatolia with supplies, and so they stood by to receive them.<sup>37</sup>

According to Doria, some of the Christian galleys had reached the strait between Scarpanto (*Kárpáthos*) and Rhodes as early as 18 September. The strait is about thirty miles wide and was then, as now, the chief sea route from the Aegean to Cyprus. The confusion, of which Pallavicini had complained, must have continued, for he warned Zane as the fleets drew near Rhodes "che fusse cosa malfatta et pericolosa il caminar in quel modo." Again the leaders, at least the Venetians, took counsel, and resolved to preserve order "si nel caminare come nel combattere."<sup>38</sup> In his letter to Juan de Zúñiga (of 13 October, 1570), Doria complained that they had had a fair wind. They might have reached Cyprus, but it had taken the Venetians and Colonna four full days to get halfway there. Time had been wasted, Doria claimed, but at least the Christian galleys, following Querini's vanguard at a distance, reached the island of Kastellórizon (Meyisti) by the evening of 21 September and the morning of the twenty-second. Pallavicini calls the island "Castel Ruzzo"; it lies at the far east end of the Dodecanese, off the southwest coast of Turkey.

It was at this point, as Pallavicini tells us, that Alvisé (Luigi) Bembo, who had been sent out to get news of the Turks, arrived with two caiques which he had captured, one empty and the other with a number of men aboard. They gave us the news, says Pallavicini, of the unfortunate loss of

<sup>34</sup> Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega,'" *Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia*, XIX (1965), 386–89.

<sup>35</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 87: "Partimo di Candia et andamo a Sithia per levar certe genti per rinforzar l'armata et de li meterci in camino per la volta de Cypro, il che facemo alli 18 di settembre con molta confusione et senza salvare alcuni degli ordini che erano stato [sic] dati nel modo del caminare."

<sup>36</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 16'–18'; Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 68: "Ed ai diciasette di Settembre circa alle cinque ore di notte [which is midnight in mid-September] si levò tutta l'armata dal porto di Sithia per andare in Cipro; e l'ordine che tenne nel viaggio fu tale: per antigiardia navigava il Provveditor Quirini con dodici galere, nella battaglia il Colonna con le dodici del Papa, il Doria con quarantanove, il Zane con trenta, il Pallavicini con venticinque, il Celsi con venti, e l'Canale con venti, le quali tutte si ripartivano anche ne' corni di essa battaglia. Per retroguardia Sante Trono, governatore de' condannati [i.e., galley slaves] con sedici galere, Francesco Duodo con dodici galeazze, computativi il galeone [the *Fausto*], e Pietro Trono con quattordici navi. Ed ebbero tutti convenientissimi ordini da servarsi si nella navigazione come nel combattere." This is not quite the picture, however, which Pallavicini gives us of disorder.

Doria states in his *Secondo Manifesto*, ed. Achille Gennarelli, "Della Guerra di Cipro . . ." *Il Saggiatore*, II, 358, ". . . Partimmo con tutta l'armata dal porto di Settia alle XVII di Settembre di prima notte." Doria's "second manifesto," justifying his conduct of affairs after the Christian fleets had sailed toward Rhodes, was apparently written soon after his return to Crete and his departure therefrom on 5 October (1570).

<sup>37</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 16', 19'; cf. Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 70–71, and Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 131–32.

<sup>38</sup> Doria, *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 358; Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 87'.

Nicosia, which had fallen on 9 September. As they learned the bad news, a severe storm arose, "una periculosissima borrasca," which drove them to take shelter wherever they could [on 21–22 September], some of them presumably in the Anatolian port of Kaş (Andifili). Those aboard Pallavicini's galley lost all contact with Zane until noon of the following day. He had sought to escape the storm by taking cover "in another port, but at the same time as we found ourselves [again] with his Excellency, the lord Giannandrea Doria came back—he had been unwilling to stay in any port that night, but had remained out on the high seas."<sup>39</sup>

"The distinguished lords provveditori and I," as Pallavicini reported to the doge in his still unpublished *Difesa*,

went to see our most excellent general aboard his galley. He gave us the news in more detail of the loss of Nicosia, asking us our opinion as to whether we should go on to Cyprus or not. I told him that as long as the orders of your Serenity and of the most excellent Senate stood, which his Excellency had interpreted as an explicit command to proceed to Cyprus, I did not wish to advise him on the matter, but only to look to my duty of obedience. The distinguished provveditori said the same thing. His Excellency replied that in the light of the news which had come of the loss of Nicosia, it was necessary again to take counsel, because there was no time to inform your Serenity [of what had happened] and to wait for further orders from you. . . .<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Doria's own statement in his *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 359. He had apparently feared the possibility of a Turkish attack in the confinement of a small harbor. Doria, *ibid.*, says Colonna did not inform him of the news that Nicosia had fallen, ". . . et non mi diede per allora veruna parte di esse nuove: è vero ch' intesi per altra strada che Nicosia era pigliata sino il otto di Settembre. . . ." [the city was taken on the ninth].

Doria's letter of 13 October to Juan de Zúñiga, alluded to in the text, has already been cited above; for his complaint as to the slowness of Colonna and the Venetians in their eastward voyage, see Molini, *Documenti di storia italiana*, II (1837), 483. Zúñiga wrote Philip II a defense of Doria on 27 October, having just received his letter of the thirteenth from Corfu (Luciano Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática entre España y la Santa Sede*, 4 vols., Madrid, 1914, IV, no. 29, pp. 61–64).

<sup>40</sup> Having been asked his opinion immediately after the fall of Nicosia, Pallavicini had written Zane that of course there was no time to write the doge and await the answer, ". . . ma bisogna risoluzione perciò essendo sopraintesa la nuova della perdita di Nicosia, et certificato il numero di vasselli dell'armata nemica esser maggiore di quello che prima era presupposto, et tanto più potendo loro i nemici rinforzarla di quanta gente vorranno sì per combattere in mare come per aspettare la nostra nel suo forte, et havendo tanta commodità di artiglieria et di tutte le altre cose necessarie e trovandosi avere in mano l'electione del combattere o non combattere oltre l'esser vittoriosa di fresco, il che non è di poca consideratione, all'in-

When Marc' Antonio Colonna, Giannandrea Doria, and the two generals of Naples and Sicily, Cardona and Bazán, were consulted, according to Pallavicini,

the opinion of all those illustrious lords was in conformity with our own, that is, that we should not continue our voyage to Cyprus, for it would be a fruitless venture, but that we should turn around and attempt some other attack [upon the Turks]. . . . Having made this resolution, on the following night we put ourselves on the road to return to Scarpanto, where we arrived the next night, but with the fleet[s] scattered in several directions, owing to a very heavy scirocco we had [to struggle with]. The fleet[s] having been reunited in Porto di Tristano [Tristamo] in the said island of Scarpanto [from 25–26 to 27 September], the lord Giannandrea let it be understood that he wished to return [to Sicily via Zante and Cephalonia],<sup>41</sup> which gave rise to many [unfriendly] words, especially between the most excellent Colonna and him. . . .<sup>42</sup>

The result was that your Serenity's fleet left for the island of Candia [Crete] along with the most excellent Colonna, the lord Giannandrea remaining behind for some time [sailing more quickly than his confrères, however, Doria reached the city of Candia on 30 September].<sup>43</sup> With the passage of some days we arrived in the city of Candia [on 4 October], where our most excellent general had decided to go, so as to give orders for the security of that city and of all the island as well as for the aid which one had to provide for Famagusta. First of all, however, he had ordered that all the galleys, except for a chosen few which he had required to stay with him, should proceed to the port of Suda to wait for him. . . . At this time the lord Giannandrea, having arrived [at Candia] and having stopped there for some days, took his leave of the most excellent general, and then departed . . . [on 5 October, 1570].<sup>44</sup>

contro trovandosi la nostra nel termine et conditione che la si ritrova, come ben conosce la Eccellenza vostra . . . et considerando il dubbio che si deve avere del tempo nel quale ci troviamo, et per il disordine e pericolo nel quale potria mettere questa armata ogni piccola burasca che ne sopra giungesse, come si è potuto chiaramente conoscere in quel poco di moto di hieri, et tanto più non havendo alcun ridotto sicuro dove potere ritirarsi. . . ." clearly it was unwise to go on. . . . a manifesto pericolo di perdere se non tutta almeno una gran parte di questa armata. . . ." (Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 93).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Doria's *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 359–61; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 19<sup>v</sup>; Guglielmotti, *Marina pontificia*, VI, 81 ff.; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 932 ff.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Doria's own account in the *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 362–64, and note Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 69, 83–86.

<sup>43</sup> Doria gives us the date in his *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 364. In a letter to Philip II's secretary Antonio Pérez, Doria says that Colonna had been more concerned with pleasing the Venetians than with seeking to preserve the king's fleet (Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega,'" p. 391).

<sup>44</sup> I take the dates from Doria's letter of 13 October, 1570, to Zúñiga, in Molini, *Documenti di storia italiana*, II, 483–84.

The high command decided to leave soldiers in Candia and at Canea, selecting troops from those aboard the Venetian fleet and on the island to send as a "soccorso" to Famagusta. Pallavicini was opposed to the idea of the fleet's spending the winter on Crete because of the lack of supplies, the need to rebuild their forces, and the impossibility of restoring the fleet with the limited resources to be found on the island. Pallavicini was convinced, and it was so decided despite the expression of contrary opinions, that Zane should return with the fleet to the Adriatic, while Marco Querini, the captain of the Gulf, should remain behind with the Candiotte galleys and their soldiers and crews for the defense of the island. Pallavicini gave such orders as he thought necessary to strengthen the fortifications of the city of Candia which, in view of the Turkish success at Nicosia, might now be exposed to attack.<sup>45</sup>

To continue with Pallavicini's report to the Doge Alvise Mocenigo, he notes the captain-general Zane's departure from Candia to Suda [on 4 October, 1570] after giving orders to load four ships (*navi*) with munitions for the "soccorso" of Famagusta. At Suda he disembarked all the infantry, discharging and paying those whom he wished to let go, and selecting those who were to be sent to Famagusta as well as those who were to be left in the garrisons on the island of Crete. An effort was made, "one by one," to re-enlist the older and

more experienced captains "who might be willing to go to Famagusta." Not one of them would do so, "declaring they had come to serve on the fleet, not to go to Cyprus." Furthermore, they said their companies were in poor condition, and would be useless against the Turks. The *capitani vecchi* were, therefore, dismissed from service, and *nuovi capitani* were chosen to form companies for the proposed aid to Famagusta as well as for the continued defense of Crete.

Only those soldiers, to whom Pallavicini had granted the leave or *licentia* to depart, were to be allowed aboard the galleys and ships that were homeward bound. The old captains were thus "licensed" to go, with the promise that their passage and expenses would be paid to Italy, "and to each one of them was granted the right to be able to take with them ten men [to be chosen] from their relatives and officers." Pallavicini signed the warrants of release from service for all the captains and soldiers who were being discharged. The licenses to depart were then taken to Onfrè Giustinian, who was commissioned to embark those with *licentia* duly signed. "The number of all those who received the license from me," says Pallavicini, "was slightly above 600 men but, nevertheless, contrary to his Excellency's orders and mine, many others were surreptitiously embarked without the knowledge of the said lord Onfrè, some for money, others for other reasons. . . ." One year later (on 19 October, 1571) Onfrè Giustinian secured a niche in history by being the first person to bring to Venice the news of the Christian victory at Lepanto.

It was necessary to maintain the armed forces at effective strength, but dismissals of the unable and unwell were important, for they saved money. Also, of course, wages should not be paid to soldiers (or to their families) who had slipped away while their names remained on the active rolls.

Presently letters came from Pietro Emo, who had been sent by Zane with two galleys to discover the whereabouts of the Turkish armada (and shortly afterwards Vincenzo Maria Priuli and Angelo Suriano were dispatched on a similar mission).<sup>46</sup> Emo's letters brought the news that Piali Pasha and the armada had gone to Rhodes [about 10 October]. The Turks had tarred their keels at

<sup>45</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 87-88; Doria's letter of 13 October, 1570, to Zúñiga in Molini, *Documenti di storia italiana*, II (1837), 481 ff.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 19; Sereno, *Commentarii*, pp. 71-72. On 6 October (1570), the day following Zane's arrival at Candia, a heavy north wind drove ashore and broke up eleven Venetian galleys, Colonna also having lost two of the pope's galleys a few days before (Sereno, *ibid.*, p. 70).

" . . . Le quali [galleys which Zane was sending on] to Suda, some of which were supposed to be sent to the aid of Famagusta . . . essendo partite ai sei di Ottobre, mentre al detto porto navigavano, furono assalite da tanto aspra fortuna generale da tramontana, che non poterono tanto schermirsi che undici di esse non dessero nella spiaggia, le quali tutte si ruppero, essendone anche pochi giorni prima rotte due altre di quelle del Papa nel porto di Candia," on which note also Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 19'-20', and cf. Doria, *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 364.

We learn from a letter of the doge and Senate to Zane, dated 11 November (1570), that the latter blamed the loss of both the papal and the Venetian galleys upon the disobedience of the galley commanders, "for which they are certainly deserving of punishment" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 26 [47], *al capitano general da mar*). Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 280, pp. 386-87. Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 381, is quite inaccurate in his statement of the loss of Venetian galleys ("13, perhaps even 27"), and he seems to think that Colonna brought back "only three of the twelve galleys which had been entrusted to him" 1

<sup>46</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 20': ". . . A XVI d' Ottobre [il Generale Zane] parti di Candia, et a XXII entrato nella Suda, di ove mandò due galee sotto la guida de Piero Emmo per lingua [i.e., to get information], et poco dopo per spiar meglio il nimico, Vincenzo Maria di Priuli et Angelo Suriano."



Rhodes, and then sailed westward to the island of Stampalia (Astypalaea). Their movements caused some apprehension among the Christian commanders because of "la debolezza et disordine della nostra armata," which led them to decide upon a hasty withdrawal of the Venetian fleet. Pallavicini offered to remain at Canea in western Crete [whither the fleet had gone after brief stays at Candia and Suda] with a few galleys to embark the troops for the relief of besieged Famagusta. About 1,700 troops were scheduled to go to Famagusta, and about 800 were to remain on the island for garrison duty.<sup>47</sup> Pallavicini could have wished they were "meglio in ordine," but they had suffered a good deal of hardship. Marco Querini, "il clarissimo capitano del Colfo," saw to the embarkation at Canea of the troops for Famagusta and of those being sent to the garrisons at Candia. Others were left for service in the garrisons at Canea.

All these troops [assigned to the relief force for Famagusta] had been put under the command of the most excellent [Sebastiano] Venier in case he should be willing to go to Famagusta. Otherwise they were to remain under the authority of the distinguished captain of the ships [il clarissimo capitano delle navi], since the lord Pallavicino Rangone had already died, such being the orders which his Excellency [Zane] had left with me. These matters having been tended to, and such orders also given as seemed to me essential for repair [of the defenses] of Canea, I sailed with the three galleys which had been left with me. At length I came to Corfu, where I found his Excellency, who had arrived some days before . . . [on 17 November].

Marc' Antonio Colonna had reached Corfu just before Zane got there. Upon Colonna's departure from Corfu [on 28 November], Pallavicini says that he asked Zane to allow him to go on to Zara to review "things in Dalmatia," presumably the land forces and fortifications, and there to await further orders from the doge and Senate. "This was my intention when I left Corfu," as Pallavicini informed the doge,

and with various ups and downs [con diversi successi] I came as far as Lesina where, finding myself beset with the illness which is known to your Serenity, I stayed many days.<sup>48</sup> Then I did make it to Zara, as I had in-

structions from his Excellency to give such orders as might be required for [repair of] the fortifications of that city, which I did as best I could, being unable to rise from my bed. . . . Leaving Zara, I have finally come to Venice, remaining so ill that up to now I have been quite unable to come in person to pay my respects to your Serenity and to give you an account of my actions, which has been my greatest desire all along.<sup>49</sup>

After the Turkish capture of Nicosia even the more belligerent commanders of the Christian armada, with the exception of Sebastiano Venier, were prepared to concede that it was inadvisable to attack the enemy in Cyprus. The weather was poor, and the season was indeed late. The Turkish troops which had taken Nicosia could be put aboard Piali Pasha's armada. Victory would embolden the Turks; the Christians were dispirited. The Christian high command discussed the possibility of attacking the Turks at Negroponte, Valona, Castelnuovo, Durazzo, or at some other accessible place on their return voyage.<sup>50</sup> In keeping, however,

arrivò una fregata da Liesena con nuova che 'l Signor Sforza Palavicino stava male a morte, et della Signora sua consorte ha deliberato andare a lui, et questi Signori [presumably the Collegio] li dano la fusta che doveva menare il clarissimo Giustintino Sindico a Zara. Che 'l Signor Giulio Savorgnan stava tuttora via male a morte, et che 'l Signor Marcantonio Colonna era gionto a Zara, et ivi aspetterebbe il breve del Papa."

<sup>47</sup> Pallavicini, *Difesa e narrativa*, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 88<sup>v</sup>-90<sup>v</sup>, *data in Venetia il dì 27 d' Aprile MDLXXI*. Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 29<sup>v</sup>, informs us that Pallavicini returned to Venice on 13 February, 1571, and that his illness was the gout, "essendo mal conditionato per indispositione delle gotte." Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 152, correctly states that Pallavicini's illness first struck him at Lesina (Hvar); cf. Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 74, who says it was at Zara, "dove gravemente cadde ammalato." In the sixteenth century so many people had the gout that it must have been unfashionable not to be so afflicted.

On the passage of Zane and Colonna from Candia to Corfu, see Arch. di Stato di Venezia, *Deliberazioni*, Roma Ordinaria (Secreta), Reg. 3, fol. 19<sup>v</sup> [29<sup>v</sup>], *all' ambasciatore a Roma*, doc. dated 4 December, 1570, based on Zane's letters from Corfu dated 19-20 November. According to Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 382, the Signoria punished Pallavicini (as well as Zane) "avec sa rigueur habituelle" for the failure of the expedition, which is quite untrue. Pallavicini remained, with a diminished reputation perhaps but unharmed, in the service of the Republic (cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 74<sup>v</sup>, an *avviso* dated at Venice on 20 June, 1571). For example, on 11 October, 1571, the proposal was made in the Senate to recall to Venice both Sforza Pallavicini and Giulio Savorgnan to get their views concerning the steps to be taken for the defense of the island of Crete against Turkish attacks (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 19<sup>v</sup> [41<sup>v</sup>]).

<sup>50</sup> Doria's *Secondo Manifesto*, in *Il Saggiatore*, II, 360; *Informazione di quanto è successo nell' . . . armata*, *ibid.*, III, 29; letter of Colonna to Philip II, dated at Sitia in eastern Crete on 28 September (1570), after the return from Scarpanto, also in *Il Saggiatore*, III, 173.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 71-72, who had read Pallavicini's *Difesa e narrativa*, and on Emo's report, see Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 20<sup>v</sup>, whose account suggests that Emo's letter or letters were sent after his return to Candia.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 9<sup>v</sup>, *di Venetia li 26 Gennaro* (i.e., a report from Venice, dated 26 January, 1571): "Hiersera

with the dismal performance of the expedition throughout the summer of 1570, they did nothing.

Leaving Doria at Scarpanto, Zane and Colonna had sailed for Crete, where they had arrived by 28 September (1570), for on that day Colonna wrote Philip II from Sitia, explaining why the Christian armada was unable to go on to Cyprus.<sup>51</sup> Zane was at Candia on 5 October. He remained there until the sixteenth, when he went to Suda, which he reached on the twenty-second.<sup>52</sup> Four days later Fra Pietro Giustinian put into Suda Bay (on 26 October) with three galleys of the Knights of Malta. He had come with five galleys of the Order to add them to Colonna's papal squadron, but having been attacked by eighteen Turkish galleys, he had lost two of them.<sup>53</sup> Everything was going wrong. When on 8 November Zane and Colonna moved farther west with the Christian galleys to Canea "per esser porto sicuro e comodo," Angelo Surian suddenly appeared with the news that, four days before, Vincenzo Maria Priuli had been attacked and "cut to pieces" by five Turkish galliots, "everyone fighting valiantly and not without considerable loss to those Turks." Surian had barely escaped with his galley and his life.<sup>54</sup>

As winter came on, the Turks and Christians both began to unwind. Piali Pasha, leaving guards in the Archipelago "to prevent aid getting through to Famagusta," returned with the rest of the Turkish armada to Istanbul.<sup>55</sup> On 10 and 11 November

Colonna and Zane had set sail for Corfu, where they arrived less than a week later (Zane on the seventeenth). Fear of the Turks descending upon their rickety galleys and ailing crews had speeded their voyage. On 28 November Colonna took formal leave of Zane, and sailed up the east coast of Corfu. He had to stop, however, at the tiny northern port of Kassiope (Casoppo), where he was held up for almost a month, says Contarini, "per i tempi contrarii." When the winds abated, he continued up the Albanian coast to Bocche di Cattaro (the Gulf of Kotor), where a terrible storm fell upon him "with thunder, flashes of lightning, and rain." The expedition was ending as it had begun. Lightning struck a mast on Colonna's galley, which caught fire, although all those aboard were saved.

Colonna then managed to get on board Francesco Tron's galley, rowed by slaves (*condannati*), but that also was driven ashore and broke up, leaving everyone to shift for himself. Contarini makes no mention of the galley slaves, chained to their benches.<sup>56</sup> According to Sereno, Colonna and the survivors of the wreck of Tron's galley were well received by the Ragusei, who refused to turn them over to the Turks, and helped them on their way. Paruta says that Colonna went as far north as Zara (Zadar), then crossed the Adriatic to Ancona, and went on to Rome "per dar conto al Pontefice di tutte le cose successe."<sup>57</sup>

In Corfu, meanwhile, Girolamo Zane, procurator of S. Mark and captain-general of the sea, had been writing the Venetian Signoria letters dated up to 20 November (1570) that his health had broken down. He could no longer render the state, he said, the service which the troublous times required. He asked to be relieved of his command, and to be allowed to return to Venice. On 9 December his request came before the Senate. A motion was made, but rejected, that a decision should be postponed until word came from Rome that the negotiations for the tripartite league of

<sup>51</sup> Reference is made to Colonna's letter in the preceding note.

<sup>52</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 19<sup>v</sup>, 20<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>53</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 20<sup>r</sup>: "Giunse nella Suda alli XXXI [d' Ottobre] Fra Pietro Giustiniano, general delle galee di San Giovanni di Malta, con due galee, il quale per viaggio venendo con cinque galee della Religione a congiungersi con il Colonna fu assaltato da deciotto galee Turchesche, delle quali due restorno da nemici prese, et lui con due altre s' era salvato."

Cf. Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 71, who says that Giustinian had started out with four galleys, and made it to Suda with two. Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 133, has Giustinian, who had distinguished himself in the siege of Malta, lose two galleys, "l' altre due con la capitana [flagship] del Giustiniano [or, as Contarini says, 'lui con due altre'] con fatica rifuggendo nel porto della Suda si salvarono."

<sup>54</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 20<sup>r</sup>; Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 71; Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 133; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 939.

<sup>55</sup> According to later reports, which reached Venice in early February (1571), 130 galleys had returned to Istanbul, "30 by day and the rest by night so that no one could see in what bad shape they were" (Stella, *Nienz. Venezia*, IX, no. 323, p. 446, a letter of the nuncio Fachinetti to Cardinal Bonelli, dated at Venice on 14 February, 1571).

<sup>56</sup> Contarini, *Historia* (1572), fol. 21<sup>r</sup> (in line 2 the *General Venier* should read *Zane*), and for Francesco Tron's *galera de' condannati*, note fol. 18<sup>r</sup>, no. 4 in the list of the galleys under the overall command of Santo Tron.

<sup>57</sup> Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 72; Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, p. 152. A dispatch from Rome, dated 3 February (1571), states that Marc' Antonio Colonna arrived in the city "the other evening," having visited the shrines of the Madonna of Loreto and S. Francis of Assisi. At Rome he was met by Cardinals Colonna, von Truchsess, Pacheco, Gian Francesco di Gamba, and Fulvio della Corgna as well as by Pius V's nephews. Colonna spent an hour with the pope, who gave him 2,000 scudi "per li danni patiti" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 18<sup>r</sup>).

the Holy See, Spain, and Venice had finally come to some conclusion. Rather, on 9 December, the Senate voted to replace Zane, with the motion that the *Maggior Consiglio* should immediately choose a captain-general to take command of the fleet in the continuing war against the Porte. On the next day Sebastiano Venier was elected captain-general of the sea.<sup>58</sup>

By a letter of 13 December the doge and Senate informed Zane that, in accord with his request to be "repatriated," they had elected Venier to take his place. They would give Venier the orders necessary "per il buon governo dell' armata," but in the meantime Zane must restore order in the Venetian fleet and try by all possible means to reinforce it. Since it was believed in Venice that there was a shortage of food in Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante, the Senate assumed that Zane would find it much easier to recruit soldiers and oarsmen in the islands than would have been the case otherwise. The Venetians had also been suffering shortages closer to home, for the war had made it almost impossible to gather the harvests in the Republic's territories in Dalmatia and Albania. It had been difficult to find enough ship's biscuit for the fleet, and despite Pius V's generous response to their needs, the situation had been desperate for months.<sup>59</sup>

To return to the dual letter of 13 December, Zane was told that if the galleys which required repair had not already left Corfu [for the Arsenal in Venice], he was to keep them at Corfu, and have the requisite work done locally as quickly as possible "per il servizio nostro et per armarli con le genti delle predette isole." The Senate also wanted further troops, supplies, arms, and munitions sent to Famagusta.<sup>60</sup>

Agostino Barbarigo, who was officially appointed provveditore generale of the sea on 30 January, 1571, was to deliver to Venier his commission and the standard of captain-general at Corfu whither, it was thought, Venier might be going to take command of the fleet.<sup>61</sup> If Venier had already left for the Levant, however, to convey reinforcements to Famagusta, Barbarigo was to take over from Zane the interim command of the fleet at Corfu.<sup>62</sup> In any event care would be taken to see that Venier received the standard, symbol of his supreme authority at sea, with the usual ceremony of a solemn mass, psalms, and sermons.<sup>63</sup>

come si sa, ma per sovvenire anco le provincie di Dalmatia et Albania, le quali non havendone per ragione della presente guerra potuto racogliere quest' anno nell' loro territorii alcuna qualità si ritrovano in estrema necessità, onde vi commetto col Senato che ringraziata sua Beatitudine della tratta che ultimamente vi concessa delle 2 m. some di formento, dobbiate rappresentarle questo grandissimo bisogno nostro, considerandole di quanta importanza sarebbe che per mancanza di biscotti, hora che per gratia de Dio l' armate Christiane si sono unite et s' è fatta resolutione di andar a ritrovar et combatter la Turchesca, si convenisse restar di far quei progressi che ricercherà il beneficio commune, et medesimamente considerandole il pericolo, al quale è sottoposta per ciò la Dalmatia." Shortages of food had contributed to persistent illnesses in the Venetian fleet.

<sup>58</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 35 [56], at *capitiano general da mar*, doc. dated 13 December, 1570; cf., *ibid.*, fol. 39<sup>r</sup> [60], and Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 258<sup>r</sup> [303].

<sup>59</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 51<sup>r</sup> [72].

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 53<sup>r</sup> [74], 58<sup>r</sup>-59<sup>r</sup> [79<sup>r</sup>-80<sup>r</sup>], and cf. Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fols. 267<sup>r</sup>-268<sup>r</sup> [312<sup>r</sup>-313<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>61</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 59<sup>r</sup> [80<sup>r</sup>]. "... lo stendardo che in nome della Signoria nostra ti sarà dato con le ceremonie di una messa solennemente cantata et con i salmi et orationi con lequali noi [i.e., the doge] solemo consignarlo alli capitani nostri generali."

The commission of Agostino Barbarigo as "provveditor general da mare" is dated 30 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570), and may be found in the *Senatus Secreta*, Reg. 77, fols. 49<sup>r</sup>-53<sup>r</sup> [70<sup>r</sup>-74<sup>r</sup>]; that of Sebastiano Venier as captain-general is dated 3 February, 1571 (Ven. style 1570), and may be found, *ibid.*, fols. 58<sup>r</sup>-61<sup>r</sup> [79<sup>r</sup>-82<sup>r</sup>].

At the time of his appointment as captain-general of the Venetian naval forces Sebastiano Venier was seventy-four years of age, but "nonostante questa età, huomo gagliardo et ardito" (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX [1972], no. 297, p. 407, doc. dated 13 December, 1570).

<sup>58</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Sen. Mar, Reg. 39, fol. 258<sup>r</sup> [303<sup>r</sup>], resolution of the Senate dated 9 December, 1570: "Dalle lettere del diletissimo nobel nostro Hieronymo Zane, cavalier, procurator, capitiano general da mar fin vinti del mese passato da Corfu si è intesa l' indispositione della persona sua, per la quale egli non può continuare al governo dell' armata nostra et prestarci quel servizio che ricerca il bisogno delle cose nostre, et che sarebbe il desiderio suo, ricercando per ciò con instantia di venire a repariarsi, onde essendo conveniente satisfarlo et insieme proveder d' altro capo et governo ad essa armata. l' andrà parte che nel primo *Maggior Consiglio* per scrutinio di questo et quattro mani d' elezione d' esso *Maggior Consiglio* sia col nome dello Spirito Santo et in buona gratia fatta elezione d' un altro capitiano general da mar con tutti i muodi, conditioni, salario, utilità, preminencie solite et consuete, et con le quali fu eletto il predetto Ser Hieronymo Zane. . . . +111."

Zuan Donado, *savio di terraferma*, and Alberto Badoer, *savio agli ordini*, proposed "che la presente materia sia differita fino che da Roma si habbia la rissolutione della trattatione della Lega." Their motion was not passed. On the following day, 10 December, Sebastiano Venier was elected captain-general of the sea (by a vote of +1,119, 60, 89 in the *Maggior Consiglio*). Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 22, erroneously dates Venier's election on 20 December.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Delib. Roma, Reg. 3, fol. 4<sup>r</sup> [14<sup>r</sup>], letter to Michele Surian, the Venetian ambassador in Rome, dated 7 October, 1570: ". . . Vi è manifesto il bisogno grandissimo che noi al presente habbiamo di grano non solo per tener munita di biscotti l' armata nostra così numerosa,

Since it was abundantly clear that Girolamo Zane had been unable to maintain discipline in the fleet, "essendo seguiti molti et grandissimi disordini, errori, et inconvenienti dannosi al stato nostro," the Senate appointed three nobles with the title and authority of "inquisitori, sindici, et avogadori" to take action against those whom investigation should reveal to have been remiss in their duties.<sup>64</sup> The investigation would seek to establish responsibility, *nemine excepto*, for the "faulty operations, poor administration, failures, errors, and crimes" that had made Zane's tenure of command, whether his fault or not, a period of utter disaster.<sup>65</sup>

The expedition having finally come to its sad conclusion, the Signori Veneti were held up to opprobrium and bitter criticism by the unknown author of a work on *The Notable Errors Committed by the Venetian Signoria in their Resolution and Administration of the War against the Turk*. He held the Signoria responsible for "the loss of Nicosia, the death or imprisonment of 56,000 persons, as well as the loss of more than 300 pieces of artillery [*pezzi di bronzo*] and of almost the entire island [of Cyprus] except for the walled enclosure of Famagusta." Their mismanagement had cost the state the "royal" revenues of the villages and, what was more, the 700,000 ducats a year [!] which had been derived from the Cypriote salt flats, especially those at Salines.

The Turkish hold upon the island would endanger Venetian navigation in the eastern Mediterranean. The expedition had seemed to start out well enough. No prince but the sultan could ever have readied for action eighty galleys and twelve galleasses in hardly more than a month, "il che fu di ammirazione agli huomini delle piazze." The Senate had admired its own performance, having recruited 8,000 paid infantry and 4,000 adventurous volunteers (*venturieri*). They had come from Lombardy, the Marches, Romagnola, and as far away as Naples, "which was a wondrous thing."

Sforza Pallavicini, *lor capitano da terra*, had set sail on four huge ships loaded with artillery, mu-

nitions, timber, cut beams, gangplanks, wagons, hammers, shovels, ladles, trowels, hoes, and other tools for masons, along with 4,000 sappers or "pioneers" (*guastadori*) and bombardiers. In a few days such a force could have destroyed the Hexamilion in the Morea, and taken numerous places, for the only fortresses of importance in the entire area were Nauplia and Monemvasia. The Venetian commanders should have moved the Greeks and Albanians of the Morea to rebellion. They would have rebelled if they could have been sure of support, just as the Mainates responded when Marco Querini had seized and left in ruins the Turkish stronghold on the Brazzo di Maina. Three hundred thousand able-bodied men had been all ready to rise in revolt [according to the author of *The Notable Errors*], and join the Venetians in the war against the Turks, "and they pray that this year [in 1571] one can make up for the failure of the past year."

The vast preparations and the opportunities of the spring and summer of 1570 had raised high hopes of victory. The failure of the twelve galleys of the pope and the forty-nine galleys of the Catholic king to join the Venetian fleet in due time, with Doria and the king's officers dragging their feet all the while, had brought the Christian efforts to naught. Now it was clear to everyone "that Doria has been the real reason for the loss of Nicosia and of the kingdom [of Cyprus]." The Venetian Signoria, however, had made its share of mistakes both in embarking upon the war and in waging it. The author of *The Notable Errors* in fact lists almost a score of serious missteps on the part of the Venetian government.

Reflecting the gossip of the time, the author says that the Signoria should never have raised Sultan Selim II's suspicions by fortifying Nicosia at the same time as the Venetian ambassador [Marino di Cavalli] was negotiating confirmation of the Republic's peace with the sultan's father Suleiman. It was a mistake to build the fortress [at Nicosia] in the middle of the island, far from the possible delivery of aid. The fortifications were inadequate. The Signoria had scorned the advice of the duke of Alva [Fernando Álvarez de Toledo], who had written them "that it was essential always to maintain there a large force of Italian soldiers." Alva apparently knew, even if the Venetian government did not, that the native Cypriotes were neither adept at the use of arms nor much dedicated to the cause of Venice. The Signoria had, furthermore, not taken seriously the warnings of the bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro that Cyprus was certain to be the object of Turkish attack.

<sup>64</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 61 [82].

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Sen. Mar., Reg. 39, fol. 269 [314], doc. dated 4 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570). Zane was brought to trial for his failure, and died on 14 October, 1572, before his acquittal, leading Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 189-90, to the age-old reflection "che l'uomo non deve chiamarsi felice avanti l'ultimo giorno di sua vita," on which note Ugo Tucci, "Il processo a Girolamo Zane, mancato difensore di Cipro," in Gino Benzoni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, pp. 409-33.

Also the Signori Veneti had been altogether too arrogant in their dismissal of the cha'ush Kubad, whom Barbaro had contrived to have sent to Venice "a domandar loro Cipro d' accordo."

Leaving aside other wrong moves of the Signoria, the disgruntled author of *The Notable Errors* tells us that the Signori Veneti lost all hope of success when they sent to Cyprus the count of Rocas [Roucha], Eugenio Sinclitico, as the "generale della cavalleria." Although Eugenio was the chief personage on the island, "huomo principale de quel regno," and had acquired the title of count, he was long on commerce and short on warfare. Furthermore, one must take account of the fact "that they made Girolamo Zane general of their fleet, a man without experience of the sea or of warfare, and most avaricious." Opportunities had been lost [owing to the instructions of the Senate, as we have seen, and to Zane's incompetence] to attack the Turks along the coasts of Dalmatia and Albania, the Morea and the Archipelago. The Venetian fleet had wasted endless time at Zara, Corfu, and Candia, achieving nothing, letting men die of the plague. What about the recent appointment of Sebastiano Venier as captain-general of the sea? and of Agostino Barbarigo as provveditore generale of the sea? Well, Venier was a man of courage, but without experience of the sea or of warfare, and Barbarigo would very likely prove even less capable, for he was "inespertissimo di guerra et di mare."<sup>66</sup>

Since we have seen a good deal of Zane and something of Barbarigo, with more to come on Venier, we should say something of Eugenio Sinclitico, who unfortunately helped to determine the Cypriote strategy of defense. Sinclitico supported the view of Niccolò Dandolo, the lieutenant of Nicosia, that the Venetian forces on the island should not forcibly oppose the landing of the Turks (which, as we know, took place at Salines on 3 July, 1570), contrary to the contention of Astorre Baglione that the Venetian forces should indeed do so. As Pietro Valderio, the viscount of Famagusta, noted later, it was an important decision that was about to be made. According to Valderio, Sinclitico had returned to Cyprus from Venice on 27 March (1570) with Dionisio Naldi, commander of the infantry of Famagusta, bringing five hundred foot-soldiers to the island.

At a conference of the Venetian commanders

held at "Aschia" (Asha), a village midway between Nicosia and Famagusta, on 6 April, Baglione is said to have proposed making every effort with both horse and foot to prevent, or to make as costly as possible, the enemy's landing troops on the island. Marc' Antonio Bragadin, the captain of Famagusta, agreed with him, and so did Scipione Piacenza, Dionisio Naldi, the councilor Pietro Pisani, and Pietro Rondacchi, commander of the Greek and Albanian stradioti. Niccolò Dandolo, however, "luogotenente et viceprovveditor," objected, saying that this would bring about the utter ruin of the kingdom of Cyprus. To put an effective force in the field, he declared, it would be necessary to strip the fortress [of Nicosia]. The Christians would be forced to retreat before the artillery of the Turks, who could then pursue "our men" with such speed as to cut them to pieces before they could reach the safety of Nicosia, "e le città [Nicosia and Famagusta] resteriano debilitate facilmente, e si potriano espugnare dall' inimico." The gentlemen, says Valderio, who did not want to make a line of defense of themselves, praised Dandolo's opinion as the best, but it in fact was the worst.

At this critical juncture Sinclitico rose, and said that when he was in Venice, he had been summoned before the Collegio to receive the order "that they should by no means take the field." This had been Sforza Pallavicini's advice to the Signoria. The Venetian forces and the citizens of Nicosia and Famagusta should withdraw into the two municipal fortresses. The peasants and villagers (*villani*) should seek refuge from the Turks in the mountainous region of Troödos, some thirty-three miles southwest of Nicosia, "because they would very quickly send the fleet which would free them from the siege."

This brought the dispute to an end, but for the sake of their reputation Astorre Baglione insisted that Sinclitico, the "lord collateral," should at least put in an appearance at Salines with 300 horse and 200 foot so as to be seen when the enemy armada arrived. The stradioti should also be on hand. They might accomplish something. Baglione would also come with some 300 horse from Famagusta, "and so with this arrangement [*ordine*] they departed."<sup>67</sup> With such an "arrangement" it

<sup>66</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Urb. lat. 855, fols. 349-356, by original enumeration, *Errori notabili commessi da Signori Veneti nella risoluzione et amministrazione della guerra contra il Turco*.

<sup>67</sup> *La Guerra di Cipro scritta da Pietro Valderio, visconte della città di Famagusta in quel tempo, come chiaramente si raccoglie dalla storia medesima, copiata la seconda volta da N. N. l'anno 1753*, in the Biblioteca Comunale di Treviso, MS. ital. 505 (53-105-F), pp. 28-31; on Eugenio Sinclitico's support of Niccolò Dandolo,

is no wonder that Lala Mustafa Pasha had been able to land his troops and artillery without opposition at Salines, and wait there unmolested for three weeks until Piali Pasha and Ali Pasha could bring him reinforcements with which to march northward and begin the siege of Nicosia.<sup>68</sup>

In Rome negotiations had been going on for months in a vain effort officially to establish a league consisting of the Holy See, Philip II, the other Christian princes, and the Republic of Venice. Although Philip had given Venice his less than half-hearted support in the fleet under Doria, the league had not been concluded. The Signoria had much desired such an anti-Turkish union as, on 27 October (1570), the doge and Senate wrote their ambassadors Michele Surian and Giovanni Soranzo in Rome. The Venetians were determined "continuar la guerra con il Turco, acerbissimo et natural inimico del nome Cristiano," and deplored the suspicions which Philip's ministers were said to entertain of their sincerity in carrying on the unequal struggle with the Turks. There was no time for these long-drawn-out negotiations to form the proposed league.

The Venetians had suggested renewal of the terms of the alliance of 1537 when Paul III, Charles V, and the Republic had combined to fight the everlasting enemy. Other terms had been set before them; important issues had been raised. They had tried, however, to answer every question, to settle every point, "con ogni sincerità."

cf. also Giovanni Sozomeno's account in Cobham, *Excerpta Cyprus*, pp. 81-82, 85 (see below, note 78), and that of Antonmaria Graziani, trans. Cobham, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta* . . . , London, 1899, pp. 20-21, 23, 24.

In two letters, one dated at Nicosia on 26 June (1570) and the other written on board a galley on 13 July, Giovanni Falier informed his father of the approach of the Turkish armada, conditions in Nicosia and Famagusta, and the landing of the Turks above Paphos and at Salines, "dove dopo havere sbarcato senza resistenza, essendo il Conte di Roccas retiratosi in Famagusta." Mustafa Pasha's forces advanced upon Nicosia (Bibl. Correr, Cod. Cicogna 3596). Falier also wrote, later on, a detailed account for his father, *ibid.*, in 29 fols., of the Turkish seizure of Nicosia, giving the usual list of the more prominent persons killed and captured.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 895-96, 958-60, 1037-39, and see Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 45-47 and ff. The pages of Valderio's work which are concerned with the siege of Nicosia were not only disintegrating, "worm-eaten," when his MS. came into the hands of the copyist N. N. in the middle of the eighteenth century, but the pages were also out of order. Unfortunately N. N. reproduced them as he found them, apparently making little or no effort to rearrange them to preserve their original chronological sequence (cf. above, Chapter 21, note 18).

The Venetians had but one purpose—to see the papal and Spanish fleets join that of Venice to stem the audacity and to stay the onward progress of the Turks. The situation had become desperate.

In Cyprus Nicosia was said to have fallen, "which we pray God is not true." Although the report was still unconfirmed, this was apparently the first word to reach Venice of the disaster of 9 September. All the news was dismal. The Christian armada had accomplished nothing, failing to meet the Turks, missing the chance of a lifetime, and bringing no aid to those strongholds in the Levant which were the very bulwark of the Christian defense against the Turks. Surian and Soranzo were instructed to share their grief with the pope if the loss of Nicosia, *metropoli del regno di Cipro*, had finally been verified. They must implore Pius to instruct the commission of cardinals deputed to negotiate the terms of the league to see that all differences were cast aside, and that the Christian defense and offense against the Turks was guaranteed by the formation of the needed league.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria (Secreta), Reg. 3, fols. 5<sup>v</sup>-7<sup>r</sup> [15<sup>v</sup>-17<sup>r</sup>], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, letter dated 27 October, 1570: The doge and Senate were vastly distressed ". . . che con l' avviso dell' infelice et lacrymabil perdita di Nicosia, qual pregamo il Signor Dio che non sia vero, perchè non ne habbiamo altra nova fin' hora che quella venuta da Napoli l' armata Christiana sia ritornata a dietro senza pur veder l' inimico, perdendo la maggior occasione che mai si potesse desiderar, abbandonando quelle fortetze che sole in Levante sono antemurale alla furia Turchesca che non se venghi a sfogar nell' Italia, come è sempre stato il loro desiderio. . . .

"Ma perchè le cose passate non hanno altro rimedio che di farne più ardenti et soleciti in provveder alle future, vi cometto col Senato che andati al Pontefice tutti voi [Surian and Soranzo] . . . debbiate dolervi con la Beatitudine sua, se però la nova se sarà verificata, che Dio non voglia, della gravissima perdita che ha fatto la Republica nostra, anzi la Republica Christiana, de una città così importante come è Nicosia, metropoli del regno di Cipro, isola che se ben posta nelle fauci d' infideli sostentava pur, et volendo sperar che sustenti ancora in qualche parte, il vexillo di Jesu Christo, et poi soggiogiate che se mai fu tempo, è al presente di metter ogni spirito . . . per provveder gagliardissimamente che questo gravissimo inimico non faccia maggior progresso. . . [etc.], +140, 8, 27."

The *avviso* of the "sad and lamentable loss of Nicosia" referred to in this letter is also noted in Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fol. 358<sup>r</sup>: "Questa mattina dicono che è giunto un straordinario di Roma con nova che ha attristata tutta la città, et che molto mi dispiace a scriverla, cioè che essendo andata tutta l' armata Christiana sino a Finica presso una fregata de Turchi con 4 Christiani presi sopra, li quali diedero nova della presa di Nicosia alli 8 Settembre. . . ." [actually, of course, on 9 September].

Numerous documents in the Deliberazioni, Roma Ord. (Secreta), Reg. 3, bear witness to the endless difficulties encoun-

Pompeo Colonna, Marc' Antonio's relative and lieutenant, had arrived in Rome on 24 October (1570) to report to Pius V on the expeditionary fiasco, and on the following day the Spanish ambassador Zúñiga received the defensive letter of 13 October which Doria had written him from Corfu. Shortly after the arrival of the letter Pompeo's brother, the Cardinal Marc' Antonio Colonna, came to Zúñiga's dwelling, giving him an account of the general Marc' Antonio's dispatches to Philip II. Zúñiga, of course, wished to see Pompeo, but the cardinal said his brother could not talk with Zúñiga until he had gone back to the Vatican Palace, for his Holiness had just sent for him again. With apparently reassuring references to Philip's fleet, the cardinal said that he understood the Venetians were also satisfied with the naval force the king had sent. Whatever they really thought, no one of the participants in the recent expedition was going to utter a word of criticism of his Catholic Majesty.

Zúñiga wanted to know what Pius V had had to say. The cardinal replied "that [his Holiness] had expressed no little bitterness [*mucho desabrimiento*] about Giannandrea's failure to render the Venetians more satisfactory service."<sup>70</sup> Cardinal Giovanni Morone was also said to have found Pius "very discontented." Zúñiga told the Cardinal Marc' Antonio that he and his brother Pompeo Colonna must set the pope's mind at ease and set the record straight, for if his Holiness remained dissatisfied, it would be assumed that it was because of information which the Colonnas had fed him.<sup>70</sup> According to the Venetian historian Francesco Longo, Cardinal Morone, *nato vassallo del Re Cattolico*, had publicly expressed the wish that the fleet under Doria's command had never joined the papal squadron and the Venetian fleet, "because it had done more harm than good!"<sup>71</sup>

---

tered in forming the anti-Turkish league, although Pius V, as the doge and Senate acknowledged in a long letter (of 14 November, 1570), was certainly doing his best on behalf of Venice (*ibid.*, fols. 10<sup>r</sup>-11<sup>r</sup> [20<sup>v</sup>-21<sup>r</sup>]).

After the Turkish seizure of Nicosia, the Senate became most anxious for the conclusion of the league (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 24<sup>r</sup> [45<sup>r</sup>]), with whatever modification of its terms Philip II might be willing to make. By 1 November almost everyone in Venice must have known that Nicosia had fallen (Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 277, p. 384).

<sup>70</sup> Zúñiga's letter of 27 October, 1570, referred to above, to Philip II, in Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 29, pp. 61-62. Zúñiga then proceeded to defend Doria.

<sup>71</sup> Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, in the *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, p. 20. In 1549 Morone had been one of Charles V's five candidates for the papal throne (*cf.* Volume III, Chapter 13, note 11).

Pius V was certainly discontented. On 31 October he addressed instructions to Pompeo Colonna, whom he was sending to the Spanish court to give as full a report on the expedition "as you have given to us." He was to protest against the conduct of affairs by his Catholic Majesty's "ministers," meaning chiefly Doria, who had shown (says the pope) scant obedience to Marc' Antonio Colonna and scant respect for the papal standard, which they had deserted at Scarpanto. They had aroused suspicion in the minds of the Venetians, whom Pius was trying in every way "to keep firmly in this holy union." Pius intended to send Marc' Antonio Colonna once more to Venice (and in a few months the latter would go) to persuade the Signoria to continue in its previous resolve to carry on against the Turks.

Pompeo Colonna must be insistent that Philip II should henceforth give such clear and resolute orders to his ministers that the world could not look upon their actions as being contrary to his Majesty's intentions. Pompeo was also "most warmly" to urge the king to send an envoy straightway to the Emperor Maximilian II to try to get him to join the Christian union against the Turks, "as a matter of such great importance in serving Christendom and in protecting his own kingdoms." Finally, Pompeo must seek to convince the Spanish king that he should instruct his representatives in Rome to conclude the proposed league with the Holy See and Venice, "la ultimazione della liga." Philip could be sure that Pius V would always be his "amorevolissimo padre," and would endeavor all the more to advance his interests when Philip had truly committed himself to the sacred cause the pope was advocating.<sup>72</sup> The informal "union" was one thing. A formal, binding "league" would be quite another.

Now the news was pouring into Venice—even from Istanbul in a letter dated 25 September (1570)—that the Turks had indeed taken Nicosia, and with a fearful slaughter. On 3 November the doge and Senate wrote Giacomo Soranzo and Giovanni Michiel, the Venetian envoys at the imperial court (then at Speyer), sending them the news to pass on to Maximilian II, who would (they said) lament the blow which had fallen not only upon Venice but upon all Christendom.<sup>73</sup> Al-

---

<sup>72</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 31, pp. 66-67, doc. dated 31 October, 1571.

<sup>73</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 19<sup>r</sup> [40<sup>r</sup>], *all'ambasciatore appreso la Maestà cesarea*, doc. dated 3 November, 1570: "Habiamo per lettere da Constantinopoli de 25 di Settembre passato havuta la certezza dell' infelice successo, per altra via anco

though Maximilian was at peace with the Turks—the eight years' peace which, as we have seen, was

prima inteso, della città di Nicossia, metropoli del regno di Cipro, la quale essendo a 8 di esso mese stata assalita da più bande, seben furono li Turchi quel giorno gagliardamente ributtati con grave danno loro, tuttavia essendo il dì seguente stato rinforciato l' assalto, che durò dal far del giorno fino verso la sera con molto spargimento di sangue fu da loro finalmente conquistata [according to a letter of the doge and Senate, *ibid.*, fol. 24' [45'], dated 6 November, 1570, the Turkish assaults of 8 and 9 September upon Nicosia had come 'dopo una lunga et continuata oppugnatione di molti giorni', iquale infortunato et miserabile accidente sapendo noi che apporrà molto dispiacer a sua Maestà cesarea sì per il particular danno del stato nostro come per l' universale che ne viene a seguir a tutta la Republica Christiana, vi commetto col Senato che doviabene in nostro nome condolerli colla Maestà sua di questa grave iattura commune . . . , particolarmente il pericolo gravissimo alquale hora vengono a ritrovarsi sottoposte non solo l' isole nostre di Levante ma la provincia di Dalmatia, laquale è da temer che debba esser invasa da grandissima forza . . . , and note the letter of the doge and Senate, *ibid.*, fol. 20', to Girolamo Lippomano, the Republic's ambassador to the duke of Savoy. Cf. also Gustav Turba, ed., *Venetianische Depeschen vom Kaiserhofe*, III (Vienna, 1895), no. 169, pp. 505–12, letter of Soranzo and Michiel to the doge, dated at Speyer on 16 November, 1570.

On 4 November the proposed texts of three letters to the captain-general Zane were presented one after the other to the Senate. Although not one of them was accepted and sent to Zane, each letter reflects the profound distress and disappointment caused by the loss of Nicosia: "Grandissimo dolor, come si può pensare, ci ha portato l' avviso prima inteso per la relatione delli tre Greci presi sopra la fregata Turchesca et poi confirmato per lettere di Constantinopoli de 25 Settembre passato della miserabile et lacrymosa perdita di Nicossia, et tanto più vedendo che da questo accidente iquale doveva esser cagione che con maggior ardore fusse eseguita la risolutione che di concorde volontà era stata fatta di andar inanzi per combatter l' armata nemica. . . ." The Spanish fleet had withdrawn from its union with that of Venice (*et essendo anco seguita la separatione et partita della armata Catholica*), and neither the one nor the other had been on hand to defend or to try to recover Nicosia. The Venetians had thus lost not only Nicosia, but a splendid opportunity to strike at the Turkish armada, which had conveyed the sultan's forces to the now sad shores of Cyprus, ". . . con la perdita insieme di così gloriosa et così vicina occasione di combatter l' armata inimica, a tempo a punto che potevamo esserpar con l' aiuto del Signor Dio ad esaltatione della sua santa fede et a beneficio della Christianità una memorabil vittoria. . ." (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 20'–21' [41'–42']).

Upon learning of the loss of Nicosia, Zane had returned, as we have seen, to Crete and Corfu with the Venetian and papal fleets. He had apparently not been keeping the Signoria properly informed of his movements, but some members of the Senate professed to believe that he must have sent men and munitions to Famagusta to help hold the fortress there (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 20', 21'–22', 22'). Philip II was said to be distressed by the Venetian loss of Nicosia, and held out the hope "che il presente anno [i.e., 1571] si potrà ricuperar il perduto et far anco qualche progresso contra questo fiero inimico" (fol. 56' [77']). By 11 November (1570) the Senate had received three letters from Zane dated at Candia during the first half of October, and so far at least the Signoria was not holding Zane in any way responsible for the disaster (fol. 26 [47]).

negotiated in 1567–1568—the Venetians as well as Pius V had hoped that he might join a formal Christian league against the Porte. Pius's grant of the title grand duke of Tuscany to Cosimo I, however, still annoyed Philip II, and certainly rankled in Maximilian's mind. The Venetians feared that it would prove an impediment to luring the emperor into the league.<sup>74</sup>

On 15 November the doge and Senate wrote Michele Surian and Giovanni Soranzo, their ambassadors in Rome, in violent complaint of the Genoese commander Giannandrea Doria. Since it was the custom of the Signoria, they declared, never to say anything until they were sure of the facts, they had so far refrained from making any statement "cerca il ritorno delle armate Christiane con tanto danno et ignominia publica." They had been waiting for letters from the captain-general Zane. Now the letters had come. Surian and So-

<sup>74</sup> For the Senate's concern lest "il titolo [di gran duca di Toscana] aggiunto al Signor duca di Fiorenza" should cause trouble between Pius and Maximilian, note Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 7' [28'], *alli ambasciatori appresso la Maestà cesarea*, doc. dated 16 September, 1570. The Senate was fearful of "il disturbo grande che in questi turbulenti tempi et moti della guerra col Signor Turco potria apportare a tutta la Christianità l' introdurre una guerra in Italia" (Reg. 77, fol. 12' [33'], doc. dated 14 Oct. 1570), for Maximilian regarded the pope's bestowal of the title as an infringement upon his imperial rights (*ibid.*, fol. 12' [33']).

Maximilian had written the imperial Electors concerning the significance of the pope's bestowal of the grand-ducal title on Cosimo de' Medici (in 1569–1570) with the intention "di proceder più oltre in questa causa per l' interesse dell' imperio predetto et conservazione delle sue giuridictioni. . ." (Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria [Secreta], Reg. 3, fol. 5 [15]), letter of the doge and Senate to Michele Surian and Giovanni Soranzo, the Venetian ambassadors in Rome, dated 14 October, 1570).

The Venetian ambassadors at the imperial court, Giacomo Soranzo and Giovanni Michiel, had been cautioning the emperor not to stir up a hornets' nest because of the current war with the Turks. Indeed, the Senate feared "che per il disparer fra lei [i.e., sua Santità] et sua Maestà cesarea potrebbe riuscire che sarebbe introdurre la guerra in Italia, alla qual vi concorre non solamente la Germania così poco devota di quella Santa Sede, come è noto a cadauno, ma anco per quello che si può temere li Ugonotti di Francia, li quali tutti insieme con li altri heretici che sono in queste parti li quali così occultati stanno aspettando alcuna occasione tale, potriano fare di quei mali et sinistri effetti che in altri tempi si sono veduti seguire, perturbando tutta essa provincia d' Italia con manifesta ruina et danno delli stati di quella. . . il che non saria altro che far il servizio del Turco. . ." (*ibid.*, Reg. 3, fol. 5 [15]).

As for Cosimo's title of grand duke of Tuscany, the doge and Senate intervened with Maximilian on Cosimo's behalf (Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria [Secreta], Reg. 3, fols. 26'–27' [36'–37'], doc. dated 27 January, 1571 [Ven. style 1570]), for which the Florentine envoy in Rome thanked the Signoria's ambassadors at the Curia Romana (and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 29 [39]).



ranzo were therefore directed to protest to the pope Doria's failure to go forward, his unwillingness to engage the Turks, and his disobedience to Marc' Antonio Colonna despite his Catholic Majesty's orders for him to obey. Doria was the cause of the Christian fleets' "ignominious withdrawal" from combat. Doria had no excuse, and his Holiness must consider the implications of such a captain's having a command and a place in the councils of the Christian fleets.<sup>75</sup>

The fall of Nicosia was a shock to the Venetians such as they had rarely known since Mehmed the Conqueror had wrested Negroponte from them a century before. The Turks had taken Nicosia, as we have had cause more than once to observe, on 9 September (1570) after fifteen assaults and a siege of forty-five days, which began on 26 July. Reinforced by the soldiers and crews aboard the Turkish armada,<sup>76</sup> Lala Mustafa Pasha's forces had assailed the four southern bastions of Tripoli, Davila, Costanzo, and Podocattaro, especially the last. After days of heavy bombardment, in the last and greatest attack they had streamed over the battered walls and through the gates, killing and capturing the defenders and inhabitants of the city. They beheaded the willful, incompetent lieutenant Niccolò Dandolo, the commander of Nicosia, who had in miserly fashion doled out gunpowder to his bombardiers as though it were gold.<sup>77</sup> Calepio had preserved the names of the

more prominent soldiers and citizens mowed down in the merciless massacre. For three days the city was sacked, the janissaries and the Turkish mercenaries collecting a rich booty.<sup>78</sup>

the beleaguered inhabitants (Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 92-95, and cf. Antonmaria Graziani, trans. Cobham, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta* . . . London, 1899, p. 23 [see the following note], on the hostility of the Cypriotes toward the local nobility and the Venetians).

<sup>75</sup> On the siege and fall of Nicosia, see Claude D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, Cambridge, 1908, repr. New York, 1969, pp. 80-148, who gives in translation the accounts of Fabriano Falchetti, Giovanni Sozomeno, and Angelo Calepio, all three of whom were captured by the Turks and lived to tell the tale. Cobham also gives in translation the later accounts of Paolo Paruta (d. 1598) and Giacomo Diedo (d. 1748), with a plan of the siege of Nicosia opp. p. 87. Calepio's *Vera e fidelissima Narratione del successo dell' espugnazione et defensione del regno di Cipro* was first published in Étienne de Lusignan, *Chorographia et brevis historia universale dell' isola di Cipro* . . . Bologna, 1573, and was reprinted in French as *La Vraye et très-fidèle Narration du succès des assaults, défenses, et prise du Royaume de Cypre, faite par Révérend Père, Frère Ange Calépien de Cypre, docteur en théologie, de l' Ordre des Frères Prescheurs* . . . The French version of Lusignan's work is called *Description de toute l' isle de Cypre* . . . Paris, 1580, repr. Famagusta [actually Brussels]: Les Éditions l' Oiseau, 1968, Calepio's account of the taking of Nicosia being found on fols. 237<sup>v</sup>-271<sup>v</sup>, and cf. the general account, with lists of the more prominent "killed or imprisoned," in the Cod. Urb. lat. 1041, pt. 2, fols. 358<sup>v</sup>-360<sup>v</sup>, *di Famagosta 14 Ottobre [1570]*. See also the remarkable letter of the Grand Vizir Mehmed Sokolli to Charles IX of France, dated 16 November, 1570, in Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 135-40.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 55-64; Antonmaria Graziani, *De bello cyprio*, Rome, 1624, pp. 62-97, trans. C. D. Cobham [adapted from trans. of Robert Midgley, London, 1687], *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta* . . . London, 1899, pp. 15-43; Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. 1, pp. 92-122 (Paruta being also available in translation, as stated above). On the Turkish siege and seizure of Nicosia, note G. A. Quart, *La Guerra contro il Turco in Cipro e a Lepanto (1570-1571)*, Venice, 1935, pp. 262-99, 307-8, and Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 966-87, esp. pp. 980 ff. I have reduced my account of the occupation of Nicosia to save space for the more important siege and fall of Famagosta, to which the hitherto unused work of Piero Valderio, *La Guerra di Cipro*, adds much new information.

As always, Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 13<sup>v</sup>, covers a lot of ground in a few words: "Il sabbato istesso a XXXII [sic] hore arriùo Ali [Bassà] con quasi venti mila persone, il quale fu ricevuto da Mustafà [Bassà] con grande honore et allegrezza, et la notte istessa all' alba venendo la Dominica a IX di Settembre [9 September, however, fell on Saturday] con grandissimo sforzo di gente diedero gli assalti alli quattro Beloardi, al Podocattaro era Caraman Bassà con la genti della Caramania, al Costanzo vi era Mustafar Bassà, alli dui Daula et Tripoli erano Mustafà et Ali Bassà con gli huomini dell' armata, et tutti ad un' istesso tempo con grandissimo impeto et sforzo diedero la batteria, difendevansi quelli di dentro al solito valorosamente, sostenendo gli assalti et ributtando gli nemici senza lasciarsi smontare dal parapetto, con uccisione d' ambe le parti, ma molto più de Turchi, non sapendo però l' accrescimento delle genti nemiche venute dalle galee [whom Piali had sent with Ali from Salines to Nicosia], quando che dopo lungo contrasto per via del Beloardo Podocattaro (non sapendosi per qual disordine) entra-

<sup>75</sup> Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria (Secreta), Reg. 3, fol. 15 [25]. The Senate, however, had words of high praise for Colonna. Giovanni Soranzo's commission as Venetian ambassador (to serve with Michele Suriano), dated 9 September, 1570, is to be found in the Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria (Secreta), Reg. 3, fols. 1<sup>v</sup>-3<sup>v</sup> [11<sup>v</sup>-13<sup>v</sup>]. He was to try to hasten the conclusion of the league with Spain, which was to require months (cf. *ibid.*, fols. 32<sup>v</sup> ff. [42<sup>v</sup> ff.], et *alibi*).

Soranzo replaced Suriano as *ambasciatore ordinario* at Rome in September, 1571, remaining at the Curia until after October, 1572. Soranzo had been the Republic's ambassador to Spain (1562-1564), and returned to Philip II's court as envoy extraordinary in July, 1573 (cf. Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà*, I, pp. xxiv, xxvii, liv, lvi-lvii, and II, nos. 278 ff., pp. 724 ff.). Note also Stella, *Nunzi Venezia*, IX, nos. 242, 248, 251, pp. 339, 346 ff., 350.

<sup>76</sup> According to Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 12<sup>v</sup>, the Turkish commander Lala Mustafa Pasha, despairing of the conquest of Nicosia, sent two *cha' ushes* to the admirals Piali Pasha and Ali Pasha, who (having decided that the Venetian and Spanish fleets could not really co-operate) gave up to Mustafa a hundred men from every Turkish galley, "senza i quali [Mustafà] vedeva l' impresa impossibile." Cf. Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 98 ff.

<sup>77</sup> Although Dandolo's capacity for leadership was nil, it should also be noted that there was much dissension among the commanders in Nicosia as well as serious disaffection among

Before the smoke had cleared, Hassan Pasha of Caramania, whose troops had stormed the vulnerable bastion of Podocataro, sent a peasant with a letter addressed to Marc' Antonio Bragadin, the captain of Famagusta, announcing "che la città vostra di Nicosia è stata presa dal potentissimo esercito nostro." The defenders had "all been cut to pieces." Hassan asked for the surrender of Famagusta "so that we may send you in our ships wherever you want to go into the lands of the Christians—otherwise you may be certain that we shall kill you all, the great and small alike." Valderio was among those who read the letter; he reports that some believed, and others did not, that Nicosia had fallen. Surely the valorous lords and knights, feudatories, burghers, and commoners with such a large force of cavalry could hold out against a greater army than Lala Mustafa Pasha had brought to Nicosia. Presently, however, at about 5:00 P.M. (*alle 22 hore*) on 10 (or 11?) September another peasant arrived in Famagusta, carrying a metal basin which contained the head of Dandolo, the "quondam" lieutenant of Nicosia.

Obviously the Turks had taken the capital city of Cyprus. Marc' Antonio Bragadin had been ill, and only now did Astorre Baglione tell him the terrible news "with those fine words which the occasion required." Valderio tells us that Bragadin sent back the following answer to the pasha's letter:

Milord pasha of Caramania, I have seen your letter. I have also received the head of the lord lieutenant of the city of Nicosia, and I tell you herewith that even if you have so easily taken the city of Nicosia, with your own blood you will have to purchase this city, which with God's help will give you so much to do that you will always regret having encamped here. From Famagusta, 10 September.<sup>79</sup>

rono dentro molti Turchi, facendosi padroni della piazza et della ritirata, nel qual assalto furono tagliati a pezzi in un subito molti gentiluomini et soldati, quali stavano gliardamente alla difesa. . . . Cf. Stella, *Nunc. Venezia*, IX, nos. 294, 313, pp. 403, 433-34.

<sup>79</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 78-80. Valderio described at some length the siege of Nicosia (*ibid.*, pp. 58-60, 65, 66-67, 69-70 [pages out of order], 72-74, 77 ff., 80-106 [a day-by-day description of the siege]). Following Angelo Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta nell'anno 1571*, ed. Policarpo Catizani, Orvieto, 1895, p. 38, and Antonio Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa e di Marc' Antonio Bragadino comandante*, Venice, 1843, p. 20, Hill places the delivery of Dandolo's head on 11 September (*Cyprus*, III, 987-88), on which day the frightful fact became known throughout Famagusta but Valderio, who was on the spot, twice puts it on the tenth (*Guerra di Cipro*, pp. 80, 106). Alessandro Podacataro, who was also on the spot, puts the receipt of the Turkish letter (which he says came from "il Bassà")

At the beginning of November (1570) Pompeo Colonna had left Rome as the agent of Pius V and Marc' Antonio to go to the Spanish court, then at Madrid, where he arrived on the twenty-third. He was supposed to give Philip II an account of everything that had happened from the day of departure of the papal squadron and the Catholic fleet from Otranto to the sorry end of the expedition to relieve Cyprus. He was not only to remonstrate with Philip concerning Giannandrea Doria's insufferable delays and his failure to cooperate with the allies, but he was to urge Philip, on Pius's behalf, to make "the necessary provisions in the coming year for the defense of Christendom with the greatest possible efficiency." Pompeo charged Doria, among other complaints, with the failure to join the allies in an attack upon Valona or Durazzo which, consequently, was not attempted, but we have heard enough of the papal and Venetian grievances against Doria.

Pompeo Colonna had informed Leonardo Donado (Donà), the Venetian ambassador in Spain (1570-1573), that the Signoria's fleet had been in no condition to take effective action "per la disgratia delle malattie patite." Pompeo had still not been able to see Philip when on 27 November Donado prepared his report to the doge. In the meantime, however, the papal nuncio Giovanni Battista Castagna had also received instructions from Pius V to press Philip II with the greatest insistence to take action (. . . *infiammar il re e gliardi apparecchi*). Philip must try to get the Em-

and the delivery of the head on 12 September (Andrea Tessier, ed., *Relazione di Alessandro Podacataro de' successi di Famagosta dell'anno 1571*, Venice, 1876, pp. 13-14). Apart from dates and minor details, there are some surprising differences in the eyewitness descriptions of events during the siege of Famagosta.

According to the anonymous contemporary diary published by L. A. Visinoni, *Del Successo in Famagosta (1570-1571)*, Venice, 1879, pp. 21-22, ". . . Fu mandata la testa del clarissimo Dandolo, locotenente de Nicosia, in un bacile di stagno per un villano con due lettere mandate dal bassà al clarissimo Signor Marcantonio [Bragadin] et l'illustrissimo Signor Estorre [Baglione], le quale una era in turco e l'altra in franco. . . . dicendo che si dovesse rendere e darli la città se non che il medesimo sarebbe fatto a tutti loro—la risposta fu fatta che venisse a torla con l'arme in mano. . . ."

Although it is hardly of any importance to nail down the precise date of the arrival in Famagusta of confirmation of the fact that Nicosia had fallen (which came along with Dandolo's head), Fra Agostino, prior of the convent of the Eremitani in Famagusta, is among those who put it on 11 September, on which see Nicolò Morosini, ed., *Relation del Reverendo Padre Fra Agustin Famagostano, fo prior in Famagosta nel monasterio de Santo Antonio de l'Ordine Eremitano, della perdita di Famagosta. . . .* [from the Morosini Archives], Venice, 1891, p. 14, comm. Nobili Nozze Lucheschi-Arrigioni.

peror Maximilian II to show himself as an enemy of the Turks and to join the league. The pope had, furthermore, instructed Castagna that he must do his best to persuade the king to assemble forces strong enough to recover Nicosia and so save Cyprus. Like Pompeo Colonna, Castagna had not been able in these last days to see the king, who had only just returned to Madrid, but soon they would both be entreating him to give an affirmative answer to the papal appeals. But there was a serious problem—Pius V's grant of the grand-ducal title to Cosimo de' Medici.

Donado believed that Philip was as anxious to preserve peace in Italy as were the doge and Signoria. Philip had written to the emperor about the disputed "titolo di Fiorenza," putting all the blame on Cosimo "so that the hatred felt by the Germans and by the Diet may be turned upon the duke rather than upon the pope." Leonardo Nobili, the ambassador of Cosimo in Spain, seemed not to be the least worried about the emperor, "saying that he doesn't have a farthing, and that the Germans don't move without money." Philip disapproved of Cosimo's new title, but he was not the sort of person to go to war on another's behalf. He always said that since the pope had given Cosimo the title, it was up to the pope to defend it. Philip would, however, have his representatives in Rome make a protest to Pius V "privately in the pope's chamber in the presence of only two or three cardinals," but only after his Holiness had authorized payment of the ecclesiastical *cruzada*, and after the bull of concession had actually been received in Spain.<sup>80</sup>

Pompeo Colonna remained in Madrid for about a month, always full of praise for Venice, whose galleys (he told Philip II) had been strong and serviceable despite the "molte mortalità" they had suffered before leaving Candia. Donado's numerous dispatches are singularly interesting and very well written. He speaks of Philip's claim to be a friend of Venice and his Majesty's expressed desire to see the recovery of Nicosia (*ricuperar il perduto*). One wondered at the Spanish court, however, whether Marc' Antonio Colonna had not been overly dedicated to Venetian interests, even perhaps to the extent of endangering the king's fleet.

There was also the fear, not so openly expressed, that Venice might make peace with the Porte, leaving Spain to face the Turks alone.<sup>81</sup>

Since the nuncio Castagna and Pompeo Colonna received merely the usual polite rejoinders from Philip II in response to their complaints about Doria, Leonardo Donado remained uncertain as to Philip's reaction to his admiral's strange performance and to the costly withdrawal of the Christian fleets from eastern waters. In mid-December (1570) Doria had appeared in Madrid with a few complaints and worries of his own, concerning which Donado wrote the doge and Senate on 21 December. Doria had come to the court not only "per l' occasione delle cose seguite"—to explain what had happened—but also because the contract under which he had rented his galleys to the king had now expired. He wanted to renew the contract on more advantageous terms, for he said that he could not maintain his galleys at the current annual rental of 6,000 scudi each. He was mortgaged to the hilt, having pledged all his revenues; he owed (he claimed) 200,000 ducats to various persons. He was paying interest every year at huge rates, and would have to seek his Majesty's help to relieve the financial burden under which he was laboring.

Doria might have to ask for permission to sell certain rights and properties which he held of the crown or, if need be, to sell his galleys to the king, offering to continue as captain thereof in the royal service. Despite what Doria said, Donado doubted that he was seriously considering the sale of the galleys. His reputation and position depended upon his possession of the eleven galleys. [Had he lost or sold a galley?] As far as Donado could see, Doria did not want to propose to the king that he should increase the size of the royal fleet for, as it was, Doria's squadron comprised an important part of the king's naval force. Whenever Donado had discussed with Doria the possibility of adding to the fleet, "he has told me that by removing one man from each bench aboard the king's galleys, which are being rowed four men to a bench, he could increase the royal fleet by twenty galleys, considering the hulls he now has." Donado would not venture to confirm Doria's statement, for he knew from his own observation that not all the king's galleys did have four men to a bench, and he feared that Doria's inadequate answer to the

<sup>80</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid dell' ambasciatore Leonardo Donà*, I (1963), no. 58, pp. 151-53, letter to the doge and Senate, dated at Madrid on 27 November, 1570. Philip II had thoroughly approved of Doria's conduct on the expedition, and was most grateful for the safe return of all his galleys (Stella, "Gian Andrea Doria e la 'Sacra Lega,'" pp. 393-95).

<sup>81</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *Corrispondenza da Madrid*, I, nos. 59-63, pp. 154 ff., esp. p. 168.

question of increasing the royal fleet would leave them short-handed.

In any event Don John of Austria had arrived in Madrid from Granada the week before. Donado had gone to see him as soon as circumstances permitted. He presented Don John with the ducal letters of credence he had received at the time of his departure from Venice, and dilated upon "the glorious opportunity which will be presented to him as soon as the league has been concluded." Don John, who would be commander-in-chief of the naval forces of the league, thanked Donado for his kind words, assuring him that he would try to render Venice as well as his royal half-brother Philip full satisfaction.<sup>82</sup>

As yet, however, there was no league. The negotiations seemed to be interminable. Every week, almost every day, Michele Surian and Giovanni Soranzo, the Venetian ambassadors at the Curia, sent their reports from Rome to the apprehensive Signoria. With no less regularity the doge and Senate were belaboring them with letters ranging from high hopes to lowly depression concerning the projected Holy League against the Turks. Philip II's ministers in Rome—Cardinals Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle and Francisco Pacheco de Toledo and the ambassador Don Juan de Zúñiga—were impeding the alliance, and frustrating the king's good intentions. At least the Venetians found it diplomatic to say so. But the interests of Venice were also those of Christendom, especially those of the king. If Venice removed herself as an obstacle to the Turkish advance, Philip's possessions and the papal states would be exposed to the "impeto et forze di questo fiero et potentissimo inimico commune." The Venetians were not claiming the high command of the league. They were quite content that it should go to Don John of Austria, "and in the absence of his Highness, to the general of the Church," Marc' Antonio Colonna.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *Correspondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 62, pp. 168–70.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. the letter of the doge and Senate to Surian and Soranzo, dated 14 November, 1570, in *Deliberazioni, Roma Ordinaria (Secreta)*, Reg. 3, fols. 11'–13' [21'–23']. The tentative articles of the League are discussed in detail in this letter. It may be noted that "quanto al capitano general da mar, si contentamo del capitolo notato, che l' illustrissimo Signor Don Gioan d'Austria habbi tal carico, et in absentia dell' Altezza sua il general della Chiesa [Marc' Antonio Colonna] . . ." and see, *ibid.*, fols. 13' ff. [23' ff.], 16 ff. [26 ff.]. When the league had been finally negotiated, as Surian and Soranzo were told, Venice would require grain from Philip's kingdom of Sicily (*ibid.*, fol. 20' [30'], doc. dated 8 December, 1570).

The Signoria was willing to make concessions to Spain, giving way to the demands of Philip's ministers in Rome, at least so the doge and Senate claimed. They had been looking forward to the completion and publication of the anti-Turkish league, but the negotiations still dragged on and on. Surian and Soranzo were instructed to go to Pius V, and tell him "che con grandissimo nostro dolor vedemo diferirsi tanto la conclusione della Lega et per consequenza le provisioni per resistere alle forze del Turco." If the goodness of God did not open the eyes of the Christian princes to see in the afflictions of others their own impending perils, they might soon find Turkish arms in the very heart of Italy. The Senate wanted to recognize Don John of Austria as the general of the allied armada, publish the formation of the league, and settle minor differences later. They urged the pope to send another envoy to Spain—they would do likewise—to help bring about the alliance which Christendom needed.<sup>84</sup>

In Rome there were bitter exchanges between the partisans of Marc' Antonio Colonna and the Venetians on the one hand and those of Giannandrea Doria on the other, with each side publishing tracts of self-justification, blaming their opponents for the expensive failure to achieve anything. Cardinal Charles de Rambouillet acquired copies of the tracts, which he sent to Charles IX as early as 5 November, when he described the situation in Rome. The enmity between Colonna and Doria was increasing to an alarming pitch, and Pius V had been appalled by the futility of the expedition: "le pape en est fort travaillé." While some persons were making a pretense of not believing that the

Don John's royal position and prestige were such that his overall command of the projected expedition for 1571 was accepted by the Venetians, but in the event of his absence they did not want a Spaniard to take over as his lieutenant (*cf.* Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX [1972], nos. 291, 294, pp. 398, 401, letters of Facchinetti to Rusticucci, dated 27 November and 6 December, 1570). Above all, the Venetians could not abide the thought of Doria's being appointed Don John's lieutenant.

Now that the revolt of the Moriscoes had been wholly suppressed, Don John was available for service with the league (*cf.* Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 6', an *avviso* dated at Genoa on 19 January, 1571): "È passato di qua un corriero di Spagna che parti da quella corte alli 4 del presente che dà nuova essere arrivato a detta corte il Signor Don Giovanni d' Austria ritornato dalla guerra di Granata, la qual era finita. . . . Che l' Signor Gio. Andrea Doria era stato spedito per Italia con celerità di sua Maestà Cattolica, che l' detto corriero havea lasciato il Signor Pompeo Colonna in Avignone, che andava alla volta di Roma."

<sup>84</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fols. 20–21' [30–31'], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, doc. dated 13 December, 1570.

Turks had taken Nicosia, as Rambouillet wrote Charles IX, and the Venetians were certainly not publishing the fact, the truth was that now

the island of Cyprus is without hope of any relief for eight or nine months, almost all the people on the island having revolted against the Signoria of Venice, and God knows whether Famagusta will be strong enough to hold out for so long a time against the forces of the Turk, since even the inhabitants of the place are supporting them.

The hostilities that had been engendered by the failure of the expedition were not making the league any easier to effect, although both sides "are making more of a demonstration of desiring it than ever before." Philip II had managed to wring from the pope "toutes les grâces et concessions," and doubtless hoped "that his Holiness will never revoke them if the said league is formed." Rambouillet was frequently asked whether his king would enter the anti-Turkish league. His answer was certainly, "fort volontiers en toute conjunction et unyon qui se fera pour le bien de la chrestienté," but that Charles IX would not waste so much time in such empty words as Rambouillet had seen banded back and forth for the past year. When the negotiators ceased their self-seeking, Charles would make clear that he had at heart the well-being and peace of Christendom.<sup>85</sup>

While Don John of Austria had been declared general of the Christian armada—if the league were ever to be formed—the question of his lieutenant was still being debated. Philip II wanted Don John to be supreme commander on land as well as at sea, to which the Venetians would not consent. Don John expressed himself as content with only the maritime command, provided he could name his own lieutenant to serve in his place if for some reason he could not be on hand. To this neither Pius V nor the Signoria would agree. Pius insisted that his own "general," Marc Antonio Colonna, should take command in the absence of Don John. There were those who thought that Philip would never send his half-brother as commander of the expedition, fearing perhaps that it might inflate his ambition. The weeks, months, of discussion had produced more bitterness than concurrence. The Venetians found Cardinals Granvelle and Pacheco difficult to deal with, and indeed they were, but in mid-December

(1570) Rambouillet wrote Charles IX that Granvelle and Pacheco had recently said that the Venetian ambassadors were bargaining with them "as if the Catholic king had laid siege to Famagusta!"

The king's ministers were, however, trying to take advantage of the Venetians' need. Would there be a league? One day the negotiations would stop; the next day they would be broken off. Pius V told Rambouillet that the obstacles the king's ministers were putting in the way of an alliance amazed him. They seemed not to be considering their master's own need of the league. If the Venetians fared badly enough, they would have to reach an accord with the Turks. As far as Rambouillet was concerned, six full months of haggling had produced no worthwhile results, although he suspected that extreme necessity would lead the Venetians to submit to the Spanish ministers' demands.<sup>86</sup>

The Venetians were not alone in their altercations with Philip II's ministers. As the doge and Senate informed Leonardo Donado in Spain, Pius V was having his difficulties with Granvelle, Pacheco, and Zúñiga over who was to have the high command "in the absence of the lord Don John of Austria." The Signoria found the absurdly slow pace of the negotiations wearying and distressing. Time was passing, introducing delays into the necessary preparations for the Christian armada that was supposed to meet the Turks in 1571. One could be certain that the Turks were getting ready. They would send out their forces first, cut off the eastward course of the allied armada, and achieve some success "a danno et ignominia del nome Christiano," giving the Turks an opportunity to show their contempt for the soldiery of the Christian princes.

The Turks were united, "massimamente essendoli cresciuta l'audacia per li felici progressi del presente anno," their audacity being increased by their success at Nicosia. Donado must inform Philip II of the Signoria's terrible anxiety that the failure to conclude the covenant augured ill for the future. One could only hope for the quick resolution of their difficulties and the publication of the league. Donado must also urge Philip to order his ministers to see to the provisioning of the Spanish fleet so that when the alliance was at last agreed to, its terms might be put into immediate effect.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 124–26. Pius V had been trying, unsuccessfully, to secure French adherence to a league against the Turks (Stella, *Nunci Venezia*, IX [1972], no. 292, p. 399, letter of Rusticucci to Facchinetti, dated 29 November, 1570).

<sup>86</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 128.

<sup>87</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 37r [58r], all' ambasciatore in Spagna, doc. dated 14 December, 1570, and note *ibid.*, fols.

Meanwhile the Venetian ambassadors at the imperial court, Giacomo Soranzo and Giovanni Michiel, had been putting such pressure as they could upon the Emperor Maximilian II to enter the war against the Turks, but quite without success.<sup>88</sup> Some persons of importance at the Spanish court, however, feared that the emperor's entrance into the league would be less of a help than a hindrance to his allies, for his resources of men and money were so slight that, as his *confederati*, they would have to bail him out when the Turks took the field against him. Any assistance rendered to Maximilian would thus divert the allies from their "principal enterprise." Furthermore, such was the unpredictability of the Germans that Maximilian's embarking on a war with the Turks might well mean defeat for him.<sup>89</sup> As usual when it came to planning a campaign on land or at sea, there were marked differences of opinion.

Ascanio della Corgna wrote his brother Fulvio, the cardinal of Perugia, a detailed letter from Naples (on 17 December, 1570), setting forth his reasons for believing that a league made up of the pope, the Catholic king, and the Venetians could not possibly accomplish anything worthwhile. Like Pallavicini, Ascanio was an old campaigner. In his opinion one needed a land army, in fact a largely German army, to attack the Turks in conjunction with the Christian armada. Since such an army could only reach the Turks through the states of the emperor, he must become part of the league if the allies were to achieve any success of significance.<sup>90</sup>

67°-68° [88°-89°]. Although Donado had clearly not received this letter by 9 January (1571), he was well aware that the lieutenancy was the chief stumbling block the negotiators then faced. Cardinal Diego de Espinosa thought that Pius V should not, as pope, concern himself with "questions of arms" (*che al papa non si conviene trattar le arme*), but should confine himself to uniting the princes and setting them on their way with prayers and benedictions (Brunetti and Vitale, *Corrispondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 64, pp. 176-77). Confining the preacher to the pulpit has a long history.

<sup>88</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 38°-39° [59°-60°].

<sup>89</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *Corrispondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 63, p. 173, letter of Donado to the doge and Senate, dated 27 December, 1570: "Li humori di Germania sono molto diversi, et il romper la guerra al Turco con le sue sole proprie forze [i.e., of Maximilian] potria metterlo in grande confubbia di perder del suo."

<sup>90</sup> Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 96°-97°, *Copia di una lettera scritta dal Signor Ascanio della Corgna al Cardinal di Perugia suo fratello*, dated at Naples on 17 December, 1570, with another text of this letter in Cod. Urb. lat. 855, fols. 322°-325°: "... Hora vostra Signoria illustrissima et reverendissima è in Roma et ragionevolmente ogni di le doverà venir occasione di parlarne et con sua Santità et con quei signori deputati et particolarmente co' l' Cardinal Morone ho pensato de dir a lei quanto mi occorre,

The Signoria was trying to maintain the Venetian fleet in a state of readiness for action when

et è questo: che la Lega qual si tratta fra 'l Papa, Re Cattolico, e Venetiani senza l' Imperatore non possa far cosa sostantiale ad offensione de Turchi per le ragioni seguenti:"

Assuming the Holy See, Spain, and Venice could put together an armada superior to that of the Turks, it would still not be strong enough to seek out the enemy's armada in their own ports, under their own fortresses, or in any place in Turkish territory where they had the advantage of heavy artillery and of access to reinforcements of infantry, "e di questo non credo che si dubiti, vedendosi che ogni barca disarmata e carica di mercantia sta sicura sotto una delle nostre torri di marina da tutti li corsari del mare." Having put troops ashore, the Christian armada could become divided or depleted of manpower, and then how could it meet the Turkish armada at sea?

"Stanti questi presupposti, quali a me pare che non si possano negare nè in tutto nè in parte, chiara cosa è che non si può pensare alla recuperatione di Cipro, essendo quell' isola in capo del mondo et in mezzo alle forze del Turco, et trovandosi dentro anco un' esercito numero de cavalli e fanti impadronito di Nicosia e di tutto 'l regno da Famagosta in poi che sta in un' angolo di detta isola, dove non può dare a nimici impedimento o disturbo alcuno, che non si fortifichino o provvedano di tutte le cose necessarie."

Obviously in Ascanio della Corgna's opinion no Christian armada could by itself recover Nicosia or save Famagosta. One might direct the allies' attack upon one of the islands of the Archipelago or try to take Castelnuovo or Valona or some such place, but such an undertaking would do the Turk little harm and Christendom little good, and would hardly justify the costs of the armada. Now and then one heard that if the western powers made a good start, the Greeks would rise in revolt. No, said della Corgna, they would not do so: "... Nè si può con ragione far fondamento sopra i Greci che s' habbino da levare e ribellare al Turco subito che vederanno l' armata et che basti solamente di portare e dar loro delle arme come molti dicono perchè i poveretti sono stati altre volte ingannati et castigati tanto asperamente che stanno impauriti di sorte che non sono per far molto alcuno se prima non vedono che le genti Christiane habbino fatto qualche buon progresso e fermato molto bene il piede."

Was there any hope, then, any likelihood of the Christians' succeeding in the venture being planned for 1571? Perhaps so, if the Emperor Maximilian II could be persuaded to enter the league, for a land army was as much needed as the Christian armada: "Onde concludo che per far danno al Turco sia necessario oltre l' armata di mare condurre esercito per terra et questo io giudico che difficilmente si possa fare senza l' aiuto et opera dell' Imperatore, prima per haver soldati buoni delli quali tanto da piedi come da cavallo non se può avere a sufficienza senza Allemanni, e poi perchè lo esercito haverà da passare per li stati di sua Maestà cesarea e da quelli esser provveduti di vettaggie et cose necessarie, essendo il paese de Venetiani che confina con Turchi asperissimo e sterilissimo."

Although the Christian armada might seize a few islands in the Aegean or a town or two on the Dalmatian coast, the tripartite league could do little without the emperor. Being pro-Hapsburg (*cf.* Chapter 19, note 113), it did occur to della Corgna that the league might profitably turn toward Algiers, Tunis, or some other Turkish stronghold on the North-African coast, where (like the Christians in the Levant) the Turks would be at a disadvantage but, even so, della Corgna did admit that this would also be of but slight importance. His Holiness should,

the spring came. If the galleys were disarmed as usual for the months of December, January, and February, it would be difficult or almost impossible "to find the oarsmen to arm them in time." The losses of manpower owing to illness and death had been fearful during the year 1570. It would be harder than ever to recruit oarsmen for the coming year. In a letter of 4 December to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome, therefore, the doge and Senate stated that they were retaining in service until March the oarsmen then aboard the galleys in their colonial outposts. The ambassadors must make his Holiness understand the necessity of keeping his own galleys and crews in a similar state of readiness so that he and they alike could meet their obligations to the league when the time came. The doge and Senate also wanted the pope to remove the obstacles being put in their way, in the papal states, which prevented their recruitment of the infantry necessary for service in the Levant.<sup>91</sup>

The war had brought higher prices for food, clothing, lodgings, and almost everything else. The infantrymen whom the Signoria had sent into the Levant were having a hard time keeping body and soul together on their current earnings. Wages had been raised for the infantry in the service of the Republic in Dalmatia, and on 7 De-

ember (1570) the motion was made in the Senate that wages should be raised from thirty to thirty-six ducats a year for all infantrymen who had been sent or would in the future be sent into the Levant "during the present war with the Turk." The motion was passed with an overwhelming vote.<sup>92</sup>

When on 13 December Sebastiano Venier was informed of his appointment to replace Girolamo Zane as captain-general of the sea, he was told that aid must go to Famagusta if it had not already been sent. All the galleys at Candia must be armed, i.e., equipped with oarsmen and infantry. The Signoria was going to purchase grain in Sicily.<sup>93</sup> To the colonial government at Candia the Senate wrote on the same day:

We have learned from your letter of the 27th of last October of the scarcity of victuals [*biave*] which now obtains on our island, . . . and so to provide for such need we shall send you within a few days two large ships loaded with grain, ship's biscuit, and other sorts of victuals which are ready to go. We have also ordered that a large supply of grain should be bought in Sicily and sent to you from there with all possible speed so that you may not have to suffer from a lack of these things. We shall also send you quickly a large garrison of soldiers, munitions, and money both to pay the soldiers and to arm the galleys at the island. You will keep the crews ready and in order, since we want to provide in every way and by all possible means for the defense and protection of that realm and of all those faithful subjects who are so dear to us.<sup>94</sup>

There was reason to be prepared, for it was common knowledge in Istanbul that Sultan Selim II was spending the winter in Adrianople (Edirne) to attend to the gathering of provisions and equipment for his land forces, "per la guerra dalla parte di terra dell' anno venturo." The Turkish armada was still in the Archipelago. It was generally believed that it would remain outside the Dardanelles to get an earlier start, when the spring came,

therefore, turn to the emperor, and make every effort "to induce him to enter the league." And della Corgna relied upon his brother, Cardinal Fulvio, to take this word both to the pope and to Cardinal Morone.

<sup>91</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fol. 19 [29], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, doc. dated 4 December, 1570, and note fol. 19' [29']. On the prohibition of recruitment in the papal states, see, *ibid.*, fols. 29'-31' [39'-41'], doc. dated 17 February, 1571 (Ven. style 1570), the proposed commission for the Venetian secretary Giovanni Frumento, who was to go as an envoy to Rome (but did not do so, because the Senate rejected the motion to send him). Frumento was to be instructed, if he went to the Curia, to urge upon the pope ". . . la conclusione della Lega tanto necessaria et utile per difesa et conservazione della Christianità et per l'oppressione del comune inimico. Fatto questo officio le soggiungerai che havendo noi per avvisi della predetti nostri ambasciatori [Surian and Soranzo] inteso la prohibition et bando publicato di ordine di sua Beatitudine et mandato fuori in stampa circa il non potersi trare soldati del stato ecclesiastico, n' habbiamo sentito dispiacere non poco, perchè andando queste voci et avvisi all' orecchie dello inimico, sicome certamente saranno mandati dalli Hebrei et dalli esploratori sui, che sono in ogni loco, si farà certo giudicio che fra sua Santità et noi non vi sia buona unione et intelligentia, cosa che gli sarà grata, et lo farà tanto più ardito alle imprese che egli disegna di fare . . ." (fol. 30' [40']). The ban against recruitment in papal territory had been circulated in print. The Porte would learn of it from the Jews and Turkish spies, which would lead the pashas to assume that there was no strong bond of union between Venice and the Holy See, and thus lead them to increased anti-Christian activity.

<sup>92</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 256' [301'], resolution of the Senate dated 7 December, 1570: "È così grande al presente la carestia di tutte le cose necessarie al vivere, che difficilmente si possono trattenerne i fanti che da questa città sono stati espediti in Levante con la paga che si dà loro per l'ordinario, al che essendo tanto più ragionevole di provvedere quanto che è stato ancora in questa materia provveduto a fanti nostri di Dalmatia, l'anderà parte che durante la presente guerra col Turco tutte le paghe dei fanti nostri che sono stati mandati, et che nell'avvenire si manderanno, in Levante siano nell'avvenire ridotte da dieci a paghe dodeci all'anno, a ducati tre per paga, acciò che havendo con questo mezzo maggior commodità di provvedere ai loro bisogni possano tanto più volentieri et prontamente attendere ai nostri servitii, +128, 1, 0."

<sup>93</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 35'-36' [56'-57'].

<sup>94</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 36' [57'].

to do the Venetians all the more damage. On 30 December (1570), therefore, the doge and Senate wrote the ambassadors Surian and Soranzo in Rome to pass the warning on to Pius V. Venetian towns and fortresses were in the "most evident peril" not only in the Levant but also in Dalmatia. They needed grain and soldiers desperately. The ambassadors were to thank his Holiness for the 4,000 measures (*some*) of grain, for the export of which he had recently granted a license. They must keep reminding him, however, that more grain was required, and more soldiers, for Dalmatia was the Christian bulwark (*antemural*) against the Turk. Also it lay just across the Adriatic from Italy and the papal states.<sup>95</sup> Cattaro (Kotor) and Dulcigno (Ulcinj) were already in grave danger, and continued to be so for months to come.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fol. 21 [31], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, doc. dated 30 December, 1570, and see, *ibid.*, fols. 22-24' [32'-34'], also to Surian and Soranzo, doc. dated 10 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570). On the *soma* as a measure for liquids and dry products, see R. E. Zupko, *Italian Weights and Measures from the Middle Ages to the Nineteenth Century*, Philadelphia, 1981, pp. 258 ff.

<sup>96</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 70 [91], *al conte et capitano di Dolcigno*, doc. dated 19 February, 1571 (Ven. style 1570). The Senate was suspicious of a Turkish refugee, who had appeared in Dalmatia, apparently believing him to be an agent of the Porte (*ibid.*). On 9 April, 1571, Giacomo Malatesta was appointed governor-general of Cattaro and of "all the militia of Albania" (*ibid.*, fol. 81' [102]'). The Turks had constructed two bastions at the "bocca di Cattaro," which the Senate assumed the rector and the provveditore of Cattaro had demolished or would demolish as soon as possible (fol. 112 [133], docs. dated 12 July, 1571). In August Dulcigno was in danger (fols. 126'-127' [147'-148'], 128' [149]').

On Giacomo Malatesta's efforts against the Turks, cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 32', *avviso* from Venice, dated 21 March, 1571, and esp. fols. 70'-71', an *avviso* from Cattaro, dated 31 May; Malatesta, "non havendo potuto supportare più la insolentia delli Turchi di questi confini," led a company of two hundred footsoldiers from Cattaro in an attack upon the Turks, burning and sacking the countryside for six miles within Ottoman territory but the Turks, descending from the hills, suddenly struck his men unexpectedly and took him prisoner, killing and capturing half of his entire company as well as several of his captains.

Pope Pius V was distressed by Malatesta's capture, and said that he wished to contribute a large part of the 3,000 scudi, which the Turks had set as the amount of his ransom (*ibid.*, fol. 78'), an *avviso* from Rome, dated 25 June, 1571). The Signoria planned to send Sforza Pallavicini to Zara to review the situation in Dalmatia, and it was thought that the exiled Sciarra Martinengo might be going to replace Malatesta in Albania (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 74', di *Venetia li 20 Giugno*, and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 75'; Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 16, p. 50). The ban was lifted from Martinengo, who did go to Albania with five hundred French infantry, who had been lodged and received payment at Chioggia (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 81', doc. dated 26 June, 1571, and cf. fols. 129', 161'; Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 36, pp. 73-74, and nos. 46, 99, *et alibi*).

It never rained but it poured, and when it did, it drove the price of grain up to six scudi for each measure of some twenty-five or more pounds (*il rubbio*). On Wednesday, 3 January (1571), there was a fearful storm in Rome with thunder and terrifying flashes of lightning, one of which struck the campanile of S. Pietro, hurling a good part of the chapel to the ground, and wreaking havoc in the apartments of Cardinals Antonio Carafa and Gian Paolo della Chiesa.<sup>97</sup>

The Venetians began the year 1571 with their fleet in grave disorder. They needed more than grain and soldiers. What had gone wrong? On 4 January the Senate had voted, as we have seen, for the election of three nobles to serve for one year as "inquisitors, syndics, and advocates" to determine the causes of their sad showing at sea. Those responsible for the deplorable condition of the fleet were to be duly punished "si per la satisfatione della giustitia come per essempto et terror alli altri." The inquisitors were to investigate everyone and spare no one.<sup>98</sup>

The fleet was short of everything. In February the Senate appealed to Duke Alfonso II of Ferrara for oarsmen.<sup>99</sup> Famagusta was in a parlous state; Candia was also in need of provisions.<sup>100</sup> In Venice the most serious sentences were being lifted, and rich rogues and exiles allowed to return to the city, if they would serve in Candia or pay for the recruitment of oarsmen.<sup>101</sup>

Although money was also needed in Rome, Pius V had taken away the hope of many rich prelates of becoming cardinals, notwithstanding the ad-

<sup>97</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, *Avvisi del mondo dell' anno MDLXXI*, "di Roma 6 Gennaio," fol. 3, by mod. stamped enumeration. On the *rubbio*, cf. Zupko, *Italian Weights and Measures*, pp. 231-35.

<sup>98</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fols. 269-270' [314-315'], and cf. Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fol. 25' [33'], doc. dated 10 January, 1571 (Ven. Style 1570). The first of these two texts has been cited above, note 65.

<sup>99</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 39, fol. 295 [341], doc. dated 10 February, 1571 (Ven. style 1570).

<sup>100</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fol. 25 [35], doc. dated 21 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570), and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 27' [37'].

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 22', di *Venetia 14 Gennaio* (report from Venice, dated 14 January, 1571): "Hieri sera per l' illustrissimo Consiglio di X fu dato un salvoconduto per cinque anni al Conte Piero Avogadro, che era bandito per detto illustrissimo Consiglio di X, et che vada a servir in Candia con 2,000 fanti." On Pietro Avogadro, note also, *ibid.*, fols. 32', 45'-46', 52', and on the Council of Ten's efforts to raise money for the war, cf. *ibid.*, fol. 72', di *Venetia 7 Giugno*: "Hieri sera per l' illustrissimo Consiglio di X fu assolto il magnifico Messer Alvise Dolfino dal suo bando con pagar 30 huomini al remo per un' anno."



vantage the Camera Apostolica might have derived from the sale of the offices they would vacate. Pius had said that he was going to leave the next promotion of cardinals to his successor. He had appointed sixteen cardinals, as we have noted, on 17 May (1570), and indeed he named no more during the remainder of his papacy. In the meantime plans were being made to establish a new loan office (*monte*) in which to deposit the proceeds to be obtained from the creation of five new clerks of the Camera. The number of referendaries was to be set at twenty-four. The new appointees' payments for office, set at 3,000 scudi each, would also be deposited. The number of "participating" protonotaries, abbreviators, chamberlains, and apostolic secretaries would be doubled in order to

redeem offices, *entrare* [*in carica*], sold at ten percent to resell them at six percent.<sup>102</sup>

Such "offices" were actually titles to annuities; purchased from the papacy, they paid a set income. Like a modern insurance company, the Curia assumed in each case that the participant would not live long enough for his receipts to exceed his capital investment. If returns from the sales of these offices were perhaps meager in the long run, they were worthwhile in that they produced an immediate inflow of cash, and cash was needed in view of the Turkish menace.

---

<sup>102</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 5, by mod. stamped enumeration, an *avviso* dated at Rome on 13 January, 1571, and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 8', 16', 17'-18', 19', 21-22'.

## 23. THE HOLY LEAGUE, THE CONTINUING WAR WITH THE TURKS, AND THE FALL OF FAMAGUSTA (1571)

AS A NEW YEAR of naval warfare lay ahead, the Venetian Senate was making every effort within the resources of the Republic to protect Famagusta, on whose fate would depend the future, Venetian or Turkish, of the island of Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> Letters from Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the bailie in Istanbul, up to 7 January (1571) brought the Signoria discouraging news of the "grandissimi apparati" which the Turks were making with the intention of attacking the island of Corfu. As the doge and Senate wrote Leonardo Donado (Donà), their ambassador at the court of Philip II, they were beset with a vast concern and desire to see "la conclusione della lega tanto necessaria, conoscendo ogni dilazione esser grandemente dannosa."<sup>2</sup>

On the island of Cyprus there were only two fortified cities worthy of the name *fortezze*, Nicosia and Famagusta. Having taken the one, the Turks had quickly moved on to the other.<sup>3</sup> On 18 Jan-

uary (1571) Girolamo Ragazzoni, the bishop of Famagusta, arrived in Venice aboard the galley *Donata*, having been sent by the rectors of the city to give an account to the Signoria of the condition of their fortress and of recent events in Cyprus. Ragazzoni dined with the nuncio Giannantonio Facchinetti on the morning of 20 January, and gave him the reassuring news that Famagusta was so built upon rock that the walls were not to be undermined either by explosion or by sapping. Astorre Baglione and the other captains entertained the "almost certain hope" that they could defend themselves against Turkish attacks. Their chief fear was hunger. The Turks had abandoned the thought of taking Famagusta by assault, and so had laid siege to the city, filling the surrounding countryside with infantry and cavalry. It was impossible to bring supplies within the walls. Wells within the city provided the besieged with water enough, but there was a lack of wine. They had salted meat and grain enough to last a year. Besides the local militia there had been 2,200 Italians within the city walls when Ragazzoni had left Famagusta on 4 November (1570), but one could place little confidence in about a third of them.<sup>4</sup>

Almost the only successful move made by the Venetians in 1570 was Marco Querini's destruction of the Turkish fortress at Brazzo di Maina on the south-central coast of the Morea, toward the beginning of the expedition. Now, on 4 January (1571), Querini was elected "provveditor dell' arma esitente in Candia" to replace Antonio da Canale.<sup>5</sup> (The latter was soon reappointed, and served with Querini.) As we have seen from Palavicini's account of the expedition, the captain-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 42<sup>v</sup>-46<sup>r</sup> [63<sup>v</sup>-67<sup>r</sup>], 49<sup>r</sup> [70<sup>r</sup>], 51<sup>r</sup> [72<sup>r</sup>], 53<sup>r</sup> [74<sup>r</sup>], 58<sup>r</sup>-59<sup>r</sup> [79<sup>r</sup>-80<sup>r</sup>].

<sup>2</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 77 [98], all' *ambassador in Spagna*, doc. dated 24 February, 1571, and out of chronological order in the register since it was "non data in tempore" for insertion in its proper place. On the Turkish threat to the islands and Dalmatia as well as the concern of Pius V, "conservatore della fede di Christo," for the formation of the Holy League, note Contarini, *Historia* [1572], fol. 21. For Marc' Antonio Barbaro's dispatches from Istanbul as well as for his trials and tribulations under house arrest at Pera (*in casa mia a modo di prigioniero*), see Michel Lesure, "Notes et documents sur les relations vénéto-ottomanes, 1570-1573," *Turcica*, IV (1972), 134-64, and VIII-1 (1976), 117-56.

<sup>3</sup> The Venetian commanders at Kyrenia (Cerines) surrendered immediately after the fall of Nicosia; the Turks were installed in Paphos, Limassol, and Salines; and by 16 and 17 September (1570) large Turkish forces were under the walls of Famagusta (Policarpo Catizzani, ed., *Narrazione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta nell' anno 1571 da un manoscritto del Capitano Angelo Gatto da Orvieto*, Orvieto, 1895, pp. 38-39; Contarini, *Historia* [1572], fol. 13; *Del Successo in Famagosta [1570-71]*, *diario d' un contemporaneo* [1879], pp. 22-23; Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa*, p. 24, with the usual wrong dates in the accompanying Italian translation; Calepio, "Prinse de Cypre," in Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* [1580, repr. 1968], p. 266; Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* [ed. 1827], pp. 122 ff.; Grazianni, trans. Cobham, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta* . . . [1899], p. 43; Foglietta, trans. Cobham, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta* . . . related by Uberto Foglietta [1903], p. 22; Sereno, *Commentari* [1845], p. 123; Quarti, *La Guerra contro il Turco in Cipro* . . . [1935], pp. 315 ff.; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 987-88).

<sup>4</sup> Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX (1972), no. 313, p. 433, a letter of Facchinetti to Pius V's nephew, Cardinal Michele Bonelli. According to Angelo Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio* (ed. 1895), p. 45, on 31 December, 1571, the commanders in Famagusta held a general review of their troops, and "d' Italiani furno in tutto da duo millia in circa, et i Greci quattro millia in circa, e cento cavalli." On 5 July, 1571, Gatto was given command of a small detachment of troops, replacing a captain named Francesco Foresti, who was killed (*ibid.*, p. 79); taken a prisoner on the fall of Famagusta, Gatto finished writing his diary of the siege "on 19 November, 1573, in the tower on the Black Sea," in Istanbul (p. 125).

<sup>5</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 40 [61], docs. dated 4 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570).

general Zane had assigned four ships (*navi*) and 1,700 men to the relief of Famagusta. On 16 January Querini set sail for Famagusta with a dozen galleys as escort for the four ships "cariche di presidio," loaded with men and munitions, under the charge of a certain Marc' Antonio Querini, whose name has caused some confusion in the sources.

Marc' Antonio had been chosen by the rectors of Candia to take the place of Pietro Tron, who had died unexpectedly. A thirteenth galley under Francesco da Molin was to have formed part of the escort, but Marco Querini sent it back from Cape Salamone (Akra Plaka) on the eastern end of Crete, because so many of his men had become ill, as Contarini tells us, "per essergli cascati alquanto huomini in infermità." One suspects that the illness was typhus fever, which had undone hundreds of men on the expedition of the year before.<sup>6</sup>

The relief force under the two Querini, sailing (one would think) around Cape Greco on the southeastern tip of Cyprus, reached Famagusta on 26 January after a voyage of ten days.<sup>7</sup> As the four ships, which had taken a somewhat different course from the galleys (*havendo fatto diverso cammino dalle galee*), made for the harbor, they were pursued by seven Turkish galleys which had been stationed at the lookout in Costanza, a half dozen miles north of Famagusta. Somehow or other Marco Querini had brought his galleys close enough to the coast to keep them out of sight, and now suddenly emerged to attack the Turkish galleys. The Turks made for the shore, which they

reached in a hurry, but Querini assailed them all day. He could not approach too close to the shore, for the Turkish land forces were at hand, now laying siege to Famagusta. But he shot three of the Turkish galleys to pieces, almost sinking them (*con li pezzi le combattè, et ne gittò tre di esse a fondo*). At nightfall the four *navi* were towed into the harbor of Famagusta under the fortress. The relief force, munitions, and supplies were received "with incomparable joy."

On the following day Querini caught sight of a galleass (*maona*) at sea. He gave chase and captured the vessel "loaded with Turks, munitions, and supplies which were going to Mustafa's army." The Turks were taken without a struggle, having allowed Querini's galleys to draw up alongside them under the assumption they were part of the sultan's armada. The next day Querini decided to try to take on the four Turkish galleys that had largely escaped his gunfire (on 26 January), but going back to Costanza, he found that the Turks had fled in their galleys, having first burned such of the hulks of the three ruined galleys as remained above water. He did, however, set fire to a caramusalino. A day later Querini seized another vessel "loaded with Turkish soldiers of fortune [*venturieri*], munitions, and supplies for the said army [of Mustafa]."

The four Venetian *navi* and the captured Turkish ships were unloaded at Famagusta, while the adventurous Querini ranged like a corsair through the neighboring waters, destroying some Turkish forts "on the rocks of Gambella not far from the fortress of Famagusta." He also captured a French vessel, and demolished the Turkish mole at Costanza, which had served as a defense for the galleys at the lookout. Having spent three weeks in these operations, Marco Querini took leave of the lords of Famagusta. He assured them that aid would come to them. Then, with the four *navi* and the three captured vessels, he set sail on 16 February, arriving back in the island of Crete on the twenty-first after a voyage of five days. At Candia he found that Sebastiano Venier had received letters from the doge and Senate informing him that he had been elected captain-general, and Querini himself provveditore, of the Republic's fleet.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> At this time the soldier-engineer Giulio Savorgnan was afflicted with typhus fever in Zara, as we learn from an *avviso* in the Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 6, dated at Venice on 19 January, 1571: "Da Zara s' intende che tuttavia stava mal di petechie [typhus fever] il Signor Giulio Savorgnano . . ." and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 8<sup>r</sup>, to the effect that he was getting better, and then, fol. 9<sup>r</sup>, that he had become worse. He survived.

Upon his departure from Crete the captain-general Zane had left under Marco Querini's command at Candia twenty armed galleys, twenty-five hulls, and nine or ten galleys with enslaved oarsmen (Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX [1972], no. 294, p. 403, a letter of the nuncio Giannantonio Facchinetti to Cardinal Girolamo Rusticucci, dated at Venice on 6 December, 1570).

<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio* (ed. 1895), p. 45, says, "Alli 25 [Gennaio] . . . si scoprese al Capo di S. Andrea quattro navi e dodici galere venetiane quali veniva de conserva con le navi per condur in Famagosta il soccorso, monitione, e vettaglie." To go around Cape S. Andreas on the far northeast of Cyprus would not only add miles to Querini's voyage, but would expose him to attack from the coast of Asia Minor. On the other hand Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, in *Treviso MS. lit.* 505, p. 125, tells us, "Alli 24 di gennaio alle 12 ore dal Capo della Grega comparvero quattro navi grosse, per le quali fu fatto da noi una grandissima allegrezza. . . ."

<sup>8</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 21<sup>v</sup>-22<sup>r</sup>, and *cf.* Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 72-74; L. A. Visinoni, ed., *Del Successo in Famagosta (1570-1571)*, *diario d' un contemporaneo*, Venice, 1879, p. 26; N. Morosini, ed., *Relation del reverendo Padre Fra Agustin . . . fo prior in Famagosta nel monasterio de Santo Antonio de l' Ordene Eremitano . . .*, Venice, 1891, pp. 16-17; Antonio Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa . . .*, Venice, 1843, pp. 28, 30; Ca-

Of the contemporary sources relating to Marco Querini's "soccorso" to Cyprus, that of Contarini is informative and the most precise. Gatto adds a few facts, but begins by confusing Marco with Marc' Antonio Querini, who had charge of the four round ships.<sup>9</sup> Hitherto unused, however, is the account of Pietro Valderio, the viscount of Famagusta. He witnessed the arrival off Cape Greco of the four ships from Candia (which he puts on 24 January, 1571) and of Querini's twelve galleys (at dawn on the twenty-fifth) as well as the latter's departure, which he dates on 14 February. Since Valderio composed his account *ex post facto*, as we have stated, one is inclined to prefer Contarini's dates to his. The copyist in the mid-eighteenth century found the worn-entailed pages of Valderio's *Guerra di Cipro* awry in various places, and apparently that relating to Querini's "impresa" was among them. Nevertheless, the importance of Valderio's work is undeniable. He dwells on the vast joy with which the Famagustans first sighted the four ships off Cape Greco. Owing to the lack of wind in Famagusta Bay, they could not get close enough to the shore for immediate identification, but the Famagustans lighted fires on the evening of their arrival, "et ci fu repose." They received affirmative answers.

Fires were then lighted around all the walls of the city. The Famagustans did not sleep that night, awaiting the next day with boundless exuberance. When Querini's dozen galleys hove into view, they were assumed to be the relief force which the doge and Senate had promised "for our liberation, but we were deceived, because these twelve were the only galleys—they were escorting the ships which brought a modicum of munitions." According to Valderio, six (not seven) enemy galleys at the Turkish station in the harbor of Costanza had come forth that morning to attack the four ships, which were "very far from one another." Having spotted the dozen Venetian galleys, however, they

scurried back into their harbor, where they unloaded their artillery in the fort at Costanza. The commanders of "our galleys," Marco Querini and Santo Tron, advanced upon them, firing all their shipboard cannon, and the Famagustans did what they could with their own culverins from the "new cavalier" or gun emplacement they had just built. The Turkish galleys were badly battered, says Valderio, but although Querini himself went forward against them, the other galley commanders hung back, firing perfunctorily. Seeing that he was being abandoned, Querini had to give up the attack, and turned to the task of towing the four ships into the inner harbor of Famagusta, where the dozen Venetian galleys also cast anchor.

The commanders now came ashore, bringing letters from the colonial government of Candia. The captain of the four *navi*, Marc' Antonio Querini, counted out 6,562 ducats in cash, a welcome relief from the copper coinage which had been imposed upon the besieged. Among the supplies brought from Crete were four culverins, a half dozen cannon, a large quantity of cannon balls, "besides other artillery to the number of 46 pieces," and 1,400 kegs of gunpowder. Valderio and his fellow Famagustans were also glad to see 800 casks of wine unloaded as well as a fair supply of grain. It was not a large haul, but the commanders declared that it would do "for now." Alvise Martinengo had also come with the relief force, bringing with him two captains and 1,270 (not 1,700) soldiers.

On 26 January—always according to Valderio—Querini's twelve galleys seized a large Turkish ship coming south from the area of Rhizokarpaso. The Turks put up a fight "con morte de' nostri," but their ship was taken, loaded with supplies for Mustafa Pasha's army under the walls of Famagusta. There were some important Turks aboard. Their goods were sold at auction, to the sound of the trumpet, "even to their shoes." To Valderio's annoyance the copper money complicated purchases for the Famagustans. On the following day the commanders of the Venetian galleys spotted another ship off Cape Greco, apparently a French ship commandeered by the Turks. They later learned that a *defterdār*, an Ottoman financial official, was aboard "with a large treasure to pay the army." They went after the ship slowly and cautiously, because they wanted to seize its cargo without undue damage in order to sell it at auction. They gave the Turks too wide a scope, however, and the *defterdar* got safely ashore with the treasure. But finally the galleys did capture the French vessel, says Valderio, "in which there were spices, galleys, and nothing else."

lepio, in Cobham, *Excerpta Cyprica* (1908, repr. 1969), pp. 149–50, and in Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* (1580, repr. 1968), fol. 273; Longo, *Successo della guerra fatta con Selim Sultano*, in *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, p. 20, a mere reference; Bizarro, *Bellum Cypricum* (1573), pp. 91–92, of slight value; Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 190–92, also of slight value; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 944–47, who wrestles with various details of the conflicting sources.

For the reports reaching Venice up to 30 January on plans and preparations for the relief of Famagusta, see Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 7, by mod. stamped enumeration, and on "le quattro navi per il soccorso di Famagosta," *ibid.*, fol. 31, and note fols. 46', 47'. On the celebrations in Candia upon receipt of the news of Venier's election, see *ibid.*, fols. 33'–34'.

<sup>9</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 46–48.

If Querini's galleys had descended upon the harbor of Costanza in time, they could have seized the Turkish galleys which were taking cover there but, in Valderio's opinion, they delayed too long. When the Turks had removed the artillery and moorings from their two (not three) ruined galleys, the hulls of which they burned, they had made off during the night to Istanbul, where they reported on the arrival of Querini's relief force, such as it was. But if the Venetian galleys had prevented the escape of the Turks from Costanza, according to Valderio, they could have made a tremendous haul of booty "from the vessels which were continually coming and going to and from [Mustafa's] camp." At length, however, on 14 February Querini sailed off to Crete with his twelve galleys, the relief ships, and the vessels he had captured.<sup>10</sup> Gatto says that after Querini's "soccorsio" the defenders of Famagusta numbered 3,500 Italians, about 4,000 Greeks, and 200 horse.<sup>11</sup>

Two weeks later, on 1 March, according to Valderio, early in the morning there arrived off Cape Greco fifty galleys, "and we were overjoyed, thinking that this was the rest of the promised aid." As the Famagustans watched to see whether they would come into the harbor, the galleys sailed toward the landing at Mustafa Pasha's camp,

where a grand salute of artillery was fired. And this was Ali Pasha, who had come to find our ships and galleys, sent by the Gran Signore as a result of the report of Arab Ahmad, captain of the galleys which had escaped from Costanza.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Marco Querini took with him to Candia the four *navi* which had brought the supplies and 1,270 soldiers to Famagusta, the vessels he had seized from the Turks, and the ships which had brought Girolamo Martinengo's troops to Cyprus—the *Gradenaga*, *Cornara*, and *Contarina* (cf. Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, in *Treviso MS. ital.* 505, p. 114)—of which the old *Cornara* sank on the return voyage (Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 946, note 2). On the success of Querini's expedition, cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 349, p. 486. The French protested the seizure of the vessel belonging to them, and demanded restitution (*ibid.*, IX, no. 358, pp. 493–94). Cf., below, note 134.

The four *navi* had succeeded in conveying men, munitions, and supplies to Famagusta solely because of the protection they had received from Querini's twelve galleys, of which Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 379–80, seems quite unaware, and without disputing his reflections on the future of the round ship (*navis, nave, bateau rond*); his assertion that "en février [it was January] . . . l'artillerie des naves a foudroyé les galères turques" is quite untrue—the Turkish galleys were destroyed by Querini's Venetian galleys, not by the round ships.

<sup>11</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 54, according to the review of the troops (*la mostra generale*) held on 18 April, 1571, and cf. above, note 4.

<sup>12</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, in *Treviso MS. ital.* 505, pp. 125–31.

Valderio's putting the arrival of Piali on 1 March is a slip of the pen—or of the copyist—for, as Gatto informs us, Piali arrived with two flagships and eighty galleys on 30 March,<sup>13</sup> which corresponds to Contarini's date "al principio d' Aprile."

Contarini tells us that Selim II was "much disturbed" by Marco Querini's extraordinary delivery of aid to Famagusta, although Valderio found it inadequate. Selim ordered the decapitation of the bey of Chios, and the bey of Rhodes lost the honor of the night-time lantern (*fanò*) on the poop of his galley, which ceased to be a "flagship"—the penalties "for having let the said relief force get by to Famagusta." Selim also sent a *cha'ush* to the bey of Negroponte, who "under the penalty of impalement" had to assemble all the guardships in the Archipelago, go with them to Chios, and there await orders. Ali Pasha was then straightway dispatched from Istanbul with forty galleys and instructions to collect the guardships and proceed with them to Cyprus, while other galleys were being rearmed in the arsenal at Istanbul. Shortly after Ali's arrival at Chios the bey of Negroponte came with another forty galleys, the "galee delle guardie," and off they went to Cyprus. They reached the island at the beginning of April (1571), "portando a Mustafa molti rinfrescamenti"—bringing Mustafa Pasha a large number of reinforcements.<sup>14</sup>

On Sunday, 28 January (1571), M. de Granrie de Grandchamp, the French ambassador to the Porte, arrived in Venice, having left Istanbul on 13 November. The nuncio Facchinetti was soon in touch with him. Grandchamp had not made a formal entry into the Collegio, but had conferred privately with the Doge Alvise Mocenigo, to whom he brought a letter from the bailie Marc' Antonio

<sup>13</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 51: "Alli 30 [Marzo] . . . vennero dui fanò turcheschi con ottanta galere in circa, et per quanto s' intese da uno schiavo fuggito dal campo, il quale refere che el capitano de dui fanò era Piali Bassà . . . si fermò alquanto e poi si partì, e lasciò al servizio dell' esercito quaranta galere. . . ."

<sup>14</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 22'. An attempt in March and April (1571) to relieve Famagusta came to nothing. On 24 January Niccolò Donado had been appointed "capitano delle navi armate del soccorso di Famagosta" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 42'–43' [63'–64']); he was supposed to take 800 infantrymen under Honorio Scotto to Famagusta (cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 12, *avviso* dated at Venice on 12 February, 1571). Owing to delays in setting out and bad weather, however, Donado and Scotto got no farther eastward than the island of Crete (Contarini, *op. cit.*, fol. 23'; Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 52, and cf., *ibid.*, fol. 70'; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 948). Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX (1972), nos. 317–18, pp. 439, 440, on Niccolò Donado.

Barbaro. It was assumed that Barbaro's letter contained proposals for a Venetian accord with the Porte. The doge had, in fact, told Grandchamp, who passed the information on to Facchinetti, that the Signoria could not accept the Turkish terms, for the sultan and the pashas were demanding that the Venetians give up all their possessions outside the Gulf, i.e., the Adriatic, which would mean the loss of Corfu, Crete, Zante, Cephalonia, "et insomma quasi tutto che possiedono in mare!"

The Turks said that they were making "great preparations" for the year 1571. It was believed, however, that such discord and hatred existed among the sultan's chief ministers and pashas that even slight resistance to the Turkish armada and army might have saved Nicosia. The grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli had been opposed to the Turks' Cypriot venture from the beginning, and would have recalled the armada and the army at the first opportunity. Within six days Grandchamp would, supposedly, be leaving for France. He was waiting for ten Turkish horses to take to Charles IX, which delayed his departure.<sup>15</sup>

The Signoria must have dealt gingerly with Grandchamp, *huomo di mala natura*, for they hated him, and three months later (on 29-30 April) we find the doge and Senate trying to prevent his reappointment as the French ambassador to the Porte, where he had conducted himself (according to the doge) in such fashion that he had also earned the hatred of Mehmed Sokolli, the grand vizir. Since Mehmed governed the Ottoman empire, as the doge wrote Alvise Contarini, the Venetian ambassador in France, the latter must warn the French court that Grandchamp would do them no good in Istanbul.<sup>16</sup> Contarini succeeded in securing the revocation of Grandchamp's appointment, which had just been made, and François de Noailles, bishop of Dax, was sent to Istanbul in his place.<sup>17</sup>

The letters of Giannantonio Facchinetti from Venice to Rome and those of Leonardo Donado from Madrid to the doge and Senate are full of the efforts to put together the anti-Turkish league. It seemed that progress was being made, however slowly, but again on 4 February (1571) Donado warned the Senate that Philip II had other worries than the Turk, for he had just received unsettling news from Germany and Flanders.<sup>18</sup> The Signori Veneti knew what it meant to pursue self-interest. They rarely did otherwise, but even so it was disturbing to learn from Donado (in a dispatch dated 20 March) "that a large proportion of the informed persons at this court believe that the intentions of this most serene king are, for the present year, to undertake a campaign [*impresa*] against Tunis and the port of Bizerte in Barbary. . . ."

The king's ministers were very reserved; they never discussed the Spanish plans openly with Donado. The Moslem outposts on the Barbary coast always troubled the royal council, for Uluj-Ali (Occhiali) and the corsairs (like Khaireddin Barbarossa before them) were a notable threat to the king's domains in Spain, Italy, and Sicily. While the Turks were tied up with the Cypriot war, Philip and his commanders could more easily launch their attacks on Tunis and Bizerte with a better chance of success "than at any other time." Without taking a very firm stand, Donado gave reasons for his strong suspicion that Philip was turning toward North Africa, not toward the Levant.<sup>19</sup>

The Venetians did not worry so much about the Barbary Coast. Cyprus and the Turks were their main concerns. Agostino Barbarigo, the provveditore generale of the sea, was instructed to watch the comings and goings of the Turkish armada and to keep in close touch with the Venetian rectors of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Cerigo, and Candia. Barbarigo must send out "frigates and spies" whenever and wherever he thought they might pick up useful information. If he discovered any galley commander (*governator o sopracomito*) embezzling public funds or engaging in

<sup>15</sup> Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX (1972), no. 318, pp. 439-40, a letter of Facchinetti to Cardinal Michele Bonelli, dated 31 January, 1571; cf. *ibid.*, nos. 320-22, 324, 325, pp. 442, 443, 444, 447, 448, and see Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 140-42. On 19 January Leonardo Donado (Donà), the Venetian ambassador in Spain, had written the doge from Madrid that the Spanish were saying "che la Serenità vostra si concerterà prestissimo con Turchi et che Francesi, a quali questa lega non piace, saranno li mediatori!" (Brunetti and Vitale, *La Correspondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 67, p. 189).

<sup>16</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 87 [108]. This letter, which was rejected by the Senate in three votes on 29 April (1571), was accepted without essential change in a single vote on the thirtieth.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 105 [126], *all'ambassador in Franza*, doc. dated 23 June, 1571: "La dimostrazione di quel Christianissimo

re usata verso di noi et pronta et affettuosa nel rimuovere Monsignor di Granscan destinato già suo ambasciatore a Constantinopoli col mandare in loco suo il reverendo Monsignor d'Acx, come ci aviate per le lettere vostre de 21 del mese passato, ci è stata di molta satisfatione. . . ." Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 110-11, 161 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Correspondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 70, p. 197, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 71-72, pp. 203, 205-6, 208, et alibi on the difficulties which Philip faced in the Netherlands.

<sup>19</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Correspondenza da Madrid*, I, no. 81, pp. 238-40, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 83, 87, 91, 93, 94, pp. 248, 261-63, 274-75, 282-83, 286.

illegal trade, he must punish the wretch severely "as an example to others."<sup>20</sup>

As for news of the Turks, the doge and Senate were distressed by word which soon came to them from Giovanni Michiel, their ambassador to the imperial court, then at Prague. Michiel had acquired an alarming *avviso* relating to the plans and preparations of the Turks. The doge sent the report to Surian and Soranzo in Rome with orders to take it to Pius V, and implore him to see to it that the necessary steps were taken "for the defense of Christendom," the first of which should certainly be the formation of the league.<sup>21</sup> The long-drawn-out negotiations, however, and the capitious disagreements between the Spanish and Venetian representatives in Rome led Facchinetti (for various reasons) to believe that the Signoria might make peace with the Porte. As he wrote Cardinal Michele Bonelli (on 21 February), "I have no doubt that if he [the sultan] should offer these lords some sort of accord, and the league is not quickly settled, they will accept it, even though it means simply surrendering Cyprus to him."<sup>22</sup>

The league, as we know well, had been the subject of endless wrangling between the Venetians and the Spanish for months without a final agreement. Upon receipt of certain dispatches from Rome, dated 7 and 8 March (1571), Facchinetti went into the Collegio (on the twelfth), where he reminded the Doge Alvise Mocenigo and the Savi that according to the understanding reached by the negotiators in the latter months of 1570 there should have been an army of 50,000 soldiers "tra Italiani, Spagniuoli, et Alemanni" in the Levant throughout the present month of March, not to speak of April. But it was already mid-March, and Pius V was sorely disturbed that there was no such army anywhere. The allies must work harder.

His Holiness had been pressing Philip II's ministers. They had promised him that the Spanish would have ready for service as soon as possible—at the latest by the end of May—a fleet of 70 to 80 galleys "well armed." His Holiness and the king's ministers believed, however, "that this year it would be well to have an armada of 250 galleys," and that along with the 80 Spanish galleys the

Venetians should provide the rest up to "this number of 250." The Serenissima had the means and wherewithal to do it. While Venice would thus be contributing a much larger proportion of the Christian armada, Philip would make up for it "in troops, supplies, oars, munitions, and other things desirable and necessary for the enterprise." Facchinetti did not specify how many galleys the pope would contribute to the armada. All that remained, he said, for the conclusion and publication of the league was the doge's consent to the papal-Spanish agreement.

To ask for the doge's consent, as everyone knew, was merely a diplomatic courtesy. What was required, was the consent of the Senate, which would act upon a motion brought before it by the Collegio. At this time the Council of Ten would also have to agree with the senatorial decision. In replying to Facchinetti, the Doge Mocenigo declared that the "College of Savi" had not yet read and discussed the last letters from their ambassadors. On Tuesday, 13 March, the Senate met, and on the following morning Facchinetti hastened into the Collegio. The doge informed him that a courier had just now arrived from Rome, which Facchinetti knew to be a fact. They must consider the new report from Rome. But since various motions might be made, and diverse opinions expressed in the Senate, Facchinetti took the opportunity to speak of the inadvisability of the Signoria's trying to reach an accord with the Turks.

First of all, Venice would lose Cyprus. The so-called advantages of a peace with the Turks were illusory. The Signoria would not be able to count on an end to the expenses caused by the war, nor on the resumption of a profitable commerce in the Levant. Furthermore, there could be no assurance of a lasting agreement as to Crete and the other Venetian possessions overseas. The sultan's "injustice and bestiality" had led him to break the Signoria's last capitulation with him. The same qualities would lead him again to violate any pact or promise he might make. Then the Signoria would face once more the cost of war, the disruption of commerce, and the imperilment of Crete and the other colonies.

Whereas a Venetian accord with the Porte would be "uncertain and perilous," the Christian league would bring security to the Signoria. The expenses of the war would be shared by Spain and the Holy See. There would be a good chance of recovering Cyprus and other places lost in the past. Facchinetti reminded the doge of Venice's heroic struggle of sixteen continuous years (1463–1479) against the Turks. Facchinetti was encour-

<sup>20</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 51' [72'], from Barbarigo's commission, dated 30 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570). Admonitions to guard against illegal trade and fraud were common, as in Venice's commission of 3 February, 1571 (*ibid.*, fol. 60' [81']).

<sup>21</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fol. 28' [38'], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, doc. dated 10 February, 1571 (Ven. style 1570).

<sup>22</sup> Stella, *Nunciature di Venezia*, IX (1972), no. 325, p. 448.

aged to learn that when the Council of Ten met (on 14 March), they had discussed the armament to the Christian armada, "this year" against the Turks as well as what help they might expect from the league if the enemy invaded Friuli or attacked Zara. He was worried, however, by the widespread view in Venice that Philip II's ministers were more interested in a defensive than an offensive war against the Turks,<sup>23</sup> which would mean that the Spanish would not assist the Signoria to recover Cyprus.

The Venetians were understandably distressed. The impossible was being asked of them, while others were being relieved of obligations which the doge and Senate believed they could easily undertake. The Republic had done all it could, meeting in every way its share of responsibility. The Venetians already had 25,000 infantry and thirty ships (*navi*) prepared for action. They had kept their fleet in strategic ports (*fuori*) all winter at vast expense so that it would be ready and in order when the spring came. The Signoria desired above all things to help maintain "the effectiveness and honor of the Christian name," and fully realized that such was the strength of the Turkish armada (as Philip II's ministers had stated) that at least 250 galleys would be needed. The doge and Senate had declared again and again, however, that Venice simply could not provide what was being asked of her, "non potendo noi . . . supplir a questo bisogno."

His Catholic Majesty must exert himself to do his part, lest the allies be forced to succumb to the Turks and witness therewith the utter ruin of Christendom. The enemy armada would soon be at sea to prevent the forces of the league [from reaching Cyprus]. The galleys of his Catholic Majesty and those of the other allies (including those of Pius V) must, therefore, as the doge and Senate wrote their ambassadors in Rome, "be joined with ours well in advance of the end of May." Money was badly needed, and men aboard the galleys. Oarsmen and galley slaves were in terribly short supply in Venice "per la mortalità dell' anno passato." The Signoria simply could not find the manpower to arm the number of galleys being

asked of the Republic. While the Venetians might have to try to furnish some additional galleys to the Christian armada, the oarsmen would have to come from the states of his Catholic Majesty.<sup>24</sup>

Soldiers were also becoming hard to find, and when assigned to "the garrisons of our cities and fortresses in the Levant," they often deserted before they could be put aboard ship at Capodistria, Parenzo, Rovigo, and the various other Istrian ports. The doge and Senate were indignant because the wretches (*scelerati homini*) had accepted the usual military subventions and wages, and then made off into the hills. On 14 April the podestà and captain of Capodistria and a dozen or more other officials in Istria were instructed to use all diligence to track down the fugitives in their several jurisdictions. When captured, the poor devils were to be sentenced to at least eighteen months at the oars (*per vogar al remo alla catena per mesi disdotto al meno*).<sup>25</sup> In one way or another one had to pick up oarsmen.

It is small wonder that soldiers and oarsmen should be in short supply aboard the Venetian galleys, considering the harsh treatment they received from most of the galley commanders. Perhaps the Senate's letter to Sebastiano Venier (or in his absence to Agostino Barbarigo) did some good,<sup>26</sup> but there are grounds for doubt. Conditions both above and below deck were often filthy beyond description.<sup>27</sup> For decades soldiers and sailors alike had dreaded typhus fever (*petecchie*), which filled galleys and encampments with death. Aboard the Venetian galleys priests and chaplains were letting the afflicted die without the sacraments of confession and communion for fear of

<sup>24</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fols. 35'-37' [45'-47'], *alli ambasciatori a Roma*, doc. dated 30 March, 1571, and note Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 368, pp. 504-5, a letter of Pius V to the Doge Mocenigo, dated 20 May, 1571.

<sup>25</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 81' [102'], doc. dated 14 April, 1571, *de literis* +192, *de non 1, non sinceri* 3.

<sup>26</sup> Sen. Mar, Reg. 40, fol. 20' [54'], *al capitano nostro general da mar et in sua absentia al proveditor general da mar*, doc. dated 7 April, 1571: ". . . mal trattamento usato per la maggior parte delli governatori et sopracomiti nostri contra le ciurme et homeni da spada con tanto danno et iattura publica. . . ."

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 40, fol. 21' [55'], letter of the doge and Senate to Venier (or Barbarigo), also dated 7 April, 1571: "Nelli arsii disarmati [galleys 'disarmed'] a Corfu et condotti in questa città sono state ritrovate tante immonditie così sotto come sopra coperta che quelli che hanno avuto carico di nettarli per il fetore grandissimo che vi era sotto coperta sono quasi morti, da che si può chiaramente comprendere che infirmità et morte seguita nella armata nostra sia in gran parte causata dal mal governo et poca cura di quei che hanno governate et comandate quelle galee. . . ."

<sup>23</sup> Stella, *Nunziature di Venezia*, IX (1972), no. 335, pp. 460-63, letter of Facchinetti to Cardinal Bonelli, dated 14 March, 1571, and see, *ibid.*, no. 336, pp. 463-65, a letter to Bonelli, dated 16 March. Although details remained to be straightened out, and doubts removed, before the articles of the league could be signed, by the second week of March there were those who assumed the league was virtually in existence (cf. Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, II [1900], no. 277, pp. 342 ff.).



exposing themselves to the usually fatal contagion.<sup>28</sup>

The last stages of the diplomatic struggle during March, April, and early May (1571) to bind together the Holy See, Spain, and the Signoria in an offensive league against the Turks are not uninteresting. They are also important.<sup>29</sup> In the Venetian Senate opinions varied, as Facchinetti informed Bonelli with a sigh on 7 April: "alcuni vorrebbono l' accordo, altri la lega."<sup>30</sup> In any event the Venetians wanted a firmer commitment from Philip II and the concession of further tithes from Pius V. Marc' Antonio Barbaro's letters continued to reach the Signoria in Venice. Finally Barbaro sent to the Signoria Matteo Salvego, the Venetian dragoman in Istanbul. Facchinetti refers several times to Salvego, who was generally known as "Mateca," and he was certain that the dragoman had brought proposals for peace with the Porte.<sup>31</sup>

As Selim II and the pashas learned more about the extent of the Christian plans for an armada, they apparently softened their requirements for

an accord with Venice, for the Turkish armada was in miserable shape. On 7 March Facchinetti had written Bonelli that, as a result of the dragoman Mateca Salvego's appearance in Venice, the Signoria was sending Giacomo Ragazzoni, the brother of the bishop of Famagusta, to Istanbul to effect an exchange of the Turks and Jews (who had been imprisoned in Venice) for the Venetian merchants and their goods being held by the Porte. Mehmed Sokolli had made the suggestion to Marc' Antonio Barbaro. Facchinetti suspected that the purpose of Ragazzoni's mission was "per qualche maneggio d' accordo." He was taking to the Porte counterproposals for peace that Barbaro was in no position to make. Facchinetti was not far wrong. As we shall see, the doge and Senate later acknowledged to Leonardo Donado in a letter dated 16 June (1571) that, quite apart from the exchange of merchants and of merchandise, Mehmed Sokolli very much regretted the whole war (*che il bassà sentiva malvolentieri questa guerra*). Indeed, Mateca informed the Signoria that Mehmed Sokolli was trying to make peace. We shall return to this text in its proper chronological context.<sup>32</sup>

Mehmed Sokolli was less moved, presumably, by friendship for Venice than by hostility toward Piali Pasha and Lala Mustafa Pasha. Nevertheless, he was the grand vizir, and he wanted to resume relations with the Signoria on some basis which might be enlarged into negotiations for a truce. But Marc' Antonio Barbaro needed instructions from Venice. He may well have told Mehmed that the last letter he had received from the doge and Senate was dated 8 February, 1570! Now, thirteen months later, the doge and Senate wrote Barbaro again, owing to Mehmed's initiative.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 40, fols. 54–55' [88–89'], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 2 June, 1571: The doge and Senate were "much displeas'd" with the failure of the priests and chaplains, "i quali ricusando di andar a far il loro officio con gli infermi, parte con dir di voler fuggir la contagione di pettechie et altri mali, parte con dir d' esser venuti per la messa solamente et non aver tal carico et con altri pretesi hanno lasciato mancar i poveri Christiani senza poter confessarsi et ricever il santissimo sacramento . . ." a matter of such importance (writes the doge) as to provoke the anger of God.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venesia*, IX, nos. 337, 339, 342–44, 346–47, 353, 357, 359, pp. 465 ff.; Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, I, nos. 74–90, pp. 212 ff., Donado's very detailed dispatches; Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, nos. 90–110, 112, 114, 116, p. 208 ff., important dispatches between Rome and the Escorial-Madrid; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I (1918), esp. pp. 95 ff.; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 574 ff.

<sup>30</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venesia*, IX, no. 347, p. 484. The uncertainties in the Senate, the pros and cons of peace or the continuing war with the Turks, are reflected in Paolo Tiepolo's speech in the Senate, presumably in April, 1571, for which see Cod. Urb. lat. 857, fols. 208–223': *Discorso se doveano li Signori Venetiani continuar la lega con li principi Christiani o accettare la pace proposta dal Turco del clarissimo Signor Paolo Tiepolo*.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venesia*, IX, nos. 326, 332, 346, 347, 353, 359, pp. 449 ff. At one point Facchinetti even wrote Bonelli ". . . si verifica che Mateca dragomano, che venne da Constantinopoli, portò partito di pace con la restituzione di Cipro [!], accrescendo il censo" [which was an annual payment to the Porte of 8,000 ducats]. The dragoman Mateca had left Istanbul with Barbaro's *maestro di casa* on 8 January, 1571 (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 591 [8873], fol. 116', and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 152').

<sup>32</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 103–104' [124–125'], *all' ambasciator in Spagna*, doc. dated 16 June, 1571. On Giacomo Ragazzoni, note Barbaro's dispatches of early May and June, 1571, in Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 591 (8873), fols. 142 ff., 169', 178 ff., 185 ff., and cf. fols. 227, 375'.

<sup>33</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venesia*, IX, no. 332, pp. 456–57, and cf. Senata, *Deliberationi Constantinopoli*, Reg. III, unnum. fol., a resolution of the Senate dated 3 March, 1571. Note especially, however, the following important text (*ibid.*, Reg. III, unnum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate to Marc' Antonio Barbaro, dated 8 March, 1571): "Dapoi che vi scrivessimo a VIII di February dell' anno 1569 [Ven. style, i.e., 1570] non vi habbiamo più scritte nostre lettere, il che è causato per la rottura della pace che havevimo con quel Signor, non già per mancamento alcuno di canto nostro, ma per quelle cause che a voi sono molto ben note, dal qual tempo fin' hora habbiamo ricevute tutte le lettere che per più vie et con diversi mezi ci havevate fatto capitare fino li 13 di Zenaro passato, certo con tanta diligenza et cautela così nel spedir esse lettere come in ben

Although in Madrid Leonardo Donado seemed to find the Spanish king's preparations and finances insufficient for warfare in the Mediterranean as well as in Flanders, he also had to acknowledge that seven thousand Spanish soldiers were being embarked for Italy.<sup>34</sup> As the Spanish armament grew, and Philip II's ministers in Rome assured the pope of a royal contingent of eighty galleys for the Christian armada, the Venetians seemed to become more recalcitrant. At length Pius V sent Marc' Antonio Colonna, who was popular on the lagoon, to remonstrate with the Signoria.

Facchinetti reports on Colonna's arrival in Venice late in the evening of 11 April (1571) and on his reception by the Signoria on the evening of the twelfth.<sup>35</sup> Two days later the doge and Senate wrote Donado that the king's ministers in Rome were trying now to avoid certain obligations they had agreed to in the capitulations; they wanted the full execution of the terms of the league to be postponed for another year. In the meantime they insisted his Catholic Majesty would do everything possible to increase his naval armament, but for the present he wanted the Signoria to provide more than the Venetian share of galleys.<sup>36</sup>

If the Venetians did not in one way or another come to terms with the Turks, they were obviously going to be obliged to furnish more than their share of galleys. It would be costly, but the Venetians could apparently build galleys even if they could not man them. Among the various requests which the Signoria addressed to Marc' Antonio Colonna as the pope's emissary was an appeal for tithes, i.e., levies on the incomes of the clergy in Venetian territory. On this score Facchinetti sent his advice to Cardinal Bonelli (on 24 April),

Your most illustrious lordship knows whether I have ever tried to persuade his Holiness to do anything to hurt the clergy, but in this case (where it is a question of the protection of Christendom) I have never regarded it as dishonorable to concede tithes to this Signoria.

Facchinetti suggested four tithes which would bring in 80,000 scudi a year, a good deal less than the concession of 100,000 scudi which Pius had made the Republic in 1570. "I should think," adds Facchinetti, "that it would be advisable to restrict this 'grace' to five years and for the duration of the league. For the rest, the lord Marc' Antonio is writing you at length."<sup>37</sup>

Despite more than ten months of discord, disagreement, and distortion of the facts by one side and the other, the Venetians and Spanish were finally and formally drawn together into the league under the aegis of the Holy See. Facchinetti has attested to Marc' Antonio Colonna's hard work and adroit maneuvering in Venice. At last on 6 May (1571) Facchinetti wrote Bonelli that the Venetians had accepted the current terms of the league, but if Philip II's galleys were not forthcoming in time, they could well bow out of the agreement. Facchinetti believed that "the best and most of these gentlemen are proceeding sincerely;" if the Spanish galleys were late by some fifteen or twenty days, he did not believe it would cause much trouble. Colonna was returning to Rome. He would give his Holiness and Bonelli a full report. The Spanish galleys at Naples and in Sicily should be made ready to join the Venetian fleet. Don Diego Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, had sent a courier to the king, urging that Don John of Austria should come

---

intendere l' operationi e preparationi che di tempo in tempo si sono fatte de li, quanto che nè maggiore nè più esatta havressimo saputo desiderare, onde col Senato v' attribuiamo quelle laudi che potemo maggiori, come a savio et valoroso ministro et rappresentante nostro si conviene, certissimo che poi ch' al Signor Dio è piaciuto di farvi provare questi tanti travagli et disturbi per servizio della patria vostra. . . . oltre di ciò, essendo venuto in questa città il fidelissimo nostro Matthea Salvego, dragomano, insieme con Anzolo Laurato, vostro maestro di casa, li quali ci hanno presentate le lettere vostre de 3 et 6 di Zenaro in proposito della permutatione de nostri mercanti et robbe loro con quelli Turchi et Hebrei che si ritrovano de qui insieme con le robbe loro, et inteso da esse vostre l' instantia fattavi per il magnifico Mehemeth Bassà in nome del Signor Turco circa questo negozio et il desiderio che ne dimostrano quei signori, havemo deliberato di mandar de li il fidelissimo cittadino nostro Giacomo Ragazoni, il qual sarà portator delle presenti, ben instrutto della mente et volontà delli mercanti interessati et della nostra ancora circa questo negozio, con ordine che si comunicata con voi la commissione che gli habbiamo data . . . debba coll' indriccio et consiglio vostro trattar et negoziar questa materia per condurla a quel buon fine di risoluzione che si desidera. . . . +166, 3, 5." Cf. also, *ibid.*, the resolution of the Senate of 10 March (1571).

<sup>34</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, I, nos. 71-72, 74, pp. 201 ff.: "S' imbarcorono già quattromillia spagnoli . . . et altri tremillia si vanno tuttavia mettendo in ordine pur per Italia . . ." (p. 212).

<sup>35</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 349, p. 485.

<sup>36</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 82' [103']. *All' ambasciator in Spagna*, doc. dated 14 April, 1571, and on Colonna's presence in Venice, "mandato dal Pontifice a far ufficio con noi nel ne-

gocio della lega," see *ibid.*, fols. 86 [107], 88' [109']. In Venice Colonna did not find it all work and no play, for he obviously enjoyed dancing with the ladies at the festivities attending the marriage of Giorgio Corner's daughter to Andrea Bragadin (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 52, an *avviso* dated at Venice on 1 May, 1571).

<sup>37</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, IX, no. 355, pp. 490-91.

to Italy as soon as possible, for Don John was to be the commander-in-chief of the Christian armada.<sup>38</sup>

The Hapsburgs and the Venetians had almost never got along well, and on the whole their suspicions of each other were not unjustified. As late as 5 May Gianbattista Castagna, the nuncio in Madrid, reported to the papal nephew Bonelli that "I have found his Majesty more than a little persuaded that the lords of Venice are prepared to reach an accord with the Turk." Philip had received such a warning from various sources, but his suspicion arose chiefly from the fact "that the said lords are demanding what they themselves know is impossible, namely eight thousand oarsmen for this year." In his inability to produce so many oarsmen Philip saw the Venetians' "seeking the opportunity to find an excuse for what they already intend to do."<sup>39</sup> Two days later, however, Philip wrote Cardinal Francisco Pacheco and Juan de Zúñiga that he approved of the trend of their negotiations in Rome, and notified them of Don John of Austria's departure as well as of the extensive preparation of the galleys, the recruitment of troops, the gathering of victuals, "y todo lo necessario."<sup>40</sup>

Philip II was only confirmed in his distrust and dislike of the Venetians when, two or three weeks later, he received from Zúñiga a dispatch dated 7 May, complaining of the Venetians' "caviling." Colonna had just sent word of certain last-minute demands being made by the Signoria. Pacheco and Zúñiga had immediately rejected them, and Cardinals Bonelli and Rusticucci told Zúñiga that Pius V agreed the Venetians had no leg to stand on. The Signoria had wanted the allies to help pay the costs of maintaining the infantry in their various garrisons. Furthermore, even at the eleventh hour there remained the question whether the league was to be primarily offensive or defensive. In Rome as in Madrid the Spanish feared that now the Turk might grant the Venetians easier terms of peace, "knowing that they have formed this league with your Majesty."<sup>41</sup>

On Saturday, 28 April, a meeting was held in Cardinal Michele Bonelli's apartment at the Vatican. The Venetian ambassadors Surian and Soranzo were not present. The Spanish ministers sol-

emnly promised that seventy well-armed galleys would be at Otranto ready for combat throughout the month of May.<sup>42</sup> After endless fussing and fuming rapid progress was made toward union during the first two weeks of May. In Venice, having attended a meeting of the Collegio on the morning of 6 May, Marc' Antonio Colonna left for Rome. Now there were widespread hopes on the lagoon for the anti-Turkish alliance, and "Dio faccia quello sia per il meglio!" On the evening of Marc' Antonio's departure the Senate added Prospero Colonna to the Venetian payroll with two thousand infantry.<sup>43</sup>

At the same time (6 May) the doge and Senate addressed a letter to Leonardo Donado in Madrid, informing him of Marc' Antonio's mission to Venice on behalf of Pius V and of the satisfaction he had expressed with the Senate's readiness to conclude the league. Donado was to convey the message to Philip II in such a way as to make amply clear the Signoria's sense of dire emergency as well as complete willingness to respond to the needs of Christendom with all the strength of the Republic. Although the Signoria had every confidence in his Catholic Majesty, Donado must urge rapidity of action upon him, upon the lords of the royal Council, and especially upon Don John of Austria. The Venetians had learned with the greatest satisfaction that Don John had already sent his household to Italy as the prelude to his own arrival. His Highness's presence in the Christian armada was indispensable.<sup>44</sup>

Despite his house arrest in Istanbul, the bailie Barbaro was now being kept well informed of events in the outer world by letters from the doge and Senate. On 14 April they had written him of Marco Querini's aid to Famagusta, the death of "the Transylvanian" [John Sigismund, Zápolya's son], the pro-Venetian uprising in Albania, and Marc' Antonio Colonna's coming to Venice "per sollicitarne alla conclusione della lega." On 6 May they sent on a report that the captain-general Sebastiano Venier had taken Durazzo with the assistance of the Albanians, and was said to be planning an attack on

<sup>38</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 58\*, an *avviso* from Rome, dated 5 May, 1571.

<sup>39</sup> Also Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 58\*, an *avviso* from Venice, dated 7 May. The Senate had some difficulty in deciding upon the precise terms of the doge's formal reply to Colonna (Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fols. 38\*-45' [48\*-55'], docs. dated from 21 April to 5 May, 1571). There had seemed to be no end of obstacles to effecting the final agreement to the league (*ibid.*, fols. 46 ff. [56 ff.]).

<sup>40</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 88\* [109\*], *de literis* +192, *de non 1, non sinceri* 5.

<sup>38</sup> Stella, *Nunzi Venezia*, IX, no. 361, pp. 497-98; on Colonna, *cf. ibid.*, no. 359, p. 495, and on Bonelli's pleasure in receiving the good news, no. 362, p. 498.

<sup>39</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 117, p. 264.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, no. 119, p. 270, doc. dated 7 May, 1571.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, no. 121, pp. 272-73.

Valona. They had also received word that the Venetian captain of the fuste in the Adriatic had seized and burned Scardona (Skradin), with all its mills, a half-dozen miles north of Sebenico (Sibenik) on the Dalmatian coast. Since Marc' Antonio had been pressing them to enter the anti-Turkish alliance with Spain, the doge instructed Barbaro neither to agree to the surrender of Famagusta nor to a suspension of arms, at least not without informing the Signoria of every detail of the Turkish proposal and receiving full authorization from Venice to proceed.<sup>45</sup> Barbaro was not told, however, to put an end to his negotiations for peace with the Porte.

Marc' Antonio Colonna arrived back in Rome on 11 May (1571). Pius V gave him a warm welcome. The Fugger agent in Rome—it was apparently he—prepared a well-informed *avviso*, to be sent presumably to Augsburg on Wednesday, 23 May:

They say that on Saturday [19 May] negotiations for the league were concluded, and the settlement has not come about without the divine will, with great consolation to his Holiness and to the entire Curia. The conditions to be observed by the confederates have not only not been published, but are being kept so secret that up to now nothing has been found out, except it is said that they were subscribed to on Sunday [the twentieth], and that thereafter couriers were sent to Spain and other places. We understand that next Sunday [27 May] there will be a service in S. Pietro, where Monsignor [Iñigo de] Aragonia will give the sermon, and the League will be published with a full jubilee celebration. The following Friday [1 June] the pope will go in a solemn procession to S. Spirito, also on Friday to S. Giacomo degli Spagnoli, and on Saturday to S. Marco. They say that Monsignor Macerata has received a commission to have new coins of half a groat issued, [especially] one to throw to the populace in *signum gaudii et letitiae*.

The succession of events took place almost exactly as the writer of the *avviso* had been led to believe they would. His further news, which could have come as no surprise to anyone, was that Marc' Antonio Colonna was to be the general of the papal fleet, and Pompeo his lieutenant. Don John of Austria would be commander-in-chief of the allied armada, and Marc' Antonio his "principal lieutenant." The pope's soldier nephew, also named Michele Bonelli, was to have command of two galleys and four captaincies.<sup>46</sup>

The day after the signing of the allied compact Pius V granted Philip II (on 21 May) the financial "graces" which Zúñiga insisted Pius had offered the king "sin esperar la conclusión de la liga." The papal concession included the *crusada*, *susidio*, and *excusado*, with the usual exemption of the Order of Santiago and with the usual trouble, for the Catalan clergy had already refused to pay the *susidio*. As the nuncio Gianbattista Castagna had notified Cardinal Bonelli on 4 May, Philip II was requesting a papal brief to assist him in collecting the impost. A greater freedom existed in Catalonia than in Castile. Philip had, says Castagna, a "greater need of money than of quarrels," and so care would have to be exercised in the collection. Even with the financial graces Philip still had problems. The revolt of the Moriscos in Granada, with its ruinous effect upon agriculture, had made it necessary to reduce the amount of the *susidio* to be paid by the clergy in the far south of Spain.<sup>47</sup> Without the graces Philip would not have joined the league, and in fact without them he probably could not have paid his share of the projected naval campaign against the Turks, for (it must always be remembered) he also had the war in the Netherlands to finance.

In Venice the doge and Senate expressed fulsome satisfaction in the final contractual obligation of the Holy League. Surian and Soranzo must now implore the pope to get the king's ministers in Rome to secure the necessary orders from Madrid to join the galleys of his Catholic Majesty with those of the captain-general Venier, who was then in the waters off Corfu. The pope's own galleys and those of the Hospitalers must do likewise. The Signoria was, however, disturbed by the pope's pious declaration that the armed forces of the league were to make the recovery of the Holy Land their major objective, "andar ad acquirar Terra Santa, ove è morto il Salvador nostro!" One could hardly hope for the reconquest of the Holy Land if one could not hold on to Cyprus. Famagusta was in grave danger. Candia was threatened. The pope should send legates, as he had said he would, to the Emperor Maximilian II, King Sigismund II Augustus of Poland (d. 7 July, 1572), and Philip II. He should also try to induce Charles

which puts the service in S. Peter's on Sunday, the procession to S. Spirito on Monday (28 May), and that to S. Giacomo degli Spagnoli on Wednesday (30 May).

<sup>45</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, nos. 115, 132, pp. 261-62, 295-96; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 577; M. Ulloa, *La Hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II*, Madrid, 1977, pp. 586-87, 611, 623-24.

<sup>46</sup> Senato, *Deliberazioni Constantinopoli*, Reg. III, unnum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate to the bailie, dated 6 May, 1571.

<sup>47</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 65<sup>v</sup>-66<sup>r</sup>, di Roma 23 Maggio, but cf. the Acta Consistorialia, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 36, fol. 88<sup>r</sup>,

IX to embark with the allies upon "this sacred expedition."<sup>48</sup>

The emperor and the king of Poland were not likely to disrupt their peaceful relations with the Turks. Owing to the death of John Sigismund, Zápolya's son, the estates of Transylvania had met in mid-April to elect his successor. To avoid conflict with the Turks they sent envoys to Istanbul to assure the pashas of their desire to see Transylvania continue in friendship and confederation with the Porte. Sigismund Augustus of Poland had dispatched "three personages" into Transylvania to add to the prospects for peace. Everyone seemed to be working for law and order in central Europe, to the obvious advantage of the emperor, who had no intention of infringing upon his own hard-won treaty with Sultan Selim. Presently the news was widespread that the diet of Transylvania had elected Stephen Báthory, "a Hungarian knight and very well-disposed toward his imperial Majesty." Stephen would not seek to push the emperor into conflict with the Turks, and the Holy League would not find an ally in Maximilian.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Delib., Roma Ord., Reg. 3, fols. 50 [60], 50<sup>a</sup>-51<sup>a</sup> [60<sup>a</sup>-61<sup>a</sup>], *all'ambasciadori a Roma*, docs. dated 22 and 26 May, 1571, and *cf.* the Venetian letters to the pope, *ibid.*, fols. 52 ff. [62 ff.], dated 26 May and 9 June, 1571. On the processions celebrating the league in Venice, see Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 67<sup>r</sup>, 75<sup>r</sup>, 84<sup>r</sup>-85<sup>r</sup>, *avvisi* dated 11 June and 1-2 July, 1571. On 22 May the pope told a consistory that he now planned to send legates to the king of the Romans, *electus Imperator*, the king of France, the king of Poland, and other kings "inviaturus eos contra comunem et Christiani nominis hostem" (*Acta Consistorialia*, *Acta Miscellanea*, Reg. 36, fol. 86<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration).

Hopes were running high in Venice, on which note Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 88<sup>r</sup>-89<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>r</sup>-110<sup>r</sup>], a letter to the captain-general Venier, dated 22 May, and on the league, *cf.* also, *ibid.*, fols. 93<sup>r</sup>-95<sup>r</sup> [114<sup>r</sup>-116<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 22 and 26 May. Like the pope, the Signoria was eager to see Maximilian II join the alliance (fols. 93<sup>r</sup>-94<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>49</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 65<sup>r</sup>, *an avviso* from Prague dated 9 May, 1571: "... Alii 17 si doveva tenere in Transilvania la dieta di tutti li stati per consultare intorno al governo di quella provincia et alla electione de farsi del nuovo signore et per non ricevere disturbo dalle armi del Turco haveano inviati huomini a Constantinopoli a promettere di volere continuare nella solita buona amicitia et confederazione, et il re di Polonia ha mandato in Transilvania tre personaggi, et si adopera con ogni suo potere per il buon successo delle cose a servizio dell' Imperatore," and on the death of Isabella of Poland's son John Sigismund Zápolya, prince of Transylvania, *cf.* *ibid.*, fols. 51<sup>r</sup>, 53<sup>r</sup>-54<sup>r</sup>.

According to *an avviso* from Prague, dated 6 June, "S' è inteso che la dieta di Transilvania ha electo vaivoda di quella provincia il Signor Stefano Battori [Stephen Báthory, later king of Poland, 1575-1586], cavalier lungo et molto affectionato alla Maestà cesarea, essendo restato ogmo mal satisfatto l' altro concorrente, il qual haveva in mano il thesor del re morto" (*ibid.*, Cod. 1042, fol. 73<sup>r</sup>; see also fol. 75, a dispatch from Prague of 13 June, and fol. 78<sup>r</sup>, another dispatch from Prague, dated 20 June, *et alibi*).

At a consistory of all the cardinals then in Rome, held on Friday, 25 May, Pius V spoke "with lively and loving words, thanking the divine Majesty that in the time of his pontificate He had conceded the grace to Christendom that the Catholic princes had united and drawn together against the common enemy." But the formation of the league was not enough; the participants must fulfil its terms with valiant determination. He exhorted the cardinals "by the examples of their own lives and those of their retainers to inspire the princes and lords to persevere with decisive effect in this Holy League." Then the datary Antimo Marchesano produced the bull in which the formation and formalization of the league were to be announced to the world. The bull was read in the consistory and approved by all the cardinals. The pope ordered its publication, which came two days later, on Sunday the twenty-seventh, when Cardinal Otto von Truchsess was to sing the mass, and Cardinal Niño de Ávalos to preach the sermon. Pius now publicly announced his intention to send legates to the Christian princes "to render an account of this league and to persuade and implore them to join it for the universal good."<sup>50</sup>

The treaty or capitulation establishing the Holy League was signed in the Sala del Concistoro on 25 May (1571) by Pius V for the Holy See, Cardinal Francisco Pacheco and Don Juan de Zúñiga for Philip II, and Michele Surian and Giovanni Soranzo for the Republic of Venice. Thirty-five cardinals were present; Granvelle was absent in Naples, where he was serving as viceroy. The threefold alliance was to be maintained in *perpetuum*, offensive as well as defensive, directed against the Turks and against the Moslems in Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli. The forces to be used in the coming expedition, at sea and by land, were to consist of 200 galleys (*triremes*), 100 transports (*onerariae naves*), 50,000 Italian, German, and Spanish infantry, and 4,500 light horse (*equites levis armaturae*) plus an adequate number of cannon (*tormenta bellica*), munitions, "and the other necessary things." Every year in March or in April at the latest these forces were to be assembled, ready for action "in eastern waters" (*in mari orientali*). Every autumn envoys of the high contracting parties were to gather in Rome to decide upon the expedition for the following spring.

For the expedition, then in the offing under Don John of Austria, Pius V was to provide twelve galleys (which, it was assumed, might be supplied

<sup>50</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 68<sup>r</sup>-69<sup>r</sup>, *avviso* dated at Rome on 26 May, 1571, and, *ibid.*, fol. 69<sup>r</sup>, *di Roma di 30 Maggio*.

by Venice), 3,000 infantry, and 270 light horse. The Catholic king's ministers made him assume responsibility for one half (*tres sextae partes*) of the overall costs of the coming campaign. Surian and Soranzo promised that the Signoria would pay two sixths of the total, and Pius undertook to pay the remaining one sixth. If the pope was unable to meet his share of the financial burden, his allies would make up the deficit between them. At the end of the campaign the pope was to return the leased galleys to the lessor. The Catholic king obviously had every right to provide victuals—drawn from his kingdoms of Naples and Sicily—to his own fleet and to the garrisons at La Goletta and Malta. Nevertheless, the allies must supply one another with foodstuffs, when they were available, at an honest price, which meant that the king's ministers agreed to lower their recent asking price for grain.

If Philip II's territories were to be attacked by the Moslems, whether from Turkey or from Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli, at any time during which a joint expedition was not under way, the Venetians must send fifty well-armed galleys to assist the threatened areas, "just as his Catholic Majesty sent aid last year to the most illustrious doge and Senate of Venice." The Catholic king would provide a like assistance to the Venetians whenever the Turks invaded their domains. Either power, however, could give prior attention to its own defense if being assailed by the Turks or by other Moslems. If some year Philip should undertake an expedition against Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli—when there was no *communis foederatorum expeditio*, and when Venetian territory was under no likelihood of attack—the Signoria must furnish him with fifty galleys, "just as his Catholic Majesty sent aid last year to the said most illustrious doge and Senate of Venice." Philip and the Venetians also pledged their protection to the papal states.

The three generals—Don John of Austria, his lieutenant Marc' Antonio Colonna (who was also the papal commander), and the Venetian captain-general Sebastiano Venier—were to take counsel together "in belli administratione," and a majority of two (*trium maior pars*) would carry the day. An honored place in the league was reserved for the Emperor-elect Maximilian, Charles IX of France, and King Sebastian of Portugal. The pope must employ to the full his "paternal exhortations" to persuade Maximilian, Charles IX, Sigismund Augustus of Poland, "and all the other Christian kings and princes" to assist the coming expedition in every way and with all their strength, to assure the safety of the Christian forces. The division of conquered territory was to be made in accord with

the convention of the Holy League of 1537 except that Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli belonged to Philip. The neutrality of the Ragusei was to be recognized and preserved.

Disagreements between Philip's commanders and the Venetians were to be submitted to papal arbitration. No one of the high contracting parties could make peace or a truce with the Turkish tyrant without the knowledge, participation, and consent of the other allies. Pius V and Cardinal Pacheco solemnly swore, with hands on their breasts, to observe the terms of the treaty, all and singly; Zúñiga, Surian, and Soranzo took a similar oath, with their hands on the sacred Scriptures which the datary Marchesano held out to them. The text of the treaty of the league lists the witnesses present in the Hall of the Consistory. Among them were Don Luis de Torres, whom Pius had sent on the well-known mission to Spain in 1570, and the two Firmani, Cornelio and Lodovico, who served as masters of ceremonies at the papal court for years. As the pope and cardinals, Philip's ministers, the Venetian ambassadors, and the various witnesses filed out of the hall, they were all aware that one of the most important agreements of the century had finally come to pass.<sup>51</sup>

Pius V had already on 23 and 24 May sent Philip II and Don John of Austria his congratulations on the establishment of the league "adversus immanissimum Turcarum tyrannum," urging the dispatch of the royal galleys and troops as soon as possible.<sup>52</sup> There might be trouble ahead, how-

<sup>51</sup> The Latin text of the treaty of 25 May, 1571, is given in Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 136, pp. 299–309; the Spanish version may be found in Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), no. xciv, pp. 203–5, misdated 26 May; cf. Predelli, *Regesti dei Commemoriali*, VI (1903), bk. xxiii, no. 141, pp. 321–23, and cf. *ibid.*, nos. 144–45. Although the Holy League was now indisputably in effect, Philip II did not formally ratify the treaty until 25 August (1571), for which see Serrano, *op. cit.*, IV, no. 137, pp. 309–11, nor the Doge Alvise Mocenigo until 24 October (Predelli, VI, bk. xxiii, no. 156, p. 326, and cf. no. 158). Cf. Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 27'. There is only the barest notice of the treaty establishing the League in the much-abridged version of the ceremonial diary of Cornelius Firmanus in the Library of the University of Pennsylvania, Lea MS. 428, p. 353: "Die Sabbati 19 Maii in sero fuit conclusa lege principum Christianorum licet non omnium contra Turchas."

<sup>52</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, nos. 134–35, pp. 297–99, and cf. *ibid.*, no. 128, pp. 283–84, a letter of Cardinal Bonelli, dated 21 May, to the nuncio Castagna in Spain, informing him of the conclusion of the league and directing him "sollicitare sua Maestà a mandare la sua armata quantoprima al luogo determinato."

ever, for the king's ministers in Rome were already complaining of Marc' Antonio Colonna.<sup>53</sup> Pius assured Cardinal Pacheco and Zúñiga that if the king's fleet reached Otranto by 20 June, it would be soon enough, and according to Marc' Antonio, that would also satisfy the Venetians. Zúñiga warned Philip (on 25 May), however, that if the fleet did not arrive on time, the pope and the Venetians would be more than disappointed. There was in fact always the danger that Pius might limit or revoke the financial graces he had granted Philip.<sup>54</sup>

Cosimo de' Medici's grand-ducal title was still irking the Emperor Maximilian and Philip II. On 29 May Zúñiga informed Philip that Cosimo was fortifying his cities and towns in great haste and stocking his garrisons with provisions, for he feared that the purpose which lay behind Don John's gathering troops and assembling galleys was to seize Siena.<sup>55</sup> No, the Spanish were not planning to attack the Florentine forces in Siena, the possession of which had prompted Cosimo to press Pius V for the title grand duke of Tuscany, but they were beginning to move toward Italy. Philip wrote Zúñiga from the Escorial on 4 June that Don John was leaving Madrid [for Barcelona] within two days.<sup>56</sup> In Rome Colonna had told Zúñiga that he wished to await Don John's arrival, but that the pope had told him to take to Otranto the galleys which were expected at Civitavecchia on 12 June. These were Florentine galleys which Cosimo was making available to the Holy See. Pius and his two nephews, Cardinal Michele Bonelli and the soldier also named Michele Bonelli, were all strongly pro-Medicean. If word came that Don John had embarked before these galleys left Civitavecchia, it was decided that it might be well for Colonna to wait there for him. At long last things seemed to be going smoothly. The pope and the Venetians were satisfied. Philip declared that he was pleased with the "conclusión de la liga, que me ha causado mayor contentamiento." At least he was pleased with the financial graces, and he had sent Don John on his way. His Holiness had just withdrawn 40,000 scudi from the treasury in the Castel S. Angelo to add to the available funds.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, nos. 129–30, pp. 287, 290–92.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, no. 140, p. 316.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, no. 145, pp. 321–22, and *cf.* no. 149, pp. 328 ff.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, no. 146, pp. 323–24, and *cf.* no. 152, p. 337.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, nos. 151–4, pp. 335–40. On the galleys in question, of which there were twelve, see the *avviso* in Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 76<sup>v</sup>, of *Roma* 16 Giugno: "... Mercordi mattina partirno per Civitavecchia sopra la carozia del Cardinal

Having committed themselves to the Holy League—now that Philip had thrown in his lot with them—the Venetians ordered their captain-general Venier, the government of Candia, and Marino di Cavalli (the provveditore generale of Candia) to pay no attention to word from the baillie in Istanbul if he should direct them to suspend hostilities as a result of some "trattatione di pace tra quel Signor [Turco] et la Signoria nostra." The Senate had authorized the baillie to seek such an accord with the Porte, but now the alliance with Spain gave the Signoria some hope, even expectation, of victory and of the recovery of Cyprus. This was not the time for a suspension of arms.<sup>58</sup>

There seemed also to be hope of saving Famagusta, for four shiploads of "soccorsio," men, arms, and provisions, had reached the city safely [under the protection of Marco Querini], of which Marc' Antonio Bragadin, *capitano del regno de Cipro*, had informed the Senate in a letter dated 14 February. More aid would soon be on its way. The Senate rejoiced in what had been accomplished by the defenders of Famagusta as a result of the aid which the four ships had brought, "li felici successi causati dal detto soccorso." Various persons were singled out for praise—Bragadin himself; Lorenzo Tiepolo, the captain of Paphos (Baffo); Astorre Baglione, governor-general of the Cypriote militia; Marco Querini, provveditore of the armada at Candia [who had led the "soccorsio"]; and Alvise Martinengo, who had left Canea to go with the ships to Famagusta, and had stayed there to help defend the city.<sup>59</sup> The captain-general Venier, then at Corfu, had informed the Signoria that he wished to go on to Candia. He

de' Medici il Signor Marc' Antonio Colonna et il Signor Michele Bonelli, essendo ivi arrivate le 12 galere di Fiorenza, sopra le quali ha mandato 30 cavalieri di S. Stefano per ciascuna. . . . Colonna had been in Naples, as noted in a dispatch which came from Rome on 2 July, *ibid.*, fol. 81<sup>v</sup>, that "scrivono da Napoli che 'l Signor Marc' Antonio Colonna doveva partire da quella città alli 8 del presente [which must be 8 June] con le sue galere con speranza d' haverne sei del vicere oltre le tre di Malta, le quali accompagnate che havessero sua Eccellenza fino a Messina arriverebbono a Malta per rinfrescarsi di gente et soldati et poi ritornar a Messina per seguir detto Colonna nel suo viaggio. Questa mattina si sono cavati di Castello 40 m. scudi per l' abbondantia." *Cf.* Camillo Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana*. . . . Rome, 1897, pp. 471–72.

<sup>58</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 89<sup>v</sup> [110<sup>v</sup>], 91 [112], docs. dated 22 May, 1571.

<sup>59</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 91<sup>v</sup>–92<sup>v</sup> [112<sup>v</sup>–113<sup>v</sup>], docs. also dated 22 May, 1571. Contrary to the situation which had obtained in Nicosia, there was no division nor hostility among the leaders at Famagusta, Bragadin and Baglione being (says Gatto) "dui cuori in un corpo, et dui animi in un cuore" (*Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 48).

was, however, instructed not to do so, but to wait until his galleys could be joined with those of the Catholic king.<sup>60</sup>

On 16 June the Senate approved the text of an important letter to be sent in the doge's name to Leonardo Donado, their ambassador in Madrid. The letter began with the reminder that the dragoman Mateca Salvego had come to Venice, along with the bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro's majordomo (*maestro di casa*), to try to arrange the release of the imprisoned merchants. Mateca had dwelt on the extent to which the Cypriote war was grieving the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli (*ch' el bassà sentiva malvolentieri questa guerra*). Mehmed had made evident his goodwill toward Venice with the promise "that he would make every effort to reconcile us with his lord [the sultan], whose mind he knew was not averse to peace." Mehmed had also stated that if, to start with, the Signoria had listened to Kubad Cha'ush and sent a "better response" (*miglior risposta*) to the Porte, the whole affair would have turned out differently. But thereafter, of course, Venice had lost the greater part of the kingdom of Cyprus, "con Famagosta in molto pericolo," and something had to be done.

No aid had been forthcoming from Europe—the negotiations for the Holy League had been dragging on forever—and the Signoria decided to give some heed to the Turkish overtures for peace. They had sent an agent to Istanbul to take up the question of the captive merchants and to charge the bailie Barbaro to respond attentively to the Turkish proposals. Pius V had made the next move, sending Marc' Antonio Colonna to Venice to urge the Signoria to accept the final terms of the league and to bring the assurance of Philip II's goodwill and desire for the common good. The Signoria had, therefore, straightway sent instructions to Barbaro "that he must not come to any decision in the matter of peace." They had then awaited the formal conclusion of the league, which had now come about. Barbaro had written (in letters of 4–8 May) that Mehmed Sokolli wanted to discuss the possibility of peace as well as the liberation of the merchants. Barbaro had done so, "always confining himself, however, to generalities."

Now that the Holy League had been agreed upon, Barbaro would certainly not give the Turks a pledge of peace. Donado was consequently to assure Philip II of the rejection of the grand vizir's offer (*abandonata la pace offertane da Turchi*). The Signoria was determined to remain in the league,

continue the war against the Porte, and take aid to imperiled Famagusta. Donado must, therefore, exhort his Catholic Majesty to order the union of his fleet with that of Venice as soon as possible, for the Signoria knew both from the bailie's dispatches and from other reports that, in the first days of May, Pertau (Pertev) Pasha, *general da mar*, had sailed from Istanbul in command of eighty galleys with orders to effect their union with the one hundred galleys which had sailed before him and with the various corsairs (*li leventi*) in the service of the Porte "to meet and do battle with our fleet before it can come together with those of his Holiness and the most serene Catholic king." Furthermore, the Signoria had learned that Ahmed Pasha, *general da terra*, had also left Istanbul. Rumor had it that Ahmed was coming into Dalmatia, "and the man who brought the letters from our bailie told us that he had left the said pasha with the army at Elba, a town two days on this side of Adrianople." Philip II would thus understand (or Donado must make him understand) the Signoria's apprehension. The Christian fleets must come together quickly to avoid the "unhappy events" of the past year.<sup>61</sup>

In any event, as the doge and Senate wrote the

<sup>61</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 103–104<sup>r</sup> [124–125], *all' ambasciador in Spagna*, doc. dated 16 June, 1571. The letter was approved by the Senate de literis 158, de non 11, non sinceri 21. On the same day the doge and Senate wrote to much the same effect to their bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro in Istanbul (Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol., doc. dated 16 June). According to a senatorial letter of 23 June to Donado in Spain, Pertau Pasha's armada was said to consist of 120 sail "fra galee, galeote, et fuste," but it was to be reinforced by another 60 galleys which had landed Turkish troops in Cyprus. The great corsair Uluj-Ali had also sailed eastward with the Barbary galleys to join Pertau (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 105<sup>r</sup>–106<sup>r</sup> [126<sup>r</sup>–127<sup>r</sup>]). Having fortified Bizerte, Uluj-Ali "s' era partito per Levante con 10 galee et 12 fuste" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 77<sup>r</sup>, *dalla Goletta li 26 di Maggio*). On the *leventi* (corsairs), see above, Chapter 19, note 102.

At the beginning of May, 1571, Mehmed Sokolli had informed the bailie Barbaro, as the latter wrote the doge, "che quando vostra Serenità havessse ascoltato Cubat Chiaus che le cose sarebbono passate per miglior via, oltre che haveano grandemente offesa la Maestà del suo Signore et nella risposta superba mandatali per mano di esso Cubat et nella diminutione delli suoi titoli, il che sopra ogn' altra cosa gl' ha alterato l'animo contra quella Republica, et che per ciò era per farle gran guerra, et che le piglierebbe et Candia et Corfu, et che poi la Serenità vostra haverrebbe havuto di gratia a far la pace. . . . Si dolsse anco grandemente della retentione di Mamut Bey. . ." (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 138<sup>r</sup>, letter dated at Pera on 4 May). According to Barbaro, Pertau Pasha had left Istanbul in mid-May with his eighty galleys (*ibid.*, fol. 149<sup>r</sup>). On Marc' Antonio Barbaro's negotiations with the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli, see Michel Lesure, "Notes et documents sur les relations vénéto-ottomanes, 1570–1573," *Turcica*, VIII-1 (1976), esp. pp. 128 ff., 148 ff., where Barbaro's long audience with Sokolli on 7 May (described in a dispatch of 8 May), 1571, is recorded at length.

<sup>60</sup> Aldo Stella, ed., *Numziature di Venezia*, X (Rome, 1977), no. 2, p. 32, letter of Facchinetti to Cardinal Bonelli, dated 26 May, 1571.



bailie Barbaro (also on 16 June), considering the huge preparations the Turks were making on land and at sea to assail the Christians, and especially their mobilization "against our fortress of Famagusta," one could hardly hope for much from any negotiations for peace.<sup>62</sup> The Venetians were living on hope, and although they were disturbed by the slowness with which Don John of Austria seemed to be proceeding,<sup>63</sup> they were delighted to receive from Rome a papal brief, dated 7 June, conceding to the Signoria the right to a levy of 100,000 scudi a year for five years (and for as long as the war should last) on the revenues of the clergy in Venetian territory.<sup>64</sup>

As usual, personal interests and hostilities had a strong influence upon Venetian policy and personnel. Michele Surian's enemies were trying to effect his recall, allegedly for illness, but Pius V wanted to keep him in Rome. The nuncio Facchinetti worked on his behalf, and Surian remained as the Signoria's ambassador at the Curia for some months longer. When he did return home, malicious charges were brought against him, but he was finally absolved. As Facchinetti noted, one paid a price for distinction.<sup>65</sup>

One also paid a price for troops. On 9 June (1571) the nuncio reported that the Signoria had hired the Swiss knight Melchior Lussy for 1,200 ducats [a month] with twenty captains at 100 ducats each "in time of peace." Lussy undertook to provide 6,000 Swiss "at every request of this Republic" with the understanding, however, that he would never be called upon to furnish fewer than 4,000 men nor to serve at sea. If need be, Lussy and his troops would serve in the garrisons in Dalmatia. "The pay in time of war," Facchinetti adds, "is a little less than the other princes give."<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Delib. Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol., referred to in preceding note.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, nos. 2, 4-5, 10, 12, pp. 31, 33-34, 40, 45.

<sup>64</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 12, p. 45, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 579.

<sup>65</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, nos. 7, 10, 11-12, pp. 36, 40, 41-42, 45: "Ha ben il clarissimo Soriano alcuni emoli particolari, come hebbero sempre gli huomini di valore nelle republiche. . . ." On Surian, note also, *ibid.*, nos. 47, 53, 56, 61, 88, 90, 154, 175, pp. 86 ff.: "Il clarissimo Soriano, che fu ambasciatore di questi signori [veneziani] a Roma et che al ritorno suo fu sequestrato in casa per non so che imputationi dategli dagli emoli suoi, secondo l' usanza delle republiche, è stato finalmente assolto" (from a letter of Facchinetti to Tolomeo Galli, cardinal secretary of state under Pius V's successor Gregory XIII, dated 20 September, 1572). Obviously Facchinetti did not think very highly of "republics."

<sup>66</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 11, p. 43. Since Lussy was a good Catholic, or at least a Catholic, the Curia was doubtless pleased by his employment (cf. *ibid.*, IX, no. 309, p. 427).

As Don John of Austria delayed his departure from Barcelona, so the Venetians (to Facchinetti's annoyance) delayed the formal, public announcement of their adherence to the Holy League. At length, however, on Monday, 2 July, the league was published in the Piazza S. Marco "with the largest crowd one could expect to see in this city." Don Diego de Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador to the Signoria, sang the mass.<sup>67</sup> By a dispatch of 7 July the doge and Senate notified Leonardo Donado in Madrid that they had published the league on the day of the Visitation of Our Lady "after a solemn mass had been sung in the church of our protector, S. Mark, and all the clergy and the 'Schools' [the Scuole] had marched in the procession." The Doge Alvise Mocenigo had of course attended the festivities in person, and so had all the ambassadors who were resident in Venice.<sup>68</sup>

In the meantime Pius V had been doing what he could to advance the cause of Christendom against the Turks. At a consistory held on Monday, 18 June, he had named Cardinal Gianfrancesco Commendone as legate to the Emperor Maximilian II, the German princes, and Sigismund Augustus of Poland. The cardinal-nephew Michele Bonelli was to go as legate to Philip II and to Sebastian of Portugal.<sup>69</sup> Bonelli's instructions,

<sup>67</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 22, p. 56, Facchinetti to Rusticucci, letter dated 4 July, 1571, and on the Venetians' slowness in "publishing" the league, note, *ibid.*, nos. 9-10, 14, 18-19, 21, pp. 38, 40, 47, 50, 51, 54. Cf. Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 214 ff.

<sup>68</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 108<sup>r</sup> [129<sup>r</sup>]. The formal instruments ratifying the league followed in September and October (*ibid.*, Reg. 78, fol. 19<sup>r</sup> [41<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>69</sup> Acta Consistorialia, Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 36, fols. 88<sup>r</sup> ff., by mod. stamped enumeration. For some weeks it had been generally known whom the pope would send as legates, on which see Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 69<sup>r</sup>, of *Roma di 30 Maggio*, and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 71<sup>r</sup>-72<sup>r</sup>.

On Commendone's appointment on 18 June, 1571, as apostolic legate to Maximilian II and Sigismund Augustus, note the Lettere di principi, vol. XXV, fol. 304, et *alibi*, on which date Paolo Burali, the cardinal of Piacenza, wrote Commendone, "Questa mattina in concistoro Nostro Signore ha pubblicato le legationi per questa importantissima impresa contra il Turco, nominando vostra signoria illustrissima con universale approbatione di tutto il Sacro Collegio alla Maestà cesarea et al serenissimo re di Polonia et Monsignore illustrissimo Alessandrino [Bonelli] al re Catolico et di Portogallo. Per Francia è parso a sua Santità per alcune degne considerationi di non nominare adesso alcuno, ma si mandará legato a quella Maestà ancora . . ." (*ibid.*, vol. XXV, fol. 311).

According to a dispatch from Rome, dated 20 June, "Lunidi fu consistorio, et . . . il Papa diede la croce al Cardinale Alessandrino, facendolo legato per Spagna et Portogallo, et disse che per Francia non faceva altra ispeditione per adesso, non perchè non tenesse conto della grandezza di quel re, ma perchè

dated a week later (on 25 June), make it clear that the purpose of his mission was "first and foremost" to persuade Philip to send the fleet "which his ministers had promised when the league was concluded." In Rome one feared, inasmuch as the season was getting rather advanced for naval warfare, that the Venetians might lose faith in the undertaking for, after all, theirs was "a Republic, in which there are diverse opinions and judgments." Venetian distrust could lead to the "ruin of Christendom, which God forbid!" The other Catholic princes were awaiting the next turn of events, but they had not said they would not enter the league. Philip should exhort the emperor "ad intrare in essa lega." If Maximilian joined the anti-Turkish alliance, one could hope that the king of Poland would do so also. Furthermore, Bonelli must assure Philip that Cosimo de' Medici's title of grand duke of Tuscany was prejudicial to the interests neither of his Catholic nor of his imperial Majesty. Bonelli had certain other difficulties to iron out, for the king's ministers both in Naples and in Sicily had been "usurping" ecclesiastical jurisdiction.<sup>70</sup>

Don John had left Madrid on 6 June, along with his mistress Maria de Mendoza. Making his way rather slowly, with stops at Saragossa and the old Benedictine monastery of Montserrat, he reached Barcelona on the sixteenth. According to a Fugger dispatch of 4 July,

His Holiness has sent a courier to Genoa to urge and hasten the departure of Don John of Austria as soon as he should arrive in Genoa, so that he may join the lord Marc' Antonio Colonna as quickly as possible, and then both of them go to effect a union with the Venetian fleet.<sup>71</sup>

per hora li pareva espedito di soprasedere per alcuni rispetti. Dichiarò poi legato all' Imperatore et al re di Polonia il Cardinal Comendone" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 73<sup>v</sup>-74<sup>r</sup>, and cf. fols. 76<sup>r</sup>, 78<sup>r</sup>, et *alibi*).

<sup>70</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 162, pp. 355-56, and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 580-81.

<sup>71</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 79, *di Roma di 4 Luglio*. On Don John's expected arrival in Genoa, cf. *ibid.*, fols. 80<sup>r</sup>-81<sup>r</sup>, "... nella quale città s' intende che quei signori fanno gran preparamenti per riceverlo con li serenissimi principi [i.e., the young archdukes Rudolf and Ernst, sons of Maximilian II, who had been in Spain, and sailed with Don John from Barcelona to Genoa on their way home], et che hanno radoppiate le guardie et posto i caporioni per tutte le contrade . . ." and cf. fols. 82 ff.

From the end of June (1571) Don John's movements loom large in the *avvisi* assembled in the Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, the last of the five volumes of news reports prepared and collected for the most part by the banker Ulrich Fugger of Augsburg.

Although Don John enjoyed ceremonious receptions, he was also detained by the continuing preparations for the coming campaign. Shortly before his departure from Barcelona, Spanish accountants had prepared (on 15 July) a budget of the naval and military expenses which lay ahead. According to the secretary Francisco Ibarra, every year the Holy League took to the sea against the Turks, with the full complement of troops and galleys, it was going to cost the pope 121,150 scudi, Philip 1,755,320, and the Venetians 1,170,213, the total expenditure thus amounting to 3,046,683 scudi. A revision of these figures raised somewhat the costs for each of the high contracting parties—129,150 scudi for the pope, 1,765,140 for Philip, and 1,176,759 for the Venetians—to a total of 3,071,049.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> On the projected costs of the coming campaign, *note Cod. Barb. lat. 5367*, fols. 39-57, a document dated at Madrid on 15 July, 1571, which seeks to assess the funds required each year to maintain a force of 200 galleys, 100 ships, and 50,000 infantry, i.e., 10,000 Germans, 10,000 Spaniards, 6,000 "Walloon" (*Valloni*), and 24,000 Italians, plus 4,000 horse and 6,000 sappers, "et l' altra gente et cose necessarie," especially heavy artillery. The 200 galleys would allegedly cost 600,000 scudi; 100 ships 272,737; 10,000 Spaniards 228,686; 10,000 Germans (for six months) 421,210; 24,000 Italians (for six months) 471,111, etc., etc., making a total of 2,567,570 scudi—as usual, however, my calculator does not agree with the sixteenth-century accountants. Adding the same figures (I have not given them all), I reached a (slightly higher) total of 2,571,470 scudi.

Supplies such as *biscotto*, *vino*, *presciutto*, *tomnina*, *cacio*, *alici*, *riso*, *fave* et *ceci*, *oglio*, *aceto*, and *orzo* would add greatly to the costs, the *biscotto* amounting to 322,282 scudi, the *vino* 75,000, the *presciutto* (or *carne salata*) 114,625, and the *tomnina* 73,750, the *cacio* 319,000, etc., etc., which (according to the accountant Francisco Ibarra) amounted to 1,735,669 scudi. Powder, lead, *zapponi* et *ferri*, cannon balls, etc., would require some 264,191 scudi. Taking stock of other expenses, the accountant reached totals of 2,577,579 scudi "per il soldo della gente di guerra, galere, et navi," and 469,104 scudi "per munitioni dell' artiglieria," adding which figures together he seems to arrive at 3,466,083 scudi as the "somma tutto l' anno" [rather than 3,046,683]. Of these costs 121,150 scudi were assigned to the pope, 1,755,320 to Philip II, and 1,170,213 to the Venetians, which (*mirabile dictu*) do amount to 3,046,683 scudi.

A revision of these figures by another accountant, *ibid.*, fols. 59-78, assigned expenditures of 129,150 scudi to the pope, 1,765,140 to Philip II, and 1,176,759 to the Venetians, which brought the final total to 3,071,049. The wages of soldiers and sailors had been increasing of late (cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 32<sup>r</sup>, *avviso* from Venice, dated 21 March, 1571). On 16 September, 1571, the day the Christian armada set sail for the encounter with the Turks at Lepanto, Francisco Ibarra sent Philip II a checklist of all the commanders and troops in the royal forces then at Messina (*Docs. inédits*, III, 203-15). He reports also that there were 208 galleys, six galleasses, 22 ships (*naves*), with some other smaller vessels in the armada.

On Ibarra (Ybarra), who had organized Alva's expedition to the Netherlands in 1567 and the Catholic fleet in the unhappy expedition which never reached Cyprus in 1570, cf. René

Don John moved slowly because the Spaniards always moved slowly. According to a well-known proverb, many a man has wished that death might come to him from Spain. On 18 June, two days after Don John's arrival in Barcelona, Luis de Requesens y Zúñiga, the grand commander of Castile, wrote his brother, the Spanish ambassador in Rome, "The original sin of our court is never to get a thing done with dispatch and on time. It has increased a good deal since you observed the court, and it is getting worse every day!"<sup>73</sup> Philip II would have preferred to use the assembled forces against Bizerte—and thereafter against Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli—but his only hope of employing the Venetian alliance against the Moslem outposts in North Africa had lain in the Holy League. It would be highly desirable, if one could manage it, to defeat the Turkish armada in the Levant. Then one would not have to meet it in the western Mediterranean. On 26 June Philip instructed Don John to proceed with all due haste from Barcelona to Messina by way of Genoa, Tuscany, and Naples, stopping only long enough to embark the Spanish regiments (*tercios*) in Italy and to put aboard the galleys and ships the necessary guns, munitions, and supplies. Since Philip believed that his young brother had shown more daring than discretion in the war against the Moriscos, Don John was placed (to his annoyance) under the military tutelage of a council consisting of Luis de Requesens, Giannandrea Doria, Álvaro de Bazán, Juan de Cardona, Ascanio della Corgna, Gil de Andrade, and others.<sup>74</sup>

After a month at Barcelona, Don John finally set sail with more than forty galleys for Genoa where Antonio Tiepolo, the newly-appointed Venetian ambassador to Spain, was waiting for him. Tiepolo was on his way to join Leonardo

Donado in Madrid.<sup>75</sup> While Don John was en route to Genoa, the doge and Senate wrote Tiepolo (on 22 July) that their captain-general Sebastiano Venier had decided to go to Messina with the Venetian fleet, "laqual è di 65 galee sottili, sei grosse, et buon numero de navi." Venier had expected to reach Messina by 15 July to meet up with the fleet of his Holiness and with that of the Catholic king. He had sent a galley to Candia with orders to Marco Querini and Antonio da Canale, the two provveditori of the fleet (*provveditori dell' armata*), "that they must also come to Messina as soon as possible with the galleys which are in that island of ours, which number seventy or thereabouts." Tiepolo was informed that the remaining heavy galleys in the Adriatic area would also proceed to the rendezvous at Messina to join the allied armada. He was to give this information to Don John, and urge him to go quickly to Messina, where his presence and the union of the allied fleets would prove to be of the greatest advantage to the Christian commonwealth.<sup>76</sup>

Don John was supposed to leave Barcelona on 17 July, according to what Giannandrea Doria had told Tiepolo. It was thought that he would reach Genoa on the twenty-second or the twenty-third. Actually he sailed on the twentieth, and arrived in Genoa six days later. The Senate was pleased with the news. Considering the progress of the

<sup>73</sup> Tiepolo's commission as ambassador to Philip II is dated 2 June, 1571 (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 99<sup>v</sup>-101<sup>r</sup> [120<sup>v</sup>-122<sup>r</sup>], and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 108<sup>r</sup> [129<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>74</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 116<sup>r</sup> [137<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 22 July, 1571. Tiepolo had been conferring in Genoa with Giannandrea Doria, the commander of Philip II's fleet (*ibid.*, fol. 116<sup>r</sup> [137<sup>r</sup>]). In a letter of 26 July to Tiepolo, the Senate stated Venier's fleet to consist of 60 regular galleys and six heavy galleys, with about 70 galleys in Candia, which were to join Venier in Messina, *tutte [galee] ben all' ordine d' ogni cosa necessaria* (fol. 118<sup>r</sup> [139<sup>r</sup>])—which was far from the case!

In describing Venier's plans and the progress of the Turkish armada, the Senate wrote Tiepolo and Donado (on 28 July), "Con le lettere del capitano nostro general da mar da noi questi giorni ricevute de 9 fin 14 del presente [9-14 July] da Corfu et da Otranto intendessimo che l' armata Turchesca partita di Candia era andata al Zantho, ove haveva abbrusciti li borghi et fatti molti danni, et dappoi era venuta al Paxu [i.e., the island of Paxos or Paxoi, about seven or eight miles southeast of Corfu] con voce d' entrar in Colfo, et ne scrive esso general essersi messo in camino con l' armata che aveva seco di 65 galee sottili, sei grosse, et buon numero de navi per andar a Messina per congiogersi tanto più presto et tanto più facilmente con le armate di sua Santità et di sua Maestà Catholica. . . . Venier had sent a galley to Candia with orders to the two Venetian provveditori of the fleet "che con le galee che si ritrovano in quella isola nostra che sono al numero di 70 in circa dovessero con ogni celerità passar medesimamente a Messina in modo che ancora quelle potranno presto ritrovarsi unite con le altre . . ." (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 120<sup>v</sup>-121<sup>r</sup> [141<sup>v</sup>-142<sup>r</sup>]).

Quatrefages, *Los Tercios españoles (1567-1577)*, trans. Carlos Batal-Batal, Madrid, 1979, pp. 93, 189, 314, and on the apparent costs of the naval campaign of 1571, note Geoffrey Parker and I. A. A. Thompson, "The Battle of Lepanto, 1571: The Costs of Victory," *The Mariner's Mirror*, LXIV (1978), 13-21; Michel Lesure, *Lépende, la crise de l' empire ottoman*, Paris, 1972, pp. 48-50; and Felipe Ruiz Martín, "Las Finanzas de la monarquía hispánica y la Liga Santa," in Gino Benzoni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, pp. 325-70.

<sup>75</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, 347, note, from a letter dated at Barcelona on 18 June, 1571, to Juan de Zúñiga in Rome, and cf. Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I (1918), 104-5.

<sup>76</sup> On Don John of Austria's progress from Barcelona to the naval rendezvous at Messina, cf. Contarini, *Historia* (1572), fols. 28<sup>r</sup>-29<sup>r</sup>, 32<sup>r</sup>, 33<sup>r</sup>; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 107-10; Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, I, 351-60; Felix Hartlaub, *Don Juan d' Austria und die Schlacht bei Lepanto* [diss. 1959], Berlin, 1940, pp. 76-79.

Turkish armada, which was known to have been heading for Corfu with the apparent intention of entering the Adriatic, the sooner Don John reached Messina, the better. Although the Turkish armada was reported to be very large, many of the vessels were small, and seemed to be in poor condition, "laqual seben era di buon numero di vele si intendeva però esservi in essa molti legni piccioli et anco poco all' ordine."

In fact the doge and Senate had already written Tiepolo (on 7 July) that word had come from Candia and Canea that there were 250 sail in the Turkish armada—galleys, galliots, fuste, and brigantines—which had entered the Cretan port of Suda on 14 June. The Turks had landed troops "per inferir danni a quei casali vicini alla Canea," but they had been driven back to the shore and put to flight by "our men." Some slaves aboard the Turkish vessels had managed to escape, and they (especially a Genoese) had reported that many of the Turkish galleys lacked oarsmen, and that they had few troops in condition to fight, owing to an invasion of typhus fever, ". . . molte galee mal ad ordine d' homini da remo et con poche genti da combattere, et con l' infirmità di pettechie." Tiepolo was to inform his Highness of all this, exhorting him to push on to Messina and put to sea to frustrate the Turks' evil designs.<sup>77</sup> With the Venetian fleet at Messina, the Republic's fortress towns along the Dalmatian coast were going to be almost entirely dependent upon their garrisons. Since Don John should be in Genoa by now—26 July—Tiepolo must try "to hasten his voyage to Sicily."<sup>78</sup>

Don John was indeed in Genoa by 26 July. It was the day of his arrival. All Europe had been following his passage.<sup>79</sup> He was not, however,

moving quickly enough to satisfy the Venetians. With the Turks on the verge of entering the Adriatic under the command of Pertau (Pertev) Pasha, the Senate feared to send the captain-general Sebastiano Venier the 5,000 soldiers (*soldati*) who had been recruited for service on the Venetian galleys, and who had apparently gone aboard the "six heavy galleys and other ships and vessels." Since they would be in the gravest danger of falling into the enemy's hands, they were not going to be sent to Messina. This would leave Venier's forces below their requisite strength, but efforts would be made to raise 1,500 soldiers who might be sent to Messina along routes not exposed to Turkish attack. It had been and still was the "intention and desire" of the Senate to have 100 fighting men (*homini da spada*) aboard every galley. Venier should, therefore, seek permission from Antoine de Perrenot, the cardinal de Granvelle, then viceroy of Naples, and from Francisco de Avalos de Aquino, marquis of Pescara, who was then the viceroy of Sicily (from August, 1568, to July, 1571) to raise in the southlands as many men as might be necessary.<sup>80</sup>

On 30 July (1571) Filippo Bragadin received his commission as provveditore generale in the

the Signor Don Gio. d' Austria con 44 galere et XX navi et XXX d' Italia n' erano a Genova che l' aspettavano, il qual doveva partire presto per Messina." Note also the avviso from Rome of 1 August (*ibid.*, fol. 92). "Dominica sera gionse un corriero di Francia, il quale è passato da Genova, et porta aviso che alli 26 gionse in quella città alle 22 hore i serenissimi principi con Don Gio. d' Austria con 40 galere et buon numero de navi cariche di gente, sopra le quali vi erano cento cavalli bellissimoi, 80 dell'i serenissimi principi et 20 del Signor Don Gio. d' Austria, il quale arrivato che fu nel porto comandò che le galere di Napoli che si trovavano là per aspettar sua Altezza dovessero partir subito per la volta di Napoli a far tutte le provisioni necessarie per l' armata acciò che per il X d' Agosto si trovasse a Messina per congiogersi con l' altra armata et per andarsene unitamente a buon camino per incontrare l' armata turca . . ." and on Don John's arrival in Genoa on 26 July, *cf. ibid.*, fol. 300.

<sup>80</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 119<sup>v</sup>-121<sup>r</sup> [140<sup>v</sup>-142<sup>r</sup>], letters dated 26-28 July, 1571, to the captain-general Venier; to the viceroy of Naples; to the Venetian secretary in Naples, Alvise Buonrizzo (Bonrizzo), who had formerly been the baillie Barbaro's secretary in Istanbul; and to Leonardo Donado and Antonio Tiepolo, the Republic's ambassadors in Spain; and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 124<sup>v</sup>, 129, et *alibi*.

Of the 5,000 soldiers in question, more than 1,000 were in the employ of Galeazzo Farnese. They had been embarked on "la nave Dolfinia et sopra le galee grosse et galeon Garzaruolo," and the Senate was apparently planning in mid-August to send them to Zara rather than wait for the opportunity to send them to join Venier's fleet (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 130<sup>v</sup>-131<sup>r</sup>), and note Sen. Mar. Reg. 40, fols. 72<sup>v</sup>-73<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>v</sup>-107<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 4 August, 1571). *Cf.* Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 252-53.

<sup>77</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 108<sup>r</sup> [129<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 7 July, 1571; *cf. ibid.*, fol. 109 [130], a letter to Venier, also dated 7 July, on the Senate's fear of the Turks' entering the Adriatic; note also fol. 113 [134] and Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 79<sup>v</sup>-80<sup>r</sup>, an *avviso* from Corfu dated 24 June. On the Turkish landing at Suda, "ruinando et abbruciando ove potero," *cf.* Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 25<sup>v</sup>, who dates it on the night of 15 June; see also, *ibid.*, fol. 26, and Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 185-86.

<sup>78</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 118 [139], doc. dated 26 July, 1571. On 30 July the doge and Senate wrote Tiepolo, "Dalle lettere vostre de 26 ricevute hoggi habbiamo inteso il giunger de l' illustrissimo Signor Don Gio. d' Austria con l' armata in quella città [Genoa] . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 121<sup>r</sup> [142<sup>r</sup>]), with a letter to Don John, fols. 121<sup>v</sup>-122<sup>r</sup>). *Cf.* Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, II, nos. 281, 282, 286, pp. 350-51 and ff., 356-57, 367.

<sup>79</sup> *Cf.* Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 88<sup>r</sup>, di *Venezia di ultimo Luglio*: "Hieniera arrivorno lettere di Genova di 22 di questo [a slip for the 26th] con nova che quel giorno alle 22 hore arrivò là

Adriatic (*in Colfo*), being put in command of "quella banda di galie che havemo deliberato di armare et . . . quelle galie, fuste, et altri legni armati che si trovano al presente in Colfo." His was to be the care and custody of the Dalmatian coast and the approach to Venice itself. If, incidentally, he found any galley commander engaging in illicit trade (*guadagni prohibiti*) or in any way seeking to defraud the state by cheating the oarsmen and the crew, he was to punish the offender severely "as an example to others."<sup>81</sup> It was the usual formula, repeated every year, as the galley commanders' abuses of authority also went on every year.

Yes, Don John had finally reached Genoa on 26 July, as the doge and Senate informed Venier (in a dispatch of 4 August), "con 44 galee di Spagna per venir a Messina." Venier had been worried by the slow progress of the Spanish fleet. He had also been wondering whether the galleys at Crete were on their way, as ordered, to Messina or whether he should go to Candia to effect their union with the Venetian fleet. He was now instructed to await Don John's coming. Antonio Tiepolo had written from Genoa on 1 August that Don John had set sail the night before, with all his fleet, and as the doge and Senate wrote Venier, his Highness was thus at long last on his way to join his forces with those of Venice, "et incaminato verso Messina per unirsi con voi. . . ."

The doge and Senate assumed that the galleys from Candia were or soon would be in Sicilian waters. Furthermore, they now intended, having reconsidered the matter, to send on the 5,000 infantry (*fanti*) along with ship's biscuit and munitions on three heavy galleys, all armed, on three large transports, and on other vessels when, of course, they could do so safely. The galleys would bring Venier 70,000 ducats for the needs of the fleet and 20,000 for Corfu, as he had already been notified (in a dispatch of 22 July). The transport of the troops on their southward passage down the Adriatic coast would have to await such time as it could be managed without fear of the great Turkish armada, which had wrought absolute havoc on the island of Zante. The Senate was going to provide the poor inhabitants of the island with timber to rebuild their

houses. Venier was being sent copies of Tiepolo's last letters from Genoa (of 31 July and 1 August), from which he could see with what alacrity and courage Don John was going about his business. If Venier's galleys seemed unduly lacking in manpower, which was certainly the case, he was to explain to Don John that a "buona quantità" would be found at Corfu and at Crete, "and that from hour to hour you are expecting about 5,000 men, who are aboard the great galleys and various other ships, which will be on their way to join you as soon as they may have a safe passage."<sup>82</sup>

The Austrian archdukes Rudolf and Ernst, who had spent some seven years in Spain (1564–1571), had sailed with Don John from Barcelona. They were now returning home to Vienna, and were entertained along with Don John at Giannandrea Doria's estate outside Genoa. Paolo Moniglia Giustiniani, then the "biennial" doge (1569–1571), and a hundred members of the Genoese Signoria paid three visits in three days to Don John and the archdukes. The Hapsburg prince and his young nephews, Rudolf and Ernst, also received visits from Francesco de' Medici, son of the grand duke of Tuscany; Alessandro Farnese, son of Ottavio, duke of Parma; and Francesco Maria della Rovere, son of Guidobaldo II, duke of Urbino.<sup>83</sup> Alessan-

<sup>81</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 124–125<sup>v</sup> [145–146<sup>v</sup>], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 4 August, 1571. On 6 August the doge and Senate wrote the Venetian secretary in Milan, "Ne scrive l'ambassador nostro Tiepolo per lettere sue di primo del presente da Genova esserli stato detto dal Signor Gio. Andrea Doria che la partenza sua dipendeva dall' imbarcar di Tedeschi. . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 125<sup>v</sup> [146<sup>v</sup>], and cf. fol. 126). On the destructiveness of the Turkish fleet, note fols. 128<sup>v</sup>–129<sup>v</sup> [149<sup>v</sup>–150<sup>v</sup>] and 131 ff.

Note also, *ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 115 [136], *al capitano general da mar*, a letter of the doge and Senate, dated 22 July, 1571, on which day the Senate also wrote the provveditore generale of Dalmatia (*ibid.*, fols. 113<sup>v</sup>–114<sup>v</sup> [134<sup>v</sup>–135<sup>v</sup>]). "Per lettere del capitano nostro general da mar de 9 del presente [9 July] da Corfu siamo avvisati che l'armata Turchesca era arrivata al Zante et havea brusciati li borghi et fatti molti altri danni, il che vi havemo voluto significar per vostra intelligentia. . . ." The provveditore must look to the defense and security of the "città, luoghi, et sudditi nostri, et specialmente haverete l'occhio che sia ben provisto et presidato il castello di S. Nicolò di Sibinico acciò in ogni caso possi far resistenza tale all'armata nemica che la non eri in quel porto. . . ."

As if the progress of the Turkish fleet in the Ionian Sea was not enough, the Uskoks were active in the Adriatic, and on 22 July the doge and Senate directed the Venetian provveditore of the fuste in the Adriatic to condemn Uskok corsairs to the galleys "for such time as shall seem appropriate to you." The galley slaves thus acquired were to be assigned to Filippo Bragadin, "whom we have elected provveditore generale in the Gulf [the Adriatic]" (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 114<sup>v</sup> [135<sup>v</sup>]).

<sup>82</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 304–5, *di Genova li 3 d' Agosto 1571*. The Archduke Rudolf was later Emperor Rudolf II

<sup>83</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 122<sup>v</sup>–123<sup>v</sup> [143<sup>v</sup>–144<sup>v</sup>], and note Sen. Mar, Reg. 40, fols. 68<sup>v</sup>–69 [102<sup>v</sup>–103], docs. dated 22 and 24 July, 1571, Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, p. 232, mistakenly calls Bragadin Filippo Bernardino. On Bragadin's naval responsibilities a decade before (in 1562), see Sen. Secreta, Reg. 73, fols. 17<sup>v</sup>–19<sup>v</sup> [34<sup>v</sup>–36<sup>v</sup>], and note, *ibid.*, fol. 22<sup>v</sup> [39<sup>v</sup>].

doro and Francesco Maria would go with Don John's fleet; Alessandro was the nephew of Don John, being the son of the latter's half-sister Margaret of Parma. Alessandro had a distinguished career ahead of him, and would some day succeed Don John as governor-general of the Netherlands.

Going aboard his flagship on the evening of 31 July, Don John set sail early the next morning. With brief landings at La Spezia, Port' Ercole, and Civitavecchia, on 9 August he reached Naples, where he was accorded a grand reception.<sup>84</sup> Now there were more delays, which Pius V and the Signoria looked upon as inexcusable, but the king's ministers were always behind schedule in their preparations to arm and equip the fleet. At a solemn ceremony in the Franciscan church of S. Chiara, burial place of the Angevin kings of Naples, Don John received the standard of the Holy League from Cardinal de Granvelle. There had been balls and banquets along the way but, then, as Serrano has reminded us, it did not occur to the Spanish of the time to forego their celebratory fiestas, even in times of emergency "or when the requirements of military enterprises demanded such a sacrifice."<sup>85</sup> In any event Don John was back on board the flagship on 20 August, and

three days later he entered the harbor of Messina to the welcoming roar of cannon.<sup>86</sup>

In the meantime, from 13 to 19 June, Marc' Antonio Colonna had attended to the loading at Civitavecchia of "il biscotto e le munizioni," which the papal referendary Domenico Grimaldi had collected for him. Colonna's little fleet consisted of twelve galleys which the pope had hired from Cosimo de' Medici (not from the Venetians) "col convenuto stipendio." He also had aboard his galleys 1,600 infantry, divided into eight companies. They had been recruited by Onorato Caetani, the lord of Sermoneta. On 21 June Colonna sailed from Civitavecchia to Gaeta, where he was met by his son-in-law Antonio Carafa, the duke of Mondragone, who had decided to join him in the coming venture, apparently with two galleys from Naples. At Gaeta, Colonna had been greeted by a salvo of artillery and a gathering of all the people and the clergy. On 24 June he arrived at Naples, having first been met at the island of Procida by three galleys of the Hospitallers, who had volunteered to go with the Christian armada "as adventurers and without stipend." They were under the command of Pietro Giustinian, a Venetian, the prior of Messina, where the Christian armada was to assemble.

At Naples Colonna was welcomed with "festa e allegrezza" beyond Sereno's capacity to describe the reception. All the city had turned out to witness his entry into the harbor. Colonna spent twenty-three days in Naples, where the Italians and Spanish nearly turned the streets into battlefields. He had waited for the hull of a galley to be finished in the Neapolitan arsenal. It was to replace one of the Hospitallers' galleys, "che per esser vecchia poco e mal'atta era a' servizi di guerra." At length Colonna sailed from Naples, and arrived with his fleet at Messina on 20 July, where he was again greeted with wondrous demonstrations of joy. Again, too, the Spaniards and Italians were at each others' throats, and this time the Spaniards were certainly the aggressors, but Marc' Antonio restored peace by condemning some of them to the galleys and hanging others, after which he settled down to await the arrival of the Venetians and of Don John of Austria.<sup>87</sup>

(1576-1612); he was twelve years of age when he went to Spain with his brother Ernst, then eleven years old. On their seven-year sojourn in Spain, see Erwin Mayer-Löwenscherdt, "Der Aufenthalt der Erzhertoge Rudolf und Ernst in Spanien (1564-1571)," in the *Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl.*, CCVI, Abh. 5 (1927), 64 pp., and on their passage from Barcelona to Genoa, *ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>84</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 98<sup>r</sup>, *di Napoli di 9 Agosto*: "Hoggi su le 21 hore è arrivato il Signor Don Gio. di Cardona con le sue 27 galere cariche di Alemanni, et alle 23 hore il Signor Don Gio. d' Austria ha fatto l' entrata con gran satisfactione di questo popolo. Il Cardinal Granvella è andato a riceverlo al ponte fatoli al molo, et poi sempre gli ha dato la man dritta. Detto signore è di carne bianca, di pelo biondo, con puoca barba et rara, et di bello aspetto et di mediocre statura. Era a cavallo sopra un bellissimo leardo ben guarnito al corsiera. Gli andavano inanzi i principi d' Urbino et Parma, et questo dava la man dritta ad Urbino. Il detto Signor Don Gio. ha un bellissimo numero di paggi et staffieri vestiti di velluto giallo con le franze turchine. . . ." It was now reported from Rome (in a news dispatch of 15 August), *ibid.*, fol. 98<sup>r</sup>, "Dicono che quando il Signor Don Gio. sarà giunto a Messina che ha ordine di dire al signor generale veneto [Sebastiano Venier] che sarà sempre prontissimo a combattere l' armata turca et a seguir la sua Eccellenza. . . ."

<sup>85</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 109, and note in general Antonio Ossorio (1623-1680), *Vida de Don Juan de Austria*, trans. J. L. de Toro, Madrid, 1946, bk. II, pp. 86 ff., 96 ff., 103 ff., interesting but inaccurate, as is Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 392, who puts Don John's departure from Genoa on 5 August.

<sup>86</sup> A picturesque description of Don John's arrival and reception at Messina may be found in the *avviso* dated at Messina on 23 August, 1571, in Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 115, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 319, and esp. fols. 325, 343-44, apparently the original text of this report.

<sup>87</sup> Bart. Sereno, *Commentarii della guerra di Cipro* (1845), pp. 115-18, whose dating (like that of other contemporary sources) is off a day or more here and there; Pompeo Molmenti, *Seba-*

For the Venetians Colonna did not have long to wait. The captain-general Sebastiano Venier, having left Corfu at two hours before daybreak on 11 July, arrived at Messina on the twenty-third. Colonna met him outside the harbor for the usual exchange of salvos of artillery. In the report which Venier later made to the doge and Senate (on 29 December, 1572, almost fifteen months after Lepanto), he complained that the Venetian presence in Messina had caused prices to double. Although the local authorities charged no duty (*datio*) on Venier's purchases of victuals, he encountered problems with the coinage, and it took some negotiating to purchase the cables, wheat, and wine he needed. Furthermore, finding it difficult to procure the necessary supplies in Messina, at one point Venier withdrew to nearby Tropea in Calabria with thirty galleys, and the provveditore Agostino Barbarigo looked elsewhere with another detachment of galleys.<sup>88</sup>

Venier wanted to add the Venetian galleys in the "Gulf" (the Adriatic) to his fleet in south Italian waters, because he foresaw the likely prospect of a large-scale engagement with the Turkish armada. The Senate agreed to send him eight or ten of the Republic's best galleys when they could move down the coast with less chance of encountering the Turks, who were then rampant in the Adriatic. But the members of the Senate naturally did not wish the expectation of further galleys to give Philip II's ministers a pretext for delay.<sup>89</sup> We

shall return to Venier's problems at Messina at a moment. In Venice the Signoria was aghast at the advent of the enemy armada.

The Turks were reducing to a wasteland "all our islands in the Levant," as the doge and Senate wrote Venier (on 11 August), including the island of Corfu. They had retaken the stronghold at Sopotò on the Albanian coast opposite Corfu, and were apparently on the point of a direct assault upon Cattaro (Kotor) "and our other places in Albania." Twenty-five Turkish galleys had appeared in the harbor of Budua (Budva) on 31 July, attacked the town, sacked the castle of S. Stefano and, as evening came, gone on to Dulcigno (Ulcinj). The Turks were approaching the very heartland of the Venetian state, *penetrando nelle viscere del stato nostro*, meeting no obstacles along the way. Venier must make clear to Don John of Austria and to Marc' Antonio Colonna the extreme seriousness of the situation. Venetian losses were European losses, and redounded to the shame of Christendom. The Senate waited in an hourly anxiety to learn that the galleys from Candia had reached Sicily safely.<sup>90</sup>

A dispatch of 9 August from the island of Lesina (Hvar) brought the sad news to Venice

that the city of Dulcigno has been taken by the enemy armada, with the death of all those who were in the city, that Budua and Antivari have surrendered after several assaults, and that the armada then came up to Castelnuovo to tar the keels [*spalmare*] while the word is that the Turks will attack Cattaro. It was being said, moreover, that they were going to leave fifty galleys at Castelnuovo, and then come on with the rest as far as Zara, and that their land army was also heading for the same place. . . .

Venier must indeed warn Don John and Marc' Antonio of the peril which accompanied the Turks' advance. They must come with all speed to the aid of the Republic's coastal possessions. The Turks had become lords of the Adriatic. If not stopped, they could soon be at S. Niccolò, Malamocco, and Chioggia (*ai lidi di questa città*), at the very shores of Venice.<sup>91</sup>

stiano Veniero et la battaglia di Lepanto, Florence, 1899, pp. 80-81 (where by a typographical error Colonna's arrival in Messina is dated 30 instead of 20 July), and doc. no. VII, pp. 353 ff., a letter of Colonna to the doge of Venice, dated at Corfu on 26 October [i.e., after Lepanto], 1571; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 582-83.

Cf. also Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 88'-89', di Roma di 20 Luglio: ". . . Questa settimana sono venute diverse stafette da Napoli, et si cava questa per la più fresca, che ha portato lettere di 15 che quella notte il Signor Marc' Antonio Colonna doveva partirsi alla seconda con 21 galere, et che l'armata Turchesca era arrivata al Zante, onde il Cardinal Granvella havea ordinato grandissima provisioni nel regno per la difesa de' luochi maritimi di sua Maestà Cattolica, et s' intende ancora che erano stati rimessi in Lucca 400 m. scudi alla disposizione del Signor Don Gio. d' Austria per servizio della guerra, la tardanza dell' arrivo del quale fa stupire ogni' uno. Nel Cardinal Rusticucci si riposa hora *summa rerum* del pontificato, nel quale con maniera incredibile satisfa all' universale, et mostra di non far cosa alcuna facendo il tutto." The tribute to Cardinal Rusticucci was well deserved.

<sup>88</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 136 [157], *alli ambasciatori al re Catholic.*, doc. dated 25 August, 1571.

<sup>89</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 138' [159'], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 25 August, 1571, and cf. *ibid.*, Reg. 78, fol. 1' [23'], doc. dated 1 September. As noted below, Venier had recently lost seven galleys (Reg. 77, fol. 139' [160']).

<sup>90</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 131 [152], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 11 August, 1571; on the Turkish seizure of two Venetian galleys, the recovery of Sopotò, and Uluj-Ali's appearance on the scene, note Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 29r; and on the Turks in the Adriatic, cf. in general Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 217-27, and Lesure, *Lépante, la crise de l'empire ottoman*, pp. 77 ff.

<sup>91</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 132 [153], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 13 August, 1571. About seven weeks later, however, as conditions on the Turkish armada were deterio-

Meanwhile poor, old Venier had his problems, but at any rate the Turks were apparently wearing out the armada that would soon be meeting the Christians at Lepanto. In one way or another Venier could find wine and ship's biscuit at Messina, but the recruitment of troops was far more difficult. He had been ordered by the doge and Senate to put a hundred men aboard each galley (to match the papal and Spanish assignment of soldiery to the galleys). Lacking knowledge of the area and its resources, Venier turned to Colonna, who assured him that with the assistance of his relatives and friends he could find the men, "but the soldiers would not come without their leaders [*capì*], nor would the leaders let them go without them." Colonna said that one Gasparo Toralta could produce twelve hundred men in Calabria, but that Venier would have to make Toralta a colonel (*chel facessi colonello*), with a stipend of from eighty to a hundred ducats a month. Some seventeen months later, after he had given up his command, Venier explained the situation to the doge and Senate (in his report of 29 December, 1572):

Although it seemed to me that I did not have the authority to create colonels, I did it anyway both for him [Toralta] and for the lord Prospero Colonna, who appeared later. I also gave away a good deal of money to others, but I still did not get half the soldiers [required], as your Serenity can see from the accounts, and for this I could be blamed, but circumstances thus made it necessary to do as I did. I also gave money to those aboard the galleys instead of ship's biscuit, and if I had not done so, I should have run out of biscuit, although Don John later loaned me some. The lack of biscuit might have led to absolute ruin. The money was spent, however, more to the advantage of your Serenity than the purchase of biscuits would have been, as you will see from the accounts, which is to the credit of Messer Marco Falier, my chief financial officer [*mio sopramasser*], an excellent man and competent in his job, who has kept and does keep your Serenity's accounts with all diligence.

On 23 August Don John arrived [in Messina] with forty-two galleys, and we received him with all possible ceremonies. His Highness called us into consultation, and said that we must see what forces we had. He stated that he had 84 galleys, counting the three of Sa-

voy and those of Malta, as well as 7,000 Spaniards, 7,000 Germans, and 6,000 Italians, all good troops. The lord Marc' Antonio said that he had few galleys, but that they were ready for action [*ma bene ad ordine*]. I said that I had come from Corfu with 58 light galleys, six heavy galleys, and three ships—and that in the Canal of Corfu two light galleys and two ships loaded with biscuits, munitions, and soldiers had been taken by the enemy armada, as well as another ship at Cephalonia. Furthermore, I had sent three vessels into the Adriatic [*Golfo*], and had lost to the hazards of the sea and fire seven others.

I thus found myself with 48 [galleys], which were not well supplied with soldiers because of illness, the seizure of our ships, and the beleaguering of others by the Turkish armada, which had gone into the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the lord Prospero Colonna was to bring me 2,000 infantry, and I should have 1,200 from the duke of Atri, another 1,200 from the lord Gasparo Toralta, and four other captains with 800, which would make 5,100 [sic]. I said that they would have been here in order, had they not been impeded, and that their victuals had also been held up by the viceroy of Naples. I noted that my heavy galleys were in good order, and that I expected 60 more galleys from Candia. Don John asked me about the soldiery. I replied that we usually put forty to fifty soldiers aboard a galley, because all our crews engage in combat [i.e., there were allegedly few galley slaves]. He said, "Whoever has a superabundance, will take care of the others."

Don John asked to be given a record of the victuals, and he wanted our views as to the [coming] enterprise. We replied that while his Highness was awaiting his other galleys from Naples and from Genoa—and we those from Candia—we should put our present galleys in order, and then we could discuss the coming campaign. This answer was made after consultation with the lord Marc' Antonio. His Highness was quite content with it. And so that I should not have a little satisfaction without a lot of sadness, I received letters from Naples about the loss of Dulcigno, Antivari, and Budua, with the news that the [Turkish] armada was going, part toward Cattaro, and part toward Zara, toward which the [Turkish] army was also making its way.

We told his Highness that when his galleys had come from Naples and from Genoa, and we had provided ours with biscuits and soldiers, even if the galleys from Candia had not arrived, we ought to head for Taranto in order not to leave the Turkish armada free to do us all the more damage, having taken from us Dulcigno, Antivari, and Budua. We also declared that we should leave orders at Messina and along the coast of Calabria that the galleys from Candia should come to Taranto, which would not interfere with any other enterprise that we might want to undertake. Don John showed himself quite agreeable to the idea, and gave us orders and letters for the biscuits, the money, and the soldiers which the viceroy [Granvelle] did not want the lord Prospero to raise [in Naples] as well as for the cash which [the

---

rating, and the commanders of the allied Christian fleets had decided upon offensive action, the Senate took steps to reduce the heavy costs of the garrisons in Zara, Sebenico, Traù, and Spalato for the coming winter. It was to be done by maintaining fewer but better soldiers, *procurando d' interiere delli migliori che si potrà* (*ibid.*, fol. 13 [35]), doc. dated 28 September; cf. fol. 17; see also Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 29<sup>r</sup>-30<sup>r</sup>, and Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 186).



Venetian secretary] Buonrizzo was to send us, for letters of exchange could not be acquired.<sup>92</sup>

The captain-general Venier, whose galleys were the worse for wear, manned with ailing crews and furnished with insufficient troops, would have felt even "less satisfaction and more sadness," had he known that Venice had lost not only the Adriatic ports of Dulcigno, Antivari, and Budua but, alas, the Turks had taken Famagusta. Never again would the lion banner of S. Mark float from the fortress towers in Cyprus. Every Venetian grieved over the magnitude of the Republic's loss and the likely consequences which lay ahead.<sup>93</sup>

When the relief force under Marco Querini, which had brought men, munitions, and provisions to Famagusta, sailed off to Candia on 16 February (1571), it left behind in the embattled city 4,000 infantry, 800 local militiamen, 3,000 townsmen and villagers, and 200 Albanian mercenaries. So we are told by Nestor Martinengo, who was in the city throughout the terrible siege, and lived (like Angelo Gatto, Pietro Valderio, and others) to bear witness to the heroism and hardihood of Marc' Antonio Bragadin, Astorre Baglione, Lorenzo Tiepolo, and a host of others, including the Greek residents of the city and the villagers who had sought a doubtful refuge behind the walls and bastions of Famagusta.<sup>94</sup> Immedi-

ately after the fall of Nicosia, the Turkish commander Lala Mustafa Pasha moved his troops and some artillery to an area just north and west of Famagusta,<sup>95</sup> and then settled them in a huge encampment to the south (and west) of the city, opposite the great Ravelin and the Gate of Limassol, the bastions of S. Napa, Andruzzi, and Campasanto, and the Tower of the Arsenal.<sup>96</sup>

The siege had been a desultory business through the winter of 1570-1571, but the pace was quickened with the advent of spring, for the Turks had stored up "everything necessary to assail the fortress," as Martinengo says, "such as the huge quantity of sacks of wool, timber, artillery, hand tools, and other things which were carried across from Caramania and Syria with great dispatch." At the beginning of April, Ali Pasha returned to Cyprus with eighty galleys—more men and more supplies—and then departed, leaving behind about thirty galleys which were continually ferrying across troops, munitions, victuals, and everything

1571 partirono li legni che condussero il soccorso in Famagosta, dove si trovano in tutto 4 millia fanti, 800 delle cernide [the local militia], et 3 millia tra cittadini et villani, et 200 Albanesi, et si è seguito con maggior diligenza che prima da tutte le parti a fortificarsi, lavorando tutto il presidio, la città, et li patroni istessi, non perdonando a sorte di fatica et opera per esempio di tutti. . . ."

Martinengo's account of the siege and fall of Famagusta is especially important—Gianpietro Contarini, Angelo Calepio, Pietro Bizarro (Bizaro), Bart. Sereno, Uberto Foglietta, and Antonmaria Graziani all rely on him as their chief source, sometimes following him word for word. I have used the text of Martinengo in the Houghton Library at Harvard (Ott. 196. 6, no. 23), which consists of eight (unnumbered) pages. Angelo Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio e della resa di Famagosta nell'anno 1571*, ed. Policarpo Cattizani, Orvieto, 1895, is an independent account of great value. Gatto was a soldier, chiefly interested in warfare and details of combat.

Another independent account is to be found in Andrea Tessier, ed., *Relatione di Alessandro Podacataro de' successi di Famagosta dell'anno 1571, ora per la prima volta pubblicata*, Venice, 1876 (Nozze Bonomi-Bragadin). Before the siege of Nicosia began, Alessandro Podacataro volunteered, with his father Filippo and his brother Tuzio, to go to Famagusta and take part in the defense of the fortress. They brought to Famagusta an abundance of cheese, barley, vegetables, "et ogn' altra sorte di biave et vittuarie." Alessandro also recruited three hundred soldiers "con le sue famiglie, vestendoli a mie spese molti di loro" (*ibid.*, pp. 9-10), a fact which Gatto, *Narrazione*, pp. 31-32, confirms.

<sup>93</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 15<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>96</sup> On the layout of the fortifications of Famagusta, see George Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 1918, esp. pp. 105 ff.; Rupert Gunnis, *Historic Cyprus*, London, 1936, pp. 89 ff.; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 990-93, 997; and on the siege and fall of the city, note Paruta, *Guerra di Cipro* (ed. 1827), bk. II, pp. 235-61.

<sup>92</sup> *Relazione del clarissimo Messer Sebastian Venier Procurator, et hora Serenissimo Principe, del suo Capitanato Generale da Mare, la quale fu presentata a 29 dicembre 1572*, in P. Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero* (1899), pp. 283 ff., 298-301, which is the text I have used, and cf. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, II, 384 ff., 388 ff., where Venier is awaiting 5,200 [not the incorrect 5,100] infantry, but Venier's text does give the figure 5,100 (Arch. di Stato di Venezia, Rel. Provveditori Generali e Capitani Generali da Mar, now to be found in the series Collegio, V [Secreta], Relazioni, Busta 75, 42 fols., with the passage in question on fol. 10<sup>r</sup>). Molmenti, *op. cit.*, p. 283, believes that Alvise Buonrizzo (Bonrizzo) was still secretary of the bailie in Istanbul in 1571 although, as we have seen, Buonrizzo had been stationed in Naples since the summer of 1570 (see above, Chapter 21, note 137).

<sup>93</sup> Cf. the letter which Cardinal Zaccaria Delfino wrote Gianfrancesco Commendone, then the apostolic legate in Vienna, as one Venetian to another, ". . . Io piango con la Signoria vostra illustrissima la perdita di Famagosta e le iatture che ne vanno in conseguenza. Pregato sia Dio Benedetto a mirar per pietà sua misericordiosamente verso il calamitoso stato della Christianità et della patria nostra particolarmente. Tanto non ho potuto contenermi di scrivere, trasportato dall' afflittione in che m' ha posto questa mala nuova. . ." (Lettere di principi, vol. XXV, fols. 329<sup>r</sup>, 332<sup>r</sup>, letter dated at "Waldestorff" on 22 September, 1571).

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Nestor Martinengo, *Relatione di tutto il successo di Famagosta*. . . Venice, 1572, p. 1 unnum.: "Alli 16 Febraio

else required." Galleasses (*maone*), transports (*pa-landarie*), and other small, fast vessels (*caramusolini*) went back and forth to the mainlands in a ceaseless hurry "in fear of the Christian armada."

In the middle of April the Turks moved another fifteen pieces of artillery from Nicosia, and began to dig ditches and trenches (*fossi et trincere*), having moved their encampment from areas to the northwest into the extensive gardens to the south of Famagusta. They also established themselves in a fort which they built just beyond the village of Precipola, to the west, opposite the bastions of Pulacizzari, Moratto, and Diocari. By 25 April they were raising gun emplacements (*bastioni per metter l'artegliaria*), and digging more trenches for their arquebusiers, "one close to the other, drawing nearer [our walls] little by little in such fashion that it was impossible to ward them off, for they worked mostly at night with some 40,000 pioneers [*guastadori*] always on the job."<sup>97</sup> In addition to the pioneers and sappers, Gatto assures us that Lala Mustafa Pasha had 7,000 horse and 193,000 foot in his army under the walls of Famagusta, making a formidable total of 240,000 men.<sup>98</sup> Although it is appropriate for the writer to record such figures, obviously neither he nor the reader will believe them.

As at Corfu in 1537 and at Siena in 1554, as we have seen, now in mid-April (1571) the "useless mouths" were expelled from Famagusta. Valderio says they numbered 3,660, and that (*mirabile dictu*) the janissaries escorted them to the safety of their villages, where they had adequate means of subsistence.<sup>99</sup> Lorenzo Tiepolo, the captain of Paphos

(*Baffo*), had charge of making bread for the soldiers, as Martinengo informs us, and Valderio says that he worked under him. The bread was made and the gunpowder ground at the Arsenal.<sup>100</sup>

As the enemy's workmen dug their trenches day after day, they finally brought them up to the counterscarp of the southern walls. Having finished their "forts" and gun emplacements, according to Martinengo, on 19 May the Turks began the bombardment with 74 large cannon, "including four basilisks, as they are called, of enormous size." Their cannonading ranged from the Gate of Limassol on the west to the Tower of the Arsenal on the east, with most of the fire being directed against the Gate of Limassol and the bastions of Andruzzi and S. Napa. At first, however, the Turks did less shooting at the walls than they did into the city, causing a turmoil which led the soldiers and the Greeks "to live on the walls, where they stayed until the end." Marc' Antonio Bragadin took his stand in the bastion of Andruzzi, Astorre Baglione in that of S. Napa, and Lorenzo Tiepolo in that of Camposanto.<sup>101</sup>

Like Martinengo, Gatto, and Podacataro, Valderio also begins the heavy bombardment on 19 May, and puts Bragadin and Baglione in the bas-

lissime, quali da giannizzeri sono state accompagnate alli loro casali; vi restorno ben molti, che avevano il modo di vivere, et persone che anno fatto il debito loro nelle fazioni." Cf. Antonio Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa e di Marc' Antonio Bragadin comandante*, Venice, 1843, pp. 33, 34 [per le nozze Arrigoni-Luccheschi], who says that 5,360 left Famagusta: "Itaque ex illis, partim maribus, partim faeminis, partim senibus, partim pueris, quinque millia, trecenti et sexaginta exiverunt." Riccoboni takes the figure from the soldier Angelo Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 52, on which see Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1008-9. On the Turks' kindly treatment of the useless mouths, cf. Uberto Foglietta, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta in Cyprus* [drawn from Foglietta's *De sacro foedere in Seltimum libri IV*, Geneva, 1587], trans. C. D. Cobham, London, 1903, p. 22.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 160: "Alli 26 [luglio] venne il eccellentissimo capitano [Bragadin] a visitar quello di Baffo [Tiepolo] all' Arsenal, con il quale io avevo la cura di far fare per tutta la milizia il pane delle formenti della Real . . ." and cf. *ibid.*, p. 157, on the grindstones (*le mazine*) and the final exhaustion of gunpowder, when by 26 July there were only five and a half barrels left in Famagusta to employ against the Turks (p. 161). Cf. Aless. Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 13, and Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 52-53, who tells us of the care in distributing bread, "non dando più di doi pani al giorno per testa," wine, cheese, rice, meat, oil, and everything else.

<sup>101</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, pp. 1-2 unnum.; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 57-59, who gives the Turks 64 cannon and 4 basilisks; and cf. Calepio, "Prinse de Famagoste," in Étienne de Lusignan, *Description de l'isle de Cypre*, Paris, 1580, repr. Famagusta [actually Brussels], 1968, fols. 275 ff., who follows Martinengo. Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 18, says the Turks had 82 pieces of artillery, including the four basilisks.

<sup>97</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, p. 1 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 23<sup>v</sup>, who puts the transfer of the fifteen pieces of artillery from Nicosia to Famagusta in mid-May. The besieged continued to work on their fortifications, on which cf. Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 119-23. According to the latter, pp. 136-37, the besieged became aware of the seriousness of the Turkish trenches on 25 April, but see Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 40, 41, 55, 90, who notes that the 40,000 pioneers were Armenians. On the siege of Famagusta, see in general Guido A. Quarta, *La Guerra contro il Turco in Cipro e a Lepanto (1570-1571)*, Venice, 1935, pp. 503-60, and Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 988-1025.

<sup>98</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 54. Among the 193,000 foot Gatto puts 12,000 janissaries (*ibid.*, p. 57). Toward the end of his narrative Gatto states that after the siege the Turks themselves declared that Mustafa Pasha had brought 250,000 men to Famagusta, including 7,000 horse, 40,000 pioneers, and sutlers [*wandari*], as well as seventy cannon and four basilisks which, all told, fired 163,000 shots, 120,000 iron cannon balls (*palle di ferro*) and 43,000 stone balls (pp. 96-97, and cf. p. 111).

<sup>99</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 133-34: ". . . uscirono fuori 3,660 anime in quattro giorni inuti-

tions of Andruzzi and S. Napa, the latter of which was also known as the Giudecca. Valderio has dwelt on the great bombardment of 19 May, when it seemed in Famagusta that the world was falling into ruin. The firing continued all through the day, but the Christians responded with equal ferocity, and shot to pieces the Turks' fortified gun emplacements (*forti*), killing many of the enemy and destroying a hundred pieces of artillery.<sup>102</sup> Martinengo, Gatto, and Valderio thus had reason to remember 19 May, and so have we, for that was the day on which Pius V, the Venetians, and the Spanish finally agreed upon the terms of the Holy League.

When the Turks began the heavy bombardment of Famagusta, the Venetian reply was strong and effective. In fact on 22 May a slave escaped from the Turkish encampment, and reported that the Christian "contrabatteria" had killed so many men, including engineers and bombardiers, that Lala Mustafa Pasha's whole army was clamoring for him "to cease the bombardment and lay siege." Others believed that the time necessary for a siege would allow the Christian fleets to unite and destroy the sultan's army. The Turkish high command decided to make a trial of the bombardment for three more days, the results of which should suggest the procedure to follow. The continued bombardment created consternation within the city, as Martinengo has noted; it also caused serious concern to Bragadin, Baglione, and the other leaders of the besieged.

About 7:00 or 8:00 P.M. on 25 May, according to Calepio, Mustafa Pasha sent a janissary to the walls of the city with two letters, one addressed to Bragadin as captain of Famagusta and the other to Lorenzo Tiepolo, the captain of Paphos, doubtless offering the usual Turkish terms for surrender. Astorre Baglione sent the janissary packing—let the pasha continue the siege; the Christians

would meet it with the full range of their weaponry. The soldiers on the walls supported Baglione with insulting gestures and the cry of "Viva S. Marco!"<sup>103</sup>

Despite Marco Querini's "soccorso," powder was in short supply within the walls. In late May "our men" made an account of the powder, "which they found to be only 4,300 barrels . . . and with the three days of firing a third of it had been consumed." The order was given, therefore, to be sparing in its use; no more than a hundred shots should be fired in any given response to the enemy's cannonading. The Turks immediately became aware of the Venetians' lack of powder. They increased their cannon fire, "and discharged another broadside of more than 4,000 shots." The Christian gunners were now instructed to limit a given volley to eighty shots, "and so every day from our lack of fire the enemy knew for certain that [our troops] did not have ammunition." The Turks were thus led to increase their pressure on the defenders, bombarding the walls by night as well as by day, "so that by 8 June they found themselves upon the counterscarp, of which they took full possession, and the counterscarp being as strong as the walls, they could not be attacked in any way." The defenders then sought, and received "with great difficulty," permission to fire twenty shots a day, and this they did in rather useless fashion, "living in anticipation of relief."<sup>104</sup>

The Turks gradually filled with earth and debris the moat along the southern wall, upon which they concentrated their attacks, and presently they were digging mines "al Revelino, al Torrione di S. Nappa, a quello de l' Andruzzi, a quello di Campo Santo, alla Cortina, et al Torrione dell' Arsenale." The Cortina was the curtain wall between the Camposanto and the Arsenal. The Christians cast fireballs (*fuochi artificiatii*) at their attackers, "which did the enemy no end of damage." They dug countermines, and embarked on sudden sallies against the Turks. Martinengo pays

<sup>102</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 141 ff.: "Alli 19 Maggio, giorno di sabato, 3 ore avanti giorno incominciorono gl' inimici intrincherati a fare una salva di archibugiate grandissima e mescolata l' artiglieria tutta cominciorono insieme a fare così orrendo e crudo rumore, che si pensava che il mondo rovinasse. E tutto quel giorno altro non fecero che tirare e battere, ma arditi gli nostri e saldi facendoli contrabattere già s' avevano provisto, avendo veduti gli forti de nemici, et conosciuto quello intendevano fare, gli diedero tal risposta che li forti loro gettono a terra con ruina di molta gente e rottura di pezzi 100, e quel giorno per conto tenuto gl' inimici uirono 3,373 tiri." Martinengo, p. 2, puts Bragadin at the Andruzzi and Baglione at S. Napa on 19 May, and Valderio, pp. 146-47, 185, locates them in the same bastions two months later, on 21 and 26-27 July. Cf. Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 24<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>103</sup> Calepio, "Prinse de Famagoste," in Lusignan, *Description de toute l' île de Cypre*, fol. 276<sup>r</sup>: "Le vingt et cinquième, sur les vingt et trois heures (où selon les François, à sept heures du soir) le Bassà envoya un Janissaire avec deux lettres, l' une au Capitaine de Famagoste et l' autre à celui de Paphé . . ." in which note the different indications of the hour. On the alleged Turkish losses, cf. Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>104</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 142-45, and on the defenders' shortage of gunpowder, cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1011-12, to whom Valderio's text would have been useful if he had known of it.

a special tribute to Astorre Baglione, "nè si cessò mai con maravigliosa industria et fatica del Signor Baglione, che prevedeva e tutte queste cose, disturbar gli nimici con ogni maniera d'ingegno et arte."<sup>105</sup>

The first of seven great assaults came on 21 June, when the Turks exploded a mine under the Tower of the Arsenal. They poured fresh troops into their attacks five or six times, *rinfrancesandosi gl' inimici cinque et sei volte*, but failed to enter into the city. Baglione fought in person at the threatened Arsenal. The assault lasted "five continuous hours," and many Turks were killed. The Christians lost a hundred men in dead and wounded, when a stock of their fireballs was accidentally ignited (*per una disgratia de nostri fuoghi arteficiati*).

A frigate had arrived from Candia on 29 May, "filling us with hopes of aid," and now on 22 June another came, "bringing news of certain aid and sure," which brought joy to the defenders, and inspired them with renewed courage.<sup>106</sup> Aid was neither certain nor sure. Their hopes were misplaced. However futile their courage, it would be a source of pride to their countrymen for generations. From month to month the besieged had received news of impending relief. At the very beginning of the siege (on 3 October, 1570) a frigate from Candia had brought word

that the Christian armada was at Fineka, a hundred miles distant from us, and that within three or four days it would appear, and free the city from the siege, but then in secret we got the news that although the armada had come as far as Fineka, the commanders [*signori*] had consulted among themselves, and decided to return, now that the city of Nicosia was taken. . . .

<sup>105</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, pp. 2-3 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 25, who follows Martinengo; cf. Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 61 ff.

<sup>106</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, p. 3 unnum., and for the frigate which had reached Famagusta on 29 May, *ibid.*, p. 2; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 65-69; for the frigate, the arrival of which Gatto puts on 28 May, see *ibid.*, p. 61, and for the frigate, which came on 22 June, p. 72. On the assault and explosion of the fireballs (*nostre balle artificiate*, i.e., sacks of inflammable materials) which came on 21 June, "che fu il primo assalto dato con tanto impeto che penetrarono gl' inimici la mezzaluna [i.e., the 'demilune' or shield-wall of the Arsenal]," see Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 153-54, where the copyist has apparently put the passage out of chronological sequence, and given the event a wrong date.

For the first great assault on 21 June, cf. also Calepio, "Prinse de Famagoste," in Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre*, fols. 277-278<sup>r</sup>, and Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 25<sup>r</sup>. The assault is misdated 2 June in Podacataro, *Relatione*, pp. 18-19, presumably by a printer's error.

But, as Valderio says, Famagusta was the "key and fortress" of the entire kingdom of Cyprus, and if the allied Christian fleets had come within sight of the city, just a hundred sail, the island of Cyprus would have been saved, "che se fossero comparse in vista di questa città e regno solamente cento vele, Cipro sarebbe recuperato!"

At Famagusta, unlike what had happened in Nicosia, Latins and Greeks—soldiers and civilians—worked together in friendship and love, leading the besieged to believe that God would help them, "che nostro Signore ci volesse aiutare, tanto più che vi era un' amorevolezza fra noi e soldati che maggiore non si poteva desiderare!" And yet things went from bad to worse, as the siege continued by land and sea and, when it was all over, Valderio looked back sadly to the vain suffering of the siege, "and we had to eat cats, dogs, horses, asses, and mice, and every other unclean animal to hold on [to Famagusta], awaiting from hour to hour the relief and liberation,"<sup>107</sup> which never came.

On 29 June the Turks set fire to a mine they had dug into the foundations of the Ravelin. It shattered everything in the area, says Martinengo, "et fece grandissima rovina." Charging over the debris the Turks then made their second great assault, under the watchful eyes of Lala Mustafa Pasha himself, attacking the defenders amid the ruins of the Ravelin and the parapet "con grandissima furia." The defenders lost several captains and thirty soldiers in the head-on collision with the Turks. Many Christian standard-bearers and officers, *alfieri et ufficiali*, were wounded. The Turks made simultaneous attacks upon the Arsenal, where they suffered great losses, although only five Christians were killed. Martinengo was himself wounded in the leg by a shot from an arquebus. During the whole six hours of the Turkish onslaught the bishop of Limassol stood by, holding aloft a cross, "giving courage to soldiers, and there were brave women who came to help the soldiers with arms, rocks, and water."

Seeing how badly they had fared in the assaults on 21 and 29 June, in *questi due assalti*, the Turks altered their strategy, concentrating cannon fire upon the southern walls of the fortress for days. They built seven new gun emplacements closer to the walls, moved artillery into them, and battered the walls with eighty cannon with such fury "that during the day and night of 8 July 5,000 shots were counted, and the enemy wrought such havoc

<sup>107</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 117-19.

on our parapets that we could repair them only by the most fearful effort because our men, who were at work there, were continually mowed down by the artillery and by the ceaseless shots of the arquebusiers, and only a few were left." The redoubt in the Ravelin, *la retirata*, had been so completely destroyed by the Turkish cannoners and sappers that there was no more platform (*piazza*), for the defenders now used what was left of the platform in thickening the defensive parapets. They then mined the remains of the Ravelin, "so that not being able to hold it any longer, they might leave it for the enemy to his own considerable loss."<sup>108</sup>

On 9 July, after the day and night bombardment, the Turks launched their third assault "al Revelino, al Torrione di Santa Nappa e a quello dell' Andruzzi, alla Cortina e Torrione dell' Arsenale." The attacks lasted some six hours, and were repulsed at all four places. The Turks did, however, move up onto the broken Ravelin

to their great loss and ours for, upon being attacked, our men were not able to manage with their pikes in the small space available, and wishing to withdraw in accordance with the order given by Signor Baglione, they were thrown into confusion, and drew back mixed up with the Turks, so that when our mine was fired—what a horrendous sight!—it carried off more than a thousand of the enemy and more than a hundred of our own men.

In the five hours of attacks upon the Arsenal, Martinengo was wounded again, this time by a chip of cannon shot (*scaglia d' artiglieria*), and more brave captains were done to death.

The Famagustans showed much valor at all points, along with their women and children, but the Ravelin was so destroyed by the mine that no further effort was

made to retake it, for there was no place left on which to secure a footing. There remained standing only the left flank [*il fianco stanco*], where we put another mine. . . .<sup>109</sup>

The Ravelin having been demolished, the Turks made the Limassol Gate behind it the objective of their fourth assault. It came on 14 July. Astorre Baglione and Alvise Martinengo, the latter of whom was in command of the Christian gunners, led a counterattack against the enemy as they charged upon the Gate, killing many of them, according to Nestor Martinengo, and putting most of them to flight. Then they fired the mine in the

<sup>108</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, pp. 3–4 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 27, who as usual follows Martinengo in his account of the siege and surrender of Famagusta; Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 21, who puts the third assault on 10 July, and notes that his brother Tuzio was killed in the explosion on the Ravelin; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 79–82, who says that on 9 July the Turks "mantennero l' assalto sette hore a tutte le batterie, e sette volte si rimisero con gente fresca all' assalto, e sette volte fero una sparata con tutta l' artiglieria che haveano in campo." Gatto claims that 1,500 Turks and 150 Christians were buried in the explosion of the Ravelin, and that so far was Baglione from having given the order to fire the mine that he wanted to wring the neck of the guilty party "with his own hands" (*ibid.*, p. 81).

Note also Valerio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 150–52, who says that the Turks climbed up on the Ravelin, "dentro del quale fu fatta da nostri una mina con animo di mostrar di ritirarsi, et entrando dentro li nemici darli poi fuoco, e fare andare tutti in aere, ma la cosa riuscì altramente, perchè dando la calca alli nostri da non si sa chi—chè per onori si tace—fu dato fuoco alla mina, la quale assaltò la maggior parte de' nostri . . . e così con morte di 100 de' nostri il Revelino restò in mano de' nemici, essendo morti li uomini che lo difendevano.

"Ma perchè non osavano venire sopra li nemici, dubitandosi delle mine con le quali ancor loro non amò avuto minor danno, anzi molto maggiore, al vespero il valoroso capitano Zorzi famagostano Tricchi andò dall' eccellentissimo capitano [Bragadin] et s' offerse con la sua compagnia andare a ricuperare il Rivellino. Tale offerza fece uno Messer Anzolo de Nicolò da Venezia, il quale da principio venuto da Saline gli fu dato il carico dell' artiglieria del cavaliere di Limisò, nel qual officio si portò anco valorosamente, et comparse dinanzi sua signoria eccellentissima, che era accompagnata con il Signor Astor [Baglione] et noi tutti.

"Fu deliberato però dagli signori per non metter a pericolo tanti quanti bisognavano a far l' impresa di quello per salvare la gente, qual ricuperazione dicevano esser facilissima, ma mantenerlo non era possibile, perchè da ogni banda potevano da novo gli inimici prenderlo, et così fu concluso che fosse serrata la Porta di Limisò quel giorno, che li inimici come padroni si stavano nel Rivellino a darsi bel tempo."

On the explosion of the Christian mine in the Ravelin, which killed so many of the besieged as well as of the besiegers, cf. Uberto Foglietta, *The Sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta . . .* [drawn from Foglietta's *De sacro foedere in Selimum libri IV*, Geneva, 1587], trans. C. D. Cobham, London, 1903, pp. 27–28, who mistakenly dates the Turks' third assault on 7 July.

<sup>109</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, p. 3 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 26<sup>r</sup>, who follows Martinengo; Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 20; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 72–79: ". . . Non m' estenderò in raccontar minutamente il combattere dell' una et l' altra parte [which is, however, Gatto's usual practice!], vi concludo . . . durando l' assalto in questo giorno sette hore, et sei volte se misero all' assalto, et tutte le galere Turchesche s' erano messe in battaglia, e venivano verso il porto sparando molte cannonate" (p. 74).

For the second assault (and those which followed), cf. Calepio, "Prinse de Famagoste," in Lusignan, *Description de toute l' ile de Cypre* (1580, repr. 1968), fols. 278<sup>r</sup>–283<sup>r</sup>, which the English reader will find in translation in C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria*, Cambridge, 1908, repr. New York, 1969, pp. 153–56. As a witness to the trials and death of his fellow Christians in the siege of Nicosia in the summer of 1570, Calepio wrote a valuable account of the fall of the capital city, but his description of the siege of Famagusta is largely lifted from Martinengo's *Relatione*, which he cites ("Prinse de Famagoste," fol. 285<sup>r</sup>).

left flank of the Ravelin, "which killed about 400 Turks, and the lord Baglione acquired an enemy standard, snatching it from the hands of an ensign." On the next day the Turks exploded a mine they had dug under the Cortina, between Camposanto and the Arsenal, but it did them little good. They made no assault, contenting themselves with enlarging and raising the "traverses" (*traverse*) in the ditches to protect themselves from cross fire and improve their position for further assaults.

Within the walls the women carried stones, and water to put out the fires set by the Turks, who lighted a huge pile of wood from a foul-smelling tree, "un legno detto teglia," before the Limassol Gate. It burned for four days with an intolerable stench, and added immeasurably to the heat of mid-July. The Turks rebuilt the platform (*piazza*) of the Ravelin, pointing a small cannon at the Gate. They dug more mines. Within the city everything but hope and courage was coming to an end. "The wine was finished," Nestor Martinengo tells us,

and neither fresh nor salted meat nor cheese could be found, except at a price beyond all limits. We ate horses, asses, cats, for there was nothing else to eat but bread and beans, nothing to drink but vinegar with water, and this gave out.

The Turks were always at work, digging mines. Opposite the Tower of the Arsenal they erected a huge cavalier "alto tanto quanto il nostro," as high as the Tower itself. The defense forces were now reduced to some five hundred Italian soldiers, weary from their long vigils, toilworn from combat in the burning sun. The Greeks had done well, but most of them and the best of them were dead by now.

About 20 July the leading citizens of Famagusta finally resolved to address a petition to the captain and commander Marc' Antonio Bragadin to the effect

that since the fortress had been reduced to desperate straits, without defenders, without supplies, and without hope of assistance, and since they had pledged their lives and properties to secure their salvation and to serve the most illustrious Signoria, he should now be willing to surrender on honorable terms, having regard for the chastity of their wives and the safety of their children, who would fall prey to the enemy. Bragadin answered them with kindly words, seeking to allay their fears. He said that aid would come. He tried to relieve the fright which had entered the minds of all. At their request he

sent a frigate to Candia to inform the authorities of the plight in which they found themselves.<sup>110</sup>

The defenders no longer had the means to maintain themselves. They had run out of gunpowder, "which was indeed a torment on an island so far [from help], thrust into the very mouth of the wolf," as Valderio puts it, "for in six hours the enemy got from places in their own country whatever they wanted, and we no longer had either charcoal or saltpeter, which was their salvation and our destruction."<sup>111</sup> We have already noted Astorre Baglione's curt dismissal of the janissary whom Lala Mustafa Pasha had sent (on 25 May) with letters to Bragadin and Lorenzo Tiepolo. Baglione had directed the janissary to tell Mustafa that the besieged would use the full range of their weapons to defend themselves, but now (as Mustafa knew well) they had little weaponry left, only pikes and swords and few men to wield them.<sup>112</sup>

It is perhaps small wonder, then, that on 23 July Mustafa should write to Baglione himself. The letter was brief, shot over the walls by an arrow:

I, Mustafa Pasha, want you, milord general Astorre, to understand that you must yield the city to me for your own good, because I know that you have no means of survival, neither gunpowder nor even the men to carry on your defense. If you surrender the city with good grace, you will all be spared with your possessions, and

<sup>110</sup> Martinengo, *Relazione*, pp. 4-5 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 28, following Martinengo; Podacataro, *Relazione*, pp. 21-22; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 83-86, who also describes the "teglia ardire, dal qual non si vede fiamma, ma solo fumo acutissimo e pestifero, d' insopportabil odore con radiche di pino." On the Turks' re-use of the Ravelin and their burning the foul-smelling wood, which (like Gatto) Valderio identifies as pitch (*legno pegola*), note the *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 154-55; cf. Foglietta, trans. Cobham, p. 29, and Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1022-23. A "traverse" was a bank of earth built in a trench to protect the occupants against cross fire and to confine the range of shell burst.

<sup>111</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 157. Valderio doubtless had in mind the fact that sixty Turkish galleys had been "ferrying" men and munitions from Caramania and Syria to Cyprus, "che sessanta galee Turchesche erano già passate in Cipro con gente da guerra et per tragartrarne anco dalle marine di Caramania et Soria per l' oppugnatione di Famagosta . . ." (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 105<sup>v</sup>-106<sup>r</sup> [126<sup>v</sup>-127<sup>r</sup>], *all' ambasciatori appresso il serenissimo re Catholico*, doc. dated 23 June, 1571). On the sixty galleys and the Turkish ferrying of supplies, see Podacataro, *Relazione*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>112</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 87, says that Baglione rejected the pasha's letter on 28 July, and is followed (as usual) by Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa*, p. 46, but since the Christian leadership knew by 28 July that they were beaten, Calepio's date for Baglione's dismissing the pasha's messenger seems more reasonable.

we shall send you into the land of the Christians. Otherwise we shall seize the city with our great sword, and we shall not leave a single one of you alive! Mark you well.

The pasha's letter sent Bragadin and the commanders into immediate consultation. Valderio and his fellow Famagustans did not know what form their deliberations took. Presently, however, the suggestion was made to the local "captains" as leaders of the community to appear before Bragadin and the *eccellentissimi signori* with their viscount—with Valderio—to say it was obvious that the city of Famagusta was lost, and that they must take pity on their wives and children. One must bear in mind what happened at Nicosia. The Italian soldiers realized that they would all be slaughtered on the next assault. A Famagustan came to Valderio, actually on the soldiers' behalf (or so it is said), to urge him "as chief of the city" (*come capo della città*) to go before Bragadin and the commanders

in the name of the [local] nobility and the people together with the provveditori of the municipal government [*università*] to make them understand that we now see how we are about to fall prey at any moment to our enemies, and that we find ourselves devoid of all hope of assistance. . . .

The *eccellentissimi* must arrange terms of surrender.

Valderio was loath to do as he was asked, but various persons, including one Dr. Gallo, who was a procurator of the municipal government "and our physician," assured him that they had actually been sent by Bragadin himself (*sua Signoria illustrissima*) to ask the viscount to make the appeal to their lordships for surrender. Valderio was in fact asked to do so in writing. That he could not do, he said, unless Signor Astorre himself told him that the city was in such peril.

In late July Bragadin came to see Lorenzo Tiepolo, "quello di Baffo," at the Arsenal, where Valderio was working with Tiepolo "making bread for the whole militia from the grain of the realm." Baglione had also come. Suddenly he approached Valderio.

"Signor viscount," said Baglione,

I have often wanted to talk things over, with you especially, but I have been caught up in the many activities in which you have seen me. And with you yourself here in the Arsenal looking after the important matter of bread, I could not but take heart. I have been told by your people that they have besought you to appear before their Excellencies and to ask that the city be given

over to the enemy, now that we can no longer defend it. You told them if I did not state positively that the city was lost, that you would not do this. Now I tell you, on my word as a gentleman, that the city has fallen. At the next assault we shall not be able to meet them, not only because of our few troops, now so depleted, but because of the gunpowder, which has been reduced to five and a half barrels. . . .<sup>113</sup>

Gatto believed that by the last day of the siege the defenders had only some seven barrels of powder, five barrels of coarse powder for the artillery and two of finely-ground powder for the arquebusiers' use.<sup>114</sup>

"Their lordships," says Valderio, "were on one side of the room, and we were walking up and down on the other." When Baglione ceased speaking, a number of persons came up to Valderio, especially Captain Matteo Colti and Dr. Gallo, telling him that he must make the formal request for surrender on behalf of the Famagustans, "and delay no longer." Taking Baglione by the hand, Valderio spoke to their lordships at some length. Until this hour, he said, he had believed their constant assurances that the Christian armada would come "to free us from this war." Every morning he had waited upon their lordships; to his inquiries they had always said that everything was fine, "che stavano benissimo." He was not a soldier by profession, but he had always tried to comfort the Famagustans with the assurances their lordships had given him. From what Signor Astorre had just told him it was clear that he had been deceived, and that he in his turn had misled the people, "but may the love of God undeceive your most excellent lordships, because I shall undeceive the people who expect a statement of truth from me." Signor Astorre had made it clear that the "slightest assault" (*minimo assalto*) would take the city.

Obviously, Valderio declared, he had labored in vain. He had recruited and sent into action the native soldiery "in gran numero," and now both native soldiers and citizens were about to fall into the enemy's hands. This was not a just recompense (*guiderdone*) for his labors. His life had been an unending "sweat"—*che ho tanto sudato*—to find housing for the soldiers. He had dispatched poor peasants throughout the countryside to bring food and fodder, charcoal and wood into the city. They

<sup>113</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 157-62, who dates Baglione's acknowledgment that the city would fall on 26 July.

<sup>114</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 94.

had ventured as far as Limassol (according to Valderio) for wine, oil, pitch, and other things. It had all fallen on his shoulders. He had finished his term as viscount of Famagusta (*il tempo del mio reggimento*), but their lordships had refused to allow a successor to be chosen. Although it was contrary to custom for a viscount to be set to bread-making, this was one of the tasks their lordships had given him. He had had to provide for the poor people as well as for the soldiers. The responsibility had fallen upon him to take from those who had to give to those who had not, so that up to now with God's help the defenders of Famagusta had lived together in peace, charity, and concord—"et io fui che ne tolevo da chi ne aveva, dispensandolo a quelli che non ne avevano sicchè finora coll' ajuto di Dio si ha vissuto in pace, carità, et unione."

The Famagustans had shared their own resources with the Italian soldiery as well as with the local militia, "spending all they had to attest to the world their confidence." They had shed their blood without payment, exposed their houses to destruction, and labored day and night with their wives and children to help save the city from the Turks, "as you, my lords, have seen with your own eyes to this very hour." They had been eating horse-meat and every other foul animal, for a piece of beef cost 140 soldi, pork 80 soldi, an egg a whole bezant, a hen a ducat, and firewood 25 ducats a load. The Famagustans had worn themselves out and impoverished themselves to save the fortress, displaying more spunk and spirit than any other people for a century. Now there must be an end to the bloodshed, and as a reward for their services the Famagustans would go with their wives and children into servitude, "quanto il specchio di Nicosia ci ha dimostrato." But let their lordships and the captains, "che sono uomini da guerra," take counsel again. They must get at the truth. If they found the cause to be hopeless, they must grant the Famagustans' request for surrender. If there was hope of success and salvation, however, the Famagustans would rise above surrender, "for we are ready to maintain this city with our own blood until the very end on behalf of the most illustrious Signoria."<sup>115</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 162-66. On the office and duties of the viscount in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem (from which it passed to Cyprus with other administrative posts), note John L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291*, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, pp. 106, 135-36, 167-69, and cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, II, 54, and III, 1030, note 1, the latter being a reference to Valderio as "viscount of Famagusta," whose name Hill does not know (cf. Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 26).

As viscount of the city Valderio had made a formal request for surrender. When he had finished speaking, their lordships withdrew briefly, but soon returned, and Marc' Antonio Bragadin, the captain of Famagusta, answered Valderio with tears:

Signor viscount, I have heard all you said both on your own account and on that of the captains [of the local militia] and of the city, whose chief you are. I can only thank you, for I know you to be the father of them all. You have been most faithful to our illustrious Signoria from the very beginning. Although you had finished your term of governance a year ago, when this war came upon us, I did not want to allow the management of affairs to be taken over by others. . . . In this grave business with which I must deal, I wanted matters to pass through your hands. Yes, I have recognized the devotion, readiness, and loyalty of these captains and the people in responding to my slightest order. . . . If by concession of the grace of his divine Majesty I return to Venice, I shall not cease to proclaim both to our Signoria and to all the world the valor and promptness of all you gentlemen of Famagusta, for your name and valor will live forever. But you must know that by the commission which I hold, I am forbidden on pain of death to surrender the city. Forgive me. I cannot do it.

Astorre Baglione then spoke in passionate remonstrance. The city was lost. It would fall on the morrow if an assault came. Bragadin and he could die on the walls to preserve their honor, "for we are soldiers." It would be, however, a dreadful thing to allow the loss of so many lives. "Having discharged our debt in defense [of the city], we have not failed in any way." They had waited for the Christian armada until this hour, perhaps "the last hour of our lives." If they had yielded to the Turks without so many assaults, bombardments, and hardships, the law might have required the punishment the Signoria had implied in Bragadin's commission, but it was no longer a matter of law. Therefore, Baglione concluded, it was meet and fitting to satisfy the people, "and all the other captains supported him." It was then agreed that the Famagustans should present in writing the petition for surrender, and after hearing a solemn mass of the Holy Spirit the next morning, "we shall do what the Lord God inspires us to do."<sup>116</sup>

Valderio's account of the war of Cyprus, written after the events he describes and doubtless dressed up a bit, is obviously an *apologia pro vita sua*. Although the anonymous diarist of the siege of Fa-

<sup>116</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 166-70, and cf. Podacataro, *Relatione*, pp. 22-23.



magusta and Alessandro Podacataro both refer to Valderio as viscount of the city without identifying him by name, the Italian writers of the time preserve in their narratives chiefly the names of the Italian soldiers and heroes of the siege, almost to the exclusion of the other defenders of Famagusta. They do give us the names of some Albanians, but of very few Greeks, and of these Albanians almost all were captains. Valderio, however, the "mayor" (*visconte*) of Famagusta, who had been set to making bread, was not a soldier (*profession mia non fu di guerra*).<sup>117</sup> Whether half-Italian or not, Valderio (like Matteo Colti) was a "Greek" native of Famagusta. In fact, in one passage in his work, Valderio refers to "my village of Trapesa, a place three miles distant from Famagusta."<sup>118</sup> In any event when, later on, Valderio proved to be of use to the Turks, he dropped out of the Italians' sight.

Be all this as it may, the speeches which Valderio gives himself and Baglione do depict the differing points of view of the Famagustans on the one hand and the Venetian captains on the other. Bragadin's eloquent response to Valderio sounds like a restatement of the commander's own words. In the alleged text of the petition for surrender, *La Scrittura presentata alli Eccellentissimi*, which Valderio is said to have prepared with Baglione's advice, we have an extensive recital of the Famagustans' loyalty and devotion to the Venetian Signoria, as made evident by their efforts of the preceding eighteen months. When the Turks had filled the moat with earth and debris, the Famagustans had cleared it, bringing the earth into the city to add to the fortifications. They had built eleven cavaliers on the bastions, extended the glacis (*spalti*) from the counterscarp, and rendered every conceivable service to carry the fortifications as close

to perfection as possible. During the siege deprivation had added to their determination. The deaths of their fellows had increased the valor of the living. Everyone had taken up arms "per difendere la nostra patria e conservarla alla devozione e sotto questo santissimo nome e vessillo di San Marco," and Greeks and Italians had fought together against the barbarous infidels.

According to the *Scrittura*, the Famagustans had, up to this point, endured sixty-eight days of unheard-of bombardment, 150,000 rounds of heavy artillery, including shots from 106 basiliisks and more than 100 other cannon. They had not been dismayed by the ruin of their palaces and houses, churches and other buildings through the seven fierce assaults which they had so far sustained,<sup>119</sup> nor by the terrible mines which had made all the earth shake, nor by the fire at the Limassol Gate, nor by anything. Although they had not had the Italians' experience of warfare, they had not failed to stand side by side with them to meet (always according to Valderio) the enemy's army of "300,000 persons." The Famagustans had paid a price for their loyalty to Venice in the deaths of sons and brothers, relatives and friends. They had accepted copper money for specie. Indeed, as Valderio says with resentment, "this war has been fought with our money, as your most excellent lordships know" (*et col nostro danaro questa guerra è stata fatta, come lo sanno le vostre signorie eccellentissime*). The promised help, the *soccorso et ajuto*, had never come, as the Famagustans had watched the Turks gradually overwhelm their city with cannon and all sorts of earthworks.

The so-called petition for surrender goes on and on in a sad monotone of despair, recalling the shortages of food and powder and anticipating the influx of the Turks. No help had come from Candia; not even a word had come despite all the promises. The responsibility for the fall of the city "before God and before all the world" would lie with those who had failed to send help. Valderio closed with an appeal to their lordships to grant the now desperate Famagustans deliverance from

<sup>117</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 164; for the anonymous diarist of the siege of Famagusta, see below, note 125; Podacataro, *Relazione*, pp. 23, 26, has three references to the "Visconte di Famagosta"—as a native Cypriote, Podacataro was naturally at least somewhat concerned with the presence and activities of the "mayor" of Famagusta. The writer's family name is usually spelled Podacataro. As for references to Albanians and Greeks, cf. Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 31–32, 109 ff. If instead of going to work for the Turks, when the siege was over, Valderio had been killed in one of the assaults, Gatto might have added him to Nicolò Saraciniopoli and Antonio Greghetto, the only two Greeks he mentions of the 1,700 "Greci ammazziati in tutta la guerra" (*ibid.*, p. 110).

<sup>118</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 70: ". . . la mia villa di Trapesa, loco distante da Famagosta tre miglia. . . ." Trapesa is just northwest of Famagusta; on the remains of the village, see George Jeffery, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus*, Nicosia, 1918, p. 200.

<sup>119</sup> Counting from 19 May, when the bombardment began, sixty-eight days would bring us to 26 July (cf., above, note 113), but the seventh and last assault apparently came on 31 July which would, as Martinengo says (see below), amount to seventy-five days of bombardment. There is ample evidence throughout Valderio's *Guerra di Cipro* that the work was written after the events described; apart from the poor condition of the original and the copyist's carelessness, it would appear that Valderio's dates were sometimes unreliable. He was obviously too busy to do much of any writing during the siege.

final ruination, "come avvenne all' infelice Nicotia." Perhaps it was possible to save the city, the citizens, and their goods, "as the enemy has offered to do with the capitulations which your most excellent lordships may agree to," and thus the Famagustans [who wished] could be resettled in Venetian territory and lead their lives and keep their belongings under the aegis of the Signoria and the faith of Christendom.

According to our text, on 26 or 27 July there appeared before their lordships Marc' Antonio Bragadin, captain of the kingdom of Cyprus, and Lorenzo Tiepolo, captain of Paphos, in the presence of Astorre Baglione, Alvise Martinengo, and many other captains and soldiers—there appeared, that is,

the magnificent Signor Pietro Valderio, viscount of the aforesaid city of Famagusta, together with the judges of the city, the citizens, and many other persons, who have presented [to them] the letter given above, requesting that it be taken into consideration with justice and prudence by their most excellent lordships in the event the city is found to be in such plight that it cannot be defended, as has been said to be the case by their own experts. . . .

But if the Signori Capitani would take an oath to the effect that the city could still be defended, they withdrew the petition, and pledged their lives and properties "to maintain this city for the most illustrious Signoria of Venice, as whose vassals they are prepared to die." The tenor of the petition explains itself; Valderio and the Famagustans were avoiding the possibility of a subsequent charge of treason.

Upon receiving the petition Bragadin, Tiepolo, and Baglione withdrew, summoning the captains for a formal consultation, after which Bragadin emerged, again in tears, and addressed another speech to Valderio. He bore witness once more to the viscount's loyalty and to that of the Famagustans. No one within the walls had failed in his duty to defend the city. There was no alternative to surrender. Valderio was given the responsibility of finding a way to inform Lala Mustafa Pasha of the Venetian high command's readiness to negotiate and to bring about a suspension of arms. Valderio immediately consulted with "those of the city," and the decision was reached to send by whatever means possible a letter to the pasha, offering in the name of the Famagustans to arrange with "our lords" to give up the city on honorable terms (*a patti onesti*). The letter pleased the Signori

Capitani, because it cast no reflection on the military.<sup>120</sup>

Martinengo says that after a widespread explosion of mines along the southern wall on 29 July, the Turks launched their fifth, sixth, and seventh assaults (on the twenty-ninth, thirtieth, and thirty-first), which led to the cease-fire on 1 August. In his description of the fifth assault Gatto identifies various pashas, beys, and sanjakbeys, together with the bastions, batteries, and "demilunes" (*mezze lune*, roundish shield-walls) which they attacked. He tells us, too, that after the sixth attack there were scarcely nine hundred Italians left alive in the city, and many of these had been wounded by cannon fire, with shot from an arquebus, or by some other means. And finally Gatto depicts the seventh onslaught as an "horrendissimo assalto generale a tutte le batterie."<sup>121</sup>

For whatever reason, like his fellow Cypriote Podacataro, Valderio tells us nothing of these last assaults. He does say, however, that Baglione wanted to see that the letter intended for Mustafa Pasha should be delivered "that night," *perchè s' aspettava la mattina l' ultimo assalto*, for the last assault would come on the morning. Could one

<sup>120</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 170–83. The letter bears the obviously impossible date 25 July, for Valderio puts the petition that gave rise to it on 26 or 27 July. Martinengo, *Relazione*, pp. 4–5, informs us that it was about 20 July when the leading citizens of Famagusta decided to appeal to Bragadin for surrender on honorable terms, "quando si risolsero i principali della Città, che fu circa a venti di Luglio, fare una scrittura con supplicar il clarissimo Bragadin ch'è . . . volessero con l' arrendersi a condizioni onorate haver riguardo all' honor delle loro moglie et alla salute de figliuoli, che sarebbono andati in preda de' nemici. . . ." Cf. Foglietta, trans. Cobham, pp. 29–30.

<sup>121</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 87–94, who at first dates the fifth assault on 30 July (*ibid.*, p. 87), and then puts it on the twenty-ninth (p. 92); Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa*, pp. 46, 48, 50, follows Gatto, and also puts the seventh and last assault on 31 July (*pridie Kalendas postrema Turcarum aggressio facta est*). The Italian version of Riccoboni, which is published with the Latin text, is to be avoided, for the translator (strangely enough) did not know how to transfer dates from the Roman calendar of the original to their modern equivalents. Cf. in general Quarti, *La Guerra contro il Turco* (1935), pp. 538–42, and Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1024–25. According to Gatto, *Narrazione*, p. 97, when it was all over, the Turks acknowledged losing 80,000 men.

To the sources cited by Quarti and Hill should be added L. A. Visinoni, ed., *Del Successo in Famagosta (1570–71)*, *diario d' un contemporaneo*, Venice, 1879, pp. 33–34, the diary of an unknown soldier who went through the siege. Valderio, at least in the text of the *Guerra di Cipro* given in the Treviso MS. ital. 505, mentions no assault after the Famagustans' presentation of their petition for peace to the Signori Veneti on 26–27 July.

get the letter into Mustafa's hands? Yes, said Valderio, that would be easy. The nearby Tower of Camosanto was in the charge of Captain Matteo Colti and his company. The Turks had been laying a mine under the Tower, and Colti's men had dug a tunnel to destroy the mine (*contraminando*). One could talk there with the enemy, and give them a letter which would certainly be delivered to the pasha. Colti was summoned, and undertook to get the letter into Turkish hands that same evening. It was no sooner said than done. Mustafa's reply came at dawn on the following morning. It was addressed to Baglione:

Signor Astorre, general in that city: I have been advised by the men of Famagusta that they are willing to surrender the city to me, and that they will arrange for you to do so also. I have suspended the arms which would have been bloodied by your bodies, and today certainly no one of you, from the highest to the lowest, would have remained alive. Now, for your own good, send two of your people here to us. I shall also send two of mine to you so that we may be able to discuss and settle the terms. Stay well. Mustafa Pasha, general of Cyprus and of the armada and army of the Gran Imperator.

Baglione gave the letter to Bragadin, and off they went to the Arsenal to see Tiepolo, who summoned Valderio. Now that they were prepared to surrender, everything depended upon the outcome (*consiste il tutto nel fine*). Valderio was asked to choose two Famagustans, with the counsel of his fellow citizens, who were to go into the Turkish encampment as hostages until an accord had been reached. According to Podacataro, the white flag of surrender was hoisted on the city wall on 1 August.<sup>122</sup> Valderio says that he chose as hostages Captain Matteo Colti and Messer Francesco Calerghi, on the advice of his fellows, but Bragadin declared Count Ercole Martinengo wanted to go to see "quell' esercito et apparato Turchesco," and so Calerghi was not sent to the pasha.

On the morning of 2 August Astorre Baglione, accompanied by Valderio (according to the latter's account), took Martinengo and Colti with a body of horse out the Porta del Diamante,<sup>123</sup> which was now left open, to effect the exchange of hostages with the Turks. Outside the Diamante they met

Mustafa Pasha's lieutenant or majordomo, *che loro chiamano cheragià*, and the lieutenant of the agha of the janissaries, "who entered the city with a great company, and by this time it was theirs, for they were all gathering to see what was happening under the guise of an accord."

Anyone who wished could now come into the city, walking over the ruins, says Valderio, for the sentinels had been withdrawn. "We went into the city," he continues,

to the house of the late Captain Antonio Gregchetti, where Signor Astorre was living, and where his Excellency had had a banquet prepared in their honor, and having refreshed themselves with unaccustomed restraint they set to talking to us when the food had been removed: "Signor Astorre, you who are the general, for we have not seen your captain, we want this city to be given to our emperor without more ado. . . ."

As the king of Jerusalem, *al qual il regno di Cipro è sottoposto*, Sultan Selim II was also king of Cyprus. Christians had been robbing Moslem pilgrims on their way to and from Mecca, using Cyprus as a base, and no one had been safe while sailing in Cypriote waters. Sultan Selim's father [Suleiman] had become too old to deal with the numerous complaints of Christian piracy which had been lodged at the Porte, but now Selim had sent an army of "300,000 persons" to assure the safety of the pilgrims and to secure his rights as king of Jerusalem.<sup>124</sup>

Bragadin had left the negotiations with the Turkish "hostages" to Baglione, who demanded that the defenders' lives be spared, and that they retain their arms and goods, five pieces of artillery, and the three finest horses. He also asked for a safe passage to Candia, according to Martinengo, with an escort of galleys, "and that the Greeks should remain in their houses, and continue to enjoy their property, living as Christians."

Gatto, Podacataro, and the anonymous diarist all say that the Turkish "hostages" offered the

<sup>122</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 183-88, where by slips of the pen Valderio or his copyist first refers to Girolamo Martinengo (p. 186) as wanting to go and see the Turks' military "apparatus" and also refers to Selim (p. 188) as being the aged father of the reigning sultan. Although the conference was held in Antonio Gregchetti's house, Podacataro says that the Turkish hostages were lodged in the house of one Danadella (*Relazione*, p. 23). According to Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 110, "Il Signor Antonio Greghetto, successore al Signor Hieronimo Greghetto, [era] tagliato a pezzi in campagna doppo la resa della città." Hieronimo [Geronimo, Girolamo] Greghetto was Valderio's predecessor as the viscount of Famagusta (*Guerra di Cipro*, pp. 14-15).

<sup>122</sup> Podacataro, *Relazione*, p. 23.

<sup>123</sup> Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, p. 94, and Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 186, both date the exit of Martinengo and Colti on 1 August, which under the circumstances seems a day early. Martinengo, *Relazione*, p. 5, puts it on 2 August, as do Calepio and others.

Christians a "carte blanche" for the surrender, promising to abide by the terms which the defenders were to propose. It would appear from Valderio's account that Mustafa Pasha did indeed agree to Baglione's capitulations, but then refused to allow the Venetians to take the five pieces of artillery for fear of a riot in the Turkish army, because it was not the practice of the Turks to give up artillery and allow its removal from conquered territory. When the majordomos of the pasha and the agha explained this to Valderio (on 3 August), he told them he could not deal with this problem "now that they had made him their bailie" (. . . *giacchè mi anno fatto bailo loro*), but that they must take the matter up with Baglione. They did so, Valderio adds, "and having talked among themselves in secret, because I removed myself from that piece of trouble, I do not know what was done."<sup>125</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, p. 5; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 30; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 94-96; Podacataro, *Relatione*, pp. 23-24; Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 190-91; Quarti, *La Guerra contro il Turco*, pp. 544 ff.; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1026-27, who gives a somewhat different account, relying especially upon Gatto, Sylv. Brenzone, Andrea Morosini, and Podacataro: According to Gatto, "Mustafa . . . sent a jannissary to their Excellencies, rejecting one article [of the Capitulation], because he did not want the city without the artillery, but because of the great valor he had found in Famagusta he was willing to grant them five pieces, to be chosen by their Excellencies" (*Narrazione*, p. 95).

The anonymous diarist is well informed (*Del Successo in Famagosta (1570-71), diario d' un contemporaneo*, pp. 34-36): "Alli 2 detto [2 August] fu dati li ostaggi da l' una e l' altra parte in questo modo che fu mandato a Mustafa Basà il Signor Ercole Martinengo et il Signor Mattio di Colti, gentiluomo de la città, et per ostaggi di Mostafa Bassà venero in la fortezza un suo chiaia et il chiaia de jannizzeri, i quali portò carta bianga et li disse che il bassà li mandava questa carta e che dovesse dimandare che li ditti ostaggi faria quel tanto che il bassà li avea comesso e che il bassà non averia mancato quanto loro prometteria sopra la testa del Gran Signore et presentò un turbante su una tavola carga de catene d' oro, e così sua Eccellenza et il visconte de la città [Valderio] et il cancelliere del clarissimo Signore Marcantonio Bragadino et cominciaro a capitolare in questo modo prima che ci lassino andar via tutti quelli che vogliono andare insieme con l' Italiani et che ess' Italiani possano andare co' le loro moglie e figliuoli, robbe, arme, et insegne spiegate [with their banners unfurled] e che ne fusse dato quattro galie e tanti caramusali per buttarni in Candia sani e salvì et alquanti pezzi de artellaria di quella de la fortezza et con questa conditione che se volesse restare indietro niungno cristiano non si dovessero stringerli allevarli de la fortezza cos' Italiani come altri et che li Greci possano vivere in la loro fede e che stiano in casa loro, possedendo tutto il suo per cinque anni [cf. Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1027, note 1, who does not know the present source] essere asente de ogni angarie, et in questi cinque anni non pacendoli stare nel regno che ogniuno potesse partirse a suo bene placito et li dimandò de imbarcare tre cavalli belissimi [cf. Martinengo].  
"E così li detti ostaggi non volse risolverli sino che il bassà no

Except for the export of artillery Mustafa Pasha accepted Baglione's terms. According to Martinengo, the Turks promptly sent galleys and other vessels into the enclosed harbor of Famagusta:

The [Christian] soldiers began to embark, and when most of them were on board, and the ships' captains wanted to depart, the distinguished Bragadin sent me [Martinengo] on the morning of 5 August with a letter to Mustafa, which informed him that in the evening he wished to go to him to deliver the keys, that he would leave the distinguished Tiepolo in the fortress, and that in the meantime [Mustafa] should take care that nothing be done to distress those within the city . . . because up to that hour the Turks' relations with all the rest of us had been friendly and without suspicion, for they had shown much courtesy toward us in both word and deed.

Mustafa told Martinengo that he might inform Bragadin to feel free to come when he wished. He looked forward to meeting him "per il molto valore che haveva provato in lui et negli altri capitani et soldati." Indeed, Mustafa said that he would always, wherever he might be, praise the valor of the defenders of Famagusta. No, the pasha asserted he would not allow the citizens to be molested, and this is what Martinengo declares he reported to Bragadin.<sup>126</sup>

As far as Valderio was concerned, the terms to which Mustafa Pasha gave his assent were an almost meaningless convention attending the ceasefire. The Turks were already pouring into the city and looting houses and churches, for the Christian soldiers, the Latins at least, had already gone with their goods to the shore for embarkation. The pasha's majordomo assigned twenty jannissaries to Valderio to guard the main streets of the city (*alla custodia delle contrade*), where the residents had the means to buy off their oppressors. Although one might be hard-pressed, he could save some of his property if he could afford it, "but the poor folk

vedeva li detti capitoli et subito li furno mandati fuora al suo padiglione et visti che ebbe capitoli se contentò del tutto, eccuando che no voleva dare l' artellaria ch' lui diceva che no voleva la forteza senza artellaria, ma si ben che ne donava cinque pezzi per il valor che aveano mostrato quelli signori et quelli onorati capitani e soldati in el combattere, cioè Italiani, li fava questo donativo di questi cinque pezzi de artellaria a sua eleta, e così li sottoscrissero et li sigillò col sigillo d' oro del Gran Turco e subito mandato addire al bassà che era terminato tutto e subito venne alla catena del porto [i.e., the chain from the 'spur' of the Castello to the north end of the jetty or Secca, forming the harbor enclosure] alquanti caramusali et galere . . . but of course Mustafa Pasha's pretense of generosity did not last long.

<sup>126</sup> Martinengo, *Relatione*, p. 5 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 30', following Martinengo; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 96, 97; Podacataro, *Relatione*, p. 24.

who were already ruined, since they did not have the means to pay, were stripped of whatever they had left." Valderio sent two janissaries to guard the Greek church, but they wandered off under the pretense of going to see their agha, whereupon others broke into the church, robbing and pillaging it. They wrenched the silver from the images, wrecking everything.

The citizens were all hard put to protect their own houses, for the Turks broke in, "and tried to make themselves masters of their wives and children, and by God I had one of these janissaries on my hands who by himself cost me more than forty sequins [*zecchini*] in eight days." All the well-off Famagustans shared Valderio's plight, for they had to provide meals to the more important Turks who descended upon them without invitation, and for whom they had to find food and drink with a show of welcome. Many times, as Valderio tells us, the Famagustans were obliged to entertain the Turkish invaders

from morning until evening or from evening until morning, but since I was being employed by them, and had told them what was done to me, they sent me two janissaries who were not to permit anyone to pass along this street, and so my house remained quiet, but God knows what they cost me in two days!<sup>127</sup>

Nevertheless, as Valderio's report makes clear, not all the Famagustans had been reduced to eating horses, dogs, and cats during the worst of the siege. As at other times and other places, this was a plight reserved for the poor.

Valderio notes that Mustafa Pasha was pressing Bragadin, Tiepolo, and Baglione for the surrender of the fortress, but one could not find porters (*bastasi*) to carry anyone's possessions to the shore. The soldiers were looking after their own things, and the citizens were busy trying to protect their houses, which were "full of Turks." At last, however, on 5 August, a Sunday and the feast of S. Maria della Neve, Bragadin told Valderio (who does not mention Nestor Martinengo) that he must accompany him and Baglione to wait upon the pasha. Valderio was to convey the keys of the city to the Turkish general.

A merchant named Angelo di Niccolò was also to go, bringing with him "silk cloth in a great abundance to give as a present to the pasha and those other lords." Valderio adds that

the magnificent majordomo of Mustafa Pasha told me that I should go with him to kiss the hand of the pasha before the departure of the most excellent [Bragadin]. Finding myself between Scylla and Charybdis, I excused myself, saying that it behooved me as viscount to carry the keys of the city before the most excellent captain, and so he departed, having accepted my excuse.

At the evil hour of vespers Bragadin, Baglione, Valderio, and numerous other gentlemen issued from the Porta del Diamante, followed by soldiers with halberds and arquebuses with their matchlocks clogged. Trumpeters went before them. Bragadin was clad in a crimson damask robe lined with crimson satin. A parasol, the symbol of authority, was carried over his head by one Pietro Paolo Seda. Two hundred thousand Turks gathered to witness the spectacle and to hurl insults at the defeated defenders of Famagusta, who finally arrived at Mustafa Pasha's pavilion. As they dismounted, Mustafa rose to his feet; they paid him reverence, and he sat down again. Stools, covered with crimson velvet, were brought in for the Italians, who were seated before the pasha. Mustafa's settee (*banca*) was higher than the Italians' stools (*scagni*). The agha of the janissaries sat nearby; the pasha's majordomo stood close to him. The majordomo (*cheragià*), the pasha's lieutenant, presented Valderio to his lordship; the viscount then kissed the hand of the pasha, who had him sit on his left. With everyone thus in his place, the proceedings began.

Marc' Antonio Bragadin, as captain and commander of Famagusta, now declared, "Since the divine Majesty has determined that this kingdom should belong to the most illustrious Gran Signore, herewith I have brought the keys to the city, and therewith I give the city up to you in accordance with the pact which we have made with each other. . . ."

Since princes kept their word, Bragadin assumed, he said, that they were now free to leave with their possessions and go back to Candia.<sup>128</sup>

"But, captain," replied Mustafa Pasha, "what have you done with the Turks taken by your galleys, those who were aboard the transport? One of them was a man of mine."

"I do not know what men they were, but they were captured in combat. The captain of the galleys [Marco Querini] took many of them off with him, along with their galleys. He left about six of them

<sup>127</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 191-93.

<sup>128</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 193-97; Podacataro, *Relazione*, p. 24; and cf. Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 97-98.

in the Castello, where they were kept, but they made a breach in the walls, and escaped two days ago."

"Not so," declared Mustafa, "I know that you have had them [the Turks aboard the transport] put to death. The men who escaped, as you say, have told us so. They would also have come, if they had been alive. These things are not right. You say that I am to keep my promises to you, and you have broken faith with me despite the truce we have made."

Mustafa reproached Bragadin with discarding the Italians' stocks of wine, vinegar, and oil rather than leave them to the Turks. He also charged him with having ordered a soldier to set fire to five hundred bales of cotton which had been put on the cavalier at the Limassol Gate. Valderio says that the charge was true, but that Bragadin had been much distressed by the destruction of so much cotton. Mustafa went on, giving Bragadin no chance to reply or to appease the pasha's mounting anger. Bragadin tried to state that all the Turkish prisoners he had held in Famagusta had in fact escaped. If he had put any to death, he would never have allowed the others to escape to tell the tale.

When Messer Angelo di Niccolò, who was near Bragadin, advanced, apparently to inform Mustafa Pasha of the gift of silk cloth, the Turkish general said, "You all want to leave, and I have put at your disposal the galleys of the Gran Signore. Who among you will stay as security with me to see that these galleys and caramusalini come back, now that your fleet is in Candia? You must give me a hostage, and let it be one of these Venetian gentlemen . . . with the promise that as soon as my armada returns, I will send him back to Candia in a galley."

Bragadin remonstrated, "But, milord, this is no part of our accord. You promised to send us all off in freedom and to give us the ships to take us."

That was true, Mustafa acknowledged; it was what they had agreed upon. Having thought about his own possible loss, however, Mustafa now said that he was not at all certain, once his galleys had reached Candia, that they would ever return. If the Venetians took them, the sultan would cut off his head (*mi saria tagliata la testa dal mio Signore*), which would certainly have been the case.

"But once I have a hostage from among those of you around me here, I am safe. And, look, I will have him stay with the bailie here [Valderio], who is a Christian. He will have regard for him and take care of him. When the armada returns, I will send the hostage back."

"Milord, I cannot sanction this," said Bragadin,

"for now these gentlemen are private citizens like me."

Mustafa Pasha then turned to Astorre Baglione, somewhat wrathful (*alquanto in collera*), whereupon the latter whispered to Valderio, "Messer Angelo may intervene to some effect, for I see the pasha is becoming angry." Messer Angelo apparently had the good sense to say nothing. The pasha was angry, but it still seemed possible to deal with him:

"Very well, gentlemen, you generals leave me one of your captains as a hostage and go with God!"

Baglione then protested that leaving a hostage was not in the terms of surrender, and after the surrender the generals no longer had authority over the captains. This seemed to be the last straw. Clapping his hands, Mustafa Pasha rose, now quite in anger, "And so you have written to Candia in order that your fleet may be on the watch, because you will surrender on agreement to be escorted to Candia, so that according to some such plan we should lose this entire armada, the property of the Gran Signore. Tie them all up!"

It was done in an instant, says Valderio, and with another clap of the hands all the Christian soldiers who were in the Turkish encampment were slain as well as most of the citizens and people of Famagusta who had accompanied their generals to the pasha's pavilion, "and to sum up, they left no one alive, whom they found in the camp." When Bragadin, Baglione, and the others had been trussed up,

they wanted to bind me also, but the lord pasha ordered them to leave me alone, because I was [their] bailie, and he himself took me by the hand, and set me over on the right side near the recess of the youngsters [in his suite]. The majordomo also took Messer Angelo by the hand, and although he had been tied, he made him sit near me. Then they led Signor Astorre out to the slaughter, and cut off his head. Signor Alvise Martiniengo, the castellan [Andrea Bragadin], and [Giannantonio] Querini were cut to pieces.

The pasha ordered that Captain Dardano should also be put to death, as they had done [to the others] one by one. The poor gentleman started to protest. Since one of our Famagustans, Dimitri Bargas, was near me, although he had been tied up at the same time, I said to him, because he spoke Turkish [*stante che l'avea la lingua araba*], that he should tell his lordship it was a great pity to put to death the men who were not soldiers, but native Greeks of Famagusta. Considering [all] the others who had been put to death in the camp today, there hardly remained a hundred persons in Fama-

gusta,<sup>129</sup> and inasmuch as they are not at fault, his lordship should let them live, because all these are men who will have to pay the Gran Signore the poll-tax levied on non-Moslems [*carraggio*, i.e., the *kharaġ*]. The pasha then turned to me, "Baillie, what are you saying? These men are natives of the place?" I assured him they were, and so he ordered them to be untied.

The news came from the camp that the janissaries and the Turks [*Arabi*] were going to enter into the city to do the same thing as they had done to the Christians outside, in the camp. The pasha straightway sent the agha of the janissaries, who held them in check. He also sent his lieutenant into Famagusta to issue the proclamation that those who had arms in their houses or elsewhere must give them up under pain of the gallows [*forca*]. At the same time that this command was given, all the [Italian] soldiers who were in the harbor ready to embark were put in chains, and the chain across the entrance to the harbor was raised so that they all remained slaves. Then the rest of the galleys which were anchored off the vineyards at S. Marina moved under the Castello [at the entrance to the harbor]. . . . Mustafa Pasha summoned Captain Matteo Colti, and sent him to Famagusta to say that he was coming to safeguard the Famagustans, but the poor fellow found his house plundered and all the rest in ruins. . . .<sup>130</sup>

When two executioners approached Bragadin, he stretched out his neck—two or three times, says Martinengo—expecting death and commending his soul to God, but they only cut off his ears, reserving him for further torture. Count Ercole Martinengo, who had been tied up, was concealed by Mustafa Pasha's eunuch "until his anger had passed, and then he spared his life, taking him as his slave," according to Nestor Martinengo, "and the Greeks, of whom there were three in the pavilion, were let alone." Actually five "Greeks" had been in the pavilion, and they were all spared—Valderio, Captain Dardano [Squarzialupi], Dimitri Vargas, the merchant Angelo di Niccolò, and Matteo Colti. Podacataro tells much the same story as Valderio. After being ransomed from the Turks, Podacataro learned it all from Angelo di Niccolò.<sup>131</sup>

<sup>129</sup> The statement is obviously rhetorical, and belied by Valderio's later assertions.

<sup>130</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 197–204, and cf. Martinengo, *Relazione*, pp. 5–6, where the dates 15 and 17 August should be 5 and 7 August, which Cobham failed to note in his translation of Martinengo (in the *Travels in the Island of Cyprus* . . . from the Italian of Giovanni Mariti [1736–1806], Cambridge, 1909, pp. 188–89). The dates are given correctly in Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 307–317. See also Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 98–101, who ends his account of the siege with a good deal of rhetoric.

<sup>131</sup> Podacataro, *Relazione*, p. 26: All the Christians, both Italian and Greek, who were in the camp, were slain, "né altri

Martinengo, like Podacataro and Valderio, notes that all the Christian soldiers in the Turkish camp had been slain as well as three hundred other Christians, "non pensandosi a una tanta perfidia et crudeltà." Bragadin, Baglione, and the others had left Famagusta to go the short distance to the Turkish camp between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. (*circa le 21 hore*), according to Martinengo, Podacataro, and Gatto. And now Valderio says that between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. (*miglio di un' ora di notte*) twenty-four janissaries took "twelve of us" back into Famagusta, and "the following morning we went to our houses."

As for Ercole Martinengo, Valderio says that it was he and the pasha's chief dragoman who saved Ercole's life. It was the dragoman who hid him until the first period of violence, "il primo empito," had passed, and then interceded with Mustafa Pasha on his behalf. Poor Ercole was clad as a Turk—*li fu posta una sessa bianca in capo*—and, to his great distress, he thought they had made a Moslem of him. But Valderio assured him that if they had made him repeat words that he did not understand to effect such a conversion, it would not matter: *verba debent intelligi secundum intentionem proferentis*. Valderio did not know, as he wrote, whether Ercole was in Turkey or back home, but he was an honorable gentleman (and a true Christian), and so Valderio "wanted to give the truth of the event, so that whoever reads this history may be certain that the thing happened in this way."<sup>132</sup>

rimasero in vita, eccetto il Visconte di Famagosta, messer Dardano Squarzalupi, et messer Anzolo de Nicolò, quali furno salvati da un turco, sino che cessò la furia, et poi li presentò al Bassà, li quali interrogati da lui, il Visconte et il Squarzalupi li dissero esser Famagostani. Et così li licentiò, et insieme anco licentiò messer Anzolo de Nicolò, havendolo veduto così vecchio et inteso che era mercadante già tanti anni in Cipro, et esso messer Anzolo essendo stato presente al tutto mi ha riferito dopo ch'io fui riscattato, così essere anco ogni verità; et fu anco lasciato messer Mattio di Colti, qual era ostaggio, per essere Famagostano, ma il Conte Hercole Martinengo fu fatto schiavo, et furno anco fatti schiavi tutti quelli che si ritrovorno sopra li navilli di ordine del Bassà, tra li quali mi ritrovai io ancora. . . ."

<sup>132</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 204–5, 207–10; Martinengo, *Relazione*, pp. 5–6; Foglietta, trans. Cobham, p. 31; and see below, note 135. Inasmuch as Mustafa Pasha had spared the lives of the "Greek" captives, he insisted on being paid for it, and Giannantonio Giustinian had to give up his new houses at S. Antonio, which (says Valderio) had cost him more than 40,000 ducats. Dardano lost his beautiful palace, and others had their houses and shops taken away. In fact five whole sheets of paper, *un quaternio de carta*, "would not suffice to record the wrack and ruin we have suffered" (*Guerra di Cipro*, p. 218).

As for Alessandro Podacataro himself, Mustafa Pasha refused to believe that he was a Cypriote, for if he had been (said the pasha), he never would have boarded one of the ships in the harbor to leave his country and abandon his property. Poor Bragadin bore witness to the fact that Podacataro was a Cypriote, but it did no good. After thirty-seven days in chains, however, the French consul, "qual era amicissimo del Bassà," ransomed Podacataro for 325 sequins (*cechini*), and the latter lived to write his invaluable account of the siege.<sup>153</sup>

Thus the city of Famagusta, the last refuge on Cyprus, says Valderio, became Turkish on 5 August, 1571, "thanks to the fact we were abandoned, and if the quarrels among these Christians go on like this, we can be sure that the rest of Christendom will go the same way." The Turkish presence in the city was a torment to the Christians. The Turks wanted them to remove the debris of the ruined cavaliers in order to begin rebuilding the fortifications. Mustafa Pasha feared the likelihood of attack by the Christian armada, which by this time he may have known was supposed to be assembling at Messina. Bragadin was forced to carry on his shoulders a sack of earth from the cavalier at the Limassol Gate all the way to the Arsenal at the other end of the southern wall of the city. Lacking his ears (and perhaps his nose), Bragadin was "come morto," but the terrible Turks took him into the city to the sound of trombones and castanets. They employed every device to make a Moslem of him, "and the saintly man always spat on their faith and their law, saying 'I am a Christian, and thus I want to live and die. I hope my soul will be saved. My body is yours. Torture it as you will. . . .'"

Bragadin's servant Andrea accepted conversion to Islam (*si era fatto Turco*) "in order to be able to go up and down in his service." We all tried to help, says Valderio, but with the secrecy which the danger required. Bragadin was thrust into a chair, and hoisted to the main yard on Arab Ahmad's galley for all to see. Thereafter he was taken to the column of the pillory in the city. Stripped to the waist, he was flayed alive. As the knife reached his navel (*l'ombelico*), he cried, "In manus tuas, Domine, commendo spiritum meum," and expired. Laying him on the ground, the executioners finished the ghastly task of stripping the skin from his body. They stuffed the skin with straw, and divided his body into four pieces. Bearing them through the city, with castanets and trumpets, they

hung the four pieces on beams in the Towers at the Diamante, the Arsenal, the cavalier at the Limassol Gate, and the bulwark of Andruzzi. "Truly he may be canonized and put among the saints," as Valderio bears witness, "and certainly if the legends of the saints are true, as they are, this honored and blessed martyr deserves to be preferred to any other," for such was his suffering, the constancy of his faith, and the absolute integrity of his character.

On the day of Bragadin's death the leading Famagustans were obliged to wait upon Mustafa Pasha in the palace, and give him presents. The act of obeisance cost Messer Antonio Giustinian 600 ducats, the merchant Angelo di Niccolò 300, and Valderio himself 300, "che fu il presente de 1,200 ducati al Bei." The Turks complained that this was not an adequate gift for a pasha,

but I told them of the poverty of the city, the expenses we had had, and that everything we possessed had been given to the Signoria as a loan, and although we had been stripped bare, we had done the little bit we could. And so he accepted it, and then departed, going to the camp to attend to the embarkation and transport of his troops and to load his artillery aboard ship.

Nestor Martinengo dates Lala Mustafa Pasha's first entry into Famagusta on 7 August, "the second day after the slaughter," when he hanged Lorenzo Tiepolo, the captain of Paphos, along with Giovanni Sinclitico. Valderio has words of high praise for Tiepolo; they had worked together at bread-making in the Arsenal. The merchant Angelo di Niccolò was virtually robbed of 20,000 ducats' worth of cloth by the pasha's lieutenant, who promised to pay him, and did so in paltry sums in corrupt coinage. Angelo "writhed and protested," but had to accept the so-called payment. What else could he do? The janissaries broke into the church of the Misericordia, where Angelo had stored "the flower of his merchandise," and took it all. Nestor Martinengo lay hidden for five days "per le case de' Greci." When the risks became too great for his Greek friends, he gave himself up to the sanjakbey of "Bir," who fixed his ransom at 500 sequins. After forty-two days "in which I remained a slave," as Martinengo tells us, "I paid the ransom of 500 sequins by means of the consul of the French merchants, who had come from Tripoli to the encampment."

Martinengo's captor did not release him, however, "saying that he wanted to take me to his province [*sanzaccato*] on the river Euphrates, and would then let me go." But since he was sometimes permitted to go from the Turkish encampment

<sup>153</sup> Podacataro, *Relatione*, pp. 26-27.



into the city, Martinengo, knowing the Turk's evil ways, hired a boat from a Greek fisherman who, with two oars and "a bit of a sail made from two shirts," managed to get him to Tripoli on the Syrian coast. Again he lay hidden "in a house of some Christians," until 25 September, when he boarded a small French ship setting out on its return voyage. The ship touched upon the Cypriote coast at Capo delle Gatte (between the Bays of Episkopi and Akrotiri), where Martinengo landed, and (he says) he talked with some peasants, who told him they were being treated dreadfully by the Turks, "no longer having anything which was their own." In answer to questions they said that crops were being grown in the mountainous western section of the island, where the Turks were not harassing the peasants, but that in the east there was little cultivation, few inhabitants, and almost no livestock. The Turks had ruined the island, says Martinengo, and now the Cypriotes realized how beneficial had been the rule of the Venetians (*la piacevol Signoria de' Christiani*), and they were "praying that they might return."<sup>134</sup>

By way of summary Nestor Martinengo states that

the enemy's army consisted of 200,000 persons of every rank, of whom 80,000 were mercenaries, besides the 14,000 janissaries taken from all the garrisons in Syria, Caramania, Anatolia, and even the Porte. Also there were 60,000 adventurers of the sword, the reason for such a large number of adventurers being the fact that Mustafa had spread abroad the rumor throughout the lands of the Turk that Famagusta was much richer than Nicosia, and they were attracted by the ease of passage. In the seventy-five days that the bombardment lasted [i.e., from 19 May to 1 August] 140,000 iron cannonballs were seen and counted.

Valderio concludes the sad record of the siege with an outbreak of the plague, which was brought to Cyprus by a ship from Syria, "un navilio carico di morbo." Although he took the precautions "which we held to in the time of the Christians," and a cha'ush made a survey of the vessel, after a day's detention those aboard came into Famagusta "with their permit." They brought with them the plague, "which did so good a job that

25,000 men who paid the poll-tax . . . died, besides the women and children, so that there were more than 70,000 souls who after the war perished of the disease during the two years that it lasted. . . ." Hardships and taxes brought about conversions to Islam. There were shortages of almost everything, "and we have to pay double for what we buy from the Turks."

The Christians had to look upon the Turks' bad manners as a boon, and thank them, but their cruelty was intolerable. No one seemed to know who had authority, because everyone exercised it, especially in doing evil to Christians, who had fallen into the Inferno. The Famagustans had been promised "great things," but little was done. Even the four ships of Marco Querini's so-called relief force, "il soccorsetto di quelle quattro navi," had taken away the little money the Famagustans had possessed [leaving them a useless copper coinage]. "Such has been the unhappy outcome of the war of Cyprus, which was lost so miserably and with such dishonor to Christendom. . . ." Poor Valderio, he had served the Venetians, and had been obliged to serve the Turks. As a Christian he much preferred the former, but as he looked back upon the past, he called down a plague on both their houses.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, pp. 210-21; Martinengo, *Relazione*, p. 6 unnum.; Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 31, following Martinengo; Calepio, "Prinse de Famagoste," in Lusignan, *Description de toute l'isle de Cypre* (1580, repr. 1968), fols. 284'-286'; Gatto, *Narrazione del terribile assedio*, pp. 101-4, with a detailed description of the torture and death of Marc' Antonio Bragadin; Riccoboni, *Storia di Salamina presa*, pp. 60 ff. [but beware of the Italian translation accompanying Riccoboni's Latin text]; Podacataro, *Relazione*, pp. 27-28, who while still a prisoner had learned from a Genoese the details of Bragadin's sad fate; Quarri, *La Guerra contro il Turco* (1935), pp. 550-54, 559-60; Hill, *Cyprus*, III, 1032-33.

An informative and fairly accurate report of the fall of Famagusta may be found in an *avviso* dated at Venice on 4 December, 1571, in Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 161'-162', and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 473', with reference to Nestor Martinengo's arrival in Venice on 4 December and his well-known account of the fall of the city.

As might be expected, there had been persistent rumors of the fall of Famagusta before it happened and before the fact could have been verified (cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 106-107' [127-128'], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 26 June, 1571; Douais, *Dépêches de M. de Fourquevaux*, II, no. 286, p. 367, doc. dated at Madrid on 4 August, 1571; Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 321', an *avviso* from Vienna, dated 18 August). On the other hand there were rumors that Famagusta was still holding out after its fall (cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 119', and note Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 6'-7' [28'-29'], 15' [37'], 15' [37']', docs. dated 15-29 September).

On 17 August, 1571, the Venetian bailie Marc' Antonio Barbaro wrote the doge that three days of public prayers had

<sup>134</sup> Cf. Podacataro, *Relazione*, pp. 28-29, who has a similar report on conditions in the island of Cyprus after the Turkish conquest. Podacataro left the island on 17 September "con la nave francese detta *Buon Gesù*, la qual fu presa dal clarissimo messer Marco Querini, quando venne col presidio, et fu ricuperata dalle mani del Bassà per il Consule di Franza con tutta l'artiglieria. . . ." Like Martinengo, Podacataro went first to Tripoli, and finally got to Venice in another ship.

been decreed in Istanbul "per il felice successo dell' assalto che dicevano doversi dar a Famagosta, per il che vi concorse tutto quello popolo, et vi andò anco il proprio Signore." Barbaro had been informed, however, "che a 8 [sic] del presente mese quelli di Famagosta si sono aresi, havendoli Mustaffa Bassà promessa la vita, et così 700 soldati, che soli erano rimasti, con il capitano uscirono della città, nella quale esso Mustaffa fece intrar un corpo di gente senza dar alcun danno con salvar tutti li Cipriotti, ma che volendo per le convenzioni fatte lasciar partir li soldati, i Turchi cominciarono a gridare che meritavano esser fatti morire, perché haveano il giorno prima tagliati a pezzi tutti li prigionieri che haveano fatti, onde il Bassà ordinò che fussero amazzati li soldati, et che al capitano [Bragadin] si tagliasse il naso et le orecchie, pur nella esecuzione essendoli state tagliate le orecchie li salvò il naso, il qual capitano viene condotto qui per mare [or at least Bragadin's hide was being sent to Istanbul], et che in Famagosta era stata trovata gran quantità d'artiglieria . . ." (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 218, and note, *ibid.*, fol. 219).

With his dispatch to the doge of 30 November (1571) Barbaro

sent a vivid account of the siege of Famagosta prepared by some of the lesser commanders, who had been brought to Istanbul as slaves (*Copia della lettera scritami da alcuni capitani che si ritrovavano in Famagosta, et che hora sono qui schiavi*, "dal bagno di Mehemet Bassà alli 28 d' Ottobre 1571"). This account, in the Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 (8873), fols. 235-240, begins the final stage and overwhelming hardships of the siege with the bombardment which started at dawn on 19 May: "Et la batteria incominciò dalli 19 di Maggio al far dell' alba con tanto fracasso, ruina, et mortalità di noi altri che non si ricorda da coloro che son più vecchi di noi d' haver vista tal cosa in altre città assediate" (fol. 235).

Later on, on 27 March, 1573, Barbaro had occasion to write the doge that Mehmed Sokolli had expressed utter contempt for Mustafa Pasha's savagery, "quel crudel atto del martirio dato al clarissimo Bragadino" (MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 426). Bragadin's hide was later brought to Venice, and now lies in the commemorative sarcophagus on the wall of the right aisle (as one faces the altar) of the church of SS. Giovanni e Paolo. The monument is set into a gray-monochrome fresco depicting Bragadin's "martyrdom."

## 24. THE ROAD TO LEPANTO, THE BATTLE, AND A GLANCE AT THE FOLLOWING CENTURY

AS THE FLEETS were assembling at Messina in the late summer of 1571, no one in Rome, Venice, or Madrid could imagine how close the Christian allies were to a wondrous victory over the Turks. Fearing that a long trial of arms lay ahead, both Pius V and the Venetian Signoria were already trying to persuade Philip II to order the generalissimo Don John of Austria "to winter in Sicily or elsewhere in Italy," with the Christian armada being kept in order and ready to meet the needs of Christendom when the spring came.<sup>1</sup> The captain-general Sebastiano Venier seemed to be spending money with both hands in maintaining the Republic's fleet at Messina, but the Senate answered his needs by sending him bills of exchange payable in Messina and Palermo. Amid the gloomy news of August the Senate learned with pleasure, by way of Naples, of the safe arrival of the galleys and other vessels from Candia (*in numero di 75 vele*). It was assumed in the Senate (on 18 August) that the arrival of the Candiotte galleys in the harbor of Messina was a matter of hours,<sup>2</sup> and a report from Rome (of 8 September) confirmed the fact that Marco Querini, provveditore of the fleet, had reached Syracuse with sixty galleys on 19 August. The other galleys under his colleague the provveditore Antonio da Canale, although delayed by the winds, were also safely in the offing.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fol. 134 [155], *alli ambasciatori in Spagna*, doc. dated 16 August, 1571.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 135<sup>v</sup> [156], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 18 August, 1571, and see, *ibid.*, fol. 138.

<sup>3</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 117<sup>v</sup>, *di Roma VIII Settembre*: ". . . Hierisera venne una staffetta da Messina con aviso che 'l clarissimo Querini era giunto alli 19 a Saragosa [Syracuse] con 60 galere, et che 'l clarissimo [Antonio da] Canale era rimasto in dietro con alcune altre galere, le quali sariano giunte tutte ad un medesimo tempo a Messina se li venti non impeditivano. Che 'l Signor Don Giovanni haveva spedito diverse fregate a sollecitar le galere che erano fuori ad unirsi quanto prima. Che Monsignor [Paolo] Odescalco [the papal nuncio] alli 21 giunse a Messina, et si era inteso che l'armata turca si era ritirata con animo forse di andare verso Levante."

In a letter to Don García de Toledo, dated at Messina on 30 August, Don John informed him of the arrival of sixty Venetian galleys, but they were in dreadful condition as far as manpower was concerned: "Las galeras de venecianos comencé a visitar ayer, y estuve en su capitana—no podria creer Vm. [i.e., Vuestra Merced] cuan mal en órden estada de gente de pelea y marineros. Armas y artillería tienen, pero como no pelean sin hombres, póneme cierto congoja ver que el mundo me obligó á hacer alguna cosa de momento, contando las galeras por nú-

The Turkish armada is said to have sailed from Istanbul on 25 April (1571) under the joint command of Pertau (Pertev) Pasha, general of the land forces aboard the galleys, and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha, the commander of the sultan's naval forces. The Turks had spread destruction from Crete, Zante, and Cephalonia to Corfu and the coasts of Albania and Dalmatia.<sup>4</sup> Although Pertau had led the Turkish forces into the Adriatic, Contarini assigns the chief role to Ali.<sup>5</sup> On 3 September the doge and Senate wrote the captain-general Sebastiano Venier that reports from both Cattaro (Kotor) and Ragusa (Dubrovnik) of 25 August had reached Venice to the effect that Pertau had left Castelnuovo (Herccegovi) "to go back east." The redoubtable corsair Uluj-Ali had arrived in the area of Ragusa on 23 August with eleven galleys and galliots, having just returned from raiding the Dalmatian coast. Uluj-Ali had not tarried an hour, "leaving with great haste." On 24 August the corsair Caracosa also passed through Ragusan waters

mero y no por cualidad!" (*Correspondencia entre Don García de Toledo . . . y el Sr. D. Juan de Austria . . . desde el año de 1571 hasta el de 1577 . . .*, in the *Documentos inéditos*, III [1843, repr. 1964], 18).

Citing the foregoing letter of Don John to García de Toledo, Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 394, states that "à la fin du mois d' août, avec les deux providéiteurs Agostino Barbarigo [1] et Marco Quirini, ses 60 galères ralliaient sans encombre la grande flotte alliée." In this context the "two providitori" are always Querini and Antonio da Canale, who were providitori of the fleet. Barbarigo, the provveditore generale of the sea, was already in Sicily with Venier. There is a sketch of Barbarigo's career by Aldo Stella in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, VI (1964), 50–52, and a notice of Canale by F. Fasulo, *ibid.*, XVII (1974), 636–37. The latter was also called Canaletto (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 112<sup>v</sup>).

For Barbarigo's commission, see above, Chapter 22, note 63. Marco Querini had been elected "provviditor dell' armata esistente in Candia" on 4 January, 1571 (Ven. style 1570), to replace Canale (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fol. 40 [61]) who was, however, soon reappointed to serve with Querini.

<sup>4</sup> See the contemporary account of the events leading to Lepanto in Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 185–86; cf. *Relazione della giornata delle scioriolare fra l'armata Turchesca et Christiana alli sette d' Ottobre 1571, ritratta dal Comendador Romagosa*, Rome: Gli Heredi di M. Antonio Blado, Stampatori Camerali [1571?], p. 1 [of 7 unnumbered pp.], which puts the departure of Ali Pasha and Pertau Pasha from Istanbul on 15 April; and note G. A. Quairi, *La Guerra contro il Turco a Cipro e a Lepanto*, Venice, 1935, pp. 445 ff., 462 ff., 479 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 29<sup>v</sup>–30<sup>r</sup>, 32<sup>v</sup>–33<sup>r</sup>.

with forty-two sail "between fuste and brigantines."

Both Uluj-Ali and Caracosa were following Pertau Pasha and the Turkish armada which, according to some slaves who had escaped, was in terrible shape except for some thirty large galleys. The Senate sent Venier a deposition from their informants so that he could pass on the information it contained to Don John, Colonna, and the other Christian generals. Within two or three days the Senate was going to send Venier a reinforcement of galleys, some more infantry, the well-known ship *Dolfin*, and other vessels loaded with munitions, biscuits, "and a goodly sum of money for the needs of the fleet."<sup>6</sup>

The Turkish haste "per andare verso Levante" makes it more than clear that Pertau Pasha, Uluj-Ali, and Caracosa—and Ali Pasha—were well aware of the extent of the Christian armada being assembled at Messina. Their retreat from the Adriatic, however, was not an attempt to escape the Christian forces; it was, rather, the necessity to regroup and to refurbish their fleet. According to letters from Ragusa (dated 23 August), the Turks had abandoned their attempt upon Cattaro, because the season was getting late, and "because the pasha had sent frigates to summon Uluj-Ali and Caracosa who must come as soon as possible to join the armada, for he had orders to engage our force in combat," *havendo commissione di combattere la nostra*.<sup>7</sup>

Although Don García de Toledo, the reputed savior of Malta, who was then living in retirement at Pisa, had written Don John (on 1 August) that it might not be in the interests of Philip II to engage the Turks in a great naval battle,<sup>8</sup> Don John had every intention (as events were soon to show) of advancing to meet the Turks at sea. On 6 September he addressed a letter to Don García, his friend and advisor, informing him that on the sec-

ond Giannandrea Doria had reached Messina with eleven galleys; on the fifth Álvaro de Bazán, the marquis of Santa Cruz, had put into port with thirty; and "in his arrival I have taken great satisfaction, for his delay was causing me anguish." On 9 or 10 September, "á Dios placiendo," he expected to sail with the Christian fleets in search of the Turkish armada.<sup>9</sup>

Hopes were being raised in the Greek communities in Venice, Naples, and elsewhere. For more than a century the Greeks had had to endure Turkish domination in the Morea and on the continent. At Lepanto there were to be Greeks on both sides. Most Greeks had found it necessary to reach some sort of compromise with the conquerors, but many had been ready to revolt, and sometimes had done so, when moved by opportunity or necessity. According to a dispatch from Rome (dated 5 September),

We also understand that some Greeks are going aboard the Catholic king's fleet. They have offered Don John, if he will have arms conveyed to their towns and villages [*in quelli luochi loro*], to expel the Turks themselves without any other assistance, for they have been reduced to utter desperation as a result of the tyranny and oppression they are suffering. . . .<sup>10</sup>

An anti-Turkish uprising did begin later on, in November and December, 1571, in the Moreote peninsula of Maina, but little or nothing came of it.<sup>11</sup>

Although at the moment our attention is necessarily fastened upon Messina, we should note that the Venetian ambassador Michele Surian had finally been allowed to take his leave of the Curia to return to Venice. Surian had been largely instrumental in assisting Pius V to bring about the Holy League. According to a report from Rome

<sup>6</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, III, 20, and cf. *Cod. Urb. lat.* 1042, fol. 112\*, *di Messina 3 Settembre*, and on Doria and Santa Cruz, cf. *ibid.*, fol. 114\*.

<sup>7</sup> *Cod. Urb. lat.* 1042, fol. 114\*, *di Roma 5 Settembre*. On Greek unrest under Turkish domination, see M. Manoussacas, "Lepanto e i greci," in *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, pp. 215-41, with an indication of the more recent bibliography, and note esp. J. K. Chasiotes [Casiotis, Hassiotis], *The Greeks on the Eve of the Battle of Lepanto: Appeals, Insurrections, and Revolts in the Greek Peninsula from the Eve to the End of the War of Cyprus* [in Greek], Thessaloniki, 1970; *Makarios, Theodoros and Niphoros, the Melissenoi (Melissourgoi), 16th and 17th Centuries* [in Greek], Thessaloniki, 1966 (on which see above, Volume I, Chapter 13, note 206); "La Comunità greca di Napoli e i moti insurrezionali nella penisola balcanica meridionale durante la seconda metà del XVI secolo," *Balkan Studies*, X-2 (Thessaloniki, 1969), 279-88.

<sup>11</sup> Michel Lesure, *Lépano, la crise de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, 1972, pp. 205 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 1 [23]; on Caracosa, note Paolo Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, Florence, 1975, pp. 262-63, and see below.

<sup>7</sup> *Cod. Urb. lat.* 1042, fol. 114\*, *di Roma di primo Settembre*, and cf. Halil Inalcik, "Lepanto in the Ottoman Documents," in Gino Benzoni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, pp. 188-89. There are various discrepancies between the Venetian and Turkish sources.

<sup>8</sup> *Docs. inéditos*, III, 9-10. As everyone knew, the risks of a large-scale encounter with the Turks at sea were great, on which cf. *Cod. Urb. lat.* 1042, fol. 113, "onde perendosi la giornata haveria potuto succedere la rovina della Christianità, et par che sua Santità habbia preso a bene questo ricordo," but the pope still wanted the Christian armada to meet the Turks head-on.

of 15 September, Surian left Rome on Thursday morning, the thirteenth, taking the road to Loreto, his first stop being with Cardinal Ippolito d' Este in the villa at Tivoli.<sup>12</sup> Their chief topic of conversation must surely have been the size of the Christian armada gathering at Messina and the extent of its readiness to engage the Turks. In fact almost everyone in Rome and Venice, Madrid, Naples, and Barcelona, must have been eager to learn the latest news from Messina.

According to an *avviso* of 3 September,

we have 208 galleys, 6 galleasses, and 23 ships besides the small vessels carrying a good many troops. His Highness's assertiveness has overcome every difficulty, and the lords of Venice are satisfied with it all. From Naples one writes to have received word by way of Cotrone that the Turkish armada had been sighted off Corfu.<sup>13</sup>

Two days later another *avviso* from Messina carried the news that the 30 galleys Álvaro de Bazán had brought from Naples were "molto bene in ordine." From hour to hour more galleys were expected from Palermo, and one was hastening to put aboard everything necessary "per combattere con l'armata Turchescha." All told, Philip II's contribution to the Christian armada seemed to be 81 galleys, 20 ships, 7,000 Spaniards, 6,000 Germans, and 5,000 Italians, as well as the troops provided by military contractors. The Venetian fleet consisted of 108 galleys, six galleasses, two ships, and 5,000 infantry, to which might be added the troops which the Signoria had promised to make available at Brindisi, where allegedly other galleys and galleasses would join the armada. (No such troops or vessels would be acquired at Brindisi.) There were also 12 papal galleys with the requisite number of troops plus three galleys of the duke of Savoy and four of the Knights Hospitaller of Malta, "che tutte insieme sono 208 galere, sei galeazze, et 22 navi. . ."<sup>14</sup>

It was reported from Messina on 13 September that the ships (*navi*) were ready to sail, and that the galleys soon would be. Don John had gone aboard his flagship, the *galera reale*, and had even left the harbor for a while. The Christians would head for Corfu to track down the enemy armada "con animo di combattere." Now we are told there were 209 galleys, six galleasses, 27 large ships, "and many small vessels." The fighting force consisted of 28,000 paid infantry and 2,000 adventurers. The useless folk (*gente inutile*) and property of all sorts were being left behind to speed the progress of the armada and to lighten the load for combat. Don John could not depart when he wished, however, because of a heavy rain, "but he will leave with the first good weather, and we have letters, [telling us] that on the ninth the Turkish armada was at the island of Corfu and in the area of Gomenizza," i.e., Igoumenitsa, a little port on the mainland opposite the southern end of Corfu, on an inlet off the "canal" of Corfu.<sup>15</sup>

The order of battle had been determined at Messina on or before 14 September, and was to be adhered to three weeks later at Lepanto. Don John would sail in the center of the main division or "battle" (*la battaglia*), with the generals Venier and Colonna in their flagships on his left and right. Agostino Barbarigo, the Venetian provveditore generale, would take command of the left wing; the two provveditori of the fleet, Marco Querini and Antonio da Canale, would remain with Barbarigo's squadron. Giannandrea Doria would command the right wing, and Álvaro de Bazán, the marquis of Santa Cruz, the reserve (*il soccorso*), the rearguard, which would follow the three main divisions of the armada. The six Venetian galleasses would form the vanguard, two of them sailing about a quarter of a mile or so in advance of each of the three main divisions of the armada.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 123<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 112<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 369, di Messina il V di Settembre. On galleys, ships (*navi*), frigates, and other vessels, their sizes, capacities, forms, structures, sails, standards, lanterns, etc., mariners, oarsmen, soldiers, artillery, coastal defenses, ports, naval bases, etc., see Francisco-Felipe Olesa Muñido, *La Organización naval de los estados mediterráneos y en especial de España durante los siglos XVI y XVII*, 2 vols., Madrid, 1968. On Philip II's land forces, especially the infantry regiments of Naples, Sicily, Lombardy, and Sardinia, problems of organization and supply, recruitment of the soldiery, promotion, morale, and wages, weapons, munitions, and costs, courier service and transport, garrisons and billeting, tactics, etc., see René Quatrefofages, *Los Tercios españoles (1567-1577)*, trans. Carlos Batál-Batal, Madrid, 1979.

<sup>15</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 120, *avvisi* dated at Messina on 13-14 September, 1571. On the Turks' destructive (but costly to them) descent upon the island of Corfu on 2-5 September, see *ibid.*, fols. 120<sup>v</sup>-121<sup>v</sup>, a letter of Annibale Prototico to Cardinal de Granvelle, dated at Corfu on 7 September, and *cf.* fols. 125<sup>v</sup>, 135.

<sup>16</sup> Bibl. Apost. Vaticana, Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 6<sup>r</sup>, 10 ff., *Ordini della Lega di quanto ha da osservare l'armata et galere in mare nella presente giornata fatta in Messina alli 14 di Settembre MDLXXI*: "Sua Altezza [Don Giovanni d' Austria, general della Santa Lega,] andrà in mezzo di gli due generali, et questa sarà la battaglia di galere numero 57—al corno sinistro il clarissimo provviditor generale di Venetiani, il Barbarigo, con galere numero 56; al corno destro il Signor Gio. Andrea Doria con galere numero 56, dico 56; il soccorso, il marchese di Santa Croce con galere numero 40, il quale manderà galere quattro per corno

Colonna and the Venetians would keep a weather eye on Doria as the armada sailed eastward, for it was being said in Rome that having sold his galleys to Philip II, he had just repurchased them. His brother Pagano had gone to Malta to take the habit of the Hospitallers, and had apparently given most of his share of the Doria patrimony to Giannandrea, who now felt that he could better afford the galleys,<sup>17</sup> but would he be any more willing to risk them in combat?

Sebastiano Venier had written the Venetian Signoria of Don John's ardent desire to seek out the Turkish armada, which (as the doge and Senate wrote Venier on 15 September) was a source of immense consolation to the Venetians "per la speranza che habbiamo di gloriosa vittoria contra l' inimico commune." Don John had also expressed a willingness to supply Venier's galleys with the men, money, and ship's biscuit they lacked, owing to the operations of the Turkish armada in the Adriatic.<sup>18</sup> As Venier reported more than a year later to the doge and Senate, Don John had offered him 2,000 Germans, 1,500 Spaniards, and 1,500 Italians to put aboard his galleys, which were notoriously shorthanded. With humiliation and reluctance Venier accepted the Italians and Spaniards (he did not want the Germans), and along with the reinforcements came "molte insolentie de soldati."<sup>19</sup>

---

fuora et il resto da dietro per soccorso; li clarissimi proveditori dell' armata Venetiana [Marco Querini and Antonio da Canale] andranno in la squadra del detto proveditore generale Barbarigo; le galeazze quali sono si andranno per antighuarda ripartite a due a due per corno un quarto di miglio avanti." For a list of the galleys in the *battaglia*, the left and right *corni*, and the *soccorso*, see, *ibid.*, fols. 154-57, 159, and *cf.* Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 37 ff.

In addition to the numbers of galleys, the names of the Christian commanders are also given in this document, in which (as usual) Venice is said to have provided 108 galleys and six galleasses, the Holy See 12, and the Hospitallers four, the rest being Spanish, Neapolitan, Sicilian, and Genoese, together with the privately-owned galleys of Giannandrea Doria, the Lomellini, and others. The naval array is given differently (and inaccurately) in Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 120, di *Messina di 13 Settembre*, and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 126<sup>v</sup>, an *avviso* from Rome dated 24 September.

<sup>17</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 123<sup>v</sup>-124<sup>v</sup>, di *Roma di 15 Settembre*.

<sup>18</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 5<sup>v</sup>-6<sup>r</sup> [27<sup>v</sup>-28<sup>r</sup>], al *capitaino general da mar*, doc. dated 15 September, 1571.

<sup>19</sup> *Relazione del clarissimo Messer Sebastian Venier . . . la quale fu presentata a 29 dicembre 1572*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero e la battaglia di Lepanto* (1899), p. 301. When the Holy League had been formed, the Venetian galleys were each supposed to have from 100 to 120 fighting men besides the sailors and galley slaves (*galeon*), while Philip II's agents had hoped to have about 150 *homini da combattere* aboard each galley. The Venetians were also to maintain fifteen to twenty transports to carry biscuit, munitions, "et li soldati medesimamente che non potranno star sopra le galere" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 77, fols. 88<sup>v</sup>-89<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>v</sup>-110<sup>r</sup>], al *capitaino general da mar*, doc. dated 22 May, 1571).

Although Venier says that he thus accepted 3,000 troops, the fact is that Don John wrote Garcia de Toledo (on 9 September) "that these Venetian lords have finally just decided to take on board their galleys four thousand of his Majesty's infantry, namely 1,500 Spaniards and 2,500 Italians. . . ." <sup>20</sup> When Venier made his report to the doge and Senate (on 29 December, 1572), he had apparently forgotten that on 7 September he had himself written the doge from Messina that Don John "with great readiness and courtesy" had supplied him with ten thousand biscuits for each galley and four thousand infantry, *4 m. fanti tra italiani et spagnoli*. In his letter of 7 September Venier had also noted that Don John, Marc' Antonio Colonna, and he were all three determined "to go find the enemy armada and do battle with it."<sup>21</sup>

Upon the receipt of Venier's letter the doge and Senate wrote Don John (on 20 September) that his resolution to find and fight the Turkish armada was worthy of the son of Charles V and the brother of Philip II. The Signoria's prayers for victory would enter the combat with Don John, with high hopes of punishing the enemy which had destroyed so many sacred places, and killed or carted off into slavery so many Christian souls. "With all our heart we must thank your Highness for the provision you have made both of biscuits and of soldiers for our armada, and [everything] else with such readiness and friendship. . . ." <sup>22</sup>

Every reference to Don John in the Venetian texts (up to this point) contains words of praise. The Senate also approved very highly, as we have seen, of Marc' Antonio Colonna, the papal commander, who had discussed with Venier the need of maintaining 120 galleys in readiness for action by the beginning of March, 1572, "per pigliar l' vantaggio et impedir i disegni Turcheschi," to beat the Turks to the draw. Although it was always important to look ahead, and the Senate's views were consonant with Marc' Antonio's, they pointed out (as Venier knew well) that such a plan would require the fleet of the League to winter in the Archipelago or in south Italian waters. The Senate had of course already instructed Leonardo Donado (Donà), the Venetian ambassador in Spain, to

<sup>20</sup> *Docs. inédits*, III, 20.

<sup>21</sup> As the doge and Senate informed Leonardo Donado and Antonio Tiepolo in Madrid, for which see Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 12 [34], *alli ambasciatori in Spagna*, doc. dated 28 September, 1571.

<sup>22</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 10<sup>r</sup> [32<sup>r</sup>], *all' illustrissimo Don Gioan d' Austria*, doc. dated 20 September, 1571, and *cf.* the letters of the same date to Venier and Agostino Barbarigo (*ibid.*, fols. 10-11<sup>v</sup>).

seek Philip II's assent to Don John's "wintering in Italy." What was done this year, however, would determine what should be done next year, ". . . perchè li accidenti, i tempi, et l' occasioni possono far mutar spesso i disegni et pensieri."<sup>23</sup>

As the Christian armada was being assembled at Messina, and as it began to sail toward the Levant, the French were still continuing their efforts to make peace between Venice and the Porte. To the Holy League the French were highly suspect. François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax, had replaced Grantrier de Grandchamp as the French envoy to Istanbul. De Noailles was in Venice, trying to secure the release of Mahmud, the *cha'ush* (*chiaux*) who had been sent as an ambassador to the Signoria. The Venetians had been holding him as a prisoner (as we have seen in Chapter 21) since the beginning of March, 1570. The doge and Senate answered de Noailles's remonstrance against the detention of an ambassador with the statement that while they fully acknowledged the diplomatic nature of his mission, the sultan had broken his peace with the Republic during the period of Mahmud's embassy. Until this had happened, Mahmud had been free for months to go to France (which was part of his assignment), had he wished, but he had chosen not to do so. When Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the Venetian bailie in Istanbul, and the Venetian consuls in Syria and at Alexandria had been detained, so had the unfortunate Mahmud. He had been well housed and well treated (in Verona), and surely milord of Dax could see the justice of the Venetians' continuing to hold Mahmud. Furthermore, now that the Holy League was in full operation, the Signoria must not give its members the slightest grounds for suspicion. As for the good bishop of Dax, the Senate would assist his departure for the Bosphorus in every possible way. Alvise Contarini, the Venetian ambassador at the French court, was directed to explain the situation to Charles IX and justify the imprisonment of Mahmud Beg.<sup>24</sup>

Some days later (on 22 September) the doge and Senate wrote Contarini that they had reminded François de Noailles

that not only did the said Mahmud make no effort to leave this city and go to France, but that M. [Paul] de Fois, his Majesty's ambassador here with us at the time, told us it did not seem proper to him, when the Signor Turco was preparing an armada against Christendom, that any *cha'ush* of his should go to the most Christian king to give rise to suspicion among all the Christian princes, a judgment with which his most Christian Majesty agreed. . . .<sup>25</sup>

The release of Mahmud might well have increased the suspicions of the Spaniards, but de Noailles's efforts on his behalf were too late.

Letters of 12 September from Messina, which were known in Naples on or before the seventeenth, brought news of the return of Gil de Andrade and Orazio Orsini, who had gone out with two galleys to learn what they could of Ali Pasha's armada. They brought back word that the armada "has, all told, 280 sail." The Turks, having learned of the strength and preparedness of "la nostra armata," had suddenly sent some sort of message or appeal to the Porte, "notwithstanding the fact that they had orders to meet the Christian armada in combat." Rumor soon had it that the Turks were fearful of the Christian armament, which might very shortly descend upon them, and

that his Highness had resolved not to lose the opportunity, and intended to leave on the evening of the seventeenth with 210 galleys, 6 galleasses, 25 ships, and 50 frigates, upon which armada there were to be some 40,000 men.<sup>26</sup>

76, fols. 4<sup>r</sup> ff. [25<sup>r</sup> ff.]). He apparently continued as ambassador, despite the appointment of Leonardo Contarini as an ambassador to Charles IX on 2 June, 1571 (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 98<sup>r</sup>-99<sup>r</sup> [119<sup>r</sup>-120<sup>r</sup>]). Alvise was actually replaced by Sigismondo di Cavalli, whose commission is dated 13 September, 1571 (*ibid.*, Reg. 78, fols. 3-4<sup>r</sup> [25-26<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>23</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 11 [33], *al ambasciator in Franza*, doc. dated 22 September, 1571, *de literis* + 193, *de non* 3, *non sinceri* 2, and see esp. the letters of de Noailles to Charles IX in Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 175 ff. On Mahmud's arrest and detention, see above, Chapter 21, pp. 949-50.

<sup>24</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 119<sup>r</sup>, *di Napoli 17 Settembre*. Letters from Ancona, dated 12 September, had conveyed the welcome news to Rome "che l'armata Turchesca era malissimo in ordine" (*ibid.*, *di Roma di 19 Settembre*). On Don John's determination "to engage the Turkish armada," *cf.* fols. 128<sup>r</sup> and 339<sup>r</sup>; ". . . Che nella detta armata [Turchesca] vi sono 150 buone galere et atte al combattere, et il resto fin a 300 vele, le quali non sino bene armate n' atte al combattere, et fra le quali sino gran parte de levantini piccoli . . ." from a report of 23 August, and *cf.* fol. 426<sup>r</sup>.

The numbers of men, galleys, cannon, etc., tend to vary from time to time (and from source to source), on which note Quarti,

<sup>25</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 7<sup>r</sup>-8<sup>r</sup> [29<sup>r</sup>-30<sup>r</sup>], also to Venier, dated 15 September, 1571, and on the importance of Don John's "wintering" in Italy, note, *ibid.*, fol. 12<sup>r</sup> [34<sup>r</sup>]. Whatever happened, some reduction in the size of the Venetian fleet would be necessary when winter came (fols. 14 ff. [36 ff.]).

<sup>26</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 4-5<sup>r</sup> [26-27<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 13 September, 1571, and *cf.* *ibid.*, fols. 6 [28], 8<sup>r</sup>-9<sup>r</sup> [30<sup>r</sup>-31<sup>r</sup>], docs. dated 15 September, especially the instructions to Alvise Contarini to make clear to Charles IX the justice of Venice's holding Mahmud (fol. 9<sup>r</sup> [31<sup>r</sup>]), and note fol. 11 [33]). Contarini had been the Republic's resident ambassador in France for some time; his commission is dated 27 April, 1569 (*ibid.*, Reg.

Whatever the precise number of galleys, ships (navi), and frigates in the armada, Don John of Austria did set sail on 16 September (1571) with the largest naval armament the Christians were ever to assemble in the sixteenth century. The disgruntled Venier, to whom Don John took an understandable dislike, says that they sailed "without any order, nay in utter confusion" (*senza alcun ordine, anzi assai confusi*) to the Fossa, now the Fiumara, S. Giovanni which Venier puts fourteen or sixteen miles south of Messina. It is on the Calabrian coast just below Reggio. Few fleets left port in order; mostly the commanders found their place in open waters. On 17 September the armada reached Cape Spartivento, two days later it was at Cape Colonna "somewhat out to sea" (*alquanto in mare*), and on the nineteenth it put into the harbor of Cotrone, where Don John embarked six hundred soldiers, who had been waiting for him. He generously offered the troops to Venier, who needed them, but insisted that he did not (*risposi che non ne havevo bisogno*).<sup>27</sup> Despite Venier's caviling complaints of delay, an *avviso* from Rome of 25 September says that Don John now moved on hastily to take advantage of the good weather, "che il Signor Dio gli duoni buon viaggio e vittoria!"<sup>28</sup> Another *avviso* tells us that Don John kept the pope and the Curia well informed.<sup>29</sup>

Venier fussed and fumed when Don John stopped to take on water and waited awhile for the heavy galleys which lagged behind. He was

annoyed when the generalissimo suggested that (if he was in such a hurry) he might go on ahead in the Venetian galleys but, no, "I replied that his Highness was the leader, and it behoved him to go ahead, and me to follow him, but that I must also state my opinion and urge our getting on, for the delay had already been damaging." Venier added that he must state the facts even if it displeased Don John to hear them. Presently Marc'Antonio Colonna came aboard Venier's flagship. He said that he wanted to send Gil de Andrade out again with two galleys, one from the papal squadron and one from the Venetian fleet, the purpose being to get wind of the Turks. Colonna asked Venier for a pilot, and

then his Excellency remarked, making light of [the difficulties] which had arisen—and I do believe that this was the real reason for his coming—that I must avoid breaking up the league, to which I replied, "God help me, it is necessary to wait for the troops [*la compagnia*], but not to waste time!"<sup>30</sup>

Despite Venier's grumbling, the Christian armada was making progress. By 25 September it had reached the tiny town of Kassiope (Casoppo) in the northeast corner of the island of Corfu, at the northern entrance to the Corfiote channel. On the following day the armada reached the anchorage at the city of Corfu, the ancient Corcyra, on the east central coast of the island. At Corfu, according to Venier, there was some discussion of a possible attack upon the Turkish strongholds of Sopotò or Margariton, but on 30 September Don John went on with the armada to the bay and town of Gomenizza (Igoumenitsa), on the mainland about eighteen or twenty miles from the city of Corfu.<sup>31</sup> On the evening of 5 October a courier brought the news from Naples to Rome of the armada's arrival at Corfu, where Don John was said to be awaiting the return of Gil de Andrade from his second scouting mission. The Turks were alleged to have taken on more soldiers and oarsmen at Prevesa (Prèveza), and now to be in the area of Zante.<sup>32</sup>

At Gomenizza on 2 October the Holy League almost fell apart. On that day Giannandrea Doria came to Venier to inspect his flagship and other

*La Guerra contro il Turco*, pp. 491 ff. In this context cf. the Spanish secretary Francisco Ibarra's estimate of the numbers of Christian vessels in Don John's armada, in *Docs. inéditos*, III, 215, and Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI: *Marcantonio Colonna alla battaglia di Lepanto (1570-1573)*, Rome, 1887, p. 203. Seeking to effect some adjustment in the disparate figures, Guglielmotti believes there were, all told, 207 galleys, 30 ships, six galleasses, 28,000 soldiers, 12,920 sailors, and 43,500 oarsmen in the allied force, which (he thinks) had 1,815 cannon.

<sup>27</sup> Venier, *Relatione*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, pp. 301-2, 305-6; Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 125', di *Roma* di 24 Settembre; Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI, pp. 183 ff.; G. A. Quarta, *La Guerra contro il Turco* (1935), pp. 561 ff.

<sup>28</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 126, di *Roma* li 25 Settembre, and cf., *ibid.*, fols. 128', 398.

<sup>29</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 127', di *Roma* 29 Settembre: "... Il Signor Don Gio. d' Austria mandò una scrittura di quattro fogli al Papa, che contiene li consigli fatti, li voti di ciascuno, le resolutioni, gli ordini dell' armata, et li nomi di ciascuna galera con molti altri particolari. Di Napoli scrivono con lettere delle 24 che della nostra armada non ci era altro avviso di nuovo di più da che parti dalla Fossetta di San Gio., et da Corfu avisano che la Turca passò per il Canale alli XII verso la Prevesa, dove spalmaria . . ." and cf., *ibid.*, fols. 130', 131'.

<sup>30</sup> Venier, *Relatione*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, p. 306.

<sup>31</sup> Venier, *Relatione*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, p. 307, and see esp. Contarini, *Historia* (1572), fols. 35'-40', who lists the galleys and the names of their commanders in the vanguard, the left wing, the *bataglia*, the right wing, and the rearguard, as the Christian armada sailed southward from Gomenizza on 3 October.

<sup>32</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 129', di *Roma* 6 Ottobre.



Venetian galleys—obviously assigned to the task by Don John—and although reluctant and resentful, Venier says that he allowed him to do so. The fact that a Doria should be passing judgment on Venetian galleys was an almost unendurable insult. It may have helped provoke Venier into the ill-advised action which he took later in the day. At about 4:00 P.M. (*circa le XXII hore*) a quarrel arose between Andrea Calergi, the *sopracomito* of a Venetian galley, and one Muzio Alticozzi di Cortona, an Italian captain in the service of Spain. The dispute had begun between some arquebusers in Muzio's company and the Venetian seamen and soldiers.

According to Venier, he sent his first mate (*comito*) with an ensign (*compagno di standardo*) to try to settle what had become a heated altercation, but Muzio and some of his men hurled insults at the first mate and trounced the ensign. Venier then sent the superintendent of his galleys (*il mio ammiraglio*) with three ensigns to summon Muzio aboard his flagship. But a captain in the service of Spain had no intention of obeying Venetians. He and his men had recourse to arms, including muskets. They fired at the superintendent, burning his cloak, and wounded all three ensigns, of whom two soon died. Venier later claimed he had to send a force to prevent the superintendent and the ensigns from being killed on the spot. He also feared (he said) for the lives of others aboard Andrea Calergi's galley. In any event Muzio was nearly killed in the encounter which followed, and three soldiers in his company were seized. Without waiting for word from Don John, Venier had all four of them hanged, claiming that on several previous occasions the generalissimo had been unwilling to punish serious offenses committed by soldiers in the Spanish companies.

Don John was furious at what he regarded as an outright and unwarranted usurpation of his authority. He later declared that it seemed less of an accomplishment to defeat the Turks than to control himself "nell' accidente occorso di quel capitano." Of his eleven councilors eight advised him immediately to send twenty galleys against the Venetian fleet, seize Venier from its midst, and straightway hang him on a yardarm. Once again, however, Marc' Antonio Colonna's more sagacious counsel prevailed. He softened Don John's anger with the suggestion, which was accepted, that Venier should no longer take part in the deliberations of the generals. Venier's place was to be taken by his second in command, the provveditore generale Agostino Barbarigo, who could receive instructions from Venier, and keep him

informed of each successive move which the high command proposed to make. Venier's galley was, however, still to take its place in the *battaglia* to the left of Don John's, "stando però la galea del nostro general apresso la galea di Don Giovanni."<sup>33</sup>

On 3 October the Venetian and Spanish galleys weighed anchor, sailing south with a light wind toward Prevesa, their commanders having decided to fight the Turk rather than each other. Venier's report to the doge and Senate, almost fifteen months later, still reflects the bitterness of the contention at Gomenizza. Having complained that Don John was advancing too slowly against the Turks, he now grumbled about the tired oarsmen's rowing all night, with lowered sails, to reach the bay of "Guiscardo" between the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca at about 3:00 P.M. (*a hore XXI*) on the afternoon of 4 October. Guiscardo (*Fiskardho*) is on the northern tip of Cephalonia. It was here that Venier put out of his mind for a while the fatigue of the oarsmen, because it was here that he first learned of the fall of Famagusta, which removed all hope of the Venetians' ever recovering Cyprus. At a meeting which Don John had at this point with Barbarigo, Marco Querini, Antonio da Canale, and Marc' Antonio Colonna the proposal was made to effect a landing on S. Maura or attack some other Turkish outpost, the purpose being, says Venier querulously, "to avoid the enemy" (*per schivare il nimico*). On 5 October

<sup>33</sup> Pompeo Molmenti, "Sebastiano Veniero dopo la battaglia di Lepanto," *Nuovo Archivio veneto*, new ser. XV (tom. XXX, pt. 1, 1915), esp. pp. 6-9, and see, *ibid.*, doc. XXXV, p. 78, a letter of Leonardo Contarini, the Venetian ambassador to Don John, dated at Messina on 8 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571), with reference to Venier's hanging Muzio Alticozzi: "Al qual passo soggiugne sua Altezza che non le pareva haver fatto manco vincer se medesima, nell' accidente occorso di quel capitano, che a vincer l'armata Turchesca, perchè di uidec delli suoi consiglieri, otto la consigliavano a mandar vinti galee alla sprovvista a torre in mezzo l' eccellentissimo Generale per prenderlo et impiccarlo immediatamente ad una antena . . ." I find Contarini's commission as ambassador to Don John, dated 17 November, 1571, in the *Senatus Secreta*, Reg. 78, fols. 37-39<sup>r</sup> [59<sup>r</sup>-61<sup>r</sup>].

*Cf.* also Venier, *Relatione*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, pp. 308-10; Camillo Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572, con lettere di M. Antonio Colonna," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVI (1893), 353-54. Although Colonna publicly defended Venier, "che è un uomo stravagantissimo," he did not approve of him as a general, and hoped to avoid sharing the high command with him in 1572. On the quarrel aboard Calergi's galley and its consequences, *cf.* also G. A. Quarti, *La Guerra contro il Turco* (1935), pp. 571 ff.; Luciano Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570-1573)*, 2 vols., Madrid, 1918-19, I, 120 ff.; Julien de la Gravière, *La Guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lépante*, 2 vols., Paris, 1888, II, 122 ff.

the armada sailed southward between Cephalonia and Ithaca the dozen miles to the Val d' Alessandria. That evening Barbarigo told Venier, according to the latter, "that [their allies] were saying that we did not want to fight, but that we were pretending we did."

On the following day, Saturday, 6 October, at 7:00 or 8:00 P.M. (*a due o tre hore*) Venier tells us that the armada sailed from the Val d' Alessandria to the Curzolari, the ancient Echinades (mod. Ekhnades), the small cluster of islands in the Ionian Sea at the mouth of the Achelouïs. At dawn on Sunday, the seventh, some armed vessels were sighted, and "as the day became lighter, one saw the entire Turkish armada" (*fatto più chiaro, si vide tutta l'armata Turchesca*). If we can believe Venier, "Don John now came to the stern of my galley, and said, 'This means we fight?' I replied, 'We must. One can do no less!'" Don John then sailed through the Christian armada to encourage the men on board. As previously planned, the six great galleasses were placed, two by two, before each of the three main divisions of the allied armada. To Venier's annoyance the galleys of the main divisions could not meet the Turks in a wholly straight line (*ben in fila*) but, as thousands of soldiers, mariners, and slaves realized all too well, at long last the inevitable hour had come.<sup>34</sup>

The Christian galleys were a bit north of the tiny island of Oxia, just to the south of the outlet of the Achelouïs, when the first Turkish vessels came into view on the misty dawn of 7 October, 1571. Müezzinzade Ali, the Turkish *kapudan pasha* or captain-general of the sea, had emerged from the safe enclosure of the Gulf of Corinth (the entrance to which was protected by the twin forts of "Rumelia" and "Morea") into the open arena of the Gulf of Patras, where the battle was now to be fought. Although Ali Pasha had added men, munitions, and guns to his armada in the Gulf of Corinth, also called the Gulf of Lepanto, the long excursion to Candia and into the Adriatic had weakened his strength. Coming southward between Oxia and the mainland promontory of Skrofa, the Christian forces descended upon the Turkish armada, whose commanders stood ready to meet them. Hitherto the Christians had faced a mild but contrary east wind. Now, however, "per l'opera del Signor Dio" the wind shifted to the west, assisting the Venetian oarsmen, many of whom would take up arms when they reached the enemy. Don John had had the sharp, heavy "spurs" (*espionnes*) removed from the prows of the Christian galleys to give the guns on the forecastles a wider and lower range of fire.

The corsair Caracosa is said to have ventured close enough to the Christian armada at Cephalonia on the night of 5 October to make a count of the galleys, which he put at not more than 164, his tally being short by more than 40 galleys.<sup>35</sup> According to Gianpiero Contarini, when the Christian armada left Gomenizza on Wednesday, 3 October, Don John actually had 208 galleys apparently ready for action—eight in the vanguard (*antiguarda*), 53 in the left wing (*cornò sinistro*), 61 in the *battaglia*, the main central squadron, 50 in the right wing, and 30 in the rearguard or reserve (*retroguarda*), plus the six galleasses, two of which would be towed to the forefront of each of the three main divisions of the armada before it met the Turks. Contemporary accounts of the battle are, on the whole, in almost surprising agreement as to the size of the armada.<sup>36</sup> As for the Turks,

<sup>34</sup> Venier, *Relatione*, in Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero*, pp. 310–11, and note esp. Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 13 ff., instructions to the commanders of the League with the notes of a participant in the battle of Lepanto, dated 3–8 October (1571), in which it is stated that a frigate brought an *avviso* with the news "che l'armata del Turco era in Lepanto, et di più diceva che era per venir ad incontrar l'armata Christiana alla Cefalonia, et di più diede avviso della perdita di Famagosta presa a dì 4 d' Agosto. . . . Subito sua Altezza, non volendo più aspettare niente nè dar tempo al tempo, si levò il sabato in prima sera, che fu li sei di ottobre, nè vi essendo punto di vento, anzi un poco contrario, sempre si andò a remo fino alla dominica mattina et nell'uscire fuori di Canale per entrar nell'isola Corsolari, loco amplissimo, ma intorno isole alle due hore di giorno scoprissemmo l'armata del Turco, qual veniva a vela per incontrarsi, il che fu vero l'avviso, et subito scopertosi l'una et l'altra, cessò il vento (cosa miracolosa), volendo la Maestà di Dio darsi il tempo pari il loco manco si poteria meglio desiderar per esser detto loco commodo per combattere dell'una et l'altra armata. [I Turchi] erano bene superiori di molte galee et di forze, . . . ma d'ingegno inferiori, havendoli Dio benedetto levato il cervello per la loro insolentia[!]. . . . Era . . . la Domenica alli 7 di ottobre 1571 alle dette isole doi hore dopo giorno . . . ." after which there follows a description of the battle with an account of the Turkish losses, and cf. *ibid.*, fols. 138–141'.

Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 40', notes that the Christian armada was at the Val d' Alessandria on the island of Cephalonia when "si hebbe confirmatione per una fregata dal Zante con lettere di Paolo Contarino, provveditor di quel luogo, che l'armata

nimica era nel Colfo di Lepanto. . . . Venne poi per via del Zante lettere mandate da Marino di Cavalli, provveditor generale dell'isola di Candia, le quali davano conto particolare della perdita di Famagosta. . . ."

<sup>35</sup> *Il Felicissimo Successo della giornata* . . . [see the following note], p. 2.

<sup>36</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 37'–40'; *Il Felicissimo Successo della giornata fatta dall'Armata Christiana contra l'Armata Turchesca* . . . , Brescia, 1571, 6 pp. unnumbered; *L'Ordine delle galere*

their galleys and other vessels were more numerous if less large. Contarini puts 55 vessels (they were mostly galleys) in the Turks' right wing, 96 vessels (also mostly galleys) in the Turks' mainline or *battaglia*, 94 galleys and galliots in their left wing, and 30 gunboats (largely fuste) in their "soccorsor" or rearguard, making a total of 275 vessels.<sup>37</sup> They had no galleasses.

According to Contarini, although the corsair Caracosa had been sent on a scouting mission to reconnoiter the Christian armada, he had actually not done so, but had falsely reported the armada to be in fact "no more than a hundred and fifty galleys and without ships." Whatever lay behind Caracosa's report, the fact was that Gil de Andrade's estimate of the sultan's armada had also fallen short of the mark. Contarini tells us that although Ali Pasha had resolved to fight, he held a council of the pashas, at which Pertau Pasha expressed opposition to engaging Don John's armada. With contrary points of view being expressed, Hassan Pasha, son of the famous Barbarossa, took the floor to support Ali. The Christians, he said, had no love for one another. They knew no obedience, the very sinews of an army. They came of different nations, and had

different religious rites. Their disunity—so Contarini reports Hassan's speech—would be their disaster. The Turks, however, obeyed one lord, the sultan, "who always was, and always will be victorious." Their unity and love for one another would bring them success. The Christians had only 150 galleys, as Caracosa had shown, but the Turks had 280 "perfect vessels" (*perfetti vasselli*), including 200 galleys, 50 armed galliots, and 20 fuste. Later on in his account Contarini assigns the Turks the same number of galleys, galliots, and fuste, and (apparently correcting his proofs) gives the more correct total of 270 armed vessels.<sup>38</sup>

As one Francisco de Murillo wrote Philip II's secretary Antonio Pérez on 9 October, two days after the battle,

The number of Turkish galleys, as far as I have been able to find out, was two hundred and sixty, rather more than less, in which they had put all the soldiery they could gather from the whole of Greece, the best and bravest, of both infantry and cavalry, to go track us down, for such was the order which had come to them from Constantinople.<sup>39</sup>

In fact the Turks and Christians had sought each other out.

As the Christian armada descended from the southern Echinades, it gradually straightened out into an extended and somewhat irregular line stretching from north to south. One might have expected the fifty-odd galleys under Agostino Barbarigo (which were to comprise the left or north wing) to be the first to sail around the promontory of Skrofa to face the right (north) wing of the Turkish armada, which was sallying forth from the Gulf of Lepanto into that of Patras. In this way Barbarigo could have protected the left flank of the *battaglia*, as the latter moved south to take up its position in the middle of the armada. As Con-

*et le insegne loro, con li fanò, nomi, et cognomi delli magnifici et generosi patroni di esse, che si ritrovano nella armata della Santissima Lega al tempo della vittoriosa et miracolosa impresa attemta . . . contra la orgogliosa et superba armata Turchesca, Venice: Giovan Francesco Camotio, 1571, 9 pp. unnumbered; Relazione della giornata . . . ritratta dal Comendator Romagnoso, Rome [1571?], 7 pp. unnum.; Avvisi particolari ultimamente mandati dal magnifico M. Antonio Egiptio, maggiordomo dell' illustrissimo et eccellentissimo Signor Pavolo Giordano, al mag. M. Pietro Egiptio suo fratello, dove minutamente si narra tutto il successo et confitto fra l' armata Turchesca et Christiana, without place or date of imprint, 3 pp. unnum., with the Turkish armada at 280 vessels, "et la nostra 240," but the six great galleasses alone, like six cities, would have been enough to throw the Turks into confusion!*

Contemporary books, pamphlets, letters, and documents relating to the battle of Lepanto are legion. Note especially Fernando de Herrera, *Relación de la guerra de Cipro y suceso de la batalla naval de Lepanto*, Seville: Alonso Picardo, 1572, which has been reprinted in the *Docs. inéditos*, XXI (1852, repr. 1966), 243–382, and Miguel Servia, *Relación de los sucesos de la armada de la Santa Liga, y entre ellos el de la batalla de Lepanto, desde 1571 hasta 1574 inclusive*, *ibid.*, XI (1847, repr. 1964), 359–454. Servia was a Franciscan priest and Don John of Austria's confessor. See also the recently-published *La Batalla naval del Señor Don Juan de Austria según un manuscrito anónimo contemporáneo*, with a preface by Julio Guillén Tato, Madrid: Instituto histórico de marina, 1971, pp. 128–42, a work which seems to have been written about 1580. Five other (brief) Spanish accounts of the battle of Lepanto may be found in the *Docs. inéditos*, III, 216–23, 224–26, 239–59, 259–70, and 346–51.

<sup>37</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 44'–48', with typographical errors in the foliation.

<sup>38</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 40'–41', 50'. Mehmed, the sanjakbey of Negroponte, spoke at length in opposition to Hassan Pasha, both speeches being largely figments of Contarini's imagination (but the views attributed to the contestants seem to have had a wide currency): "Piacque à Portaù [Pertau] Bassà il prudente discorso di Mehemed Bey," but because Sultan Selim had ordered them to fight, and because God chose thus to begin the extermination of the Turks, "si risolero finalmente tutti unitamente d' andar a ritrovar l' armata Christiana et far deliberatamente la giornata . . . et senza colpo di spada prenderla tutta! . . ." (*ibid.*, fols. 41'–44'). Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI, 204, estimates the Turkish naval force at 222 galleys, 60 galliots, 34,000 soldiers, 13,000 sailors, and 41,000 oarsmen, with 750 cannon aboard.

<sup>39</sup> Carta de Francisco de Murillo al secretario Antonio Pérez dándole cuenta de la victoria de Lepanto, in *Docs. inéditos*, III, 224.

tarini makes clear, however, Barbarigo's squadron was the last to come into view of the Turks.

Actually the *battaglia* under Don John, Colonna, and Venier was the first to move into place, going south to form the central line of some sixty-odd galleys to meet the main division of the Turks. The right wing under Giannandrea Doria appeared next, going still farther south to confront the left wing of the Turkish armada. Before each of the three main divisions of the Christian forces two galleasses under sail were to be towed to the forefront to train their heavy guns upon the Turks, who had (as we have noted) no such galleasses to form the first line of battle. Behind each armada lurked a rearguard or reserve of some thirty galleys (or rather fuste in the case of the Turks) to be held in abeyance to strengthen or replace weak or broken links in the naval chains before them.<sup>40</sup>

Since the battle of Lepanto is the *terminus ad quem* of these volumes, it seems appropriate to say more than a word about it. The battle has been described many times from the sixteenth century to the twentieth.<sup>41</sup> In the interests of clarity we

<sup>40</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 50<sup>r</sup>, puts ten galleys and twenty fuste in the Turks' rearguard or "soccorso," but *cf.*, *ibid.*, fols. 47<sup>r</sup>-48<sup>r</sup>, misnumbered by the printer.

<sup>41</sup> On the voluminous contemporary sources, *cf.*, above, note 36. During the last century the following writers, among others, have dealt with the battle of Lepanto and its aftermath: Sir Wm. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, 2 vols., London, 1883, I, 384-441, who relies especially on the works of Fernando de Herrera (Seville, 1572), Marco Ant. Arroyo (Milan, 1576), Hierónimo de Torres y Aguilera (Saragossa, 1579), and the letter of Girolamo Diedo, a Venetian official at Corfu, to Marc' Antonio Barbaro, the imprisoned bailie in Istanbul, dated 31 December, 1571, in the *Lettere di principi*, 3 vols., Venice, 1581, III, 259-75; Cayetano Rosell, *Historia del combate naval de Lepanto y juicio de la importancia y consecuencias de aquel suceso*, Madrid, 1853, esp. pp. 102 ff., with a documentary appendix of forty-nine texts from the years 1570-1573; Alberto Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI: *Marcantonio Colonna alla battaglia di Lepanto*, Rome, 1887, esp. pp. 196-247, with a good indication of the sources; Julien de la Gravière, *La Guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lepante*, 2 vols., Paris, 1888, II, 143-205, with a series of excellent, detailed maps illustrating the successive stages of the battle; Cesáreo Fernández Duro, *Armada española . . .*, II (1896), 151-67; Camillo Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana*, Rome, 1897, pp. 487-503; Pompeo Molmenti, *Sebastiano Veniero e la battaglia di Lepanto*, Florence, 1899, esp. pp. 101-33; Luciano Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia y la Santa Sede (1570-1573)*, 2 vols., Madrid, 1918-19, I, 124-42; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 587-92; G. A. Quartí, *La Guerra contro il Turco a Cipro e a Lepanto (1570-1571)*, Venice, 1935, esp. pp. 595-680; Felix Hartlaub, *Don Juan d'Autria und die Schlacht bei Lepanto*, Berlin, 1940, pp. 135-55; Michel Lesure, *Lepante, la crise de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, 1972, pp. 115-47, valuable for its emphasis on

shall run the risk of repetition. First of all, it is worthwhile to identify the chief actors and to locate them on the stage in the great drama which aroused all Europe and the Levant. Although Agostino Barbarigo was the last to emerge from behind Cape Skrofa, as we have just noted, we shall take him first. Holding close to the Albanian mainland, his galley took its place at the northern end of the Christian line. Antonio da Canale came next to him, and Marco Querini brought his galley to the southern end of Barbarigo's squadron, i.e., the left wing. The two galleasses posted before them were commanded by Ambrogio Bragadin and his kinsman Antonio Bragadin. They would fire their heavy cannon at the Turkish right wing, which was led by Mehmed Siroco, the governor of Alexandria, whose galley faced that of Barbarigo, and by Mehmed Beg, the sanjakbey of Negroponte, whose galley faced that of Marco Querini.

Meanwhile, south of Barbarigo's squadron, the sixty-one galleys of Don John's *battaglia* had already sailed into position, having been the first to come in sight of the Turks. In the center of the line Don John's galley, *la Reale*, occupied the thirty-first place in the *battaglia*, counting from north to south. Venier's was the thirtieth, to the left of the generalissimo. Marc' Antonio Colonna sailed on Don John's right, with Luis de Requesens, the grand commander of Castile, coming close behind. They faced Müezzinzade Ali, the admiral or kapudan pasha, and Pertau (Pertev) Pasha, the commander of the soldiery, in the central squadron of the Turkish armada. The two galleasses, moving slowly ahead of the Christian *battaglia*, were under the guidance of Giacomo Guoro and Francesco Duodo, the latter of whom was captain of the galleasses.<sup>42</sup>

The Christian right wing under Giannandrea Doria should have had the cover of the cannonry of the two galleasses commanded by Andrea da Pesaro and Pietro Pisani. Pesaro and Pisani, however, had had the longest way to go, from the area of Oxia to the southeastern end of the Christian

the Ottoman sources; G. F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galley*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1974, esp. pp. 227-52; José-María Gárate Córdoba, *Los Tercios de España en la ocasión de Lepanto*, Madrid, 1971, with a documentary appendix of thirty-three texts; and *cf.* the article (alluded to in the preceding chapter) by Geoffrey Parker and I. A. A. Thompson, "The Battle of Lepanto, 1571: The Costs of Victory," *The Mariner's Mirror*, LXIV (1978), 13-21.

<sup>42</sup> Francesco Duodo's commission as "capitano delle galee grosse," dated 23 May, 1570, may be found in the *Senatus Secreta*, Reg. 76, fol. 97 [118].

line, and may have got into place too late to pour much of their artillery fire into the Turks' left wing under Uluj-Ali, who made the best of the Turks' most favorable position.<sup>43</sup>

In a small, fast frigate Don John, accompanied by his secretary Juan de Soto and Luis de Cardona, sailed rapidly (as we have already learned from Venier) astern the long line of Christian galleys, showing himself in a display of confidence and evoking a hearty response from the thousands of men aboard.<sup>44</sup> As he returned to his flagship, standards were raised, identifying the galleys. Over Don John's flagship, the *reale* of his Catholic Majesty, the banner of the Holy League was unfurled, with a huge embroidery of the crucifixion and the arms of the three allies: the Holy See, Spain, and Venice. To obviate chauvinism and try to weld the armada together, one papal, three Genoese, and eight Neapolitan galleys were placed in the Venetian left wing. In the Spanish-dominated *battaglia* some thirty Venetian, papal, and Candian galleys were interposed among those of Spain, Genoa, Naples, and Savoy, while in Doria's right wing more than a score of Venetian, Candian, Corfiote, and papal galleys sailed amid those of Genoa, Naples, Sicily, and Savoy. The rearguard or "soccorso" under Álvaro de Bazán was made up largely of Venetian and Neapolitan galleys, with three papal, two Spanish, and a few other galleys.

Ali Pasha is said to have taken on board at Lepanto 10,000 janissaries, 2,000 sipahis, and 2,000 "adventurers" whom Mehmed Beg of Negroponte had rounded up for him.<sup>45</sup> The Turks, looking forward to a certain victory and the capture

of the Christian armada, had spent Saturday night, 6 October, in "revelry and celebration."<sup>46</sup> Contarini assures us that Don John, Colonna, and Venier together with all their captains, adventurers, soldiers, and sailors were confident of victory and united in the will to fight. The pashas, captains, corsairs, and all their soldiery, however, came on with the expectation and certainty that the Christians would try to take flight. The Turks were persuaded by their own savagery and by the Christians' past misfortunes. Looking forward to rewards from the Gran Signore, they thought they could acquire a rich booty in the meantime. Nevertheless, with each passing half hour the Turks could see the Christian armada increasing in size as the *battaglia*, the right wing, and the rearguard rounded Cape Skrofa, "non essendo ancor da loro veduto il corno sinistro per esser nascosto in coperta del terreno." Assuming that this was the whole armada, for the number of galleys in sight would correspond to Caracosa's estimate, the Turks were still undaunted, "but when little by little they also beheld all the left wing, and described the galleasses being impelled so vigorously by oars, which they had never imagined possible, even they began to fear."<sup>47</sup>

The opposing armadas straightened out their lines. Order must be maintained as long as possible, for disarray would bring about defeat. No one would know where he was, nor how his leadership was faring. As the Turks were preparing for the encounter, the Christians cleared the decks, and gathered arms along the gangways, "et tutti con l'armi pertinenti a loro si armarono," arquebuses, halberds, iron-bound maces, pikes, and swords. Gunners stood by the cannon and the falconets. Bowmen were ready with their crossbows. Fireballs (*fuochi artificiat*) had been prepared for ignition when the time came. Barriers were strung along the starboard and portside of the galleys to prevent the Turks from boarding. There were two hundred soldiers (*huomini da spada*) aboard every galley, and three or even four hundred aboard the flagships (*capitane, fanò*) "depending upon rank." The iron shackles were removed from the Christian convicts condemned to the oars, with the assurance that victory would bring them freedom.

Moving slowly to preserve their tactical units, the two armadas approached each other, as Con-

<sup>43</sup> As noted above, Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 37-48, 50<sup>r</sup>, among other sources, lists all the Christian and Turkish vessels, giving the names of their captains, and noting their location in each armada as the battle began. Numerous maps illustrating the course of the battle are available, among the best being those going with the second volume of Jurien de la Gravière, *La Guerre de Chypre et la bataille de Lépanie* (1888).

De la Gravière's maps have been reproduced, as by Luis Carrero Blanco in the appendix to his *Lepanto*, Estella (Navarre), 1971. Although de la Gravière's maps are a useful guide to the battle and to its site, one must always bear in mind that the coastline has changed a good deal in four centuries (cf. Peter Throckmorton, H. E. Edgerton, and Eleftherios Yalouris, "The Battle of Lepanto, Search and Survey Mission [Greece], 1971-72," *The International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Exploration*, 11-1 [March 1973], 121-30).

<sup>44</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 49. Cf. Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 124, a letter to Giovanni Vincenzo Pinelli in Padua, with praise of Don John, "il quale sopra una fregata andava di galera in galera, dando animo a tutti con grande humanità et magestà insieme . . ." and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 130<sup>r</sup>, et *alibi*.

<sup>45</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 40<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 48<sup>r</sup>: ". . . tutto il Sabbato di notte hebbero fatto bagordi et allegrezze, tenendo per fermo haver in mano l'acquisto della nostra armada."

<sup>47</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 50.

tarini tells us, "pian piano venivano ad incontrarsi." As usual aboard the Christian galleys, bread, wine, cheese, and other foodstuffs were put along the gangways from the quarter-deck to the prow. With the advent of the Turks one might be killed, but he would not be hungry. Trumpets, drums, "and every other sort of instrument" aroused the Christian host. A cry resounded through the whole armada. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were invoked. Priests and even captains of the galleys carried crucifixes from stem to stern, exhorting the soldiers and sailors to look upon Christ, who had now descended from heaven "in person to fight against the enemies of his most holy name, and inflamed and moved by these exhortations, they all became one body, one will, one desire with no heed nor thought of death." In an instant all hatreds, all enmities vanished, and those who had been at hostile odds for years now embraced one another in tears.<sup>48</sup>

The Christian oarsmen rowed to the beat of the drum, the tambour, "et ogni altra sorte d' instrumenti," the galleys pressing on side by side, but not so close as to impede the oars. The imposing array formed a crescent. The wind had shifted gently to the west, as if by divine intervention, to propel the Christian armada the more forcibly against the enemy. The sea was calm. As the day wore on, the sun also moved to the west, shining into the eyes of the Turks. When the first cannon fire burst from Ali Pasha's flagship, the smoke was blown back into the faces of the Turks. The Turkish wings under Mehmed Siroco on the north and Uluj-Ali on the south also opened fire, "which was understood as the signal to attack, as they did, hastening the stroke of the oars by the buoyancy of their spirit and the fearfulness of their cries."

As the two armadas approached each other for a head-on crash, according to Contarini, the six Venetian galleasses were at last in place, and their heavy cannon suddenly fired one volley after another into the Turkish galleys, creating havoc and causing widespread destruction. The pashas must have cursed Caracosa, who had assured them they would face no such gunfire. To reach the Christian armada the Turks had to go through or get around the raking fire of the galleasses, "tanto folta tempesta di grossissime canonate." An increase in the west wind hampered their advance, and they were blinded by the thick smoke from the cannon fire, "which was the reason the stalwart bombardiers of the galleasses had the time to dis-

perse a third of the [Turkish] armada with a countless number of dead and wounded."

The Turks were thrown into utter confusion, their armada into hopeless disorder, a scene of splintered masts and yardarms, sinking and burning galleys,

and already the sea was wholly covered with men, yardarms, oars, casks, barrels, and various kinds of armaments, an incredible thing that only six galleasses should have caused such great destruction, for they had not [hitherto] been tried in the forefront of a naval battle.

The cannon aboard the galleasses were not silent for an instant, as the great vessels turned this way and that, shooting over the bow, from starboard and portside, and from the poop-deck, encompassing the enemy in "tanta horribile et perpetua tempesta." To escape the cannonade Mehmed Siroco, "who commanded the enemy's right wing, wishing to save himself, withdrew from the battaglia and from the rest of the armada, and headed for the shore to meet the Christian left wing under Agostino Barbarigo. . . ."

Mehmed Siroco also had in mind the possibility of outflanking Barbarigo's galleys and firing at them broadside and from behind but, Contarini declares, Barbarigo's force turned toward the shore in perfect order, and blocked Mehmed's passage so completely "that not a galley, not even a little boat could possibly have got through." Mehmed, however, was determined to push his way along the shore. The fighting was fierce, and when Marino Contarini, the nephew of Barbarigo, saw that the full weight of Mehmed's galleys were descending upon his uncle, he came to his aid and may have saved the day. Although Mehmed saw the masts of his galleys broken, poop-decks shattered, and bulwarks, benches, and oars blown into the air "con horrenda mortalità de suoi," he persisted, but his men gave way, heading for the shore, many of them trying to swim to safety.

It was the way of the Turk, says Contarini, to launch a ferocious attack to begin with, but to lose courage and flee from a strong and valorous foe. The Christians boarded the enemy galleys, cutting the Turks to pieces and freeing their fellow religionists who were chained to the oars. If we can believe Contarini, the Christians captured every galley that was still afloat in the Turkish right wing, and did not spare the life of a single infidel. It had been a close call, however, for Mehmed Siroco had broken the Christian line, and exposed the left flank of Don John's battaglia. In the Christian left wing, aside from the unnamed hundreds who fought and died in the fray, Marino Conta-

<sup>48</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 48<sup>r</sup>-49<sup>r</sup>.

rini, Vincenzo Querini, and Andrea Barbarigo were killed. The Venetians paid a heavy price. Agostino Barbarigo was mortally wounded by an arrow in the right eye (*d'una frecciata nell'occhio destro*). He lost the power of speech, and died on 9 October, a serious loss for Venice.<sup>49</sup>

At the southern end of the battle site Uluj-Ali, who must have been startled by the magnitude of the Christian armada, held back the Turkish left wing from an immediate attack upon the Christian right wing under Giannandrea Doria. Uluj-Ali, a Calabrian renegade, was probably the most formidable seaman of his day; Doria, a master mariner, was not unreasonably afraid to pit his fifty galleys against Uluj-Ali's ninety. In the ill-fated expedition of 1570 Doria had insisted upon being in the right wing, which (when one sailed eastward) was usually on the seaward side, and would make escape easier. It is perhaps not to be wondered at that Uluj-Ali also found himself on the seaward wing as the Turkish armada issued from the Gulf of Lepanto. Whether fearful of being outflanked or otherwise, Doria bore off about a mile to the south, being followed by a number of galleys. He thus separated himself, with the captains who followed, from the rest of the right wing (*seguitato da molte galee si scostò per spazio di uno miglio dal resto del suoorno*), opening a gap in the northern end of his squadron and exposing to possible attack the south end of the Christian battaglia, where the prior of Messina had been placed with three galleys of Malta. It remained to be seen what Uluj-Ali would do.

Meanwhile the allied battaglia under Don John, Colonna, and Venier pressed ahead against Ali Pasha, Pertau Pasha, Caracosa, and the main body of the Turkish armada. The Christians advanced behind a barrage of cannon fire spewed forth with deadly effect by the bombardiers aboard the galleasses of Giacomo Guoro and Francesco Duodo, who caused so much bloodshed and created such

terror among the Turks that the latter could not even fire many of their own cannon. "And of those which they did fire, many did the Christians no harm," says Contarini,

because the prows of the Turkish galleys were so much higher than those of the Christians that even when they lowered the mouths of their cannon to a point just above the peaked rams [*le bocche abbassate fin su i speroni*], they were still set so high that they shot over the pennants on the Christian galleys.

Don John had been well advised to remove the rams or "spurs" (*speroni, espolones*) on the prows of the allied galleys.

Despite the carnage the Turks came on, shrieking and bellowing, amid cries of victory and a storm of arrows and gunshot. The sea was aflame with flashes of cannon fire and burning vessels:

Three galleys were locked together in combat with four, four with six, and six with one, of both the enemy and the Christians, all fighting in the cruellest fashion, the one determined not to leave the other alive, and presently Turks and Christians had boarded many of their opponents' galleys, constrained to do battle with short arms in hand-to-hand combat, from which few came out alive. . . .

They fought with swords, scimitars, iron maces, knives, arrows, arquebuses, and fireballs. The dead were thrown and the wounded leapt into the sea, where the living joined the lifeless by drowning in water, "which was already thick and red with blood."

Don John's galley ran alongside that of Ali Pasha and two other Turkish captains of flagships. In naval battles it was the custom of the time and a matter of honor for the supreme commanders to engage each other in action. Ali had aboard his galley three hundred janissaries, some arquebusers, and a hundred crossbowmen. On his flagship Don John had at hand four hundred arquebusers from the regiment of Sardinia under the command of Don Lope de Figueroa, "as well as many other lords and gentlemen," who now came to blows with the Turks. Contarini has high praise for Colonna, who was also in the thick of it, seizing a Turkish galley which had attacked him. Venier fought like the "valoroso capitano" that he was, on Don John's left, going after the enemy "con gran cuore." The three Christian generals became embroiled in dangerous conflict with seven Turkish galleys. Requesens came to their aid, as did two Venetian galleys, the *Loredana* and the *Malipiera*, "with a great slaughter of the enemy," but Giovanni Loredan and Caterino Malipiero were killed

<sup>49</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 51–52". In the spring of 1570, as the Turks began their campaign against Cyprus, Mehmed Sirocco [Sirocco, Scirocco] had joined Piali Pasha's armada "with the six galleys of the guard of Chios" (Pietro Valderio, *Guerra di Cipro*, Treviso MS. ital. 505, p. 39). Sirocco, badly wounded at Lepanto, was put to death by the victors. He had been *capitano della guardia d' Alessandria*, and was well known for his "insolentie," on which see Marc' Antonio Barbaro's letter of 22 July, 1569, to the doge in Venice (Marciana, MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fols. 140<sup>v</sup> ff., and note, *ibid.*, fols. 202<sup>v</sup>–203<sup>v</sup>, 210<sup>v</sup>–211<sup>v</sup>, 214<sup>v</sup>, et alibi), as well as Fedel Fedeli, *Storia della guerra contro il Turco, 1570–1571*, *ibid.*, MS. It. VII, 106 (8033), fols. 83<sup>v</sup>, 90<sup>v</sup>, and on the battle of Lepanto, fols. 88–93. The Marciana has eight or ten manuscript copies of Fedeli's work.

in the encounter. The crews of the *Loredana* and the *Malipiera*, undaunted by the deaths of their captains, redoubled their efforts, "anzi infiammati di vendicarsi," and took possession of two Turkish galleys, while Venier and Colonna are said to have captured two more.<sup>50</sup>

By this time Don John's hefty flagship had allegedly sustained the attacks of five enemy galleys, and had subdued three of them. Having sought each other out, the two commanders-in-chief were finally locked in deadly combat. Don John's men got aboard Ali Pasha's galley; three times they were repulsed "con gran mortalità." On the fourth attempt, however, they drove the Turks back to the main mast of the pasha's galley (*fino al alboro*), killing Ali himself. On all sides the Christian cries of victory were heard, and were quickly understood. Soon the Christians became "more concerned with seeking booty and tying up [captives] than in fighting and killing." Many important Turks, *molti personaggi nimici*, had been slain, and many made prisoners in expectation of lucrative ransoms. The Porte had lost

a large number of janissaries and a huge mass of soldiers: Only those escaped who from the very start of the battle, having seen the destruction of the [Turkish] galleys, had taken refuge in frigates and other small boats, as Pertau did, when he had observed the imminent peril. Making the best of the situation as discreetly as he could, he got aboard a *caïque*, and made it safely to the shore.

Uluj-Ali had also realized that the day was lost. To prevent the wily corsair from outflanking him, Doria continued to veer to the south with a number of galleys, widening the gap in the Christian right wing. Never one to miss a trick, Uluj-Ali saw his chance. As Christian galleys straggled into the gap, Uluj-Ali made a sudden attack upon them, and our men held up valiantly and met it with courage, not because they had confidence in their slender strength, but rather in their firm expectation of assistance which, however, they did not receive in time, since Doria stood too far out at sea with his galleys dispersed . . .

He was in fact too far out to sea to swerve around, outflank Uluj-Ali, and catch him from behind (*dietro alle spalle*) with the heavy fire of Pisani's galleass. Although Doria tried to rally his forces, it was too late. Some of the commanders of the "victorious galleys" of the *battaglia*, perceiving the plight of the stranded galleys in the Christian right wing, also made an effort to come to their aid, "ma tardo fu il soccorso," again too late. Uluj-

Ali, with a considerable number of his galleys, had plowed through the breach, slaughtering the Christians aboard the galleys in his way, escaping with ease, "et con commodità essendo fuggito." Doria and the "soccorso" from the *battaglia* did, however, arrive in time to save some Christian galleys which Uluj-Ali was towing away, including that of Pietro Giustinian, the prior of Messina, although most of those aboard were "scarcely alive."<sup>51</sup>

The battle had ended,

and with God's own resolution by about 3:30 P.M. [*a hore XXI in circa*] the enemy had been entirely shattered, subdued, and conquered so that without a sword's stroke all that remained of the Turkish armada was captured—except for the galleys of Uluj-Ali who, taking advantage of his position, had fled out to sea, and because there was already little left of the day, he was not pursued, but all the others surrendered to whoever was first to move against them.

The sea was a fearful spectacle, *tutto il mare sanguinoso*, with wounded men and floating corpses lying in the wreckage of skiffs and galleys. Cries for help were heard from Christians and Turks alike, as they swam about clutching oars and buoys, splintered masts and yardarms. Writing only months after the important and stirring events he had just described, Gianpietro Contarini was doubtless right in his assertion

that this has been the greatest and most famous naval battle which has ever taken place from the time of Caesar Augustus until now, and it has occurred in almost exactly the same place that he conquered Mark Antony [in 31 B.C.], for that was near the promontory of Actium, where Prevesa now is.

Christians looked upon the victory at Lepanto as a miracle. In a mere four hours, as Contarini says, they had clipped the wings of the great serpent of the Levant. The booty was enormous, and the captured Turkish standards would be preserved for centuries. The wind had shifted from east to west in the very hour that the change was needed. The battle had been fought on a calm sea. The heavy cannon of the Christian galleys, and especially of the galleasses, had been too much for the Turks, who had far less artillery and were much less skilled as gunners. By 7:00 P.M. (*a hora una di notte*) the weather began to change again, but only when the Christian armada had already taken refuge in the port of Petalà and the inlets just north of the island of Oxia, with the Turkish

<sup>50</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 51<sup>r</sup>-52<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>51</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 52<sup>r</sup>-53<sup>r</sup>.



prisoners and captured galleys. A violent wind arose, "che fece horrenda et furiosa fortuna di mare;" local residents said that they had never seen such a storm. If the heavy rains had come at mid-day, the Christian "firelocks," arquebuses and muskets, would not have functioned so well as the Turkish bows and arrows. But in the safety of Petalà, where the ships' physicians took care of the sick and wounded, the Christians were able to contemplate their good fortune.<sup>52</sup>

Sebastiano Venier lost no time in sending the news of their incredible achievement to Venice. Without consulting Don John, which renewed the hard feeling between them, Venier dispatched Onfrè Giustinian in a galley "con lettere al Senato del felice successo ch' egli conosceva dalla man di Dio."

The surviving Christians who fought at Lepanto could glory in their everlasting victory, as Contarini notes toward the end of his *Historia*. Those who were killed were among the blessed, however, having exchanged by their martyrdom a few hours of earthly existence for an eternal abode in God's own presence. These fortunate dead Contarini reckons at 7,656, including one captain of a flagship, i.e., Agostino Barbarigo, 17 galley commanders, eight nobles, five chaplains, six counts, five *patroni* [from the Arsenal], six scribes, seven pilots, 113 bombardiers, 32 skilled workers, 124 mates, 925 seamen, 2,274 galley slaves, and 1,333 soldiers, all from the Venetian fleet, while 2,000 men had been killed aboard Philip II's fleet, and 800 from the pope's dozen galleys.

According to Contarini, the Turks lost 29,990 men "between those killed and captured," including 34 captains of flagships, 120 commanders of galleys, 25,000 janissaries, sipahis, adventurers, and galley slaves, as well as the 3,846 captives taken by the Christians, who also seized 130 vessels from the Turks, i.e., 117 galleys and 13 galliots, together with their munitions and supplies. About 80 vessels were virtually destroyed or sunk, and perhaps another forty escaped the Christians' clutches.

For three days after the battle those aboard the Christian armada celebrated their signal success with "feste et allegrezze." It was deemed impracticable to follow up their victory as a united armada, for they were confined to the port of Petalà and the neighboring inlets until 15 October, owing to the bad weather and the pressing need to take care of the sick and wounded. Don John de-

cidied to return to Messina, expressing hope that the armada might again be assembled the following year for another campaign against the Turks. The three generals then went on to Corfu, "conducendo seco i vasselli acquistati et spoglie nemiche," where the spoils of conquest were divided rather less amicably than Contarini suggests.

The Holy See received 19 galleys and two galliots, Spain was given 58 galleys and six galliots, while the Venetian share was 39 galleys and four galliots. The Turkish artillery was also divided among the victors, and so were the captives, with 881 slaves going to the pope, 1,713 to the king of Spain, and 1,162 to the Venetian Signoria. And, as Contarini says, Onfrè Giustinian brought the news to Venice.

The Piazza S. Marco was crowded, as the populace waited and wondered "between fear and hope," but from Giustinian's discharge of cannon and from the fact that he was dragging Turkish banners through the water behind him, it was clear he brought good news. Until he came ashore, however, with Venier's letter and made his own report to the Doge Alvise Mocenigo, no one could imagine the extent of the allied triumph "con pochissimo danno de Christiani," with so little loss of Christian life. The doge received Giustinian in the Collegio, and then came down into the church of S. Marco, accompanied by the papal nuncio Gianantonio Facchinetti, the Patriarch Giovanni Grimani, two counselors, and such nobles as were on hand. The Senate had been in session, and its members also hastened into the church, as the clergy and choir began to sing the *Te Deum laudamus*, which was followed by a mass of thanksgiving.<sup>53</sup>

Onfrè Giustinian arrived in Venice at about 11:00 A.M. (circa 17 hore) on 19 October, not on the eighteenth as stated by Contarini. When the news was made public that day, an *avviso* was prepared, presumably by agents of the Fuggers, recounting the first-known facts of the Christian victory at Lepanto. The battle was declared to have

<sup>52</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 54<sup>r</sup>-56<sup>r</sup>, and cf. Gugieliomotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI, 243-46, who modifies slightly the figures given by Contarini, who provides for the division of only 116 galleys and 12 galliots. Philip II was supposed to receive three sixths of the booty, Venice two sixths, and the Holy See one sixth, the spoils being divided in accordance with the expenses which each of the three high contracting parties had agreed to assume (cf. above, Chapter 23, p. 1016a). Don John received two or three galleys. M. Lesure, *Lépanthe, la crise de l'empire ottoman* (1972), p. 9, mistakenly assumes that the Giustinian who brought the news of Lepanto to Venice was [Pietro] Giustinian, the prior of the Hospitalers of Messina.

<sup>53</sup> Contarini, *Historia*, fols. 53<sup>r</sup>-54<sup>r</sup>.

lasted five hours. The high spot was Don John's successful clash with Ali Pasha, in which Venier in shining armor (*in arme bianche*) was said to have participated. According to this account, Ali was taken prisoner and brought on board the gallely of Don John, who had his head cut off and displayed aboard a frigate, which went the rounds of the Christian armada. The death of the Turkish generalissimo inspired the Christians with the assurance of victory.

It was reported that 180 Turkish galleys had been taken, and towed to Corfu. The rest of the sultan's armada had been burned to water level or sunk. The victors had killed 15,000 Turks, captured 7,000 prisoners, and freed 20,000 Christian slaves. Of the 40 flagships (*fanò*) in the Turkish armada, 39 had now come into the possession of the Christians. The fortieth *fanò* belonged to Uluj-Ali, who escaped with five galleys, but had allegedly been pursued. Ten Christian galleys had been destroyed. Yes, Barbarigo had been killed and, it seemed, so had 18 galley commanders. Marco Querini had been wounded. The booty was so great that one could assume the soldiers had profited a good deal.

It was thought that Christians had never known such a military triumph as God had given them at Lepanto. The city was in an ecstasy. As soon as the doge heard the news, he entered the church of S. Marco with the Signoria and the ambassadors of the princes. The mass was sung with the *Te Deum laudamus*, as we have just seen. All the shops were closed. No one was doing business. Everyone was celebrating, and thanking God for the triumph. Debtors were freed from prison. It was to be hoped that God would see to it that the Christian captains must chase that dog of a sultan from his throne, venturing right up to Istanbul to do it.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>54</sup> The text seems worth giving (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 134-135, di *Venetia 19 Ottobre*): "Questa mattina circa 17 hore è arrivata qua la galera del magnifico Messer Onfrè Giustiniano con le insegne turche trascinare per acqua con molti tiri d'artiglieria, il quale ha portato la più felice nova che potesse haver questa Serenissima Republica et tutta la Christianità insieme, et è la rotta, ruina, et fracasso di tutta l'armata turca, che seguì all' 7 del presente, giorno di Dominica a circa tre hore di giorno. Presso il luogo detto Curzolari, presso il Golfo di Lepanto, si vennero ad incontrar tutte due l'armate, et quella del Turco fu la prima che venisse ad investire la nostra, contra la quale furno spinte le galeazze con il clarissimo Augustin Barbarigo in una bonazza calma che durò tutto il giorno, le quali galeazze diedero un gran fracasso all'armata nemica, et s'attacò il resto della battaglia, et il fatto durò da 5 hore continue et il menar delle mani—la qual battaglia hebbe questo fine, che Don Gio. d' Austria investì con la sua galera per poppe quella del bassa general della Turca, et l'ecellentissimo general Ve-

Giustinian was knighted, and given a gold chain worth 500 scudi. Who had ever brought such tidings to Venice? On 19 October the nuncio Giannantonio Facchinetti wrote Cardinal Girolamo Rusticucci, who was then acting as Pius V's secretary of state, that he wanted to believe the pope had already learned of the Christian victory by

nier la investì per fianco in arme bianche. Et fu fatto pregione esso bassa et menato subito sopra la galera di esso Don Giovanni, che gli fece tagliar la testa su la palmetta, et subito montò in una fregata, et andò all'ultimo corno dell'armata Christiana, dandoli la nova della presa et morte di esso bassa et generale de' Turchi, et che però volessero menar le mani che la vittoria era fatta.

"Et così sono state prese 180 galere de' Turchi remurciate dall'armata nostra sita a Corfu, et il resto di detta armata turca, parte buttata a fondi et parte brugata, tagliati a pezzi da 15 m. Turchi et da 7 m. pregiioni, liberati qui di 20 m. schiavi, et di 40 fanò [i.e., flagships] che erano in detta armata turca presi trentanove. L'altro, che era l'Occhiali, si era fuggito con 5 galere, ma era seguitato da alquante delle nostre, et della nostra armata sono restate da X galere disertate di gente, morto il clarissimo Signor Agustin Barbarigo di una frecciata nella faccia, et dicono da 18 sopracomiti, et si ragiona che siano questi, però non si sa del certo . . . [the names of the galley commanders assumed to have been killed are listed], et ferito il magnifico Messer Marco Querini.

"Il bottino è stato grande, et è da credere che tutti li soldati habbino guadagnato bene. Di questa così gloriosa vittoria che ci ha dato il Signor Iddio che mai è stata forsi tale a tempo de' Christiani ne giubila tanto questa città che tutto è in festa et in allegrezza, et subito sua Serenità con l'illustrissima Signoria et ambasciatori de' principi andò a San Marco, dove è stata cantà la messa con il Te Deum laudamus, et tutto il popolo della città è in grandissimo giubilo con serrar tutte le botteghe, abbandonar li negozi, et spender tutto il tempo in allegrezza et abbracciamenti, ringraziando Iddio che ci ha consolati. Et si sono liberati pregiioni per debiti civili, et si andarà dietro facendo altre allegrezze. Piaccia a sua divina Maestà darci gratia che li capitani nostri in questa vittoria vadano a caccià di seggio questo cane sino in Constantinopoli, sicome s'ha speranza che debbano fare."

Note also, *ibid.*, fols. 137, 147, 445<sup>r</sup>. For bringing the good news of Lepanto and the Turkish banners to Venice, "il Signor Onfrè Giustiniani . . . è stato fatto cavaliere con dono d'una colana di 500 scudi" (fol. 143<sup>r</sup>).

Other accounts of the battle of Lepanto are given in Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, e.g. fols. 436 ff., 440, 456<sup>r</sup>, and see Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 14 ff., 123 ff., 135 ff., 144<sup>r</sup>, which register is almost entirely dedicated to the prelude to Lepanto and its aftermath. On the thanksgivings and celebrations in Venice, note the letter of the doge and Senate to the captain-general Venier in the Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 23<sup>r</sup>-24<sup>r</sup> [45<sup>r</sup>-46<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 22 October, 1571.

The outpouring of reports, letters, sermons, orations, *avvisi*, *ragguagli*, *Beschreibungen*, *Zeitungen*, *cantoni*, *sonnetti*, etc., from late October through December, 1571, announcing, describing, and extolling the victory at Lepanto is almost incredible—see the listing in Carl Göllner, *Turca: Die europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts*, II (Bucharest and Baden-Baden, 1968), nos. 1306-1496, pp. 220-93. I have cited only such items as I have read.

way of Otranto. But news traveled uncertainly at sea, and so Facchinetti was sending a courier to Rome to inform his Holiness

that a little while ago the magnificent Giuffrè Giustinian has arrived with his galley, and has stated in the Collegio, in my presence, that of 200 Turkish galleys one hundred and eighty—I say 180—have been taken, and are now in Christian hands. He says that the victory has been bloody, with the deaths of 20,000 Turks and a great many prisoners taken. Fifteen thousand Christian slaves have been freed. The provviditore Barbarigo was killed, with six or eight Venetian galley commanders. The lord Don John, the lord Marc' Antonio Colonna, the princes of Urbino and Parma [Francesco Maria della Rovere and Alessandro Farnese], the count of S. Fiora [Mario Sforza], and the lord Ascanio della Corgna were safe. The battle took place on the seventh of this month, and lasted from 11:00 A.M. [17 *hore*] until nightfall, not far from the Gulf of Lepanto.<sup>55</sup>

On 19 October, the twentieth, and in the days and weeks to come many letters were written from Venice, describing and glorying in the Christian success. Five letters, for example, are extant addressed to Giovanni Vincenzo Pinelli (1535–1601), one of the great polymaths of his age, whose friendship was sought by the eminent and the obscure. One of Pinelli's correspondents wrote (on 20 October) that Don John's achievement had been tremendous (*Don Giovanni si è fatto tremendo*), and that after more than a century the Turk's dominance at sea had been swept away. On the whole these letters contain much the same information as the other sources, with the usual variations, such as the assertion that the Christians had captured 140 galleys, Uluj-Ali had escaped with twenty-five, and so on.<sup>56</sup>

After mass on that memorable morning of Onfrè Giustinian's return to Venice from Petalà,

<sup>55</sup> Aldo Stella, ed., *Nunziature di Venezia*, X (1977), no. 70, p. 117.

<sup>56</sup> Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fols. 123–32, five letters written from Venice between 19 and 25 October, 1571, addressed to Giovanni Vincenzo Pinelli in Padua, three of them from one Nicolere Primo. Other texts and letters relating to Lepanto may be found, *ibid.*, fols. 133 ff., and in fact throughout the remainder of this volume. Born in Naples, Pinelli lived in Padua throughout his adult years. He collected manuscripts, paintings, books, coins, and almost everything else of cultural interest or value. His library became famous. After his death (on 1 August, 1601) part of his library went to Naples, and part is still preserved in Venice, but during one shipment a large portion fell into the hands of Turkish corsairs who, dissatisfied with their booty, threw some chests of books overboard and destroyed others on other ways, on which note J. H. Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexikon*, XXVIII (Leipzig and Halle, 1741, repr. Graz, 1961), cols. 369–70.

the Signoria repaired to the Sala del Collegio in joyful haste. The sixteen Savi (del Consiglio, di Terra Ferma, and agli Ordini) joined the doge and his six counselors, the three heads of the Quarantia, and the three heads of the Council of Ten. Letters were prepared for submission to the Senate. One of them, dated 19 October, was addressed to the Emperor Maximilian II. The doge and Senate told his imperial Majesty that the victory at Lepanto was to be looked upon not so much as an end in itself as the means whereby the Christian princes could now "abbassar questo fiero et natural inimico commune." Maximilian, as emperor, was "capo della militia Christiana," bound by close ties of blood to Philip II and Don John of Austria, whose Spanish fleet had played so large a part in the spectacular defeat of the Turks.

The road was now open for an attack upon Selim II from Austria, not only to recover lands lost to the Turks but to acquire "some other states." Maximilian might make himself "the most famous and glorious emperor there ever was," if he would seize the chance to strike while the sultan and his advisors were taken aback, utterly dismayed, by the extent of their unexpected comedown. The Turks were unprepared to face a large-scale attack. The emperor must use the opportunity which God had given him. The Signoria was certain that Maximilian would not fail in his responsibility, and that he would help move the other Christian princes both near and far, especially the king of France, to take prompt action against the Turk and to end his tyranny.<sup>57</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 21' [43'], *all' imperator*, doc. dated 19 October, 1571, and note the letter of the same date to Giovanni Correr, the Venetian ambassador to the imperial court: "Essendo venuta quella occasione tanto desiderata dalla Christianità, che l'armata Turchesca sia stata con l'aiuto del Signor Dio destrutta dalle armate della lega, ne è parso per corrier espresso mandarvi il summario delli avvisi che ne habbiamo havuti questa matina, et vi commettemo col Senato che dobbiate comunicarli a sua cesarea Maestà, rallegrandovi infinitamente con lei d'una tanta vittoria. . . ."

Correr was to try to persuade Maximilian to attack the Turks, and do his best to bring Sigismund Augustus of Poland into an invasion of Turkish territory, "et da modo sia preso che sia data libertà al Collegio di scriver alli serenissimi re di Polonia, de Portogallo, et altri principi Christiani, che li parerà con darli aviso della vittoria et eccitarli a moversi contra il Turco. De litteris + 158, de non O, non sinceri I" (*ibid.*, fols. 21'–22' [43'–44']).

On the continued effort of the Venetians and Pius V to persuade Maximilian to join the anti-Turkish League, note, *ibid.*, fols. 40' [62'], 43 [65], 48 [70], 50'–51 [72'–73], 55' [77']. Although the Venetians and others had offered Maximilian large support to enter the League, he was more inclined to peace than to war with the Turks (*ibid.*, fol. 56' [78']), and of

On the same day (19 October) the doge and Senate wrote Charles IX of the God-given victory of the allied Christian fleets, which had destroyed the Turkish armada, ". . . che con tanta felicità hanno destrutta l'armata Turchesca." With this beginning the divine Majesty had shown the Christian princes what one might hope for, if they would press ahead for the common good and for their own everlasting fame. Since the king had often stated that when he saw "things moving forward," he would not fail to share in the enterprise, the doge and Senate assured him that now was the time to act. When the ample resources of France were added to those of the rest of Christendom, one could be sure that the consequences would exceed the fondest hopes of the past. It only remained for the Christian princes to do their duty as the Turk faced his future in consternation.<sup>58</sup> Charles was, however, even less able and less likely than Maximilian to make a move against the Turks.

To Philip II the doge and Senate wrote that the Christian victory and the destruction of the Turkish armada gave every promise of those further successes of which the Christian commonwealth had need, and which surely would follow when the princes did their duty, "as the supreme pontiff, your Catholic Majesty, and our Republic have done up to now!" The Venetians rejoiced with his Majesty in this victory in which his brother Don John of Austria and the Spanish fleet had "had so great a part." They looked forward to a future that would have been hard to conceive of only a few weeks before, but now they must reap the rewards of their common victory. They were thankful that Philip had ordered Don John to "winter in Sicily," and they implored him to try to prevail upon his cousin Maximilian II to enter the Holy League, thus setting an example for all the other Christian princes whose duty it was to proceed against the Turk.<sup>59</sup>

The nuncio Facchinetti's courier reached Rome the night of 21 and 22 October, and when morn-

ing came, Pope Pius V began a series of letters to the kings and princes of Christendom, rejoicing in the glad tidings he had received.<sup>60</sup> On 23 October Pius wrote Don John that words were inadequate to express the elation he felt. Congratulating the young prince in fulsome Latinity, his Holiness stated he had been told that Don John intended to press on and make the greatest possible use of the victory at Lepanto (which of course was not the case). With high praise for Don John's alleged decision and for his courage, Pius said he was now led to hope that further news of further victories lay just ahead. He would not cease to pray that God would keep his beloved son safe and sound, "sicut adhuc fuisti," and imparted "by the present letter the apostolic benediction to your Highness [*Nobilitati tuae*], to all the armada, and to the army."<sup>61</sup>

Although Pius was well aware that Duke Alfonso d' Este of Ferrara must already have learned of the "insignis et celeberrima victoria . . . contra immanissimos hostes Turcas," he wished nevertheless to share his happiness with Alfonso by a letter "pro paternae erga te voluntate nostra."<sup>62</sup>

On 25 October Pius wrote Philip II that the Christian victory had gladdened his heart "with incredible joy and happiness." It was the work of God, marvelous in what He does, "through whom kings reign and princes command." The Almighty had given them a victory, as he told Philip, such as no one had ever seen or heard of "either in our own times or in earlier centuries."<sup>63</sup> Three days later Pius addressed another letter to Philip, congratulating his Catholic Majesty and praising the valor of Don John. He also requested that both the king's fleet and land forces be ready for further action against the Turks by the following March or by April at the latest. Although the Venetians appeared to know that Philip had instructed Don John "to winter in Sicily," Pius had not been so informed. He hoped, however, that such would be the case,

fol. 60' [82']). Correr had replaced Giovanni Michiel as the Republic's ambassador to the imperial court, his commission being dated 2 June, 1571 (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 96'-98' [117'-119']).

<sup>58</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 22 [44], *al re Christianissimo*, doc. dated 19 October, 1571, and *cf.* the letter of the same date to Alvis Contarini and Leonardo Contarini, the Venetian ambassadors in France, *ibid.*, fol. 22'.

<sup>59</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 22'-23' [44'-45'], *al re Catholicio*, doc. dated 19 October, and *cf.* the letter, also of the nineteenth, to Leonardo Donado and Antonio Tiepolo, the Venetian ambassadors in Spain, *ibid.*, fol. 23.

<sup>60</sup> *Cf.* the brief to Charles IX in the Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 105, by original enumeration, "datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, etc., die XXII Octobris 1571, anno sexto: Simile Catharinae reginae Christianissimae." On the arrival of Facchinetti's courier in Rome with the first news of Lepanto, *cf.* L. Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV (1914), no. 233, pp. 488-489, a letter of 22 October of the Spanish ambassador Zúñiga to Philip II.

<sup>61</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 144.

<sup>62</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Busta 1300/15, no. 151, doc. dated 23 October, 1571.

<sup>63</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 235, p. 492, and *cf.* Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 104.

so that both the soldiers and oarsmen might "be found fresh for the fight" when the spring came.<sup>64</sup>

Naturally and necessarily Pius V wrote his friends and allies, the Venetians, during these joyous days that were filling Rome with celebrations. The Venetians had been bearing the brunt of the war against the Turks. They had lost Cyprus; they were co-authors of the Holy League. If we may be allowed another full text amid the scores and scores of letters and documents concerning the triumph at Lepanto, it should probably be Pius's letter of 24 October to the doge and Senate. It illustrates the then current state of mind at the Curia, for even if the Turks had forced the war upon the Signoria, everyone knew that the Venetian commanders at Lepanto had, like Don John, earned the gratitude of Christendom.<sup>65</sup> The more one reads the endless texts, the more he comes to realize the profound impression made by the victory, and nowhere was the spirit moved more deeply than in Rome. No casual statement can do justice to the evidence we can gather from the flood of papal briefs which poured into the chanceries of Europe.<sup>66</sup>

In Rome on 24 October, as we learn from a news dispatch,

<sup>64</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 236, p. 493, doc. dated 28 October, 1571.

<sup>65</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 100: "Dilectis filiis nobili viro Duci ac Domino Venetiarum: . . . Legimus hilari sane laetitiaque animo literas vestras quo nobis nudius tertius [i.e., 22 October] orator apud nos vester reddidit easque ipse prudenti ac diligenti admodum sermone est subsecutus. Primumque quod de tam insignis tamque gloriosae victoriae adversus perfidissimos Turcas beneficio Deo Omnipotenti, a quo bona cuncta procedunt, maximas gratias (scilicet omnes facere debemus) egeritis, vos in Domino summoepere laudamus, deinde vobis ex toto corde totaque mente nostra incredibili erga vos nostri amoris abundantia sincere de eadem victoria gratulamur nobisque mirabiliter gaudemus! Ea ut si qui manus suae potentia innumerabiles hostium exercitus fugare delerere potest, sicut iam inchoavit, felices ac secundos rerum populi sui progressus in dies magis fortunare et augere pro suaque ineffabili bonitate et misericordia id clementissime concedere dignetur, assiduis orationibus semper precabimur idemque tum a vobis tum a Christianis omnibus incessabiliter vobis agendum esse censemus. Verum enimvero, filii, vobis exploratissimum esse volumus nos secundum Apostolum opportune importune instando, arguendo, obsecrando, increpando apud Christianos principes legatis, nuntiis, litterisque nostris (uti iam praecclare coepimus) nullo loco defuturos quin eos studiosissime moneamus, hortemur, oremus, et obtestemur ut se nos obiscum ceterisque confederatis contra terrerimum immanissimumque tyrannum coniungere non differant ut consociatis communibus omnium viribus, dum saevissimos hostis insperata inexpectataque tanta hac amissae potentissimae classis laetura contentum iacet, in natam eius ferociam ac feratitem fortius et validius contundere atque reprimere Deo favente veremur. Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, etc., die XXIII Octobris 1571, anno sexto."

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fols. 109 ff., which briefs are addressed to (among others) Cosimo I de' Medici and his son

they are saying that the pope will solemnize the seventh of October in memory of this victory, as Calixtus III once did when the Christians had obtained a victory against the Turks much less important than this one. Yesterday morning the Roman people had a solemn high mass celebrated in Araceli, and his Holiness has granted them an indulgence of ten years and ten "quarantene." The Spanish ambassador [Juan de Zúñiga], doubtful about the safety of his brother, the Comendador [Luis de Requesens], has not yet shown any sign of rejoicing. . . . One eagerly awaits the arrival of the lord Prospero Colonna with details of the victory of the armada. There has been no word from Venice except for two letters, one from the Signoria and the other from the nuncio. . . . The news reached here Sunday night [21 October], and Monday evening they put on a joyous display of bonfires with great salvos of artillery, which they were to do again yesterday evening [Tuesday, the twenty-third], but because of the fear that many lords have lost their lives, his Holiness did not want it.<sup>67</sup>

Three days later another dispatch (of 27 October) described how Pius V rose from his bed, threw himself on his knees, and thanked God for the news which the nuncio Facchinetti's courier had brought. The next morning he went into S. Peter's, accompanied by the cardinals, to say prayers of thanksgiving. He received the ambassadors with tears of joy. On Tuesday, 23 October, a courier came from Venice, sent by the Signoria, with a letter to the ambassador Giovanni Soranzo, confirming what the nuncio had written and providing more information. The writer of the dispatch repeated word of the bonfires and the festive bursts of artillery, the costs of which the pope deplored, preferring to see the money spent on the

Francesco Maria, the one the grand duke and the other the prince of Tuscany; Alfonso II d'Este, duke of Ferrara; Ottavio Farnese, duke of Parma and Piacenza; Guidobaldo II della Rovere, duke of Urbino; Guglielmo Gonzaga, duke of Mantua; Pietro del Monte, grand master of the Hospitaliers of Malta—all dated 23 October (1571), *septem principibus Italiae, significatio victoriae classis*.

Similar briefs with generally similar wording went to Henry, duke of Anjou; Emmanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy; King Sebastian of Portugal, his grandmother Catherine, and his great uncle, Cardinal Henry; Albrecht, duke of Bavaria; the governor of Milan, the royal lieutenant in Sicily; the Archbishops Ferdinand and Charles of Austria; Sigismund Augustus, king of Poland; and numerous others, to the extent that determining the proper addresses became something of a problem of ecclesiastical etiquette and diplomatic protocol. Cf. the note of a secretary, *ibid.*, fol. 130: "Principi alli quali mi pare che si doveria scrivere," with lists of "Ecclesiastici" and "Secolari."

On 17 November, 1571, Pius V informed the king of Portugal that he intended to send anti-Turkish exhortations to the kings of Ethiopia and Persia and "to other princes in those areas," *Aethiopiae ac Persiarum regibus aliisque illarum partium principibus (ibid., Reg. 20, fol. 204)*.

<sup>67</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 138, di Roma 24 Ottobre.

divine offices. Besides a large number of small vessels "our armada" was said to have captured 170 Turkish galleys of which some, badly battered, had been sent to Corfu for repairs. The report was circulating that about 6,000 Christians had been killed, and a like number wounded. A Spanish lord was killed aboard Don John's galley. He was named "Cardonas" [Bernardino de Cardenas], and had an annual income of 30,000 scudi. Now the legate Gianfrancesco Commendone, "nell' occasione di questa vittoria," could quite reasonably urge the king of Poland to take up arms against the Turks, "and of this there is good hope, although previously there was not." One might also hope for the emperor's intervention. In the meantime his Holiness had dispatched couriers to the Christian princes to signalize the victory and to urge their entry into the Holy League.<sup>68</sup>

Pius did hope for the emperor's intervention, as made clear by the official announcement of the victory he sent him on 24 October. Christendom had never known such success in all the campaigns that had been waged against the infidels. It was a sign of divine favor. Even greater triumphs might be hoped for and expected, "if only we do not fail ourselves and neglect such a splendid opportunity to crush the common enemy." A prince as well endowed as the emperor was with piety and prudence needed no lengthy disquisition on the necessity and the advantages of prompt action. The legate, Cardinal Commendone, or the nuncio, Bishop Giovanni di Torcello, could tell the emperor a number of things which the pope was not putting in his letter. Indeed, the first draft of the papal letter contained a passage which, for whatever reason, was omitted from the text sent to Vienna:

There must, therefore, be no further delay, but an attack must be made upon the enemy as soon as possible. The time has now come to recover that most fair and opulent kingdom of Hungary and to add other [kingdoms] to your empire.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 138<sup>r</sup>-139<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>69</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 103, *charissimo in Christo filio nostro Maximiliano Romanorum, Hungariae, et Bohemiae regi illustri in Imperatorem electo*, doc. dated 24 October, 1571. The text has been published by W. E. Schwarz, *Der Briefwechsel des Kaisers Maximilian II. mit Pius Papst V.*, Paderborn, 1889, no. CXLV, pp. 187-88, but the copy of the brief which Schwarz gives us (from Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Arm. XLIV, tom. 19, fol. 400) lacks the following passage: "Igitur cunctandum amplius non erit, sed primo quoque tempore in hostem irruendum. Nunc pulcherrimum et opulentissimum Ungarie regnum recuperandi tempus venit et alia imperio tuo adiciendum!"

In a brief of 26 October (1571) Pius instructed Don John as soon as possible to have prepared a record of all the captives taken at Lepanto with their names, surnames, and other data so that he could determine who should be freed and who should be held for ransom. The ransoming of prisoners was a problem, however, for one had to be careful that sea captains, mariners, and other persons skilled in naval affairs should not be able quickly to re-enter the service of the Porte to resume attacks upon Christians and their possessions. Three days later Pius addressed a special plea to Don John, Marc' Antonio Colonna, and Sebastiano Venier to give all the help they could to the Hospitallers, who had suffered heavily in the battle, especially when Uluj-Ali broke through the allied right wing under Giannandrea Doria.<sup>70</sup>

Meanwhile, before the news of Lepanto had reached the lagoon, the doge and Senate had written Antonio Tiepolo, Leonardo Donado's ambassadorial colleague in Spain, to go to Portugal, and try with Philip II's aid and intercession to persuade the young, stary-eyed King Sebastian to enter the Holy League. Considering the extent of Portuguese interests in India, the Senate hoped that Sebastian might be responsive to the appeal.<sup>71</sup> Distressed beyond words by the fall of Famagusta, the doge and Senate also wrote Agostino Barbarigo, not yet knowing he was dead, to look into the reasons why aid had not been sent to the threatened city "according to our orders."<sup>72</sup> The fear of the Turk so evident in the letter to Tiepolo and the disgruntlement equally evident in the letter to the deceased Barbarigo disappear with the

The nuncio referred to at the end of this brief was the Venetian Giovanni Delfino (Zuan Dolfin), bishop of Torcello from 1563 to 1579, when he was transferred to Brescia. He died in May, 1584. Cf. the letter of congratulation on Lepanto, which the emperor wrote the pope on 26 October (Schwarz, *op. cit.*, no. CXLVI, pp. 188-89).

<sup>70</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 138, *dilecto filio nobili viro Joanni ab Austria, totius classis confederatorum principum Christianorum praefecto et capitano generali*, doc. dated 26 October, 1571. On the twenty-ninth Pius appealed to Don John to assist the Hospitallers, who had lost heavily at Lepanto, "... audita modo gravissima strage quam [militis Hierosolymitan] in eorum triribus contra Turcos forisissime dimicando acceperunt. . . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 149). Similar appeals on behalf of the Order were sent to Marc' Antonio Colonna, *dux Paliani*, *classis nostrae ecclesiasticae praefectus et capitaneus generalis*, and to Sebastiano Venier, *praeceptor Sancti Marci, classis inclitae Venetorum Reipublicae praefectus et capitaneus generalis* (fol. 150).

<sup>71</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 20-21<sup>r</sup> [42-43], *all' ambasciatore Thiepolo in Spagna*, doc. dated 11 October, 1571.

<sup>72</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 21<sup>r</sup> [43], *al provveditor general da mar Barbarigo*, doc. dated 17 October, and *cf. ibid.*, fols. 30-31<sup>r</sup> [52-53], docs. dated 3 November, 1571.

arrival of Giustinian's galley at the Piazza S. Marco.

Shortly after Giustinian had given his report to the Collegio and delivered Venier's report of victory the Doge Alvise Mocenigo and the Senate wrote Don John (on 22 October) a letter of glowing praise as the "minister of divine Majesty" in achieving the remarkable victory over the Turkish armada. Venier had extolled the valor of Don John, the enhanced splendor of whose reputation now increased the obligation he bore to Christendom to reduce the power of the Turk, ". . . per deprimer la potentia del nemico." He must deprive the enemy of the means of building a new armada, and free the thousands of poor Christians who had for so long awaited the day of their deliverance from Turkish oppression.<sup>73</sup>

A week later, on the twenty-ninth, Giacomo Soranzo received his commission as provveditore generale of the sea, to succeed the late Agostino Barbarigo. It was a most responsible as well as honorific post. His instructions were much the same as his predecessor had received, including the reminders that the commanders of galleys (*governatori* and *sopracomiti*) and others should not carry merchandise with them and, in accordance with the law of 16 November, 1470, they should not bring their sons and nephews with them for service aboard their galleys. Soranzo was, like his predecessor, to see to the maintenance and preservation of the hulls of galleys, oars, sails, and armaments which were being used up at twice and perhaps three times the normal rate. He received the usual four months' salary and allowance in advance. He was to present his letters of credence to Don John of Austria, if the latter was still with the allied fleets, and throughout his term of service he must preserve an amicable understanding with both Don John and Marc' Antonio Colonna "in order that we may be able to follow up the victory, advance further against the cruel and barbarous enemy of the Christian name, and maintain this most holy League. . . ."<sup>74</sup>

In Venice the issuance of commissions was a run-of-the-mill procedure. The chief item of in-

terest in Giacomo Soranzo's commission is the extent to which the Venetians had been running through galleys, sails, oars, munitions, and everything else. Sound galleys and supplies were especially important at this time, for on 22 October the doge and Senate had directed Venier to restore the strength of the Venetian fleet as soon and as fully as he could in order to follow up the victory. Istanbul was badly defended "con pochissima gente da guerra." The Turks had stripped their capital for the expedition against Cyprus and for the soldiers, crews, and oarsmen who had made up the armada which the allied fleets of the Holy League had destroyed. The Turk and his councilors must be "consternati d' animo." The city of Istanbul was said to lack provisions. The doge and Senate left the next move of the Venetian fleet up to Venier and his advisors, however, for they could assess the situation at closer hand. The Turks who had overrun Cyprus were also believed to be very badly provisioned. Venetian galleys operating between Crete and Cyprus should be able to seize Turkish transports and foodstuffs, cutting off the Turks at Cyprus from even the barest necessities.

Venier had written the Signoria that he intended to go raiding and burning his way from island to island in the Archipelago. The idea of offensive action appealed to the Collegio and the Senate, but once Venier and the fleet had gone into the Archipelago, it would be well to consider entering the strait of Gallipoli (*l' andar nel stretto di Constantinopoli*) or trying to take some city in the Morea or even the island of Negroponte, which the Venetians had lost to the Turks a century before. Taking places and burning them was all very well, but certainly it was more to the point to try to occupy and hold places, in which case it was obviously better not to destroy them and simply hear further hardship on poor, innocent Christians, ". . . liquali [luoghi] non sarebbe a proposito nostro che fussero destrutti et ruinati con offesa delli poveri Christiani innocenti. . . ." These Christians might rather be employed on behalf of Venice, and be encouraged to free themselves from domination by the infidels.

The Senate wanted Venier to use all possible diligence to get hold of the casks, artillery, bales of wool and cotton, rigging, ship's biscuit, and the like aboard the Turkish galleys. It was up to the Signoria to use or dispose of such things, which must not get into the hands of individuals "con pericolo anco d' andar in mano de Turchi"—many a huckster would sell them back to the enemy. It was most important that the Turks

<sup>73</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 25' [47'], *all' illustrissimo Signor Don Giovanni*, doc. dated 22 October, 1571.

<sup>74</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 26'-29' [48'-51'], dated 29 October, 1571. The statement that the hulls of galleys, oars, sails, and armaments were being used up at "il doppio et anco il triplo più di quello che si soleva ad altri tempi" is a recurring formula (*cf.* the commission of Giacomo Foscarini as captain-general of the sea, dated 23 February, 1572 [Ven. style 1571], *ibid.*, fol. 70' [92']).

should not be able to rebuild their armada. They must be deprived of every existing galley and such means of building more as trees for masts, timber, rigging, pitch, "et toute quelle autre materie che sono necessaria a fabricar galee et far armata da mare." When Venier no longer had need of Filippo Bragadin, the provveditore generale in the "Gulf," he was to let him go with as many galleys as he thought advisable, for the Senate saw that a good deal might be accomplished in the Adriatic in the coming winter. Venier was, however, to retain Bragadin and his galleys if they were necessary for any more important undertaking which the commanders of the allied fleets might be planning.<sup>75</sup>

Venetian ambitions as to conquests in the Morea or on the island of Negroponte were soon well known at the Curia, as Cardinal Charles d'Angennes de Rambouillet wrote Charles IX and Catherine de' Medici from Rome on 7 November. It was thought that the Christian armada might venture into the Moreote ports "soubz esperance d'une rebellion des peuples." The Venetians had Greeks aboard their galleys. On the other hand the island of Negroponte, "one of the Turk's main munitions' magazines, is destitute of men, without fortresses, and with little hope of being assisted by sea." There was also some speculation that the armada might try to take the castles at the entrance to the Gulf of Lepanto. But all these hopes, as de Rambouillet informed Charles and Catherine, had now gone up in smoke, for on 5 November word had reached Rome, based upon letters of 27 October from Corfu, that Don John of Austria was returning to Sicily, the Venetians were headed some for Venice, others for Candia, and Marc' Antonio Colonna was coming back to Rome, all with the intention of using the winter months to make plans for a new expedition in 1572. Rambouillet thought little would come of such plans, "selon mon opinion, plus fondées sur l'insolence d'une victoire inespérée que sur quelque bien assuré!"

The expedition had made the Spanish actually jealous of the Venetians' performance. The Spanish were also distrustful, convinced that the Venetians, "under the shadow of this league," would

seek advantageous conditions of peace with the Turk, and then give up the Christian alliance. Rambouillet was not sure the Spanish were right, for the Venetians were full of expressions of gratitude to Philip II and to Don John (and the Senate's letter to Venier of 22 October would certainly suggest the Spanish were wrong).

While the pope was doing everything in his power to strengthen and extend the league, there was hostility among the leaders. Despite an outward show of courtesy Don John had no use for Venier, owing to the latter's execution of Philip II's soldiers at Gomenizza and his sending Onfrè Giustinian to Venice without consulting him. Furthermore, Rambouillet had just learned that one of the chief reasons for the allies' not proceeding against the Turks after Lepanto was their inability to agree on the division of the Morea, should they manage to conquer part of the peninsula. As far as that went, however, Rambouillet agreed with a number of other informed persons that it was a matter of dividing the skin before they had caught the bear.<sup>76</sup> Incidentally, the first news of the great event at Lepanto appears to have reached the French court on 29 October,<sup>77</sup> where it caused no great rejoicing.

Pius V was certainly making every effort to extend the league. Don John had sent one Fernando de Mendoza to Rome to pay his respects to the pope, who gave him a letter (dated 1 November) to take to the Emperor Maximilian. Mendoza was on his way to Vienna to give the emperor an account of the battle. Pius again urged Maximilian in the strongest possible terms to join the Christian allies without delay and, relying upon the Almighty, to share the "prospera ceterorum confederatorum fortuna," which would redound (as Mendoza would explain) to his imperial Majesty's incredible advantage.<sup>78</sup>

On 15 December Maximilian replied to Pius with an assertion of his joy in the Christian victory and with the assurance of his sincere desire to help Christendom, "nostra . . . iuvandi rempublicam Christianam sincerissima voluntas."<sup>79</sup> Two days later the pope decided to write Maximilian again, promising him that the allies in the Holy League would provide him with at least 20,000 foot and 2,000 horse if he would take the field against the

<sup>75</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 24-25<sup>r</sup> [46-47], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 22 October, 1571; the Senate voted to send the letter to Venier de literis + 161, de non 3, non sinceri 4. Filippo Bragadin had been appointed *provveditor general in Golfo* on 30 July, 1571 (*ibid.*, Reg. 77, fols. 122<sup>r</sup>-123<sup>r</sup> [143<sup>r</sup>-144<sup>r</sup>]).

<sup>76</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 190-93.

<sup>77</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 140<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> Schwarz, *Briefwechsel*, no. CXLVII, pp. 189-90; cf. *ibid.*, no. CXLVIII, and Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, 538, note.

<sup>79</sup> Schwarz, *Briefwechsel*, no. CXLIX, pp. 191-92.



Turks.<sup>80</sup> A month later (on 15 January, 1572) Maximilian thanked the pope for his letter and for his generous offer of the "peditum atque equitum subsidia," with the solemn pledge of more to come, but in a matter of such grave importance Maximilian must have ample time to think, "and so at this time we cannot make a decision."<sup>81</sup>

Leaving Maximilian to think, we may return to Don John, who had arrived back in Messina on 1 November, 1571,<sup>82</sup> and to Pius V, who on the following day addressed an appeal to Duke Charles of Lorraine to support the Holy League against the Turks.<sup>83</sup> As Pius sought new allies, he was having trouble with the old ones. A reckoning of the booty taken at Lepanto, dated at Rome on 10 November, included 117 galleys, 13 galliots, 3,486 slaves, and numerous cannon, which are pretty much the figures already given to us by Gianpietro Contarini but, as generalissimo, Don John now claimed one tenth of the spoils.<sup>84</sup> According to the treaty of 25 May (1571) the three allies were supposed to share the spoils of war in proportion to the expenses they were to incur on the expedition—Spain would, therefore, receive one half, Venice one third, and the Holy See one sixth. Don John's one tenth would reduce the shares of the three high contracting parties. The result was, as Cardinal de Rambouillet wrote Charles IX on 19 November, a dispute between Don John and the Venetians "à cause des prétentions qu' il fait comme général de toute la ligue, soit à l' occasion de son dixiesme sur tout ledit buttin comme pour aultre considération." They had, consequently, submitted their quarrel to the pope for settlement. And the papal commander Marc' Antonio Colonna was also not happy with the way things were going.<sup>85</sup>

In the meantime Marc' Antonio had sent Pompeo Colonna and Maturin de Lescaut, who was known as Romegas, to give the pope an account of Lepanto. On Thursday, 1 November, they had spent a long time with his Holiness, providing facts and figures more or less in accord with what we know. They claimed that the crews Sultan Selim had lost were so numerous and so good "that it will not be possible for him to replace them with anything similar." Ali Pasha had received orders just before the battle to attack and destroy the Christian armada. More than seven hundred janissaries (they told the pope) had been slain aboard Ali's galley. The pasha had fought bravely until he was wounded by an arquebus shot in the head. Don John had already taken possession of Ali's galley when a Spaniard finished the pasha off by removing his head with a sword. When the head was brought to his Highness, he had it concealed immediately, so that it might not be seen by Ali's two sons, who had already been taken prisoner. The generals of the Christian armada had decided not to go on with the "enterprise," for they had only a month's provisions and munitions, their soldiers required a rest, and the galleys needed repairs, "both their own and those taken from the enemy." It was believed that Don John would send the pope Ali Pasha's two sons, who should soon be arriving in Rome.<sup>86</sup>

A report from Venice of 12 November (1571) informs us that all the shops on the bridge at the Rialto were adorned with Turkish rugs, banners, trophies, arms, and turbans. In the middle of the bridge were two Turkish heads in turbans looking across at each other, one of which was so well done that it looked as though it had just been severed from the body.<sup>87</sup> Turkish standards were also used as festive decorations in Rome, being strung over the main portal of Araceli on the feast of S. Lucia (13 December).<sup>88</sup> In Venice, Rome, and elsewhere

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, no. CL, p. 193: "... Nunc autem a foederatis accipies peditum ad minimum viginti millia, equitum duo millia."

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, no. CLII, pp. 196-97.

<sup>82</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 143<sup>v</sup>-144<sup>r</sup>, di *Messina 2 Novembre 1571*: "Hierì che fu il primo di questo arrivò qua il serenissimo Don Giovanni d' Austria con 12 galere, et sbarcò a Porta Reale senza entrare altrimenti nella città. Se ne andò di lungo alla chiesa di Santa Maria di Gesù, luogo de' frati zoccolanti vicino alla muraglia, dove rese grazie a Dio della ricevuta vittoria, et con tanta devotione et humiltà prese il santissimo sacramento che ben si dimostrò esser vero cavalier di Christo. . . ."

<sup>83</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 209, doc. dated 2 November, 1571.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 141<sup>v</sup>-142<sup>r</sup>, and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 457<sup>r</sup>, and see, above, p. 1059a. As we have seen, however, Contarini, *Historia*, fol. 55<sup>r</sup>, says that 3,846 (not 3,486) slaves were taken at Lepanto.

<sup>85</sup> Charrière, III, 194, and cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 37 [50], all' *ambasciator in Spagna*, doc. dated 17 November, 1571. A news report from Venice, dated 12 November, states "che

questa divisione del bottino si era fatta con una concordia grandissima" (Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 148<sup>v</sup>-149<sup>r</sup>), which was obviously not the case.

<sup>86</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 147<sup>v</sup>-148<sup>r</sup>, di *Roma 7 Novembre*, which news dispatch gives inaccurate figures as to the division of the galleys, but states that money, jewels, and clothing belonged to those who took them from the Turks. On Ali Pasha's two sons and some forty other important Turkish prisoners, who were taken to Rome, note the brief but valuable monograph of M. Rosi, *Alcuni Documenti relativi alla liberazione dei principali prigionieri turchi presi a Lepanto*, Rome: Società romana di storia patria, 1898, with an appendix of thirty-three documents.

<sup>87</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 149<sup>r</sup>, di *Venetia 12 Novembre*.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 164<sup>r</sup>, di *Roma a di XV Dicembre*.

the people enjoyed the celebrations, but in the council chambers there was still fear of the Turk.

Although, as the doge and Senate wrote Leonardo Donado and Antonio Tiepolo, their ambassadors in Spain, the Turk no longer counted for much at sea (*ilquale benchè si possa con ragion dire che si ritrovi hora nelle cose da mar poco potente . . .*), he remained immensely powerful on land. The sultan commanded vast numbers of horse and foot. One must not let him breathe, but harass him everywhere by sea throughout the coming winter. This was, if ever, the chance to seize Turkish territory. The ambassadors, or at least Donado, should seek an audience with the king, and dwell on the necessity of the Christian fleets' wintering in Turkish territory to fulfill their divine mission, ". . . la importantia dell' invernar dell' armate Christiane nei paesi del Turco per poter far di quelle imprese et di quei progressi che dal Signor Dio et dalla opportunità del tempo sarà lor poste inanzi."

The failure to spend the winter in the waters and among the islands of the Turks would mean beginning all over again, when the spring came, with far less sanguine expectations. Further successes were needed to encourage the other princes to enter the league. Unless the allies used well the victory which God had given them, the Turk would reassemble a fleet, for many of his galleys had fled from Lepanto, and others were still to be found at Cyprus. He would soon be strengthening his land forces, fortifying his islands, putting garrisons on them, and resuming his attacks upon Christians. The Venetian ambassadors must, therefore, try to persuade his Catholic Majesty to order Don John of Austria to winter, "nei paesi del Turco," in the Morea, at Negroponte, on the island of Rhodes, or somewhere in the Archipelago.<sup>89</sup>

Although a report from Hungary was circulating to the effect that as of mid-November (1571) the Turks still refused to believe in the defeat of their armada,<sup>90</sup> the sultan and the pashas were entertaining no illusions. If there was an Ottoman note at Lepanto, it was the Calabrian renegade Uluj-Ali, and now he was needed at the Porte. After the battle Uluj-Ali was said to have retired

to S. Maura and then sought refuge at Lepanto. According to a dispatch from Rome, however, of 17 November Don Juan de Cardona was believed to have captured a Turkish galliot which the sultan was sending to the Barbary coast to summon Uluj-Ali, "the Gran Turco having got the news of the defeat of his armada on 17 October," at which time a meeting of the divan was held, and thereafter the pashas sent out to enlist Tatars and send them to the western borders of the empire.<sup>91</sup>

According to a dispatch from Rome (of 8 December),

we have letters from Corfu with the report that when the Turk received the news of the defeat and loss of his armada, he was at Adrianople. Straightway he mounted a horse and rode to Constantinople, where he issued a decree that no one, under penalty of impalement, should speak of the armada. At the same time he sent stringent orders to all his sanjakeys that within a period of two months they must have prepared, every one of them, a galley with everything set in order. It is thought that Uluj-Ali was then at Modon with seven galleys, wounded by two arquebus shots, but awaiting the command of his lord as to what he was to do, and that there were twenty-five galleys and some other small vessels at Lepanto, but in poor condition.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 151<sup>r</sup>, di Roma 17 Novembre.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, fol. 151<sup>r</sup>, di Roma di 8 Dicembre, and cf. *ibid.*, fol. 153<sup>r</sup>. In a letter to Charles IX, written from Ragusa on 8 January, 1572, François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax, denied that Sultan Selim had rushed from Adrianople (Edirne) to Istanbul as soon as he had learned of the Turkish defeat at Lepanto (Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 241-42). On the Turkish reaction to the news, note M. Lesure, *Léopante, la crise de l'empire ottoman* (1972), pp. 179 ff., 213 ff.

De Noailles was quite right. Selim had not hurried back to Istanbul upon receiving word of Lepanto. On 30 October, 1571, the baillie Barbaro had prepared a report for the doge and Council of Ten upon the Turkish reception of the news (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 231): "The victory was the greatest" *che per il tempo passato sia mai successa.* "It was the will of God, and Barbaro hoped that the Signoria would act wisely. Sultan Selim was at Adrianople, as Barbaro had already informed the doge (cf. *ibid.*, fol. 223<sup>r</sup>, letter dated at Pera on 18 September), and it was at Adrianople that the sultan had got the startling news, "essendo ella [nova] portata da persone fuggite dell' armata per il Golfo di Lepanto a Negroponte, et di là a qui per mare. Et accio che la Serenità vostra sappia la somma che qui si ha di questo fatto, non resterò di dirle che molti di costoro fuggiti affermano che tutta l' armata Turchesca è persa fuor che quattro galee che fuggendo si sono salvate con Uluzali, et 27 che non si trovarono alla battaglia, essendo 15 di esse andate a Lepanto per levar biscotti, et le altre 12 per gente a Modon, che il capitano del mare è morto o preso, et Pertau Bassa essendoli stata sfondata la sua galea ferito se ne fuggì con una fregata, ma che tutto il restante è perso, il che prego Dio che così sia conforme a quella verità che saldamente già molti giorni haverà havuto la Serenità vostra. . . ."

<sup>89</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 29-30<sup>r</sup> [51-52<sup>r</sup>], dated 3 November, 1571. The Senate could see and feared what probably lay ahead—that Philip's fleet would go into winter quarters, and do nothing until the spring of 1572 (*ibid.*, fols. 31<sup>r</sup> ff. [53<sup>r</sup> ff.]).

<sup>90</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 145<sup>r</sup>.

Uluj-Ali went to Istanbul before the end of the year, and addressed an *apologia* to Sultan Selim. If he had not done his best, however, as a brave and ardent slave of the Porte, he would never have had the courage again to appear in the presence of his imperial Highness. Also if the Turkish losses were as great as people were saying, Uluj-Ali would certainly have come in a less buoyant spirit. But he had done his duty, and Turkish affairs were in a better state than those of the Christian enemy of the Porte—"therefore I have come to give you a true account of what happened." Ottoman forces had ventured out at the beginning of the year, "according to your grand command, to Cyprus, which kingdom has been acquired by your invincible sword." The stalwart servitors of the sultan, upon leaving Cyprus, had brought "fire and flames" to the islands of the enemy, burning their villages, killing their subjects, and taking prisoners. Few persons had found safety in the enemy's fortresses.

The sultan's slaves had taken and destroyed Betimo, recovered Sopotò, and seized Dulcigno, Budua, and Antivari as well. They had moved into the very heart of the Adriatic, capturing Venetian galleys and ships. Then they had finally met the Christian armada, and "I' havemo combattuta gliardamente." Ali Pasha had given Uluj-Ali command of the Turkish left wing: "I have surprised and put into flight the galleys of their right wing." Although it was true that the Venetian galleasses had done great damage to the sultan's galleys, "your Highness may rest assured that the enemy's loss has been no less than yours," which was far from the truth. But Uluj-Ali claimed the Christians could hardly be viewed as conquerors, for had they not fled back to their fortresses? The sultan should, therefore, rejoice in the possession of Cyprus "and of so many other cities." He must reinforce his armada. The Christians could not make good their lack of manpower and their shattered galleys. "The war will end this coming year with their ruination, and if I can serve your Highness, use me as you will."<sup>93</sup>

The sultan might well have use for the intrepid corsair very shortly, for the Venetians were seriously considering large-scale attacks upon Istanbul or Cyprus. If the emperor should enter the Holy League as a serious ally, there might be good reasons for making the Turkish capital their objective. To Venice, Cyprus was perhaps the more attractive alternative, for there were many Christians on the island who were devoted to S. Mark. Also Cyprus was, as the nuncio Facchinetti wrote Cardinal Girolamo Rusticucci, "very necessary to Christendom, inasmuch as no state is more suitably placed for the expedition to the Holy Land,"<sup>94</sup> and everyone knew the pope's dedication to recovering the Holy Sepulcher.

In the expedition of 1571, as in that of the previous year, Doria's doubtful maneuvers had earned widespread criticism, perhaps unjustly in '71, and various persons came to his defense.<sup>95</sup> Criticism of Doria, however, faded into unimportance in comparison with the fears aroused in Venice and Rome as a consequence of the dissension between Don John and Sebastiano Venier. When Leonardo Contarini was appointed ambassador to Don John (on 17 November, 1571), he was instructed to go to Messina by way of Rome, where he "would kiss the pope's foot and wait upon the most illustrious Cardinal Rusticucci [then the papal secretary of state] and such other personages as seem to you likely to assist our affairs." Among them would be Marc' Antonio Colonna, who was presumed already to have returned to Rome. Employing more than his customary dexterity (and the usual flattery), Contarini was to try to find out the extent of Don John's continuing anger—and its likely results—"se nell' illustrissimo Signor Don Giovanni sia rimasto alcun risentimento per qual si voglia causa contra il capitano nostro general da mar."

The Venetian Signoria entertained the greatest possible affection for Don John, of course, and

just as we learned with infinite displeasure of the dissension which arose between his Highness and our said general, so have we also been pleased and satisfied to learn of the reconciliation they worked out after the battle. . . .

<sup>93</sup> *Relazione dell' Ucciali al Gran Turco della rotta della sua armata l' anno 1571*, in Cod. Barb. lat. 5367, fol. 108. From Pera on 30 November, 1571, the bailie Barbaro informed the doge, "Quanto alle provisioni maritime, è stato creato capitano del mare Uluzali, del quale se ben qui si è sempre stabilita la voce ch' egli fuggendo dalla rotta si sia salvato . . . , si come anco di Pertau io non so cosa certa, ragionandosi ben che l' Signore habbia mandato per strangolarlo, et altri dicono che ad instantia delle sultane gli sia stata fatta gratia . . ." (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fols. 233-234).

<sup>94</sup> Stella, *Nuovi Venetia*, X, no. 86, p. 138, letter dated 14 November, 1571.

<sup>95</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 153, of *Roma di 17 Novembre*: ". . . Dicono che sia fuori un manifesto sottoscritto dalli Signori Ottavio Gonzaga, Vincenzo Vitelli, Pagan Doria, et Don Carlo d' Avalos in favore del Signor Andrea Doria circa il slargarsi in mare il giorno della battaglia. . . ."

As Marc' Antonio was well aware, mutual understanding and co-operation between Don John and Venier could only add to the well-being of Christendom. When Contarini reached Naples, he was to lavish words of praise and friendship upon Cardinal de Granvelle, the viceroy, and then pass on to Messina and to Don John.<sup>96</sup>

Pius V and the Signoria had been urging Philip II and Don John to press on with the great campaign against the Turks. The crusty old warrior Venier had been doing so. Toward the end of November he seized Margariton, and recovered the fortress of Sopotò.<sup>97</sup> The Senate was planning or at least hoping for an even stronger fleet in the coming year than that which had met the Turks at Lepanto.<sup>98</sup> In early January (1572) Leonardo Contarini, now in Messina, was directed to buy salted meats, cheeses, vegetables, and wines "in good quantity" as well as other victuals for the Venetian fleet, which could not be provisioned "in our islands in the Levant . . . because of the very great losses which they have suffered as a result of the enemy's invasion." Contarini was to rely on one Placido Ragazzoni, a Venetian citizen, who was "pratico et sofficiente in ogni maneggio," in making his purchases, which were to be loaded on one large ship or two smaller ones for delivery to the fleet.<sup>99</sup>

Ragazzoni encountered difficulties, however, all along the way, for at best the Venetians and the Spanish were very uneasy allies. Since the royal agents in Sicily, where there was a "grandissima abbondanza di grani," could sell the grains at a much higher price than the Venetians had previously agreed to pay, they were proving troublesome. The doge and Senate, therefore, wrote Leonardo Donado, their ambassador in Spain, to make an appropriate remonstrance to Philip II, pointing out the damage being done to his Maj-

esty's interests as well as to those of Christendom.<sup>100</sup> War with the Turks always increased the Venetians' zeal for the interests of Christendom.

In Rome there was a disturbing rumor that Don John had proposed to set out at the end of February (1572) for an attack upon Tunis<sup>101</sup> which, if true, would probably make an expedition into the Levant unlikely when the spring came. Pius V had appointed to a commission or congregation for the crusade Cardinals Giovanni Morone, Gianpaolo della Chiesa, Pietro Donato Cesi, Giovanni Aldobrandini, and Girolamo Rusticucci. A dispatch from Rome, dated 15 December (1571), tells us something of the activity of the congregation, which was seeking to bind the allies together in the Holy League. It met on Monday, 10 December, in Morone's apartment at the Vatican Palace, on which occasion only Marc' Antonio Colonna joined the cardinals. On Tuesday they summoned Juan de Zúñiga and his brother Requesens, the grand commander of Castile, and the next day the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Soranzo met with them.

Zúñiga and Requesens reported at length to Philip II in two letters of 12 December. Morone had told them, in brief, that the allies of Lepanto had an obligation to put to good use "la gran merced que Dios avia hecho a toda la Christiandad en esta victoria," for the victory would amount to little if they failed to take the God-given opportunity "entirely to crush the power of the common enemy of Christendom." We replied, says Zúñiga, in the same terms, extolling the grace of God's gift to us and lauding the zeal of his Holiness to see that this golden chance was not lost, but it could be that we disagreed, each one of us looking at the problem in a different way and choosing different means to essentially the same end.<sup>102</sup>

Although the writer of the dispatch of 15 December was of course no witness to these proceedings, he was well informed. He reported that there had been some disagreement on the expenses which each of the allies had thus far incurred in the contest with the Turk as well as on which of the two expeditions (*imprese*) the Christian ar-

<sup>96</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 37r-39r [59r-61r], doc. dated 17 November, 1571, and of Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 145r, di Venezia li 20 Novembre: "Dominica [18 November] partì di qua il clarissimo orator Thiercopolo per Roma, et presto dicono partirà ancora il clarissimo Signor Lunardo Contarini che va orator al Signor Don Giovanni a Messina. Dicono che le galere grosse verranno in Istria a conciansi," i.e., the galleasses that had disrupted the Turkish armada at Lepanto. On Paolo Tiepolo, the Republic's special envoy to Rome, see Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 37 [59], doc. dated 17 November, and Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, nos. 86, 88 ff., pp. 137 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 39r [61r], 44r [66r], and of Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 97, p. 155.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 42 [64], 45 [67], 49r [71r], 49r-50r [71r-72r], 53r and ff. [75r and ff.].

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 78, fol. 53 [75], doc. dated 11 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571).

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 78, fols. 54r-55r [76r-77r], doc. dated 11 January, 1572, and on the Venetians' need of grain. Cf. *ibid.*, fol. 58 [80], a letter of 19 January to the Republic's secretary Alvise Buonizzo in Naples.

<sup>101</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fol. 163r, di Roma di XII Dicembre, and of Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 87, p. 139.

<sup>102</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, nos. 267-68, pp. 554-59, esp. pp. 554-55, letters dated at Rome on 12 December, 1571.

mada should undertake, "volendo li Spagnoli quella dell' Africa et Venetiani Levante." Pius V favored movement into the Levant, for if the Turks were really crippled there, the Barbary coast could easily be occupied by the Christians. As Morone had told Zúñiga and Requesens, it was important to secure the Emperor Maximilian's entry into the league, and Paolo Odescalchi was supposed to be leaving for Vienna in four or five days to offer the emperor every possible inducement. When the Christmas celebrations were over, the pope would send Antonio Maria Salviati to France to try to persuade his Most Christian Majesty "ad intrar nella Lega."<sup>103</sup> He was also to protest the king's appointment of François de Noailles, the "heretical" bishop of Dax, as French ambassador to the Porte.<sup>104</sup>

About the same time (on 16 December) Pius V addressed an eloquent brief to Alfonso II d' Este of Ferrara. In joining forces with Philip II and the Doge Alvisio Mocenigo he had, he declared, labored through adversity in the confident expectation that God would reward their efforts against the Turks. Just as it would have been unwise, however, before Lepanto to despair of the future of the Church when it seemed that that loathsome monster, the Turk, would take over all the seas and lay waste all the shores of Christendom, just so now it would be a mistake to think that, broken and defeated, the monster would remain quiet. Not at all. Incited by the blow he had received, he was planning day and night some way of spewing forth his venom upon Christians and of assuaging his sorrow by some terrible slaughter. Driven from the sea, what more likely venture would he seek than some great attack upon Maximilian's imperial domain?

An invasion of central Europe would be a threat to all Christians, and should be repulsed by all. Pius and his allies in the Holy League had promised Maximilian all the money, horse, and foot that they could possibly provide. But since the resources of the allies were clearly smaller than required by the peril, "because we must maintain so large a fleet," Pius was forced to turn for help also to his other beloved sons, "among whom we account you the dearest by your own just deserts." Assessing Alfonso d' Este's status and his apparent means, Pius thought that as duke of Ferrara he

could easily contribute to the common cause a thousand foot and three hundred horse. His Holiness needed Alfonso's response to this appeal as soon as possible

so that we may be able not only to render Maximilian the more certain to stand up to an attack by the enemy and to defend the Christian commonwealth in anticipation of our common support, but also to inspire him to invade the enemy, and overcome him. . . .<sup>105</sup>

Maximilian had paid the Turkish tribute for 1571. He would do so also for '72, and there would be no invasion of the empire.

In the meantime Don John of Austria had sent two colonels into Germany to recruit six thousand mercenaries "per servizio della lega," which had led Diego Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, to come before the Collegio to ask for their free and safe passage through Venetian territory. Guzmán de Silva also wanted the Signoria to provide for their transportation to Otranto "per imbarcarsi poi sopra l' armata." According to Don John, one could not hope to do anything of importance without such a body of troops. Anxious to oblige his Highness and to assist the Holy League in every way possible, the Senate granted the ambassador's requests as far as was practicable. When notified as to when and where the German mercenaries would make their appearance, the Venetians would attend to their needs, and supply foodstuffs at the Germans' expense.

As to providing the vessels to take six thousand troops to Otranto, although the Senate would have been pleased to do as Don John wished, it was impossible. The Signoria had to send precisely that number of infantry to join the armada as well as to transport the necessary ship's biscuit, munitions, "et ogni altra cosa che è necessaria per servizio delle nostre galee." Venice had also to provide infantry, fodder, and everything else for her towns in the Levant and in Dalmatia, areas in which there had been widespread destruction, and so their needs were great. The Signoria was, therefore, employing every vessel, large or small, that could be found. Furthermore, as was well known, the Turks had seized or sunk many Venetian ships, but of course Don John could seek naval transport for his troops from the Ragusei and others.

<sup>103</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1042, fols. 163<sup>v</sup>-164<sup>r</sup>, di Roma a di XV Dicembre, and cf., *ibid.*, fols. 165<sup>v</sup>-166<sup>r</sup>, 169<sup>r</sup>.

<sup>104</sup> On Salviati's mission to the French court, then at Blois, see Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 381-82.

<sup>105</sup> Arch. di Stato di Modena, Canc. ducale, Cart. di principi esteri, Busta 1300/15, nos. 152-53, two copies, both originals.

Guzmán de Silva had also asked the Senate to loan his Highness 36,000 ducats to help recruit the Germans, which the Venetians were willing to do, provided they were repaid in cash at Messina. On 22 December the doge and Senate wrote at some length to Leonardo Contarini, their envoy to Don John, instructing him to explain all this to his Highness. The Senate had informed Guzmán de Silva that the 36,000 ducats should be repaid in cash, but if the suggestion was made at Messina that part of the sum be paid in ship's biscuit, "et che 'l resto sia dato in contanti," Contarini might tell Don John that this would be quite acceptable to the Signoria. The Venetian ambassadors in Rome, Paolo Tiepolo and Giovanni Soranzo, as well as the secretary Alvisé Buonrizzo in Naples, were being informed of the Senate's decision in these matters.<sup>106</sup>

Almost nothing was more needed aboard the Venetian galleys than oarsmen. Considering the ghastly conditions aboard the galleys, about which we have already said quite enough, the Signoria was finding it essential to acquire galley slaves. A letter of 29 December to the captain-general Venier instructed him to learn as fully as he could the precise number of Turks captured by the Christian armada who could be set to the oar. Venier must take all he could get "per conto della Signoria nostra," paying their owners from fifteen to twenty ducats a piece for them and, as in the case of all merchandise, "having due regard for the age and quality of each one." The galley slaves which Venier thus purchased should be properly clothed, well kept, and put in chains "so that they cannot flee." Similar letters were sent to Filippo Bragadin, the provveditore generale in the Adriatic, to Francesco Duodo, the captain of the galleasses, and others also to buy captive Turks for the oars. When the spring came, the price rose to twenty-five ducats for each able-bodied Turkish captive or Christian subject of the Porte, "who might have done ill to our affairs,"<sup>107</sup> a convenient formula

(despite Pius V's objections) for chaining Christians to the benches in Venetian galleys.

Aid came to Venice from various quarters, as when Giacomo IV Crispo, the last Christian duke of Naxos, offered "to arm a galley with men from the Archipelago at his own expense for our service," i.e., to furnish the galley with oarsmen, a crew, and at least some soldiers. On 5 January (1572) the doge and Senate wrote Venier to turn over to Giacomo the hull of a galley in Candia, along with the necessary equipment, "acciòch' egli possa armarlo, come si è offerto per servizio delle cose nostre."<sup>108</sup>

The Signoria was trying to build up the fleet, and now wanted some relaxation in its use. When, therefore, Venier wrote (on 24 December) that he then had sixty-four galleys in order which he wished to use for "some enterprise in the Levant," the doge and Senate directed him (on 19 January) not to go too far afield. They had been trying, through Paolo Tiepolo and Giovanni Soranzo in Rome, to arrange for the gathering of the Spanish and papal galleys at Corfu as early as the beginning of March in order to have enough time to get something done. Venier must have his galleys on hand at Corfu, or at whatever other rendezvous was decided upon, when the Republic's two allies put into port. Also he must transport to the island the infantry which the Signoria was going to assemble at Otranto, Brindisi, and neighboring areas. In fact he must have ready one hundred galleys as the Venetian share of the armada "besides the ten which we wish to remain on guard in the Adriatic."

As soon as Venier had received word of "the time and place of the union," he must proceed with his hundred galleys and six galleasses "con ogni celerità et prontezza a quelle imprese che piacerà a nostro Signor Dio di prepararci." Venier had, according to the doge and Senate, enough sound vessels, artillery, supplies, and munitions for a successful campaign. He could also seize a goodly number of men in Turkish territory to put to the oars. Recruits should not be hard to find, lured

<sup>106</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 48'-49' [70"-71"], a *Ser Lu- nardo Contarini ambasciator all' illustrissimo Signor Don Gio. d' Austria a Messina*, doc. dated 22 December, 1571.

<sup>107</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 51' [73'], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 29 December, 1571, and *cf. ibid.*, fol. 77' [99'], letter of 29 March, 1572, to Giacomo Foscarini, Venier's successor as captain-general of the sea, where the price could go as high as 25 ducats for a Turkish slave—"dobbiate in quelle parti di Levante pagar cadauno Turco che vi fusse apresentato over suddito Turchesco, seben Christiano, che havesse fatto danni alle cose nostre, et fusse atto et bon per galea dalli XXV ducati in giù. . . ." On Turkish slaves aboard the Venetian galleasses, note the letter to Francesco Duodo, in Sen. Mar,

Reg. 40, fols. 140-141' [174-175'], *al capitano delle galie grosse*, doc. dated 31 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571). As for the cost of slaves, by 23 August (1572) the price was once more "da ducati vinti in giù" (Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 124' [146'], "from twenty ducats down," and note Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 112, p. 174.

<sup>108</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 52 [74], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 5 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571). *cf. ibid.*, the letter of the same date to Don John of Austria. Four offers to arm fuste came also from four Candioti (Sen. Mar, Reg. 40, fols. 132-135' [166-167'], doc. dated 3 January, 1572).

by the prospect of booty and inspired by the desire for revenge, "eccitati dalla vendeta," to make amends for the injuries, conflagrations, and violent robberies which they had suffered at Turkish hands for years.

The inhabitants of the island of Zante, for example, wanted to return to their homes, and now the Signoria would do everything possible to help them. The Senate had got together 100,000 ducats to send to Venier with the first two ships which would set out loaded with ship's biscuit, and which were only waiting for good weather. Another 100,000 ducats would go to Venier aboard the six galleasses.<sup>109</sup> Some members of the Senate wanted the allied fleets to assemble farther east, at Candia rather than Corfu, but apparently they could not muster votes enough to make it a formal proposal and so inform the captain-general.<sup>110</sup>

Pius V and Don John had been preparing with equal assiduity the papal and royal fleets. The Spanish, however, could not forget Sebastiano Venier's execution of a captain and three soldiers in the royal service. Philip II, Don John, and Pius all advocated removal from the Venetian command of Venier, whom the Doge Alvise Mocenigo defended with strenuous insistence. Don John could hardly abide the thought of having one more to deal with Venier, and Pius persevered in his efforts to secure the election of someone in Venier's place.<sup>111</sup> Despite their reluctance and resentment, the old guard in Venice had to give way.

On 31 January (1572) the doge and Senate wrote Venier that they had decided to have two captains-general,

as has been done at other times, so as to be able to send one of them with the fleets of the league and to avail ourselves of the other in undertakings of the highest importance; [hence] we have decided to elect another captain-general with the restriction that when he finds himself in your area, he must lay aside the standard and the lantern, and remain in obedience to you.

The second captain-general would be nominated as usual by a vote, *per scrutinio*, in the Senate, and

the formal election would take place in the *Maggior Consiglio*.<sup>112</sup>

Don John's hostility toward Venier was, as we have seen, no whit less in January than in the period preceding Lepanto.<sup>113</sup> It was of course the reason for the election of Giacomo Foscarini, who had been serving as *provveditore generale* in Dalmatia. Foscarini was notified of his new post by a letter from the doge and Senate dated 5 February. He was told to get ready immediately to go to Corfu, where he would find the Venetian fleet, "et esser pronto a congiogersi in quel luogo con l'armata pontificia et Catholica, sicome è stato in Roma determinato." The union of the three fleets was now set "for the beginning of the month of April, as we have been advised from Rome."<sup>114</sup>

In order to allow for Foscarini's quick departure for Corfu, Alvise Grimani had already been chosen his successor as *provveditore*. Grimani would leave Venice within six days, and would bring Foscarini the standard of a captain-general. Foscarini was then in Zara. When Grimani had conveyed the standard to him, he would hasten to Corfu with eight galleys of the Gulf. His commission would be sent to him along with money and whatever else he might need.<sup>115</sup> The 200,000 ducats, referred to above in the Senate's letter to Venier, now went not to the latter but to Foscarini.<sup>116</sup>

Venier was duly informed of Giacomo Foscarini's election as a captain-general by a letter of the doge and Senate dated 9 February (1572). Both generals were to continue gathering all the oarsmen they could for, as we know, shortages of *homini da remo* had been one of the chief problems of the Christian galley commanders since the war with the Porte had begun. The Senate assumed that Venier was, and had been, busy recruiting oarsmen and making other provision for the huge

<sup>112</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 60-61' [82-83'], docs. dated 31 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 61 [83], *all'ambasciatore [Leonardo Contarini] appresso Don Giovanni*, doc. dated 31 January.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 78, fol. 62' [84'], from a letter of 9 February to Sebastiano Venier.

<sup>115</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 62' [84'], *al provveditor general in Dalmatia designato capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 5 February, 1572 (Ven. style 1571). On Foscarini's election, note also Sen. Mar. Reg. 40, fol. 144' [178'], dated 5 February, and on that of Alvise Grimani, *ibid.*, Reg. 40, fol. 145 [179], docs. also dated 5 February. Grimani's commission, dated 13 February, 1572, is given in Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 64'-66' [86'-88'], and that of Foscarini, dated 23 February, may be found, *ibid.*, fols. 68'-71' [90'-93'].

<sup>116</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 69' [91].

<sup>109</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 56'-57' [78'-79'], *al capitano general da mar*, doc. dated 19 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571), and on the Senate's determination to put one hundred galleys into the naval armament of the league, cf. *ibid.*, fol. 66' [88'].

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, Reg. 78, fols. 57-58' [79-80'].

<sup>111</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, nos. 279, 297, pp. 585-86, 631-32, esp. note; Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, I, 472; Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, nos. 68, 96, 99, 113, 121, 125, pp. 115-16, 151, 158, 175-76, 186, 192.

fleet of one hundred galleys, which the Senate desired and expected to be prepared for action and assembled at Corfu by the beginning of April. Meanwhile the Senate wanted Venier to come from the island of Corfu to that of Lesina (Hvar), off the Dalmatian coast, with the unarmed galleys (*li arsili*) which had been taken from the Turks at Lepanto. At the same time he must have a number of other galleys towed to Lesina, "essendo di molta importanza che non restino in quel luogo con tanto pericolo di esser abruciati et andar di male. . . ." Venier might also meet Foscarini at Lesina, where he could give him certain necessary instructions. Thereafter, among other duties, he could order the transport of the infantry collected at Brindisi and Otranto by the galleys remaining at Corfu.<sup>117</sup>

It is an odd, embarrassed letter. Venier was not specifically barred from being present at the union of the fleets in April (if the Spanish could reach Corfu so early), but he was given every chance of avoiding further contact with Don John. In any event dealing with the young generalissimo would be left to Foscarini. The message was all too clear, however, for as another senatorial document states, Venier had been "separato dalle forze della lega." Nevertheless, to honor him the Senate proposed to arm ten more galleys, with a miscellany of manpower, and put the old warrior in command of them, "[per] dargli modo di poter continuar adoperarsi valorosamente nei servitii nostri."<sup>118</sup>

After some months of the usual haggling between the Venetians and the Spaniards the "capitulation" of the Holy League was renewed at Rome, in the Vatican Palace, on 10 February (1572). Philip II was represented by Cardinal Francisco Pacheco, Don Juan de Zúñiga, and Luis de Requesens, the grand commander of Castile, who had recently been appointed governor of the duchy of Milan. Paolo Tiepolo and Giovanni Soranzo acted on behalf of the Signoria. Pius V was present at the proceedings, as were Cardinals Giovanni Morone, Gianpaolo della Chiesa, Giovanni Aldobrandini, and Girolamo Rusticucci. The text was subscribed and published by the datary Antimo Marchesano.

The Spanish had finally agreed "che la guerra et imprese di quest' anno si facciano nelle parti di Levante." They had postponed the proposed expedition against Tunis and Bizerte. Their galleys would go with those of the Holy See and Venice to seek out the Turkish armada, or what was left of it, in the Levant. The papal and Catholic fleets should meet at Messina in March, and proceed without delay to join the Venetians at Corfu. This year the Christian armada was to number, if possible, 250 galleys and nine galleasses, for the Venetians were supposed to provide "more than their portion." The Holy See should furnish 12 galleys, Philip II no fewer than 100, "and besides these galleys at least twenty-four ships, and the Venetian Signoria at least sixteen."

His Holiness was to supply the armada with 2,000 infantry, Philip with at least 18,000 infantry and 300 horse, and the Venetians with 12,000 infantry and 200 horse. Financial arrangements were made to cover the very large number of galleys which the allies wanted the Signoria to make available to the league and also to cover any increase in infantrymen (above the 32,000 *fanti* specified) "provided they do not exceed 40,000 in all." Although the Venetians expected the gathering of the fleets at Corfu in April, the capitulation of 10 February allowed for the muster of 11,000 infantry at Capo d' Otranto by the end of June. Detailed specifications listed the required arms and munitions. Experience of the year before had given the Christian high command a more precise knowledge of their needs, and the text of the capitulation gives us the required numbers of arquebuses, pikes, swords, corselets, iron shards to halt a cavalry charge (*triboli*), mattocks, shovels, baskets, ladders, fireballs, coats of mail, cannon, and other items that would prove useful.<sup>119</sup>

The Christians were better, and the Turks less well, prepared in 1572 than in '71. It is amazing that so little should eventually have come of their efforts. Although they had expected to occupy—and to establish naval bases in—Turkish territory, they apparently failed to define their objectives

<sup>117</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 62<sup>v</sup>-63<sup>r</sup> [84<sup>v</sup>-85<sup>r</sup>], letter of 9 February to Venier, referred to above, and *cf.* *ibid.*, fols. 76<sup>v</sup>-77<sup>r</sup> [98<sup>v</sup>-99<sup>r</sup>], 79<sup>v</sup>-80<sup>r</sup> [101<sup>v</sup>-102<sup>r</sup>], 82<sup>v</sup> [104<sup>v</sup>].

<sup>118</sup> Sen. Mar. Reg. 40, fols. 147<sup>v</sup>-148<sup>r</sup> [181<sup>v</sup>-182<sup>r</sup>], doc. dated 9 February, 1572 (Ven. style 1571), and *cf.* Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 63<sup>v</sup> [85<sup>v</sup>], *ad finem*, on arming the ten galleys. On 11 June, 1577, Sebastiano Venier would be elected Alvise Mocenigo's successor as doge of Venice.

<sup>119</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 310, pp. 656-59, and *cf.* *ibid.*, no. 316, pp. 667-69; Paolo Tiepolo, "Seconda relazione di Roma, letta in Senato il 3 maggio 1576," in Eugenio Albèri, ed., *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV (1857), 233-34; Sereno, *Commentari*, bk. IV, p. 266, who is well informed, but obviously had not seen the text of the capitulation. As to the infantry at Capo d' Otranto, Sereno notes that they were to be properly paid "per farli stare al Capo d' Otranto per traghettarli con prestezza ove il bisogno fosse." *Cf.* Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, 1 (1918), 153-54. *Triboli* are small chevaux-de-frise.



and to agree on who was to own what if they made landed conquests.

Although the Christian armada fell short of the grandiose makeup outlined in the capitulation, it was more than enough to cause apprehension at the Porte, where Uluj-Ali, whom the sultan now called Kilij-Ali, the "Sword," had fallen heir to the Ottoman naval command. As the new kapudan pasha Uluj-Ali worked with the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli to rebuild the Turkish armada. As von Hammer notes, the Turks did not deck out their arsenal in sculptures, but are said to have enlarged the dockyards, taking space from the imperial gardens to do so, and building eight vaulted dry docks. During the winter which followed Lepanto the Turks are alleged to have constructed one hundred and fifty galleys and eight galleasses or "maonas." On one occasion the new kapudan pasha remarked to the grand vizir that it was easy enough to produce the vessels, but impossible to make the necessary anchors, cordage, riggings, and the like. Mehmed Sokolli's answer to this is well known. "Milord pasha," he is reported to have said, "the might and means of the Sublime Porte are so great that if the order were given to provide anchors of silver, riggings of silk, and sails of satin, it would be possible—whatsoever is lacking on any ship, just ask me for it!" Bowing so low that the backs of his hands seemed to touch the ground, Uluj-Ali almost shouted his praise, "I knew well that you would restore the fleet to a state of perfection!"<sup>120</sup>

It is a good story, and well told. It also receives confirmation of a sort from the dispatches of François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax, who arrived in Istanbul as Charles IX's ambassador to the Porte on 13 March, 1572, and had an audience of two hours on the sixteenth with the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli. On 23 March de Noailles went to kiss the hand of Selim II with eighteen French

gentlemen, "which is a larger number than has yet been received on a like occasion." Thereafter de Noailles wrote Charles IX,

Sire, the naval force [*armée*] which the Grand Seigneur is putting to sea this year will go out at the end of next May. There are 200 vessels, among them 160 galleys, of which the general is Uluj-Ali [*Luchally*], lately the viceroys of Algiers, to whose place has been appointed Arab Ahmad [*Arabamat*], who has come to visit me, and offer all the courtesies and good offices he can on behalf of your subjects, especially with regard to the deliverance of those who are now slaves in Algiers, in accord with the order which I have had conveyed to him by the pasha. . . . They are making great preparations in this arsenal and at sea for the coming year. It is said that their naval force will consist of at least 400 galleys. Time, which is the father of truth, will let us see, God willing, what will come of it.<sup>121</sup>

De Noailles was doubtless not allowed within the arsenal, and he obviously did not believe what he was being told. The main object of his mission was to make peace between the Porte and Venice, for the French wanted to undo the Holy League. The recent Venetian failure to take the island of S. Maura after a siege of fifteen days, with seventy galleys, four thousand men, and five pieces of artillery, as de Noailles wrote Henry [III], then the duke of Anjou, on 25 April, "has so restored the Turks' spirit, and given them back their former insolence, that they think the Christians lack the means to take a place of importance. . . ."<sup>122</sup>

On 8 May (1572) de Noailles again wrote Charles IX concerning the Turks' rearmament

that in five months they have built 150 vessels with all the artillery and equipment needed and, yes, they have resolved to continue at this pace for an entire year. Thus with the diligence they have shown up to this point your Majesty can understand how many vessels they will have this coming year, since already their general is prepared to set out to sea at the end of this month with two hundred galleys and one hundred galliots, of corsairs and others, without the Grand Seigneur's having used a single écu in his treasury for this huge expense. In short, I should never have believed the greatness of this monarchy, had I not seen it with my own eyes.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>120</sup> Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, III (Pest, 1828, repr. Graz, 1963), 599–600, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, VI (Paris, 1836), 432–33, and of Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, I, 468; A. C. Hess, "The Battle of Lepanto and its Place in Mediterranean History," *Past and Present*, LVII (Nov. 1972), 54; Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, New York and London, 1982, 43–44.

As of 5 January, 1572 (Ven. style 1571), the bailie Barbaro reported to the doge that the Turks had on hand 45 galleys in the water, 11 old galleys and 14 new ones on land, eight in the dockyard (*cantier*), 11 on the outside (*fuori*), and eight fustas, a total of 97 vessels (Barbaro makes it 96). Another 102 galleys were then said to be under construction at various places in Anatolia and in "Greece," where Barbaro puts Varna (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 244r).

<sup>121</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 250–52, letter dated at Istanbul on 23 March, 1572.

<sup>122</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 261–62.

<sup>123</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 269. According to Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 270, Uluj-Ali superintended the building of 130 galleys at Istanbul, "benché di materia verde e di poca durata," i.e., of green timber and of slight durability. De Noailles was not entirely to be trusted, on which see below, p. 1091b.

A month later, in a letter of 10 June, de Noailles informed Charles that the Turks wanted foreigners to see their naval ensemble, for they had built two hundred new galleys in six months, and were going to put 20,000 arquebusiers aboard them, "a thing which has never been seen in this empire." Uluj-Ali was getting the Turks to leave their bows at home for this campaign, having already had novices use the arquebus at Lepanto. De Noailles also informed Mehmed Sokoli that it was the king of France,

who had prevented the emperor and the German princes from entering the league against this [Ottoman] state, and that you [Charles] had sent two ambassadors into Germany expressly to divert this storm from your good friend, the Grand Seigneur. . . . As for peace with the Venetians, I know that your Majesty desires their well-being and quietude, and I should account myself more than fortunate to be able to be the instrument of that peace.<sup>124</sup>

If as de Noailles says, "le temps . . . est père de vérité," it would seem—to judge by events of the coming summer—that he was either enlarging upon the facts or he was being misled by the Turks. Despite the capitulation of 10 February, the Venetians were having some difficulty providing the league with one hundred light galleys and six galleasses,<sup>125</sup> but they were doing their best, and so was the ailing Pius V. In a long and noteworthy brief of 12 March (1572), addressed to Christendom at large, *universis et singulis Christianidelibus*, Pius sought to renew the just war against the Turks, granting to Christians who gave their property for the cause, as well as to those who gave their persons, the same sweeping indulgence that his predecessors had granted the crusaders of old.<sup>126</sup> In another brief of 12 March, also ad-

ressed to all Christendom, Pius appealed for contributions to enlarge the hospital at Corfu, "pro ampliacione et subventione hospitalis Corcyrensis," to receive the sick and wounded of the three allied fleets, which he hoped would soon be moving against the Turks.<sup>127</sup>

There had been a persistent rumor since mid-November (1571) that Don John of Austria might seek to take Tunisia before venturing again into the Levant.<sup>128</sup> The Venetian Signoria thus felt some distress upon receiving letters dated 19 and 21 February (1572) from Leonardo Contarini, their ambassador to Don John, that word was rife in Sicily "che l' Altezza sua sia per fare l' impresa di Tunisi prima che vada coll' armata verso Levante. . . ." On 15 March the doge and Senate

omni tempore miserabiliter perculisse atque afflixisse non ignoramus, magnopere idoneum et opportunum esse censemus, si Christiani maiori quo fieri poterit militum numero bellicoque apparatu contra hostem ferociam insurgere conabuntur, sic enim facilius sperandum est felicia nostra capta adiuvante Domino fore in dies feliciora atque optatum exitum gravi cum hostium formidine ac pernicie habitura.

"Itaque decrevimus omnes et singulos fideles ad piissimum iustissimumque bellum, ubi de Jesu Christi Domini et Salvatoris nostri causa et gloria Christianique nominis salute, scitis omnes aperte vident, inprimis agitur monere, requirere, et exhortari prout monemus, requirimus, et hortamur per praesentes ut unusquisque sanctissimum hoc bellum vel personis vel facultatibus adiuvere velit. . . .

"Necnon eis, qui non in personis propriis illuc accesserint, sed suis tantum expensis iuxta facultatem et qualitatem suam viros idoneos destinaverint donec milites nostri ibi fuerint commoraturus et illis similiter qui licet alienis expensis, propriis tamen personis, belli laborem et pericula sustinerint, ac deum eis qui de bonis sibi a Deo collatis congruam ad id portionem benigne erogaverint, plenissimum et amplissimum omnium peccatorum suorum, de quibus corde contriti et ore confessi fuerint, et eandemque quam Romani pontifices, praedecessores nostri, cruceignatis proficentibus ad subsidium Terrae Sanctae concedere soliti fuerint veniam, remissionem, et absolutiorem tenore praesentium indulgemus et elargimur. Bona insuper proficentium ad bellum huiusmodi ex quo profecti fuerint sub beati Petri et nostra protectione suscipimus. . . . Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, etc. die 12 Martis 1572, anno septimo."

<sup>127</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fols. 320–21, with a petition inserted, *ibid.*, from Paolo Tiepolo and Giovanni Soranzo, the Venetian ambassadors in Rome, as to the handling of the funds: "Supplicamo la Sancta vostra, noi ambasciatori di Venetia, che sia contenta far scrivere a tutti li metropolitani in Italia che facciano cercar per l' hospital che si deve ampliar a Corfu, il quale ha da servire per tutte le armate Christiane, facendo che li denari capitano in mano di loro metropolitani, et siano mandati o in Venetia al reverendissimo nuntio o al patriarca ovvero qui al signor thesorier, et quelli del regno di Napoli siano fatti capitar a Otranto in mano del reverendissimo arcivescovo con ordine che li mandati al balio in Corfu."

<sup>128</sup> Cf. Stella, *Nunt. Venezia*, X, nos. 85, 87, pp. 136, 139.

<sup>124</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 271–73, 276. Although Diego Guzmán de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, had been assuring Juan de Zúñiga that the Signoria was adhering firmly to the Holy League, Zúñiga had been doubtful for some time. By late March (1572) Guzmán de Silva seemed to be changing his mind. As Zúñiga wrote Philip II on 29 March, ". . . Se ha dicho mucho por Roma que Venecianos tratan de acuerdo. . . . Esta semana me parece que [Guzmán de Silva] va temiendo que dan alguna oreja a esta platica, y que de franceses procuran quanto es posible este acuerdo no ay ninguna duda. . . ." and if the Turks opened the doorway to peace, the Venetians might well enter because of Pius V's serious illness (Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 539, pp. 716–17).

<sup>125</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 70<sup>r</sup> [92<sup>r</sup>], from Giacomo Foscarini's commission as captain-general of the sea, dated 25 February, 1572 (Ven. style 1571), and *cf.*, *ibid.*, fol. 81<sup>r</sup> [109<sup>r</sup>], a letter of the doge and Senate to Foscarini, dated 17 April, 1572.

<sup>126</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fols. 315–16, by original enumeration: ". . . Considerantes immanem Turcarum potentiam infinitamque multitudinem, qua potissimum res Christianorumum

instructed Contarini forthwith to wait upon Don John, congratulate him upon his determination to pursue the Turk, and mention the upsetting rumor of his going to Tunisia before going into the Levant. If there seemed to be any likelihood of such a thing happening, Contarini must point out to his Highness the obvious fact that sometimes undertakings depicted as easy can quickly involve one in difficulties and misfortunes "which then impede the course of some other greater and more important good thing [bene]."

If Don John embarked on an expedition to Tunisia, his fleet could not join those of Venice and the Holy See at Corfu by the beginning of April, which would be a severe blow to his allies. Also a diversion of the Catholic fleet to Tunisia would certainly not encourage the Emperor Maximilian to join the anti-Turkish league. Anyhow there was not much more to say, and the Senate now allowed Contarini to conclude his mission at Messina and return home to Venice.<sup>129</sup>

The Venetian fleet appears to have been ready for action at Corfu by late April. Despite the capitulation of 10 February, however, and the Spaniards' not ungenerous decision to aim their fire at the Turks in eastern waters rather than to attack Tunis, Don John was still at Messina, awaiting his brother's orders to sail. With final preparations still under way in the papal fleet, Pius V appointed a great grandnephew, Michele Bonelli, as commander of the infantry aboard his galleys on 27 April, at which time he also notified Marc' Antonio Colonna of the young man's charge.<sup>130</sup> It was an amiable gesture of nepotism, for Pius knew that he had not long to live.

As Juan de Zúñiga wrote Philip II, Pius had been so ill since 27 April that one had lost all hope of his survival, and so it was, for the pope died at 7:00 P.M. (*a las XXII oras*) on 1 May.<sup>131</sup> He was

universally lamented. Immediately upon the announcement of his demise, the Venetian ambassadors Tiepolo and Soranzo notified the Signoria. On 7 May the doge and Senate wrote Leonardo Donado (Donà), their ambassador in Madrid, that the pontiff's death was causing them fearful distress, "dispiacer et travaglio," for they feared the loss of his support and activity in advancing the cause of the Holy League. The Sacred College and Philip's ministers in Rome seemed, however, to be taking every step necessary to assemble the Christian armada for the Levantine expedition, as was Marc' Antonio Colonna, who was putting aside all personal interests to try to sail eastward with the papal galleys.

As soon as Donado had received the Senate's letter, he must go to Philip, and (after paying appropriate compliments to Don John and the king's ministers) urge his Catholic Majesty to action "senza verder punto di tempo." The pope's death must not become an impediment to the expedition's getting under way. The three fleets must assemble at Corfu. Although the Senate was certain that the cardinals would move quickly to elect the new pope, nevertheless if the conclave dragged on, they hoped that his Majesty would take steps to urge the cardinals to the expeditious choice of a pope of the highest character and prudence, "come ricerca la qualità de' tempi presenti."<sup>132</sup>

Pius V was buried temporarily in the chapel of S. Andrea in S. Peter's. He had planned a modest tomb for himself in the village of Bosco Marengo, his birthplace, a half-dozen miles southeast of Alessandria, but in 1588 his remains were interred in the majestic monument which Sixtus V built for him in S. Maria Maggiore in Rome. The inscriptions and bas-reliefs on his tomb celebrate his contributions to the defeat of the Huguenots at Montcontour (in 1569) and to that of the Turks at Lepanto (*ad Echinadas*) where, it is said, 30,000 of the enemy were slain, 10,000 captured, 180 of their galleys seized, 90 sunk, and 15,000 Chris-

<sup>129</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 75-76<sup>v</sup> [97-98<sup>v</sup>], a *Ser Lu-nardo Contarini, cav., ambasciatore presso all' illustrissimo Signor Don Giovanni*, doc. dated 15 March, 1572. The Venetian agent Placido Ragazzoni remained in Messina to do what might be necessary. Don John had gone to Palermo.

<sup>130</sup> Sec. Brevia, Reg. 20, fol. 352, *dilecto filio nobilit adolescenti Michaeli Bonello omnium peditum classis nostrae ecclesiae capitano generali*, doc. dated 27 April, 1572. On the papal appointment of another relative, Ercole Ghislieri, to an apparently lucrative office in Bologna, see, *ibid.*, fol. 354, brief dated 28 April.

<sup>131</sup> Serrano, *Correspondencia diplomática*, IV, no. 353, pp. 731-732, and cf. Acta Consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 36, fol. 127<sup>v</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration: "Die Iovis prima Maii 1572 Romae apud Sanctum Petrum hora circiter XX [5:00 P.M.] Pius Papa V ab hac luce migravit." Note also Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 613-15.

<sup>132</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 83<sup>v</sup>-84<sup>r</sup> [105<sup>v</sup>-106<sup>r</sup>], all *ambasciatore in Spagna*, doc. dated 7 May, 1572, and cf., *ibid.*, fols. 84<sup>v</sup>-85<sup>r</sup> [106<sup>v</sup>-107<sup>r</sup>], letters of the same date to Don John and the Venetian ambassador, who seems still to have been in Messina.

On the efforts of the Sacred College, "massime negli affari di questa santa spedizione contro gl' Infedeli," see the letter dated 6 May from Cardinals Giovanni Morone and Girolamo Simoncelli to Cosimo I de' Medici, in Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI, 292-95: Don John of Austria had the Catholic fleet in order at Messina, the Venetians were ready at Corfu, and the Holy See was awaiting and urgently needed the Tuscan galleys.

tians freed from slavery.<sup>153</sup> The somewhat inflated figures were based rather upon popular belief than upon the factual record, but certainly Pius had been the author of the Holy League.

After the customary novena of mourning, the funeral rites, and a solemn mass of the Holy Spirit, fifty-one cardinals entered the conclave at the Vatican on Monday night, 12 May (1572), or rather early Tuesday morning, and after a conclave of ten or twelve hours Ugo Boncompagni, the cardinal of S. Sisto, emerged as Pope Gregory XIII. Philip II and Cosimo de' Medici had opposed the possible election of Alessandro Farnese; quite acceptable to the Spanish, Boncompagni had been Medici's chief candidate. When the new pope re-appointed Marc' Antonio Colonna as captain-general of the papal fleet, Cosimo made available eleven Tuscan galleys, to which were added, says Sereno, two armed hulls (*arsili*) which had been taken from the Turks at Lepanto. Turkish slaves also rowed the pope's two new galleys. Embarking at Gaeta, Marc' Antonio sailed to Naples, where he waited a few days for the Tuscan galleys, with which he then went on to join Don John at Messina, where Álvaro de Bazán is also said to have come with thirty-six Neapolitan galleys.<sup>154</sup>

Marc' Antonio Colonna was received with obvious unfriendliness by Don John, who regarded him as the friend and ally of the Venetians, and so he was, and so Don John was supposed to be. By the end of the second week in June the allied armada should have been ready to sail eastward, for Giacomo Soranzo, provveditore generale of the Venetian fleet, had already arrived in Messina with twenty-five galleys. The bulk of the Venetian naval forces were waiting for Don John, Colonna, and Soranzo at Corfu. Gregory XIII sent Paolo Odescalchi as nuncio to Messina, as Pius V had sent him the year before; he brought an "amplissimo giubileo" for all who sailed with the armada and a blessing for the vessels and troops at their departure. In a week or so the three commanders and their galleys should have been able to reach Corfu, and thence embark upon the *reconquista* of the Morea and Negroponte which, some folks thought, would probably require fifteen or twenty days. It was believed that the Greeks might rise in revolt, and shake off the "Tourkokratia." Maybe the armada could win another victory like

that of Lepanto, and sail on to Istanbul or Alexandria.

Don John, however, could not leave Messina, as Sereno quickly learned, for Philip II had ordered him not to go into the Levant. "ma l'ordine contrario, che aveva dal Re suo fratello, contra sua voglia lo ritardava," to the young generalissimo's distress. In Messina it was being said that ecclesiastics were refusing to pay Philip the *excusado* after the pope's death. There was also a question, or so it was alleged, of the *cruzada* and the subsidy for the galleys.<sup>155</sup>

The Venetian Signoria was concerned to find a proper use for the Turkish galleys "taken in the battle," which were still at Corfu. They should obviously be removed from the scene, so as not to be in the way when the Christian armada assembled in Corfiote waters. Although Venier had been directed to sail or tow them into the Adriatic (for repairs), perhaps Foscarini would prefer to take the best ones to Candia, if that would not interfere with plans for the armada. In any event these *arsili* were valuable; they could be armed, and they must be preserved.<sup>156</sup>

While the Venetians were worrying about how to salvage the battered Turkish galleys, Philip II had been worrying about how to maintain his threatened authority in the Netherlands. He had been perturbed by the news of Pius V's illness, rather uncertain as to what to do "en caso que Dios fuesse servido de llevarle para sy," i.e., suppose he died. What would happen to the league? On 17 May he wrote Don John not to take his fleet into the Levant; if, indeed, he went anywhere, it should rather be to Algiers. One could meanwhile hope for the election of a pontiff who would promote the anti-Turkish objectives of the league with determination.

The naval power of the Turks had been shattered. The Venetians could attend to their own affairs, and engage in such ventures as they chose, or at least they could now look to their own defense (*o a lo menos a su defensa*). Philip had received disquieting news from Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, the duke of Alva, as to recent events in Zealand. Dispatches from various quarters suggested that these troubles in the southwestern Nether-

<sup>153</sup> Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 270-71; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I (1918), 203-7.

<sup>156</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 82<sup>v</sup> [104<sup>v</sup>], al capitano general Foscarini, doc. dated 3 May, 1572, and cf. *ibid.*, the letter of the duke and Senate to Venier, *ibid.*, fols. 79-80<sup>v</sup> [101<sup>v</sup>-102<sup>v</sup>], dated 12 April.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Renzo U. Montini, *Le Tombe dei Papi*, Rome, 1957, no. 226, pp. 332-37.

<sup>154</sup> Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 268-69, and cf. Guglielmotti, *Storia della marina pontificia*, VI, 298-99.

lands were inspired by the French and the English, "y por la mala inclinación y voluntad que los unos y los otros tienen a mis cosas." Don John must, therefore, procrastinate in Messina. He must delay his departure for the Levant, but do so "with complete secrecy and dissimulation" (*con gran secreto y disimulación*)!

Don John must wait for the arrival of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the duke of Sessa (Sesa), who was to replace Requesens as lieutenant of the Catholic fleet. Philip wanted him also to await Giannandrea Doria, of whose skill as a naval commander and of whose knowledge of "las cosas de la mar" his Majesty never ceased to approve. Don John could use the time created by the delay to collect foodstuffs "and other things necessary for the expedition." Philip was not canceling the campaign for 1572, but before committing his galleys to the Levant he wanted to know who would be pope, Pius V or a successor, and what the French were up to in Zeeland.<sup>137</sup> On 18 May, the day after writing to Don John, Philip had letters prepared to Cardinal de Granvelle and to Juan de Zúñiga, suggesting that if Pius should die, it would be well to turn their attention to Algiers and get some advantage from the great expense to which the Holy League had put them.<sup>138</sup> The next day, the nineteenth, the news of Pius's death reached Philip at El Pardo, just north of Madrid, and it would seem from a letter which he now sent Don John that the news had fixed his gaze even more firmly on the Moslem outposts in North Africa.<sup>139</sup> Everything depended of course on the behavior of the French.

Philip's letters of 17 and 19 May reached Don John at Messina about the time of, or shortly after, Colonna's arrival early in June. The Venetians were aware of the possibility of war between Philip and Charles IX, owing to the "progresso delli moti di guerra che al presente intendemo farsi nella Fiandra." At the request of the recently-elected Gregory XIII the Senate now chose two special envoys, Giovanni Michiel to go to France and Antonio Tiepolo to Spain, to work for "peace and

quiet among the princes . . . , and especially in these times when there is a war going on against the Turk."<sup>140</sup> Don John was finally forced to acknowledge to Colonna and the Venetian provveditore Giacomo Soranzo that the chief reason for the order given by his Catholic Majesty to keep the fleet in Messina was the report of French preparations for apparent incursions into Flanders, Piedmont, and even into Spain, "tenendosi la guerra per rotta." It seemed as though war had already broken out.

Nevertheless, on 7 July the doge and Senate wrote Leonardo Donado, the Venetian ambassador at Madrid, that when he was told Philip II must obviously think of the defense of his several states under the circumstances in which he then found himself, Donado's answer was to be that the commotion in Flanders did not invalidate the capitulation of the Holy League. The agreement of 10 February was supposed to be inviolable. If the Catholic fleet was to detach itself from those of the Holy See and Venice every time there were disturbances in one place or another, one could depend on the French to cause some such excitement somewhere every year. Nothing would distress them more than to have the entire Christian armada advance against the Turks and destroy the rest of the Ottoman naval armament. This would end the evil machinations of the French, i.e., the Huguenots, who were always bringing pressure upon Charles IX to break with Spain and aid their coreligionists in Flanders.

Nothing could more enhance Philip II's reputation and solve his various problems than to make himself superior to the Turk at sea. Philip should let his fleet go into the Levant. Donado must make clear to his Majesty that the French ambassador in Rome had declared "that his most Christian Majesty would not move against the Catholic king, showing himself to be entirely averse to such a thought." There was actually no sign of any "preparation for war" at the French court. Everything was completely quiet in Milan, also in Piedmont, and there was nothing awry along Spain's frontier with France. Furthermore, the Venetian ambassador at the imperial court had written the Signoria (contrary to current reports) that neither France nor England had sent any aid to the rebels in Flanders. Also the Republic's ambassador at the French court had informed the Signoria that

<sup>137</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 294-95, gives the text of Philip II's letter to Don John, dated at Madrid on 17 May, 1572; cf. Fernández Duro, *Armada española*, II, 170 ff.; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (1923), 236-37; and see especially Leonardo Donado's report to the doge and Senate, also dated at Madrid on 17 May, in Brunetti and Vitale, *La Correspondenza da Madrid*, II (1963), no. 167, pp. 473-76, and note, *ibid.*, nos. 168 ff., 172 ff. The duke of Sessa was delayed by illness in Valladolid (no. 175, p. 491).

<sup>138</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 296-97.

<sup>139</sup> Serrano, I, 298 ff.

<sup>140</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 96 [118], 105'-111' [127'-133'], docs. dated 12 June, 5 and 7 July, 1572, passage quoted from fol. 106'.

Charles IX had published decrees condemning any of his subjects who sought to foment unrest in Flanders or to aid the rebels, a fact which the French envoy in Venice confirmed. Charles wanted to preserve "la buona amicitia et parentado" which he had with his Catholic Majesty. The troubles in Flanders would go no farther, "essendo già acquietati quasi del tutto." These were the facts which Donado must emphasize to Philip II at his next audience with the king.<sup>141</sup>

In another letter of 7 July to Donado the doge and Senate stated that they had been making every effort to get Don John to join the projected expedition. They had sent the provveditore generale Soranzo to him "con una banda di galee per maggior dimostrazione d' honore et per accelerar la partita sua. . . ." Time was passing. From every side came reports that the Turkish armada of more than 150 galleys under Uluj-Ali, who had left Istanbul at the end of June,<sup>142</sup> would soon be or already was spreading fear and ruin in the Aegean. His purpose was to convince the Greeks on the mainland and in the islands that recent events had in no way diminished the power or shortened the reach of the Turks.

The Venetian islands of Tenos and Cerigo were threatened with downright destruction and all the Republic's other islands and towns in Greek waters were at stake. The inhabitants of the islands, subjects of the Signoria, were desperate. After Lepanto they had expected freedom from the Turkish yoke, but now their oppressor seemed stronger than ever, "spending himself without opposition to give courage to his own subjects and take it from ours, repressing those Christians who stood ready to revolt in support of our fleets."

Dispatches from Rome now brought the distressing information that his Catholic Majesty had ordered Don John not to proceed to Corfu to add his forces to the papal and Venetian fleets because of recent events in Flanders, "onde è nasciuta la dilazione che si è intesa da Messina." Philip II's order was wholly unexpected. The prospect was dreadful, "for this means nothing else than leaving the Turk a free field to pillage, range the sea in all directions, seize towns, and what is more important, give proof of the weakness of our forces. . . ."<sup>143</sup>

When Gregory XIII had learned of Philip II's order to Don John, he also lost no time in sending his Catholic Majesty a letter of strong remonstrance. The papal courier reached Madrid on 14 July but, as Donado now informed the Signoria, Philip had already changed his mind, and on 4 July had ordered his brother to proceed with the expedition. Despite the bad news from Flanders, where conditions were "worse than they had been," and despite the fact "that suspicions of the French do not cease," Philip had put aside his own peril, "in servizio di Dio," to do what he could for the common good of Christendom. On Friday, 4 July, a Spanish courier had left Madrid; in three days he would be in Barcelona; from there he would go in a galley directly to Messina without touching at Genoa or Naples.

The king's new orders left Don John almost unhampered (*ha dato ordine liberissimo a don Giovanni senza alcuna riserva*)—he was to leave immediately to join the embattled Venetians at Corfu "with 64 galleys, the best he had, with 33 ships, with 16,000 infantry, and with all the 30 or 40 boats which he had got ready." The courier, who was on his way by sea, "should have arrived today [16 July] in Messina," but to be sure of the expeditious delivery of his orders Philip had dispatched another courier by land. What had been done was well done, although time had been lost. The king's taciturnity, however, and the secrecy with which he and his ministers went about their business "without informing their allies of anything," Donado found disturbing, as he told the doge, and their extreme reserve made his mission difficult. Nevertheless, the expedition against the Turks would at long last put to sea.<sup>144</sup>

" . . . et sentendo da ogni parte l' armata inimica fatta già molto grossa et potente che s' intendeva passar il numero de 150 galee venir a danni dell' isole nostre de Tine et di Cerigo, attendere a rovinarle et depredarle, restar in preda dell' inimici tutte l' altre isole et terre nostre, tutti i nostri populi in estrema disperatione in luogo del sollevamento che aspettavano l' anno presente dopo una tanta vittoria, vedendo parimente farsi il Turco più gagliardo, presidiar i luoghi suoi, spengersi inanzi senza contrasto dar animo a suoi sudditi, levarlo a nostri, reprimere quei Christiani che stavano per sollevarsi in favor delle nostre armate, ci ha apportato quel travaglio che si possa immaginar maggiore, considerato il malefico non pur della Republica nostra ma il detrimento et ignominia del nome Christiano. . . ."

<sup>141</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 113–114' [135–136'], all' ambasciatore appresso il serenissimo Re Catholico, doc. dated 7 July, 1572, and note Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, II, nos. 180 ff., pp. 500 ff.

<sup>142</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 363a.

<sup>143</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 111–113' [133–135'], all' ambasciatore presso la Maestà Catholica: The long delay at Messina was multiplying difficulties for the papal and Venetian fleets,

<sup>144</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, II, no. 185, pp. 508–13, letter of Donado to the doge and Senate, dated 16 July, 1572, and cf. Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fol. 125' [147'], a letter of the doge and Senate to Don John dated 31 August (in answer to a letter he had sent the doge on 22 July): the Senate still had every hope that Don John was on his way "a ritrovar l' armata inimica per combatterla et per far quelle altre imprese che dal Signor Dio saranno ispirate. . . ."

To go back for a moment, we should note that Don John had sent a courier with a letter to Madrid on 12 June. The courier delivered the letter to King Philip on the twenty-fifth and, as we have stated, Philip's answer was given on 4 July. The king was disturbed by a new insurrection in Guelderland and by his suspicion that the French were fomenting unrest and aiding the rebels "segun los avisos que de cada día se entienden." Nevertheless, he strongly desired the continuation of the Holy League, he said, "como obra tan santa y de tanto servicio de Nuestro Señor y daño de enemigo de la Christianidad." He also wished to satisfy the new pope. He did not want to discourage the Venetians nor expose them to such dangers as could not fail to make them come to an agreement with the Turks, "que a mi me dolería en gran manera."

There are often discrepancies between the reports of ambassadors to their governments and the actual facts, but not in this case. The information which Donado sent the Venetian Signoria was quite correct. Philip II had not misled him. Of the overall armament then on hand in Sicily, Philip had indeed told Don John (on 4 July) that he might take into the Levant 64 galleys, 30 or 32 "naves y los barcones," 6,000 Spaniards, 4,000 Germans, and 6,000 Italians, which would still leave 5,000 Spanish and about 4,000 German soldiers available for service elsewhere if they should be needed. Thirty-nine galleys would also be left, with which Giannandrea Doria could run through the islands and along the Italian coast "in search of corsairs." If nothing untoward occurred before the middle of August, Giannandrea might take the galleys into the Levant to join Don John. In the war against the Turk it is obvious that Philip was trying to do his part,<sup>145</sup> however much he would have preferred to use his resources (as we have said more than once) in a campaign against Algiers, Bizerte, Tunis, and Tripoli.

Març Antonio Colonna had sailed from Messina on 7 July, with some fifty-six galleys, to meet the Turk in a spirit of self-righteousness that the Spaniards found irritating. Of the galleys that went with him thirteen were in the papal service, eighteen in that of Spain, and twenty-five belonged to the Venetians.<sup>146</sup> On the day of Colonna's departure

Don John sailed to Palermo with most of the Catholic fleet, intending to go on to Algiers and Bizerte, but Philip II's letter of 4 July soon diverted him from Barbary to the Levant. Colonna reached Co-trone on 9 July, took on water and proceeded to Capo S. Maria di Leuca, where he met Álvaro de Bazán, general of the Neapolitan galleys, who was said to be returning from Corfu with 36 galleys and four ships, to join Don John at Messina. According to Servia, he turned over to Colonna four more Spanish galleys under the command of Gil de Andrade. Colonna took on more water at Otranto on 13 July, and arrived at Corfu on the fifteenth. Giacomo Foscarini came out to meet him with the whole Venetian fleet then at the island, i.e., 74 galleys, six galleasses, and 25 galliots. There was the usual exchange of salvos of artillery, "y todos juntos se volvieron al puerto."<sup>147</sup>

The Christian fleets left Corfu on 20 July, headed for Gomenizza, whence Colonna dispatched two galleys to Cerigo (Kythera), just south of the Gulf of Laconia, to pick up news of Uluj-Ali's armada. The Christians spent eight days at Gomenizza, where five hundred enemy horse suddenly appeared to prevent their taking on water, but Colonna sent ashore infantry enough to chase them away. While at Gomenizza, Colonna received a letter dated 16 July from Don John, "who was coming," says Servia, "to join them with the armada, at which they all rejoiced." He directed them to wait for him at Corfu, which would have meant a return to the island rendezvous. Foscarini

26 Venetian galleys. Sereno, *Commentari*, p. 276, also dates Colonna's departure from Messina on 7 July, and gives him 54 galleys—13 papal, 28 Venetian, and "18 of the king." Camillo Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVI (1893), 399–412, gives 6 July as the date of Colonna's sailing from Messina—with 18 papal, 19 Venetian, and 22 Spanish galleys. It is true that in a letter to Gregory XIII, dated at Messina on 3 July, *ibid.*, pp. 411–12, Colonna says Don John "has given us 22 galleys" with Gil de Andrade as their commander, but it is not clear that he actually left Messina with that number of Spanish galleys (*cf.*, *ibid.*, p. 415). The sources provide us disparate data of all sorts concerning the expedition of 1572, especially minor differences in the dating of events.

*Cf.* Longo, *Successo della guerra*, *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 35 ff.; Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, I, 481–82, inaccurate, as often; Manfroni, *Storia della marina italiana* (1897), pp. 511–12; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II (1919), 17–18. The Spanish regarded war with France as a possibility (Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," pp. 395 ff., 402), and on the Turks' desire to have the French enter the war against Spain, note Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 287 ff., a letter of François de Noailles to Charles IX, dated at Istanbul on 31 July, 1572.

<sup>147</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 372, and *cf.* Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVI (1893), 412–20.

<sup>145</sup> Philip II's letter to Don John, dated at Madrid on 4 July, 1572, is given in Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, I, 363–70.

<sup>146</sup> *Cf.* the account of Don John's confessor, the Franciscan Miguel Servia, *Relación de los sucesos de la armada de la Santa Liga*, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI (1847, repr. 1964), 372, who says that Colonna left Messina on 7 July with 12 papal, 18 Spanish, and

was reluctant even to think of it, for it would have meant the further postponement of action against the Turks. Colonna also wanted to get on with the campaign, presumably anxious to enhance his reputation by another victory over the Turks. They thus decided to press on and to disobey the generalissimo's orders.

On 28 July the two galleys which had gone to Cerigo returned with uncertain news of Uluj-Ali. The next day the Christian fleets left Gomenizza, "which is eighteen miles from Corfu," proceeding southward to Cephalonia, where they were reinforced by 12 galleys and two galliots from Candia under Marco Querini "Stenta," which (according to Servia) now meant that the Christian armada consisted of 145 galleys, six galleasses, 25 galliots, and 22 ships. Servia, however, says that Querini, whom he calls Marco Ostento, added 22 galleys to the Christian armada, and his dates usually differ by a day or two from those of Colonna, whose own dates were not always accurate, as we recall, in his account of the expedition of 1570. On or before 2 August the armada reached the island of Zante, where the men took on water, and feasted on the grapes and vegetables in which the island abounded. After three days at Zante, Colonna and Foscarini moved on to Cerigo, where they arrived on 4 August, and learned that 60 Turkish galleys had preceded them, taking on water at the promontory of S. Niccolò on the eastern side of the island. The Turkish armada was said then to be at Monemvasia (Malvasia) about forty miles away. It was composed of 150 galleys and 50 large galliots.<sup>148</sup>

Less than thirty hours after the arrival of Colonna and Foscarini, Uluj-Ali sallied forth from Monemvasia apparently with the intention of attacking the Christian armada if it included no Spanish galleys. At dawn on 7 August, however, Colonna had sent Marco Querini (*es un buen soldado*) with four galleys to Cape S. Angelo, i.e., the promontory of Malea on the southeastern prong of the Moreote peninsula,

"to get news of the enemy's armada." Querini encountered the advance guard of Uluj-Ali's forces, which was also at S. Angelo, and prepared to do battle with them. Although the Turks had six galleys to Querini's four, they chose not to meet him, retreating to the safety of Uluj-Ali's armada, which was also now approaching S. Angelo. Querini retired toward the bay of S. Niccolò on the eastern coast of Cerigo, and Colonna ordered his heavy ships (*naves*) with their large cannon to be towed from the shelter of the harbor. Firing two salvos from the guns on his flagships, he directed that the galleys in the Christian armada be drawn up in battle array.

The order was much the same as at Lepanto, Colonna occupying the center of the battaglia with Foscarini and Gil de Andrade on either side, while the right wing was under the command of the provveditore generale Giacomo Soranzo and the left under that of Antonio da Canale. Two galleasses moved slowly ahead of each of the three main divisions of the battle line. According to Servia, there were 58 galleys in the battaglia, including the flagships of Colonna, Foscarini, and de Andrade, and 40 galleys in each of the two wings. Behind the battaglia were seven galleys of reserve, "the soccorso," and galliots and brigantines ranged behind the entire armada. As the Christian forces prepared to attack, Uluj-Ali's galleys fired a useless round of artillery, for they had to stay clear of the galleasses and ships with large cannon aboard, which formed the Christians' first line of defense. The engagement of 7 August took place off the northeast shore of Cerigo between the islands of Servi (Elafonisi) and Dragonera, the latter being just outside the harbor of S. Niccolò.

Colonna's galleasses and heavy ships advanced very slowly, for there was only a light wind. As the Christian cannon began to reach Uluj-Ali's galleys, he quickly "retired out to sea" (*se retiró a la mar*) under cover of a heavy smoke screen. His galleys were smaller and more maneuverable than Colonna's, and he had some two hundred vessels between galleys and galliots. When the Christian vanguard of ships and galleasses had passed on, Uluj-Ali's galleys suddenly wheeled around to attack "our armada." Colonna's armament kept in formation, however, turning slowly, waiting for the ships and galleasses to get into the forefront again, and then came on cautiously, with no sign of the misstep or confusion for which the wily corsair had hoped. He fired volleys of artillery, but they failed to halt the Christians' approach.

Unwilling to face the cannonading from the ships and galleasses, Uluj-Ali changed his course, bearing to starboard or port, pushing forward or

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVI, 417, 421, 422, 427-32; Servia, in *Docs. inédits*, XI, 372-73; Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 294 ff.; Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 279-80, 284-85; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 21-32. On Colonna's capacity to misremember dates, cf. above, Chapter 22, note 25. From Zante Colonna had sent out Maturin de Lescaut, better known as "Romegas," with two Venetian galleys on a scouting mission; the latter returned on 4 August to join the Christian armada at the island of Cerigo, reporting that Uluj-Ali was in the harbor stronghold of Monemvasia (Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," pp. 430, 431). Sereno gives us much the same information.



retreating with surprising facility. He tried to create a break in Colonna's line (like that in Doria's squadron at Lepanto), looking for the chance to outflank Colonna or to cut through between his *battaglia* and one of the wings. But Colonna maintained his tripartite formation, keeping behind the fire power of his vanguard. Uluj-Ali had, therefore, no intention of meeting him head on, and with the further employment of "artillery in vain," as we learn from Servia, he withdrew at nightfall into the Gulf of Laconia, heading for the port of "Cohalla." The futile maneuvering had lasted all day, and Colonna searched for the Turkish armada late into the night, finally returning to the island of Cerigo, where he took on water for his parched oarsmen and soldiers.<sup>149</sup>

The next day (8 August) Colonna dispatched a galley and a galliot to Corfu, where Don John of Austria was expected to arrive very shortly, to warn him not to come eastward, for he was known to have only fifty galleys and thirty ships, "y el enemigo le era superior." Uluj-Ali would try to waylay him. Don John should await the Christian armada, which was going to return to Corfu. Colonna also sent the generalissimo an account of his embroilment with Uluj-Ali. On the ninth, Colonna and the Venetian captain-general Foscarini left Cerigo, setting sail for Corfu, to reunite the armada under Don John. At dawn on the tenth, the feast of S. Lorenzo, they again encountered the Turkish armada, "which had come forth from the port of Cohalla, and was at Cape Maina." The provveditore Soranzo, who commanded the Christian right wing, pushed ahead with his two galleasses and a small number of galleys, and began to fire upon the Turks. As the Turkish left wing seemed to give way, Soranzo pressed forward too far, causing a break in the Christian line.

The apparent setback of Uluj-Ali's left wing was presumably a tactical device, because he now struck at Soranzo's galleys, and the Turks who had seemed to be in flight suddenly stood their ground. Now in retreat himself, Soranzo managed (according to Servia) to offer sufficient resistance with his flagship, a galleass, and ten galleys to hold his own until Colonna could turn the cannon of the ships and galleasses of his vanguard upon Uluj-Ali's attacking forces. The Christian left wing under Canaletto could do little to help, for Soranzo had got too far afield.

<sup>149</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 373-75; Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 285-86; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 35-40; Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," pp. 33 ff. Bart. Sereno, incidentally, commanded a galley in the expedition of 1572.

It was an almost hairbreadth escape, but Uluj-Ali again had to give way before the Christians' heavy guns. Withdrawing toward Cape Maina (Matapan), he finally made for the harbors of Modon and Navarino. The Christian armada was obliged by stormy weather to return to the Venetian island of Cerigo and the safety of the anchorage at S. Niccolò. At Cerigo they renewed their disputes about returning to Zante or Corfu in search of Don John, without whose ships and galleys it was now clear they could hardly hope to achieve a significant victory over the extraordinary Uluj-Ali. Should they leave the ships and galleasses behind at Cerigo or Candia in order to get to Zante or Corfu the more quickly? But suppose they were intercepted by Uluj-Ali without the heavy guns?<sup>150</sup>

Re-entering the harbor at Cerigo on 11 August, "our armada" remained there for four days, when rumor had it that Uluj-Ali's armament was being re-inforced by another fifty galleys. Colonna, Foscarini, and Gil de Andrade took counsel as to what they should do with the ships (*naves*) as they went back to Zante or Corfu to rejoin Don John. Colonna and the Spanish Hospitalier de Andrade were of the opinion they should send the ships the short distance to Candia, and then proceed to Zante with the galleys and galleasses. Foscarini objected, however, asserting that no harbor on the island of Crete would be secure from Turkish attack and the burning of the ships, which would be a victory for the enemy. There was no alternative, therefore, to the entire armada's going on to Zante, where it arrived on 17 or 18 August. The inhabitants of Zante, a Venetian island, flew to arms, says Servia,

thinking that it was the enemy armada, for they had a poor opinion of our armada as a consequence of the second battle. When they saw that we were friends, two armed galleys came out, one of Malta and the other of Naples, which his Highness was sending for word of our armada. They returned to his Highness with the news that it was safe at Zante.

Since Zante was close to Cephalonia and Corfu, the Christian commanders left the heavy ships in the harbor, and proceeded on 20 August with the galleys and galleasses to Cephalonia "to receive his Highness." They remained at Cephalonia for two days, departing on the twenty-fourth for the neighboring island of S. Maura. Don John had reached Corfu at night on 9 August. He had been

<sup>150</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 376-77; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 41-46.

waiting for them with extreme impatience for more than two weeks, and on the twenty-eighth he sent two galleys to Colonna and de Andrade with orders "que toda la armada fuese en Corfu." Returning to Zante, Colonna and his fellow commanders picked up the *naves*, which were already on their way northward under full sail. On 31 August the armada reached the mainland port of Gomenizza, opposite the southern end of Corfu, stopping to take on water, but Don John demanded that Colonna and Foscarini come immediately to Corfu,

and at midday the armada arrived at Corfu, with a great salvo of artillery and arquebus-fire, where they found his Highness with 50 galleys, five galliots, two galleasses of the duke of Florence, and thirty ships.<sup>151</sup>

Despite the salvo of artillery, no one was pleased with anyone. Don John was indignant that Colonna and Foscarini had not waited for him at Corfu. Colonna was much annoyed that Don John had not come as far as Zante to meet them, while Foscarini had opposed leaving Cerigo in the first place to join Don John at such a distance as Zante. Also, as Colonna explained in an *apologia* to Philip II (at the beginning of 1573), the Venetians were always opposed to his wishes and to those of Gil de Andrade, whom they did not regard as a commander. Furthermore, the Venetians refused to recognize Don John's authority as supreme when it came to making important decisions, and the generalissimo usually addressed his orders to Colonna and Gil de Andrade.<sup>152</sup> Sereno has much to say of Don John's petulance and of the difficulties which both Colonna and Gil de Andrade had with his self-willed Highness. The discreet Servia, however, gives us no hint of the animus and altercation which marked the reunion of the generals, merely noting that on 3 September (1572) Don John consulted with his colleagues. Orders were then issued to clean, caulk, and tar the bottoms of the galleys, galleasses, and ships, and to take on enough water

for ten days. Four days later, on the seventh, the enlarged armada left Corfu for Gomenizza.

On 9 September Don John was informed "that the enemy armada was at Navarino, a port in the Morea, with 218 fine galleys and fifty galliots, with every intention of awaiting the battle." The next day Don John sailed from Gomenizza, to go in search of Uluj-Ali's armada, with 195 galleys, 25 galliots, eight galleasses, and 25 ships, leaving the frigates and brigantines behind. The order of sailing and of battle was like that at Lepanto, with Don John in the center of the *battaglia*, the papal and Venetian flagships on either side, with 65 galleys. Álvaro de Bazán, the marquis of Santa Cruz, was in command of the right wing of 50 galleys, Soranzo in the left wing with another 50, and Juan de Cardona in the rearguard, the "soccorso," with the remaining thirty. A vanguard went eight miles ahead of the armada during the day, four miles ahead at night. By 12 September what Servia calls the "Catholic armada" was in the harbor of Cephalonia, where two Christians who had escaped from the Turks reported that Uluj-Ali was fearful of meeting the armada, for his cannonry was inadequate.

By 15 September the Christian armada was at the island of "Astanfaria" (Stamphane, the Strophades), where upon his escape from Lepanto in '71 Uluj-Ali had burned the monastery, and slaughtered the monks. The island was almost halfway from Zante to Navarino. Don John spent the day in the Strophades, expecting to sail at night and catch Uluj-Ali at dawn in Navarino, behind the historic island of Sphacteria. By the time of his arrival, however, the Turks had sailed a few miles south to the harbor of Modon "to be more secure than in Navarino." Exchanges of gunfire amounted to nothing. In fact the next three weeks amounted to nothing.

The galleys of the Holy League anchored off the island of Sapienza, scarcely a mile from the well-defended harbor of Modon. On 18 September they went around Cape Gallo to get water at a stream a half-dozen miles north of the lofty, impregnable Turkish stronghold of Coron. The soldiers who were sent ashore for water were attacked, but when Don John landed troops, the Turks withdrew. Returning to Sapienza, the Christians made various plans and several efforts to enter the harbor of Modon, but the Turkish defense was such that one by one the plans were discarded, and the efforts proved to be in vain. Don John sent for reinforcements from the island of Zante, and took his armada into the harbor of

<sup>151</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 377-78, and see Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, doc. no. VIII, pp. 372-73, an indignant letter from Don John to Colonna, dated at Corfu on 26 August, 1572. On Don John's increasing rancor against Colonna and the latter's resentment, see Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," pp. 438-45. Manfroni, who always defends Colonna, depicts Don John's conduct as rather childish in (among other things) requiring Colonna and Foscarini to return all the way to Corfu rather than agreeing to meet them at Zante. Serrano is always defensive of the Spaniards.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 47-51, 59 ff.

Navarino (where water was plentiful), from which he could keep an eye on any Turkish galleys issuing from nearby Modon.<sup>155</sup>

The so-called theater of operations was now confined to the narrow areas on land and at sea between Navarino and Modon. Despite the costly grandeur of preparations and the proud banners on the masts, the expedition of 1572 was becoming less a pageant of victory than a comic opera. When on the morning of 20 September some thirty Turkish galleys set forth from Modon to find out what the armada of the League was up to, "para reconocer á donde iba la armada católica," Don John sent out Álvaro de Bazán after them with the galleys of the right wing. Bazán's cannon sent the Turks scurrying back into Modon behind the shelter of Sapienza. When the Christians went ashore for water, and they were always "haciendo agua," the Turks attacked them. Renegades and Christian captives who broke loose from Modon informed Don John that Uluj-Ali was very apprehensive, having reinforced thirty-two of his galleys, and had the rest hauled up, stern first, on the low-lying shore of Modon, mounting their guns in "forts" he had put up on land.

The next day, 21 September, the Turks in the castle which rose above the bay of Navarino fired three or four rounds of artillery. Don John sent men on a scouting expedition "para reconocer el castillo," and that night he dispatched twenty armed galleys to Zante to tow the ships and bring the German infantry to Navarino to help deal with the Turks. On the morning of 23 September the ships left Zante for Navarino, while the twenty galleys took on board fresh troops. The stormy season was beginning, however, and a gale whipped up by the southwest wind drove the ships back into the harbor of Zante. During the next two days the infantry, artillery, munitions, supplies, and equipment for sappers were removed from the ships and put aboard the galleys to assure their more expeditious delivery to Don John. But, alas, the transfer of the men and everything else had been unnecessary, for on 26 September the sea became calm. The galleys and ships weighed anchor together "con buen tiempo," and on the twenty-sev-

enth they sailed into the bay of Navarino, where the generalissimo awaited them.

Meanwhile two galleys had been stripped, bound together, and their decks covered with planks to form a gun platform which, it was hoped, might be pushed into the channel behind Sapienza, where the Christian cannoners could blow to pieces the Turkish galleys crowded into the small harbor of Modon. Don John's armada could not enter the harbor, for the channel was too narrow, and Turkish guns were mounted on the mainland shore. But the gun platform, like everything else, was a failure. Time was growing short. The southwest wind was rising. The rain was beginning. There was a breath of winter in the atmosphere.

On 2 October Don John put 5,000 infantry ashore. During the night they climbed the steep slope to the Turkish castle above the bay of Navarino. The occupation of the castle, apparently easier to take than Modon (still defended by its old Venetian walls), would give the discouraged forces of the league a foothold on land. Alessandro Farnese, the prince of Parma, was given charge of the infantry. The futile exertion of three or four days was enough, however, and on Sunday, 5 October, Don John ordered the re-embarkation of the men and artillery, for time was short, provisions were shorter, "and also because the beylerbey of Greece had come with a relief force of 20,000 horse, while about 750 soldiers had died in the siege."

At an hour and a half after daybreak on 7 October, the first anniversary of Lepanto, Don John gave orders to weigh anchor, and the armada sailed to Modon, while the heavy, slow-moving ships began their return to Zante. To the distress of the Venetians, he had announced that the campaign was over. As the galleys of the league paid their last "visit" to Modon, it was discovered that twenty Turkish galleys were in pursuit of a ship some fifteen miles at sea. The Christians quickened their pace as fast as sails and oars allowed them, heading for Sapienza with their cannon roaring, to try to cut off the Turkish galleys from re-entering the refuge of Modon. The Turks hastily gave up their attempt to take the ship, making for Modon with all possible speed. Uluj-Ali sent out fifteen galleys "to bombard our armada," to encourage and assist the twenty galleys endangered by Don John's approach. All the Turkish galleys got safely into port except one, a splendid flagship (*la galera enemiga capitana de fanal*), which Álvaro de Bazán captured after a struggle.

The captain to whom the flagship belonged was the commander of fifty galleys in the sultan's ar-

<sup>155</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 378-82; Sereno, *Commentari*, pp. 294-306; C. Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVII (1894), 23-38; Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 92 ff., 110 ff.; and cf. Longo, *Successo della guerra*, *Arch. stor. italiano*, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 41-42 and ff. Longo was a Venetian publicist; his work is anti-Spanish, and on the whole of little value.

mada, the son of Hassan Pasha, the "king of Algiers," and the grandson of Khaireddin Barbarossa. The Turk, "whose own arrogance did him in" (*el cual por bizarría se perdió*), says Servia, was slain by one of his own stern-rowers before Bazán's men had even boarded the flagship. He was twenty-two years of age, and had been brought up a dog of a Turk, an enemy of the Christians. Two hundred Christians were rescued, and two hundred janissaries captured. The ship which the Turks had tried to capture was a Venetian "nave" coming from Candia. The captured flagship was then taken with the Christian armada to Navarino, whence the ships had set sail for Zante.

The armada itself left Navarino the following day, 8 October. It reached Zante on the ninth or tenth, Cephalonia on the fifteenth, and despite storms entered the port of Gomenizza on the eighteenth, although a papal galley, the *S. Pietro*, ran aground at midnight. On 19 October, Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the duke of Sessa, and Giannantonio Doria arrived at Gomenizza "with thirteen galleys," says Servia, "loaded with Spanish infantry—they were received with a great salvo of artillery and arquebuses, although they came late." On 20 October the armada crossed the channel from Gomenizza to Corfu, and two days later Don John, firing a salvo of farewell, was off to Messina, where he arrived on 26 October with more meaningless salvos of artillery, "which shook the earth." Colonna also departed to return to Rome. The Venetian fleet remained in the spacious anchorages at Corfu. At colossal expense the expedition had achieved nothing but the capture of a Turkish galley. The leaders were estranged from one another, despite their outward courtesies and alleged hopes to pursue the Turk the following year. The good Franciscan Miguel Servia ends his account of the naval campaign of 1572 with the prayer that "it may please our Lord God that the armada of the Holy League may have better success next year, and may He not allow any attack upon Christendom, but only peace and concord."<sup>154</sup>

There was peace between the two chief military partners in the league, Venice and Spain, but there was certainly little concord. On 24 October, two

days after Don John's departure from Corfu, the captain-general Giacomo Foscarini wrote the Signoria that the Spaniards had been the sole reason why so little had been accomplished by the expedition. Instead of trying to achieve the objectives of the league they had sought to weaken, indeed to ruin, the Venetians. The lateness of Don John's arrival and his irresolution throughout the whole course of the expedition had had no purpose but, little by little, to destroy the forces of the Republic. He was chiefly interested in the Spaniards' making progress against the rebels in Flanders, disregarding and even damaging the interests of the league. Almost nothing had been more evident than the Spaniards' willful opposition to everything that might have been of advantage to Venice.

Such was Foscarini's view of Don John's performance at Modon and Navarino. Colonna was more careful: he was a vassal of Philip II; nevertheless, he resented the generalissimo's criticism. As for Don John, although he chose his words with care, he had small regard for the Venetians, and he looked upon Colonna as their ally. When the three generals bade one another farewell at Corfu (on 22 October), they expressed the resolve to get an earlier start and do better when the spring came. They did not, however, believe that such would be the case, nor did anyone else.<sup>155</sup>

Although not nearly in such serious trouble as poor old Girolamo Zane had been after his failure to relieve Cyprus, Foscarini had to blame someone. His return to Venice would be embarrassing. As for the Spanish, Philip II had spent fortunes on the expeditions into the Levant in 1570 and especially in '71 and '72, when he would have much preferred to use his men and money, artillery and galleys against Algiers and Bizerte, Tunis and Tripoli. The Venetians had stood to gain the most from any lasting success which the Christians might achieve in the eastern Mediterranean. Philip was no friend of the Venetians, and so why had he helped them? The answer is clear: if he had not done so, they would have made peace with the Porte, and Philip would have had to deal by himself with the Turkish armada's presence on the Barbary coast. If the combined armaments of Spain and Venice could cripple the Turks, Philip would obviously have an easier time trying to take the Moslem strongholds in North Africa. Also

<sup>154</sup> Servia, in *Docs. inéditos*, XI, 382–88; Sereno, *Commentari*, bks. 1v–v, pp. 308–28; Manfroni, "La Lega cristiana nel 1572," *Arch. della R. Società romana di storia patria*, XVII (1894), 38–54, with selections from Colonna's letters; and cf. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, I, 484–501; esp. Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 110 ff., 128–50 and ff.; and Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II (1966), 409–14.

<sup>155</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 147–48, and cf. *ibid.*, append., no. XIII, pp. 381–83, a letter of Don John to Philip II, dated at Fossa di S. Giovanni on 24 October, 1572.

there is no question but what Philip, as the strongest monarch in Christendom, felt an obligation to take action against the plundering Turks. It was the bounden duty of the Hapsburgs in Spain as well as of those in Austria.

The plea which Miguel Servia addressed to heaven for peace and concord was well made, for 1572 was a disturbing year. On 7 July Sigismund II Augustus died at Knyszyn in northeastern Poland, leaving no heir to succeed him. Deeply concerned for the future of his native land, Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius addressed an open letter from Subiaco (on 31 July) to the high clergy, palatines, and nobles of Poland. Expressing the fervent hope that Sigismund had been received "in piorum sedes," he declared that, as they knew even better than he, the king's early death endangered the entire realm. It was devoutly to be wished that the electoral diet might choose a king with the same "celerity and felicity" as the conclave had elected Gregory XIII to the papal throne less than three months before. Poland had been beset with religious dissension for some fifty years. Hosius feared for the future; he feared the evil work of Satan. Poland was threatened by Turks, Tatars, Vlachs, Muscovites, "and probably by others too, whom I prefer to pass over in silence." The electoral diet had a grave responsibility to meet.<sup>156</sup>

In mid-October (1572) a Spanish Jesuit, Francisco Toledo, fell in with Niccolò Barbarigo, a Venetian "advocate of the Commune," who was on a judicial circuit in the Veronese. Toledo was returning to Rome from a diplomatic mission to the Emperor Maximilian II in Vienna. Earlier in the year Toledo had been in Poland. Each very likely known to the other by reputation, Barbarigo and Toledo spent some time together, and the latter unburdened himself to the Venetian with surprising frankness. He told Barbarigo that even if the Archduke Ernst, son of the emperor, were elected king of Poland, he doubted very much that Poland could be drawn into the Holy League. If the son of the duke of Moscow were elected, there could be no hope at all. Toledo, a servitor of the Holy See, also said he was inclined to think that Venice would get "more words than deeds" from the recently-elected Gregory XIII, and that one

should not put overmuch confidence in the new pope's promises. Pius V had been a truer soul, more forthright in his dealings with others, and quite dedicated to the well-being of Venice. When Barbarigo returned home, he appeared before the Collegio, and gave a full report of what Toledo had had to say.<sup>157</sup> One can only wonder what influence, if any, Toledo's remarks may have had on Venetian policy, but as far as the expedition of 1572 was concerned, the Signoria could have no complaint of Gregory's zeal for the war against the Turk.

Early in the following year Henry [III] of Anjou, the younger brother of Charles IX, was chosen king of Poland. He reigned briefly (in 1573-1574), and then returned home to succeed his brother as king of France. Two or three years before, since it looked as though Sigismund Augustus would die without heirs, the Turks had suggested Henry's election to the Polish throne.<sup>158</sup> The Polish election was a matter of great importance on the eastern front in 1572-1573. In fact it was a matter of importance to all Europe. Although Henry had been loath to leave France, his brother Charles had been insistent. Ivan IV the Terrible, the grand duke of Moscow, had sought the throne, but nobody wanted him or his son. Maximilian II's son, the Archduke Ernst, was the choice of the Holy See. His election, some thought (but not Francisco Toledo), might bring his father as well as him into the Holy League against the Turks. The Muscovites were watching the election, and so were the Turks.

A report from the diet at Warsaw, dated 4 May (1573), a few days before Henry's election, brought the news that Ivan IV had sent no ambassador to the diet, but he had sent letters: If the Poles chose not to elect him, they should not elect the brother of the king of France, "who is the friend and ally of the Turks." If they made Henry king, their prospect would be "unending war" (*guerra perpetua*). If they chose the Archduke Ernst, however, Ivan would not fail to be their friend, "cosa che ha dato da pensar molto." Sultan Selim did not send a *ch'ush*, but letters had come from Wallachia, from the pasha of Buda, who was acting upon orders from the Porte: The pasha's letters said that the

<sup>156</sup> Arch. Segr. Vaticano, Lettere di principi, vol. XXIV, fols. 138-39, and cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 157, p. 250, a letter of the nuncio Giannantonio Facchinetti to Cardinal Tolomeo Galli, Gregory XIII's secretary of state, dated at Venice on 26 July.

<sup>157</sup> Gaetano Cozzi, "Un Documento sulla crisi della 'Sacra Lega': Le Confidenze del Padre Francisco Toledo all'avogadore di comun Nicolò Barbarigo (ottobre 1572)," *Archivio veneto*, XCI (ser. V, vol. 67), 76-96, esp. pp. 81 ff., 90, 95.

<sup>158</sup> See above, Chapter 21, p. 938, and on Henry of Anjou's election as king of Poland, cf. the baillie Barbaro's letters from Pera at the beginning of July, 1573, in the Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 391 (8873), fols. 478-81, 486\*.

Poles must elect Henry and not an enemy of the Turks, "unless they wished to make trial of the awful power and mighty empire of his Signore, but if they elected the Frenchman, he promised them unending peace [*pace perpetua*]." <sup>159</sup>

The Turkish conquest of the Balkans had been made easier by the schism between the Greek East and the Latin West, and since the time of Martin Luther the gradual division of Europe into a Protestant North and a Catholic South had certainly facilitated the Turks' access to eastern Hungary, the Adriatic, and the coast of North Africa. The Lutherans were the unwitting and unwilling allies of the Turks. <sup>160</sup> Where the Lutherans were not a problem, the Calvinists, the "Huguenots," were, especially in the Netherlands and in France. <sup>161</sup> After a decade of civil and religious wars in France a massacre of the Huguenots began in Paris during the early morning hours of Sunday, 24 August (1572), the feast of S. Bartholomew. The leader of the Huguenots, Gaspard de Coligny, the admiral of France, was among the first to be slain (by henchmen of Henri, duke of Guise), and the murdering madness spread to other parts of the kingdom. *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*. Coligny had been the chief advocate of Charles IX's helping the Protestant rebels in Flanders. He was the brother of the heretical Cardinal Odet de Châtillon. Philip II rejoiced in the Massacre of S. Bartholomew, and Gregory XIII had a medal struck to commemorate the *Ugonottorum strages*, but the massacre brought neither religious peace nor a change in the foreign policy of France. After the alleged freedom of worship and conscience proclaimed in the treaty of La Rochelle (on 1 July, 1573), the Huguenots remained the strong opponents of the coming Catholic League. <sup>162</sup>

Although Henry [III] had aligned himself with his mother and the Guises in helping to contrive

the Massacre of S. Bartholomew, once more the Protestants could share the satisfaction of the Turks in a Hapsburg setback, for Henry's election prevented the addition of Poland to the Hapsburg family alliance of the Spains, Naples, Sicily, Lombardy, the Empire, Austria, and Bohemia. S. Bartholomew did not mean that the Valois were veering toward Spain, but François de Noailles, the bishop of Dax, the French ambassador to the Porte, was quite understandably confused. Toward the end of September (1572) de Noailles had left the Bosphorus without having managed to effect peace between the Venetians and the Turks. He had, however, as he wrote Charles IX from a port near Ragusa on 28 November (1572), negotiated what he regarded as "the most ample and advantageous treaty which has ever been obtained from the Levant." <sup>163</sup> It was in fact a Franco-Turkish military alliance against Spain.

According to the (Italian) text of a letter from Sultan Selim to Charles IX, the latter was to launch an all-out attack upon Philip II's domains when the time and season were right. By the beginning of June the sultan would send two hundred galleys to the French port of Toulon to assist in the war against Philip. As long as Charles's efforts against Spain continued, the Turks would send two hundred galleys every year, "le quali sieno per aiutare e favorire detta guerra." Furthermore, whatever territories might be taken from Philip, either in Spain or in Italy, were to belong to the French, for the Porte would make no claim to them.

When François de Noailles reached the Adriatic coast, however, as he wrote Catherine de' Medici, he learned of S. Bartholomew, "ce qui estoit advenu à Paris le XXIII<sup>e</sup> d' aoust dernier," and he feared that this might well cause "quelque changement aux affaires de ma légation." Although a loyal servitor of Charles and Catherine, de Noailles had been a close friend of Coligny and the latter's brother, the heretical Cardinal de Châtillon. The French government recognized de Noailles as the bishop of Dax, but he had been under the ban of the Church for almost ten years. <sup>163</sup> It might not be a good time for a heretic to return to France. In any event de Noailles realized that it had been a mistake to leave Istanbul. As he informed Charles (in his letter of 28 November), he had decided to return to the Porte

<sup>159</sup> Cod. Urb. lat. 1043, fol. 239<sup>r</sup>, di *Varsovia li 4 Maggio* 1573; note, *ibid.*, fols. 251 ff., 266<sup>r</sup>; and cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 303 ff., 342 ff.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. K. M. Setton, "Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril," *Balkan Studies*, III (Thessaloniki, 1962), 133-68, and Carl Göllner, "Die Türkenfrage im Spannungsfeld der Reformation," *Südost-Forschungen*, XXXIV (1975), 61-78.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Jacques Pannier, "Calvin et les Turcs," *Revue historique*, CLXXX (1937), 268-86.

<sup>162</sup> See the lively account of Philippe Erlanger, *Le Massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy*, Paris and Mayenne, 1960, esp. pp. 157 ff., 252 ff., trans. Patrick O'Brian, London and New York, 1962, pp. 156 ff., 240 ff.; and on the background of events, note N. M. Sutherland, *The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict, 1559-1572*, London and Basingstoke, 1973.

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VII (repr. 1957), 423-26. De Noailles had arrived in Istanbul on 13 March, 1572, and left the city on 20 September, according to the *batte* Barbaro (Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. V.11, 391 [8873], fols. 261<sup>r</sup>, 330<sup>r</sup>).

not so much in any hope I have of being able to do some service for you in accord with the mandate you gave me as to rebut the views which the Spaniards and others could spread abroad at the Porte concerning what has happened in France. . . .

Also, as de Noailles added, after the failure of the expedition of the Holy League this year (1572), the Venetians would have more need than ever of Charles's "name and authority" to arrange a peace with the Turks.<sup>164</sup>

De Noailles remained at Ragusa until mid-January, 1573, when he began the long, slow journey back to Istanbul in stormy weather along bad roads. He reached the Turkish capital on 28 February, as he wrote Catherine de' Medici a week later, at which time he could also inform her,

As for peace with the Venetians, the pasha [Mehmed Sokolli] has freely acknowledged, after much discussion of the subject, that the baillie [Marc' Antonio Barbaro] had sought it again, and that they had got very close to concluding a peace.<sup>165</sup>

In actual fact the peace had already been agreed upon, and Marc' Antonio Barbaro signed it on behalf of the Signoria on the following day, 7 March, eight days after de Noailles's arrival on the Bosphorus. He claimed credit for the peace.<sup>166</sup> He had had something to do with it, but apparently not much.

The peace was the work of the baillie Barbaro. He had been secretly instructed by the Council of Ten as early as 19 September, 1572, to negotiate a peace with the Porte. The Venetians later claimed that they had spent more than twelve

million ducats on the war, that their subjects in the Levant had been reduced to intolerable misery, and "that in the coming year the armada of the Turk would be more powerful than ever, made up of four hundred sail." In making peace, according to the Venetians, they had taken thought not only of preserving their possessions but also of ensuring the safety of Italy.<sup>167</sup>

There had been rumors in Rome and elsewhere that the Venetians might make peace. Cardinal Tolomeo Galli, Gregory XIII's secretary of state, had addressed a worried inquiry to the nuncio Giannantonio Facchinetti, who answered him on 17 January (1573). The nuncio stated that he had read at a regular meeting of the Collegio that portion of Galli's letter containing an expression of the pope's desire to know what provisions the Venetians were making for the naval campaign against the Turks in the coming spring. The last part of Galli's letter concerning the rumors of an accord with the Turks Facchinetti read later at a small, closed meeting of the Collegio, at which the

<sup>167</sup> One may find hastily-written summaries of extracts from Marc' Antonio Barbaro's letters to the doge and the Council of Ten in the *Estraedi di lettere al Consiglio de X con la Zonta del bailo Barbaro in Costantinopoli, che concluso la famosa pace dopo la guerra di Cipro, il tutto con la maggior fedeltà cavato dalla publica Segreta*, in the Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 410 (8711), 41 fols., title taken from the heading on fol. 29<sup>r</sup>. As often noted above, however, the complete texts of Barbaro's letters to the doge and the Council of Ten are preserved in the Marciana, MSS. It. VII, 390-91 (8872-73).

It was on 19 September, 1572, that the Council of Ten directed Barbaro to arrange a peace with the Turks (almost in the midst of the Christians' third Levantine expedition), on which see Barbaro's letter of 13 January, 1573 (Ven. style 1572), given in MS. It. VII, 391 (8873), fol. 372<sup>r</sup>, and cf. the *Estraedi di lettere al Consiglio de X*, fol. 29<sup>r</sup>. One may follow in the text of Barbaro's letters (MS. Ital. VII, 391 [8873], fols. 372<sup>r</sup>-414, and to a lesser extent in the *Estraedi*, fols. 29 ff.) his dealings, mostly through the "Rabbi" Salomon Askenasi, with Mehmed Sokolli during January, February, and early March (1573). The bishop of Dax had indeed mixed himself up in the negotiations, which Barbaro accepted willingly, "introducendo lo stesso Aix [Dax] alla conclusione accio nella capitolazione si possa inserir l' autorita del re Christianissimo" (*ibid.*, fol. 37<sup>r</sup>, and cf. MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fols. 395<sup>r</sup>-396<sup>r</sup>, *et alibi*).

The result was the "perpetual peace" of 1573, costing Venice 300,000 ducats and certain territorial concessions. Barbaro gives the terms of the peace (MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fols. 414<sup>r</sup>-417). To no small extent the peace was the result of Askenasi's effective mediation between Mehmed Sokolli and Barbaro. On 3 April, 1573, the Senate ordered that Gregory XIII should be informed of "la conclusione della pace" (*Estraedi*, fols. 39<sup>r</sup>-40<sup>r</sup>). It would be difficult to determine how much Venice had spent on the war but, despite the letters of the bishop of Dax, there does seem to have been some truth in the widespread report "che l' armada del Turco nell' anno venturo sarebbe più poderosa che mai, composta di 400 vele" (fol. 40<sup>r</sup>), and the Venetians would be glad of the peace.

<sup>164</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 312-17, who gives the texts of de Noailles's letter of 28 November to Charles IX, his (undated) letter to Catherine de' Medici, and Selim II's (undated) letter to Charles. The chief reason for de Noailles's departure, a hasty departure, from Istanbul had been his fear of Charles IX's "resolution to take possession of Algiers" for his brother Henry of Anjou. The French hoped that Selim would give up Algiers, so that they might defend it against Spain.

The Turkish response was that although the sultan would have liked to gratify Charles and Henry, he could not give up Algiers any more than he could Istanbul. The tenets of Islam forbade it (Charrière, III, 293-94, 298-99, letters of de Noailles to Charles, dated at Istanbul 8-14 August and 4 September, 1572). De Noailles's apprehension over l' *affaire d' Alger* passed with Sigismund Augustus's death and Henry's likely election as king of Poland (cf. *ibid.*, p. 345).

<sup>165</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 355, 359, letter of de Noailles to Catherine de' Medici, dated at Istanbul on 6 March, 1573.

<sup>166</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 361 ff., letter of de Noailles to Charles IX, dated at Istanbul on 8 March, 1573, and note Alberto Tenenti, "La Francia, Venezia e la Sacra Lega," in G. Benzioni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, esp. pp. 405-7.

Capi of the Council of Ten were present. As for Venetian preparations against the Turks, the Doge Alvise Mocenigo declared the Signoria would have at least 112 galleys ready, ships enough to carry victuals and other "things necessary" for those aboard the galleys, and at least 12,000 soldiers. In fact they had it in mind that very evening to make a motion (*mettere la parte*) in the Senate to raise another 12,000 troops. The Signoria would be ready for action by the end of March.

As for the rumored negotiations for peace with the Turks, Facchinetti declared that his Holiness had at heart beyond all else "il felice progresso di questa Santa Lega." There was a widespread and most disturbing suspicion that the Signoria was seeking an accord in Istanbul with the assistance of the French. The nuncio asked the doge, the Capi del Consiglio de' X, and other members of the Collegio to assure the pope "of their constancy and perseverance in the war," for thus one could bring all the more pressure upon Philip II to keep the promises he had made. The doge replied almost testily that he had already stated "that they did not know the reason for the coming of the bishop of Dax, and that they did not have any negotiation for an accord with the Turk. . . ." The doge added, apparently annoyed, that the pope had asked the Venetian ambassador Paolo Tiepolo about these alleged discussions with the Turks, "and that it was now necessary for them to think of war and not of peace—these were the doge's exact words!"

In Facchinetti's opinion, if the emperor should enter the league, and Philip II should say go-ahead (*dicesse davvero*), the Venetians would persevere in their military efforts. There was also, however, a good deal of skepticism as to Philip's next move, for many persons believed that he was unwilling to risk his galleys in battle. If Philip made sufficient headway with his galleys and troops, Facchinetti believed that for 1573 at least the Venetians would do what they could against the Turks at sea. He does not mention the fact but, despite the Capitulation of 25 May, 1571, according to which the allies should put to sea against the Turks in March or in April at the latest, Don John had not reached Corfu until September in 1571 and August in 1572. Nevertheless, if the bishop of Dax was to be the instrument of the Signoria's peace with the Porte, recent letters made clear that "he had not yet left Ragusa."<sup>168</sup>

Actually Philip II seemed to be making extensive preparations,<sup>169</sup> but would the Spanish forces really reach Corfu in time for a successful campaign against the Turks? Whatever their doubts, the Venetians kept them to themselves, and in Rome on 27 February, 1573, the ambassador Paolo Tiepolo signed another binding Capitulation in the presence of Cardinals Giovanni Morone, Mark Sittich de Atempes, Tolomeo Galli, Gianpaolo della Chiesa, Pietro Donato Cesi, Giovanni Aldobrandini, and the pope's nephew Filippo Boncompagni. For the fourth year in succession the allied expedition was to go into the Levant to do the enemy all possible harm. The papal and "Catholic" fleets would assemble at Messina in March—only a month after the renewal of the Capitulation was signed—and proceed straightway to Corfu to join the Venetian fleet.

The three participants in the Holy League would try to get 300 galleys ready for action; Gregory XIII was to supply at least 18, Philip 130, and the Signoria also 130 galleys. One galleass was to count for two galleys, and the Venetians were allowed to include 10 galleasses in their fleet of 130 galleys. Philip was to supply 24 ships (*navi*), the Venetians 16, to transport troops, victuals, munitions, arms, and other necessities. The allied army must number at least 60,000 infantry, of which the pope would supply 3,000, Philip 34,200, and Venice the remaining 22,800; there must also be 4,500 horse, as required by the Capitulation of 25 May, 1571. At Corfu a review of the armada was to be held to make certain that every galley carried at least 150 infantry. Detailed provision was made for arms and munitions.<sup>170</sup> Meanwhile in Venice the Spanish ambassador Diego Guzmán de Silva regarded the Signoria as lagging in preparations for the campaign, and Don John was worried lest, as in the earlier campaigns, the Venetian galleys should be short of manpower.<sup>171</sup>

While Philip II and Don John gave every evidence of continuing to recruit troops and equip their galleys, apparently for action in the Levant, Marc' Antonio Barbaro was seeking as reasonable terms for peace as he could obtain from Mehmed Sokolli. Suspicions of Venice were not abating, and on 19 March (1573) Gregory XIII issued the bull *In coena Domini*, excommunicating those who

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 249–52, 257–58.

<sup>169</sup> Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 216, pp. 377–79, a letter of Facchinetti to Cardinal Galli, dated at Venice on 17 January, 1573, and see, *ibid.*, nos. 217 ff.

<sup>170</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, append., no. XXXI, pp. 407–10, and cf. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 229, pp. 405–6.

<sup>171</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 249, and note, *ibid.*, pp. 301 ff., on Spanish doubts of Venetian reliability.



sought to dismantle the Holy League.<sup>172</sup> By this time, however, the bonds holding the allies together had become untied.

At Pera on 7 March, 1573,

I, Marc' Antonio Barbaro, procurator of S. Mark and bailie for the most serene Doge, the lord Alvise Mocenigo, and for the most serene Signoria of Venice at the Sublime Porte of the Gran Signore Sultan Selim Khan, son of Sultan Suleiman Khan, Emperor of the Moslems, by the commission and command given to me by the aforesaid most serene Doge and Signoria of Venice—I have made and concluded peace with the aforesaid most high and mighty Gran Signore Sultan Selim Khan on the basis of the articles given below. . . . For the observance of all these articles his imperial Majesty will give his noble command with his oath and promise, and for the confirmation of the aforesaid articles I, the aforesaid Marc' Antonio Barbaro, by the authority given me by the most serene Doge and Signoria of Venice, do swear and promise to Almighty God, to Jesus Christ, and on the holy Gospels that the most serene Signoria will observe inviolably and completely the aforesaid Capitulation, and in pledge of the truth herein I shall with my own hand sign and seal with the seal of S. Mark this Capitulation.

According to the articles of the Capitulation, Venice was to pay the Porte an indemnity of 300,000 ducats, "as was done in the time of the peace with Sultan Suleiman of auspicious memory [on 2 October, 1540]," but since the Signoria was obliged to surrender the island of Cyprus, the Cypriote tribute of 8,000 ducats a year was henceforth cancelled. Venice must surrender the stronghold of Sopotò with all its artillery. The inhabitants of the Castello who wished to remain in their dwellings were to be free to do so; those who wished to leave might also do so, taking their children and their movable properties with them without let or hindrance of any kind. The Venetian tribute of 500 ducats a year for peaceable possession of the island of Zante was raised to an annual assessment of 1,500 ducats. Sultan Selim II swore to maintain and observe all the terms of peace negotiated with his father Suleiman. The boundaries of both Turkish and Venetian territories in Albania and in Dalmatia were to be restored "si come stavano avanti il romper della pace," just as they were before 1570. The Venetian and Turkish merchants held captive by the one party or the other were to be released, their goods, merchandise, and ships being restored, and if any of their possessions had been sold or lost, the merchants were to receive proper compensation.<sup>173</sup>

The terms of the treaty were such that contemporaries said, as Charrière has noted, "it would seem that the Turks had won the battle of Lepanto." While de Noailles was ready to claim undue credit for bringing about the peace, he was most reluctant to have the harshness of the terms imputed to him. Immediately after writing Charles IX to inform him (on 8 March) of the peace, de Noailles also penned a letter to M. de Ferrals, the French ambassador in Rome. When one learned, he said modestly, that the peace had been made within a week of his arrival in Istanbul, it would be clear why he had returned from Ragusa. But he obviously wanted de Ferrals to make it clear in Rome, where the Curia held him in abomination, that he had grave reservations concerning the terms, and that he was not responsible for them although, of course, he had made the peace. We have already seen that Sereno in his *Commentari* described the armada which went out under Uluj-Ali in the early summer of 1572 as "of green timber and of slight durability" but, as we have said, de Noailles had praised the armada as a miracle in letters to Charles IX of 8 May and 10 June, 1572.<sup>174</sup>

Now, however, the good bishop of Dax had changed his mind. He could wonder at the acceptance of such painful terms

having seen toward the end of June [1572] an armada leave this port made up of new vessels, built of green timber, rowed by crews which had never held an oar, provided with artillery which had been cast in haste, several pieces being compounded of acidic and rotten material, with apprentice guides and mariners, and armed with men who were still stunned by the last battle. . . .

The generals of the Holy League had been well aware of the debility of the sultan's armada (and no one more so than Uluj-Ali, who had avoided a head-on collision with the Christian armada). Charles IX, however, had ordered de Noailles to restore the erstwhile neighborliness between Venice and the Porte. He had done so.<sup>175</sup> As far as the Curia Romana was concerned it was bad enough—more than bad enough—that he should have succeeded in breaking up the Holy League. He did

<sup>172</sup> Serrano, *loc. cit.*, and cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XIX, 331–33, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, IX, 241–42.

<sup>173</sup> The Turco-Venetian treaty, with Selim II's confirmation (in Italian), is given in J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*,

V-1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), no. CIII, pp. 218–19, the Cypriote tribute being incorrectly given as 80,000 ducats on p. 218b, but correctly as 8,000 on p. 219a.

<sup>174</sup> Cf. above, note 123.

<sup>175</sup> Charrière, *Négociations*, III, 362, note. On the rebuilding of the Turkish armada after Lepanto, cf. Robert Mantran, "L'Écho de la bataille de Lépante à Constantinople," in G. Benzoni, ed., *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, Florence, 1974, esp. pp. 250 ff.

not wish to be held accountable for the extent to which the Turks would profit from the peace.

On 2 April, 1573, Francesco Barbaro, son of the bailie Marc' Antonio, arrived in Venice, having come posthaste from Istanbul, bringing letters from his father addressed to the Signoria and to the heads, the Capi, of the Council of Ten. The most recent letters were dated 13 March, on which day a few details in the treaty had been clarified. The letters sent to the Capi contained a full account of Barbaro's negotiations with Mehmed Sokolli Pasha, *primo visir*, which had led to the restoration of peace between Venice and the Porte. The Capi should have been pleased; Barbaro had followed their instructions in every way. The Senate was at least a bit taken aback. In the first draft of a letter of the doge in praise and commendation of Barbaro (authorized by the Senate on 6 April by an affirmative vote of 156, with only four negative and six uncommitted votes) the helpful intermediation of the so-called Rabbi Salomon Askenasi was acknowledged (*col mezzo di Rabbi Salomon*). Reference to the rabbi's usefulness in the negotiations was deleted, however, in the text of the letter sent to Barbaro, to whom full credit was given for getting the Turkish accord, although it must be admitted that in the emended text even praise of Barbaro became somewhat muted. The latter was informed that Andrea Badoer had been elected ambassador to the Porte, and that the Senate would shortly choose a new bailie "secondo il desiderio et bisogno vostro."<sup>176</sup>

<sup>176</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol. On 6 April, 1573, "essendosi conclusa la pace fra 'l serenissimo Signor Turco et la Signoria nostra." Andrea Badoer was named ambassador to the Porte, with the usual allowance "per sue spese ducati duseuto d'oro in oro al mese senza obbligo di mostrarne conto" (*ibid.*).

On the same day the doge and Senate wrote Selim II (*ibid.*), "Dalle honoratissime lettere di vostra imperial Maestà habbiamo con satisfatione dell' animo nostro intesa la conclusione della pace firmata tra lei et la Signoria nostra col mezzo del diletteissimo nobel nostro Marc' Antonio Barbaro, procurator, bailo nostro residente alla sua Sublime Porta con le conditioni et modi in esse sue lettere contenuti, onde con ogni sincerità le affermiamo ch'è sì come li successi passati ci sono stati di grande dispiacere, così questa reconciliazione et pace ci ha apportato contento.

"La qual pace facemo certa vostra imperial Maestà che da noi et da tutti li ministri et rappresentanti nostri sarà interamente osservata et con quella sincerità et candidezza d' animo, colla quale ci rendiamo certi che dalli et dalli ministri et rappresentanti di vostra imperial Maestà alli confini et altrove sarà in ogni sua parte medesimoamente osservata et eseguita come ricerca la giustizia, et conviene alla grande bontà sua per conservar l' antica amicitia che habbiamo havuta colli serenissimi suoi predecessori, sì come più a pieno le sarà esposto con la viva

In a long letter of 3 April (1573) the doge and Senate notified Leonardo Donado and Lorenzo Priuli,<sup>177</sup> their ambassadors in Madrid, of the peace which the bailie Barbaro had made with the Porte, instructing them to justify the action thus taken, when in the name of the Signoria they informed Philip II that Venice had dropped out of the Holy League. The Signoria had fulfilled all its obligations to the league. The Venetian galleys and troops had always been ready and on time. The Republic's territories in Dalmatia were in grave danger of falling into Turkish hands. They could no longer stand the fire and pillage. The people were desperate. Venice had exceeded her capacity, financially and militarily. The Turk had completely rebuilt his armada after the defeat at Lepanto. He was as powerful at sea as on land, for from all sides came the news that he had ready more than three hundred galleys and more than a hundred other "armed vessels," including a good number of galleasses (*maone*). This gigantic

voce d' uno nostro ambasciatore [Badoer], quale habbiamo già eletto et destinato a vostra imperial Maestà, li anni della quale siano molti et felicissimi. +156, 4, 6."

A similar letter, also dated 6 April, was sent to Mehmed Pasha, *primo visir del serenissimo Signor Turco* (*ibid.*), expressing the Signoria's pleasure in the renewal of peace with the Porte, "... la quale pace, si come siamo avvisati dal predetto baillo [Marc' Antonio Barbaro], è seguita mediante l' opera et la grande autorità di vostra Magnificenza, per il che la ringratiamo grandemente della buona volontà sua et della grand' affettione ch' ella in ogni tempo et specialmente in questo negotio ha dimostrato verso di noi. . . +156, 4, 6."

Rabbi Salomon, incidentally, remained a useful informant concerning Turkish affairs (note, *ibid.*, the letter of the doge and Senate to Alvise Grimani, the Venetian provveditore in Dalmatia, dated 2 October, 1573, and on Salomon, see the letter of the doge and Senate to Antonio Tiepolo, Barbaro's successor as bailie in Istanbul, dated 1 September, 1574, *et alibi*). Salomon was in Venice in the summer of 1574. On the "rabbi," apparently a title of honor, cf. also Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MS. It. VII, 410 (8711), fols. 30<sup>r</sup>, 31<sup>r</sup>-32, 33, 34<sup>r</sup>, 35 ff., and MS. It. VII, 391 (8875), *passim*, dispatches of Barbaro, who calls him "il dottor Rabi Salomon Ascanazi" (e.g., fol. 224<sup>r</sup>), and of fol. 110<sup>v</sup>: "Rabi Salomon medico." On one occasion, after peace had been made, Salomon moved Barbaro greatly by telling him in emotional tones "che tutta la natione hebrea si sente obligatissima a quell' eccellentissima Republica [Venice], poichè veramente in niuna parte del mondo ella è stata meglio trattata. . ." (*ibid.*, fol. 439<sup>r</sup>), a letter to the doge dated at Pera on 7 May, 1573).

<sup>177</sup> Although Priuli had been elected "ambasciatore nostro al serenissimo Re Catholico in luogo del diletto nobile nostro Lumardo Donado" (his commission, dated 13 September, 1572, may be found in Sen. Secreta, Reg. 78, fols. 128-129 [150-151]), Donado did not return to Venetian territory until November, 1573 (Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, II, no. 289, p. 748, a letter of Donado to the doge and Senate dated in the Veronese on 12 November, 1573).

armada of a full four hundred sail was ready to take to the sea "to our loss."

On land Turkish forces were prepared to move not only against Dalmatia but also to enter Friuli "per depredare et mettere il paese a sacco et fuoco." At the mere appearance of the sultan's armada every Venetian island in the Levant might well have surrendered with little or no resistance, for the people were exhausted, worn down by their terrible suffering. Having lost Cyprus, the Signoria was worried about Crete. According to the Senate's letter, the ministers of the Signor Turco had proposed certain "measures of accord and peace," which the baillie had had no alternative but to accept. In the expedition of 1572 the Christian princes with forces superior to those of the Turk had accomplished nothing, and now the sultan's ministers had made quite reasonable proposals, reasonable that is in view of the accustomed arrogance of the Turks and the practice of earlier sultans under similar circumstances.

The conclusion of peace now made it possible for Venice to preserve her territories in the Levant and in Dalmatia "for the benefit of our state and of Christendom." Without this peace many peoples and places would have certainly fallen to the enemy, becoming lost to Christendom, increasing the resources and reputation of the Turks. The Venetians had acted in the best interests of their fellow Christians, and the doge and Senate wanted to believe that their explanation would be understood and accepted by the most serene Catholic king. Yes, surely his natural goodness and the affection he had always shown toward Venice would make him understand, for he would have been immeasurably distressed by the loss to Christendom of the Republic's threatened possessions.<sup>178</sup>

The courier bearing the senatorial letter of 3 April to Donado and Priuli arrived in Madrid two hours before midday on 17 April with "the news, most unexpected here at this time, of the conclusion of peace." They requested an immediate audience of Philip II. He was too busy, he said; could they not see one of his ministers? He would receive them the next day. Fearing the arrival of another courier (from Rome or Naples) bringing the king the same news couched in the harshest terms, Donado and Priuli persisted. They sent another servant to the palace. The matter was of supreme importance; it

concerned his Majesty's interests. Wondering, perhaps suspecting, what their message would be, Philip sent to tell them, even before he had received their second appeal, to come to see him immediately after dinner.

When admitted to the royal presence, the two ambassadors dwelt upon the Signoria's three years of unceasing warfare with the Turks and the price Venetian nobles had paid with their own blood to maintain that warfare not merely for the Republic but for all Christendom. Venetian subjects were exhausted; the Signoria was now hiring oarsmen from Bohemia at double the proper rate. The ambassadors repeated the sad tale of the dreadful hardships and perils to which the Signoria's subjects in Dalmatia and the Levant were exposed. The doge and Senate, they said, had decided that their continuance in the war could prove not only the ruin of Venice but also a disaster for Christendom. Italian interests were at stake as well as those of Spain.

Taking their cue from the senatorial letter of 3 April, Donado and Priuli dwelt on the sultan's putting to sea 400 armed vessels as well as two huge armies to invade Dalmatia and Friuli. The Signoria had no means of resisting either the Turk's naval or his landed assaults. After long consideration, therefore, to avoid the still greater losses which Christendom would suffer, the Signoria had finally decided to accept "those moderate conditions of peace which the Turkish ministers had offered to our baillie who is in Constantinople." With high praise for Philip's "bontà et somma prudentia," of which all the world was aware, the two ambassadors sought his understanding for the wisdom of Venice's making peace "per evitare danni maggiori et per necessità."

The king listened to us, always most attentively, and the longer he observed the unfeeling modesty of our discourse as we ran through our argument, and our speech took that affectionate form of delivery which so grave a matter required, the more closely his Majesty looked at us, keeping his eyes fixed in our direction. He showed no emotion except that, when toward the end he learned that the conditions of peace had been accepted, there was a slight ironical twist of his lips. He smiled ever so faintly. It seemed as though his Majesty wanted to say, without interrupting us, "Oh-ho, you've done it, just as they all told me you would." Thereupon his Majesty, in his usual fashion, no whit abashed and dealing with us in the same way he was always accustomed to, replied with these few words: "Ambassadors, you have never been troublesome to me. You did well to obtain this chance to talk with me, but as I was wholly unaware that you had to give me such news, and as the action which has been taken is of the highest importance, and requires

<sup>178</sup> Sen. Secreta, Reg. 79, fols. 14-15 [35-36], *all'ambasciatori in Spagna*, doc. dated 3 April, 1573, the letter being sent to Donado and Priuli after a vote in the Senate *de literis* + 153, *de non 3, non sinceri* 18.

much thought, it is not proper that I should reply off-hand. I shall consider the matter, and have an answer given to you."<sup>179</sup>

For the Venetians the peace seemed desirable, but it proved to be extremely damaging to their reputation throughout the remainder of the century and for decades thereafter. It still raised the ire of Serrano and Pastor in the twentieth century. The Venetians had misled their allies by piling up supplies in Sicily for a campaign of seven months.<sup>180</sup> But neither Venetian officials nor the ambassador Paolo Tiepolo in Rome knew of the Council of Ten's instructions to the bailie Barbaro in Istanbul. Cyprus was obviously lost. Suppose, however, the Turks had required surrender of the Venetian towns on the Dalmatian coast or even of the island of Crete. To such demands Barbaro would not have agreed. Then the Signoria would have stood by the Capitulation, and if the Spanish galleys reached Corfu in time, the Holy League would have sent its fourth expedition into the Levant.

The Venetians had made peace with the Porte, but would it last? In late April and mid-June there were reports that from two hundred to two hundred and seventy Turkish galleys were likely to take to the sea during the spring and summer of 1573. The news came by way of dispatches from Vienna and Ragusa. It was probably more disturbing to the Spanish than to the Venetians, but the Turks had broken the last peace in their attack

upon Cyprus. Despite the treaty of 7 March, was the island of Crete safe? There were rumors of the death of Tahmāsp I, the shah of Persia, and of civil war between two of his sons for the throne of the Safavids. The rumors were untrue, but one could well wonder what effect the old shah's death (which was to come three years later) would have on Turkish policy.<sup>181</sup> It would in fact lead to war between the Porte and Persia, which would distract the Turks from the Mediterranean.

In the meantime Andrea Badoer, who had been elected the Signoria's ambassador to the Porte, was preparing to set out for Istanbul. He was taking a large sum of money with him as well as valuable gifts for the sultan and the pashas. Since Badoer would be occupied on the Bosphorus with more important matters than bookkeeping, the Senate voted (on 6 May, 1573) to give him an accountant (*rasonato*) to keep track of the disbursement of the money and the distribution of gifts at the Porte. The bailie Barbaro had thought that gifts of especial value might help free the prisoners taken at Nicosia and Famagusta, not to speak of the release of the Venetian ships then being held by the Turks.<sup>182</sup> The Signoria was not yet out of

<sup>179</sup> Brunetti and Vitale, *La Corrispondenza da Madrid*, II, no. 262, pp. 677-80, letter of Donado (Donà) and Priuli to the doge and Senate, dated at Madrid on 17 April, 1573, and note Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 332-33, and append., no. xxvii, pp. 418-19.

Philip took the news of the Venetians' desertion of the league far more calmly than did Gregory XIII, who lost his composure entirely when Paolo Tiepolo tried to justify the peace with the Turks (Serrano, *ibid.*, II, 285-90; Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, IX [1923], 242-43; note esp. Stella, *Nunz. Venezia*, X, no. 247, pp. 441-42, a letter of Cardinal Galli to Facchinetti, dated at Rome on 7 April, 1573, and see Tiepolo's own account, which he later read to the Senate [on 3 May, 1576], in Alberi, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti*, ser. II, vol. IV [1857], 235 ff.).

According to Tiepolo, *ibid.*, Gregory XIII, upon learning of the peace, "s'accese tutto d'ira, si levò di dove sedeva, si mise sulle furie e mi discacciò da lui. . . . Annullò il sussidio dei 500,000 scudi da Pio V concesso; levò che si potessero riscuotere i residui del sussidio e decime passate; rinvocò il donativo dei 100,000 scudi dei beni del clero, con astringere che si restituessero i danari già per questo conto riscossi. . . ." Gregory denounced the Venetian government at a formal meeting of the consistory on 8 April (Acta consistorialia, in Acta Miscellanea, Reg. 36, fol. 138). Cf. Longo, *Successo della guerra*, Arch. stor. Italiano, append. to vol. IV (1847), no. 17, pp. 51-52.

<sup>180</sup> Serrano, *La Liga de Lepanto*, II, 285.

<sup>181</sup> Cf. Cod. Urb. lat. 1043, fol. 238<sup>r</sup>, by mod. stamped enumeration, di Vienna de 22 Aprile: "Per un homo venuto di Costantinopoli in molta diligenza oltra al raguaglio che s'è havuto distintamente della pace tra i Signori Venetici et il Turco s'è inteso che 'l Turco havea in ordine meglio che 270 galere alle quali poco mancava per poter uscire fuori, et che per terra non si parlava d'alcuno movimento. S'intendeva parimente l' essersi verificato che 'l Soffi sia morto, et che 'l figliol maggiore sia in campagna armato non contra il Turco, ma si bene contra suo fratello minore, qual pareo che fusse stato lasciato herede del regno. . . ." and cf., *ibid.*, fols. 255, 258<sup>r</sup>. Note also fol. 265<sup>r</sup>, di Ragusa li 17 di Giugno 1573: "Per lettere di Costantinopoli delli 28 del passato [28 May] s'è inteso che Piali Bassà è uscito fuori con 140 galere oltre a quelle che sono ordinariamente alle loro guardie, che devono essere da 15 in circa. Ali, ch'è Occhiali, è restato in Costantinopoli con cinquanta disarmate, et usava diligenza in armarle per uscir poi fuori per unirse con l'altre. . . ."

On 1 February, 1573 (Venetian style 1572), the bailie Barbaro had reported to the doge that the Turkish armada was all in order, and would sail with Piali Pasha. The latter had told someone, who passed the word on to Barbaro, that although the sultan's power was such that he could produce 500 galleys, "Uluj-Ali has said, however, that three hundred will be enough, and there will also be sixteen galleasses [maone] and forty ships [navi], while this year his forces will not take to flight [as in 1572]" (MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fol. 378<sup>r</sup>). Actually when the armada sailed from Istanbul on 1 June, it consisted of about 155 galleys, five maone, and 25 or 30 other vessels (*ibid.*, fols. 460<sup>r</sup>-461<sup>r</sup>).

<sup>182</sup> Senato, Deliberazioni Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fol., resolution of the Senate dated 6 May, 1573. Badoer's commission as ambassador to the Signor Turco is dated 9 June (1573), and takes up a half-dozon folios in the register cited.

the woods. A skillful and experienced diplomat, Antonio Tiepolo, was named Barbaro's successor as bailie in Istanbul. His commission is dated 9 June (1573).<sup>183</sup> Barbaro was coming home, and during the course of his return journey he was supposed to settle some of the Turco-Venetian border disputes in Dalmatia and Albania.<sup>184</sup> These disputes, which were not easy to resolve, threatened the recently-made peace.

As the Venetians were engrossed in efforts to preserve the peace, arrange for the exchange of prisoners, and secure the return of their property in Turkish hands, the Spanish decided to use their troops and the galleys under Don John of Austria for an expedition to the Barbary coast. Their objective was Tunis, which Uluj-Ali had occupied toward the end of 1569, now the Moslem stronghold closest to Sicily. But the Turks in Istanbul had also gone down to the sea in ships, as the *avvisi* from Vienna, Ragusa, and elsewhere had stated they would. Bad weather and the maneuverings of the Turkish armada in the Ionian and Adriatic Seas delayed for weeks Don John's expedition to Tunisia, where the Spanish had held the outpost of La Goletta since 1535. Don John took the poorly-defended town of Tunis without a struggle on 11 October, 1573, and then moved into Bizerte.<sup>185</sup> Without controlling wide areas of the Moslem hinterland, however, the Spanish could

not hold Don John's acquisitions, and the sultan and the pashas were determined to undo what he had done.

Accordingly, as we are informed by an *avviso* from La Goletta, the Turkish armada left Istanbul on 13 May, 1574, headed for the Barbary coast. It was said to consist of 240 galleys besides 25 galliots from Algiers, 16 galleasses (*mahone*), three galleons, three *caramusoli*, and eight ships (*navi*). There were 120 Turks aboard each galley, 250 aboard each galleass, and 300 aboard each ship, including 8,000 janissaries, 4,000 sipahis, "and the rest inexperienced Turks, badly armed, for the most part with bows." The armada was under the command of Uluj-Ali, the land forces under that of Sinan Pasha, Sultan Selim's brother-in-law. It was rumored that Don John would go from Naples to Trapani to prepare for action 120 armed galleys, some *navi*, and other vessels "per passarsine subito in soccorso alla Goletta."<sup>186</sup> It never happened, however, for Don John had been forbidden by Philip II to try in person to hold the Barbary strongholds, and after the arrival of the Turks the Spanish governments in Naples and Sicily made no effort to send reinforcements to Tunis and La Goletta.

Uluj-Ali and Sinan Pasha appeared in the Bay of Tunis with their huge armament on 12 July (1574). After a month's determined siege they took La Goletta (on 25 August), and overwhelmed the Christian garrison at Tunis in the last of several murderous assaults on 13 September. The Turkish armada seemed still to have a mastery of the sea which the battle of Lepanto had obviously done little to diminish.

After the reconquest of Tunis there was a further strengthening of Ottoman administration in the Porte's provincial outposts in the Maghreb, the "West," i.e., in Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania. The Turks also provided men and munitions to oppose Portuguese and Spanish ambitions in Morocco. In resistance to the westward extension of Ottoman power in North Africa, King Sebastian of Portugal embarked on the so-called crusade which ended in disaster and his death on 4 August, 1578, at Alcazarquivir (Ksar el Kebir), some fifty or more miles south of Tangier. The sultanate of Morocco, it is true, tended to assert its independence of the Porte when, in the very

On the desirability of making special gifts to Selim II and Mehmed Sokolli, note the proposal made in the Senate on 22 May (*ibid.*), "... acciò che secondo 'l ricordo del predetto bailo nostro Barbaro sia tanto più facile la liberazione di quelli pregiati fatti in Nicosia et in Famagosta et in altri luoghi et anco sopra le nave et navilli nostri nella presente guerra" [this statement, although actually deleted from the final text of the resolution, illustrates the Senate's purpose].

<sup>183</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fols. Tiepolo's tour of duty in Istanbul was on the whole peaceful. He was succeeded as bailie by Giovanni Correr, whose commission, dated 16 April, 1575, fills six (unnumbered) folios in the Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. IV.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, unnum. fols., letters of the doge and Senate, dated 21 November, 1573, and 24 March, 1574, et alibi.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. *Il Vero Raggiungimento della presa di Biserta, con l'ultimo avviso del successo di Tunis, et la sentenza data contra al Re Muley Hamida* . . . , Rome: Gli Heredi d' Antonio Blado, stampatori camerati, 1573. The bailie Barbaro had informed the doge in a letter dated 2 April, 1570, that the news of Uluj-Ali's seizure of Tunis had just reached Istanbul: "Questi giorni gionse qui una galeotta venuta d' Algier mandata da Ultrazi, beglerbei di quel loco, con nova d' haverli lui impatronito di Tunesi, et scacciato quel Rey . . ." (MS. It. VII, 390 [8872], fols. 351<sup>v</sup>-352<sup>r</sup>; cf. *ibid.*, fol. 359<sup>r</sup>), and MS. It. VII, 391 [8873], fols. 1-2<sup>v</sup>, which repeats the letter of 2 April). Possession of Tunis was important to the Turks' designs upon the Barbary coast, and when Don John took the town, they immediately resolved to recover it and thereafter to hold on to it.

<sup>186</sup> *Nuovi Avvisi venuti di Messina, Napoli, e Roma, dove s' intende l'ordine che ha tenuto l'Altezza di Don Giovanni per soccorrere la Goletta* . . . , Bologna, 1574, reports from Rome and La Goletta, dated 22 August, 1574.

year of Dom Sebastian's defeat, the Turks turned their attention and resources toward Persia. Nevertheless, Turkish-governed Algiers was much closer to Spain than Messina was to Turkey. The Porte was more firmly established in North Africa after Lepanto than it had been previously.<sup>187</sup>

The Venetians were much exercised, as they wrote their new bailie Antonio Tiepolo in Istanbul on 27 May, 1574, by the lamentable plight of the Christians taken prisoner in the Cypriote war, especially those reduced to slavery "nella lacrimabile arresa della città di Famagosta." Tiepolo was directed to appeal to the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli to set them free, in accordance with Sultan Selim's sense of justice, for they had surrendered in good faith, trusting the promises made to them by the "representatives of his imperial Majesty," i.e., by Lala Mustafa Pasha and his fellows. The charge was neither true nor likely, "as is being said over there," that after the agreement of surrender [on 1 August, 1571] "our men should have killed any Moslems." Tiepolo must begin negotiations for the Turco-Venetian exchange of prisoners, and initiate discussions to find ways of exchanging other (non-Venetian) Christians for the Turkish captives being held by the Holy See.<sup>188</sup>

In early June (1574) the Rabbi Salomon Askenasi, a physician and a diplomat, came to Venice to deal with the problems relating to the exchange of prisoners. Salomon also offered the Signoria disposal of the naval forces of the Porte in the event of the Venetians' wishing to make war on Philip II (*offerendo le forze del serenissimo Gran Signor quando vogliamo far la guerra al serenissimo re di Spagna*). But the Signoria was at peace with Philip, the doge assured Salomon, "in a stable and reciprocal friendship, and in the full understanding of many years, with the most serene king of Spain." Venice was anxious to maintain as good a peace and friendship with the Porte as she had with

Spain. Salomon must, even so, thank the Gran Signore "for the courteous offer he has made to us."

The Signoria was distressed by Lala Mustafa Pasha's violation of the terms of surrender at Famagusta and the continued captivity of those seized after the surrender, for it constituted a breach of faith on the part of the sultan himself. The defenders of Famagusta had certainly not slain "Musulmani" after the accord of surrender. Salomon had made special reference to four Ottoman captives in Christian hands, but they were held by the pope and by the king of Spain. There was nothing the doge and Senate could do but to write and ask for their release, "which of course we shall do." Rabbi Salomon was in Venice for about two months, and when in mid-August he was getting ready to leave, the Senate voted him appropriate gifts of money and clothing.<sup>189</sup>

The exchange of prisoners engaged the close and considerate attention of the Signoria throughout the years 1574-1575 and for some time thereafter. On 18 March (1575), for example, the Senate approved a letter to the bailie Tiepolo, informing him that Gregory XIII had agreed to send "the Turkish slaves who are in Rome" immediately to Ancona, where they would be easily available "to effect the exchange." They had been well treated, especially Mehmed Beg of Negroponte, who had been provided with a litter because he had a touch of gout. So that the grand vizir Mehmed Sokolli could be assured of the "every possible courtesy" which had been extended to the Turks, the captives had themselves written to Sokolli. The doge was sending both the Turkish text and a translation to Tiepolo "in order that you may see the content."

Tiepolo was to give Sokolli the captives' Turkish text, emphasizing how hard the Signoria had worked in this matter, for which he should be grateful. The Venetians would send galleys to pick up the Turks at Ancona. Tiepolo must, therefore, make it clear to Sokolli that since the Turks had already been sent to the pope's Adriatic port, nothing remained to bring the business to a happy conclusion except for Sokolli to put the "Christian slaves, who are over there," on the road to Ragusa. Tiepolo was told in confidence, however, that the pope had entrusted the exchange of prisoners to

<sup>187</sup> Cf. the article of A. C. Hess, referred to above (note 120), "The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History," *Past and Present*, LVII (1972), 53-73, and on the Portuguese disaster at Alcazarquivir on 4 August, 1578, see Henry de Castries, ed., *Les Sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc de 1530 à 1845*, ser. 1, pt. 1, vol. I (Paris, 1905), nos. CI-CXIII, pp. 381-677. Morocco is far from Istanbul, and it should be noted that the language of the country is Arabic, not Turkish. The Moroccan sultanate always tended to a certain independence from the Porte. Note the documents illustrating Moroccan relations with England in *Letters from Barbary, 1576-1774*, trans. J. F. P. Hopkins, Oxford University Press, 1982, nos. 1-20, pp. 1-18, dated from 1576 to 1669.

<sup>188</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, letter of the doge and Senate to Antonio Tiepolo, dated 27 May, 1574.

<sup>189</sup> Senato, Deliberationi Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fols., docs. dated 19 June and 14 August, 1574, and on the proposed exchange of prisoners, note also the letter of the doge and Senate to the bailie Tiepolo, dated 28 October, and various other letters in this register.

Tolomeo Galli, the cardinal of Como, who was insistent that before the Turks were embarked, he must be certain that the Christians had reached Ragusa.<sup>190</sup>

Although Gregory XIII tried until the end of his reign to form another Christian league against the Turks, appealing to Spain, the Empire, Poland, and Venice, he never succeeded in doing so. The Turco-Venetian treaty of 7 March, 1573, was renewed on 10 August, 1575;<sup>191</sup> it lasted for more than seventy years, until the outbreak of the war of Candia (in 1645). As time passed, Philip II also became diverted from the offensive against the Turks by the continuing war in Flanders, his suspicions of French collusion with his enemies, the strife in Genoa between the old and the new nobility, his desire to add Portugal to his Spanish dominions, and his numerous difficulties with the English and their Protestant queen, Elizabeth. Neither the Emperor Maximilian II nor the German princes had any intention of being drawn into war with the Turks. The Empire, therefore, remained at peace with the Porte until the desultory but exhausting war of 1593–1606, which ended with the treaty of Zsitvatorok (*ad Situa Torock*) on 11 November, the feast of S. Martin. The Sultan Ahmed I had to give up the Turkish claims to all areas in Hungary then held by the Hapsburgs. Although the “two emperors” were to exchange gifts, the Porte was no longer to receive the annual tribute of 30,000 ducats,<sup>192</sup> of which we have seen a good deal in earlier chapters.

The Sultan Selim II died on 12 December, 1574, and the following 24 January the Doge Alvis Mocenigo and the Senate sent both the new sultan Murad III and the grand vizir Sokollı official statements of condolence and of their satisfaction, even “*felicissima essaltatione*,” in the succession, for they were sure that Murad III would remain friends with the Venetians, who had borne the “*deepest affection*” for his father.<sup>193</sup> The Turks were willing also to consider peace with Spain, for in 1576 the death of Tahmāsp I, son of the great Shah Ismā‘il, was followed by succession struggles, which provided the Porte with new opportunities for conquest. After preliminary truces agreed to privately (on 18 March, 1577, and especially on 7 February, 1578) Philip II authorized open negotiations with the Porte, and (to Gregory XIII’s distress) on 21 March, 1580, a ten months’ truce was publicly acknowledged between Spain and the Ottoman empire.<sup>194</sup>

In 1577–1578 the Turks embarked upon a dozen years of difficult but successful warfare with Persia, finally acquiring in the peace of 1590 the important city of Tabriz along with most of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Sirvan, Luristan, and other areas. Mehmed Sokollı had objected to the war as being beyond the resources of the Porte, but although

---

the interesting article by Hali Inalcik, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Firearms in the Middle East,” in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, 1975, pp. 199–202, and cf. Parry, “La Manière de combattre,” *ibid.*, pp. 227 ff.

On the Austrian-Turkish negotiations from 24 October to 11 November at “Zsitvatorok,” the mouth of the Zsitva creek, see the important article of G. Bayerle, “The Compromise at Zsitvatorok,” *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI (1980), 5–53. The “*treaty*” or compromise was to last for twenty years, the emperor was to give the sultan 200,000 florins in cash, the annual tribute to the Porte was forever annulled, and both rulers were henceforth to recognize each other as “*emperor*.” Despite the different texts of the so-called treaty, and the sultans’ continuing claim to be the world’s masters and arbiters, at least the long war was brought to an end, and the Hungarians, in whose territory the war had been fought, were spared further destruction—at least for a while. For the Emperor Rudolph’s ratification of the Austrian text, see Dumont, *op. cit.*, V-2, no. XLVIII, pp. 79–80.

<sup>195</sup> Senato, Deliberazioni Constantinopoli, Reg. III, unnum. fols.

<sup>194</sup> Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II (1966), 437 ff., trans. Reynolds, II (1973), 1150 ff., and cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, IX (1923), 258–60. See also S. A. Skilliter, “The Hispano-Ottoman Armistice of 1581,” in C. E. Bosworth, ed., *Iran and Islam, in Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky*, Edinburgh, 1971, pp. 491–515. The first four Turco-Spanish truces are dated 7 February, 1578; 21 March, 1580; 4 February, 1581 [first agreed to on 1 January?], and January, 1584. They were all for one year except that of 1581 which was to run for three years.

<sup>190</sup> Senato, Deliberazioni Constantinopoli, Reg. IV, unnum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate [partly in cipher] to the bailie in Istanbul, dated 18 March, 1575. It took a long while to effect the exchange of prisoners—see the commission given by the Collegio (on the authority of the Senate) to Zuan Contarini, *eletto al far il concambio d’ i schiavi* (*ibid.*, doc. dated 9 July, 1575, and note other relevant texts in this register). Turkish captives were from time to time exchanged for Christians, “*che si ritrovano schiavi in Constantinopoli in durissima captivita*” (*ibid.*, resolution of the Senate dated 25 March, 1578). On the negotiations relating to the release of the Turkish prisoners of importance, who were sent from Rome to Fermo (near the Adriatic coast, south of Ancona) in March, 1575, see M. Rosi, *Alcuni documenti relativi alla liberazione dei principali prigionieri turchi presi a Lepanto*, Rome, 1898, *append.*, docs. VI ff., pp. 58 ff. The proper maintenance of the Turkish prisoners was something of a financial problem.

<sup>191</sup> J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-1 (1728), no. CXXIII, pp. 244–47.

<sup>192</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-2 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1728), no. XLVIII, pp. 78–80. The treaty was confirmed on 9 December, 1606, by the Emperor Rudolph, who was now ruling in name only until his death in 1612 (*cf. ibid.*, nos. XLIV–XLV, pp. 68–73). On the importance of the war upon Ottoman society and the sultan’s armed forces, note

he remained the grand vizir, his influence had quickly faded with Murad III's accession. In the fall of 1579 Sokolli was stabbed to death by an assassin, and was succeeded for some six months by the Albanian second vizir, Ahmed Pasha.<sup>195</sup> The times were changing. Murad was a comedown even from his drunken father, and Ahmed Pasha and his successors fell far short of Sokolli.

Even without Mehmed Sokolli on hand to warn them, the pashas knew that one war at a time was enough for the Porte. On 4 February, 1581, the Turco-Spanish truce was renewed for three more years. As far as the Mediterranean was concerned, Spain and the Porte gradually lost interest in each other, drifting far apart; unlike the Venetians, Dutch, French, Poles, and Muscovites, the Spanish usually kept no resident ambassador on the Bosphorus. It is true, however, that when in 1580 Philip II became also king of Portugal, the Spanish-Portuguese war with the Porte was renewed on the Indian Ocean, but the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Turks were all soon ousted by the English and the Dutch. As the Spanish concentrated their efforts upon the Netherlands, England, and the New World, the Turks gave their unkind attention to the Middle East. Despite occasional hostile encounters on the Barbary coast, peace went on indefinitely between Spain and the Porte. Large-scale warfare in the Mediterranean had ended.

Although the Spanish Hapsburgs had thus found peace with the Turks, their Austrian cousins (as we have just noted) became involved with the Porte in the war of 1593-1606, from which period numerous revolts in the Balkans began against the Porte. The peace of Zsitvatorok (in 1606) brought

neither peace between Vienna and Istanbul nor an end to agitation in the Balkans.<sup>196</sup> During the later stages of the Austro-Turkish war, while the sultan's forces were engaged in Hungary and Transylvania, Abbas the Great of Persia began a series of campaigns against the Turks, finally driving them from Tabriz, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the whole region of the Caucasus.<sup>197</sup> The Persians did well, for the pashas had overreached themselves, and the Ottoman empire was in decline. The decline, however, was gradual and very slow.

There is a remote resemblance between the Spanish and Ottoman empires as to the time and causes of their decline. Each was attached to past practices, to "tradition," to an intellectual stagnation which meant failure to keep up with the technological innovations of the later sixteenth century and the seventeenth. Each was unable, therefore, to share to any appreciable extent in the advances being made in mining and metallurgy, medicine and pharmacology, the production of hardware, textiles, glass, clocks, and especially firearms and shipbuilding. The Spanish and Turks were both impeded by inefficient governments and by the failure to produce a middle class strong enough to face the increasing economic competition of the seventeenth century.

The Spanish Church and the Inquisition were obstacles to social change and scientific progress in Spain, while the growth of Moslem fanaticism among the Turks had an even more deleterious effect upon the understanding and use of any scientific improvement or instrument. Weakened central governments, hard-pressed for money, met increasing difficulties in maintaining the infrastructure of roads, canals, and dikes, bridges, warehouses, and docks—all essential to commercial, military, and naval efficiency.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>195</sup> Cf. Senato, *Deliberationi Constantinopoli*, Reg. IV, unum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate to the baillie in Istanbul, dated 25 November, 1579: "Havemo inteso dalle lettere vostre di 12 del passato certamente con dispiacer nostro il strano accidente seguito della morte del magnifico Mehemet, primo bassà, al qual essendo successo per election fatta da quel serenissimo Signore il magnifico Acmat Bassà, ne è parso di rallegrarsi con sua Magnificentia con le alligiate che vi mandamo et nella forma che vederete per la occlusa copia . . ." which letters the baillie was to deliver, "accompagnandole con quella sorta di officio che è conveniente in simil occasione per far ben certo esso magnifico bassà della grande nostra affettione verso la sua persona et della stima che facciamo delle nobilissime qualità sue. . . +151, 16, 10." The Senate also sent (*ibid.*) flattering letters to Ahmed Pasha, dated 21 November. Niccolò Barbarigo, the baillie in Istanbul to whom the Senate's letter of 25 November was addressed, had died on or before 8 November (*cf.*, *ibid.*, letters of the doge and Senate to the Venetian secretary at the Porte, dated 12 December, 1579, and 13 February, 1580 [Ven. style 1579]).

<sup>196</sup> Cf. Stephan Fischer-Galati, "Revolutionary Activity in the Balkans from Lepanto to Kuchuk Kainardji," *Südost-Forschungen*, XXI (1962), 194-213, who lapsu calami mistakenly associates Mehmed Sokolli with the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683 (*ibid.*, p. 206), and see especially the work of Peter Bartl, *Der Westbalkan zwischen spanischer Monarchie und osmanischem Reich*, Wiesbaden, 1974, *passim*, cited below in note 206. Cf. also Angelo Tamborra, "Dopo Lepanto: Lo Spostamento della lotta antiturca sul fronte terrestre," in Benzo, *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, esp. pp. 379 ff.

<sup>197</sup> Cf. Lucien-Louis Bellan, *Chah 'Abbas I, sa vie, son histoire*, Paris, 1932, chaps. VI-X. The Porte accepted the peace of Sarab with the Persians; it is dated 26 August, 1618 (*ibid.*, p. 241).

<sup>198</sup> The articles drawn from the British journal *Past and Present* (1952-62), republished in Trevor Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660*, New York, 1965, have a good deal to say of the decline of Spain, but nothing at all about the Ottoman



A century or so after Lepanto, the English ambassador to the Porte, Sir John Finch, noted "that the Turke cannot live without a warr."<sup>199</sup> In this respect the Castilian was rather like the Turk. The Count-Duke Olivares (d. 1645), the prime minister of Philip IV, and Kara Mustafa Pasha (d. 1683), the grand vizir under Mehmed IV—both serving indolent monarchs—hoped that war might solve their problems and maintain the power of the state. They were both deceived, and succeeded in bringing disaster and loss of territory to their sovereigns as well as complete ruin upon themselves. Olivares escaped with his life. Kara Mustafa was executed for his failure before Vienna, and in the twenty years that followed his death (1683–1702) a full dozen grand vizirs held the reins of Ottoman government.

When many years ago I began this work on *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204–1571*, I knew that it would be necessary to come down, however sketchily, to the Turco-Venetian peace of 1573, the Turkish occupation of La Goletta and Tunis in 1574, and the Turco-Spanish truce of 1581. To most readers the latter dates would be meaningless, but everyone who picked up one of these volumes would know that the year 1571 referred to Lepanto, one of the most famous of all naval battles. What then is the significance of Lepanto? Did it mark the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman empire? No, but it may have been a first faint warning. The failure of the Christian expedition of 1572 and the Turkish successes of 1574 show clearly that the Spanish were not in the ascendant while the Ottomans were in decline. The battle of Lepanto, then, proved not to be the decisive event which the participants and their western contemporaries assumed, in the first ecstasies of victory, that it was going to be. The battle had obviously shown that the Turks were not invincible. It also seemed likely to fulfill certain long-standing and well-known prophecies of Turkish doom.<sup>200</sup>

empire, one of the dominant forces in Europe during the period covered. On the decline of Venice vis-à-vis Turkey, note F. Braudel, P. Jeannin, J. Meuret, and R. Romano, in *Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII*, Venice: Fondazione Cini, 1961, pp. 36 ff., and cf. the observations of Omer Lütfi Barkan, *ibid.*, pp. 275 ff. The war of Cyprus rebounded, for a while, to the great advantage of Ragusa, concerning which see Jorjo Tadić, *ibid.*, pp. 250 ff.

<sup>199</sup> G. F. Abbott, *Under the Turk in Constantinople*, London, 1920, p. 281. Although personally desirous of peace, the Spanish minister Olivares also found no alternative to war.

<sup>200</sup> I have omitted from this chapter a long section on prophecies of Turkish doom, which I may publish elsewhere.

We have already noted the excitement that filled Venice when on 19 October (1571) Onfrè Giustinian reached the lagoon with news of the Turks' overwhelming defeat at Lepanto and the celebrations in Rome when on the night of 21–22 October the nuncio Facchinetti's letter brought word of the victory.<sup>201</sup> In Rome, as in Venice, celebrations and sermons lasted for weeks. When Marc' Antonio Colonna returned to the Tiber, he was accorded a triumph (on 4 December, 1571) which far exceeded in its fervor the reception given Charles V (in early April, 1536) after his conquest of Tunis.<sup>202</sup> In the church of S. Maria in Araceli the French humanist Marc-Antoine Muret delivered a stirring sermon in praise of Colonna (on 13 December), declaring that the glorious victory at Lepanto, which would be remembered forever, had closed the Mediterranean to the Turks and opened it to the Christians. The latter must now push on to Judaea, "holding out her hands in supplication," and free the Holy Sepulcher. Muret's sermon was promptly translated from Latin into Italian, was printed by the heirs of Antonio Blado, and received a wide circulation.<sup>203</sup>

Contemporaries bequeathed the importance of Lepanto to later generations in the works of poets and preachers, novelists and pamphleteers, sculptors and medalists, historians and painters. Miguel de Cervantes was wounded at Lepanto, and always gloried in the fact. In one way or another the sculptors Girolamo Campagna, Domenico da Salò, and Alessandro Vittoria have left remembrances

<sup>201</sup> On the emotional outburst in Venice, cf. *Publica Letitia della miracolosa vittoria ottenuta dalle armate Christiane contra quella del Turco* . . . , printed in Venice on 19 October, the very day the news arrived in Venice, and reprinted in Mantua on 25 October: ". . . Alli 19 Ottobre la galera Giustiniana . . . diede nova di questa maravigliosa vittoria, per la quale si vedeva tumultuosamente in tutte le strade concorre numero infinito di gente a San Marco in tanta quantitate che non si poteva dar luoco l' uno a l' altro, et tale era il strepito delle voci, dell' artiglierie, et delle campane che non si udiva a pena quel che alcuno dicesse . . ." etc. See also E. H. Gombrich, "Celebrations in Venice of the Holy League and of the Victory of Lepanto," in *Studies in Renaissance and Baroque Art presented to Anthony Blunt* . . . , London and New York, 1967, pp. 62–68, who thinks "the good tidings [arrived] in Venice on 9th October, two days after the battle" (*ibid.*, p. 63a).

<sup>202</sup> On Colonna's triumph, cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 597–99.

<sup>203</sup> *Oratione di M. Antonio Mureto, dottore et cittadino romano, recitata per ordine del Popolo Romano dopo 'l ritorno in Roma de l' illustrissimo et eccellentissimo Signor Marc' Antonio Colonna, da la felicissima vittoria di mare contra Turci, tradotta di latino in volgare*, Rome: Gli Heredi di Antonio Blado, stampatori camerali, 1572[?].

of Lepanto in works they did in Venice, as have the painters Jacopo and Domenico Tintoretto, Andrea Vicentino, Paolo Veronese, Titian, and others. There are many paintings and other memorials of Lepanto in the ducal palace at Venice, and the Cappella del Rosario at SS. Giovanni e Paolo is dedicated to 7 October, 1571.<sup>204</sup> Pius V commissioned Giorgio Vasari to do the frescoes acclaiming the achievements of the Holy League and the Christian victory in the Sala Regia in the Vatican palace, while every year tourists admire the large fresco of Lepanto by Giovanni Coli and Filippo Gherardi which dominates the ceiling of the long hall or gallery of the Palazzo Colonna at Rome. In Rome also four picturesque tapestries in the Galleria Doria-Pamphili depict the victory at Lepanto.

One can understand the jubilation in Venice and Rome. A Turkish victory at Lepanto would have brought the Turkish armada in force into the northern Adriatic and into the Tyrrhenian Seas, threatening Venice itself and the Lido di Roma. The Venetian towns and strongholds in Dalmatia and Albania might soon have succumbed to Turkish attacks.

The peace of 1573 gave Venice a long respite, but her relations with her erstwhile allies became uneasy. In 1579 the Signoria suspected Gregory XIII of surreptitiously feeding money to the piratical Uskoks of Segna (Senj), who were as much a menace to Venetian shipping on the Adriatic as they were to the inland Turks.<sup>205</sup> Spain as well as the Holy See looked askance at the Venetians' friendliness with the Turks.

As the years passed, the Venetians, being at peace with the Porte, needed few anti-Turkish subventions from the Holy See, although the Signoria was always ready to collect whatever papal subsidies it could

get. In the opinion of the Curia Romana the Venetians were encroaching upon the freedom and immunities of the Church. Clement VIII, who wanted to take action against the Turks, had his difficulties with the Signoria. A break, a serious break between Venice and the Holy See, came after Clement's death, when Leonardo Donado (Donà), whom we have known as the Republic's ambassador to Philip II during the years 1570–1573, was elected doge (on 10 January, 1606). Since Donado and the Senate insisted upon what the Curia regarded as an infringement of the rights of the Church, Pope Paul V promulgated the famous brief of 17 April (1606), excommunicating the doge, the Senate, and all their adherents, while the interdict was put upon Venice and all the cities, towns, fortresses, and lands under Venetian domination.<sup>206</sup> Nevertheless, on the feast of S. Maria del Rosario (1 October, 1606) Marino Zorzi, the Venetian bishop of Brescia, celebrated a pontifical high mass in commemoration of the battle of Lepanto.<sup>207</sup>

The battle of church and state, of canon and secular law, continued throughout the winter of 1606–1607 until—despite the divisive efforts of Paolo Sarpi—Paul V and the Signoria were reconciled on 21 April, the result of the intervention of France and Spain. When the victory at Lepanto was celebrated on the first Sunday in October of 1607, Venice and the Holy See were officially at peace, but the Church had suffered severely in the recent strife.<sup>208</sup> At mid-century, however, a larger struggle lay ahead for the Venetians, and it was they who suffered severely. The Knights of the Hospital of S. John, venturing forth from the island of Malta every year, had long preyed on Turkish shipping in the Aegean. In the early summer of 1645 the Turks struck back at the offensive Christians, but not at the Maltese. Their target was the Venetians on the island of Crete, where the Greeks were likely to welcome them, for the

<sup>204</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, VIII (repr. 1958), 606–10; Giulio Lorenzetti, *Venice and Its Lagoon*, Rome, 1961, pp. 259, 269, 270, 271, 280, 283, 308, et alibi; and on the Cappella del Rosario, note, *ibid.*, p. 353; Anna Pallucchini, "Echi della battaglia di Lepanto nella pittura veneziana del '500," in Benzioni, *Il Mediterraneo nella seconda metà del '500 alla luce di Lepanto*, pp. 279–87, with several illustrations; cf. the articles by Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Manlio Cortelazzo, and Carlo Dionisotti, *ibid.*, pp. 30–31, 121–26, 127 ff.; and on the medals cast to commemorate Lepanto, see the article by Giovanni Gorini, *ibid.*, pp. 153–62. On 7 October, 1971, the fourth centenary of the battle, the Marina Militare Italiana mounted a commemorative plaque on the small palazzo believed to be Venier's house in the Campo S. Maria Formosa.

<sup>205</sup> Senato, Deliberazioni Constantinopoli, Reg. IV, unum. fol., letter of the doge and Senate to the Venetian count of Traù (Trogir), dated 19 March, 1579: the archdeacon of Traù was suspected of having gone to Segna "per dar paga in nome del Pontefice a certo numero di Uskocchi. . . ."

<sup>206</sup> Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, V-2, nos. XI–XLIII, pp. 64–68, where the brief of excommunication of 17 April, 1606, is mistakenly called a bull; Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XXV, 111 ff., and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, XII (1927), 82 ff. On the anti-Turkish policy of Clement VIII (1592–1605), see Peter Bartl, *Der Westbalkan zwischen spanischer Monarchie und osmanischem Reich: Zur Türkenkriegsproblematik an der Wende vom 16. zum 17. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden, 1974, pp. 43 ff., 81 ff., 99 ff.

<sup>207</sup> Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XXV, 142, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, XII (1927), 103. Gregory XIII had fixed the feast of S. Maria del Rosario on the first Sunday in October for, in 1571, the seventh had been the first Sunday in the month, the day on which the battle of Lepanto had been fought.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Pastor, *Hist. Popes*, XXV, 170–83, and *Gesch. d. Päpste*, XII (1927), 122–31.

rule of the Signoria had always been unpopular on the island. War was resumed between Venice and the Porte, a long, costly, exhausting war of almost a quarter of a century.

The Signoria's response to the challenge was astonishing. Year after year the Venetians blockaded the Dardanelles, sometimes effectively, and although their fleets were smaller than those of the Turks, they pursued the enemy from one end of the Aegean to the other. The Turks established themselves in Canea in western Crete, however, and there they remained, turning the churches into mosques, and gradually extending their sway throughout the island until the lion banner of S. Mark was flying only over the battlements of the city of Candia and three other little strongholds. The siege of Candia began in the spring of 1648. The Venetians defeated the Turks in a naval battle between the islands of Paros and Naxos on 10 July, 1650. Although they lost the first battle at the Dardanelles (on 16 May, 1654), they won the second a year later (on 21 June, 1655), and the third in the following year (on 26 June, 1656). In fact in the summer of 1656 the Venetians occupied the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos at the very mouth of the Dardanelles, the *antemuralia* of Istanbul. The Venetians were less successful in engagements with the Turks the next year (on 17–19 July, 1657), and the latter recovered both Tenedos and Lemnos in the late summer. The war continued with slight abatement until the years 1661–1665, during which period, despite minor combats at sea, there was a lull in hostilities.

During the twenty-four years of almost unremitting warfare Popes Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement IX sent galleys and ships into the Aegean to assist the Venetians, and so did the Hospitallers, whose commanders sometimes found themselves at odds with the captains-general of the Republic. The French also provided some help, but mostly, the Venetians needed infantrymen and gunners to serve on land to break the siege of Candia, which became ever tighter and tighter. Unfortunately for the Venetians, neither the papal commanders nor the Hospitallers would allow their soldiers and oarsmen to fight on land. During the last three years of the war the grand vizir Ahmed Köprülü took direct charge of the Turkish forces, and when in the late summer of 1669 the French, papal, and Hospitaller galleys withdrew from Candia and the nearby island of Dia (Standia), the Venetian captain-general Francesco Morosini had no alternative but to surrender Candia (on 26 September, 1669), and on the following day the grand vizir Köprülü received the keys to

the city on a silver plate.<sup>209</sup> The Turkish occupation of Crete was to last two hundred and thirty years.

Let us follow the fortunes of Venice for a few minutes longer. With the failure of Kara Mustafa Pasha under the walls of Vienna, the Venetians joined the Austrians and the Poles in 1684, in the time of Pope Innocent XI, in another Holy League against the Turks.<sup>210</sup> The Russians soon entered the league (in 1686), but remained inactive for some time. In a vigorous and expensive campaign in 1685–1687 the Venetians under the captain-general Francesco Morosini, with German and other mercenaries, occupied the entire Morea except for the fortress of Monemvasia (Malvasia), which held out until 1690. Morosini and his Swedish field commander Otto Wilhelm von Königsmark laid siege to Athens in late September, 1687. On the evening of the twenty-sixth, five days after their arrival, an unfortunate shot fired by one of Morosini's gunners, a young subaltern from Lüneburg, ignited a supply of powder and shells which the Turks had stored in the Parthenon. The explosion largely destroyed the temple. The Turks hung on grimly for a few more days, but when it became clear that the Turkish forces in Thebes were not coming to their assistance, they agreed to terms of conditional surrender on the twenty-ninth, and five days later, on 4 October, they came down from the Acropolis, the "castle" of Athens. As Morosini reported to the Venetian government, it was a lucky shot (*fortunato colpo*), "prodigiosa bomba che causò la desolazione del maestoso tempio dedicato a Minerva."<sup>211</sup>

<sup>209</sup> Cf. Wm. Miller, *Essays on the Latin Orient*, Cambridge, 1921, repr. Amsterdam, 1964, pp. 193–98, 383–85; R. C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant, 1559–1853*, Princeton, 1952, pp. 121–84. Despite the surrender of Candia, Venice still retained the three coastal fortresses of Grabusa, Suda, and Spinalonga.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. Max Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, 5 vols., Munich, 1963–65, I, 115 ff., which work is not only a biography of Eugene of Savoy, but a diplomatic and military history of Europe from the mid-1680's to the mid-1730's.

<sup>211</sup> Comte Léon de Laborde, *Athènes aux XV<sup>e</sup>, XVI<sup>e</sup>, et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, 2 vols., Paris, 1854, II, 158, 162, and cf. Wm. Miller, "The Venetian Revival in Greece, 1684–1718," *English Historical Review*, XXXV (1920), 343 ff., reprinted in *Essays on the Latin Orient* (1921, repr. 1964), pp. 407 ff.; James M. Paton, *The Venetians in Athens, 1687–1689*, Cambridge, Mass., 1940; T. E. Mommsen, "The Venetians in Athens and the Destruction of the Parthenon in 1687," *American Journal of Archaeology*, XLV (1941), 544–56.

The interested reader will find the originals of Francesco Morosini's dispatches (as well as copies) from 20 September, 1687, to 19 May, 1688 (with the later insertion of a dispatch dated at the Gulf of Lepanto on 26 July, 1687), in the Arch.

Some six months or so after his occupation of Athens, fearing the Turkish forces on the island of Negroponte (Euboea), realizing his army was not sufficient to hold the city, and anxious about the plague rampant in Greece and the Morea, Morosini withdrew from Athens to the island of Poros on 8 April, 1688. The Acropolis was left in ruins. The Venetians gained nothing from their venture into Attica. Morosini lost nothing, for as he was preparing his withdrawal from the ruined city, he was elected doge (on 3 April).

The Venetians also seized the island of S. Maura (in 1684), which they kept, and that of Chios (in September, 1694), which they soon gave up (in February of '95), for it was too far away and would be too hard to hold. By the treaty of Karlowitz (of 26 January, 1699), to which we shall return in a moment, the Porte was obliged to recognize the Republic's possession of the Morea and the islands of S. Maura and Aegina. The Venetians were no longer to pay tribute for Zante, and with the ac-

di Stato di Venezia, Senato, Provveditori da terra e da mar, Filza 1120: *Armata, Capitano general, da 20 Settembre 1687 sin 19 Maggio 1688: Francesco Morosini, Cavaliere, Procurator*. An extensive collection of Morosini's dispatches, copies almost all done in the same hand, is also accessible, *ibid.*, Filza 949: *Lettere del general da mar dall' Arcipelago 1686 a 1688*, dated from 9 September, 1686, to 19 May, 1688, both "files" (*filze*) ending with copies of the same dispatch. The pages are unnumbered in both collections.

In a long dispatch to the Doge Marc' Antonio Giustinian, dated *di galera, Porto Lion, 10 Ottobre, 1687*, Morosini described the arrival of the Venetian fleet at Piraeus (*alle rive d' Atene in Porto Lion*) on the morning of 21 September. The bombardment of the Acropolis began on the morning of the twenty-third "con due batterie, l' una di sei pezzi di cannone e l' altra di quattro mortari da bombe a tormentar gli assediati." At length, "col getto poi delle bombe continuatosi a flagellar dal sopraincidente Conte S. Felice [i.e., Antonio Mutoni, who was in command of the gunners] l' interno del barbaro luogo, s' hebbe il contento di vederne fra le altre a cader una la sera di 26 con fortunato colpo [...], mentre acceso un deposito di buona quantità di polvere, non poté più estinguersi la fiamma che andò serpendo e per due interi giorni divorando l' habitato col' apportarle notabili danni e crucciose mestizie."

Five days after the Turks had hoisted the white flag of surrender (*bandiera bianca*), they were allowed to descend into the city, and on 5 October most of them were shipped off at their own expense to Smyrna in English, Ragusan, and French vessels: "Caduta così in potere dell' augusto Dominio di Vostra Serenità," as Morosini wrote the doge, "anco la fortezza tanto illustre e rinomata d' Atene colla sua famosa città d' ampia circonferenza che, ornata di cospicue fabbriche et antiche, vestigi di celebri et erudite memorie, gira tutta via più di tre miglia . . ." (from the original dispatch signed by Morosini, *ibid.*, Filza 1120, doc. no. 125). Cf. Léon de Laborde, *Documents inédits ou peu connus sur l' histoire et les antiquités d' Athènes* . . . Paris, 1854, pp. 170 ff., who has published a faulty text from a later copy of the dispatch (not that in Filza 949), which he thinks should be dated "probablement du 4 au 5 octobre."

quisition of S. Maura they owned all seven of the Ionian islands as well as Butrinto and Parga in Epirus. The Venetians had held the island of Tenos in the Aegean for five hundred years, and now they continued to hold it. Indeed, it looked for a while as though the Venetian "empire" were being reconstituted.<sup>212</sup>

These were among the most difficult years in the history of the Ottoman empire. The grand vizir Suleiman Pasha suffered a catastrophic defeat near Mohács in southern Hungary (on 12 August, 1687), for which he paid with his life, and on 8 November of the same year the heedless Mehmed IV, who had reigned for thirty-nine years, was deposed. He was succeeded by his more competent brother Suleiman II, who ruled for the next four years.<sup>213</sup> The Venetians profited from these disturbances, and so did the Austrians. During the period 1686-1689 the Turks lost to the imperialist forces Buda[pest], Erlau (Eger), Peterwardein (Petrovaradin), Belgrade, Stuhlweissenburg (Székesfehérvár), Nish, Vidin, and a score of other fortified places.<sup>214</sup> The Turks had held Nish and Vidin with some vicissitudes of fortune since the later fourteenth century, Belgrade since 1521, and Erlau since 1596. In 1690, to be sure, the Turks recovered Nish and Belgrade, but they were not out of the woods, for four years later they failed to recover Peterwardein, and the Russians attacked Azov, which they succeeded in taking in July, 1696.

One year later another Turkish army, this time under Sultan Mustafa II, met disaster in Hungary. At Zenta (Senta), on 11 September, 1697, Prince Eugene of Savoy caught the sultan's army

<sup>212</sup> On the complicated negotiations which led to the peace of Karlowitz and the terms of the treaty, "der merkwürdigste aus allen bis hieher mit der Türkei von europäischen Mächten geschlossen," see Jos. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VI (Pest, 1830, repr. Graz, 1963), 661-78, and the Turco-Venetian agreement, *ibid.*, esp. pp. 666, 669-71, 672-73, 675-76, trans. J.-J. Hellert, *Hist. de l' empire ottoman*, XII (Paris, 1838), 452-75, and on Venice, esp. pp. 458-59, 463-65, 467-68, 471-72. For a detailed account, with rich documentation, of the Serenissima's brief hold upon Chios, see Philip P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Venetians (1694)*, Oxford, 1935.

<sup>213</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VI, 459 ff., 490-98, trans. Hellert, XII, 212 ff., 228-41; M. Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, I (1963), 135-37; A. D. Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, Oxford, 1956, repr. Westport, Conn., 1982, pp. 65-66.

<sup>214</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VI, 507 ff., 515 ff., 543 ff., trans. Hellert, XII, 252 ff., 264 ff., 296 ff., and on the fall of Belgrade, cf. Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, I, 143-44, and on that of Buda[pest], note Pastor, *Gesch. d. Päpste*, XIV-2 (1930), 826-29.

off guard after the cavalry had crossed the Theiss (Tisza), and slaughtered some thousands of Turkish foot on the right bank of the river. It was the battle of Zenta which helped produce the treaty of Karlowitz. The negotiations were difficult, lasting seventy-one days (from 17 November, 1698, to 26 January, 1699), but they restored peace at least for a while among Austria, the Porte, Poland, Russia, and Venice—and at long last brought the Hapsburgs possession of Hungary and Transylvania.<sup>215</sup>

Perhaps nothing rankled the Ottoman spirit quite so much as the Venetians' conquest of the Morea. The patriarchs of Constantinople (in this context one can hardly say Istanbul) and the Greeks of the Phanar, the "Phanariotes," who were beginning to hold lucrative positions in Wallachia and Moldavia, encouraged the Turks in their desire to expel the Venetians from the peninsula. The Venetians were Catholics, allies of the pope, and they had cost the patriarchate its predominance in the Morea (and reduced its revenues) by allowing the Greeks to elect their own bishops. Before the Venetians instituted this change—since, in fact, long before the Fourth Crusade—the patriarch of Constantinople had always appointed the Moreote bishops as well as the abbots of the monasteries "marked with a cross" (the *σταυροπήγια*).<sup>216</sup> The offerings of priests and parishes which had been divided between the bishops and the patriarch now went entirely to the bishops. Nevertheless, the Venetians never won the support of either the Greeks or their bishops in the Morea.

In 1700–1703 the Turks confirmed their treaties of peace and clarified their territorial boundaries with Austria and Poland.<sup>217</sup> Thereafter, having renewed their peace with Peter the Great and having regained Azov (in 1710–1712),<sup>218</sup> they went to war again with Venice (on 11 January, 1715). The Turkish forces occupied Tenos and

Aegina, Corinth, the hill-top fortress of Palamidi and, just below the fortress, the town of Nauplia in June and July, all with the aid of the Greeks, who now seemed to prefer Turks to Catholics. Once more the Latin churches were converted into mosques. Modon was taken, as were Monemvasia, Mistra, the islands of S. Maura and Cerigo, and every other fortress in the Morea, all within one hundred and one days.<sup>219</sup>

Fortunately for the Signoria, however, on 15 October (1715) the Saxon soldier Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg entered the service of the Republic. He directed the defense of Corfu in July and August, 1716, putting the Turks to flight. He also recovered Butrinto and S. Maura, and (in 1717) he went on to take Prevesa and Vonitza on the Ambracian Gulf. It is small wonder that the Venetians should have erected a monument to him before the old fortress at Corfu. Schulenburg was moving into Albania when he had to desist, owing to the peace which was agreed upon in the treaty of Passarowitz, whereby Venice had to give up to the Turks the islands of Tenos and Aegina as well as her prize possession, the Morea. She retained, however, the seven Ionian islands, including S. Maura, the strongholds of Butrinto and Parga, and her recent conquests, the towns of Prevesa and Vonitza.<sup>220</sup>

<sup>215</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VII (Pest, 1831, repr. Graz, 1963), 173–84, trans. Hellert, XIII (Paris, 1839), 262–77.

<sup>220</sup> Cf. note 222 below, and on Schulenburg's career, see the article by P. Zimmermann, in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, XXXII (1891, repr. Berlin, 1971), 667–74. Schulenburg was born on 8 August, 1661, at Emden, and died in Verona on 14 March, 1747. Two large volumes of copies of his letters to the doge, relevant decrees of the Senate, plans for the recruitment of troops, data concerning the deployment and organization of the Republic's forces on land and at sea, requirements of artillery and munitions, warehouses for supplies, *biscotto* for the troops and *foraggio* for their horses, *ospedali e quartieri per la conservazione de' soldati*, financial facts and figures, the needed fortifications at Corfu, in Dalmatia, and elsewhere—all this and more may be found in the Bibl. Nazionale Marciana, MSS. II, VII, 1210–11 (9026–27), which contain documents dated from 3 December, 1715, to 30 October, 1733. Incidentally, Schulenburg closes a memorandum to the doge, dated at Venice on 26 November, 1729, "con quello antico ma saggio consiglio: Chi desidera la pace, si prepari alla guerra" (*ibid.*, vol. II, fol. 6').

Schulenburg, whose name is also given as Matthias Johann, was well known in his own day as an ardent collector of paintings and as a patron of artists in Venice. The records of his career are partially preserved in the Niedersächsisches Staatsarchiv in Hannover. Cf. the survey of Schulenburg's collection by Alice Binion, "From Schulenburg's Gallery and Records," *The Burlington Magazine*, CXII, no. 806 (May 1970), 297–303, and the

<sup>215</sup> On the complications relating to frontiers and boundaries, access to water and mills, rights of navigation, exchange of prisoners, commerce and religious issues, and the guardianship of the Holy Sepulcher, see von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VI, 664–69, 673 ff., trans. Hellert, XI, 455–63, 468 ff. On the battle of Zenta, see especially Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, I, 254–61, and on the treaty of Karlowitz, *ibid.*, pp. 269–70.

<sup>216</sup> On the monasteries marked with the *signum crucis*, cf. Volume I, pp. 46–47.

<sup>217</sup> Dumont-Rousset, *Supplément au corps universel diplomatique*, II-1 (Amsterdam and The Hague, 1739), no. CCVIII, pp. 459–61, and II-2 (1739), no. XXVIII, pp. 37–38, docs. dated 25 July–8 August, 1700, and 14 November, 1703.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, II-2, nos. LXI, LXX, pp. 78–79, 89–90, docs. dated in April, 1710, and April, 1712.

The Venetians had finally done well, far better than they would have done if the Austrians had not intervened to assist them. Fearing the consequences of the Ottoman success in renewal of the war with Venice, the Emperor Charles VI had made an alliance with Venice on 13 April, 1716, for continuance of the war against the Porte. Once more Prince Eugene of Savoy took the field in command of an imperialist army which inflicted a serious defeat upon the Turks, this time at Peterwardein (on 5 August, 1716), and then went on to lay siege to the fortress town of Temesvár (Timișoara), "the last bulwark of Islam in Hungary." To Prince Eugene's surprise the garrison offered to surrender as early as 12 October, and four days later the Turks withdrew from the fortress which the Porte had held for 164 years. All the Banat (north of Belgrade) was now in Austrian hands.

Hero of the hour, indeed the hero of years, Eugene received from Clement XI the sanctified hat and sword. News of the fall of Temesvár, a terrible blow to the Turks, was concealed at the Porte for more than two weeks. The Turkish troops were recalled from Corfu, Butrinto, and the island of S. Maura. The next year Eugene laid siege to Belgrade, shattered a Turkish army sent to its relief (on 16 August, 1717), and two days later occupied the town itself, taking as at Peterwardein a rich haul of cannon, flags, ammunition, supplies, and tents. Also as at Peterwardein, Eugene kept for himself the richly-embroidered tent or pavilion of a defeated grand vizir.<sup>221</sup>

---

brief notice of his career in Antonio Morassi, "Un Ritratto del Maresciallo Schulenburg dipinto da Antonio Guardi," *Arte veneta*, VI (Venice, 1952), 88-91.

<sup>221</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VII, 194 ff., 203-8, 212-15, 218-21, trans. Hellert, XIII, 292 ff., 306-

The Emperor Charles VI, who was also at war with Philip V, the Bourbon king of Spain, over possession of the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, not to speak of Naples, accepted British and Dutch mediation for another treaty with the Porte. This was the peace of Passarowitz, concluded on 21 July, 1718, and (as we have noted) the Austrians included Venice in the treaty. It was to last for twenty-four years. According to the terms agreed upon at Passarowitz, the Turks recognized the imperial possession of the Banat of Temesvár, the western parts of Wallachia and Serbia, the fortress town of Belgrade (which the Turks recovered in September, 1739), and part of Bosnia. It was the most advantageous treaty that Austria had ever concluded with the Porte.<sup>222</sup>

The genius and daring of Prince Eugene of Savoy had raised the military reputation of Austria to an unprecedented height. The glory would not last and, along with Belgrade, the Austrians would soon lose most of what they had gained at Passarowitz. The Turk had more wars to fight, especially with Russia. Tired though he was, with many worries, he had a century or more to go before he would become the "sick man of Europe." As for the Venetians, after Passarowitz they turned from warfare to the carnival, masques and balls, retaining all their possessions until, in 1797, the Republic was brought to an end.

---

14, 319-24, 328-32, and see Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, III (1964), 302-29, esp. pp. 316 ff., on the battle of Peterwardein and the fall of Temesvár, and pp. 347-61, on the siege, battle, and victory at Belgrade.

<sup>222</sup> Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Gesch. d. osman. Reiches*, VII, 227-37, and on the articles of the treaty of Passarowitz relating to Venice, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 251-33, 234, 235, trans. Hellert, XIII, 341-55, and concerning Venice, pp. 346-48, 350, 351-52, and cf. Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, III, 370-77.

## INDEX

No names of modern scholars (and no references to their works) are included in this index

- Aa river, **691**
- Abbas the Great, shah of Persia from 1587 (b. 1571, d. 1629), **1098**
- Abbeville, 481n
- Abbategrasso, 285ff.
- Abensach, Rabbi Abraham, physician for Venetians in Istanbul ca. 1565, 848f.
- Abruzzi, 284, 292f., 309, **637, 651, 656, 673, 680n, 681, 905, 911**
- Abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad V, king of Tunis 1494–1526: 235
- Abū l-Abbās Ḥmad III ibn-Muḥammad VI, king of Tunis 1542–1569: 905n
- Abu Sa'ud al-Amadi, mufti in Istanbul ca. 1569: **945**
- Abyssinians, 741n
- Acciajuoli, Donato, Florentine Hospitaller (*fl.* 1531), 352
- Acciajuoli, Roberto, Florentine ambassador to France in 1511 and 1527: 91n, 95, 96n, 99n, 103, 109n, 111f., 113n, 114n, 115n, 119f., 278n, 283
- Accursio, Cesare, canon of Acerra (*fl.* 1527), 294
- Acerenza and Matera, archbishops of, *see* Andrea Matteo Palmieri 1518–1528, Giovanni Michele Saraceni 1531–1556?
- Acerno, bishops of, *see* Pompeo Colonna (admin.) 1524–1525, Francisco Quiñones (admin.) 1539
- Acerra, 294, 295n, and *see* Cesare Accursio
- Achelis, Antoine, Cretan poet, 853n
- Achelous river, **1052**
- Achille de' Grassi, bishop of Città di Castello 1506–1511?, cardinal 1511–1523, bishop of Bologna 1511–1518?: 173
- Achille de' Grassi, bishop of Montefiascone and Corneto 1551–1555: 545f., 556, 558
- Achilles, 64n
- Acquapendente, **600**
- Acquaviva, Giulio Antonio, count of Conversano in 1528: 306
- Acqui, bishop of, *see* Peter van der Vorst 1534–1549?
- Acropolis (in Athens), 379, **1101f.**
- Actium, 446, battle of (31 B.C.), **1058**
- Acton, (Lord) John, English historian (b. 1834, d. 1902), 486n, 827n
- Acuto, **660**
- Ad dominici gregis*, bull of Paul III (1536), 413n
- Ad Ecclesiae regimen*, bull of Pius IV (1560), **769, 774**
- Ad illius cuius*, bull of Julius II (1512), 136n
- Ad omnipotentis*, bull of Leo X (1513), 151n
- Ad prudentis patrisfamilias*, bull of Julius III (1551), 538
- "Adam de Fulda, Magister" (*fl.* 1537), 417
- Adam von Dietrichstein, German diplomat (b. 1527, d. 1590), **919**
- Adda river, 58n, 59
- Aden, Gulf of, 348
- Adige river, 63, 122, 160, 491, 500, 777n, **804**
- Adolf von Schauenburg, archbishop (and elector) of Cologne 1535–1556: 539, 546, **628**
- Adorno, Girolamo, imperial ambassador to Venice in 1523: 213n
- Adour river, **838**
- Adria, bishops of, *see* Giovanni Domenico de Cupis (admin.) 1528–1553, Giulio Canano 1554–1591
- Adrian de Croy, count of Roeulx in 1535: 370n, 392n
- Adrianople (Edirne), 72n, 78, 79n, 84n, 88, 156n, 163n, 164, 179, 181, 191, 198, 251, 302, 371, 411, 414n, 416n, 421n, 425, 427, 428n, 450, 463, 465n, 468f., 471, 472n, 477n, 478, 481n, 483, 487f., 493, 530, 562, **589, 679, 682, 691ff., 694n, 695n, 696, 698f., 922, 945, 1001, 1018, 1068**
- Adriatic Sea, 1, 11, 16, 37, 50n, 66, 70, 73ff., 77f., 80f., 90, 116n, 123, 156, 163, 177, 191, 231, 233f., 260, 279, 292, 294, 329, 332, 344, 353, 355, 383, 385, 421, 430, 529, 532, 538, 539n, 606f., **608, 662, 665ff., 668, 682, 695, 703, 704n, 770, 842f., 848n, 879n, 899n, 901ff., 904ff., 907, 911, 923ff., 933, 935, 939, 947, 950n, 961, 970, 974f., 986, 988, 1002, 1008, 1014, 1021ff., 1025ff., 1045f., 1048, 1052, 1066, 1069, 1072f., 1078, 1088, 1095f., 1097n, 1100**
- Adrien de la Rivière, French Hospitaller at the siege of Malta, 1565: **855**
- Aegean Sea, 99, 155, 182, 205, 213, 340, 344, 352n, 371, 439, 448n, 532, **584, 606, 692n, 700, 755f., 765, 834, 849, 875, 877f., 893f., 933f., 939, 948, 963, 975, 984, 1000n, 1080, 1100ff.**; islands of, *see* Archipelago
- Aegina, 191, 445f., 1102f.
- Aeneas Sylvius, cardinal, *see* Pius II
- Aequicola, Marius (Mario Equicola), Italian writer (b. ca. 1470, d. 1525), 190n
- Aesculapius, **734**
- Africa, 77, 84, 86, 126, 140, 147, 156, 162, 165n, 179, 185, 369, 397, 412, 533ff., 550n, **632, 645, 661, 693, 762, 776, 811, 862, 911, 1071**
- Africans, 273
- Agde (in France), bishops of, *see* François Guillaume de Clermont (admin.?) 1531–1541, Claude de la Guiche 1541–1547
- Agen, bishops of, *see* Leonardo Grosso della Rovere 1487–1519?, Jean de Lorraine (admin.) 1538–1550
- Aghero and Ottana, bishop of, *see* Durante de' Duranti 1538–1541
- Agnadello, battle of (1509), **6n, 40, 56n, 59ff., 69, 71, 76, 80**
- Agnello, Benedetto, Mantuan agent in 1527: 261n, 280, 282n, 285
- Agnello, Giovanni, correspondent of Duke Federico Gonzaga, 419n
- Agostino (Agustín), Antonio, bishop of Alife 1557–1561, of Lérida 1561–1576, archbishop of Tarragona 1576–1586: **603, 715ff., 782, 787, 819**
- Agostino, Fra, author of a contemporary account of the fall of Famagusta in 1571: 996n
- Agram (Zagreb), 244
- Agustin, Antonio, *see* Antonio Agostino
- Ahmad, Arab, captain of Turkish galleys at Costanza in 1571: **1007, 1042, 1075**
- Ahmed I, Ottoman sultan from 1603 (b. 1590, d. 1617), **1097**
- Ahmed, son of Bayazid II; Ottoman prince (d. 1512?), 84, 122, 123n, 127f., 134
- Ahmed, son of Muley Hassan (*fl.* 1548), 397n
- Ahmed, agha of the janissaries ca. 1561: **833**
- Ahmed Köprülü, Ottoman grand vizir in 1669 (b. 1635, d. 1676), **1101**
- Ahmed Pasha, *fl.* 1510: 78n; victor at Rhodes and rebel against the Porte (d. 1524), 210ff., 213n, 224
- Ahmed Pasha, conqueror of Temesvár and grand vizir (d. 1555), 503, 585, 589f., 607f., 623n
- Ahmed Pasha, beylerbey of Algiers ca. 1565: **832**; Ottoman *general da terra* in 1571: **1018**; Ottoman grand vizir from 1579: **1098**
- Aias Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir (b. 1482?, d. 1539), 278
- Aigues-Mortes, 23, 27, 204, 441

- Aiméry d' Amboise, grand master of the Hospitallers (d. 1512), 17, 20, 24, 33, 39, 47, 99f., 182
- Aimo (Varigmana), Domenico, sculptor (d. 1534?), 143n
- Aire-sur-I' Adour, bishopric of, *see* Dax
- Aix, archbishop of, *see* Lorenzo Strozzi 1568–1571
- Ajax, 64n
- Akinjis, 356, 366, 379n
- Akrotiri, Bay of, at Cyprus, 1043
- Aksaray, 589
- Alamanni, Niccolò, Italian diplomat and soldier (d. after 1588), 634
- al-Ashraf Kānshūh al Ghūrī, Burjī-Mamluk sultan of Egypt, 1500–1516: 2, 18ff., 21, 23ff., 26, 28, 31, 33, 46, 71, 90n, 165
- Alatri, 660
- Alba, bishop of, *see* Leonardo Marini 1566–1572?
- Alba Iulia (German Karlsburg, Hungarian Gyulafehérvár), in Transylvania, 318n, 436, 479n, 567, 576f.; bishop of, *see* John Statilius 1539–1554; treaty of (1551), 567, 569ff., 575
- Alban hills (near Rome), 289, 713
- Albanese, Filippo, Venetian commander (d. ca. 1508), 52
- Albania, 88n, 177, 272, 584, 698, 903, 940f., 953, 988f., 991, 1002n, 1013, 1025, 1045, 1054, 1081, 1095, 1100, 1103
- Albanians, 43n, 83, 99, 177, 304, 366n, 375, 377, 385f., 970, 990f., 1013, 1027, 1035, 1098
- Albano, cardinal bishops of, *see* Ennio Filonardi, Giovanni Piccolomini
- Albany, 142n; duke of, *see* John Stuart (b. 1481, d. 1536)
- Albenga ("Arbenga"), 623; bishop of, *see* Gianbattista Cicada (admin.) 1543–1554?
- Alberini, Marcello, Roman diarist (b. 1511), 270, 272n, 273
- Albert von Wyls, imperial ambassador to Istanbul in 1567: 921, 922n
- Alberia, Venetian ship (ca. 1550), 531
- Alberti Poja, Francesco, prince-bishop of Trent 1678–1689: 491
- Albertini, Francesco, canon, author of a guidebook to Rome (1510), 140
- Albi, bishops of, *see* Antoine Duprat (admin.) 1528–1535, Jean de Lorraine (admin.) 1535–1550, Louis de Guise 1550–1558?, Lorenzo Strozzi (admin.) 1561–1568
- Albini, Girolamo, secretary to Leonardo Contarini (fl. 1566), 846n
- Albisola, 102
- Albrecht, son of Wilhelm IV and Maria Jacoba of Baden; duke (V) of Bavaria from 1550 (b. 1528, d. 1579), 569n, 603n, 632, 741n, 790ff., 1063n
- Albrecht, also called "Alciadias," margrave of Brandenburg-Kulmbach ca. 1546 (b. 1522, d. 1557), 484, 494, 561n, 749f.
- Albrecht of Brandenburg, archbishop of Mainz 1514–1545, cardinal 1518–1545: 47In, 496n
- Albrecht of Hohenzollern, margrave of Brandenburg-Ansbach, grand master of the Teutonic Order, first duke of Prussia (b. 1490, d. 1568), 144, 341n
- Alcalá, duke of, *see* Pedro Alfano de Rivera (b. 1508, d. 1571)
- Alcántara, Order of, 632
- Akcazavvir (Ksar el Kebir), 1095, 1096n
- Aldobrandini, Giovanni, bishop of Imolea 1569–1579?, cardinal 1570–1579: 965, 1070, 1074, 1090
- Aldobrandini, Ippolito, son of Silvestro, *see* Clement VIII
- Aldobrandini, Silvestro, Florentine exile (b. 1499, d. 1558), 633, 651, 655, 658n, 677, 735, 743, 749
- Alexander, Jerome, archbishop of Brindisi 1524–1542, cardinal 1536–1542: 298n, 364n, 388, 413, 432, 436n, 437n, 442n, 443f., 447n, 448n
- Alemán, Juan, *see* Jean Lallemand
- Aleppo (Haleb), 25, 164f., 175n, 182n, 483n, 501n, 502f., 590, 623n, 631, 632n, 830, 832f.
- Aleria, bishop of, *see* Innocenzo Gibo (admin.) 1518–1520
- Alessandria, 201, 225, 285, 305, 373, 374n, 438n, 915, 1077; medical of, *see* Michele Bonelli, Michele Ghislieri (Pius V)
- Alessandro de' Medici, relative of Clement VII (d. 1537), 277
- Alessandro de' Pazzi, Florentine ambassador to Venice in 1527: 266, 286
- Alessano, bishops of, *see* Agostino Trivulzio 1521–1526, Alessandro Cesarini (admin.) 1526–1531
- Alexander IV, ruler of Moldavia (d. 1568), 768n, 834
- Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia), nephew of Calixtus III; cardinal 1456–1492, archbishop of Valencia 1458–1492, pope 1492–1503: 1ff., 4n, 5n, 6, 12, 15n, 16ff., 36, 47f., 64n, 73, 77, 85, 95, 121n, 142, 153ff., 161f., 200, 254, 353, 394, 528n
- Alexander VII (Fabio Chigi), pope 1655–1667: 270n, 1101
- Alexander of Vézelay, abbot and instigator of the Council of Basel, 98
- Alexandretta (Lajazzo), Gulf of, 94, 934f.
- Alexandria, 18n, 19ff., 22ff., 25ff., 28ff., 31f., 71, 83, 87, 110n, 147, 170, 172n, 179, 212n, 285, 301, 339, 343f., 348n, 368n, 401, 406, 536, 586, 607, 702, 766n, 833, 839, 864, 926, 930, 934, 937f., 947, 950, 963, 971n, 1049, 1057n, 1078; "admiral" of, 30; Coptic patriarch of, *see* Gabriel VII 1526–1569; governor of (1571), *see* Mehmed Siroco
- Alfonso II (d' Aragona), son of Ferrante I and Isabella; duke of Calabria (to 1494), king of Naples 1494–1495: 645, 665, 668
- Alfonso I d' Este, son of Ercole I and Eleonora d' Aragona; duke of Ferrara 1505–1534: 7, 9, 50n, 59, 63, 68, 75ff., 79n, 80, 87, 91, 93, 102n, 104, 115n, 116ff., 118n, 121n, 122, 125n, 128ff., 131, 134, 149, 202f., 220, 261f., 265, 276f., 281f., 285, 287f., 302, 322, 323n, 327, 330, 336, 346, 491, 725; wife of, *see* Lucrezia Borgia
- Alfonso II d' Este, son of Ercole II and Renée, daughter of Louis XII; duke of Ferrara 1559–1597: 741, 745n, 858, 976, 1002, 1062, 1063n, 1071
- Alfonso V ("the Magnanimous"), son of Ferdinand I of Aragon-Catalonia and Sicily; king of Aragon-Catalonia and (I) Sicily 1416–1458, king (I) of Naples (1455) 1442–1458: 14
- Alfonso de Ávalos (Ital. d' Avalor), marquis of Vasto (Guasto), imperial commander (b. 1502, d. 1546), cousin and heir of Fernando Francisco de Ávalos, marquis of Pescara, 231, 261, 293f., 296, 297n, 429n, 457, 458n, 470f.
- Alfonso de Mercado, would-be assassin of George Martinuzzi in 1551: 576
- Alfonso de Valdés, humanist and Latin secretary of Charles V (b. ca. 1490/ca. 1500, d. 1532), 239n, 243, 273n
- Alfonso del Guerra, Augustinian friar sent to Malta in 1565: 862
- Algeria, 234, 461, 891, 1095
- Algerians, 906, 911
- Algiers (Zer), 86, 178f., 347, 375ff., 396f., 586, 588, 601, 607n, 758, 830ff., 837f., 842, 849, 855, 856n, 857n, 864, 874, 915, 919, 940, 943, 945, 946n, 961, 963, 968, 1000n, 1015f., 1021, 1075, 1078f., 1081, 1086, 1089n, 1095f.; "king" of, *see* Uluj-Ali (fl. 1570); sanjakbey of, *see* Khairreddin Barbarossa
- Alhambra, palace (in Granada), 744n
- Ali Aga, dragoman in 1581: 840n, 841
- Ali Beg, dragoman of Bayazid II in 1510: 89n, 157n
- "Alibey," Ottoman ambassador to Venice in 1517: 175n
- Alidosi, Francesco, bishop of Mileto 1504–1505, of Pavia 1505–1511, cardinal 1505–1511: 62, 67f., 96n, 139n



- Alife, 716n; bishops of, *see* Sebastiano Pighino 1546–1548, Antonio Agostino 1557–1561, Diego Gilberto Noguera 1561–1567; count of, *see* Ferrante Garlonio (d. 1561)
- Ali Pasha, governor of Buda in 1552: 584f., 591
- Ali Pasha, Müezzinzade, Turkish naval commander (*kapudan pasha*), d. 1571: 934f., 960, 971f., 984, 992, 995n, 1007, 1027, 1045f., 1049, 1055ff., 1055ff., 1058, 1060, 1067, 1069; sons of, 1067
- Ali Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir 1561–1565: 707n, 771, 852ff., 855f., 838f., 844f., 865, 930
- Almeria, bishop of, *see* Antonio Corriero 1557–1571?
- Alonso de Borja, *see* Calixtus III
- Alonso de Cordova, commander of Civitavecchia in 1527: 276, 281
- Aloysius de Cortili, Hospitaller envoy to the Hapsburgs *ca.* 1560: 760
- Alps, mountains, 1, 4, 97n, 130, 133, 160, 202, 256, 259, 454, 673
- Altamira, count of, 905
- Altamura, 294n
- Altemps, family, 743; *see also* Hohenems
- Altemps, Margherita, daughter of Chiara de' Medici and Wolf Dietrich, 743
- Alticozzi di Cortona, Muzio, Italian captain in Spanish employ in 1571 (d. 1571), 1051
- Altoviti, Florentine banking family, 102
- Alum, 49f., 412n, 475f., 924f., 929
- Alva, duke of, *see* Fernando Álvarez de Toledo
- Álvarez de Toledo, Juan, bishop of Cordova 1523–1537, of Burgos 1537–1550, cardinal 1538–1557, archbishop of Compostella 1550–1557: 509f., 513ff., 517, 522n, 523ff., 527, 535, 596, 613, 618, 621n, 626, 638f., 644, 651, 656, 681
- Álvarez de Vosmediano, Melchor, bishop of Guadix 1560–1574? (d. 1587), 794, 817, 822, 824
- Álvarez de Bazán, marquis of Santa Cruz, Spanish admiral (b. 1526, d. 1588), 871, 872n, 875, 901, 903, 977ff., 982, 985, 1021, 1046f., 1055, 1078, 1081, 1084ff.
- Álvarez de la Quadra, bishop of Venosa 1542–1552: 500
- Álvarez de Sande, hero of Jerba and commander of relief forces for Malta in 1565: 758, 760, 762ff., 765f., 833, 834n, 836, 871, 874
- Alvincz (Vințul de Jos), 569n, 576
- Amalfi, 296, 776; archbishops of, *see* Francesco Sfondrato 1544–1547, Tiberio Crispi (admin.) 1547–1561; ruler of, *see* Cesare Gonzaga di Guastalla (d. 1575)
- Amanieu d' Albret, son of Jean III of Navarre; cardinal 1500–1520: 3, 97, 105, 111
- Amaral, Andreas, Portuguese, chancellor of the Hospitallers (d. 1522), 203, 210, 215
- Amaseo, Romolo, scholar, 1489–1552?: 506
- Amasya (Amasia), 84, 127, 530, 590n, 591, 622, 623n, 630
- Amaury de Lusignan, son of Hugh VIII, constable of Jerusalem 1181–1194; count of Jaffa 1193–1194; ruler of Cyprus 1194–1197; king of Cyprus 1197–1205; king of Jerusalem 1197–1205: 756
- Amazons, 182
- Amboise, 178n, 550n; conspiracy of (1560), 725, 766n; Edict of (1563), 806, 808, 814
- Ambracia, Gulf of, 446, 1103
- Ambrogio da Firenze, French ambassador to Venice in 1524: 224
- Ambrogio de Castro, sent to minister to the defenders of Malta in 1565: 862n
- Amendolara, 586
- América, 1, 85, 140, 190, 644, 771, 891, 983, 1098
- Amiclae, bishop of, *see* Scipione Retiba 1541–1551?
- Amiens, bishops of, *see* Charles de Hémart de Denonville (admin.) 1538–1540, Claude de Givry (admin.) 1540–1546?
- Anabaptism, 565, 630n, 714
- Anabaptists, 559n, 453, 633n
- Anagni, 255, 650, 660, 881; bishop of, *see* Francesco Soderini (admin.) 1517–1523
- Anaphi, 472n
- Ancona, 67n, 73, 77f., 98, 114f., 117n, 118, 157, 177, 178n, 179, 292, 411f., 421, 430n, 446, 475, 559n, 559, 691, 713, 852, 881, 904, 919, 960f., 965, 968, 972, 988, 1049n, 1096, 1097n; bishop of, *see* Pietro de' Accolti 1505–1514; 1523 (admin.); March of, 96, 100, 113, 179, 307, 411, 412n, 421f., 431, 603, 684, 742, 754n; governor of the March, *see* Alessandro Palantieri 1567–1569
- Anconitan, 70f., 73
- André de Foix, brother of Odet; seigneur de L'Esparré, French soldier (d. 1547), 195
- André Le Roy, French ambassador to Egypt *ca.* 1512: 27f.
- Andrea, servant of Marc' Antonio Bragadin in 1571: 1042
- Andrea da Borgo (also Borgo), imperial ambassador to France 1509–1512: 68, 80n, 86, 94n, 113n, 116n, 133n, 134, 148n, 335n, 336n, 359n
- Andrea da Pesaro, galleas commander at Lepanto (*fl.* 1571), 1054
- Andrea de Franceschi, companion of Domenico Trevisan in 1512: 30, 33
- Andrea della Valle, bishop of Cotrone 1496–1508, 1522–1524, of Mileto 1508–1523, cardinal 1517–1534, bishop of Gallipoli (admin.) 1518–1524, of Valva and Sulmona (admin.) 1519–1521: 234, 392
- Andrea del Sarto, painter (b. 1486, d. 1530), 161
- Andreas, guide of Felix Fabri in Cyprus in 1483: 757
- Andreas de Ovedo, bishop of Hierapolis 1555–1580?: 768n
- Andrés de Cuesta, bishop of León 1557–1564: 778, 811, 819
- Andria, 294n, 309n
- Andros, 17, 25n, 83, 89, 448n, 899, 976f.; governor of, *see* Antonio Pesaro (in 1510); lords of, *see* Niccolò Sommaripa (d. 1506), Francesco Sommaripa (in 1506)
- Angelo di Niccolò (Anzolo de Niccolò), merchant of Famagusta in 1571: 1031n, 1059ff., 1042
- Angevins, French dynasty in Naples 1266–1442: 159, 193, 293, 307, 1024
- Anghiari, 266
- Angoulême, 27, 244; bishops of, *see* Antoine d'Estaing 1506–1523, Philibert Babou 1533–1567; duke of, *see* Charles, son of Francis I (b. 1522, d. 1545)
- Anguillara, 257, 300; counts of, *see* Giuliano dell' Anguillara (*fl.* 1504), Gentile Virgilio Orsini (*fl.* 1535)
- Anjou, duke of, *see* Henry III of France
- Ankara, 622
- Anna, daughter of Ladislás, king of Bohemia and Hungary, and Anna, daughter of Gaston II de Foix; wife of Ferdinand, archduke of Austria and future emperor (I) 1521–1547: 249, 370, 404n
- Anna, daughter of Maximilian II and Maria, daughter of Charles V; wife of Philip II from 1570 (b. 1549, d. 1580), 938
- Anna, daughter of Sigismund I and Bona Sforza; wife of Stefan IV Báthory 1574–1586 (b. 1524, d. 1596), 938
- Anna d'Este, daughter of Ercole II and Renée de France; wife of François, duke of Guise 1548–1563: 642, 657, 676n
- Anne (duc) de Montmorency, constable of France 1538 (b. 1493, d. 1567), 209, 215n, 297, 314, 318n, 321f., 360ff., 406, 412, 433n, 434n, 450, 457n, 522n, 525n, 558n, 559, 576n, 584n, 600n, 618, 624n, 643, 645, 647ff., 652, 653n, 654, 656, 666, 675, 678, 680, 686, 709n
- Annibale von Hohenems (Altemp), son of Chiara, sister of Pius

- IV, and Wolf Dietrich (d. 1586), **865, 880, 907**; wife of, *see* Ortesina Borromeo (married 1565)
- Annnuziata, church in Florence, 277
- Antalya (Satalia), Gulf of, **702, 971f.**
- Antibes, 473n
- Antioch, 147
- Antiochus III ("the Great"), Seleucid king (d. 187 B.C.), 60
- Antivari (Bar), 88, 473f., **947, 1025ff., 1069**; archbishop of, *see* Stefano Taleazzi 1473–1485
- Antoine d'Estaing, bishop of Angoulême 1506–ca. 1523; 112
- Antoine de Grollee, Hospitaller of Auvergne at the siege of Rhodes (1522), 211f.
- Antoine de la Rochefoucauld, sire de Barbezieux, French admiral in 1528: 300, 304, 306
- Antoine de Meudon, bishop of Orléans 1533–1550?, cardinal 1539–1559, bishop of Limoges 1544–1547?, archbishop of Toulouse (admin.) 1550–1559: 506, 510n, **722**
- Antoine des Escalins, baron de la Garde ("Captain Paulin" or "Polin"), French envoy to Istanbul ca. 1541: 456, 459, 461f., 464n, 470ff., 473, 479f., 482, **695, 698n**
- Antonio, Arrigo, jurist of Vicenza in 1527: 275
- Antonio da Canale (Canal), Venetian provveditore of the fleet in 1570 (b. 1521, d. 1577), **923, 928, 935, 967, 978, 980, 982, 984n, 1004, 1021, 1045, 1047, 1048n, 1051, 1054, 1082f.**
- Antonio da Ravenna, ally of the Hospitallers ca. 1565: **843**
- Antonio da Thiene, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- Antonio de Leyva, Spanish captain (b. 1480, d. 1536), 252, 261, 265n, 283n, 285f., 304n, 305, 328f., 368, 401n
- Antonio de Melita, envoy of Pius IV to Portugal in 1561: 768n
- Antonio de Montalvo, supposed author of an account of the war of Siena (b. 1527, d. 1581), 593n, 594n, 606n
- Antonio de Saluto, papal commissioner in 1556: 654n
- Antonio di Seveserino, cardinal 1527–1543, archbishop of Taramo 1528–1543, bishop of Conversano (admin.) 1529–1554?: 335n, 398n
- Antonio Maria Ciochi del Monte, bishop of Città di Castello 1503–1506, archbishop of Manfredonia 1506–1511?, cardinal 1511–1533, bishop of Pavia 1511–1517 (admin.), 1517–1521; of Novara, 1516–1525: 98n, 114f., 138, 234, 289n, 525
- Antonio Maria di Savoia di Collegno, conclavist of Cristoforo Madruzzo in 1549: 518, 526n
- Antwerp, 196n, 461, **647, 914, 915n**
- Anzio, **663, 881**
- Aosta, 894n
- Apennines, 264
- Apocalypse, 126
- Apollo, 182
- Apostolic Camera, *see* Camera Apostolica
- Apostolic See, *see* Holy See
- Apostolici regimini*, bull of Leo X (1513), 151n
- Appellato ab interdicto pontificio* (1509), 58n
- Appiani, family, 12n
- Appiano, Jacopo, Italian naval commander (b. 1539, d. 1585), 860n
- Appocellus, Jakob, notary in the Camera Apostolica in 1527: 274n, 290n
- Apulia (Puglia or Puglia), 14, 55, 62n, 63n, 90, 213n, 216, 246n, 274, 284, 292ff., 295, 303, 309, 321, 323, 329n, 331, 346, 360n, 361, 376, 395n, 406, 424, 428, 431, 432n, 450, 463, 492, 553, **585, 653, 674, 696, 763n, 836, 842f., 879n, 888, 902, 904, 908, 922n, 930, 939**
- Aquila, bishops of, *see* Giovanni Piccolomini (admin.) 1523–1525, Pompeo Colonna (admin.) 1525–1532
- Aquileia, patriarchate of, 55, **783**; patriarchs of, *see* Domenico Grimani 1497–1517, Marino Grimani 1517–1529; 1533–1545?, Marco Grimani 1529–1535, Giovanni Grimani 1545–1550?; 1585, Daniele Barbaro 1550–1574?, Francesco Barbaro 1585–1596?
- Arabia, **919**
- Arabic language, 27n, 165n, 195n, **316, 631, 632n, 946n, 1096n**
- Arabs, 146, 270n, **937**
- Araceli (Aracoeli), cardinal of, *see* Clemente Dolera 1557–1568
- Aragon, 14, 52, 54f., 85, 112, 457n, 464, **632, 890**; Hospitallers from, **854**
- Aragon-Catalonia, 85f., 200; king of, *see* Ferdinand II 1479–1504
- Aranjuez, **744, 915**
- Arbe (Rab Island), 78n
- Archinto, Filippo, bishop of Borgo S. Sepolcro 1539–1546, of Saluzzo 1546–1556, archbishop of Milan 1556–1558: 629ff., **632**
- Archipelago (Egepelagus; Aegean islands), 25, 37, 60, 83, 155n, 191n, 199n, 200n, 217, 234, 279, 371, 423, 429, 439, 451, **693, 696, 707, 755n, 830, 834f., 850n, 856n, 878, 899, 901, 975ff., 981, 988, 991, 1000n, 1001, 1007, 1048, 1065, 1068, 1072**
- Arco, 52n; truce of (1508), 52, 55
- Ardinghelli, Niccolò, son of Pietro, bishop of Fossombrone 1541–1547?, cardinal 1544–1547; 159n, 458n
- Ardinghelli, Pietro, secretary of Leo X (b. 1470?, d. 1526), 159n, 458n
- Arezzo, 72, 265f., 548, 564n; bishops of, *see* Cosimo de' Pazzi 1497–1508, Ottaviano Sforza 1519–1525
- Argentario, **599**
- Argentina, 160
- Argentino, Francesco, created cardinal of S. Clemente and died in August 1511: 139n
- Argus, **588**
- Arianism, 494
- Arianiti ("Comnenus"), Constantine, son of George; regent of Monteferrat 1495–1499 (d. 1531), papal envoy to Emperor Maximilian (1507), 43f., 47, 58n, 65f., 67
- Ariano, bishop of, *see* Diomed Carafa 1511–1560
- Arimondo, Alvise, Venetian envoy to the Porte (elected 1510), 84n, 90, 94
- Ario, bishop of, *see* Timoteo Giustiniani 1550–1564
- Ariosto, Italian poet (b. 1474, d. 1533), 853n
- Aristotle (b. 384 B.C., d. 322 B.C.), 454
- Arius, originator of the Arian heresy (d. 336), 113
- Ariza, **957**
- Arlotto (Arlotto Mainardi), Florentine humorist (b. 1396, d. 1484), **626**
- Armenia, 150, 179, **589, 768n**; king of, *see* Peter I of Lusignan, king of Cilician Armenia 1368–1369
- Armenians, 1028n
- Arnaud (Raynaud) du Ferrier, French jurist and diplomat (b. ca. 1508, d. 1585), **794, 796, 806, 814, 834f., 837, 839n, 842, 844n, 850, 855, 856n, 868n, 878, 879n, 952**
- Arno river, 90, 114f., 132, 231, 241n, 267, 277, 339, 341f., **601**; *see* also Florence
- Arnold of Brescia, reformer (b. ca. 1100, d. 1155), 454
- Arona, counts of, *see* Gilberto Borromeo (d. 1558), Federico Borromeo (from 1558)
- Arpaçay, **590**
- Arpads, Hungarian dynasty (to 1301), 325
- Arras, **914**; bishops of, *see* Pietro de' Accolti (admin.) 1518–1523, Antoine Perrenot 1538–1561?, François Richardot 1561–1574; league of (1579), **920**

- Arroyo, Marco Antonio, contemporary authority on the battle of Lepanto (*f.* 1576), 1054n
- Arslan Beg, governor of Székesfehérvár in 1552: 585
- Arta, sanjakbey of, *see* Luft Beg (in 1533)
- Artois, 193, 238, 327, 392, 430, 685, 691, 705
- Aruj Barrossa, Turkish corsair (b. ca. 1473/1474, d. 1518), 234
- Arze, Juan, Spanish theologian at Trent in 1551: 542
- Asapi (Asapi)*, 556f., 842, 898
- Ascanio della Corgna, nephew of Julius III; commander at the siege of Malta in 1565: 550ff., 592ff., 600, 611, 613, 634, 659, 662, 664f., 688, 721, 733, 860, 869, 871, 873f., 878, 889, 1000, 1001n, 1021, 1061
- Ascoli Piceno, 123, 292, 681f., 904; bishops of, *see* Philip Roverella 1518–1550?, Pietro Camaiani 1566–1579
- Asha, 991
- Asia, 89, 123, 126, 130, 147, 150f., 179, 181, 185, 218, 381
- Asia Minor ("Asia," Anatolia), 49, 53, 84, 99, 122, 127f., 151, 179, 274, 278, 451, 477, 532, 587, 589, 590n, 622, 630, 767, 822, 842, 852, 894, 901, 907, 930, 970f., 984f., 1005n, 1043, 1075n
- Askenasi, Salomon, rabbi, physician, and diplomat (b. ca. 1520, d. 1602), 849, 1089n, 1092, 1096
- Aspromonte, range of the Apennines, 807
- Assisi, 97; bishop of, *see* Silvio Passerini (admin.) 1526–1529
- Assun-Aga, informant at the Porte ca. 1564: 837
- "Astanfaria," *see* Strophades
- Asii, 93, 125, 129n, 130, 224, 241, 392, 429n, 473n, 709, 904, 915f.; bishop of, *see* Agostino Trivulzio 1504–1519
- Astorga, bishop of, *see* Diego de Alaba y Esquivel 1543–1548
- Asypalaea (Stampalia), 439, 472n, 987
- Athens, 193, 204n, 205n, 326n, 350n, 373, 379, 407n, 477n, 855, 1101f.; duchy of, 192n
- Atri, 680, 905; lord duke in, 1026
- Attano, Josephi, of Tripoli, renegade spy for the Turks in Cyprus in 1568: 934f.
- Attica, 1102
- Attila, leader of the Huns (d. 453), 274
- Auch (in France), archbishops of, *see* François Guillaume de Clermont 1507–1558, François de Tournon (admin.) 1538–1551, Ippolito d' Este (admin.) 1551–1563?
- Auditor of the Curia of the Apostolic Camera, Tribunal of the, 779
- Augsburg, 47, 89, 102, 112, 142n, 179n, 183n, 326n, 352, 443n, 453, 502n, 538, 546f., 549ff., 554f., 603, 614, 628, 632, 705, 714, 746n, 753n, 804, 849, 855, 865, 886, 894, 910, 914, 940, 954, 960, 1014, 1020n; Augsburg Confession, 354, 452, 544, 633, 714, 779; Augsburg Interim (1548), 354, 502, 504; bishop of, *see* Otto von Truchsess 1543–1573; diet of (1530), 353f., 360n; Peace of (1555), 354, 632, 633n, 646, 716f., 779; Reichstag of, 502, 603
- Augusta, in Sicily, 539, 554, 585, 765, 890, 891n
- Augustani, 554
- Augustinians, order, 167, 188, 721n, 862; generals of, *see* Egidio Canisio, Girolamo Seripando; *see also* Alfonso del Guerra, Antonio Guido, Onofrio Panvino
- Augustus, son of Henry V and Catherine of Mecklenburg; Albertine duke of Saxony from 1553 (b. 1526, d. 1586), 603n
- Augustus, Roman emperor (b. 63 B.C., d. 14 A.D.), 1058
- Aumale, duke of, *see* Claude (b. 1526, d. 1573)
- Aurelian Wall, 881
- Austria, 55, 190, 192, 195n, 231, 249, 254, 261, 292n, 301, 313, 315n, 316, 322n, 323f., 325n, 326n, 327f., 332, 341n, 345n, 347f., 352, 357, 361, 365, 367, 371, 374n, 384, 387, 389, 397n, 403f., 416n, 432, 433n, 435, 442, 442n, 457, 459, 463, 477n, 480n, 483, 488, 492, 495, 530, 574, 658, 661, 698f., 707, 714, 716, 743, 755, 778, 790ff., 805, 854n, 894, 898n, 904, 938, 1061, 1063n, 1087f., 1105f.; archdukes of, *see* Frederick V (Emperor Frederick III) 1457–1486, (Emperor) Maximilian I 1486–1493, Philip I "the Handsome" 1493–1506, Emperor Ferdinand I (from 1521), Ferdinand, son of Ferdinand I (b. 1529, d. 1595), Charles, son of Ferdinand I (b. 1540, d. 1590); regent of, *see* Ernst, son of Maximilian II (from 1590); and *see* Margaret of Austria
- Austria-Hungary, 349, 899, 912
- Austrians, 178, 341n, 350n, 433, 478, 479n, 568n, 580, 591n, 844, 903, 926, 934, 941, 1098, 1101f., 1104
- Austro-Turkish war (1593–1606), 1097f.
- Autun, bishop of, *see* Ippolito d' Este 1548–1550
- Auvergne, 209n, 210f.; Hospitaliers from, 207f., 854, 867, 870, 875
- Auxerre, bishops of, *see* François de Dinteville 1530–1556, Robert de Lenoncourt (admin.) 1556–1560; Philibert Babou (admin.) 1562–1570
- Avellino, 307n
- Avellino and Frigento, bishops of, *see* Bernardino López de Carvajal (admin.) 1503–?, Bartolomé de la Cueva (admin.) 1548–1549?
- Aventine, hill in Rome, 281
- Averoldi, Altobello, bishop of Pola 1497–1531, papal nuncio in Venice 1527: 185n, 262n, 265f., 288n
- Aversa, 14, 109, 129n, 294, 307ff.
- Avignon, 33, 113, 224n, 360, 412, 610n, 614, 684, 686, 690, 742, 786, 865, 998n; archbishops of, *see* Giuliano della Rovere (Julius II) 1474–1503, Ippolito de' Medici 1529–1535, Alessandro Farnese (admin.) 1535–1551, Annibale Bozzuto 1551–1560?, Georges d' Armagnac (admin.) 1577–1584
- Ávila, bishop of, *see* Diego de Alaba y Esquivel 1548–1558
- Avogadro, Antonio Maria, commander under Lautrec in 1528: 295f.
- Avogadro, Pietro, count, sent by Venice to serve in Candia in 1571: 1002n
- Avranches, 565n; bishop of, *see* Jean de Langeac 1526–1532?
- Avvogadori di Comun (Avvogaria), state attorneys of Venice, 12, 303, 1087
- Ayas (Aias) Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir (b. 1482?, d. 1539), 382, 385f., 408ff., 428f.
- Ayia Sophia, mosque (in Nicosia), *see* Santa Sophia Azerbaijan, 1097f.
- Azov, 1102f.
- Babbi, Antonio, secretary of Bongianini Gianfigliazzi ca. 1557: 674n
- Babócsa, in southwestern Hungary, 921
- Babou, Philibert, French diplomat; bishop of Angoulême 1533–1567?, cardinal 1561–1570, bishop of Auxerre (admin.) 1562–1570: 690, 713, 717, 719n
- "Babylonish Captivity" (1305–1377), 140, 453
- Badajoz, 498n, 499; bishop of, *see* Francisco de Navarra 1545–1556
- Badhorn, Leonhard, envoy of Maurice of Saxony to Trent in 1552: 543f.
- Badoer, Alberto, Venetian *savio agli ordini* in 1570 (b. 1540, d. 1592), 989n
- Badoer, Alessandro, Venetian noble bringing news of Polesella to Leonardo Loredan in 1509: 77n
- Badoer, Alvise (Aloisio), Venetian official (b. ca. 1483, d. 1554), 78n; Venetian ambassador to Istanbul in 1540: 439n, 448n, 449n, 451n, 462

- Badoer, Andrea, Venetian ambassador to Istanbul in 1573 (b. 1515, d. 1575), 931n, **1092**, **1094**
- Badoer, Andrea, Venetian ambassador to London in 1510: 82n, 91n
- Badoer, Federico, Venetian scholar and diplomat (b. 1518, d. 1593), **625**, **633n**, **645n**, **655n**, **661**, **663**, **668n**, **672**, **714**
- Badoer, Giovanni, Venetian envoy to Rome from 1507; to France in 1516 and 1520 (b. 1465, d. 1535), 20, 56n, 57n, 84, 110n, 200n, 218
- Badoer, Luca, brother of Andrea (fl. 1512), 82n, 91n
- Baghdad, 389, 391n, 396
- Baglione (Baglioni), Astorre, defender of Famagusta against the Turks (b. 1526, d. 1571), **928**, **937**, **991**, **996**, **1004**, **1017**, **1027ff.**, **1030ff.**, **1033ff.**, **1036ff.**, **1039ff.**
- Baglione, Federico, nephew of Astorre (fl. 1568), 937n
- Baglioni, Giovanni Paolo, brother-in-law of Bartolommeo d' Alviano, 5n, **6n**, 8, 12n, 39
- Baglioni, Italian family, 12, 201
- Baglioni, Malatesta, son of Gianpaolo (d. 1531), 341f.
- Baglioni, Orazio, son of Gianpaolo, Italian soldier (fl. 1527), 277, 294
- Bagno di Romagna, 264
- Bainbridge, Christopher, archbishop of York 1508–1514, cardinal 1511–1514: 74n, 95n, 109, 119f., 122n, 124n, 129, 130n
- Bakócz, Thomas (Tamás), archbishop of Gran 1497–1521, cardinal 1500–1521, titular patriarch of Constantinople 1507–1521: 58n, 61, 119, 123, 125f., 138, 150f., 157f., 166n, 183n
- Bakony Mountains, **584**
- Balaçon, sieur de, *see* Gérard de Rye (fl. 1532)
- Balassa, Melchior, Hungarian noble (fl. 1562), **771**
- Balbi, Pietro, Venetian official (d. 1514), 27, 90
- Balbi di Correggio, Francesco, author of a contemporary account of the 1565 siege of Malta (d. ca. 1590), 843n, **853**, **856ff.**, **860ff.**, **863f.**, **866ff.**, **870ff.**, **873ff.**, **876**, **878**
- Baldassare da Pescia, correspondent of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1514: 156n
- Balduino (Baldovino) de' Balduini, physician and clauvister in 1549: 498, 499n, 520n
- Balduino (Baldovino) del Monte, brother of Giovanni Maria (Julius III), 528, 560, 564n, **598**
- Baleares, 395
- Bali Beg, governor of Belgrade ca. 1521: 199
- Balkans, 54n, 147, 179, **767**, **1088**, **1098**
- Baliones, Franciscus, commissioner-general of the papal galleys in 1570: 965n
- Balthazar del Rio, bishop of Scala 1515–1540: 149
- Baltic Sea, 318
- Bamberg, 416; prince-bishop of, *see* Georg Schenk von Limburg 1505–1522
- Banchi Vecchi (in Rome), 36
- Banco di S. Spirito (in Rome), 36
- Bandini de' Piccolomini, Francesco, archbishop of Siena 1529–1588?: **592**, **604**
- Baratiero, Jacopo, secretary of Scaramuccia Trivulzio ca. 1527: 269n
- Barba, Giovanni Jacopo, bishop of Teramo 1546–1553, of Terni 1553–1565: 525
- Barbara, Venetian ship (ca. 1552), 586ff., **607**, **662**
- Barbarigo, Agostino, Venetian ambassador *manqué* in 1565: **851**, **891**
- Barbarigo, Agostino, Venetian provveditore generale of the sea (b. 1516, d. 1571), **989**, **991**, **1008**, **1009n**, **1010**, **1025**, **1045n**, **1047**, **1048n**, **1051ff.**, **1054**, **1056f.**, **1059ff.**, **1064f.**
- Barbarigo, Andrea, killed at Lepanto in 1571: **1057**
- Barbarigo, Antonio, Venetian bailie in Istanbul from 1556 (b. 1523, d. 1560), 607n, 661f., 684n, **694**, **696**, 698n, 704n
- Barbarigo, Daniele, Venetian bailie in Istanbul 1562–1564 (d. 1575), 924n, **930**
- Barbarigo, Girolamo, Venetian official (fl. 1530): 489n
- Barbarigo, Niccolò, Venetian official (b. 1534, d. 1579), **1087**, **1098n**
- Barbaro, Alvise, son of Marc' Antonio (fl. 1570), **954**
- Barbaro, Daniele, patriarch of Aquileia 1550–1574; cardinal (appointment in *pietore*, apparently unpublished) 1561: 751n, 883n, 936n
- Barbaro, Francesco, son of Marc' Antonio; patriarch of Aquileia 1585–1596?: **1092**
- Barbaro, Francesco, Venetian provveditore generale (b. 1495, d. 1570), **848**, **931**, 950n
- Barbaro, Marc' Antonio, Venetian elected bailie in Istanbul in 1568 (b. 1518, d. 1595), **849**, **892**, **935f.**, **939f.**, **944n**, **945**, **946n**, **947**, **948n**, **949**, **951n**, **953f.**, **963f.**, **971n**, **976**, **990f.**, **1004**, **1007f.**, **1011**, **1013f.**, **1018f.**, **1022n**, **1043n**, **1044n**, **1049**, **1054n**, **1057n**, **1068n**, **1069n**, **1075n**, **1087n**, **1088n**, **1089ff.**, **1092**, **1094f.**
- Barbaro, Niccolò, Venetian physician at Constantinople (fl. 1435), 209n
- Barbarossa, *see* Frederick I
- Barbarossa, corsair and Ottoman admiral, *see* Khairreddin Barbarossa
- Barbary, 85n, **891**, **1008**, **1018n**, **1081**, **1095**
- Barbary Coast, 84, 234, 284, 347, 395, 465, 532, 553f., **583**, **650**, **702**, **758**, **831**, **834f.**, **842**, **849**, **924n**, **950**, **1008**, **1068**, **1071**, **1086**, **1095**, **1098**
- Barbary pirates, 238, 310, 532, **831**, **842f.**, **874**, **902**, **902**, **923**; *see also* corsairs, Dragut, Khairreddin Barbarossa, piracy
- Barbastro ("Balbastro"), in Aragon, 47n, 458n
- Barbezieux, sire de, *see* Antoine de la Rochefoucauld
- Barcelona, 255, 328, 356, 367n, **368**, **370**, **392n**, **397**, **399n**, **466**, **532**, **871**, **886n**, **887n**, **908**, **910n**, **915**, **943**, **957**, **1017**, **1019ff.**, **1023**, **1024n**, **1047**, **1080**; bishop of, *see* Ramón de Vich 1519–1525; treaty of (1529), 327, 337n, 346
- Barengo, Giovanni, secretary under Paul IV, 633n
- Baretta, Gonsalvo, hermit of Capri (fl. 1528), 296
- Bargas, Dimitri, *see* Vargas
- Bari, 309, 312, 316n, **656**, **689n**, **711**; archbishops of, *see* Girolamo Sauli 1540–1550, Jacopo Puteo 1550–1562; duke of, *see* Lodovico Maria Sforza 1479–1494; *see also* Bona Sforza
- Barletta, 14, 293n, 309n, 329, 331; priors of, *see* Gabriele Tadini di Martinengo (fl. 1522), Vincenzo Gonzaga (d. 1591)
- Barnabites, Order of, **741**
- Barone, Nicola, associate of the Carafeschi ca. 1561: **753**
- Barozzi, Antonio, correspondent of Giovanni Barozzi in 1527: 277n
- Barozzi, Giovanni (Zuan), brother of Antonio (fl. 1527), 277n
- Barres, Sieur de, *maître des comptes* of Dijon; seized by Turks ca. 1564: **837**
- Bartolino, Nofri, archbishop of Pisa 1518–1555: 744n
- Bartolo of Sassoferrato, Italian jurist (b. 1313, d. 1357), 454
- Bartolomé de la Cueva, cardinal 1544–1562, bishop of Avellino and Frigento (admin.) 1548–1549?: 509, 523ff., **613**, **638f.**, **723**, **748**
- Bartolomé de Martyribus, archbishop of Braga 1559–1581? (d. 1590), **811**, **814**
- Bartolommeo d' Alviano, Venetian commander at Marignano (b. 1455, d. 1515), **5n**, **6n**, **7f.**, **15**, **52**, **59**, **61f.**, **160**
- Bartolommeo da Benevento, grain dealer in 1556: **660**
- Bartolommeo de' Concini, Florentine envoy at the 1559 convlave, **736**

- Bartolommeo della Rovere, papal chamberlain and relative of Julius II, 159n
- Bartolommeo di Niccolò, Genoese correspondent of Giovanni di Rocco in 1532: 362n
- Basadona, Giovanni (Zuan), Venetian ambassador to Rome from 1519: 427n
- Basel, 810; bishop of, *see* Melchior von Lichtenfels 1555–1575; Council of (1431–1449), 98, 108, 127, 441n, 453, 492, 543f., 708n, 796, 801, 803ff., 807
- Basil of Caesarea, church father (b. ca. 330, d. 379), 794
- Basilicata, 293, 586
- Basiliscus, Jacob (Heraclides), "despot of Serbia" in 1562: 707n, 853
- Basilisks, early cannon, 861, 863, 866, 875, 1028, 1035
- Bassano, 52, 93
- Bastia, 624
- Bath, bishop of (along with Wells), *see* John Clerk 1523–1541
- Báthory, Andreas, commissioner for Ferdinand I in Hungary in 1551: 568, 570
- Báthory, Nicholas, Hungarian magnate (*fl.* 1562), 771
- Báthory, Stephen, prince of Transylvania from 1571; king of Poland 1575–1586: 1015; wife of, *see* Anna, daughter of Sigismund I 1574–1586 (d. 1596)
- Bauco (Boville Erica), 754
- Baumgartner (Paumgartner), Augustin, envoy of Albrecht V of Bavaria to Trent in 1562: 790
- "Bauernkrieg," *see* Peasants' War
- Bautzen, 435n
- Bavaria, 251, 262, 354, 361, 437, 440, 773, 790, 792n; dukes of, *see* Wilhelm IV (b. 1493, d. 1550), Ludwig X (b. 1495, d. 1545), Albrecht V (b. 1528, d. 1579)
- Bayazid, son of Suleiman I (d. 1561), 539n, 550, 589, 591f., 698n, 699, 708, 767f., 830n, 831, 833f., 841, 852n
- Bayazid II, son of Mehmed II; Ottoman sultan 1481–1512: 2, 11, 12, 18n, 24, 34, 38f., 42, 45, 51, 53f., 57, 71f., 75, 77, 79n, 84, 88, 90, 99, 122f., 126f., 141, 148n, 409, 946n
- Bayeux, 565n; bishops of, *see* René de Prie 1498–1516?, Lodovico da Canossa 1516–1531, Agostino Trivulzio (admin.) 1541–1548; cardinal of, *see* René de Prie
- Bayonne, 838; bishop of, *see* Jean du Bellay 1524 or 1526–1532
- Beata Maria de Monte Carmelo, Order of, 862n
- Beatrice, daughter of Manuel of Portugal and Maria of Aragon; wife of Charles III of Savoy 1521–1538 (d. 1538), 338
- Beaumont-le-Roger, count of, *see* Stuart d' Aubigny
- Beauvais, bishops of, *see* Odet de Coligny (admin.) 1535–1563, Charles de Bourbon (admin.) 1569–1575?
- Beccadelli, Lodovico, bishop of Ravello 1549–1555, archbishop of Ragusa 1555–1564? (d. 1572), 537f., 539n, 790, 810n
- Becse (Bečej), 570, 574, 575n
- Becskekere, 570, 573
- Beirut, 25, 29, 83, 343, 607
- Belcastro, 487
- Belgians, 921
- Belgioioso, 286
- Belgioioso, Lodovico, Italian commander (b. 1488), 286, 305
- Belgium, 195, 772f., 920
- Belgrade (Alba Graeca, Beograd), 195n, 198f., 200n, 202ff., 206n, 211, 213n, 214, 216, 217n, 218, 247n, 248, 252, 254, 324n, 325n, 332, 334n, 362, 389, 416n, 442, 493, 530, 566, 570, 572ff., 575n, 845, 1102, 1104
- Belisarius, general of Justinian (d. 565), 306
- Bellarmino, Roberto, Italian cardinal and theologian (b. 1542, d. 1621), 139
- Belleville, 457
- Bellini, Gentile, Venetian painter (b. 1429, d. 1507), 40n
- Bellini, Giovanni, brother of Gentile, Venetian painter (b. ca. 1430, d. 1516), 40n
- Belluno, 30; bishop of, *see* Gasparo Contarini 1536–1542
- Beltrando de' Costabili, Ferrarese envoy to Rome in 1503: 7, 9
- Belzi, money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Bembo, Alvise (Luigi), captures Turkish caiques in 1570: 984
- Bembo, Giannmatteo, Venetian provveditore in Cattaro in 1539: 471n
- Bembo, Leonardo, Venetian vice-bailie at Istanbul in 1504; bailie in 1519: 16, 163n, 165n, 191n
- Bembo, Lorenzo, Venetian provveditore generale of Cyprus in 1569 (d. 1570), 928
- Bembo, Paolo, Venetian consul in Alexandria in 1533: 368n
- Bembo, Pietro, Venetian historian; cardinal 1538–1547, bishop of Gubbio 1541–1544, of Bergamo (admin.) 1544–1547: 82, 111n, 121n, 149n, 158, 159n, 161n, 163n, 164, 170, 238n, 288, 394, 471n, 607n
- Bencovazzo (Benkovač), 608
- Benedetti, Giambattista, commander of a Cypriote galley in 1567: 923
- Benedetto de' Accolti, bishop of Cremona 1523–1549, archbishop of Ravenna 1524–1549, cardinal 1527–1549: 268n, 527
- Benedictus Deus*, bull of Paul III (1537), 420n
- Benedictus Deus*, bull of Pius IV (1564), 496, 826f.
- Benevento, 507, 643, 713, 716n, 742, 808; archbishops of, *see* Francesco della Rovere 1530–1544, Giovanni della Casa 1544–1556, Jacopo Savelli (admin.) 1560–1574?
- Bentivoglio, Annibale, Bolognese leader (b. 1469, d. 1540), 93n, 103n
- Bentivoglio, Cornelio, Italian soldier (b. 1519/1520, d. 1585), 552f., 605, 606n
- Bentivoglio, family dominant in Bologna, 6n, 56, 62, 93, 103f., 113n, 114, 119f., 125n, 128, 129n, 134, 160f.
- Bentivoglio, Giovanni II, lord of Bologna 1462–1506 (d. 1508), 39f., 93n
- Bentivoglio, Marco Antonio, Bolognese correspondent of George Martinuzzi in 1547: 485n
- Beplin, Johann, printer of Strassburg, in Rome (*fl.* 1512), 111n, 127n
- Berbers, 583
- Berense, 921
- Berenguer de Requesens, commander of Sicilian galleys ca. 1560: 758, 762, 765f.
- Bergamo, 55, 59, 62, 104, 125, 134, 145n, 221n, 272, 279, 682, 684, 710; bishops of, *see* Alvise Lippomano 1538–1544?, 1558–1559, Pietro Bembo (admin.) 1544–1547, Girolamo Ragazzoni 1577–1592; captain of, *see* Paolo Nani (*fl.* 1522)
- Berghes-op-Zoom, 80n
- Berislzo, Peter, ban of Croatia and bishop of Veszprém 1513–1520: 158, 163, 164n
- Berlin, 772f.
- Bernardino d' Alviano, brother of Bartolommeo d' Alviano (*fl.* 1503), 15n
- Bernardino de Cardenas, present at the siege of Malta in 1565: 874, 878; killed at Lepanto, 1064
- Bernardino de' Frangipani (Frangipane, Frankopan), count of Segna in 1525: 201n, 244f.
- Bernardino della Barba, papal nuncio, bishop of Casale di Monferrato 1525–1529: 231
- Bernardino de Mendoza, Spanish soldier (b. 1501, d. 1557), 627n
- Bernardino de Carvajal, bishop of Cartagena 1493–1495, cardinal 1493–1522, bishop of Sigüenza 1495–1519, bishop of Avellino and Frigento (admin.) 1503–?: 42, 51f., 92,

- 95, 97f., 104ff., 107f., 110f., 112n, 114, 136, 137n, 143n, 145, 146n, 149, 169, 173, 200, 208n
- Bernardo, Francesco, Venetian baile in Istanbul (chosen 1528–resigned 1531), 302, 339, 342ff., 345n, 348n
- Bernardo de Cabrera, at the siege of Malta in 1565: **867**
- Bernardo del Nero, Florentine ambassador in 1528: 305, 307f., 309
- Bernhard von Cles, bishop of Trent 1514–1539, cardinal 1530–1539, bishop of Brixen (admin.) 1539: 359n, 364, 370n, 384n, 389f., 404f., 422, 437n, 490f., 777n
- Bernhardin Türk von Bürgel, author of anti-Turkish literature (d. 1548), 477f.
- Bernini, Gian Lorenzo, Italian architect and sculptor (b. 1598, d. 1680), 270n
- Bersaldo, Giovanni, bishop of Telesse 1548–1557, of Sant'Agata dei Goti 1557–1565: 507
- Berry, duchess of, *see* Marguerite, daughter of Francis I
- Bertano, Guron, brother of Pietro (fl. 1550), 522n
- Bertano, Pietro, bishop of Fano 1537–1558; cardinal 1551–1558: 521n, 522n, 528, 545, 559, 581n, 612f., 619f., **681**, **690**, 691n
- Berthier, secretary to Jacques de Gernigny in 1580: **840**
- Berthold of Rorbach, dissident preacher (d. 1359), 454
- Bertinoro, bishops of, *see* Girolamo Verallo 1540–1541, Cornelio Musso 1541–1544, Egidio Falchetta 1563–1564
- Bertrand, Jean, cardinal 1557–1560, archbishop of Sens (admin.) 1557–1560: **678**, **722n**, **724**, **725n**, **748**
- Bertrand d'Ornesan, baron of S. Blancard, admiral of the French fleet (b. 1480?; d. 1540), 431, 442n
- Berval Díaz de Lugo, Juan, bishop of Calahorra 1545–1556: 498
- Besaçon, archbishop of, *see* Antoine Perrenot 1584–1586
- Bessarion (of Trebizond), Orthodox archbishop of Nicaea (to 1439), cardinal 1439–1472, titular patriarch of Constantinople 1463–1472: 53
- Bethlehem, bishop of, *see* Cristoforo del Monte 1517–1525
- Betimo, **1069**
- Beza, Theodore, French theologian (b. 1519, d. 1605), 774n
- Béziers, bishop of, *see* Lorenzo Strozzi 1547–1561
- Biberach, 543
- Bilbao, 201
- Billick, Eberhard, German theologian (d. 1552), 542
- Bini, Giovanfrancesco, secretary under Paul IV, 470, 633n
- Biondo, Flavio, Italian historian (b. 1388, d. 1463), 70
- "Bir," sanjak of (in 1571), **1042**
- Biscay, Bay of, 132n, **916**, 949n
- Bisignano, bishop of, *see* Niccolò Gaetano di Sermoneta (admin.) 1537–1549?; 1558–1560?
- Bissone, 286
- Bistritz, 466n
- Bitonto, 487; bishop of, *see* Cornelio Musso 1544–1574
- Bitetto, bishop of, *see* Giovanni Salviati (admin.) 1532–1539
- Bizarro (Bizarus), Pietro, author of an account of the war of Cyprus published in 1573 (b. 1525, d. not before 1586), 974n, 1027n
- Bizerie, **1008**, **1018n**, **1021**, **1074**, **1081**, **1086**, **1095**
- Black Sea (Euxine), 99, 147, 151, 372, 381, **830**, **891**, **939**, **1004n**
- Blado, Antonio, Roman printer (b. 1490, d. 1567), 198n, **722**, **1099**
- Blaise de Monluc, French soldier and writer (b. ca. 1502, d. 1577), 196n, 470n, 593n, **601**, **602n**, **603ff.**, **606**, **660**, **668n**, **709n**
- Blanco, Francisco, bishop of Orense 1556–1565, of Malaga 1565–1574, archbishop of Compostella 1574–1581: **778**, **794**
- Blarer, Gerwick, abbot of Weingarten (d. 1567), 650n
- Blasio (Biagio) de' Martinelli, papal master of ceremonies in 1537: 419n
- Blois, 91, 96n, 99n, 111n, 112n, 113n, 120, 135n, 144n, 457, 729n, 1071n; treaty of (1504), 34n, 39n, 40, 42; treaty of (1513), 144f., 159n, 186n
- Blomberg, Barbara, mother of Charles V's son Don John of Austria (b. 1527?; d. 1597), **658**
- Boccaccio, Giovanni, Italian author (d. 1375), **626**
- Boche di Cattaro (*Kotoraki Zaljev*, Gulf of Kotor), 446, **967**, **974**, **988**, **1002n**
- Bodzentyn ("Bodzanczin"), 317n
- Bohemia, 9n, 37, 150, 152, 163, 192n, 195n, 203, 216n, 235, 246, 250, 251n, 252, 254, 260, 291, 292n, 300, 312, 314, 319f., 324n, 326, 332, 335, 360, 364, 412n, 432, 435, 437n, 460n, 542, **565**, **603n**, **667**, **660**, **716n**, **755**, **760**, **778f.**, **790ff.**, **1088**, **1093**; kings of, *see* George of Poděbrady 1458–1471, Ladislav 1471–1516, Matthias Corvinus (tit.) 1478–1490, Ferdinand of Austria (from 1526); people of, *see* Czechs
- Bohemians, 53, 113, 140, 165n, 326, 478, 479n, 480n
- Bohemond I, son of Robert Guiscard; prince of Antioch 1099–1111: 293n, 294n
- Boistaille, French ambassador in Venice from 1561: 766n, 831f., **834**, **837**, **899n**, **930**
- Bojano, bishop of, *see* Franciotto Orsini 1519–1523
- Bologna, 36n, 39f., 43, 49n, 56, 62, 86, 93f., 96n, 100, 103f., 108, 109n, 113f., 117n, 118n, 119f., 121n, 125, 128f., 132, 134, 136, 140, 151, 160ff., 163, 166, 190, 206n, 257, 261ff., 272, 276n, 287, 292, 298n, 299n, 309n, 326, 328ff., 331ff., 334ff., 337, 338n, 340n, 346, 348, 350n, 351, 366n, 367f., 380, 397n, 409, 411, 412n, 420, 443n, 466f., 471n, 478, 485n, 490, 494, 499ff., 502, 506, 507n, 515, 537f., 552f., 557f., 603n, **630**, **672**, **713**, **716**, **740**, **775n**, **800f.**, **826**, **881**; 1077n; bishops (archbishops from 1582) of, *see* Tommaso Parentucelli (Nicholas V) 1444–1447, Achille Grassi 1511–1518; Lorenzo Campeggio 1523–1525, Ranuccio Farnese (admin.) 1564–1565, Gabriele Paleotti 1566–1591?; concordat of (1516), 162n; Council of, *see* Trent, Council of; lords of, *see* Giovanni II Bentivoglio (d. 1508), Annibale Bentivoglio (fl. 1511); treaty of (1529), 332n, 334, 336ff., 340, 370, 410, **879**
- Bolognese, 103n, 265, 552, 557
- Bolognesi, 40, **587**, 681n
- Bolsena, **611**
- Bona, town west of Tunis, 397, 471
- Boncompagni, Filippo, nephew of Gregory XIII; cardinal 1572–1586: **1091**
- Boncompagni, Ugo, *see* Gregory XIII
- Bondimier, Andrea, Venetian galley captain in Alexandria in 1507: 22n, 23
- Bondimier, Bernardo, Venetian "captain of Zara" ca. 1507: 45
- Bône (Annaba), 234f.
- Bonelli, Michele, nephew of Pius V; cardinal 1566–1598: 899n, 904, 910n, **912**, **913n**, **914**, **916**, 918n, 923n, 924f., 933n, 939ff., 942f., **947**, **948n**, 949n, 950n, 951n, 955n, 956f., 958n, 959f., 963n, 964n, **965**, 966n, 971n, 988n, 1004n, 1008n, **1009**, **1010n**, **1011ff.**, **1014**, **1016n**, **1017**, **1018n**, **1019f.**
- Bonelli, Michele, nephew of Pius V; soldier (b. 1551, d. 1604), **1014**, **1017**
- Bonelli, Michele, great grandnephew of Pius V (fl. 1572): **1077**
- Bongallo, Scipione, bishop of Civita Castellana 1539–1564: **729**
- Boniface VIII (Benedetto Caetani), cardinal 1281–1294, pope 1294–1303: 105n, 255, **641**, **646**

- Bonnivet, sire de, *see* Guillaume Gouffer
- Bonriccio, Daniele, Venetian secretary in Naples *ca.* 1565: **848**
- Bonvisio, Girolamo, envoy of Julius II to Henry VIII (1511), 96n, **97n**
- Bordeaux, **838**; archbishops of, *see* Bertrand de Got (Clement V) 1299–1305, Jean du Bellay (admin.) 1544–1551?
- Borek (Borgk), Stanislaus, canon of Cracow (*f.* 1528), 315n
- Borgherini, Florentine money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Borghese, Camillo, *see* Paul V
- Borghese, Marc' Antonio, attorney and father of Paul V (b. 1504, d. 1574), 749n, **751**
- Borgia apartments (Appartamento Borgia), 7, 528n, **629**, **712**, **745**
- Borgia, Cesare, son of Rodrigo and Vannozza de' Catanei; archbishop of Valencia 1492–1498, cardinal 1493–1498, duke of Valentinois 1498–1507, lord of Pesaro 1500–1503, duke of Romagna 1501–1503 (d. 1507), 2ff., 5ff., 8ff., 11ff., 14, 15n, 16, 27, 33, 36, 272n, **711**
- Borgia, Francesco, nephew of Rodrigo; bishop of Teano 1495–1508, archbishop of Cosenza 1499–1511, cardinal 1500–1511: 92, 95, 98, 100n, 104n, 105n, 110
- Borgia, Lucrezia, daughter of Rodrigo and Vannozza de' Catanei; wife of Giovanni Sforza 1493–1497 (marriage annulled), wife of Alfonso of Bisceglie (1498–1500), wife of Alfonso d' Este 1501–1519: 5, 121n, **636**, **725**
- Borgia, Rodrigo, cardinal, *see* Alexander VI
- Borgias (Borja-Lanzol), Catalan family, 5ff., 14, 142
- Borgo ("Birgu," Vittoriosa), on Malta, 854f., 856n, 857f., 860f., 863f., 866ff., 869, 872f., **876**, **878**, **886**, **889**, 902n; Piazza of, 866f., **870**
- Borgo San Donnino (Fidenza), 98, 99n, 103, 261
- Borgo San Sepolcro, 114, 264, 266; bishop of, *see* Filippo Archinto 1539–1546
- Boria, money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Borjas, *see* Borgia
- Bornemissa, Gregor, defender of Eger in 1552: **585**
- Borromeo, Camilla, daughter of Gilberto Borromeo and Margherita de' Medici; wife of Cesare Gonzaga di Guastalla from 1560: **743**, **789**
- Borromeo, Carlo, nephew of Pius IV; cardinal 1560–1584, archbishop of Milan (admin.) 1560–1584: 739ff., **743**, **746**, 749n, 750f., **753**, 773n, 774n, **775**, 776n, 777n, 778n, 779n, 780n, 781n, **783**, 785ff., 788f., 790n, 791n, **793**, 794n, **795**, 797n, 798n, **799**, 801ff., 804ff., 807n, **808**, 810f., 813f., 816f., 819n, **821**, 822n, 826f., 860n, 880n, 881f., 884f.
- Borromeo, family, **885**
- Borromeo, Federico, brother of Carlo; count of Arona from 1558 (b. 1535, d. 1562), 739f., **743**, **745**; wife of, *see* Virginia della Rovere (from 1560)
- Borromeo, Gilberto, count of Arona (d. 1558), **743**; wife of, *see* Margherita de' Medici (Medeghini), sister of Pius IV
- Borromeo, Giovanni, Mantuan envoy in Florence in 1527: 264, 280
- Borromeo, Ortesiana, half-sister of Carlo; wife of Annibale von Hohenems from 1565: 800n
- Boschetti, Isabella, mistress of Federico II Gonzaga of Mantua, 280
- Bosco Marengo, 283ff., **1027**
- Bosio, Antonio, envoy of L' Isle-Adam to the pope in 1522; 209n
- Bosio, Giacomo, official Hospitaller historian (d. 1627), 203n, 210n, 853n, 862n, 873n, **895**, **898**, **903**, 904n, **906**, **937**
- Bosnia, 37, 59n, 61, 71, 75, 78n, 88f., 147, 149n, 150, 191n, 205n, 245, 253, 301f., 380n, 421n, 424, 451n, 477n, 494n, **608**, 795n, 854n, **1104**; sanjakbey of, *see* Feriz Beg (*f.* 1509), Yahya Pasha (in 1513)
- Bosnians, 209, **845**
- Bosporus, 2, 12, 17, 72, 90, 127, 128n, 179, 198, 217, 224, 240, 246n, 249n, 258, 278n, 301f., 324, 338f., 349, 361n, 368, 371, 383, 385, 387f., 398, 448n, 469, 475n, 480n, 485n, 487, 490, 530n, 535, 553, **569**, **580**, **586**, 588f., **591**, 606f., **622**, 623n, **631**, **650**, **662**, **696**, **706**, 708n, **742**, 766f., 771f., **815**, **829**, 832ff., **842**, 844f., 848f., **851**, 878f., **892**, **898**, **902**, **906**, **909**, **925**, **928**, **942**, **945**, **948**, **950**, **963**, **971**, **1049**, 1088f., **1094**, **1098**
- Boucher, Étienne, abbot of S. Ferme (*f.* 1551), 559
- Bouchet, Jean, procurator of Poitiers (*f.* 1512), 120n
- Bouclans, lord of, *see* Jean Lallemand (*f.* 1528)
- Bougie (Bejaïa), 85, 234
- Boulogne, edict of (1573), **840**
- Boulogne sur Mer, 473, 482
- Bourbon, 236n, 238, 242, 246n, 259, **1104**; duke of, *see* Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier 1505–1527
- Bourges, 55n, 94n; archbishops of, *see* Andrew Forman 1513?–1514, François de Tournon 1526–1537; Pragmatic Sanction of (1438–1461), 136, 137n, 138, 145n, 162n
- Bova, **807**; bishop of, *see* Achille Brancia 1549–1570
- Bozzuto, Annibale, archbishop of Avignon 1551–1560? (d. 1565), **616**, **633**
- Brabant, **917**, **920**
- Bracciano, 139n, 636n
- Braccio (Brazzo) di Maina, **970**, **974**, **990**, **1004**
- Bracciolini, Poggio (Gian Francesco), Florentine humanist (b. 1380, d. 1459), **626**
- Braga, archbishops of, *see* Henry of Portugal 1533–1540, Bartolomé de Martyribus 1559–1581?
- Bragadin, Ambrogio, commander at Lepanto in 1571: **1054**
- Bragadin, Andrea, castellan at Famagusta (d. 1571), **1040**
- Bragadin, Andrea, son-in-law of Giorgio Corner from 1571: 1012n
- Bragadin, Antonio "the Handsome," provveditore of Nicosia (d. 1569), **843**, **927**
- Bragadin, Antonio, Venetian official; commander at Lepanto (b. 1511, d. 1591), **1054**
- Bragadin, Filippo, Venetian naval commander (b. 1509, d. 1572), 847f., **850**, 924n, **1022**, 1023n, **1066**, **1072**
- Bragadin, Lorenzo, Venetian ambassador to Rome 1535–1537: 250n, 338n, 410n
- Bragadin, Marc' Antonio, Venetian captain (b. 1523, d. 1571), **941**, **991**, **996**, **1017**, 1027ff., 1031n, 1032ff., 1035ff., 1038ff., 1041f., 1043n, 1044n
- Bragadin, Marco, Venetian galley commander in 1506: 20
- Bragadin, Pietro, Venetian baillie in Istanbul 1523–1526: 218, 233, 245, 249n, 331, 333
- Bragadin, Vittore, Venetian baillie in Istanbul in 1565 (b. 1520, d. 1576), **845**, **848**, **849n**, **851**, **861**, **880**, **891f.**, **897**
- Bramante, Donato d' Agnolo, architect (b. 1444, d. 1514), 140
- Brami, Simone, author of an account of the sack of Prato in 1512: 133n
- Brancaccio (Brancatio), Cesare, servitor of the Carafeschi around 1559: **713**, **746**
- Brancia, Achille, bishop of Bova 1549–1570: 806f.
- Brandenburg, 502n; margraves of, *see* George (b. 1484, d. 1543), Joachim II (b. 1505, d. 1571), Albrecht of Hohenzollern (d. 1568)
- Braun, Konrad, canon of Augsburg (*f.* 1563), **804**
- Brazza (Braç), Dalmatian island, 948
- Brazzo di Maina, *see* Braccio di Maina
- Breda, **920**

- Brendel von Homburg, Daniel, archbishop of Mainz 1555–1582: **628**
- Brenner Pass, **125, 802**
- Brenz, Johann, Lutheran reformer (b. 1499, d. 1570), **540**
- Brenzono, Sylvester, historian (d. 1608), **1038n**
- Brescia, **55, 59, 62, 83, 104, 109n, 113, 115, 121, 125, 134, 143n, 145n, 200n, 206, 225, 228n, 230n, 272, 279, 283, 424, 469, 490, 493, 495, 614, 675, 682, 684, 727, 811, 982n, 1064n**; bishops of, *see* Andrea Corner 1532–1551, Durante de' Duranti (admin.), 1551–1557; Giovanni Delino 1579–1584, Marino Zorzi 1596–1631; rectors of, *see* Marco Dandolo and Sebastiano Giustinian (in 1509); Venetian podestà of, *see* Antonio Surian (ca. 1524)
- Brescians, **83**
- Breslau (Wrocław), **435f., 437n, 567**
- Bretons, **174**
- Breviary, the, **823**
- Bricani*, Venetian galleon (ca. 1558), **702f.**
- Briçonnet, Guillaume, son of Guillaume; bishop of Lodève 1489–1515, of Meaux 1515–1534, abbot of S. Germain-des-Prés 1507–1534: **106**
- Briçonnet, Guillaume, bishop of S. Malo 1493–1514, cardinal 1495–1514, archbishop of Rheims 1497–1507, of Narbonne 1507–1514, abbot of S. Germain-des-Prés 1501–1507: **92, 95, 98, 104n, 105, 107, 110f., 114, 136**
- Brindisi, **55, 177f., 182n, 295, 426f., 430, 446, 848, 854n, 902, 904f., 1047, 1072, 1074**; archbishops of, *see* Gian Pietro Carafa (Paul IV) 1518–1524; Jerome Aleander 1524–1542
- Brisighella, **264**
- Brittany, **122, 174f., 177, 370**; duchess of, *see* Anne 1488–1514
- Brixen (Bressanone), **593**; bishops of, *see* Bernhard von Cles (admin.) 1539, Cristoforo Madruzzo (admin.) 1542–1578
- Broccardo Persico, Fra (Count), emissary of Jean de la Valette in 1565: **886, 889**
- Broderic, Stephen, provost of Fünfkirchen; bishop of Sirmium 1526?–1539; of Fünfkirchen in 1533 and 1535, of Vacium 1539 (d. 1539), **204f., 219n, 235, 236n, 244n, 253n, 319n, 321, 324n, 334f., 369, 405, 436f.**
- Brosch, Moritz, historian (b. 1829, d. 1907), **139**
- Bruegel, Pieter (the Elder), Flemish painter (b. ca. 1525, d. 1569), **270n**
- Bruges, **210, 558**; treaty of (1521), **193n**
- Brugnato, bishop of, *see* Agostino Trivulzio (admin.) 1539–1548
- Brunecken, **105n**
- Brus, Anton, of Müglitz, archbishop of Prague 1561–1581?: **778f., 812n, 813, 819, 821, 824n**
- Brussels, **167, 216n, 344, 345n, 355, 358n, 480n, 504n, 509n, 521, 522n, 528, 561n, 596, 597n, 603, 611n, 612n, 623n, 624f., 632, 640, 645, 647, 655f., 669ff., 672, 689f., 691n, 711, 714, 744, 749n, 775, 865, 910, 916f., 918**; Council of, **633n**
- Bucer, Martin, German Protestant reformer (b. 1491, d. 1551), **417, 453, 502n, 540, 542, 565, 791**
- Bucharest, **567n**
- Bucintoro, state galley of Venice, **20**
- Buda (Ofen-Pest), **37, 78n, 127n, 157f., 159n, 163n, 236, 244n, 246f., 248n, 249, 250n, 251n, 252, 253n, 261, 278n, 313f., 318n, 322, 325, 332, 334n, 340f., 347n, 352n, 354, 365, 371, 378, 384n, 390f., 434, 435n, 436, 442ff., 455, 459, 461, 471f., 478f., 490n, 530, 565f., 577, 579, 584f., 697, 766, 834, 844, 963, 1087**; pashas of, *see* Kasim Beg (ca. 1550), Ali Pasha
- Budapest, **584, 697n**
- Budé, Guillaume, French humanist (b. 1467, d. 1540), **34n**
- Budua (Budva), **1025ff., 1069**
- Budweis, **349n**
- Bugenhagen, Johann, German reformer (b. 1485, d. 1558), **405, 417, 565**
- Bulgaria, **150, 383, 489n**
- Bulgarians, Bulgars, **209**
- Bullinger, Heinrich, Swiss reformer (b. 1504, d. 1575), **542**
- Bunzlau (Bolesławiec), **435n**
- Buonconvento, **601**
- Buonrizzo (Bonrizzo), Alvise, secretary to Marc' Antonio Barbaro from 1568 (d. 1582), **936, 952, 954, 955n, 1022n, 1027, 1070n, 1072**
- Burati, Paolo, bishop of Piacenza 1568–1576, cardinal 1570–1578, archbishop of Naples 1576–1578: **1019n**
- Burchard (Burckhard), Johann, bishop of Orte and Città Castellana 1503–1506 (d. 16 May, 1506), **3ff., 6ff., 9ff., 137n, 142, 153, 394n, 528**
- Burgio, baron of, *see* Giovanni Antonio Pugioni (d. ca. 1546–1548)
- Burgos, **249n, 288, 291n, 312**; bishops of, *see* Juan Álvarez de Toledo 1537–1550, Francisco de Mendoza 1550–1566, Francisco Pacheco 1567–1579; cardinal of, *see* Francisco de Mendoza
- Burgundians, **53, 632, 725**
- Burgundy, **193, 203, 223, 238f., 321, 327, 386, 399, 473, 645, 647, 910, 958**; duke of, *see* Charles "the Bold" 1467–1477
- "Burji," Mamluk rulers in Egypt and Syria, *see* Mamluk
- Buschbell, Gottfried, historian (b. 1872, d. 1946), **827**
- Busseto, **467**, lord of, *see* Sforza Pallavicini (from 1579)
- Bustan Re'is, Ottoman captain (fl. 1524), **233**
- Busti, Agostino, sculptor (b. 1483, d. 1548), **117n**
- Buterone, **598**
- Butrinto, **407n, 427, 1102ff.**
- Byzantium, **153, 162, 849n, 934**; emperor of, *see* Michael VII 1070–1078
- Ca Dandolo (in Venice), **234n, 331**
- Ca d' Oro (in Venice), **93**
- Ca Giorgi (Zorzi), in Venice, **237**
- Ca Morosini (in Venice), **93, 237**
- Ca Nani (in Venice), **21**
- Ca Sanudo (in Venice), **82**
- Ca Vallier (in Venice), **289n**
- Ca Zen (in Venice), **344n**
- Cabo de Creus, **915**
- Cabrières, **472n**
- Cadamosto, Gerardo, Milanese envoy in 1528: **304n**
- Cadiz, bishop of, *see* Pietro de' Accolti (admin.) 1511–1521
- Caetani, Onorato, lord of Sermoneta (b. 1542, d. 1592), **1024**
- Caffa (Kaffa, Feodosiya), **128n, 156, 700, 830, 897ff.**
- Cagli, **282n**
- Cagliari, **396f.**
- Gaizato, **268n, 270**; count of, *see* Roberto di Sanseverino (fl. 1527)
- Cairo, **19ff., 22ff., 25ff., 28ff., 31ff., 141, 165f., 183, 833, 837**
- Cajetan, *see* Tommaso de Vio of Geta
- Calabresi, **684, 1057, 1068**
- Calabria, **272, 294, 309, 396n, 450, 583, 586, 622, 1025f., 1050**
- Calahorra, bishop of, *see* Juan Berval Díaz de Lugo 1545–1556
- Calais, **645, 691, 705**
- Kalamata (Kalamata), **371**
- Calandra, friend of Francesco Gonzaga (fl. 1527), **282**
- Calatayud, **957**
- Calatrava, Order of, **632**
- Calbo, Paolo, Venetian galley captain in 1505: **19**



- Calcara, eminence on Malta, **854, 866, 870**
- Calenzio, Generoso, historian of the Council of Trent (b. 1836, d. 1915), **486n**
- Calepio, Angelo, Dominican priest of Nicosia and author (in 1579) of an account of the war of Cyprus, **927n, 945, 947, 954n, 995, 1027n, 1029, 1031n, 1032n, 1037n**
- Calergi, Francesco, Famagustan chosen to be a hostage in 1571: **1037**
- Calergi, Andrea, sopracomito of a Venetian galley in 1571: **1051**
- Calgi, bishop of, *see* Cristoforo del Monte 1525–1550?; 1556–1564
- Calicut (Kozhikode), in southwestern India, **18, 23**
- Calixtus III (Alfonso Borgia, or Alonso de Borja), bishop of Valencia 1429–1455, cardinal 1444–1455, pope 1455–1458: **4n, 14, 143n, 147, 510n, 1063**
- Calle delle Rasse (in Venice), **331**
- Calogierà, Demetrius, of Nauplia, father of Constantine, **926**
- Calvi, **624**; bishop of, *see* Gasparo dal Fosso 1551–1560
- Calvin, John, reformer (b. 1509, d. 1564), **540, 542, 790n**
- Calvinism, **1, 565, 704, 714, 720, 773, 909**
- Calvinists, **453, 566, 628, 653n, 642, 766n, 773f., 781, 809, 1088**
- Camaiani, Onofrio (Nofri), brother of Pietro; agent of Cosimo I (b. 1517, d. 1574), **618n, 619n, 620n**
- Camaiani, Pietro, bishop of Fiesole 1552–1566, of Ascoli Piceno 1566–1579: **546n, 547n, 548f., 553n, 559, 560n, 562f., 592f., 594n, 595, 619n**
- Camaldulensians, Order of, **146**; *and see* Paolo Giustinian, Vincenzo (Pietro) Querini
- Cambiano, Giuseppe, Hospitaller envoy in Rome in 1565 and 1568: **853n, 936**
- Cambrai, **54, 56, 78, 167, 323n, 325n, 478n, 647**; League of (1508), **25f., 28f., 34, 40, 43, 51f., 54f., 57f., 63, 65f., 69ff., 72f., 75, 78, 81, 90, 93f., 102n, 108, 116n, 118, 132n, 141, 144, 148n, 154n, 180, 196, 409, 653**; treaty of (1529), **239n, 322f., 327, 329, 332, 335n, 346f., 360, 367, 399**
- Camera Apostolica, **4, 36, 50n, 65, 274n, 355, 466, 506, 533, 634, 660, 721, 736, 747, 753, 779, 956, 976, 1003**
- Camerino, **12, 272, 402, 426n, 538, 551f., 561, 743**; bishop of, *see* Sisto Gara della Rovere 1508–1509; duchess of, *see* Caterina Cibo-Varano (b. 1501, d. 1557); dukes of, *see* Giovanni Maria 1515–1528, Ottavio Farnese (from 1540); *see also* Varani
- Camerlenghi di Commun (in Venice), **12, 608n, 771**
- "Camiencz," **314**
- Camillo de' Medici (*f.* 1565), **860n**
- Camiencz, bishop of, *see* John Drohojowski 1545–1546
- Campagna, Girolamo, sculptor (b. 1549, d. before 1625), **1099**
- Campagna, Roman, **37, 138, 151, 282, 649, 656, 663, 667n, 676, 685, 720, 742**
- Campania, **216, 306f.**
- Campanile (in Venice), **92f.**
- Campoggio, Gianbattista, son of Lorenzo; bishop of Majorca 1532–1561?; **500n, 544**
- Campoggio, Lorenzo, bishop of Feltrè 1512–1520, cardinal 1517–1539, archbishop of Bologna 1525–1525, bishop of Salisbury (admin.) 1524–1539, of Huesca and Jacca (admin.) 1530–1532, of Parenzo 1533–1537, archbishop of Candia (admin.) 1534–1536: **183, 185f., 187n, 219, 223, 236n, 297, 299, 352, 353n, 355ff., 358, 359n, 361n, 417n, 467, 500n**
- Campoggio, Lorenzo, would-be assassin of George Martinuzzi in 1551: **576**
- Campoggio, Tommaso, brother of cardinal Lorenzo; bishop of Feltrè 1520–1547? (d. 1564), **467, 493**
- Campodoglio (in Rome), **353, 645, 649, 663, 718f.**
- Campello della Chiesa (in Venice), **68n**
- Campo dei Fiori (in Rome), **95n, 102n, 110, 111n, 126n, 145n, 271f., 289, 353, 399, 413, 611, 719**
- Campo S. Maria Formosa (in Venice), **1100n**
- Campo S. Marina (in Venice), **68**
- Campo Santo (in Pisa), **106n**
- Campofregosi, **284**
- Campofregoso, Annibale, brother of Cesare (*f.* 1528), **284n**
- Campofregoso, Cesare, Genoese soldier occupying Genoa in 1527: **284f.**
- Campofregoso, Giovanni, doge of Genoa in 1512 and 1513: **129n, 130, 135**
- "Canaletto," *see* Antonio da Canale
- Canano, Giulio, bishop of Adria 1554–1591, cardinal 1583–1592, bishop of Modena 1591–1592: **539n, 602n**
- Candia (Herakleion, Iraklion), **23, 25, 27, 30, 32, 60, 155, 191, 200n, 206n, 212f., 217, 295, 335n, 402, 533n, 536, 586, 588, 696, 843, 880, 907ff., 924n, 933, 945, 954, 967, 973n, 975n, 976ff., 979, 981, 982n, 983ff., 986ff., 991, 994n, 997, 1001f., 1004ff., 1007n, 1008, 1014, 1017, 1018n, 1021ff., 1025ff., 1030, 1032, 1035, 1037, 1038n, 1039f., 1045, 1052, 1055, 1066, 1072f., 1078, 1082f., 1086, 1101**; archbishop of, *see* Lorenzo Campeggio (admin.) 1534–1536; dukes of, *see* Paolo Antonio Miani (*ca.* 1510), Marco Minio (in 1522), Alvisé Renier (*ca.* 1550); war of (1645), **1097**
- Candiotes, **1072n**
- Canea, **945, 982n, 986ff., 1017, 1022, 1101**
- Cansio, Egidio, general of the Augustinians, cardinal 1517–1532, bishop of Viterbo 1523–1532, titular patriarch of Constantinople 1524–1530, bishop of Zara (admin.) 1530–1532, bishop of Lanciano 1532: **39, 56, 111n, 121, 122n, 134n, 165n, 167, 183**
- Cannaregio (in Venice), **298n, 631, 849**
- Cano, Melchor, Spanish theologian (b. 1509, d. 1560), **542**
- Canobio, Gian Francesco, papal diplomat; bishop of Forlì 1580–1587?; **775**
- Canosa di Puglia, **293n, 294n**
- Cantalovo, Francesco, Milanese printer (*f.* 1537), **407n**
- Cantalupo, Francesco, French agent in 1527: **268**
- Cantelmo, Cesare, French agent in Istanbul *ca.* 1541: **459n**
- Canterbury, 193n; archbishop of, *see* Reginald de la Pole (admin.) 1555 (consecrated 1556)–1558
- Cantiano, **282**
- Cantone (in Trent), **777n**
- Caorle, bishop of, *see* Egidio Falchetta 1542–1563
- Capaccio, 499n; bishops of, *see* Enrico Loffredo 1531–1547, Francesco Sfondrato 1547–1549, Girolamo Verallo 1549–1553?
- Cape Africa, **533**
- Cape Arnauti, **972**
- Cape Campanella, **296**
- Cape Colonna, **1050**
- Cape Corse (on Corsica), **624n**
- Cape Gallo, **1084**
- Cape Gelidonya (Khelidonia), **972**
- Cape Greco (on Cyprus), **934, 1005ff.**
- Cape Maina (Matapan), **1083**
- Cape Malea, **27, 933**
- Cape of Good Hope, **348, 532**
- Cape Passero, **872**
- Cape S. Andreas (on Cyprus), **1005n**
- Cape S. Angelo, *see* Malea
- Cape Salomone (Akra Plaka), promontory on Crete, **975n, 984, 1005**
- Cape Spartivento, **1050**

- Capecce, Marcello, nephew of Giovanni Carafa and alleged lover of Giovanni's wife (d. 1559), 678n, **711**, 747f., **751**
- Capella, Febo, Venetian official and representative (b. ca. 1490, d. 1589), 663ff., 667n, 668f., 670n, 671n, **673**
- Capelli, Antonio, Venetian printer (fl. 1517), 137n
- Capelli, Silvano, Venetian printer (fl. 1517), 137n
- Capello, Bernardo, nephew and correspondent of Tommaso Mocenigo (fl. 1530), 342
- Capello, Carlo, Venetian ambassador to Florence in 1530, to England in 1531: 341, 342n, 348
- Capello, Paolo, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1509: 64, 72n, 394n; Venetian provveditore generale in 1510: 113n; Venetian provveditore generale in 1512: 79n
- Capello, Vincenzo, Venetian captain-general in the 1530s: 358, 366n, 367n, 395n, 429, 438f., 446, 447n
- Capestrano, 293
- Capilupi, Ippolito, Mantuan man of politics; bishop of Fano 1560–1567? (d. 1580), 557, **656**, **689**
- Capitulum, Schiavo Lelio, poet (b. 1497, d. 1563), 273n
- Capitulation (of 25 May, 1571), *see* Holy League
- Capitulation (of 27 February, 1573), *see* Holy League
- Capitulation (of 7 March, 1573), 1091ff., 1094f., **1097**, **1099**
- "Capitulations" (by Selim II) of 1569, 401, 841n
- Capizucchi, Giannangelo, cardinal 1555–1569, bishop of Lodi 1557–1569; **644**
- Capo Colonna, **701**
- Capo d' Orso, battle of (1528), 296f.
- Capo d' Otranto, **584**, 589n, **977**, **1074**
- Capo delle Gate, on Cyprus, **1043**
- Capo S. Maria di Leuca, **582**, **701**, **1081**
- Capodistria (Byz. Justinopolis, Koper, Kopar), 406n, **905**, **1010**; bishop of, *see* Pietro Paolo Vergerio 1556–1549
- Carpathoda, 100
- Cappella del Rosario (in SS. Giovanni e Paolo in Venice), **1100**
- Cappella del Santissimo Sacramento (in S. Peter's), **719**
- Cappella del Volto Santo (in S. Peter's), **719**
- Cappella Giulia (in S. Peter's), 140
- Cappella Paolina (in the Vatican Palace), **10n**, 508f., 510n, 511f., 514, 520, 523ff., 529, **613**, 619f., 621n, **719**, 722ff., **732**, **735**, 737f., **883**, **885**
- Cappella Sistina, *see* Sistine Chapel
- Capponi, Guglielmo, bishop of Cortona 1505–1515: 105
- Capponi, Niccolò, Florentine envoy; gonfaloniere in 1527 (b. 1437, d. 1529), 114, 117, 277
- Caprarola, 661n
- Capri, 295f., 305
- Capriana, Antonio, physician at the Council of Trent in 1561: **776**
- Capua, 14, 109, 293f., 307, 309; archbishops of, *see* Nicholas Schönberg 1520–1556; Niccolò Gaetano di Sermoneta 1546–1549; 1564–1572? (admin.); prior of, *see* Leone Strozzi
- Capuano, Pietro, castellan of Civitavecchia in 1555: **634**
- Caracalla, Baths of, 399
- Caracciolo, Marino, diplomat and cardinal 1555–1558: 237, 413
- Caracciolo, Niccolò Maria, bishop of Catania 1537–1567: 544, **776**, 823f.
- Caracoso, corsair (fl. 1571), 1045f., 1052f., 1055ff.
- Caradasso, Cristoforo Foppa, goldsmith (b. ca. 1452, d. 1527), 140
- Carafa, Alfonso, son of Antonio; cardinal 1557–1565, archbishop of Naples 1557–1565: 625n, 678, 679n, 710f., **721**, 722n, 723ff., **731**, 735ff., 736ff., **742**, 744ff., 747ff., 750n, 753f.
- Carafa, Antonio, cardinal 1566–1591: **755**, **1002**
- Carafa, Antonio, duke of Mondragone; son-in-law of Marc' Antonio Colonna (fl. 1571), **1024**
- Carafa, Antonio, son of Gian Alfonso; marquis of Montebello from 1556 (d. 1589), 624, 625n, 629, 634n, 640f., 649, **654**, **657**, **670**, **673**, 677n, **678**, 680ff., 683f., 686ff., **689**, **713**, **724**, **731**, **733**, 735f., 746f.
- Carafa, Carlo, son of Gian Alfonso and nephew of Paul IV; cardinal 1555–1561, bishop of Comings (admin.) 1556–1561: 624f., 629ff., **633**, 636ff., 639ff., 645n, 644f., 647f., 650f., 655f., 660ff., 663f., 666ff., 669ff., 672ff., 675f., 678f., 683f., 686f., 689ff., **694**, **703**, 710ff., **713**, **719**, 722f., 725f., 728f., 731f., 734ff., 737f., 742f., 745f., 749f., 752f., **755**
- Carafa, Cesare, volunteer for the Venetians in 1570: 956n
- Carafa Chapel (in S. Maria sopra Minerva), **720**
- Carafa, Diomedes, nephew of Paul IV; bishop of Ariano 1511–1560, cardinal 1555–1560: **644**, **710**, **723**
- Carafa, Diomedes, son of Giovanni, duke of Paliano, and Violante Garlonia d' Alife, **683**, **685**, 752n
- Carafa, Elisabetta, sister of Paul IV; wife of Luigi Orsini, 621n
- Carafa, Gian Alfonso, elder brother of Paul IV; count of Montorio, **624**
- Carafa, Gian Antonio, father of Paul IV; count of Montorio (d. 1516), **624**
- Carafa, Giovanni, son of Gian Alfonso; count of Montorio, duke of Paliano from 1556 (d. 1561), **624**, **629**, **634**, 640ff., **643**, 645f., **649**, 651ff., 655f., 659ff., **666**, 669ff., 672f., **673**, **677**, 678n, 679n, **680**, **683**, 685f., **688**, 689n, 691, 702ff., **706**, 711ff., **727**, 729f., **739**, 742ff., 745f., 748, 749n, 750n, 751f., 753n, 754n; wife of, *see* Violante Garlonia d' Alife
- Carafa, Giovanni Pietro, *see* Paul IV
- Carafa, Oliviero, archbishop of Naples 1458–1484, cardinal 1467–1511: 8f., **10n**, 63, 65f., 72, 626n, **719**
- Carafeschi, 636f., 639f., **642**, 647ff., 650f., 655f., **661**, 663f., **666**, 668, 671f., 674f., 677f., **683**, 685f., 688n, 689n, **690**, **701**, 711ff., 718f., **721**, **724**, 727f., 735ff., 742ff., 745ff., 748ff., **751**, 752n, 753f., 965n, 969
- Caramania (Karaman), 179, 530, **590**, **703**, **971**, **996**, **1027**, 1032n, **1043**
- Caramussa, Turkish corsair (fl. ca. 1505), 37; same as Caramassan, Turkish corsair (fl. 1513)?, 155
- Caramussolini, *caramussolini*, Turkish fast vessels, 874n, **879**, **981**, 982n, **984**, **1005**, **1028**, 1038n, **1040**, **1095**
- Carbone, Bernardino, party in the peace of Cave (1557), **688**
- Carcassone, bishops of, *see* Vitellozzo Vitelli (admin.) 1567–1568, Annibale Rucellai 1569–1601
- Carceri del Sant' Ufficio (in Rome), **718**
- Carducci, Baldassare, Florentine ambassador to France in 1529: 323n
- Carin, 477n
- Carinola, 307
- Carinthia, 192, 231, 249, 318, 433n, 442, 547, 564, **661**, **790**, 792n
- Carlo de' Grassi, bishop of Montefascone and Corneto 1555–1571, cardinal 1570–1571: **965**
- Carlos (Don Carlos), son of Philip II and Marie of Portugal (b. 1545, d. 1568), **708**
- Carlos de Avalos (Carlo d' Avalos), b. 1541, d. 1612), Italian commander of Spanish origin, 1069n
- Carmelites, Order of, 188, **740**
- Carne, (Sir) Edward, English diplomat (d. 1561), **639**, **648**
- Carnesecchi de' Medici, Pietro, papal secretary and heretic (b. 1508, d. 1567), 385n, 387f., 389ff., 421n
- Carniola, 52, 192, 231, 244, 249, 337, 354, 371, 433n, **661**, **790**, 792n

- Caroldo, Gian Giacomo, Venetian secretary and historian (*fl.* 1509), 62n
- Carpenras, 449n; bishop of, *see* Jacopo Sadoletto 1517–1535?
- Carpi, 261f., 287, 430n; count of, *see* Alberto Pio (b. 1475, d. 1550); *and see* Rodolfo Pio
- Carranza de Miranda, Barolomé, archbishop of Toledo 1557–1576: 912
- Cartagena, 177, 912, 915, 945ff.; bishops of, *see* Bernardino de Carvajal 1493–1495, Juan Siliceo 1541–1546
- Carte Stroziane, 113n
- Carthage, 148, 193, 397, 905
- Carthusians, Order of, 295; *and see* Certosa, Monte Subasio
- Carystus, 832
- Casa Aldobrandina, 633n
- Casa Cazzuffi (in Trent), 777n
- Casa d' Este, 600
- Casa del Duca di Ferrara (in Venice), 288n
- Casablanca, 789n
- Casale, 96, 111n, 666, 675
- Casale, Alessandro, present at the conclave of 1559: 727
- Casale, (Sir) Gregory, English ambassador to Rome in the 1520s: 230n, 266, 276n, 330
- Casale di Monferrato, bishop of, *see* Bernardino della Barba 1525–1529
- Cásicina, 956
- Caserta, 294, 307n; bishops of, *see* Girolamo Verallo 1541–1544, Girolamo Dandino 1544–1546
- Casino (or Villa Pia), in the Vatican Gardens, 881
- Caspian Sea, 100
- Cassano, bishops of, *see* Durante de' Duranti 1541–1551, Mark Sittich von Hohenems 1560–1561; marchese of, *see* Giovan Battista Castaldo (b. 1493, d. after 1565)
- Cassano d' Adda, 61
- Castagna, Gianbattista, *see* Urban VII
- Castagnola, Giorgio, bishop of Melos 1545–1560?: 755
- Castaldo, Giovan Battista, Italian soldier (b. 1493, d. probably after 1565), 568ff., 571ff., 574ff., 577f., 579n, 580f., 584, 585n
- Castel Bolognese, 6n, 264
- Castel della Pieve, 6
- Castel dell' Uovo (in Naples), 14n
- Castel Gandolfo, 675
- Castel Guelfo di Bologna, 264
- Castel Nuovo (at Naples), 13, 297n
- Castel S. Angelo, 3, 5ff., 8f., 11n, 12n, 131n, 168n, 218, 222, 255f., 271, 273ff., 276f., 282f., 285f., 288, 289n, 290, 299, 316, 339, 351n, 353, 418n, 434n, 443n, 444n, 486n, 505, 514f., 528f., 534, 611, 634f., 638, 641, 652f., 656, 658f., 663, 677, 678n, 680n, 688f., 711, 721, 738, 745ff., 748, 753f., 860, 881, 1017
- Castel S. Angelo (on Malta), 843n
- Castel S. Angelo, town near Vicovaro, 675
- Castel S. Arcangelo, 907
- Castel S. Elmo (near Naples), 295
- Castel S. Giovanni (in the Piacentino), 286
- Castel S. Giovanni (now San Giovanni in Persiceto), 261ff.
- Castel S. Piero (near Ravenna), 93n, 115
- Castel S. Pietro (near Bologna), 263
- Castel S. Pietro, built by the Knights of Rhodes on Zephyria, an island near Halicarnassus (1404), 182
- Castel Tornese (Clermont), on the Moreote coast, *see* Chloumoutsi
- Castelfranco, 330, 488n
- Castellammare, 296
- Castellaneta, bishop of, *see* Bartolommeo Sirigo 1544–1577?
- Castellazzo, suburb of Piacenza, 261
- Castellesi da Corneto, Adriano, cardinal, 1503–1521/1522: 13, 47ff., 112n, 167f., 173n
- Castello, at Sopotó, 1091
- Castello del Buonconsiglio (in Trent), 491, 777n
- Castello Ostiense, 688
- Castello Sforzesco (in Milan), 117n, 248; Sala degli Scarlioni, 117n
- Castelnuovo (Hercegovi, on the Boka Kotorska [Gulf of Kotor]), 429, 446, 447n, 888, 903f., 967, 987, 1000n, 1025, 1045
- Castiglione, Baldassare, Count, Italian humanist (b. 1478, d. 1529), 223n, 232, 242n, 243n, 249n, 250, 258n, 259n, 268, 273n, 432, 458n
- Castile, 35n, 41, 48, 49n, 55, 70, 85, 126, 187f., 200, 203n, 312, 414, 632, 1014, 1021, 1054, 1070, 1074; Cortes of, 558; Hospitallers from, 207, 854, 862f., 866f., 868n, 869f.; king of, *see* Philip I (in 1506); queen of, *see* Isabella 1474–1504
- Castilians, 810
- Castro (Acquapendente), bishop of, *see* Girolamo Maccabeo 1543–1568?
- Castro (in Apulia), 431, 520, 553, 563, 585, 641; duke of, *see* Orazio Farnese 1549–1553?
- Castrocaro, 114
- Castrum (or Collichium), Hospitaller quarter at Rhodes, 208
- Catalans, 28, 71, 86, 192n, 1014; *and see* Felipe de Paredes Catalonia, 84f., 345, 632, 1014; *see also* Aragon-Catalonia
- Cataneo, Gianmaria, translator of Isocrates (*fl.* 1509), 58n
- Catania, 866, 890f.; bishop of, *see* Niccolò Maria Caracciolo 1537–1567
- Cateau-Cambrésis, treaty of (1559), 606n, 706, 708f., 713, 720, 726, 728, 734, 758f., 766f., 773, 833, 835, 837f., 841, 853n, 888
- Catechism, 823
- Catherine, daughter of Ferdinand I and Anna, daughter of Ladislav of Bohemia and Hungary; wife of Francesco III Gonzaga from 1549 (b. 1533, d. 1572), 801
- Catherine, daughter of Philip I and Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand II; wife of John III of Portugal 1525–1557 (b. 1507, d. 1578), 1063n
- Catherine de' Medici, daughter of Lorenzo II and Madeleine de la Tour d' Auvergne, niece of Clement VII; wife of Henry II of France 1533–1559 (d. 1589), 167n, 367, 370, 374n, 391, 506, 520, 599n, 649, 685n, 729, 766n, 767n, 775, 806, 815, 831ff., 837ff., 842, 849f., 887ff., 912, 930, 939, 941, 945, 949n, 958, 963, 1062n, 1066, 1088f.
- Catholic League (1576), 1088
- Catholicism, 85, 190n, 202, 262, 336n, 353f., 378, 385, 414n, 417, 422, 453, 486, 496, 502, 545, 566, 626, 628, 633, 644, 710, 714f., 756, 769, 773, 791f., 797, 806, 811, 816, 828, 911, 920
- Catholics, 361, 364n, 401, 421, 435, 452f., 460f., 463, 466, 477, 484, 503f., 540n, 543, 545, 565, 629, 633, 705, 714f., 718, 720, 757, 760, 774, 783, 785n, 786, 810, 828, 888, 920, 1019n, 1088, 1103
- Cattaro (Kotor), 17, 57, 60, 71n, 88, 193n, 408, 424f., 429, 446, 471n, 474, 475n, 770, 849n, 903, 923, 929, 947, 970, 1002, 1025f., 1045f.; governor-general of, *see* Giacomo Malatesta (in 1571)
- Caucasus, 1098
- Cava, 198
- Cavalerio, Niccolò, of Sarzana, papal commissioner in 1565: 859
- Cave, 687; marquis of, *see* Diomede Carafa, son of Giovanni, duke of Paliano; peace of (1557), 687n, 688, 708n, 710, 712f., 729, 736, 739, 742ff., 745, 750

- Cave (Cavus), Jean, eye-witness to the sack of Rome in 1527: 273n
- Cefalù, bishop of, *see* Ramón de Vich (admin.) 1518–1525
- Celestine III (Hyacinthus Bobo Orsini), pope 1191–1198: 756
- Celestine IV (Goffredo Castiglione), cardinal 1227–1241, pope in 1241: 615
- Celibacy, 354, 460, 499, 790n, 810
- Celidonio, Alessio, bishop of Gallipoli 1494–1508, of Molifetta 1508–1517: 135, 136n
- Cellini, Benvenuto, Italian artist (b. 1500, d. 1571), 528n
- Celsi, Giacomo (Jacopo), Venetian provveditore of the fleet from ca. 1568 (b. 1520), 928, 935, 953, 967, 978ff., 982, 984n
- Celsi da Napi, Giovanni, Roman merchant (*fl.* 1559), 719
- Cenci, church of the (in Rome), 626
- Ceneda, bishops of, *see* Marino Grimani 1508–1517, Giovanni Grimani 1540–1545, Michele della Torre 1547–1586
- Cenis, Mount, 148
- Centorio degli Hortensii, Ascanio, Italian historian (*fl.* 1552–1579), 566n, 567n, 569n, 573, 576, 580
- Centurioni, Genoese family, 957n
- Cephalonia, 402, 431, 584, 902, 923, 929, 947, 959, 975, 985, 989, 1008, 1026, 1045, 1051f., 1082ff., 1086
- Ceprano (ancient Fregellae), 659n
- Cerberus, 189
- "Ceremoniale Romanum," 137n
- Cesari, Girolamo (also "Lodovico"), Mantuan agent in 1528: 292f.
- Cerignola, 294n
- Cerigo (Cythera, Kythera), 30, 445, 584, 586, 835, 959, 1008, 1080ff., 1083f., 1103
- Cerigotto, 30
- Certosa, Carthusian monastery near Pavia, 286
- Cervia (Zervia), 62, 121n, 277, 291n, 297ff., 300, 302, 310, 322n, 323n, 327, 330ff., 339f., 346, 674, 879n; bishop of, *see* Paolo de' Cesi (admin.) 1525–1528
- Cervini, Marcello, *see* Marcellus II
- Cesare de' Nobili, papal nuncio to France in 1537: 430n
- Cesarini, Alessandro, cardinal 1517–1542, bishop of Pamplona 1520–1538, archbishop of Otranto (admin.) 1526–1536f., bishop of Alessano (admin.) 1526–1531, of Cuenca (admin.) 1538–1542: 201n, 335n, 351, 634
- Cesarini, Giuliano, Roman noble, 505, 634, 689, 718
- Cesena, 4, 12f., 55, 129, 292, 419n
- Cesi, Pietro Donato, bishop of Narni (admin.) 1546–1566f., cardinal 1570–1586: 519, 965, 1070, 1090
- Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 348
- Châlons-sur-Marne, bishop of, *see* Robert de Lenoncourt 1535–1550f.
- Champagne, 473
- Champigny, 556n
- Chandilla, site of mills on Chios, 895
- Chapel of the Virgin (in the cathedral of Rouen), 80n
- Chapuis, Eustace, imperial ambassador to England in 1542: 462n
- Charlemagne, co-king of the Franks 768–771, king 771–800, emperor 800–814: 190, 381, 538, 716
- Charles I of Anjou, Angevin king of Naples and Sicily (1266) 1268–1282, "king" of Albania 1272–1285, prince of Achaëa 1278–1285, king of Naples 1282–1285: 109
- Charles II d' Amboise, lord of Chaumont (d. 1511), 72, 93, 182
- Charles III, son of Philip I and Claudia, daughter of Jean II of Brosse, count of Penthievre; duke of Savoy 1504–1553: 173, 332, 338, 441n, 471, 525; wife of, *see* Beatrice, daughter of Manuel of Portugal 1521–1538
- Charles V, son of Philip the Handsome and Joanna ("the Mad") of Castile; prince of the Netherlands 1516–1555, king of Spain 1516–1556, king of Naples and Sicily 1516–1556, emperor 1519–1556 (d. 1558), 1, 41, 70, 112n, 125n, 131, 142, 167, 170, 178ff., 186n, 187f., 190ff., 193ff., 196f., 199ff., 202f., 206n, 207f., 212n, 213n, 216ff., 219ff., 222f., 224n, 226ff., 229ff., 232, 233n, 234f., 236n, 237f., 240ff., 243ff., 246, 247n, 248n, 249ff., 252, 253n, 254ff., 257f., 259n, 260ff., 263, 265f., 268, 269n, 273f., 276f., 279f., 283n, 284f., 287n, 288ff., 291f., 295, 298ff., 303, 305, 307, 310ff., 313, 315, 322ff., 326n, 327f., 330ff., 333f., 336ff., 339ff., 342, 343n, 344, 346ff., 349ff., 352, 353n, 354ff., 357ff., 360f., 363f., 366ff., 369f., 372f., 375f., 378f., 381ff., 384ff., 387f., 390n, 391f., 395f., 398f., 401f., 405f., 409f., 412ff., 415ff., 418, 420, 423f., 426f., 429, 430n, 431f., 434f., 437, 440f., 444f., 447, 450ff., 453, 456f., 458n, 459ff., 462ff., 465n, 466f., 469n, 470, 472n, 473, 475n, 478f., 481f., 484f., 488, 489n, 490, 493f., 496f., 499n, 500ff., 503f., 508f., 510n, 514f., 517f., 520ff., 523, 525, 527f., 533ff., 537ff., 540f., 545f., 548ff., 551f., 554ff., 557f., 560ff., 563f., 566, 569, 571, 580ff., 584n, 592f., 595ff., 598, 602f., 605n, 606n, 609, 611n, 612, 618, 621n, 625, 627, 629, 632ff., 635f., 638, 640ff., 644, 646ff., 649f., 651n, 653ff., 656ff., 659, 664n, 665, 667, 669n, 671, 673, 678, 681, 690, 692f., 697f., 702n, 705, 708, 711, 714, 716f., 738, 749f., 755, 773, 779, 796, 799f., 852, 854, 859, 879, 899f., 894, 910, 914, 920, 933, 983, 992, 993n, 1048, 1090f.
- Charles VI, German emperor from 1711 (b. 1685, d. 1740), 1104
- Charles VIII, son of Louis XI; king of France 1483–1498, titular king of Naples 1495–1498: 1, 6, 15, 53, 83n, 161f., 166n, 167n, 653, 657, 668
- Charles IX, son of Henry II and Catherine de' Medici; king of France 1560–1574: 767n, 771, 775, 794, 796, 806, 808, 820, 831, 833ff., 836ff., 839f., 842, 844n, 849, 852, 878, 879n, 887n, 888ff., 901, 905, 910n, 911, 912n, 913, 915, 916n, 922, 926, 930, 937ff., 944, 945n, 946n, 948f., 951, 958, 960, 963, 965, 969f., 971n, 995n, 998f., 1008, 1014ff., 1049, 1062, 1066f., 1068n, 1075f., 1079f., 1081n, 1087ff., 1091; wife of, *see* Elizabeth, daughter of Maximilian II (b. 1554, d. 1592)
- Charles ("the Bold"), son of Philip III; duke of Burgundy 1467–1477: 190, 223
- Charles, son of Ferdinand I and Anna of Bohemia; archduke of Austria (b. 1540, d. 1590), 801, 844, 921, 1063n
- Charles, son of Francis I and Claude, daughter of Louis XII; duke of Orléans and Angoulême (b. 1522, d. 1545), 400, 455, 473, 481, 493
- Charles, son of Francis I, duke of Lorraine and Christine of Denmark; duke of Lorraine (b. 1543, d. 1608), 1067
- Charles d' Albret, brother of Henri; prince of Navarre (*fl.* 1528), 309
- Charles d' Angennes de Rambouillet, bishop of Le Mans 1556–1587, French ambassador to Rome in 1570, cardinal 1570–1587: 960, 965, 969, 971n, 998f., 1066f.
- Charles de Bourbon, bishop of Nevers 1540–1545f., of Saintes 1545–1550f., cardinal 1548–1590, archbishop of Rouen 1550–1582, bishop of Beauvais (admin.) 1569–1575: 515, 527, 619, 722n
- Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier, son of Gilbert de Bourbon and Chiara Gonzaga; count of Montpensier 1501–1527, duke of Bourbon 1505–1527, constable of France 1515–1527 (b. 1490, d. 1527), 225, 228, 230n, 238f., 243n, 256f., 261ff., 264ff., 267ff., 270f., 278n, 281, 287, 350, 563; wife of, *see* Suzanne de Bourbon (d. 1521)
- Charles de Brissac, French soldier (b. ca. 1505, d. 1563), 701, 709n

- Charles de Guise, archbishop of Rheims 1538–1574, cardinal 1547–1574, "cardinal of Lorraine," 513n, 515, 519f., 522f., 525n, 527n, 600n, 614, 641ff., 644, 657, 712, 716f., 719n, 722n, 723, 724n, 725n, 750, 767, 774n, 777n, 778, 785, 793ff., 796f., 799, 801n, 802ff., 806ff., 809, 811, 814ff., 818ff., 821, 823ff., 830, 888
- Charles de Hémart de Denonville, bishop of Mâcon 1531–1538, cardinal 1536–1540, bishop of Amiens (admin.) 1538–1540: 399, 400n, 406f., 412, 433n
- Charles de Lannoy, imperial viceroy of Naples (b. ca. 1482, d. 1527), 212n, 213n, 224f., 226n, 227, 229n, 231, 233, 239n, 242n, 257, 259f., 262f., 265f., 268, 285
- Charles de Marillac, French diplomat: bishop of Vannes 1550–1557, archbishop of Vienne 1557–1560: 449n, 456n, 550n, 551, 678
- Charles de Poupet, seigneur de la Chau, member of Charles V's regency council in 1522: 208
- Charles de Rambouillet, *see* Charles d'Angennes de Rambouillet
- Charles de Tessières, gallej commander ca. 1560, 758
- Charolais, 238
- Charry, sieur de, *see* Jacques Prévost
- Chartres, bishop of, *see* Érad de la Marck 1507–1525?
- Château la Bastie d'Urfé, near Lyon, 507n
- Chaumont, lord of, *see* Charles II d'Amboise (d. 1511)
- Chelm, bishop of, *see* John Drohojowski 1546–1551
- Chenonceau, 766n
- Chercell, 234
- Cherea, Francesco, Venetian host of Broderic and Rincón in 1530: 334
- Cherso, island in the Quarnaro, 65
- Chesme (Çeşme), Turkish village, 894
- Chesneau, Jean, secretary to Gabriel de Luetz (*fl.* 1546), 483n
- Chianas, 598
- Chinas, 83, 894f., 898f., 903
- Chiara de' Medici (Medeghini), sister of Pius IV, wife of Wolf Dietrich, lord of Hoheneim, 743
- Chiemsee, 548n
- Chierigati, Francesco, papal legate, bishop of Teramo 1522–1539: 219, 417n
- Chieti, 292f., 780n; archbishops of, *see* Gian Pietro Carafa 1537–1549, Bernardino Maffei 1549–1553; cardinal of, *see* Gian Pietro Carafa
- Chigi, Agostino, Siense banker in Rome (b. 1465, d. 1520), 49, 102, 168n, 272
- Chigi, Siense family of bankers, 102
- Chigi, Sigismondo, brother of Agostino (b. 1479, d. 1525), 272
- Chinchilla, castle of (Spain), 14
- Chioggia, 116f., 237, 587, 1002n, 1025; podestà of, 116
- Chios (Scio), 77, 81n, 83, 344, 345n, 541, 588, 710f., 756, 757n, 776, 879, 893ff., 896ff., 899, 901ff., 919, 944, 971n, 1007, 1057n, 1102; bishops of, *see* Franco Sauli (removed 1552–1553), Giovanbattista Giustiniani (from ca. 1558), Vincenzo Giustiniani (from 1562), Timoteo Giustiniani 1564–1568?
- Chios Canal, 895n
- Chiusi, 600; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Ricci 1545–1554?
- Chloumoussi (Clermont, Castel Tornese), 700
- Chojński, John, secretary to Sigismund I in 1528: 321
- Chrina, site of a garden on Chios, 895
- Christian II, son of John (Hans) and Christina of Saxony, king of Denmark and Norway 1513–1523, of Sweden 1520–1523 (d. 1559), 180, 323, 378n
- Christoph von Roggendorff, fugitive ca. 1551: 551
- Christopher, katholikos of Sis in 1561: 768n
- Christopher, son of Ulrich VI and Sabine, daughter of Albrecht IV of Bavaria; duke of Württemberg from 1550 (b. 1515, d. 1568), 543, 561n
- Christoval de Arcos, translator of Jacobus Fontanus (*fl.* 1526), 203n
- Church, Latin, or Roman Catholic, *see* Roman Catholic Church
- Cibo, Caterina, daughter of Franceschetto Cibo and Magdalena de' Medici; wife of Giovanni Maria Varano, duke of Camerino 1515–1528 (b. 1501, d. 1557; married 1520–1528), 272
- Cibo, Innocenzo, cardinal 1513–1550, archbishop of S. Andrew's (admin.) 1513–1514, bishop of Marseille (admin.) 1517–1530, of Aleria (admin.) 1518–1520, archbishop of Messina (admin.) 1538–1550: 223, 234, 239n, 243n, 246f., 337, 506, 509, 513, 516f., 518n, 519, 523ff., 528n
- Cicada, Gianbattista, bishop of Albenga (admin.) 1543–1554?, cardinal 1551–1570: 610, 611n, 613, 619n, 620, 737, 748, 770n, 785, 786n, 787, 789, 865
- Cigalla, captain imprisoned by the Turks ca. 1564: 836f.
- Cilicia, 150, 768n
- Cimera, the, coastal region of Albania, 903
- Cimeriotti, 903
- Ciphut Sinan of Smyrna, Jewish corsair ca. 1531: 347n, 395n
- Circassians, 830
- Cirmi Corso, Antonfrancesco, author of a contemporary account of the siege of Malta in 1565 (b. 1510, d. 1583?), 762f., 853n, 857n, 860n, 868n, 869, 871f., 873n, 874
- Cistercians, Order of, 48
- Ciaterina (in the Vatican), 881
- Citadel, in Cairo, 28, 31, 33
- Citard, Matthias, confessor of Ferdinand II in 1563: 804
- Città di Castello, 12n, 646; bishops of, *see* Antonio del Monte 1503–1506, Achille Grassi 1506–1511?, Marino Grimani (admin.) 1534–1539, Vitellozzo Vitelli 1554–1560
- Città Leonina, 881
- Cittadella, 13, 67
- Citanova, 803; bishops of, *see* Francesco Pisani (admin.) 1526–1535, Matteo Priolo 1561–1565
- Ciudad Rodrigo, 498n; bishops of, *see* Pedro Pacheco 1537–1539, Francisco de Navarra 1542–1545
- Civiale del Friuli (Forum Julium, Forogiuolo), 55, 67, 337n
- Civita Castellana, 5n, 140, 268, 276, 288, 290f., 713; bishops of, *see* Orte, bishops of
- Civita Lavinia (Lanuvio), in the Alban Hills, 713
- Civitavecchia, 4n, 80, 140, 163n, 164, 202, 221, 224, 257f., 260, 261n, 269n, 270n, 276, 282, 288, 299f., 311, 412, 470, 510, 595, 623, 634f., 652f., 660, 665, 687, 690f., 703, 881, 940, 1017, 1024; castellan of, *see* Pietro Capuano
- Civitella del Tronto, 292, 680ff.
- Civitella di Romagna, 264
- Civran, Girolamo, Venetian secretary, 331, 332n, 333, 461n, 462n, 479n
- Clarice de' Medici, wife of Filippo Strozzi (d. 1528), 599n
- Claude, daughter of Louis XII and Anne, daughter of Francis II of Brittany; wife of Francis I 1514–1524: 287
- Claude, son of Claude of Lorraine; duke of Aumale from 1547 (b. 1526, d. 1573), 664n
- Claude d'Urfé, French ambassador to Rome in 1549: 507, 510, 512, 514f., 517f., 519n, 528, 549
- Claude de Bourbon, son of Philippe de Bourbon and Louise d'Albret-Borgia, 14
- Claude de Fosses, secretary of Henry II; conclavist of Georges d'Armagnac in 1550: 518
- Claude de Givry, bishop of Langres (admin.) 1528–1561, bishop of Poitiers 1534–1551?, bishop of Périgueux (admin.) 1540–1541?, bishop of Amiens (admin.) 1540–1546?: 370, 508n, 722n
- Claude de la Guiche, bishop of Agde 1541–1547, of Mirepoix 1547–1553: 559f.
- Claude de la Sengle, Hospitaller grand master 1553–1557: 608

- Claude du Bourg de Guélines, French agent in Istanbul in 1569: 838n, 839, 938, 948f., 951, 970
- Claude of Lorraine, son of René II of Lorraine and Philippa, daughter of Adolphus of Egmont; count (1506–1528) and duke (1528–1550) of Guise, 142n, 641
- Claudio della Valle, notary of the Inquisition in 1559: 719
- Clement IV (Guy de Foulques, Guido Fulcodi), cardinal 1261–1265, pope 1265–1268: 190
- Clement V (Bertrand de Got), archbishop of Bordeaux 1299–1305, pope 1305–1314: 92
- Clement VI (Pierre Roger), cardinal 1338–1342, pope 1342–1352: 520
- Clement VII (Giulio de' Medici), archbishop of Florence 1513–1523, cardinal 1513–1523, pope 1523–1534: 129, 160f., 160n, 169n, 173f., 183n, 184, 186, 192n, 201n, 206n, 218n, 214f., 219n, 220f., 223f., 226f., 230f., 233f., 236f., 239f., 242f., 245f., 248, 250f., 253n, 254f., 257f., 260, 262n, 263, 264n, 265f., 268f., 273f., 276f., 281f., 286f., 289f., 292n, 294, 296f., 299f., 302, 307, 310f., 313, 319f., 321n, 323f., 326f., 329f., 331n, 332f., 335f., 339f., 342n, 344n, 345n, 346f., 350f., 353f., 356, 357n, 358n, 360, 362, 366f., 369f., 371n, 372, 374n, 384f., 389, 390n, 391f., 394, 406, 411, 417, 435f., 490, 512, 515, 592, 612, 639, 644, 682, 687, 716
- Clement VIII (Ippolito Aldobrandini), pope 1592–1605: 633, 1100
- Clement IX (Giulio Rospigliosi), pope from 1667 (b. 1600, d. 1669): 1101
- Clement XI (Giovanni Francesco Albani), pope from 1700 (b. 1649, d. 1721): 1104
- Clerk, John, English diplomat; bishop of Bath and Wells 1523–1541: 230, 297
- Clermont, bishops of, *see* Étienne Aubert (Innocent VI) 1340–1342, Bernardo Salviati (admin.) 1561–1568?
- Clermont-Ferrand, 85
- Clissa (Klis), 236n, 247n, 343n, 378n, 383, 384n, 385, 421f., 451n, 474, 476, 494n, 608, 694f., 861, 932; sanjakbey of, *see* Malkos Beg (in 1557)
- Clissani, 421
- Cloth of Gold, Field of (1520), 193
- Clovis, king of the Franks 481–511: 359n
- Cluj, 568n
- Cocciano, Agostino, Roman protonotary in 1555: 581n, 610, 611n, 615n
- Cochin, 18n
- Coco, Antonio, titular archbishop of Patras 1560–1574?, archbishop of Corfu 1560–1577?: 779n
- Coco, Jacopo, archbishop of Corfu 1528–1560?: 488, 489n
- Cogimur ab recessis*, bull of Leo X (1517), 174
- Cognac, League of (1526), 241ff., 247f., 249n, 251f., 254, 256ff., 259ff., 263f., 266ff., 275f., 278, 281f., 284f., 287f., 290ff., 293, 295n, 297f., 300, 302f., 306, 307n, 308, 309n, 310, 313, 316n, 322, 330
- "Cohalla," port on the Gulf of Laconia, 1083
- Coimbra, 740; *see also* Holy Cross, Canons regular of the Col de Larche, 160
- Col du Mt. Cenis, 916
- Colet, John, English theologian (b. 1467?, d. 1519), 49n
- Coli, Giovanni, painter (b. 1643, d. 1681), 1100
- Collo, 234
- Cologne, 72n, 346, 502n, 548f., 603n, 644, 769; archbishop of, *see* Adolf von Schauenburg 1535–1556
- Colomon I, son of Géza I; king of Hungary (d. 1116), 568n
- Colonna, Ascanio, father of Marc' Antonio, duke of Paliano (d. 1557), 296, 297, 646, 649f., 654, 745; wife of, *see* Giovanna d' Aragona (*ff.* 1556)
- Colonna, Ascanio, informant of Giulio de' Grandi in 1552: 582
- Colonna, Camillo, imperialist arrested in 1555: 634, 638, 640f., 646
- Colonna, Fabrizio, Roman leader (d. 1520), 116, 117n, 118, 128, 131n
- Colonna, Giovanni, cardinal 1212–1245: 650
- Colonna, Giovanni, cardinal 1480–1508: 8f.
- Colonna, Marc' Antonio, brother of Pompeo; archbishop of Taranto 1560–1568, cardinal 1565–1597, archbishop of Salerno 1568–1574?: 964n, 988n, 993
- Colonna, Marc' Antonio, duke of Paliano, papal commander at Lepanto (b. 1535, d. 1584), 635f., 640f., 646, 649f., 652, 654f., 659, 662, 666f., 669, 672n, 673, 684f., 687f., 692, 714, 721, 728f., 738f., 742ff., 745, 959, 964f., 967f., 971f., 977f., 980f., 983f., 986n, 987f., 993, 995f., 998f., 1012ff., 1016ff., 1020, 1024f., 1046ff., 1050f., 1054f., 1057f., 1061, 1064ff., 1067, 1069f., 1077f., 1081ff., 1084, 1086, 1099; wife of, *see* Felice
- Colonna, Marc' Antonio, papal commander at the battle of Ravenna in 1512: 15n, 116
- Colonna, Mario Algieri, bishop of Rieti 1529–1555: 407n
- Colonna palace (in Rome), *see* Palazzo Colonna
- Colonna, Pompeo, bishop of Rieti 1508–1520; 1528–1529, cardinal 1517–1532, bishop of Potenza (admin.) 1521–1526, of Acerno (admin.) 1524–1525, of Aquila (admin.) 1525–1532, of Sarno (admin.) 1530–1532, archbishop of Monreale 1530–1532: 201n, 220, 222, 242, 243n, 255, 276, 289, 297, 307
- Colonna, Pompeo, commander at Malta in 1565: 859f., 871, 874, 901, 978, 993, 996f., 998n, 1013f., 1067
- Colonna, Prospero, designated infantry commander for Venice in 1571: 1026, 1063
- Colonna, Prospero, Roman leader (d. 1523): 15n, 70, 119, 120n, 121, 196f., 201
- Colonna, Sciarra, Italian Ghibelline (d. 1329), 255
- Colonna, Sciarra, leader of the imperialist attack on Rome in 1527: 269, 646
- Colonna, Vespasiano, Roman noble (*ff.* 1527), 281
- Colonna, Vittoria, poetess; wife of Fernando Francisco de Ávalos 1509–1525 (b. ca. 1492, d. 1547), 118n, 225, 457n
- Colosseum (in Rome), 399
- Colti, Matteo, Famagustan spared by the Turks in 1571: 1033, 1035, 1037, 1038n, 1041
- Comacchio, 120, 121n, 288
- Comings, bishop of, *see* Carlo Carafa (admin.) 1556–1561?
- Comino, 872
- Commendone, Giovanni Francesco, bishop of Zante 1555–1560?, cardinal 1565–1584: 633n, 662ff., 667f., 676n, 682, 751, 753, 772f., 775, 824n, 880, 882, 884, 886n, 910, 912, 951, 959, 968, 1019, 1020n, 1027n, 1064
- Communio *sub utraque specie*, 502, 542, 565, 734, 735n, 769, 779, 788, 790ff., 882, 886n
- Como, 201, 239, 272, 333n; bishops of, *see* Antonio Trivulzio 1487–1508, Scaramuzza Trivulzio 1508–1517; cardinal of, *see* Tolomeo Galli
- Compiègne, 683n, 685n, 696n
- Compostella, archbishops of, *see* Juan Álvarez de Toledo 1550–1557, Francisco Blanco 1574–1581
- Comuneros, Castilian townsmen in revolt (1520–1521), 195, 312
- Conarski, Adam, bishop of Poznań 1562–1574: 880n
- Conca, 296
- Concordia, 93, bishop of, *see* Marco Grimani 1533–1537
- Condé, prince of, *see* Louis I (b. 1530, d. 1569)
- Confessio Augustana, *see* Augsburg Confession
- Conquistadores, 85
- Conrad III, Hohenstaufen king of Germany 1138–1152: 175

- Consejo de la Cruzada, *see* *Cruzada*  
 Consejo de Stado, 912n, 957n, **958**, **1013**  
*Considerantes ac animo*, bull of Leo X (1518), 180n  
 Consiglio degli Ottanta (in Florence), 92n, 114n, 120n  
 Consiglio Grande (in Florence), 114n  
 Consiglio Maggiore (in Florence), 103n  
 Constance, 96, 414n, **769**, 799n, 806n; bishop of, *see* Mark Sittich von Hohenems 1561–1589; Council of (1414–1418), 92, 108, 127, 272, 441n, 492, 543f., 708n, **796**, **801**, **803f.**, **807**, **825**; diet of, 41, 43f.  
 Constantine, 234  
 Constantine, Roman emperor 306–337: 150, 185n, **757**; arch of (in Rome), 399  
 Constantine, son of Demetrius Calogierà of Nauplia (*fl.* 1567), **926**  
 Constantinople, 39, 54, 142, 147, 150, 153, 162, 170, 209n, 218, 429f., 445, **795**, **893**, **1103**; patriarch of, *see* Joseph II 1555–1565; titular Latin patriarchs of, *see* Marco Cornaro 1506?–1507, Thomas Bakócz 1507–1521, Egidio Canisio 1524–1530, Francesco Pesaro 1530–1545; *see also* Istanbul  
 Contarini, Alessandro, Venetian merchant; owner of the *Contarina* (*fl.* 1537), 409, 422  
 Contarini, Alessandro, Venetian provviditore of the fleet in 1537: 422f., 425f., 449n; bailie in Istanbul *ca.* 1545: 468n  
*Consistit iuxta verbum prophetae*, bull of Leo X (1517), 170  
*Consueverunt Romani pontifices*, bull of Pius V (1567), **908**  
 Contarina, Venetian galley (*ca.* 1530), 302, 409f., 422, 425; Venetian galley (*ca.* 1557), **696**; Venetian galley (1571), 1007n  
 Contarini, Alvise, Venetian ambassador to France from 1569: **958**, **1008**, **1049**, 1062n  
 Contarini, Andrea, Venetian galley commander in 1526: 251  
 Contarini, Bartolommeo, Venetian envoy to Cairo in 1517: 165n, 180n  
 Contarini, Bortolo, Venetian consul in Damascus in 1505: 38  
 Contarini, Carlo, Venetian ambassador to Ferdinand I in 1526: 251n  
 Contarini, Gasparo, Venetian ambassador, writer, cardinal 1535–1542, bishop of Belluno 1536–1542: 81, 206n, 213n, 227n, 229, 287, 298f., 301, 307, 309ff., 322n, 328ff., 331, 333, 338n, 339f., 394, 415n, 446n, 453, 460, 466, 497  
 Contarini, Gianpietro, historian (*fl.* 1572), 974ff., 980ff., 983f., **988**, **995n**, 1005ff., 1027n, 1031n, **1045**, 1052ff., 1055ff., 1058f., **1067**, 1067n  
 Contarini, Girolamo, Venetian captain-general of Cyprus in 1563: 924n  
 Contarini, Girolamo, Venetian provviditore of the fleet in 1505: 37; galley commander in 1530: 339  
 Contarini, Leonardo, Venetian ambassador to Vienna in 1564: 846n, **931**; appointed as Venetian ambassador to France in 1571: 1049n, 1062n; Venetian ambassador to Don John of Austria in 1571: 1051n, 1069f., **1072**, 1073n, 1076f.  
 Contarini, Marc' Antonio, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1537 and 1539: 303, 358, 365, 366n, 410f., 426, 427n, 428ff., 437ff.  
 Contarini, Marco, correspondent of Paolo Giovio in 1530: 342n  
 Contarini, Marino, nephew of Agostino Barbarigo; killed at Lepanto, 1056f.  
 Contarini, Nadalino, Venetian galley commander in 1512: 30  
 Contarini, Paolo, provviditore of Zante in 1571: 1052n  
 Contarini, Pietro, bishop of Paphos 1557–1562?: 775n  
 Contarini, Tommaso, Venetian consul in Alexandria in 1511: 25f., 32f., 71; bailie in Istanbul in 1520: 194, 198f.; orator to Suleiman I *ca.* 1527: 301ff., 331, 333; ambassador to Suleiman I *ca.* 1533: 368, 369n, 383, 388; ambassador to Istanbul in 1539: 448  
 Contarini, Zaccaria, Venetian negotiator of the truce of Arco in 1508: 52n  
 Contarini, Zuan, Venetian to exchange prisoners in 1575: 1097n  
 Conte, Torquato, associate of the Carafeschi (*fl.* 1560), **746**  
 Contrada Larga (in Trent), 777n  
 Conversano, bishop of, *see* Antonio di Sanseverino (admin.) 1529–1534?; count of, *see* Giulio Antonio Acquaviva (*fl.* 1528)  
 Conza, archbishops of, *see* Niccolò Gaetano di Sermoneta 1539–1546, Marcello Crescenzi 1546–1552, Girolamo Muzzarelli 1553–1561  
 Copts, **768**; *see also* Gabriel VII, Coptic patriarch of Alexandria 1526–1569  
 Corbola, town at the northern mouth of the Po river, 77n  
 Corcyra, *see* Corfu, city of  
 Cordeliers, guardian of, *see* Jean Thenaud (*fl.* *ca.* 1512)  
 Cordova (Córdoba), **957**, **960n**, **966**; bishops of, *see* Juan Alvarez de Toledo 1523–1537, Diego de Alaba y Esquivel 1558–1562  
 Corella, Michele, henchman of Cesare Borgia (*fl.* 1500), 3  
 Corfotes, 425  
 Corfu, 30, 57, 60, 137n, 155f., 165n, 227n, 233n, 295, 309n, 363n, 366, 388, 395n, 402, 420, 424ff., 427f., 431f., 439, 446, 448n, 468, 489n, 536, 554, **582**, **584**, 607n, 610n, 622ff., **696**, 700, 763n, **765**, 770n, 848, 849n, 850f., **880**, **891**, **901**, **903**, **907**, **913n**, **923**, **927**, **929**, **935**, **939**, 940n, **944**, **947**, 958f., 961, 965ff., **970**, **972**, **973n**, **974ff.**, 982n, 985n, 987ff., **991**, **993**, 994n, **1004**, **1008**, 1010n, **1014**, **1017**, 1018n, 1021n, 1022f., **1025f.**, **1028**, **1045**, **1047**, **1050**, 1054n, **1055**, 1059f., **1064**, **1066**, **1068**, 1072ff., 1076ff., 1080ff., 1083f., **1086**, **1090**, **1103f.**; archbishops of, *see* Cristoforo Marcello 1514–1528, Jacopo Cocco 1528–1560?, Antonio Cocco 1560–1577?; canal of, **903**, **1026**, **1047**; channel of, **584**, **607**, **1050**; city of, **944**, **1050**  
 Coria, bishops of, *see* Francisco Quiñones 1530–1533?, Francisco de Mendoza 1533–1550  
 Corinth, 114n, 234, **1103**; Gulf of, 367n, 1052f., **1057**, 1060n, **1061**, **1066**, 1068n, 1101n  
 Corio, Bernardino, Italian historian (b. 1459, d. between 1503 and 1512), **626**  
 Coriolano de' Martorani, bishop of S. Marco 1530–1551: 542n  
 Cornara, Venetian ship at Famagusta in 1571: 1007n  
 Cornelius de Fine, Dutch diarist (*fl.* 1515), 162  
 Corner (Cornaro), Alvise, cardinal 1551–1584: **610**, **613**, **620**, 650n, **748**, 883n, **936**, **959f.**, **968**, **976**  
 Corner, Andrea, archbishop of Spalato 1527–1532?, bishop of Brescia 1532–1551, cardinal 1544–1551: 523  
 Corner (Cornaro), Caterina, wife of James II de Lusignan 1468–1473, queen of Cyprus 1473–1489 (d. 1510), **725**  
 Corner, Francesco, Venetian ambassador to the Hapsburgs until 1521: 298n  
 Corner, Giorgio, bishop of Treviso 1538–1577?: 818f.  
 Corner, Giorgio, father-in-law of Andrea Bragadin from 1571: 1012n  
 Corner, Giorgio, Venetian provviditore generale in 1509: 57, 59, 62f.  
 Corner, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador to France, 958n  
 Corner, Marco, cardinal 1500–1524, bishop of Verona (admin.) 1503–1524, of Famagusta 1503–1504, titular patriarch of Constantinople 1506?–1507; 1521–1524?: 4, 59n, 62, 65, 75, 77f., 82n, 173, 222  
 Corner, Raffaele, Venetian notary in the Vatican chancery *ca.* 1549: 331n  
 Corner, Raffaello, Venetian student in Istanbul *ca.* 1555: **631**

- Corneto (Tarquinia), 140, 282, 300, **665**; bishop of, *see* Alessandro Farnese (Paul III) 1501–1519
- Cornwall, 597n
- Coron, 30, 39, 114n, 155, 335n, 366f., 368n, 369n, 370ff., 373ff., 376f., 380f., 385f., 388, 392, 429, 533, **587, 1084**
- Coronenses, 377
- Corradino, eminence on Malta, **854, 861, 863, 866f., 870**
- Corrector of the Apostolic Chancery, Office of the, **729**
- Correggio, 93
- Correr, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador to imperial court in 1571, to Rome in 1580: 950n, 1061n, 1062n; Venetian baillie in Istanbul *ca.* 1575: 1095n
- Corrionero, Antonio, bishop of Almería 1557–1571?: **778**
- Corsairs, 24, 29, 37, 46, 51, 55, 70, 75, 83f., 86, 89, 99, 151n, 155, 170, 191, 200n, 217, 233ff., 278f., 282n, 284f., 340n, 347, 356, 388, 396, 409, 529, 531, 533, 535, 588n, **608, 622n, 624, 693, 695, 705, 705, 760f., 766n, 831f., 836, 842f., 857, 860f., 872n, 877, 881, 891, 896, 910n, 919, 923f., 930, 932, 939f., 943, 1000n, 1008, 1018, 1023n, 1045, 1052f., 1055, 1058, 1061n, 1069, 1075, 1081f.**; *see also* Barbary pirates, piracy
- Corsi, Giovanni, Florentine ambassador to the Hapsburgs in 1525: 227n
- Corsi, Pietro, poet (*fl.* 1527): 273
- Corsica, 171, 216, 272, 510, 532, 589n, 601n, **616, 624, 630, 635, 692n, 701, 709, 712n, 743, 835, 853n, 888, 890, 913, 929**
- Corsicans, 835n, **852**
- Corso, Sampietro, leader of a Corsican revolt against Genoa in the 1560's: **835, 888, 890, 913**
- Consolari, 1052n
- Cortes, Spanish legislative assembly, 279; *see also* Monzón, Cortes of
- Cortese, Gregorio, cardinal 1542–1548, bishop of Urbino (admin.) 1542–1548: 394, 415
- Cortile del Belvedere (in the Vatican), **880**
- Cortile del Maresciallo (in the Vatican), **10n**
- Cortile della Libreria Vaticana, **882**
- Cortile della Pigna, **881**
- Cortile di S. Damaso, **881**
- Cortona, bishops of, *see* Guglielmo Capponi 1505–1515, Silvio Passerini 1521–1529, Matteo de' Concini 1560–1562?, Girolamo Gaddi 1562–1572
- Corvino, Massimo, bishop of Isernia 1510–1522: 169, 184n
- Cos (Stanchio, Istanköy), island, 213
- Cosenza, 295n; archbishops of, *see* Francesco Borgia 1499–1511, Nicolò de' Gaddi (admin.) 1528–1535?, Taddeo de' Gaddi 1535–1561, Francesco Gonzaga (admin.) 1562–1565, Flavio Orsini (admin.) 1569–1573?
- Cosimo I de' Medici, son of Giovanni "delle Bande Nere" and Maria Salviati; duke of Florence from 1537, grand duke of Tuscany from 1569 (b. 1519, d. 1574), 427n, 433, 441, 463n, 470n, 506n, 508, 518, 521, 525, 535, 592f., 594n, 595, 597n, 599ff., 602f., 605, 606n, 619n, 620n, 648, 656, 662n, 664n, 667, 671, 674, 676f., 680, 683ff., 687, 709, 713n, 724, 726, 729, 730n, 735f., 738f., 743, 746, 781, 798n, 811, 814n, 818, 872n, 884, 936f., 994, 997, 1017, 1020, 1024, 1063n, 1077n, **1078**; wife of, *see* Eleonora of Toledo 1539–1562 (d. 1562)
- Cosimo II de' Medici, grand duke of Tuscany 1609–1621: 593n
- Cosimo de' Pazzi, bishop of Arezzo 1497–1508, archbishop of Florence 1508–1513: 114n
- Costa, George (Jorge), archbishop of Lisbon 1464–1500, cardinal 1476–1508: **10n, 16**
- Costa, la, site of a chapel to S. Maria della Vittoria, 60
- Costantino da Parenzo, Servite friar (*fl.* 1512), 117n, 118n
- Costanza, lookout north of Famagusta in Cyprus, 1005ff.
- Cotignola ("Codignola" in Sanudo), 264, 287
- Cotrone, 518n, **1047, 1050, 1081**, bishop of, *see* Andrea della Valle 1496–1508; 1522–1524
- "Council of Blood," held by the duke of Alva (1568), **918**
- Council of State (in Spain), *see* Consejo de Estado
- Council of Twelve (*Consiglio di Dodici*), Venetian body in Istanbul, **848, 849n**
- Councils, oecumenical, 58n, 92, 95, 108, 109n, 113, 120, 127, 147, 202, 288, 310, 353, 367, 378ff., 391, 395, 405ff., 406, 413ff., 416ff., 420f., 427, 430, 436, 440, 441n, 452ff., 460, 462f., 467, 478, 484, 494, 502, 543ff., **708, 710, 723, 734, 742, 768ff., 783ff., 797, 805f., 817, 820, 823f.**; *and see* Nicaea (325), Lyon (1274), Pisa (1409), Constance (1414–1418), Basel (1431–1449), Ferrara-Florence (1438–1439), Rome (1442), Pisa (1511–1512), Fifth Lateran (1512–1517), Trent (1545–1563), First Vatican (1869–1870), Second Vatican (1962–1965); *see also* Mantua
- Coucy-le-Château, 708n
- Counter-Reformation, 85, 142, 394, **789**
- Courtenay, French noble family, 450
- Coutances, 565n
- Cracow (Kraków), 252n, 255n, 256n, 313ff., 317, 319, 321, 341n, 358n, **567, 812**; bishop of, *see* Peter Tomicki 1523–1536; canon of, *see* Stanislaus Borek (Borgk) (*fl.* 1528); castellan of, *see* Christopher Szydłowiecki (*fl.* 1528)
- Crécy, 481n
- Crema, 55, 59, 104, 134, 279, 298n; podestà and captain of, *see* Andrea Foscolo (*ca.* 1521)
- Cremona, 55f., 59, 86n, 104, 128, 129n, 130n, 182n, 196n, 223ff., 239n, 257n, 272, 467, 643n, 886n; bishops of, *see* Ascanio Sforza (admin.) 1486–1505, Benedetto de' Accolti 1523–1549, Francesco Sfondrato 1549–1550, Federico de' Cesi (admin.) 1551–1560, Niccolò Sfondrati (Gregory XIV) 1560–1590
- Cremonese, 61, 129n
- Crescenzi, Marcello, bishop of Marsi 1534–1546, archbishop of Conza 1546–1552, cardinal 1542–1552: 509, 523, 537f., 540ff., 543ff., 546f., 548n, 777n
- Crépy (Crépy), peace of (1544), 473, 480f., 484ff., 490, 552
- Cresset, merchant of Montpellier seized by Turks *ca.* 1564: **837**
- Cretons, 191, 206n, 853n
- Crete, 23f., 25, 37, 193n, 200, 206f., 212ff., 215, 344, 445f., 529, 584, 586f., **700, 766, 843, 848, 850, 880, 891, 894, 907f., 913n, 919, 923, 927, 929, 930n, 932f., 941, 944f., 947, 958f., 965, 967, 970, 972, 975f., 978ff., 981, 984ff., 987f., 994n, 1005ff., 1008f., 1022f., 1045, 1065, 1083, 1093f., 1100f.**
- Crevalcore, 552
- Crevole, **604**
- Crimea, **700**
- Crispi (Crispo), governing family at Naxos, **899**
- Crispi (Crispo), Tiberio, bishop of Sessa Aurunca 1543–1546?, cardinal 1544–1566, archbishop of Amalfi (admin.) 1547–1561, bishop of Sutri and Nepi (admin.) 1565–1566: 509, 524, **611, 613, 725n, 737f., 752, 885**
- Crispo, Francesco III, duke of Naxos (d. 1511), 24, 25n; wife of, *see* Caterina Taddea Loredan (d. *ca.* 1510)
- Crispo, Giacomo IV, last Christian duke of Naxos 1564–1566: **850, 899n, 1072**
- Crispo, Giovanni IV, duke of Naxos to 1564: **755**
- Cristoforo da Canale, Venetian provveditore from 1555: 622n
- Cristoforo de' Frangipani (Frangipane, Frankopan), son of Bernardino, count of Segna *ca.* 1525 (d. 1527), 244ff., 261



- Cristoforo de Nassi, interpreter in 1557: **694**  
 Cristoforo del Monte, bishop of Bethlehem 1517–1525, of Calgi 1525–1550; 1556–1564, of Marseille 1550–1556, cardinal 1551–1564: 559, 597n, 613
- Croatia, 55, 74, 123, 147, 149n, 158, 159n, 163, 164n, 181, 192n, 216n, 217n, 244, 245n, 247n, 297n, 313, 320, 337, 354, 406n, 415n, 422, 433, 442, 444n, 455n, **608, 702n, 791, 854n, 861, 921**; duke of, *see* John Corvinus (b. 1473, d. 1504)
- Croatian language, 383  
 Croats, **921**  
 Croia (Krujë, Kruja in Albania), 88n  
 Cromer, Martin, historian of Poland (b. 1512, d. 1589), 412n  
 Crotone, **701**  
 Croydon, 237n  
*Cruciata*, crusading tax, 48, 49n, 67, 454  
*Crusade (cruciata, passagium generale, sancta expeditio)*, 14, 18, 34f., 37, 38n, 39, 42ff., 45f., 47ff., 50ff., 53ff., 56, 65ff., 70ff., 73, 74n, 75, 84ff., 87, 94, 99f., 110, 121, 130, 132, 138, 139n, 141f., 145f., 148n, 151, 153f., 155, 157f., 159, 160n, 162, 164, 165n, 166n, 167, 169f., 172ff., 175ff., 178ff., 181, 183f., 185n, 186f., 188f., 191ff., 194, 195n, 216ff., 231f., 234, 237f., 256, 288, 328, 335f., 341, 344n, 347, 350n, 351, 396, 412, 420, 426n, 430, 437, 441, 445, 447, 448n, 452n, 480, 556, 624, 665, 770, 784, 847, 962, 977, **1014, 1069, 1095**; First (1096–1099), 85; Fourth (1202–1204), 93, **1103**
- Crusaders, 81n, 157, 163, 359, **1076**  
*Crusada*, crusading indulgence, 85, 141, 162, 243, 327, 341, 784n, 823f., 846, 847n, **916, 959ff., 962, 969, 977, 1014, 1078**
- Csanád, 570ff., **574**, bishops of, *see* George Martinuzzi 1536–1539, Andrea Duditio Sbardellati 1563
- Cuenca, bishop of, *see* Alessandro Cesarini (admin.) 1538–1542  
 Culum, bishop of, *see* Stanislaus Hosius 1549–1551  
*Cum ad tollenda religionis*, bull of Julius III (1550), 537n, 538  
*Cum inchoatam*, bull of Julius II (1512), 126n  
*Cum supremus coeli*, bull of Clement VII (1529), 335  
*Cum superiori anno*, bull of Clement VII (1529), 350n  
*Cum tam divino*, bull of Julius II (1506), 138n  
 Cuneo, 160  
 Curzola (Korčula), 60, 299n, 409, **923, 948, 953**  
 Curzolari (Echinades, Ekhinadhes), 1052f., 1060n  
 Cusano, Galeazzo, imperial agent in Rome in 1563: 810n  
 Cyclades, 182  
 Cyprian, church father (b. ca. 200, d. 258), **794**  
 Cypriotes, 32, 46, **758, 926f., 990, 995n, 1017, 1035n, 1042f., 1044n**
- Cyprus, 19f., 25f., 30n, 32, 45f., 55, 84, 133, 184, 193n, 199f., 206n, 207, 213n, 308n, 338, 340, 344, 356n, 369n, 409, 449n, 468, 476, 529, 530n, 531, 536, **610, 662, 700, 755ff., 758, 766, 836, 842f., 848, 850f., 880, 891, 892n, 893f., 907f., 913n, 919, 923, 924n, 925ff., 928ff., 931ff., 934ff., 937ff., 941, 943ff., 946ff., 949n, 951ff., 954, 958, 960, 962ff., 965, 970ff., 973n, 974ff., 977f., 980f., 983ff., 986ff., 990ff., 994n, 996f., 999, 1000n, 1004ff., 1007ff., 1010, 1011n, 1014, 1017f., 1020n, 1027, 1030, 1032n, 1034n, 1036f., 1041n, 1042f., 1051, 1063, 1065, 1068f., 1086, 1091, 1093f.; kings of, *see* Amaury de Lusignan 1197–1205, James II de Lusignan 1464–1473; rulers of, *see* Guy de Lusignan 1192–1194, Amaury de Lusignan 1194–1197, Peter I of Lusignan 1359–1369; war of (1570–1571), **849, 908, 909n, 928n, 932, 937, 945n, 950, 953–1043, 1057n, 1089n, 1096, 1099n****
- Czech language, 772n, **795**  
 Czechs (Bohemians and Moravians), 177f., 248n
- Czernowicz, Michael, imperial ambassador in Istanbul in 1564–1565: 844f., **898**
- Dalmatia (Illyricum, Illyria), 37, 45, 51, 55, 59n, 60, 70, 72, 88, 123, 147, 149n, 159n, 164n, 165, 177, 192n, 193n, 199n, 201, 217, 224, 236n, 245n, 278f., 301, 320, 354, 378n, 383, 385, 402, 421ff., 424, 428, 438ff., 442, 451, 468, 471n, 473, 474n, 483n, 532, 533n, 591n, 668, 770, 771n, 790, 843, 848, 850, 903, 907, 913, 921, 923, 929, 932, 937n, 940f., 948, 950, 953, 955, 958f., 960n, 961, 964, 968, 970, 974, 987, 989, 991, 994n, 1000n, 1001f., 1004n, 1014, 1018f., 1022f., **1045, 1071, 1073f., 1091f., 1093ff., 1100, 1103n**
- Dalmatians, **790**  
 Damala, 234  
 Damascus (Dimashq), 19ff., 25ff., 30n, 31, 33, 38, 71n, 99, 343, **864**  
 Dami, Ottaviano, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n  
 Damiano da Bergamo, Fra (Damiano Zambelli); woodworker (d. 1549), 507n  
 Damietta, 21, 33  
 Danadella, Famagustan host of Turkish hostages after siege of 1571: 1037n  
 Dandino, Girolamo, bishop of Caserta 1544–1546, of Imola 1546–1552; cardinal 1551–1559: 538n, 549f., 552, 553n, 559, 596f., **610, 613, 681, 722, 730, 732**
- Dandolo, Marco, rector of Brescia (in 1509), 59n; brother-in-law of Gasparo Contarini ca. 1521: 298n, 338n  
 Dandolo, Matteo, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1549, to the Council of Trent in 1562: 511, 516n, 517ff., 526n, 528, 530f., 533, 587, 783f., **811, 824n**
- Dandolo, Niccolò, lieutenant and defender of Nicosia (d. 1570), **976, 991, 995f.**
- Danes, 788n  
 Danès, Pierre, bishop of Lavaur 1557–1577: **794**  
 Dante Alighieri, Italian poet (d. 1321), 454  
 Dantiscus, John, Polish envoy to the imperial court in 1530: 335f., 341n  
 Danube river, 53, 177, 248, 324, 326n, 340, 357, 361n, 390, 436, 442, 456n, 472, 478f., **570, 572f., 578, 584, 697n, 845**
- D' Aramon, Baron, *see* Gabriel de Luetz  
 Dardanelles (Hellespont, straits of Gallipoli), 172, 177, 212n, **347, 700, 892, 981, 1001, 1065, 1101**
- Dario, Giovanni, Venetian envoy to Istanbul (d. 1494), 607n  
 Dataria, office in the Roman Curia, 709f., **729, 825f., 900**  
 Dauphiné, 370, **916**
- Daux, **838**, bishop of, *see* François de Noailles 1556–1562?  
 Debreccen, **566**  
*Decret romanum pontificum*, bull of Paul III (1537), 420  
 Decio, Filippo, canon lawyer (b. 1454, d. ca. 1535), 106  
*Defterdar*, Ottoman financial official, **590, 1006**
- Delfino, Giovanni (Zuan Dolfin), bishop of Torcello 1563–1579, of Brescia 1579–1584: **1064**
- Delfino (Dolfin), Zaccaria, bishop of Lesina (Hvar) 1553–1574; cardinal 1565–1584: **632, 633n, 664n, 714, 727f., 792, 798n, 801, 803, 816, 817n, 824n, 826f., 829, 860n, 1027n**
- Della Rovere, Ligurian family, 12n, 142, 167n, 402, *and see* Julius II (Giuliano della Rovere)
- Delos, 182  
 Demotica, 123  
 Denmark, 417, 769, 773n, **775, 852**; king of, *see* John 1481–1513
- Deva, castellan of, **578**

- Dévai, Matthias (Mátyás), Hungarian reformer (b. ca. 1500, d. 1545), 565f.
- Dia (Standia), 1101
- Diana, 182
- Diane de Poitiers, daughter of Jean de Poitiers, count of S. Vallier; mistress of Henry II of France (b. 1499, d. 1566), 649
- Diane de Valois or Diane de France, natural daughter of Henry II and Filippa Duc; wife of Orazio Farnese (1558) and François de Montmorency (1559–1579) (b. 1538, d. 1619), 504n, 520, 548
- Didaco da Sarava, supposed author of Peter Stern's account of the siege of Vienna in 1529: 326n
- Diedo, Giacomo, author of an account of the 1570 siege of Nicosia (d. 1748), 995n
- Diedo, Girolamo, Venetian official at Corfu; contemporary authority on the battle of Lepanto (fl. 1571), 1054n
- Diego de Alaba y Esquivel, bishop of Astorga 1543–1548, of Avila 1548–1558, of Cordova 1558–1562: 498
- Diego de Guzmán de Silva, Spanish ambassador to Genoa in 1570, to Venice in 1571: 957, 1012, 1019, 1071f., 1076n, 1090
- Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Spanish statesman and man of letters (b. 1503, d. 1575), 470, 487ff., 490, 493, 495, 505, 506f., 510n, 513n, 517f., 521, 523, 529, 534, 548ff., 551, 560, 592ff., 744n, 946n
- Dietrich, Hans, of Pilseningen, envoy of Duke Christopher of Württemberg to the Council of Trent in 1551: 542f.
- Dietrich, Wolf, lord of Hohenems (d. 1536), 743; wife of, *see* Chiara de' Medici
- Dietrichstein, baron von, ambassador of Maximilian II to Philip II ca. 1567, *see* Adam von Dietrichstein
- Dijon, 837
- Diocletian, Baths of (in Rome), 881
- Dionisio de Zanettini, "il Grechetto," critic of Turks (fl. 1562), 685n, 795
- Dirutia, Sigismondo Fedrio, preacher at the Council of Trent in 1546 and 1551: 538
- Dispensations, 710, 796, 801f., 826
- Diyar-Bakr (Amida, Diyarbakir), 152, 590; ruler of, *see* Uzun Hasan 1466–1478
- Djakovo, bishop of, *see* Joseph Strossmayer 1849–1905
- Dobó, Stephen, Hungarian soldier (d. 1572), 585
- Docray, (Sir) Thomas, grand prior of the Hospitallers for England in 1521: 203
- Dodecanese, 215, 984
- Dodieu de Vély, Claude, French envoy to the Hapsburgs in 1536: 399, 400n
- Dolera, Clemente, general of the Minorites, cardinal 1557–1568, bishop of Foligno 1560–1568: 724, 729f., 733, 882, 885n, 884f.
- Dolfin, Alvise, Venetian to help with expedition to Candia in 1571: 1002n
- Dolfin, Andrea, son-in-law and correspondent of Tommaso Mocenigo in 1530: 342
- Dolfina, ship used for soldiers of Galeazzo Farnese in 1571: 1022n, 1046
- Döllinger, Johannes Joseph Ignaz von, historian (b. 1799, d. 1890), 486n, 827
- Dolu, Jean, French agent in Istanbul (d. 1561), 592n, 765n, 767, 829ff., 832, 856, 879
- Domenico, chaplain of S. Vigilio (in Trent) ca. 1545: 492
- Domenico da Salò, sculptor of the late 16th century, 1059
- Domenico della Rovere, nephew of Sixtus IV, cardinal 1478–1501, archbishop of Tarentaise 1479–1482, bishop of Turin 1482–1501: 5n
- Domine quo vadis, church (in Rome), 598
- Dominicans, 188, 190n, 631, 632n, 718f., 755, 757, 768n, 776, 927n, 945n; general of, *see* Tommaso de Vio of Gaeta (Cajetan) from 1508; and *see* Francesco da Ravenna, Nicholas Schönberg, Girolamo Savonarola, Tommaso Scotti; *see also* S. Maria sopra Minerva
- Don Garzia, son of Antonio de Montalvo, 593n
- Donada, Venetian ship (ca. 1554), 608f.
- Donado, Gianbattista, Venetian noble (fl. 1554), 608
- Donado (Donato, Donà), Leonardo, Venetian ambassador to Spain 1570–1573, doge 1606–1612: 946n, 953f., 957, 961, 962n, 966f., 972, 983, 996ff., 999, 1000n, 1004, 1008, 1011ff., 1018f., 1021, 1022n, 1048, 1062n, 1064, 1068, 1070, 1077, 1079ff., 1092f., 1094n, 1100
- Donado, Niccolò, captain of relief force for Famagusta in 1571: 1007n
- Donado, Zuan, Venetian *savio de terraferma* in 1570: 989n
- Donata, Venetian galley (ca. 1571), 1004
- Donati, Francesco, silk merchant in Venice in 1532: 365n
- Donato (Donà), Francesco, Venetian doge 1545–1553: 266f., 476, 521, 525n, 530n, 534n, 550n, 556
- Donato, Hieronimo (Girolamo) Venetian envoy to Rome 1505–1511: 36, 39, 64ff., 67f., 69n, 70n, 72ff., 75f., 80f., 82n, 86n, 91n, 96n, 148n
- Donino (Donini), Marc' Antonio, Venetian notary and envoy in 1557: 694, 695n
- Doria, Andrea, Genoese admiral (b. 1468, d. 1560), 212n, 276, 282, 284, 295f., 300, 303, 305, 307, 309f., 321, 328, 329n, 366f., 371, 377, 384n, 386, 392, 395n, 423, 426f., 429, 433n, 445n, 446, 447n, 469n, 471, 472n, 503, 532, 533n, 534ff., 554, 582f., 587, 623, 758, 760, 860, 894
- Doria, Antonio, naval officer in the service of the Hapsburgs in the 1550s: 539, 554; owner of galleys under Juan de la Cerda ca. 1560: 758
- Doria, Antonio, signatory of a letter from Zante in 1532: 367n
- Doria, Filippino, nephew of Andrea (fl. 1528), 295ff., 303f.
- Doria, Giannandrea, grandnephew of Andrea; admiral and ruler of Melé (b. 1539, d. 1606), 758ff., 761f., 869, 871f., 875, 890, 903, 915n, 940, 957, 959, 961f., 965ff., 969, 971ff., 975n, 977ff., 980ff., 983ff., 986n, 988, 990, 992ff., 995ff., 998, 1021, 1023, 1046ff., 1050f., 1054, 1057f., 1064, 1069, 1079, 1081, 1083, 1086
- Doria, Giannettino, nephew of Andrea (d. 1547), 532
- Doria, Girolamo, cardinal 1529–1558, archbishop of Tarragona (admin.) 1533–7, bishop of Noli (admin.) 1534–1549: 506, 519
- Doria, Pagano, brother of Giannandrea; marquis of Torriglia (d. 1574), 973n, 1048, 1069n
- Doria, Scipione, son of Antonio; galley commander under Juan de la Cerda ca. 1560: 758
- Dotis, *see* Tata
- Dover, 193n
- Dovizi da Bibbiena, Bernardo, cardinal 1513–1521: 101, 104, 109, 112n, 114f., 120n, 142n, 145, 160, 161n, 183, 186n, 187, 188n
- Dovizi da Bibbiena, Pietro, brother of Bernardo (fl. 1512), 120n, 133
- D'Oysel de Villeparisis, French ambassador to Rome in 1566: 888f.
- Dozza, George (György), leader of the Kuruczok in Hungary (d. 1514), 157n
- Dragonera, 1082
- Dragut (Turghud Ali Pasha), Barbary pirate (d. 1565), 501n, 532ff., 535f., 555, 583, 587ff., 606f., 622, 623n, 758ff., 761ff., 764f., 811, 831, 835, 841ff., 852ff., 855ff., 858, 860f., 864

- Drugut Point (Hermitage of S. Maria), at Malta, **854, 857**
- Drasković, Georg, bishop of Fünfkirchen 1560–1564?, of Zagreb 1564–1578, of Győr 1578–1587, archbishop of Kalocsa 1582–1587, cardinal 1585–1587: 778f., 791f., 804n, **811, 812n, 813, 821, 824n**
- Drava river, 249, 325n, 433, 442
- Dresden, 405n, 435n
- Dreux, battle of (1562), 795f.
- Drohojowski, John, bishop of Caminiec 1545–1546, of Chelm 1546–1551, of Włocławek 1551–1557: 628n
- Drzewicki, Matthias, bishop of Przemysl 1504–1513, of Włocławek 1513–1531, archbishop of Gniezno 1531–1535: 317, 318n
- Duditio (Dudic) Sbardellati, Andrea, bishop of Knin 1562–1563, of Caenad in 1563, of Fünfkirchen 1565–1573: **791**
- Dudum universas Christi fideles*, bulls of Leo X (1518), 174n, 188n
- Dugabre, Dominique, French diplomat; bishop of Lodève 1547–1558: **673, 674n, 684, 686n, 692ff., 695n, 696**
- Dulcigno (Ulcinj), 17, 88, 474, 849n, **1002, 1025ff., 1069**
- Duodo, Andrea, Venetian provviditore of the fleet in 1552: 588n
- Duodo, Francesco, commander in the expedition of 1570 and at Lepanto: **982, 984n, 1054, 1057, 1072**
- Duprat, Antoine, chancellor of France 1515–1535, archbishop of Sens 1525–1535, cardinal 1527–1535, bishop of Albi (admin.) 1528–1535, of Meaux (admin.) 1534–1535: 183n, 190, 193, 268n, 297, 322, 351
- Durante de' Durante, bishop of Aghero and Ottana 1538–1541, of Cassano 1541–1551, cardinal 1544–1558, bishop of Brescia (admin.) 1551–1557?: 523, 610n, 611n, **614, 996, 1013**
- Durazzo (Durrës), 16, 30, 177, 182n, 448n, **903, 967, 987, 996, 1013**
- Durham, 96n
- Dutch, **920, 1098, 1104**; see also *Netherlanders*
- Dysma, cross of, **757**
- East Indies, 348, **926**
- Eboli, **644**
- Echinades, see *Curzolari*
- Eck, Johann Mayer von, Catholic theologian (b. 1486, d. 1543), 455
- Edward VI, son of Henry VIII and Jane Seymour; king of England 1547–1553: **597**
- Egidio da Viterbo, Augustinian friar, see Egidio Canisio
- Egmont, count of, see Lamoral (b. 1522, d. 1568)
- Egypt, 1, 2n, 18ff., 21ff., 26n, 27ff., 33, 38n, 54, 64, 71, 84, 97n, 99, 133, 141, 146, 151, 164f., 166n, 170, 172n, 174, 175n, 176f., 179, 180n, 181, 184n, 185, 198, 200, 205n, 207n, 210, 214, 224, 240n, 342f., 344n, 356n, 532, **708, 759n, 768n, 833, 842, 907, 929, 937, 947**; soldans of, see *Ka'itbey* 1468–1496, Al-Ashraf Kansūh al-Ghūrī 1500–1516, Tumanbey 1516–1517; and see Ptolemy II Philadelphus 285 B.C.–246 B.C.
- Egyptians, 18, 46, 99, 165n
- Ehrenberg Pass, 547
- Ehes, Stephan, historian (b. 1855, d. 1926), **827**
- Eichstätt, **810**; bishop of, see Martin Schaumberg 1560–1590
- "Ein'facht Chiaus," Ottoman envoy to Venice in 1525: 234n
- Eins'fuch Burg ist unser Gott*, hymn of Martin Luther, 366n
- Eisenach, 298n
- El Pardo, **1079**
- Elba, 593n, 623f., **630, 635, 692n**
- Elbe river, 484n, 500n, 502
- Eleanor, daughter of Ferdinand I and Anna of Bohemia; wife of Guglielmo Gonzaga from 1561 (b. 1534, d. 1594), **801**
- Eleonora, daughter of Gian Francesco II Gonzaga and Isabella d' Este; wife of Francesco Maria della Rovere to 1538 (d. 1570), 273n
- Eleonora, daughter of Philip the Handsome and Joanna ("the Mad") of Castile; wife of Manuel I of Portugal 1519–1521, of Francis I of France 1530–1547 (b. 1498, d. 1558), 259n, 328, 413n
- Eleonora of Toledo, daughter of Pedro; wife of Cosimo I de' Medici 1539–1562 (d. 1562), 595n
- Eliba, **1018**
- Elio, Antonio, bishop of Pola 1548–1558?, patriarch of Jerusalem 1558–1576?: 633n, **783, 791**
- Elizabeth I, daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn; queen of England from 1558 (b. 1533, d. 1603), 766n, **773, 963, 1097**
- Elizabeth, daughter of Henry II and Catherine de' Medici; wife of Philip II from 1559 (b. 1545, d. 1568), **708, 838, 888, 938**
- Elizabeth, daughter of Maximilian II and Maria, daughter of Charles V; wife of Charles IX from 1570 (b. 1554, d. 1592), **922, 938**
- Embrun, archbishops of, see *François de Tournon* 1518–1526, Robert de Lenoncourt 1556–1560?
- Emden, 1103n
- Emmanuel Philibert, son of Charles III and Beatrice of Portugal; duke of Savoy from 1553 (b. 1528, d. 1580), 708f., **809, 837, 915, 944f., 1063n; wife of, see *Marguerite*, daughter of Francis I (b. 1523, d. 1574)**
- Emo, Pietro, searches for Turkish armada in 1570: **986, 987n**
- Ems, 443n
- England, 29, 44, 47ff., 50, 54f., 59n, 69, 74n, 76f., 82n, 87, 96n, 100, 114, 125, 150, 156, 175, 177, 183, 185n, 191, 195, 198, 206n, 210, 216, 222, 230, 232f., 236n, 237, 240f., 244n, 248, 249n, 254, 255n, 256, 258ff., 261n, 265, 272, 289, 292, 299, 313, 320f., 329n, 348, 349n, 359n, 379, 401, 407n, 417, 423, 438n, 449n, 456n, 462n, 511, 514, 541n, 557, 563, 565, 597, 603, 610n, **618, 626n, 628, 632f., 644f., 659, 676, 681, 683n, 700n, 714, 755, 769, 828, 833, 847, 909, 918, 1079, 1096n, 1098**; church of, 415; Hospitallers from, 207, **870**; lord chancellor of, see *Thomas Wolsey* 1515–1529; rulers of, see *Richard I* 1189–1199, *Henry VII* 1485–1509, *Henry VIII* 1509–1547, *Edward VI* 1547–1553, *Mary* 1553–1558; *Elizabeth I* 1558–1603
- English, 53, 74, 76, 101, 106n, 120, 122n, 132n, 135, 147, 150n, 155n, 178, 227, 292, 300, 482, 556, 597n, 700n, **705, 788n, 910n, 913, 1079, 1097f., 1104**; Channel, 120, 949n
- English language, 91n, **795**
- Enriquez, Maria, wife of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alva, **689**
- Enzesfeld, 366
- Epirus, 147, **584, 862, 1102**
- Episkopij, Bay of, on Cyprus, **1043**
- Érard de la Marck, bishop of Liège 1506–1530?, of Chartres 1507–1525?, archbishop of Valencia (admin.) 1520–1538, cardinal 1520–1538: 388
- Erasmus, Desiderius, Dutch humanist (b. ca. 1466, d. 1536), 49n, 219n, 236n, 491, **626**
- Erasmus of Nuremberg, envoy of Archduke Ferdinand to Venice ca. 1525: 237
- Ercole II d' Este, son of Alfonso I d' Este and Lucrezia Borgia; duke of Ferrara 1534–1559: 287, 288n, 302, 478n, 502, 518, 525n, 526n, 533f., 549, 551ff., 558, 560, 562, **579,**

- 581f., 596, 602, 603n, 611f., 614, 628, 636f., 642, 643n, 648, 657, 676f., 710, 713n, 745n; wife of, *see* Renée, daughter of Louis XII 1528–1559 (d. 1575)
- Ercole della Penna, brother-in-law of Ascanio della Corgna (*f.* 1554), 600
- Eregli (Eregli), 590
- Eremitani, convent of, in Famagusta, 996n
- Erivan (Yerevan), 590
- Erizzo, Antonio, Venetian bailie in Istanbul *ca.* 1554: 606n, 607n, 647n, 661, 694f.
- Erlau (Eger), 301n, 329n, 338, 342, 436, 585, 845f., 1102: bishops of, *see* Ippolito d'Este 1497–1520, Ladislás Szalkai 1523–1524, Paulus de Varda 1526–1527, Thomas Zalaházy 1529–1537, Francesco de' Frangipani 1539–1543, Anton Verantius 1560–1570?
- Ernst, son of Henry and Margaret of Savoy; duke of Lüneburg (jointly with his brothers to 1527; alone 1527–1536; with his brother Franz 1536–1538; alone from 1539 [b. 1497, d. 1546]), 417
- Ernst, son of Maximilian II and Maria, daughter of Charles V; governor of Hungary from 1578, regent of Austria from 1590, governor-general of the Low Countries 1594–1595 (b. 1553, d. 1595), 1020n, 1023, 1024n, 1087
- Erzurum (Theodosiopolis), 503, 590f.
- Escorial, 969, 972, 973n, 1011n, 1017
- Esma, daughter of Selim II; wife of Mehmed Sokolli (*f.* 1564), 837, 838n
- Espinosa, Diego, chief minister of Philip II, cardinal 1568–1572, bishop of Sigüenza 1568–1572: 957, 966, 1000n
- Esquiroz (near Pampeluna), 396
- Esseg (Eszék, Osijek), 249, 362, 364, 433
- Esslingen, 543
- Ethiopia, 768n, 1063n; emperor of, *see* Menna (*f.* 1561)
- Étienne de Lusignan, Dominican historian (b. 1537, d. 1590), 945n, 995n
- Etsi ad amplianda*, bull of Leo X (1517), 174n
- Ettenius, Cornelius, secretary of Peter van der Vorst and author of memoirs in 1536: 416, 417n, 418n
- Euboea, *see* Negroponte
- Eugene, prince of Savoy (b. 1663, d. 1736), 1101n, 1102, 1104
- Eugenius IV (Gabriele Condulmer), nephew of Gregory XII: bishop of Siena 1407–1408, cardinal 1408–1431, pope 1431–1447: 281, 825
- Euphrates river, 25, 503, 1042
- Eustache du Bellay, bishop of Paris 1551–1564?: 778n, 808f.
- Evangelismos, Orthodox church (at Rhodes), 208n
- Évora, archbishop of, *see* Henry of Portugal 1540–1564; 1574–1578 (admin.)
- Évreux, 565n
- Excusado*, 916, 962, 969, 1014, 1078
- Existimavimus haud futurum*, bull of Clement VII (1531), 350n, 354
- Exsequatur*, 912, 940, 969
- Fabri, Felix, Dominican pilgrim and author of the *Evagatorium* (d. 1502), 757f.
- Fabri (Faber), Johann, bishop of Vienna 1530–1539? (d. 1541), 260, 414f., 422, 565
- Fabrizio, 274n
- Fabrizio del Carretto, grand master of the Hospitallers 1513–1521: 152n, 172, 181, 187n, 194
- Fabrizio di Sanguine, pro-Spanish adherent of the Carafeschi in 1559: 742, 746
- Facchinetti, Giannantonio, *see* Innocent IX
- Fadrique, illegitimate son of García de Toledo; killed at the siege of Malta, 1565: 867
- Faenza, 3n, 9, 12f., 16n, 33, 38f., 44, 55ff., 58, 62, 67, 108, 109n, 183n, 264, 292; bishop of, *see* Rodolfo Pio di Carpi 1528–1544?
- Falcetta, Egidio, bishop of Caorle 1542–1563, of Bertinoro 1563–1564: 794
- Falchetti, Fabrizio, author of an account of the siege of Nicosia in 1570: 995n
- Falier, Giovanni, author of letters concerning the war of Cyprus: 992n
- Falier, Marco, chief financial officer of Sebastiano Venier *ca.* 1571: 1026
- Famagusta, 25, 33, 45f., 700, 756, 822, 907ff., 926ff., 934f., 937, 939, 941ff., 945ff., 948, 952, 965, 967, 976, 979, 984ff., 987ff., 990f., 992n, 994n, 995n, 996, 999, 1000n, 1001f., 1004ff., 1007, 1013f., 1017ff., 1027ff., 1030, 1031n, 1032ff., 1035ff., 1038ff., 1041ff., 1044n, 1051, 1052n, 1064, 1094, 1095n, 1096; bishops of, *see* Marco Corner 1503–1504, Girolamo Ragazzoni 1561–1591?; captains of, *see* Pietro Lion (ca. 1510), Marco Michiel (in 1568), Marc' Antonio Bragadin (in 1570); viscounts of, *see* Geronimo Greghetto (ca. 1568), Pietro Valerio (ca. 1570–1571)
- Famagusta Bay, 1006
- Famagustans, 935, 1006f., 1031, 1033ff., 1036f., 1039ff., 1042f.
- Famine, 34, 36, 276n, 277, 282, 292, 295n, 328n, 375, 604, 664, 675, 926, 942
- Fano, 12, 73, 292, 539n; bishops of, *see* Gregorio Gheri 1518–1526?, Pietro Bertano 1537–1558?, Ippolito Capilupi 1560–1567?
- Fantini, Girolamo, author of *avvisi* from Rome in 1535: 391n
- Fantuccio (Fantuzzi), Federigo, envoy of Julius III to Siena *ca.* 1553: 597, 611f.
- Fanzino, *see* Sigismondo della Torre
- Farinato, Paolo, painter (d. 1606), 809n
- Farnese, Alessandro, cardinal, *see* Paul III
- Farnese, Alessandro, son of Ottavio and Margaret of Parma; governor-general of the Netherlands from 1578, duke of Parma and Piacenza from 1586 (b. 1545, d. 1592), 918, 920, 1023f., 1061, 1085
- Farnese, Alessandro, son of Pier Luigi and Girolama Orsini; cardinal 1534–1589, archbishop of Avignon (admin.) 1535–1551, of Monreale (admin.) 1536–1537; bishop of Massa Maritima (admin.) 1538–1547?, bishop of Viseu (admin.) 1547–1552?: 400, 403, 404n, 418n, 434ff., 437, 442ff., 446n, 447, 448n, 450n, 452, 457n, 462f., 464n, 467, 473n, 474n, 478n, 480n, 482n, 484n, 487f., 490, 492n, 493, 498, 499n, 500, 502, 504n, 506f., 509n, 511, 513, 515, 516n, 517n, 518, 520ff., 523f., 548f., 552, 560, 563, 593f., 596n, 610n, 612, 614, 617ff., 620f., 638, 640f., 661n, 716, 721n, 723ff., 727ff., 730f., 733ff., 736f., 743, 752f., 882, 883n, 884f., 912, 918, 1078
- Farnese, Costanza, daughter of Alessandro (Paul III); wife of Bosio II Sforza (widowed 1535), 403, 495n, 533, 634
- Farnese, Galeazzo, employer of soldiers for the Holy League in 1571: 1022n
- Farnese, Girolama, sister of Alessandro and Giulia; wife of Puccio Pucci and Count Giuliano dell' Anguillara (d. 1504), 394n
- Farnese, Giulia, sister of Alessandro (Paul III); mistress of Alexander VI (d. 1524), 394n
- Farnese, Orazio, son of Pier Luigi and Girolama Orsini; duke of Castro from 1549 (d. 1553), 504n, 505, 520, 548, 552f., 563, 596n; wife of, *see* Diane de Valois, daughter of Henry II of France
- Farnese, Ottavio, son of Pier Luigi and Girolama Orsini; duke of Parma from 1547 (b. 1524, d. 1586), 400, 402, 467,

- 482, 503n, 504n, 506, 507n, 520f., 526ff., 539n, 548ff., 551ff., 554, 557f., 560f., 563, 594, 628, 637, 640, 651, 659, 661, 664n, 676, 711, 912n, 918, 1023, 1063n; wife of, *see* Margaret, natural daughter of Charles V (b. 1522, d. 1586)
- Farnese, Pier Luigi, son of Alessandro (Paul III); duke of Parma from 1545 (b. 1503, d. 1547), 400, 403, 412, 418n, 440, 467, 500, 504n, 527, 548, 557, 724n, 739; wife of, *see* Girolama Orsini 1519–1547 (d. 1570)
- Farnese, Ranuccio, archbishop of Naples (admin.) 1544–1549, cardinal 1545–1565, archbishop of Ravenna 1549–1564; bishop of Bologna (admin.) 1564–1565: 507, 516, 520f., 523, 548f., 552, 563, 596n, 611ff., 619f., 638, 711, 723f., 737f., 743, 883n, 885n
- Farnese, Vittoria, daughter of Pier Luigi and Girolama Orsini; wife of Guidobaldo II della Rovere (d. 1602), 403n
- Faro di Messina (in Sicily), 890
- Faro di S. Eufemia, 667
- Fata, Simone, secretary of Zaccaria Delfino in 1564: 827
- Fati, later called Catherine, Turkish girl seized ca. 1557: 836ff., 839ff.
- Fausto, galleon used in the expedition of 1570: 982, 984n
- Faventino, 264n
- Favignana, 871
- Feasts, 499, 823
- Fedeli, Fedel, author of an account of the 1570–1571 war against the Turks: 1057n
- Federico de' Cesi, bishop of Todi 1523–1545; cardinal 1544–1565, bishop of Cremona (admin.) 1551–1560: 511f., 513n, 613, 723, 728f., 732ff., 735, 740, 748, 755, 883n
- Federico of Gorizia, *see* Federico Strassoldo
- Federigo d' Aragona, son of Ferrante I d' Aragona and Isabella di Chiaromonte; prince of Altamura (to 1496), king of Naples (1496) 1497–1501 (d. 1504), 15n, 16n
- Federigo di Sanserivino, son of Roberto; cardinal 1489–1516: 95, 98, 99n, 105f., 111, 113f., 118, 135n, 136, 143n, 145, 146n, 149, 150n
- Felice, wife of Marc' Antonio Colonna (*f.* 1556), 646, 745
- Felice della Rovere, daughter of Julius II; wife of Gian Giordano Orsini (*f.* 1512), 119n, 139n
- Felipe de Paredes (Peretz), Catalan agent in Alexandria for Spain, France, and Naples (*f.* 1510), 23f., 26f.
- Feltr, 487; bishops of, *see* Lorenzo Campeggio 1512–1520, Tommaso Campeggio 1520–1546
- Fen, Onorato, man-at-arms at Castel Nuovo in 1528: 297n
- Ferodosiya, *see* Caffa
- Feramosca (Fieramosca), Cesare, imperial officer (d. 1528), 258f., 260n, 262f., 296
- Ferdinand I, son of Philip the Handsome and Joanna ("the Mad") of Castile; archduke of Austria 1521, king of Bohemia and Hungary 1526, king of the Romans 1551, emperor 1558–1564: 142n, 189, 190n, 216n, 219, 235, 236n, 237, 239, 244, 246n, 248ff., 251n, 252f., 258, 260f., 278n, 291, 292n, 300f., 310, 312ff., 315ff., 318ff., 322ff., 326n, 327, 328n, 329, 332ff., 335, 336n, 337n, 340f., 343n, 344n, 346, 347n, 348ff., 351, 354f., 357f., 360ff., 363f., 366n, 367n, 369ff., 372ff., 375f., 378ff., 381ff., 384ff., 387ff., 390f., 399, 403ff., 406, 412, 414n, 415, 416n, 420ff., 431n, 432, 433n, 434f., 437, 440, 442ff., 447, 452, 455ff., 458ff., 461, 463ff., 466, 469n, 471ff., 476ff., 479f., 482ff., 485ff., 489ff., 492f., 503f., 525n, 530, 542, 547, 549, 555f., 560, 561n, 563, 565ff., 568ff., 571ff., 574ff., 577ff., 580ff., 584, 585n, 589, 591, 596, 603n, 608f., 622, 627f., 630, 632f., 646, 651n, 658, 662, 664n, 665, 689f., 696ff., 699f., 705, 707f., 714f., 717f., 726, 755, 760, 766, 769, 771f., 773n, 774f., 777ff., 790ff., 796ff., 799ff., 802ff., 805n, 806, 808n, 810, 812n, 813f., 816f., 821n, 827, 829, 832ff., 835, 842ff., 846n, 922, 955; wife of, *see* Anna, daughter of Ladislas, king of Bohemia and Hungary 1521–1547
- Ferdinand II, son of John II of Aragon; king (V) of Castile and León 1474–1504, of Aragon-Catalonia and Sicily (1469) 1479–1504, of Spain and Naples 1504–1516: 2, 6, 9, 13ff., 16n, 18, 34f., 38ff., 41f., 47n, 49, 54f., 59, 63, 65ff., 69f., 76f., 79n, 80n, 85ff., 88, 90, 95ff., 100f., 103f., 105n, 109, 112n, 116, 120, 122f., 124n, 126, 130ff., 133, 135f., 141, 143ff., 152, 159, 162, 190, 193, 283, 378, 398; wives of, *see* Isabella of Castile 1469–1504, Germaine de Foix 1506–1516 (d. 1536)
- Ferdinand, son of Bernardino de' Frangipani (*f.* 1525), 245
- Ferdinand, son of Ferdinand I and Anna of Bohemia; archduke of Austria (b. 1529, d. 1595), 844, 921, 1063n
- Ferdinando (Fernando) de Alarcón, imperial captain (b. 1466, d. 1540), 220, 282n, 290f.
- Ferdinando de' Medici, son of Cosimo I; cardinal 1563–(re-signed) 1588: 798n, 1017n
- Ferentino, 660; bishop of, *see* Sebastiano Pighino 1548–1550
- Ferhad Agha, correspondent of Piali Pasha in 1560: 762n
- Ferhad Pasha, brother-in-law of Suleiman I (d. 1524), 233
- Fermo, 292, 1097n; bishops of, *see* Francisco Remolino 1504–1518, Giovanni Salvati 1518–1518, Niccolò de' Maddi 1521–1544?
- Fernández de Córdoba, Gonzalo, duke of Sessa (d. 1578), 1079, 1086
- Fernández Vigil de Quiñones, Claudio, count of Luna; Spanish ambassador to the Council of Trent in 1563: 777n, 804ff., 807ff., 810, 812f., 816f., 819ff., 823
- Fernando, nephew of Melchor de Robles; killed at the siege of Malta 1565: 866
- Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, third duke of Alba (b. 1508, d. 1582), Spanish soldier, 120, 413, 651ff., 656ff., 659f., 662ff., 665ff., 668ff., 671ff., 674ff., 677ff., 680, 682ff., 685ff., 688f., 691, 694, 698, 712, 714, 838, 871, 911, 913ff., 916ff., 919f., 941, 990, 1020n, 1078; wife of, *see* Maria Enriquez
- Fernando de Herrera, author of a contemporary account of the battle of Lepanto (b. 1536, d. 1599), 1053n, 1054n
- Fernando de Mendoza, envoy of Don John to Pius V in 1571: 1066
- Fernando Francisco de Ávalos, Ital. Ferdinando (or Ferrante) Francesco d' Avalos (b. 1489, d. 1525), marquis of Pescara, husband of Vittoria Colonna (from 1509), 118, 225, 228, 457n
- Fernando Francisco de Ávalos (Ferdinando Francesco d' Avalos), marquis of Pescara and Vasto (d. 1571), 726, 781, 783n, 788n, 809, 1022; wife of, *see* Isabella Gonzaga 1554–1571 (b. 1537, d. 1579)
- Ferrals, M. de, French ambassador in Rome in 1573: 1091
- Ferrante (Ferdinand) I (d' Aragona), bastard son of Alfonso I (V of Aragon); king of Naples 1458–1494 and (II) of Sicily 1479–1494: 14; wives of, *see* Isabella di Chiaromonte, Joanna (II) of Aragon
- Ferrante, son of Federigo d' Aragona (d. 1559), 15n
- Ferrante d' Aragona, duke of Montalto in 1528: 295
- Ferrante di Sanguine, father of Fabrizio, Neapolitan relative of the Carafeschi (*f.* 1560), 727, 746
- Ferrante di Sanserivino, prince of Salerno (b. 1507, 574, 588, 598f.
- Ferrara, I, 15, 34, 36n, 50n, 55, 63, 72ff., 75f., 78, 80, 86, 90f., 93f., 104, 108, 116n, 119f., 122, 125n, 128, 129n, 130ff., 134, 138, 140, 160, 167n, 190, 203, 220, 237n, 255, 259n, 262f., 272, 282, 284, 287f., 297, 299, 323n, 327, 329, 340, 341n, 346, 367n, 368, 411, 412n, 478, 507, 528, 534f., 550n, 552, 557n, 563n, 564, 581, 584,

- 589n, 596f., 601f., 603n, 637n, 642f., 656f., 662, 666, 671ff., 674, 676, 680f., 684, 722n, 723, 745, 853n, 1071; cardinal of, *see* Ippolito d'Este; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Salviati (admin.); 1520–1550; rulers of, *see* Alfonso I d'Este 1505–1534, Ercole II d'Este 1534–1559, Alfonso II d'Este 1559–1597
- Ferrara-Florence, Council of (1438–1439), 492, 756, 796, 807, 819, 821, 825
- Ferrarese, 71, 76, 77n, 91n, 264n
- Ferrari, Marc' Antonio, secretary of George Martinuzzi *ca.* 1551: 571, 576
- Ferraro, Battista, Genoese in Istanbul in 1566: 895n, 896n, 898f.
- Ferreri, Bonifazio, bishop of Vercelli 1509–1511, of Ivrea 1511–1518, cardinal 1517–1543: 221
- Ferreri, Guido Luca, bishop of Vercelli 1562–1572, cardinal 1565–1585: 851f., 884
- Ferreri, Zaccaria, abbot of Monte Subasio (*f.* 1511), 97, 106f., 112f.
- Ferrerio, Filiberto, papal nuncio in France in 1538: 446n
- Ferro, Antonio, Venetian envoy to Istanbul in 1487: 607n
- Ferro, Girolamo, Venetian baillie in Istanbul in 1561: 770, 831
- Ferruccio, Francesco, Florentine commissioner (b. 1489, d. 1530), 342
- Fez, 864
- Ficarolo, 76
- Fidenae (ancient town north of Rome), 275
- Fidenza, *see* Borgo San Donnino
- Fiesole, bishops of, *see* Braccio Martelli 1530–1552, Pietro Camaitani 1552–1566
- Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517), 92, 95, 99, 107, 110, 111n, 114f., 121, 123, 124n, 125ff., 133ff., 136ff., 139, 143, 144n, 145, 146n, 147, 148n, 149ff., 153f., 169f., 173, 527, 796, 807
- Fil' akova (Hung. Füleke), 584
- Filonardi, Ennio, bishop of Veroli 1503–1538, cardinal 1536–1549, bishop of Montefeltro (admin.) 1538–1549: 369n, 506, 508n, 514f.
- Finch, John, Sir, English ambassador in Istanbul *ca.* 1672 (b. 1626, d. 1682), 1099
- Fineka, 992n, 1030; Bay of, 972
- Fiordibello, Antonio, secretary under Paul IV, 633n
- Fiorentino, the, 601
- Fiozenzuola d'Arda, 256, 261, 287
- Firmanus, Cornelius, papal master of ceremonies, bishop of Ostimo 1574–1588: 877n, 883ff., 886n, 956n, 1016
- Firmanus, Joannes Franciscus, uncle of Cornelius Firmanus and Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi: 877n
- Firmanus, *see* Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, Cornelius, papal masters of ceremonies
- Firmlan, Bartolommeo, "German" envoy to Maximilian I in 1509: 73
- First Vatican Council (1869–1870), 486, 494, 785, 795n, 824, 827f.; *and see* Joseph Strossmayer
- Früz (Feriz) Beg, sanjakbey of Bosnia in 1509: 61, 88
- Fiskardho (Guiscardo), bay at Cephalonia, 1051
- Fitzroy, Henry, illegitimate son of Henry VIII and Elizabeth Blount; duke of Richmond and Surrey 1525–1536 (b. 1519, d. 1536), 241
- Fiume (Rijeka), 52, 358n, 385, 532, 608, 903f.; vicecaptain of, *see* Johann Rizan
- Fiumicino, 668f.
- Flach, Georg, titular bishop of Salona 1544–1555: 548n
- Flacius, Matthias, Lutheran reformer (b. 1520, d. 1575), 715
- Flaminio di Stabio, brother-in-law of Pietro Strozzi (*f.* 1556), 673
- Flaminio Orsini dell' Anguillara, galley commander in 1560: 758; Flaminio "dall' Anguillara," in employ of Giovanni Carafa of Paliano, 702f.
- Flanders, 43n, 49, 89, 193, 212, 227, 258, 275, 311, 327, 392, 461, 470, 473, 503, 557n, 558, 596, 602, 623n, 624, 647, 665, 680, 683, 686n, 689, 691, 705, 888, 910f., 913ff., 916f., 918n, 919f., 941, 961, 1008, 1012, 1079f., 1086, 1088, 1097
- Flanders-Artois, 709n
- Fleix, treaty of (1580), 840n
- Flemings, 23, 707n, 914
- Flodden Field, battle of (1513), 87, 150n
- Florence, city, 3, 5n, 36n, 81, 90, 93, 98f., 102f., 112, 114n, 144, 159n, 161, 167n, 256f., 261ff., 265n, 266f., 272, 274, 276n, 277, 283n, 293, 305, 308, 330, 339ff., 362, 412, 441, 528n, 529, 581, 595, 599, 602, 605, 677, 762, 956; archbishops of, *see* Cosimo de' Pazzi 1508–1513, Giulio de' Medici 1513–1523, Niccolò Ridolfi 1524–1532?
- Florence, republic of, 1, 15, 40, 43n, 54, 80, 90, 97f., 100, 101n, 103ff., 106n, 108f., 114f., 119, 129, 132f., 145, 161, 166n, 167, 190, 219, 221, 231, 237, 241f., 255, 257, 275n, 277, 280, 282, 297, 310n, 335n, 342n, 346, 368, 370, 433, 441, 564n, 601, 603n, 606n, 613n, 623n, 633, 642f., 645, 648, 659n, 667, 670n, 683, 733, 735, 742, 758, 818, 820, 860n, 869n, 871, 872n, 915, 957n, 987, 1017n, 1084; rulers of, *see* Lorenzo de' Medici 1478–1492, Piero de' Medici 1492–1494, Cosimo I de' Medici 1537–1574
- Florentines, 3n, 17, 34, 48, 59, 61, 71, 88, 89n, 91f., 96, 97ff., 100, 101n, 102ff., 107ff., 112, 114f., 131, 132n, 133, 136, 179, 190, 196, 227n, 241n, 248, 258, 265, 267, 274, 292, 297, 310, 322, 323n, 327, 329f., 332, 333n, 336, 341f., 529, 592, 600f., 603, 633, 664, 760, 1017
- Floriana, on Malta, 854
- Florida, 888f., 911
- Florentine, Galeazzo, bishop at the Council of Trent in 1545: 492n
- Florizze (Florenz), Hadrian, cardinal, *see* Hadrian VI
- Foggia, 293
- Foglietta, Umberto, Italian historian (b. *ca.* 1518, d. 1581), 617, 1027n
- Folambray, 483n
- Folch de Cardona, Ramón, Spanish general (d. 1522), 109, 113n, 115ff., 118, 120n, 125, 129n, 132f., 134n, 143ff., 149f., 160
- Foligno, 33; bishops of, *see* Gian Antonio Serbelloni 1557–1560, Clemente Dolera 1560–1568
- Fondaco dei Tedeschi (in Venice), 849n, 942
- Fondaco dei Turchi, *see* Casa del Duca di Ferrara
- Fondamenta del Megio (in Venice), 82, 83n
- Fondamenta Nuove (in Venice), 946n
- Fondi, 307
- Fontainebleau, 322, 560, 650f., 656
- Fontana, Carlo, architect (b. 1634, d. 1714), 753n
- Fontanus, Jacobus, historian of the second siege of Rhodes (*f.* 1522), 203n, 210, 211n, 212, 213n
- Foresti, Francesco, captain at Famagusta (d. 1571), 1004n
- Forêt-Montiers, 481n
- Forlì, 9, 12f., 16, 49n, 136n, 140, 264, 288, 292, 800; bishops of, *see* Pietro Griffio (Griffus) 1512–1516, Gian Francesco Canobio 1580–1587?
- Forman, Andrew, bishop of Moray 1501–1513; archbishop of Bourges 1513–1514, of S. Andrew's 1514–1522: 95n
- Fornovo, battle of (1495), 69n
- Fort Caroline (in Florida), 888
- Fort S. Angelo (at Malta), 854, 856ff., 860f., 863f., 868, 870f., 875

- Fort S. Elmo (at Malta), 82n, 854ff., 857ff., 860ff., 863ff., 867f., 869n, 870, 873, 875, 886, 887n, 889
- Fort S. Michael (at Malta), 854, 861, 863ff., 866f., 868n, 869, 876, 902n
- Fort S. Nicholas (at Rhodes), 206, 208n
- Forte, outworks at the fortress at Jerba, 764f.
- Fortizza, La*, Genoese galley, 762
- Fortezza Medicea (in Siena), 592
- Foscari, Agostino, Venetian; son of Marco (fl. 1527), 267
- Foscari, Francesco, Venetian ambassador to Rome 1511–1513: 82n, 109n, 118f., 121, 124, 128n, 129n, 130, 134, 136n, 137f., 139n, 148
- Foscari, Marco, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1523 and 1525, to Florence in 1527: 213n, 220ff., 225ff., 226, 227n, 228n, 229n, 230, 231n, 232, 235n, 239f., 267, 274, 275n, 276n, 438n
- Foscarini, Giacomo, Venetian captain-general of the sea in 1572 (d. 1602), 1065n, 1072n, 1073f., 1076n, 1078, 1081ff., 1084, 1086
- Foscolo, Andrea, Venetian bailie in Istanbul in 1507 and 1510: 23n, 51f., 57, 66, 69n, 70f., 72n, 74f., 78, 79n, 88, 90, 122, 196n
- Foscolo, Leonardo, Venetian commander (fl. 1648), 422n
- Foscolo, Pietro, brother of Andrea (fl. 1512), 122
- Fossa (now Fiumara) S. Giovanni, south of Messina, 1050, 1086n
- Fossombrone, 109n, 676n; bishop of, *see* Niccolò Ardinghelli 1541–1547
- Fourquevaux, sieur de, *see* Raymond de Rouer (b. 1509, d. 1574)
- Fracassato, Marc' Antonio, putative Bolognese aboard the *Barbara* in 1552: 587
- Fracastoro, Girolamo, Veronese physician and poet (b. 1483, d. 1553), 308n, 309n, 498, 499n, 548n
- Franchavilla al Mare, Villefranche-sur-Mer, 904f.
- France, fl., 7, 9, 15, 16n, 26f., 29, 34f., 39ff., 42ff., 46f., 47n, 51f., 57, 60, 63, 67f., 70, 72, 75ff., 80, 86f., 88n, 89ff., 93ff., 96n, 98, 99n, 100f., 103, 105ff., 108f., 112f., 114n, 115n, 119ff., 124ff., 128, 129n, 150, 152, 134, 135n, 136ff., 140f., 145, 148n, 150, 156, 159n, 161, 165n, 167n, 174f., 177f., 180n, 181n, 183f., 185n, 187, 191, 193f., 196, 198, 200n, 201, 204, 209, 215n, 219, 223n, 225, 226n, 227, 231, 235, 237, 244f., 247, 250, 252, 254n, 255n, 256, 257n, 258, 260, 265ff., 268, 272, 275, 278n, 280, 283ff., 287f., 291f., 294n, 295n, 296f., 299f., 304f., 308, 312f., 316, 318, 320ff., 327, 329n, 334, 344, 351, 357n, 358, 361ff., 366ff., 370, 373, 378, 380, 387, 391ff., 396n, 397n, 398, 399n, 401f., 404, 407n, 410, 412, 413n, 414f., 420f., 423f., 427f., 430n, 431, 442n, 446n, 449n, 453, 456ff., 459n, 461, 462n, 463ff., 468f., 473, 480f., 485f., 489n, 490, 497f., 503, 504n, 517n, 520f., 522n, 524n, 529, 536, 539, 546ff., 549, 550n, 551n, 556ff., 559, 561ff., 565, 594f., 599n, 600n, 602, 614, 618, 627n, 628, 632f., 635ff., 639f., 642ff., 645, 647f., 650f., 655, 660f., 663, 664n, 667f., 671f., 674, 676, 678, 679n, 680, 683ff., 686f., 689ff., 692n, 693, 696n, 697, 704f., 707f., 709n, 712f., 725, 727, 729, 734, 741n, 743, 750n, 753ff., 758, 759n, 766f., 769, 773ff., 778, 785, 786n, 788f., 794, 797, 800f., 803, 805f., 808, 812, 814f., 819f., 825, 829ff., 832, 834, 836ff., 839ff., 846f., 853n, 883n, 887f., 890, 899, 910f., 917ff., 921f., 938f., 941, 948n, 949, 951, 955, 958, 970, 994n, 1008, 1019n, 1022n, 1043n, 1049, 1061f., 1071, 1079, 1081n, 1087ff., 1100; Hospitallers from, 207, 854; kings of *see* Louis VII 1137–1180, Louis IX 1285–1314, Louis XI 1461–1483, Louis XII 1498–1515, Francis I 1515–1547, Henry II 1547–1559, Francis II 1559–1560, Charles IX 1560–1574, Henry III 1574–1589, Henry IV 1589–1610; queen of, *see* Catherine de' Medici 1547–1559
- Francesco Armellino de' Medici, cardinal 1517–1528, bishop of Gerace (admin.) 1517–1519, archbishop of Taranto 1525–1528: 234
- Francesco da Corte, jurist (fl. 1512), 112
- Francesco da Molin, galley commander in 1571: 1005
- Francesco da Monte, Venetian envoy to the sultan in 1506: 21f.
- Francesco da Montepulciano, husband of the *aromataria* Lucrezia (fl. 1505), 36
- Francesco da Ravenna, Dominican conspirator against Bayazid II in 1504: 34
- Francesco de' Frangipani, archbishop of Kalocza 1530–1543, bishop of Erlau 1539–1543: 253n, 314n, 319n, 436f., 466
- Francesco de' Medici, son of Cosimo I and Eleonora of Toledo; grand duke of Tuscany from 1574 (b. 1541, d. 1587), 1023, 1063n; wife of, *see* Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand I 1565–1578
- Francesco della Rovere, bishop of Vicenza 1509–1514, of Volterra 1514–1530, archbishop of Benevento 1530–1544 (d. 1545), 139n
- Francesco di Castelletto, captain retained by Ferdinand of Hapsburg in Trent at the time of the council, 491
- Francesco di S. Clemente, Hospitaller "general of the galleys" in 1570: 937
- Francesco Giulio de Nursia, physician in Rome in 1549: 519
- Francesco Maria della Rovere, son of Giovanni and Giovanna da Montefeltro; duke of Urbino 1508–1516, 1521–1538, lord of Pesaro 1513–1516: 5n, 16, 51, 96n, 118n, 120n, 129, 138, 139n, 165n, 166, 167n, 190, 201, 225, 228, 242n, 248, 254n, 257, 260n, 261, 262n, 264, 267f., 275f., 280ff., 285, 293n, 332, 363n, 402, 403n, 425n, 426n, 429; wife of, *see* Eleonora Gonzaga (d. 1570)
- Francesco Maria della Rovere, son of Guidobaldo II; duke (II) of Urbino from 1574 (b. 1548, d. 1631), 1023f., 1061
- Francesco Todeschini de' Piccolomini, cardinal, *see* Pius III
- Franche-Comté, 473, 481, 911, 916
- Francis I, son of Charles, count of Angoulême and Louise of Savoy; king of France 1515–1547: 135n, 142n, 152n, 157n, 159ff., 162ff., 165ff., 170ff., 173ff., 178ff., 181, 183n, 184ff., 187f., 190ff., 193ff., 196, 199f., 201n, 202ff., 208n, 214, 216ff., 219f., 222f., 225f., 229ff., 232n, 235ff., 238ff., 241f., 245ff., 248, 250f., 254f., 257, 259f., 264ff., 274f., 276n, 277, 283ff., 287, 288n, 290ff., 297, 299n, 300, 302f., 307, 311f., 314, 317n, 321f., 327, 332, 336, 340, 344, 346ff., 349ff., 357n, 359ff., 362f., 364n, 370, 375, 377f., 380n, 381, 385f., 389, 391ff., 395, 396n, 398ff., 401f., 406, 407n, 409, 413ff., 420f., 425f., 425n, 427, 429f., 431n, 434, 437, 440ff., 445, 448n, 449n, 450f., 453, 455f., 457n, 458n, 459n, 460ff., 463ff., 466f., 468n, 470ff., 473, 479ff., 482ff., 486f., 493, 504, 556, 569n, 632, 698n, 705, 709n, 836ff.; wives of, *see* Claude, daughter of Louis XII 1514–1524; Eleonora, daughter of Philip the Handsome 1530–1547
- Francis II, son of Henry II and Catherine de' Medici; king of France 1559–1560: 723, 725, 729, 766f., 769, 773, 829, 831; wife of, *see* Mary Stuart 1558–1560 (b. 1542, d. 1587)
- Francis, son of Francis I and Claude, daughter of Louis XII; dauphin of France (b. 1517, d. 1536), 323, 413n
- Franciscans (Minorites), 148n, 188, 706, 733, 740, 917, 1024, 1035n; general of, *see* Clemente Dolera (d. 1568)
- Francisco Quiñones, Miguel Servia, Sixtus IV
- Francisco de Aguilar, Spanish soldier deserting to the Turks at the siege of Malta in 1565: 866f.
- Francisco (or Francés) de Álaba, Spanish commandant in Siena in 1552: 593n
- Francisco de Eraso, secretary of Philip II (d. 1570), 876, 878, 902n, 905f., 913

- Francisco de Guiral, commander of a battery at the siege of Malta in 1565: **864**
- Francisco de los Cobos, imperial secretary in 1532, commander of the Order of S. James of Spata in 1533: 361n, 362, 367n, 413, 432
- Francisco de Mendoza, bishop of Coria 1533–1550, cardinal 1544–1566, bishop of Burgos 1550–1566: 523n, 524, 606n, **639, 656, 722n**
- Francisco de Murillo, correspondent of Antonio Pérez in 1571: **1053**
- Francisco de Navarra, bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo 1542–1545, of Badajoz 1545–1556, archbishop of Valencia 1556–1563: 498
- Francisco de Rojas, Spanish ambassador in Rome in 1504: 17
- Francisco de Salazar, correspondent of Mercurino Gattinara in 1527: 269n, 271, 273, 277
- Francisco de Sanoguera, commander at S. Elmo in the siege of Malta (d. 1565): **863f., 867**
- Francisco de Toledo, imperial envoy to the Council of Trent in 1551: 538, 540ff., 543, 544f., 546n, **602**
- Francisco de Vargas, Spanish ambassador, 540n, 541, 544f., 632n, **657, 681, 686, 723, 724n, 726ff., 729ff., 732ff., 735f., 738f., 742ff., 745, 751, 777n, 785n, 784n, 786f., 794n, 795n, 796n, 799n, 806, 821n, 884**
- Frano-Turkish treaty (or entente) of 1536, 400f., 414, **841**
- Francis I, son of Claude of Lorraine; duke of Guise from 1550 (b. 1519, d. 1563), 642ff., **657, 664n, 666, 673, 675ff., 678ff., 681ff., 684ff., 687, 689ff., 693, 694n, 712, 723, 724n, 767, 785n, 795f., 806**; wife of, *see* Anna d' Este (b. 1531, d. 1607)
- François de Dinteville, French diplomat, bishop of Riez 1527–1530, of Auxerre 1530–1556: 348f., 360, 361n, 363n
- François de la Tour, viscount of Turenne, 297, 298n, 299
- François de Lorraine, Hospitaller grand prior of France (b. 1534, d. 1563), **836, 839**
- François de Montmorency, younger brother of Anne (*fl.* 1522), 209, 214
- François de Noailles, French diplomat in Venice and Istanbul, bishop of Dax 1556–1562? (b. 1519, d. 1585), 696n, 698n, 700f., 702n, 704n, 707n, 766n, **767, 830ff., 839f., 1008, 1049, 1068n, 1071, 1075f., 1081n, 1088ff., 1091**
- François de Saint Pol, French soldier (b. 1491, d. 1545), 328
- François de Tournon, archbishop of Embrun 1518–1526, of Bourges 1526–1537, cardinal 1530–1562, archbishop of Auch (admin.) 1538–1551, of Lyon (admin.) 1551–1562: 515, 546, 558ff., 561, 563f., **610, 618, 637, 641ff., 644, 652ff., 676n, 680n, 690n, 713n, 723, 725n, 728n, 729, 732, 734f., 737f., 750**
- François Guillaume de Clermont, archbishop of Narbonne 1502–1507, cardinal 1503–1541, archbishop of Auch 1507–1538, bishop (admin.) of Agde 1531–1541: 221
- François Louis de Bourbon, cardinal, *see* Louis de Bourbon Franck, Marcello, *see* Silber
- Frangipani, comital family at Veglia (to 1480) and Segna, 37, 200n, 244n, 245, 246n
- Frankfurt am Main, 191n, 192n, **658, 699n, 707n, 716, 766, 772, 795, 816, 829, 922**; (Frankfurt), "Agreement of" (*Frankfurter Anstand* [1539]), 452
- Franz, son of Henry and Margaret of Saxony; duke of Lüneburg (jointly with brother Ernst) 1536–1538 (b. 1508, d. 1549), 405, 417
- Franz von Sprinzenstein, envoy of Ferdinand of Austria to Istanbul in 1536: 422n
- Franz von Turm, imperial ambassador to Rome in 1559: 726
- Franzozin, servant of Juan Antonio de Taxis (*fl.* 1556), **652**
- Frari (in Venice), 12, 279, **933**
- Frascati, 3, **675**
- Fraticelli, 454
- Fratta Polesine, 263n
- Frederick I ("Barbarossa"), Hohenstaufen king of Germany **1152–1155**, emperor 1155–1190: 47, 63
- Frederick II, grandson of Frederick I; Hohenstaufen king (I) of Sicily 1197–1250, emperor of Germany 1212 (crowned 1220)–1250: 63
- Frederick III, Hapsburg duke of Styria 1435–1486 (1493), king (IV) of Germany 1440–1452, emperor (III) 1452–1493, archduke (V) of Austria 1457–1486 (1493), 189
- Frederick III ("the Wise"), grandson of Frederick II; Wettin duke (and elector) of Saxony 1486–1525: 191
- Free Cities (of the German empire), 343n, 420, **633**
- Fregellae, **569**
- Fregoso, Cesare, Genoese supporter of the French (d. 1541), 457f., 459n, 462n
- Fregoso, Federigo, archbishop of Salerno 1507–1533?, bishop (admin.) of Gubbio 1508–1541, cardinal 1539–1541: 415
- Frjčuz, bishops of, *see* Niccolò de' Fieschi 1495–1511; Franciotto Orsini 1524–1525
- French, *fl.*, 5, **6n, 7, 9, 11, 15, 16n, 23f., 26ff., 32, 35, 40, 43f., 46, 53, 55f., 59f., 63, 64n, 66ff., 69, 71f., 74, 76ff., 79n, 80f., 86f., 88n, 89, 91n, 92ff., 95ff., 101, 103ff., 106n, 107, 109n, 110, 113, 114n, 115ff., 118ff., 121f., 124f., 128ff., 131ff., 134f., 137, 139ff., 142ff., 145, 147f., 150, 152, 159f., 162, 164, 165n, 166, 175, 177f., 179, 193f., 196, 204n, 216n, 218, 220, 223ff., 226ff., 229, 235, 238n, 244ff., 255, 257, 263, 282n, 284, 285n, 287, 292, 294ff., 297, 299f., 302ff., 306, 309f., 312, 316, 321, 335n, 336, 344, 347, 361, 368f., 386, 391, 401, 402n, 404, 406, 414n, 427, 431n, 432, 452, 455, 457, 465f., 469, 471f., 480, 481n, 483n, 484, 489f., 497n, 504, 507, 511f., 515, 519, 522, 527, 535f., 539n, 545, 548, 550ff., 556ff., 561f., 582f., 584n, 592, 593n, 594, 597f., 600n, 601f., 604f., 609ff., 612, 617f., 620, 623n, 625, 632, 634ff., 637, 640, 644ff., 651, 653, 656f., 659n, 664n, 665f., 668ff., 671f., 674ff., 677f., 680f., 683ff., 687, 689ff., 692f., 697f., 701f., 704f., 707ff., 720, 722ff., 727f., 730ff., 733ff., 737, 741, 743, 749f., 751n, 759, 761, 766f., 777, 778n, 783f., 786, 788, 791, 793, 796f., 801, 803, 805f., 808, 814f., 821, 824, 828, 831ff., 835ff., 838ff., 841, 852, 882, 883n, 888, 890, 894, 899n, 905, 911ff., 916, 924n, 926, 929f., 937ff., 952, 963, 969, 999n, 1008n, 1029n, 1049, 1075, 1076n, 1079ff., 1081n, 1088, 1089n, 1090, 1097f., 1101**
- French language, 17, 89, 91n, 178n, 362, **699, 795**
- Frequeus, decree of the Council of Constance (1417), 544
- Freschies (Frier), Cristoforo, papal nuncio to England in 1510–1511: 96n
- Frescobaldi, Girolamo, importer of alum from Asia Minor in 1505–1506: 49
- Friedrich II, count palatine of the Rhine from 1544 (b. 1482, d. 1556), 603n
- Friedrich, son of Joachim II of Brandenburg; archbishop of Magdeburg and bishop of Halberstadt in 1552 (d. 1552), 543
- Friedrich, son of Johann II and Beatrix of Baden; count palatine (III) of the Rhine from 1559 (b. 1515, d. 1576), **933**
- Friedrich, Johann, theologian and historian (b. 1836, d. 1917), 827n
- Frisia, **910**
- Frisio (Fries?), Niccolò, negotiator for the League of Cambrai in 1507–1508: 51
- Früli, 34, 37, 60, 63, 65f., 71, 81n, 83, 88ff., 93n, 94, 150n, 193n, 259, 261, 279n, 347, 366n, 435, 439f., 442, 495, **589, 637, 661, 771, 941, 948, 970, 1010, 1093**



- Frosinone, 258, 259n, 659f., 754  
 Frumento, Giovanni, Venetian secretary in 1571: 1001n  
 Fuerterrabia (Fontarabia), 152n  
 Fugger, Jacob, banker of Augsburg (b. 1459, d. 1525), 192n  
 Fugger, Philipp Eduard, member of the banking family (b. 1546, d. 1618), 753n  
 Fugger, Ulrich, banker of Augsburg (b. 1526, d. 1584), 746n, 849n, 855, 919, 954, 1020n  
 Fuggers, bankers from Augsburg, 102, 112n, 189, 849f., 852, 856n, 865, 877, 879, 894, 932, 940, 942, 954, 960, 965, 1014, 1020, 1059  
 Fulvio della Corgna, brother of Ascanio, bishop of Perugia 1550-1553?, cardinal 1551-1583: 613, 620, 659, 732f., 860, 883n, 988n, 1000, 1001n  
 Fumone, 660  
 Fundi, 15  
 Fünfkirchen (Pécs), 369, 791n, 846; bishops of, *see* George Szakmári 1505-1523, Stephen Broderic (in 1533 and 1535), Anton Verantius 1554-1560, Georg Drasković 1560-1564?, Andrea Duditio Sbardellati 1565-1573?; provost of, *see* Stephen Broderic (d. 1539)
- Gabès, Gulf of, 235, 760  
 Gabriel VII, Coptic patriarch of Alexandria 1526-1569: 768  
 Gabriel de Lorges, count of Montgomery (b. ca. 1530, d. 1574), 725  
 Gabriel de Luetz, baron d' Aramon, French diplomat (*f.* 1526-1553), 470, 481f., 485, 555f., 560, 582n, 691, 692n, 952n  
 Gabriele Tadini di Martinengo, Italian engineer at the siege of Rhodes in 1522: 206f., 211, 213n, 284n  
 Gacka river, 608  
 Gaddi, Girolamo, bishop of Cortona 1562-1572: 811  
 Gaeta, 15, 86n, 111n, 258n, 286, 293ff., 296, 297n, 309, 528, 582f., 585, 593, 595, 634, 643, 701, 1024, 1078; bishop of, *see* Tommaso de Vio de Gaeta (Cajetan) 1519-1534  
 Gaetano di Sermoneta, Niccolò, cardinal 1536-1589, bishop of Bisignano (admin.) 1537-1549?; 1558-1560?, archbishop of Conza 1539-1546, of Capua 1546-1549?; 1564-1572? (admin.), bishop of Quimper 1550-1560: 610, 612f., 638, 673, 687, 711, 732f., 736  
 Gairino (Guarino)?, Matteo, correspondent of Leonardo Loredan in 1510: 88  
 Gaiseric, Vandal chieftain (b. ca. 390, d. 477), 306  
 Galata, 372, 381n, 921  
 Galatea, 264  
*Galatea*, II, treatise of Giovanni della Casa (ca. 1551-1554), 432, 475n, 633  
 Galeotti, 891, 944, 968, 1010  
 Galeotto della Rovere, nephew of Julius II; cardinal 1503-1507: 16, 56  
 Galleria Doria-Pamphili, in Rome, 1100  
 Galles, 712n, 713, 727, 743, 745, 747, 749  
 Galli, Tolomeo, bishop of Martorano 1560-1562, archbishop of Manfredonia 1562-1573?, cardinal 1565-1607: 1019n, 1087n, 1089f., 1094n, 1097  
 Gallican Church, 136, 545, 550, 814, 818  
 Gallicanism, 81, 111, 796, 803, 814  
 Gallicans, 95f., 98, 114, 120f., 125, 129, 133f., 154, 170, 510ff., 513f., 516f., 518n, 519ff., 522f., 807, 826  
 Gallipoli (in Italy), 55, 213n, 352, 446n, 895n, 975n; bishop of, *see* Andrea della Valle (admin.) 1518-1524  
 Gallipoli (in Thrace), 39, 81n, 376, 395n, 901; straits of, *see* Dardanelles  
 Gallipoli Peninsula, 981
- Gallo, Dr., procurator and doctor in Famagusta in 1571: 1033  
 Gambella, 1005  
 Gara della Rovere, Sisto, nephew of Julius II, cardinal 1507-1517, bishop of Vicenza (admin.) 1507-1509, of Cacerino 1508-1509, of Padua 1509-1517: 56, 139n  
 García de Loaña, Juan, bishop of Osma 1524-1532; cardinal 1530-1546, bishop of Sigüenza 1532-1539, archbishop of Seville 1539-1546: 362  
 García de Toledo, son of Pedro; soldier and writer (b. 1514, d. 1578), 594n, 595, 598, 659, 838n, 842n, 844n, 853n, 854, 855n, 856n, 857, 858n, 859f., 862, 863n, 866ff., 869f., 872ff., 875f., 878f., 889, 899, 901f., 904ff., 911, 913, 957, 969, 973, 1045n, 1046, 1048  
 Garclasso de la Vega, special envoy to Rome from Charles V and Philip II in 1555: 641, 646, 652f., 656, 658, 689  
 Garde, Baron de la, *see* Antoine des Escalins  
 Gargano, 607  
 Garigliano, battle of (1503), 6n  
 Garigliano river, 9, 15, 48n, 659  
 Garlonia d' Alife, Violante, wife of Giovanni Carafa, duke of Paliano (d. 1559), 677, 678n, 683, 711, 747ff., 751, 754n  
 Garlonio, Ferrante, count d' Alife, brother of Violante (d. 1561), 678n, 746ff., 750n, 752, 753n  
 Garonne river, 838  
 Gascons, 76, 116f., 286, 601, 660, 676, 680, 684  
 Gascony, 122  
 Gaspar de Guzmán, Count-Duke Olivares, prime minister of Philip IV of Spain (d. 1645), 1099  
 Gaspard de Coligny, brother of Odet de Châtillon; admiral of France (b. 1519, d. 1572), 1088  
 Gasparino de Melis, papal police chief in 1561: 752  
 Gasparo dal Fosso, bishop of Scala 1548-1551, of Calvi 1551-1560, of Reggio di Calabria 1560-1592: 777  
 Gaspary von Fels, leader of the duke of Alva's mercenaries in 1557: 677  
 Gaston de Foix, duke of Nemours, French lieutenant-general in Milan (b. 1489, d. 1512), 28, 111n, 113ff., 116ff., 287  
 Gastón de la Cerda, son of Juan; present at the siege of Jerba in 1560: 762  
 Gattilusio, Stefano, bishop of Melos 1560-1564?: 755  
 Gattinara, Giovanni Bartolomeo, cousin of Mercurino (d. 1544), 269n, 276n  
 Gattinara, Mercurino, Piedmontese lawyer and humanist, grand chancellor of Charles V in 1518, cardinal 1529-1530: 206n, 238n, 239n, 243n, 259n, 269n, 271, 273, 277, 332  
 Gatto, Angelo, author of an account of the siege of Famagusta (*f.* 1573), 928n, 996n, 1004n, 1006f., 1017n, 1027ff., 1031n, 1032n, 1035n, 1036f., 1038n, 1041  
*Gauze et letare Jerusalem*, bull of Leo X (1518), 187  
 Gavinana, 342  
 Gaza, 706  
 Gazanfer Beg, sanjakbey of Chios ca. 1566: 898  
 Gdańsk (Danzig), 318  
 Gemona, 244n  
 Genazzano, 650, 687  
 Geneva, 136, 766n, 911, 916f.  
 Genevans, 917  
 Genoa, city, 86f., 91, 95, 102, 110, 129n, 130, 164n, 171, 230n, 246n, 248, 272, 284f., 305, 310n, 328f., 340, 344, 345n, 356, 358, 363, 395n, 397n, 412, 427, 445, 447n, 466, 507, 532, 535n, 539, 554, 582, 623f., 701, 702n, 722n, 738n, 883n, 911, 932, 943, 956f., 998n, 1020ff., 1023, 1026, 1080; archbishop of, *see* Girolamo Sauli 1550-1559  
 Genoa, republic of, 16n, 40n, 43, 46, 80, 144n, 177, 181, 217, 219, 221, 236n, 241, 255f., 284, 332, 359, 361, 381,

- 392f., 554, 631, 710, 757n, 776, 835n, 841, 871, 872n, 888, 890, 893f., 896f., 899, 903, 913, 915, 957, 977, 982, 1048n, 1055, 1097; doges of, *see* Giovanni Campoferoso 1512-1513, Paolo Moniglia Giustiniani 1569-1571
- Genoese, 40, 71, 83, 86, 102, 129, 159, 177, 211n, 296, 328, 362n, 368, 587, 624, 701, 702n, 709, 758, 760, 835, 850, 852, 890, 893f., 899, 906, 957, 1043n
- Genil de Vendôme, Pierre, author of a contemporary account of the 1565 siege of Malta, 853n, 857n, 861n, 873n, 874n
- Genile, Giovanbattista, Genoese commissioner in Chios (after 1552-1553), 893
- Geoffroy d' Eutissac, bishop of Maillezais 1518-1543: 398
- Georg I von Liechtenstein, bishop of Trent 1390-1419: 491
- Georg, marshal of Pappenheim, bishop of Regensburg 1548-1563: 810
- Georg von Frundsberg, commander of the Landsknechte (b. 1473, d. 1528), 256, 259, 261f., 270, 281
- Georg von Lokschaney, envoy of the future emperor Ferdinand to Sigmund I in 1528: 317
- Georg Schenk von Limburg, prince-bishop of Bamberg 1505-1522: 44
- George, son of Albrecht and Sidonie, daughter of George of Poděbrady, Albertine duke of Saxony from 1500 (b. 1471, d. 1559), 320n, 405n, 435, 453
- George, son of Frederick V and Sophia, daughter of Casimir IV of Poland; margrave of Brandenburg (b. 1484, d. 1543), 416
- George of Monemvasia, Greek spy at the siege of Malta in 1565: 866
- George of (Kunstat and) Poděbrady, regent of Bohemia 1451-1458, king 1458-1471: 147
- Georges d' Amboise, archbishop of Narbonne 1491-1494, of Rouen 1494-1510, cardinal 1498-1510: 3f., 6ff., 9, 10n, 15, 33n, 35, 39, 40n, 42f., 54, 56, 57n, 61, 68f., 73, 80, 81n, 87f., 91, 93, 97, 99
- Georges d' Amboise, archbishop of Rouen 1511-1550, cardinal 1545-1550: 517, 527n
- Georges d' Armagnac, bishop of Rodez 1530-1561?, of Vabres (admin.) 1536-1548?, cardinal 1544-1585, archbishop of Tours (admin.) 1548-1551?, of Toulouse (admin.) 1562-1582?, 1584-1585, of Avignon (admin.) 1577-1584: 510n, 518, 612f., 621n, 637, 690n, 755
- Georges de Selve, colleague of Jean de Dinteville in 1533: 349n
- Georgia, 503, 590, 1097f.
- Gerace, bishop of, *see* Francesco Armellino de' Medici (admin.) 1517-1519
- Gérard de Rye, sieur de Balançon, imperial envoy to France in 1532: 359
- Gerlier, Durand, publisher in Paris (*fl.* 1518), 162n
- Germaine de Foix, cousin of Louis XII; wife of Ferdinand II of Aragon 1506-1516 (d. 1536), 40n, 42n
- German ("Holy Roman") empire, 1, 34f., 43f., 47, 55, 63, 73, 96n, 150, 156, 178, 187, 197, 249f., 252, 280, 284, 319, 337, 346, 349, 360, 398, 407n, 416f., 434f., 460, 482, 484, 489, 496, 544, 565, 569, 597, 644, 646, 661, 665, 698, 705, 715ff., 718, 741, 755, 771f., 779, 800f., 807, 810, 812, 818, 820, 828, 844, 865, 886f., 917, 919, 921, 941, 955, 1064, 1071, 1088, 1097; emperors of, *see* Henry IV 1056-1106, Frederick I 1155-1190, Frederick II 1212-1250, Ludwig IV 1328-1347, Frederick III 1452-1493, Maximilian I 1493-1519, Charles V 1519-1558, Ferdinand I 1558-1564, Maximilian II 1564-1576, Rudolf II 1576-1612, Charles VI 1711-1740; Estates of the, 322n, 348, 361, 364, 467, 910
- German language, 57, 91n, 363, 743, 772n, 795
- German mercenaries, 306, 320, 433, 601, 665, 675, 677, 683, 887, 890, 1071f., 1101
- Germany, 1, 29, 43n, 46f., 53, 68, 73, 78, 116, 147, 175, 177f., 181, 190, 219, 228, 252, 259, 261f., 271, 282n, 317n, 373, 397, 404f., 416, 419n, 420, 443, 452f., 455, 462, 466, 480, 487f., 491, 519, 545, 547, 549, 565ff., 568ff., 582ff., 595, 602, 611, 623f., 628, 654, 657, 663, 666, 673f., 676, 683f., 706f., 714, 722n, 734, 741, 750, 759, 761, 772, 778, 784f., 790n, 805, 810, 828, 869, 890, 905, 910f., 913, 921, 957, 1000, 1009, 1015, 1020n, 1023n, 1024n, 1026, 1047f., 1081, 1085; kings of ("kings of the Romans"), *see* Frederick I (from 1152), Ludwig IV (from 1314), Frederick III (IV of Germany; from 1440), Maximilian I (from 1486), Ferdinand I (from 1531), Maximilian II (from 1562), Rudolf II (from 1575)
- Germany, 1, 34f., 41f., 43n, 46f., 51f., 66, 69, 99n, 124, 177, 178n, 183, 187, 189, 190n, 191, 192n, 193, 195n, 197, 209n, 216, 223, 272, 290, 292n, 298, 306, 310, 318f., 322n, 324n, 327n, 329, 332, 334n, 335f., 339, 341, 343n, 347, 350n, 353f., 357n, 358n, 359f., 374n, 378, 391, 397n, 399, 401, 403ff., 406, 416ff., 421, 426, 437, 440, 443f., 452ff., 459ff., 462, 464, 466f., 470f., 473n, 476, 478, 480ff., 484f., 488, 492, 494ff., 498, 502ff., 514, 540ff., 543, 546f., 554, 556, 557n, 560ff., 563, 565, 579n, 581, 603, 628f., 632f., 646, 663n, 674f., 677, 680, 697f., 705, 710, 714f., 717f., 720, 721n, 749, 751, 755, 769f., 772f., 779, 786, 790ff., 797, 801, 806n, 819, 827f., 833, 840, 880, 910ff., 913f., 917f., 994n, 1008, 1071, 1076; Free Cities of, 343n, 420, 633; Hospitallers from, 207, 208n, 854, 863, 866, 870; *see also* German ("Holy Roman") empire
- Gerónimo de Vich, Spanish ambassador to Rome in 1511 and 1512: 86, 115n, 119, 126
- Gerwick von Weingarten, correspondent of Andreas Masius in 1549: 510n
- Géza I, king of Hungary 1074-1077: 568n
- Ghent, 195n, 346, 347n, 353n, 452, 661n, 918
- Gherardi, Filippo, painter (b. 1643, d. 1704), 1100
- Gherardi, Luigi, Florentine consul in Istanbul in 1533: 384n, 385, 390
- Gheri, Gregorio (Goro), bishop of Fano 1518-1526?, vicelegate in Bologna (d. 1528), 257
- Ghetto (in Rome), 626
- Ghetto (in Venice, in the area of Cannaregio), 631, 849
- Ghiaradadda, 55, 58n, 61, 239n
- Ghibellines, 129, 650
- Ghillini, Camillo, Milanese envoy to the Hapsburgs in 1531: 359n
- Ghiselin de Busbecq, Ogier, imperialist diplomat and writer (b. 1522, d. 1592), 372n, 493, 589n, 590n, 591, 622, 630, 645, 650f., 662, 696f., 699n, 706f., 742, 764ff., 767f., 771f., 791, 830n, 832ff., 844, 851, 871, 921
- Ghislieri, Ercole, relative and appointee of Pius V (*fl.* 1572), 1077n
- Ghislieri, Michele, *see* Pius V
- Giacomo da Canalè, Venetian baillie in Istanbul in 1537: 424n, 425, 428f.
- Giacomo di Zante, son of Constantine Lazaro (*fl.* 1568), 926
- Gian Francesco di Gamba, cardinal 1561-1587, bishop of Viterbo (admin.) 1566-1576?: 727, 988n
- Gian Paolo da Ceri, son of Lorenzo Orsini da Ceri (*fl.* 1530), 342
- Gian Paolo della Chiesa, cardinal 1568-1575: 1002, 1070, 1074, 1090
- Gianfigliuzzi, Bongianini, Florentine ambassador to Rome in 1556-1560: 648, 651n, 662, 674n, 682ff., 685, 711f., 713n, 735f.
- Gianfrancesco di Sangro, marquis of Torremaggiore (*fl.* 1570), 978

- Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola, nephew of Pico (*fl.* 1511), 100
- Giorgio de' Medici, soldier and marquis of Marignano (b. 1497, d. 1555), 562, 594n, 600, 603f., 605, 606n, 738f., 743, 789
- "Giangir," son of Suleiman I, *see* Jahangir
- Giannandrea de' Medici, cardinal, *see* Pius IV
- Giannotti, Donato, Florentine historian (b. 1492, d. 1573), 81
- Giberti, Giovan Matteo, papal draftsman and diplomat, bishop of Verona 1524–1543: 223, 225f., 248n, 266, 267n, 270n, 281, 288f., 356, 415, 430n
- Gibraltar, Strait of, 843
- Giengen an der Brenz, 557
- Gienger, Georg, counselor of Ferdinand I (d. 1577), 769n
- Gil de Andrade, seeks the Turkish armada in 1571: 1021, 1049f., 1053, 1081ff., 1084
- Gilardo, Marco, subject of the Querini (1538), 439
- Giombattista del Monte, nephew of Julius III (d. 1552), 552, 562f.
- Giovanna d' Aragona, wife of Ascanio Colonna (*fl.* 1556), 646, 745
- Giovanni Alberto della Pigna, negotiator at the Venetian Senate in 1509: 63
- Giovanni Ambrogio da Vigevano, author of an account of Charles V's Tunisian campaign in 1535: 397n
- Giovanni Andrea da Gubbio, sent by Carlo Carafa to Ferrara in 1555: 637n
- Giovanni Battista, son of Giuliano dell' Anguillara (*fl.* 1504), 394n
- Giovanni Battista de Gargha, Hospitaller of Siena at the Fifth Lateran Council in 1513: 151f.
- Giovanni Battista de Grassis, Mantuan gentleman of the bed-chamber, 419n
- Giovanni da Lezze (Leze), Venetian ambassador to France in 1561, provveditore generale of Dalmatia in 1571: 767n, 960n
- Giovanni de' Frangipani, brother of Count Bernardino, French envoy to Istanbul *ca.* 1525: 245f.
- Giovanni de' Medici, cardinal, *see* Leo X
- Giovanni de' Medici "delle Bande Nere," son of Giovanni de' Medici (il Popolano) and Caterina Riario Sforza; papal captain (b. 1498, d. 1526), 225, 268, 275, 277, 281, 293f.
- Giovanni de' Medici, son of Cosimo I; cardinal 1560–1562, archbishop of Pisa (admin.) 1560–1562: 739, 740n
- Giovanni della Casa, poet and humanist; archbishop of Benevento 1544–1556 (b. 1503, d. 1556), 432, 474f., 487, 488n, 489n, 490, 502, 506, 537, 633, 636, 640, 644, 648, 651, 656, 735
- Giovanni di Rocco, correspondent of Bartolommeo di Niccolò in 1532: 362n
- Giovanni Domenico de Cupis, cardinal 1517–1553, archbishop of Trani (admin.) 1517–1551, bishop of Macerata (admin.) 1528–1535, of Adria (admin.) 1528–1553, of Nardo 1532–1536: 398n, 505f., 508ff., 512ff., 515ff., 518ff., 523ff., 558, 580
- Giovanni Maria del Monte, *see* Julius III
- Giovanni Michele de' Saraceni, archbishop of Acerenza and Matera 1531–1556, cardinal 1551–1568: 501n, 505, 516, 613, 619, 627, 638ff., 723, 735f., 748, 770n, 883n
- Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, count of Mirandola 1463–1494: 100
- Giovanni Pierluigi da Palestrina, Italian composer (b. 1525, d. 1594), 615
- Giovo, Paolo, Roman historian (b. 1483, d. 1552), 13, 162, 196n, 198, 296, 342n, 457n
- Girgenti, bishops of, *see* Pietro Tagliavia d' Aragona 1537–1544, Rodolfo Pio di Carpi (admin.) 1544–1564
- Girolamo Basso della Rovere, cardinal 1477–1507: 140
- Girolamo de' Federici, bishop of Sagona 1552–1562, of Martorano 1562–1569: 616, 712n, 743f., 746ff., 750f., 754
- Girolamo de' Grassi (*fl.* 1513), 139n
- Girolamo de' Simoncelli, cardinal 1553–1605: 610, 613, 619, 1077n
- Girolamo di Capodiferro, bishop of Nice 1542–1544, of Saint-Jean de Maurienne 1544–1559, cardinal 1544–1559: 462n, 463, 509n, 521n, 581n, 596f., 612f., 619, 722, 725n, 730, 732
- Girolamo di Porzia, Count; bishop of Torcello 1514–1526: 84, 155n
- Girolata, Bay of, 532
- Giua, Francesco, Hospitaller fighting Turks *ca.* 1570: 959n
- Giudecca (in Venice), 20, 29, 234n, 410n
- Giulia d' Aragona, proposed bride of Federico Gonzaga *ca.* 1530: 341n
- Giuliano da Sangallo (Giulio Giamberti), architect (b. 1445, d. *ca.* 1516), 140
- Giuliano de' Medici, son of Lorenzo and Chiara; duke of Nemours (d. 1516), 133, 144f., 159n, 161, 172n, 277; wife of, *see* Philiberta of Savoy 1515–1516 (b. 1498, d. 1524)
- Giuliano dell' Anguillara (Count), husband of Girolama Farnese, 394n
- Giuliano della Rovere, cardinal, *see* Julius II
- Giulianova, 682
- Giulio, servant of Francesco Gonzaga *ca.* 1510: 79
- Giulio da Porto, commander (*fl.* 1543), 470
- Giulio de' Grandi, bishop of S. Maria d' Anglona and Tursi 1548–1560: 533f., 549, 550n, 552f., 557n, 562, 579, 581ff., 584, 585n, 589n, 671, 713n
- Giulio de' Medici, *see* Clement VII
- Giulio della Rovere, cardinal 1547–1578, bishop of Urbino (admin.) 1548–1551, of Vicenza 1560–1565, archbishop of Ravenna (admin.) 1566–1578: 507, 521, 523, 610, 612f., 620, 740n, 748
- Giustinian, Antonio, Famagustan mulcted by Turks in 1571: 1042
- Giustinian, Antonio, Venetian envoy to Rome (from 1502), to the Hapsburgs (*ca.* 1509), to Istanbul (*ca.* 1512), 4ff., 7ff., 10f., 13, 15ff., 18, 33f., 36, 39, 62f., 66n, 113n, 128n, 156
- Giustinian, Giannantonio, inhabitant of Famagusta in 1571: 1041n
- Giustinian, Leonardo, Venetian baillie in Istanbul in 1512: 128
- Giustinian, Marc' Antonio, doge of Venice 1684–1688: 1102n
- Giustinian, Marino, Venetian ambassador to France in 1555: 392
- Giustinian, Niccolò, Venetian envoy to Istanbul in 1509, baillie in Istanbul in 1513 and 1516: 70f., 74f., 78, 79n, 84, 88n, 90, 127, 152n, 163n; baillie *ca.* 1533: 368, 369n, 383, 388
- Giustinian, Onfrè, herald of Lepanto in Venice, 1571: 986, 1059ff., 1065f., 1099
- Giustinian, Pancrazio, Venetian galley commander *ca.* 1504: 19
- Giustinian, Paolo, Camaldulensian monk (b. 1476, d. 1538), 146f., 185
- Giustinian, Pietro, appointed commander of Hospitaller galleys *ca.* 1570: 961, 988, 1024, 1057f., 1059n
- Giustinian, Sebastiano, Venetian rector of Brescia in 1509: 59n, 292n; Venetian ambassador to England 1515–1519, to France in 1527 and 1528: 153n, 170, 185n, 186n, 193n, 277f., 297, 302, 323n
- Giustiniana, galley bringing news of Lepanto to Venice, 1099n

- Giustiniani, Antonio, Dominican inquisitor on Chios (*fl.* 1558), 710
- Giustiniani, Baldassare, Genoese commissioner in Chios (after 1552–1553), 893
- Giustiniani, Genoese "family" at Chios, 893n, 897f.
- Giustiniani, Giovanbattista, Genoese podestà of Chios, appointed in 1558: 893
- Giustiniani, Girolamo, son of Vincenzo and author of a history of Chios (*fl.* 1586), 895n, 896, 899
- Giustiniani, Lazaro, one of twelve governors at Chios in 1566: 896
- Giustiniani, Paolo Moneglia, doge of Genoa 1569–1571: 956, 1023
- Giustiniani, Timoteo, cousin of Vincenzo; bishop of Ario 1550–1564, of Chios 1564–1568, of Strongoli 1568–1571: 893, 897
- Giustiniani, Vincenzo, cardinal 1570–1582: 971n
- Giustiniani, Vincenzo, Genoese podestà of Chios from 1562: 893, 895f, 898f.
- Gniezno (Gnesen), 318n; archbishops of, *see* John Laski 1508–1531, Matthias Drzewicki 1531–1535, Andreas Krzycki (Cricius) 1535–1537; provost of, *see* John Laski, nephew of John (ca. 1528)
- Goa, 348
- Godfrey of Bouillon, advocate of the Holy Sepulcher 1099–1100: 448n
- Golden Fleece, Order of the, 632, 915, 918n, 919
- Golden Horn, 381n, 891, 921
- Golden rose, 16n, 36n, 419, 603, 649, 689
- Görlitz, 435
- Gomenizza, *see* Igoumenitsa
- Gómez, Ruy, duke of Pastrana and prince of Melito (*fl.* 1556), 661, 672, 914
- Gonsalvo de Sangro, bishop of Lecce 1525–1530: 300
- Gonsalvo Fernando de Cordova (Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba), Spanish commander in southern Italy (d. 1515), 3, 13ff., 16n, 41, 120, 283
- Gonzaga, Alessandro, lord of Novellara (*fl.* 1527), 281, 282n
- Gonzaga, Chiara, daughter of Federico I; wife of Gilbert de Bourbon 1481–1496 (d. 1503), 281
- Gonzaga, Curzio, soldier and poet (b. 1536, d. 1599), 732n
- Gonzaga, Eleonora, daughter of (Gian) Francesco II Gonzaga and Isabella d'Este; wife of Francesco Maria della Rovere (widowed 1538; died 1570), 51, 275n
- Gonzaga, Ercole, son of Gian Francesco II and Isabella d'Este; bishop of Mantua 1521–1563, cardinal 1527–1563: 268n, 281f., 293n, 419, 420n, 462, 506, 508, 511, 515f., 518, 520ff., 523ff., 526, 603n, 610n, 611ff., 617, 619, 689, 721n, 723ff., 726ff., 729f., 732ff., 735, 738f., 740n, 743, 773ff., 776ff., 779n, 780ff., 783, 784n, 785ff., 788f., 791n, 793f., 796f., 798n, 799, 801, 803
- Gonzaga, Federico (Federigo), son of (Gian) Francesco II and Isabella d'Este; duke (I) of Mantua 1530–1540: 80n, 136, 218, 232n, 258, 260n, 261n, 273n, 280ff., 288n, 292, 293n, 294, 309n, 310f., 319, 320n, 321, 328, 332, 341, 344, 353, 368, 418f., 420n, 445n, 491, 798n; wife of, *see* Margherita Paleologina, daughter of William IX of Montferrat 1531–1540 (b. 1510, d. 1566)
- Gonzaga, Federico, son of Federico II; cardinal 1563–1565, bishop of Mantua (admin.) 1563–1565: 798n
- Gonzaga, Ferrante, brother of Federico, son of (Gian) Francesco II and Isabella d'Este; vicery of Sicily from 1535, count of Guastalla from 1539 (b. 1507, d. 1557), 258, 262, 281f., 368, 445f., 500, 504n, 506, 520, 525n, 526, 548ff., 552, 556f., 562, 593, 594n, 612, 724n, 726f., 743, 789, 869n
- Gonzaga, (Gian) Francesco II, son of Federico I; marquis of Mantua 1484–1519: 3, 42n, 51, 57n, 59, 63, 68f., 74, 79, 80n, 120n, 132, 136, 445n, 725; wife of, *see* Isabella d'Este 1490–1519 (d. 1539)
- Gonzaga, Francesco III, son of Federico II and Margaret of Montferrat; duke of Mantua from 1540 (b. 1533, d. 1550), 801; wife of, *see* Catherine, daughter of Ferdinand I (b. 1533, d. 1572)
- Gonzaga, Francesco, cardinal 1561–1566, archbishop of Coenza (admin.) 1562–1565, bishop of Mantua 1565–1566: 777n, 786, 882
- Gonzaga, Francesco, Mantuan ambassador to Rome in 1527 and 1528: 273n, 280, 282, 294, 310f., 320n, 321, 353
- Gonzaga, Guglielmo, son of Federico II; duke of Mantua from 1550 (b. 1538, d. 1587), 708, 729n, 752n, 777, 801, 1063n; wife of, *see* Eleonora, daughter of Ferdinand I (b. 1534, d. 1594)
- Gonzaga, Isabella, daughter of Federico II; wife of Fernando Francisco de Ávalos [Ferdinando Francesco d'Ávalos] from 1554 (b. 1537, d. 1579), 726
- Gonzaga, Ottavio, supporter of Giannandrea Doria in 1571: 1069n
- Gonzaga, Pirro, bishop of Modena 1527–1529, cardinal 1527–1529: 281
- Gonzaga, Sigismondo, brother of Marchese Francesco II; cardinal 1506–1525: 42n, 51, 141
- Gonzaga, Vespasiano, leader of the Italians of the duke of Alva in 1556: 659
- Gonzaga, (Gian) Vincenzo, son of Ferrante; prior of Barletta, cardinal 1578–1591: 869, 874
- Gonzaga da Bozzolo, Federico, French servitor (d. 1527), 275
- Gonzaga di Borgoforte, Luigi, cousin of the marchese Federico; probable author of the *Cronaca del soggiorno di Carlo V in Italia*, 328n
- Gonzaga di Guastalla, Cesare, son of Ferrante and Isabella of Capua; ruler of Amalfi (d. 1575), 743, 789; wife of, *see* Camilla Borromeo (married 1560)
- Good Hope, Cape of, 1, 19
- Gorizia, 52, 63, 249, 261, 433n; *and see* Federico Strassoldo of Gorizia
- Górka, Lucas, castellan of Poznań ca. 1528: 314, 315n, 316n, 318
- Gouffier, Guillaume, sire de Bonnavet, admiral of France (b. 1488?, d. 1525), 204, 217n, 312
- Gozo, 351, 352n, 553n, 555, 761, 765, 857, 870ff., 875
- Gozzadini, Niccolò, regained Siphnos in 1571: 899n
- Gozzadini, rulers of Siphnos until 1617: 899
- Grabusa, fortress near Candia, 1101n
- Gradniga, Venetian ship at Famagusta in 1571: 1007n
- Gradenigo, Alvise, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1521, 1522, and 1523: 191n, 200n, 202n, 213n, 338n
- Gradska, 405
- Gradska Luka, the, harbor of Ragusa, 904
- Gragnano, 307
- Gragno (Esztergom), 301, 373f., 384n, 472n, 479, 630, 697, 766; archbishops of, *see* Ippolito d'Este 1487–1497, Thomas Bakócz 1497–1521, George Szakmári 1523–1524, Ladislás Szalkai 1524–1526, Paulus de Varda 1527–1549, Anton Verantius 1570–1573; captain of, *see* Thomas de Laczano
- Gran Capitán, *see* Gonsalvo Fernando de Cordova
- Gran Signore, *see* Ottomans
- "Gran Tartaro" (1532), 365n
- Gran Turco, *see* Ottomans; "daughter of the Grand Turk," 273
- Granada, 18, 40, 84ff., 242f., 248n, 249n, 250n, 258n, 306, 347, 744n, 946, 950, 951n, 957, 998, 1014; archbishop of, *see* Pedro Guerrero de Logroño 1546–1576
- Granarolo, 264
- Grand Canal (in Venice), 82, 201, 288n, 334, 805

- Grand Council (in Venice), 77  
 Grand Harbor (in Malta), 854ff., 863f., 875  
 Grantrier de Grandchamps, French ambassador to Istanbul in 1567 and 1571: 838n, 898, 921f., 937ff., 944f., 948f., 952, 971, 1007f., 1049  
 Granvelle, cardinal of, *see* Antoine Perrenot; lord of, *see* Nicholas Perrenot (b. 1486, d. 1550)  
 Grassi, Paride, papal master of ceremonies (d. 1528), 93, 115n, 137n, 138f., 143n, 144n, 145n, 149f., 153, 161, 166n, 170, 196f.  
 Grau, 14  
 Gravedona, 738n  
 Gravelines, 193, 691, 708, 918  
 Graziani, Antonmaria, author of a contemporary account of the expedition of 1570: 663n, 992n, 1027n  
 Great Schism (1378–1417), 272  
 Grebel, Conrad, Protestant leader (*fl.* 1524), 565  
 Greece, 17, 54n, 89, 122, 126, 128, 142, 147, 150, 152, 154f., 177, 179, 185, 190, 214, 218, 240, 272, 278, 378, 441, 449, 451, 494, 531n, 548n, 755f., 833f., 947f., 952, 974, 1053, 1075n, 1080, 1085, 1102; beylerbey of, *see* Mehmed Pasha (in 1560)  
 Greek Gymnasium (in Rome), 157n  
 Greek language, 17, 91n, 128, 211, 393, 541, 568n, 626n  
 Greek Orthodox (Byzantine) Church, 37, 541, 714, 756f., 790, 1039, 1103  
 Greeks (Byzantines), 32, 54, 99, 116n, 136n, 142, 147, 177, 208f., 211, 215, 304, 366n, 375, 384n, 494, 531, 541, 756f., 807, 830, 878, 893, 902, 926f., 937, 949n, 977, 990f., 994n, 1000n, 1004n, 1007, 1027f., 1030, 1032, 1035, 1037, 1038n, 1040ff., 1043, 1046, 1066, 1078, 1080, 1088, 1100, 1103  
 Greenwich, 260  
 Greghetto, Antonio, Greek killed during the siege of Famagusta in 1571: 1035n, 1037  
 Greghetto, Geronimo, viscount of Famagusta *ca.* 1568: 934, 1037n  
 Gregoriáncz, Paul, bishop of Zagreb 1550–1554?, of Győr (Raab) 1554–1565: 547, 577f.  
 Gregorio, victim of a 1566 tornado in Famagusta, 926  
 Gregorovich, Ferdinand, historian (b. 1821, d. 1891), 4n, 139  
 Gregory I (the Great), saint; pope 590–604: 794  
 Gregory VII (Hildebrand), pope 1073–1085: 139n  
 Gregory X (Tedaldo Visconti), pope 1271–1276: 70, 92, 142, 201n, 509f., 512f., 517, 520, 730  
 Gregory XIII (Ugo Boncompagni), bishop of Vieste 1558–1560?, cardinal 1565–1572, pope 1572–1585: 650, 687, 778, 787, 824n, 882, 884, 886, 887n, 1019n, 1078n., 1081n, 1087ff., 1090, 1094n, 1096ff., 1100  
 Gregory XIV (Niccolò Sfondrati), bishop of Cremona 1560–1590, cardinal 1583–1590, pope 1590–1591: 775n, 778  
 Griffo (Griffus), Pietro, papal nuncio in England in 1506, 1508–1512, bishop of Forlì 1512–1516: 49, 96n, 136  
 Grimaldi, Domenico, papal referendary in 1571 (d. 1592), 1024  
 Grimaldi, Genoese money-lenders in Rome, 102, 957n  
 Grimaldi, Giorgio, owner of a ship sent to relieve Malta in 1565: 871, 872n  
 Grimaldi, Onorato; duke (I) of Monaco 1532–1581: 759  
 Grimana, Venetian ship, 301  
 Grimani, Alvise, Venetian bailie-designate for Istanbul in 1568: 892; provveditore generale in Dalmatia in 1572: 1073, 1092n  
 Grimani, Antonio, Venetian captain-general of the sea (1499), doge of Venice 1521–1523: 65, 67, 77, 204, 205n, 206n, 209n, 212n, 218n, 249n, 812  
 Grimani, Domenico, son of Antonio; patriarch of Aquileia 1497–1517, cardinal 1493–1523: 4, 59n, 62, 65, 67f., 70, 73f., 123, 134, 138, 200  
 Grimani, Giovanni, bishop of Ceneda 1540–1545, patriarch of Aquileia 1545–1550?: 1585 (d. 1593), 811f., 1059  
 Grimani, Marco, bishop of Tenos and Mykonos 1559–1594?: 755, 756n  
 Grimani, Marco, Venetian procuratore in 1527: 281; patriarch of Aquileia 1529–1535, captain-general of the papal galleys *ca.* 1538 (d. 1544), 446, 447n  
 Grimani, Marino, bishop of Ceneda 1508–1517, patriarch of Aquileia 1517–1529; 1535–1545?, cardinal 1527–1546, bishop of Concordia 1533–1537, of Città di Castello (admin.) 1554–1559: 170, 268n, 355, 429  
 Grimani, Vincenzo, Venetian special envoy to Istanbul in 1557: 425n  
 Grimma, 416n  
 Grisons, district in Switzerland, 424, 557  
 Gritti, Andrea, Venetian envoy to Istanbul (1503), doge of Venice 1523–1538: 2, 12, 17, 57, 59, 62, 67f., 79n, 93n, 113, 135n, 144, 201n, 213n, 219, 222n, 226, 229, 235, 237, 239, 242, 251, 252n, 253, 255n, 256, 258, 265ff., 268, 270n, 278n, 279, 287, 293, 297, 301f., 310n, 313, 322n, 329n, 330f., 336, 338, 340, 342, 358, 361n, 366n, 367n, 395n, 423, 442n, 448n, 607n  
 Gritti, Antonio, son of Lodovico (*fl.* 1534), 390  
 Gritti, Costanzo, vice-lieutenant of Nicosia in 1569: 927  
 Gritti, Giorgio, natural son of Andrea (*fl.* 1532), 361n, 381  
 Gritti, Lodovico (Alvise), natural son of the Doge Andrea; Venetian politician in Istanbul (b. 1480, d. 1534), 253, 301, 310n, 316n, 318n, 322n, 323n, 325, 326n, 327n, 329n, 333n, 334, 336ff., 339f., 342, 345n, 346, 347n, 357, 361n, 365, 370ff., 373f., 376ff., 379ff., 382n, 383, 384n, 385ff., 389ff., 407, 408n, 436, 442, 607n  
 Gritti, Lorenzo, natural son of the Doge Andrea (d. 1539), 448n  
 Gropper, Johannes, Catholic theologian; cardinal 1555–1559: 453, 502n, 542, 644  
 Grosseto, 599, 601  
 Grosso, Geronimo, papal commissioner in Ancona in 1537: 430n  
 Grosswardein (Nagyvárad, Oradea), 436, 444, 455n, 465, 466n, 571; bishops of, *see* George Szakmári 1502–1505, George Martinuzzi (from 1559); "treaty of" (1558), 434, 455n, 530, 567, 572  
 Grottaferrata, 119, 289, 665, 668, 675  
 Grotammare, 682  
 Guadaluja, 744  
 Guadix, bishops of, *see* Martín Pérez de Ayala 1548–1560, Melchor Álvarez de Vozmediano 1560–1574?  
 Gualterio, Pietro Paolo ("de Brevibus"), conclavist of Bernardino Maffei in 1549: 519n, 520, 521n, 522, 523n, 524n  
 Gualterio (Gualtieri), Sebastian, bishop of Viterbo 1551–1566: 509n, 511n, 513n, 521n, 523, 601, 647, 795, 808  
 Gualterotti, Bartolomeo, Florentine envoy in Venice in 1528: 308f.  
 Guastalla, 446n; count of, *see* Ferrante Gonzaga 1539–1557  
 Gubbio, 611; bishops of, *see* Federigo Fregoso (admin.) 1508–1541, Pietro Bembo 1541–1544, Marcello Cervini (Marcellus II) 1544–1555  
 Guelderland, 1084  
 Guelders, 237n  
 Guelts (Parte Guelts), 129  
 Guerrero de Logroño, Pedro, archbishop of Granada 1546–1576: 540n, 778, 781, 788, 793, 795, 801, 804n, 811, 819f., 824  
 Guicciardini, Francesco, Florentine historian (b. 1483, d. 1540), 1, 79n, 94n, 101, 116f., 122, 139, 145n, 166, 176f., 196n, 198, 248, 262n, 263f., 267, 269, 367n, 368  
 Guicciardini, Jacopo, brother of Francesco and author of an account of the battle of Ravenna in 1512: 116f.

- Guicciardini, Luigi, brother of Francesco; gonfaloniere in Florence in 1527 (b. 1478, d. 1551), 267n, 269n, 270n
- Guicciardini, Piero, brother of Francesco and author of an account of the battle of Ravenna in 1512: 116
- Guichardus, Thomas, orator before Clement VII in 1523: 205n, 206n, 210n, 214f., 223
- Guidi da Bagno, Gian Francesco, loses land to Antonio Carafa in 1556: 649, 688, 733, 736
- Guidiccioni, Bartolommeo, canon lawyer and diplomat; bishop of Teramo 1539–1542, cardinal 1539–1549, bishop of Lucca 1546–1549: 415
- Guido, Antonio, author of a contemporary account of the transition between Paul IV and Pius V in 1559: 721n, 725, 731ff., 734n, 738n
- Guidobaldo da Montefeltro, son of Federigo; duke of Urbino 1482–1508: 12, 39
- Guidobaldo della Rovere, son of Francesco Maria and Eleonora Gonzaga; duke (1) of Urbino from 1538 (b. 1513 or 1514, d. 1574), 402, 403n, 426n, 507, 521, 539n, 597, 601, 614f., 628, 636, 639, 643, 645, 729n, 731, 739, 969, 1023, 1063n; wives of, *see* Giulia Varano (d. 1547), Vittoria Farnese (d. 1602)
- Guidotto, Vincenzo, Venetian secretary resident in Hungary in 1509 and 1525: 61, 236f.
- Guienne, 120n, 122
- Guifford (Lord), owner of a manuscript of Antonio Longo's memoirs, 407n
- Guillaume de Bonnavet, admiral of France, *see* Guillaume Gouffier
- Guillaume de Montoiche, author of an account of Charles V's Tunisian campaign (fl. 1535), 397n
- Guillaume du Bellay, French soldier and diplomat (b. 1491, d. 1543), 462n
- Guiscardo, bay of, *see* Fiskardho
- Guise, cardinal of, *see* Louis de Guise; counts and dukes of, *see* Claude de Lorraine, count 1506–1528; duke 1528–1550, François I 1550–1563, Henri I 1563–1588
- Guises, 643, 649, 686, 725, 773, 836, 888, 1008
- Guizzalotti, Stefano, poet and author of an account of the sack of Prato in 1512: 133n
- "Gulf," *see* Adriatic Sea
- Gundersdorf, baron of, *see* Erasmus Teufel (d. 1552)
- Güns (Köszeg), 365f., 368, 379, 491, 585
- Guoro, Giacomo, commander at the battle of Lepanto in 1571: 1054, 1057
- Gurk, bishops of, *see* Raymond Peraudi 1491–1501, Matthias Lang 1501–1512?
- Guy de Blanchefort, nephew of Pierre d' Aubusson; Hospitaller prior of Auvergne (to 1512), grand master 1512–1513: 33n, 181n
- Guy de Lusignan, son of Hugh VIII; king of Jerusalem 1186–1190, ruler of Cyprus 1192–1194: 756
- Guyenne, French *roy d'armes* in 1528: 312
- Guzman, Martin, head chamberlain of Emperor Ferdinand in 1557, imperial ambassador to Rome in 1558: 690, 715, 717
- Guzzoni, Bocolino, Italian condottiere (in 1486), 11
- Győr (Raab), bishops of, *see* Paul Gregoriancz 1554–1565, Georg Drasković 1578–1587
- Hadrian VI (Hadrian Florisz or Florensz of Utrecht), bishop of Tortosa 1516–1522, cardinal 1517–1522, pope 1522–1523: 189n, 200ff., 203f., 205n, 213n, 214, 215n, 216, 218ff., 221ff., 235f., 244n, 247n, 337n, 346, 416f., 418n, 474n, 512, 532, 618
- Hafşids, dynasty in the Eastern Barbary 1229–1574: 234
- Hagia Sophia, church (in Constantinople), 150
- Haguenau (Hagenau), 452n; Acts of (1505), 42
- Hainaut, 392n, 683
- Hajji Murad, Turkish envoy to France in 1565: 838, 841
- Halberstadt, bishop of, *see* Friedrich of Brandenburg (in 1552)
- Halicarnassus (Bodrum), 182, 213
- Ham, 708
- Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph von, historian (b. 1774, d. 1856), 325, 374, 503, 569, 1073
- Hannart, Jean, imperial ambassador in 1524: 235n, 236n, 312n, 396n, 397n, 399n
- Hannibal, Carthaginian commander (b. 247 B.C., d. ca. 183 A.C.), 306, 659
- Hannover, 1103n
- Hans von Ungnad, author of an account of the siege of Pest (1542), 478n
- Hapsburgs, dynasty in Austria 1282–1918: 1, 2, 41f., 44, 55, 60n, 68, 85, 131n, 141, 167, 179, 186n, 190, 192, 197, 216n, 217n, 231, 237, 241, 244, 249, 259, 261f., 287, 300f., 310, 312ff., 315, 318, 320f., 322n, 324n, 325, 332, 334, 335n, 336f., 340, 344, 347f., 349f., 353f., 357f., 359n, 360n, 361f., 363n, 364f., 366n, 367, 370n, 371f., 375f., 383f., 386ff., 389, 393f., 400, 405f., 415, 420f., 430, 432, 434, 436f., 444n, 452, 455, 459ff., 465, 469, 473, 478ff., 481, 482n, 483ff., 487, 490, 497, 502f., 527, 530ff., 536, 546, 556f., 561n, 566ff., 569ff., 572f., 579f., 589, 591, 593n, 605, 608, 612n, 618, 623n, 624f., 631, 632n, 633, 636f., 641, 643ff., 646ff., 650, 652ff., 655ff., 658, 659n, 662, 665, 667, 673f., 676f., 682, 689ff., 693, 697, 699, 701, 702n, 704f., 711, 714, 716f., 720, 723, 726, 733, 738f., 743, 749f., 753, 758, 760, 763, 775, 778, 791, 805, 839, 841, 844f., 894, 913f., 922, 932, 934, 938, 941, 953n, 961, 983, 1000n, 1013, 1087f., 1097f., 1103; *and see* German ("Holy Roman") empire
- Harvel, Edmund, English agent in Venice in 1542: 461n
- Hassan, son of Khairuddin Barbarossa; pasha or commander at Algiers 1544–1551, 1557–1561; 1562–1567 (d. 1572), 831f., 864, 1053, 1086; present at the siege of Nicosia in 1570: 996; son of (d. 1572), 1086
- Hayapostolitis, Theodore, anti-Turkish native of Coron (fl. 1533), 367n
- Haydar, Christian renegade and corsair (fl. 1569), 923n
- Hebrew language, 925
- Hecklin, Hans Heinrich, jurist and envoy of Christopher of Württemberg in 1551: 542f.
- Held, Matthias, imperial vice-chancellor (d. 1563), 416f., 421, 452
- Helding, Michael, bishop of Sidon 1538–1550, of Merseburg 1550–1561: 496n
- Hellespont, *see* Dardanelles
- Henri, son of François I and Anna d' Este; duke of Guise from 1563 (b. 1550, d. 1588), 1088
- Henri d' Albrét, son of Jean (III) d' Albrét and Catherine de Foix; titular king (II) of Navarre (b. 1503, d. 1555), 195, 229n, 309; wife of, *see* Marguerite d' Angoulême 1527–1555
- Henri de la Valette, nephew of Jean; killed at the siege of Malta 1565: 866
- Henry II, son of Francis I and Claude, daughter of Louis XII; king of France 1547–1559: 312, 322f., 370, 374n, 391, 400, 472, 473n, 483, 485, 503, 504n, 505, 508, 510, 512, 517f., 519n, 520f., 525, 527f., 533, 538, 539n, 546, 548ff., 551ff., 554ff., 557ff., 560ff., 563f., 566, 567n, 576n, 580n, 581, 583n, 584n, 588n, 590n, 592, 594, 595n, 596f., 599ff., 602f., 611, 614n, 615n, 616n, 617n, 618, 621n, 623, 625n, 632n, 633n, 634ff., 637f., 640ff., 643f., 646ff., 649ff., 652ff., 655f., 659ff., 664, 666, 668, 671, 673ff., 676ff., 679ff., 682ff., 685f., 689ff., 692ff., 696ff., 699,

- 700n, 701f., 704ff., 707ff., 712ff., 717n, 725, 749f., 758, 767, 773, 851, 836f.; wife of, *see* Catherine de' Medici 1533-1559 (d. 1589)
- Henry III, son of Henry II and Catherine de' Medici; duke of Anjou, designated king of Poland 1573-1574, king of France from 1574 (b. 1551, d. 1589), 771, 812, 834, 840f., 938, 1063n, 1075, 1087f., 1089n
- Henry IV, son of Antoine de Bourbon, duke of Vendôme and Joanna, daughter of Henry II and queen of Navarre; king of Navarre from 1572, king of France from 1589 (b. 1553, d. 1610), 633, 840n
- Henry IV, emperor of Germany 1056 (crowned 1084)-1106: 454
- Henry VII, son-in-law of Edward IV; Tudor king of England 1485-1509: 38, 44, 46ff., 49f., 54, 74n, 76, 96n, 130, 455n
- Henry VIII, son of Henry VII; Tudor king of England 1509-1547: 49n, 65, 74, 78, 94n, 95, 96n, 99ff., 108f., 116, 119ff., 122, 124ff., 129f., 132, 135n, 137, 141, 145, 150, 152, 153n, 160n, 170, 175, 180, 185f., 187n, 193, 195, 199n, 206n, 216, 217n, 219, 222, 225ff., 228, 229n, 230ff., 237, 239ff., 242n, 248, 249n, 251, 254ff., 257, 260, 265f., 275, 299n, 313, 319, 322n, 323, 328, 335, 348, 351, 357n, 364n, 381, 392, 415, 416n, 457n, 461n, 462, 467n, 472n, 473, 482, 514, 632; illegitimate son of, *see* Henry Fitzroy
- Henry, son of Manuel of Portugal; archbishop of Braga 1533-1540, of Évora 1540-1564; 1574-1578 (admin. ?), cardinal 1545-1580, archbishop of Lisbon 1564-1570?: 508n, 722n, 723, 1063n
- Henry the Younger, duke of Brunswick (Braunschweig), imperial commander (b. 1489, d. 1568), 298, 304f., 307
- Heptameron*, book of stories produced by Marguerite d'Angoulême (published 1558), 229n
- Heraclides, *see* Jacob Basiliscus
- Herbert, Lord, *see* Charles Somerset
- Hercules, 64; pillars of, 190
- Heresy, 64n, 85, 104, 110, 113, 136, 147, 182, 190n, 200, 232, 288, 310, 395, 413, 416n, 417, 419, 430, 443n, 453f., 460, 463, 484, 494, 503, 513, 515n, 531, 539f., 542, 545f., 603, 624, 626, 629, 642, 646, 651, 657f., 665, 679n, 681n, 682f., 690, 710, 714ff., 717f., 721, 722n, 723, 730, 741, 748f., 754, 757, 769, 773, 781, 783, 786, 790, 793ff., 798ff., 806n, 807, 809ff., 812f., 816, 823f., 831, 835n, 846, 882, 883n, 888, 890f., 912f., 916, 918, 994n, 1071, 1088
- Hernando de Castro, viceroy of Naples in 1600: 595n
- Hernando de Lanoy, commander of Spanish troops *ca.* 1567: 916
- Hernando de Silva, Spanish ambassador to France in 1511: 95n
- Herzegovina (Hercegovina), 385, 608; sanjakbey of, *see* Khairreddin
- Hesdin, 596
- Hesse, 421; landgrave of, *see* Philip I 1509-1567
- Hexamilion, in the Morea, 990
- Hierapolis, bishop of, *see* Andreas de Oviedo 1555-1580?
- Hieronimo de Torres y Aguilera, contemporary authority on the battle of Lepanto (f. 1579), 1054n
- Hinderbach, Johann (IV), prince-bishop of Trent 1466-1486: 491
- Hippodrome (in Istanbul), 72, 371
- Hobordansky (Haborcans), John, envoy of Ferdinand to Istanbul in 1528: 254, 378, 381
- Hoffmann, Johann, counselor of Ferdinand in 1537: 422
- Hohenems (Hohenemb, Atempes), 885; lord of, *see* Wolf Dietrich (d. 1536)
- Hohenlohe, Gustav, cardinal from 1866 (b. 1823, d. 1896), 827n
- Hohenstaufen, imperial dynasty in Germany and Italy 1138-1268: 133, 190, 454
- Holbein, Hans, the Younger, German painter (b. 1497/1498, d. 1543), 349n
- Holland, *see* Netherlands
- Holy Cross, Canons regular of the, 740
- Holy Land, *see* Palestine
- Holy League, 81, 96n, 100, 101n, 102n, 103, 107ff., 110, 112n, 114f., 117n, 118f., 124f., 128ff., 131ff.; war of the (1511-1513), 81n
- Holy League (at Mechlin, 1513), 145
- Holy League (1526), *see* Cognac, League of
- Holy League (1537-1558), 434, 437f., 440, 442f., 445f., 448, 765, 961f., 992, 1016
- Holy League (1571), 993, 998ff., 1001n, 1004, 1008f., 1011ff., 1014ff., 1017ff., 1020f., 1024, 1029, 1046, 1047n, 1048ff., 1052n, 1055, 1061n, 1062ff., 1065ff., 1068ff., 1071, 1073ff., 1076ff., 1079, 1081, 1084ff., 1087, 1089ff., 1092, 1094, 1097, 1100
- Holy League (1684), 449, 1101
- Holy Office, tribunal of the, 626, 718
- Holy orders, 499, 539n, 542, 544, 779f., 786, 789, 793ff., 796, 805, 807, 809
- Holy Roman Empire, *see* German Empire
- Holy (or Apostolic) See, 1f., 10f., 15, 17, 34ff., 42ff., 47ff., 50, 55ff., 58, 63, 64n, 67f., 72, 76, 78, 80n, 81n, 88, 96n, 98, 112, 120, 125, 134, 143, 144n, 145, 147f., 148n, 150n, 152, 159, 162n, 167, 172, 180, 183n, 184n, 186, 187n, 192n, 196n, 197, 200n, 202f., 217n, 220, 222f., 226f., 229, 230ff., 236n, 237, 242, 245, 247, 256f., 259, 260n, 274, 276, 283n, 287, 289, 297f., 302, 310f., 313, 327, 331n, 346, 355f., 360, 384f., 394, 399, 400n, 402ff., 405f., 410n, 419ff., 422, 425, 428, 432, 433n, 434, 436f., 460, 470, 473, 478, 495, 502, 504f., 507ff., 511n, 512, 514, 523, 527, 531, 533, 537, 545f., 550ff., 557f., 560ff., 563, 564n, 588, 597, 609, 615n, 616, 627, 629, 633, 635ff., 638, 640f., 644n, 645n, 646ff., 649f., 654, 656ff., 659, 661f., 664ff., 667, 669ff., 672, 674ff., 677f., 681f., 685f., 688ff., 691, 693, 696n, 709n, 710, 712f., 715ff., 718, 719n, 720f., 725n, 729ff., 737f., 744, 747, 749f., 753, 763, 768f., 771f., 775f., 778, 780f., 785, 787f., 794, 799n, 800, 801n, 802, 804ff., 807f., 810, 818f., 822, 825f., 831, 841, 846f., 859, 865, 881, 884, 888, 900f., 906f., 911f., 915, 917, 920, 932, 935, 938, 961, 964, 973, 976, 989, 993, 994n, 1000n, 1001n, 1009, 1017f., 1014f., 1017, 1048n, 1055, 1059, 1067, 1074, 1077, 1079, 1088, 1096, 1100
- Holy Sepulcher, 18, 24, 32, 50, 110, 146n, 151, 189, 319, 962, 1069, 1099, 1103n
- Holy Sepulcher, church (in Jerusalem), 191, 372, 705
- Holy Sepulcher, Knights of the, 5n
- Hommonay, Francisus, lord in Hungary in 1528: 323
- Honter, Johannes, of Kronstadt, humanist and reformer (d. 1549), 566n
- Hoorn, count of, *see* Philippe de Montmorency (d. 1568)
- Hornad river, 315n
- Hosius, Stanislaus, bishop of Culin 1549-1551, of Warmia 1551-1570?, cardinal 1561-1579: 741, 773, 775f., 780, 797n, 800, 805, 808, 818, 823, 825, 880, 1087
- Hospitallers (Knights Hospitalier of S. John of Jerusalem, Knights of Rhodes, Knights of Malta), military Order, 17, 20, 24ff., 28f., 33f., 37, 39, 47, 51, 54, 70, 100, 121f., 138, 144, 147, 151f., 170, 181ff., 200, 202f., 205n, 206ff., 209ff., 212, 213n, 214ff., 223f., 238, 340n, 351f., 367, 395n, 396, 429, 532, 535n, 555, 560, 583, 588n, 589,

- 608f., 625, 637, 706, 740, 756, 758ff., 763, 765, 810f., 818, 829, 835f., 842f., 846, 849f., 853n, 854ff., 857f., 860ff., 863, 865ff., 868, 869n, 870f., 872n, 873n, 875ff., 878f., 886ff., 889, 899f., 902f., 906, 920, 930, 932, 936f., 940, 955ff., 959n, 961, 965, 972, 988, 1014, 1024, 1047f., 1057, 1059n, 1064, 1083, 1100f.; chancellor, *see* Andreas Amaral (fl. 1521); grand masters of, *see* Pierre d' Aubusson 1476–1503, Aiméry d' Amboise (d. 1512), Guy de Blanchefort 1512–1513, Fabrizio del Carretto 1513–1521, Philippe de Villiers de l' Isle-Adam 1521–1534, Juan de Omedes (d. 1553), Jean de la Valette 1557–1568, Pietro del Monte (from 1568); grand priors of, *see* Jacques de Bourbon (France; from 1515), François de Lorraine (France; d. 1563) Thomas Doctry (England; fl. 1521); other Knights, *see* Antoine de Grollée, Gil de Andrade, Giovanni Battista de Gargha, Jean de la Forêt, Sabba da Castiglione; vicechancellor of, *see* Martin de Rojas Portulubio (in 1563)
- Howard, Thomas, earl of Surrey and second duke of Norfolk (b. 1443, d. 1524), 205n; advisor to Henry VIII in 1512: 132n
- Howard, William, English diplomat (b. 1510?, d. 1573), 457n, 461n
- Huemaier, Balthasar, Protestant leader (b. 1480, d. 1528), 565
- Huesca, bishop of (along with Jacca), *see* Lorenzo Campeggio (admin.) 1530–1532
- Huguenots, 628, 755, 785n, 786, 789n, 795f., 806, 814f., 888, 890, 910n, 911f., 939, 949, 994n, 1077, 1079, 1088
- Huma, mother of Fati and “Marguerite,” two Turkish girls seized ca. 1557 and taken west, 836f., 839f., 938n
- Humani generis redemptor*, bull of Leo X (1517), 174
- Humanism, 1, 142, 450n, 491, 497, 795, 1099
- Humiliati, Order of, 740
- Hungarians, 9n, 23, 37n, 38n, 53f., 61, 84, 123n, 147f., 152, 157f., 159n, 165, 170, 177f., 185n, 200n, 202, 219, 224, 235f., 244n, 247f., 252, 314, 317n, 318f., 350n, 373, 377, 383, 443f., 448n, 466, 478, 479n, 530, 566, 568ff., 571f., 574, 584, 678, 771, 828, 835n, 895n, 898, 1097n
- Hungary, 4n, 9, 36n, 37, 48, 55, 70, 72, 78n, 84, 85n, 91n, 93n, 96n, 105n, 114, 117n, 127n, 134n, 139n, 141, 149ff., 152, 157f., 159n, 160n, 163ff., 169n, 177f., 181, 184, 185n, 190n, 192n, 195n, 198, 199n, 200n, 201ff., 204f., 208, 213n, 216, 217n, 218f., 223f., 230n, 235ff., 240, 243, 244n, 245, 246n, 247f., 249n, 250ff., 253, 258, 261, 278, 291, 292n, 300ff., 310, 312ff., 315ff., 318ff., 321ff., 324f., 326n, 327f., 329n, 330n, 332, 334f., 338f., 341f., 344, 345n, 347n, 348ff., 354f., 359ff., 363ff., 369, 372ff., 375ff., 378ff., 381ff., 387ff., 390f., 393, 404f., 412, 413n, 415n, 422n, 431, 434ff., 437, 442ff., 445n, 448n, 452f., 455, 457, 458n, 459ff., 463ff., 466f., 470, 472f., 479f., 482f., 485, 487ff., 490, 495f., 502n, 530, 546, 549f., 562, 565ff., 568ff., 571ff., 575, 577f., 580ff., 584f., 589, 590n, 591n, 596, 609, 628ff., 633n, 645f., 679n, 693, 697ff., 700, 704f., 707f., 755, 760, 771, 778, 781, 790ff., 801, 810, 829, 835, 839, 841f., 844n, 845f., 852n, 854n, 865, 880, 889f., 895n, 899f., 902, 907, 911f., 919, 921, 929, 931, 1064, 1068, 1088, 1097f., 1102ff.; king of, *see* Ernst, son of Maximilian II (from 1578); kings of, *see* Saint Stephen 1000–1038, Géza I 1074–1077, Coloman I (d. 1116), Matthias Corvinus 1458–1490, Ladislás 1490–1516, Louis II Jagiello 1516–1526, Ferdinand of Austria (from 1526), John Zápolya 1526–1540, John Sigismund (b. 1540, d. 1571); lower Hungary, 578
- Huns, 53, 274
- Hus, John, Czech reformer (b. 1373, d. 1415), 418n, 454f., 790n
- Hussites, 543f.
- Huter, Jakob, Anabaptist, d. at Innsbruck in 1536: 565
- “Iachia” Pasha, *see* Yahya Pasha
- lanina, sanjakbey of, *see* Lutfi Beg (in 1533)
- Ibarra (Ybarra), Francisco, accountant for the Holy League in 1571: 1020, 1050n
- Ibrahim, Turkish *eha'ust* in 1542: 465
- Ibrahim Beg, chief dragoman of Suleiman I in the 1550's and 1560's: 591n, 699, 707n, 766, 772, 829, 921f.
- Ibrahim of Granada, Morisco spokesman in Istanbul ca. 1570: 950, 951n
- Ibrahim Pasha, Ottoman grand vizier (b. 1494, d. 1536), 233, 245, 246n, 248f., 253f., 278, 301, 318, 323n, 325n, 329n, 332, 334, 336f., 339ff., 342f., 349f., 356, 358, 362, 363n, 364f., 368, 369n, 371ff., 374ff., 377f., 380ff., 383, 384n, 385ff., 388f., 391n, 397n, 401, 407, 408n, 485, 771
- Igoumenitsa, 1047, 1050ff., 1066, 1081f., 783, 1084, 1086
- Illyria, Illyricum, *see* Dalmatia
- Ilok (Újlok), 254
- Images, 812, 820ff.
- Imola, 5n, 12f., 16n, 55, 93n, 140, 263f., 292; bishops of, *see* Niccolò Ridolfi (admin.) 1533–1546?, Girolamo Dandino 1546–1552?, Vitellozzo Vitelli (admin.) 1560–1561?, Giovanni Aldobrandini 1569–1573?; and *see* Galeazzo Riario, Ottaviano Riario
- Imperialists, 114n, 221, 225ff., 229ff., 233, 238, 248, 254, 256ff., 259n, 260f., 264n, 265ff., 268ff., 271n, 273f., 276f., 279, 281f., 284, 286ff., 289ff., 292ff., 295f., 300, 303f., 307ff., 310f., 315n, 316n, 322n, 328, 329n, 333, 342, 360, 369n, 399n, 402n, 430n, 443n, 456, 457n, 473n, 496f., 500f., 504n, 505, 507, 509ff., 512, 514f., 518n, 519ff., 522f., 526n, 527, 534f., 536n, 539n, 544, 549, 551n, 552, 557, 559f., 562, 580, 595n, 596, 598, 600, 605, 611f., 617ff., 620, 621n, 632, 634ff., 638ff., 642, 644f., 648f., 651f., 656f., 659, 662ff., 666, 668ff., 672, 676f., 685ff., 687, 688n, 691, 700, 716f., 723f., 728, 733, 735, 751n, 755, 774, 778, 781, 783, 788, 796, 802f., 804n, 807, 809, 1104
- In apostolici culminis*, bull of Leo X (1513), 151n
- In cornu Domini*, bull, 912, 940, 941n, 1090
- Index Librorum*, 626, 776, 779, 823
- India, 18ff., 23, 26, 28, 83f., 165n, 185, 348, 771, 934, 1064
- Indian Ocean, 32, 1098
- Indies, 19, 554, 625n, 661, 865, 919
- Indulgences, 36, 38, 65, 100n, 106, 124, 140n, 151, 164, 174, 177, 189, 350, 355, 369n, 499, 542, 572, 757, 777, 812, 820, 823ff., 862, 954, 964, 967, 1063, 1076; and *see* crusada
- “Inferno,” cell in the Tor di Nona, 752
- Inflation, 36, 406, 565, 607, 767, 771, 830, 892
- Infigo de Aragona (de Ávalos), cardinal 1561–1600, archbishop of Turin (admin.) 1563–1564?, bishop of Mileto (admin.) 1566–1573?: 1014f.
- Infigo Lopez de Mendoza, count of Tendilla (fl. 1560), 744, 745n, 751
- Iniño nostri huius pontificatus*, bull of Paul III (1542), 463n
- Innocent III (Lotario de Conti di Segni), cardinal 1190–1198, pope 1198–1216: 140
- Innocent VI (Étienne Aubert), bishop of Clermont 1340–1342, cardinal 1342–1352, pope 1352–1362: 92
- Innocent VIII (Giovanni Battista Cibo), bishop of Molietta 1472–1484, cardinal 1473–1484, pope 1484–1492: 4n, 10n, 48, 50, 142, 154, 260, 720, 711
- Innocent IX (Giannantonio Facchinetti), bishop of Nicastro 1560–1575?, patriarch of Jerusalem 1576–1585?, cardinal 1583–1591, pope in 1591: 776, 794, 899n, 923n, 924f., 929n, 933n, 935n, 937n, 939, 941ff., 946n, 947, 948n, 949n, 950n, 951, 954n, 955, 963n, 964, 965n, 966n, 968n, 971n, 972n, 982n, 988n, 998n, 999n, 1004, 1005n, 1007ff., 1010n, 1011f., 1018n, 1019, 1059ff., 1062f., 1069, 1087n, 1089f., 1094n, 1099



ha

Beg. in 155  
terminates in 2012: 465  
Suleyman 153  
16, 772, 852  
Kerman in 201nr ib 164  
01, 51, 129  
149, 159, 161  
872, 884  
407, 408, 4  
181, 182, 183M. 202, 203  
6: 67, 68, 69  
d. 100  
100, 101, 10233, 28, 29  
271, 272  
269, 30  
329, 7156, 157  
112, 54  
159, 160  
161, 162  
163, 164  
165, 16629, 30  
31, 32  
33, 3450, 51  
52, 53  
54, 5556, 57  
58, 59  
60, 6162, 63  
64, 65  
66, 6768, 69  
70, 71  
72, 7374, 75  
76, 77  
78, 7980, 81  
82, 83  
84, 8586, 87  
88, 89  
90, 9192, 93  
94, 95  
96, 9798, 99  
100, 101  
102, 103

Innocent X (Giovanni Battista Pamphili), pope from 1644 (b. 1572, d. 1655), **1101**

Innocent XI (Benedetto Odescalchi), pope 1676–1689: 449, **1101**

Innocenzo del Monte, adopted son of Balduino and protégé of Giovanni Maria (Julio II); cardinal 1550–1577: 528, 545n, 546, 547n, 548n, 555n, 560, 562ff., 580n, 581n, 592f., 594n, **595**, 597n, **610**, **613**, **630**, **711**, **734**, **745**, **754n**

Innsbruck, 153n, **244**, 349, 357n, 363f., 495, 542, 545ff., 553n, 557n, 558, 560n, 562ff., **581**, 582n, 796f., 800ff., 803f., 805n, **829**

Inquisition, 531, 625f., **642**, 710f., 714f., 718f., **742**, 754n, **831**, 881f., **884**, **900**, **910**, **913**; *see also* Inquisitors, Spanish Inquisition

Inquisitors, **718**, **883ff.**, **893**, **900**, **912**

Invocation, **822**

Ionian Sea, 445, 529, 561, **770**, **807**, **843**, **848**, **851**, **855**, **862**, 901f., **906**, 1023n, **1032**, **1093**, 1102f.

Ippolito d' Este, son of Alfonso; archbishop of Milan (admin.) 1519–1550?, cardinal 1538–1572; archbishop of Lyon (admin.) 1539–1551?, bishop of Treguier (admin.) 1542–1548, of Autun 1548–1550, archbishop of Auch (admin.) 1551–1563?: 288, 507, 511f., 522, 551, 560, 563n, 564, **595**, 598ff., 601f., 610ff., 613f., 617ff., **620**, **636**, 637n, **710**, 725ff., 726f., 729f., **732**, **734ff.**, 737f., **740**, **752**, 853n, 882ff., 885f., **1047**

Ippolito d' Este, son of Ercole I d' Este and Eleonora d' Aragona; archbishop of Gran 1487–1497, cardinal 1493–1520, bishop of Erlau 1497–1520: 50n, 76, 120

Ippolito de' Medici, archbishop of Avignon 1529–1535, cardinal 1529–1535, archbishop of Montreale (admin.) 1532–1535: 222n, 277, 418n

Ireland, 628n

Iris, *see* Yesil Irmak

Isaac, Rabbi, proposed recipient of a stipend from the French in 1581: 840n

Isabella, daughter of Manuel of Portugal and Maria of Aragon; wife of Charles V 1526–1539 (d. 1539), 338n, 396n

Isabella, daughter of Sigismund I of Poland and Bona Sforza; wife of John Zápolya 1539–1540 (d. 1559), 455, 456n, 461, 478f., 487, 530, 566ff., 569ff., **572**, **575**, 577f., **771**, **922**, 1015n

Isabella d' Este, daughter of Ercole I d' Este and Eleonora d' Aragona; wife of (Gian) Francesco II Gonzaga 1490–1519 (d. 1539), 79n, 80n, 132, 182, 262, 273n, 280ff., 311, 330, 341, 368, 445n, **725**

Isabella of Aragon, daughter of Alfonso II; wife of Gian Galeazzo Sforza 1489–1494 (d. 1524), 656n

Isabella of Castile, daughter of John II of Castile and León; wife of Ferdinand II of Aragon 1469–1504, queen of Castile and León 1474–1504: 13, 35n, 38, 41, 42n, 190

Isachino, Geremia, superior of S. Silvestro in 1559: 712

Ischia, 294, 304, 309n

Isernia, bishop of, *see* Massimo Corvino 1510–1522

Islam, 85, 113, 126, 141, 149, 156, 179, 187, 212, 386f., 398, 415, 434, **569**, **590**, **608**, **698n**, **929**, **936**, 1042f., 1089n, **1098**, **1104**; *and see* Moslems

Isma'îl I, grandson of Uzun Hasan; Safavid shah or "sophi" of Persia 1502–1524: 25, 38, 104n, 127f., 201, **1097**

Isola della Scala, 69n, 71, 79

Isola di Lampedusa, 554

Isola Farnese, 275

Isola Sacra (between the mouths of the Tiber), 668ff., **671**

Isola Tiberina (in Rome), 687

Istanbul, 2, 11f., 17, 23n, 26, 34, 37ff., 45, 51, 53f., 57, 59, 69n, 70, 72, 74f., 78, 79n, 81n, 83n, 84, 87f., 89n, 90, 99, 104n, 122f., 126f., 128n, 133, 141, 151f., 156, 162,

163n, 164, 165n, 174f., 177, 178n, 179, 181, 183f., 185n, 191, 193n, 194, 198, 200n, 205, 212n, 217f., 224n, 227n, 229, 233, 234n, 235n, 240, 245, 246n, 251f., 254, 258, 274, 278f., 300ff., 303, 313f., 316f., 323f., 326f., 331f., 333n, 335n, 336, 338ff., 342f., 345n, 346ff., 349, 356, 358, 360, 361n, 366, 368, 369n, 370f., 373f., 376, 378, 382ff., 385ff., 388ff., 391, 393, 395n, 396, 397n, 400n, 401, 406ff., 409ff., 412, 421ff., 424f., 427, 432, 435n, 441n, 442, 444, 445n, 446, 448n, 449n, 450f., 455ff., 458, 459, 461f., 464n, 465n, 467n, 468ff., 472f., 475, 479ff., 482ff., 485ff., 488ff., 493, 495, 501n, 502f., 504n, 526n, 530f., 533f., 536f., 542, 550, 551n, 552ff., 555, 556n, 558ff., 561f., 567n, **572**, **574**, 577f., **580**, 582ff., 585n, **586**, 588ff., 591n, 592n, 597n, **606**, **608**, 622ff., 629ff., **647**, **650**, **653**, 661f., 679n, **681**, 684n, 692n, 693f., 696ff., 699n, 700f., **704**, 705n, 706f., 708n, **742**, 755n, 760n, **761**, 762n, 763n, 765ff., 770f., **784**, **805**, **815**, 829ff., 832ff., **835**, 836n, 837ff., 840ff., 843n, 844f., 848ff., 851f., **855**, 856n, 861, 862n, **865**, 874, 878ff., 891f., 894f., 896n, 897f., **901**, **903**, 906ff., **909**, **912**, **919**, 921f., 924f., 928ff., 931f., 934ff., 938f., 944n, 945f., 948ff., 951f., **959**, 963f., 970f., **976**, **981**, **988**, 993n, 1000n, **1001**, **1004**, 1007f., **1011**, **1013**, **1015**, 1017f., 1022n, 1027n, **1040**, **1045**, **1049**, **1053**, 1054n, **1065**, 1068f., **1075**, **1078**, **1080**, 1081n, 1088ff., 1091ff., 1094ff., 1097n, **1098**, **1101**, **1103**

Istria, 19n, 21, 89, 164n, 288n, 356n, 389, **783**, **925**, 948f., 1010, 1070n

Isvales, Pietro, archbishop of Reggio di Calabria 1497–1506, cardinal 1500–1511: 9, 35

Italian language, 21, 57, 91n, 139, 294, 316, 399f., **571**, 626n, **631**, **699**, **743**, **748**, **780**, **795**, 1091n, **1099**

Italians, 3, 12n, 40, 53, 70, 76, 104n, 116, 177, 182, 208n, 215f., 219, 261, 264, 282f., 286, 291n, 304, 559, 364, 378n, 397, 413, 420, 455, 466, 482, 491, 500, 513f., 519, 533, 569, 584, 595, 600f., 611, 618, 624, 639, 644, 652, 657, 659, 664f., 680, 685, 691, 722n, **723**, **727**, **733**, **741**, **759**, **761**, **778**, **783**, **785**, 787f., 794f., **797**, **802**, 804f., 807f., 821, 822n, 836, 841, 859, 871, 875f., 879, 887, **889**, **903**, **905**, **911**, **916**, **920**, **990**, **1004**, **1015**, 1020n, **1024**, **1026**, 1032ff., 1035f., 1038n, 1039ff., 1047f., **1081**

Italy, 1f., 4, 6, 12ff., 15, 17, 27, 34, 36ff., 40ff., 43f., 46f., 50f., 54, 56ff., 59n, 61, 63, 67, 70, 73, 77ff., 80, 81n, 83n, 86f., 89, 91, 93ff., 96n, 97n, 98ff., 101, 104, 109, 115f., 118ff., 122, 125ff., 129ff., 132, 134, 136f., 139ff., 142ff., 145, 147f., 149n, 150, 152, 153n, 154, 156n, 159f., 163, 164n, 165ff., 169f., 173n, 175, 177, 178n, 179, 184, 185n, 187, 188n, 189, 192, 195ff., 198, 200ff., 211, 215, 217n, 216, 218ff., 221ff., 224, 226ff., 229ff., 233, 235, 237ff., 241f., 243n, 244, 246ff., 250, 252, 254, 256ff., 259n, 260f., 263, 265, 268n, 270n, 272, 274f., 276n, 277ff., 280, 283, 287n, 288, 291, 293ff., 297ff., 300, 302, 304, 305n, 308n, 310ff., 313n, 315f., 318, 320ff., 323, 327f., 329n, 330ff., 334ff., 341, 344, 347ff., 354f., 355f., 359ff., 366ff., 373f., 378, 387n, 391, 393ff., 402f., 405ff., 411, 416n, 417, 420f., 430f., 432n, 433n, 437, 439ff., 442f., 452f., 457, 460f., 463f., 466ff., 470, 473, 482, 486, 492, 497f., 500, 503, 518n, 534, 537n, 548ff., 551, 553ff., 557, 559f., 562, 577n, 581f., 585f., **589**, **594**, **596**, **599**, 601f., **605**, 609, 611n, **612**, **622**, 623n, **624**, **628**, 631, 635ff., **638**, **642**, 644ff., **647**, **649**, 652ff., 656f., 661ff., 665f., **669**, 671, 673ff., 676ff., 679f., 682ff., **685**, **689ff**, **693**, 694n, 696n, 697n, **701**, **705**, **708**, 709n, **712**, **720**, 721n, **726**, **729**, **734**, **742**, 749n, **750**, **755**, **758**, 763f., **770**, **773**, **775**, 777n, **782**, 784n, **786**, 806f., 811, 816, 819, 828ff., 833, 841ff., **846**, **854**, 858f., **862**, **873**, **878**, **880**, **884**, **888**, 890f., **899**, **912**, **914**, 917ff., 920f., **941**, **957**, **963**, **976**, **978**, **986**, 992n, 994n, 997f., **1002**, **1008**, 1012f.,

- 1017, 1021, 1025, 1045, 1048f., 1076n, 1081, 1088f., 1093; Hospitallers from, 207, 854
- Ithaca, 1051f.
- Ivan IV "the Terrible," son of Vasily V and Helena Glinsk; grand duke of Moscow from 1533, czar of Russia from 1547 (d. 1584), 768n, 1087
- Ivaco the Armenian, envoy of Sigismund I to Suleiman I ca. 1528: 318
- Iviza (Ibiza) 891
- Ivrea, 297, 666; bishop of, *see* Bonifazio Ferreri 1511–1518
- Izmit, Gulf of, 874n
- Jacopa del Monte, sister of Giovanni Maria (Julius III), 594
- Jacopo IV d' Appiano, despot of Piombino 1474–1510: 12, 14n
- Jacopo VI d' Appiano, "lord of Piombino" until 1546: 664n
- Jacopo (Gherardi) da Volterra, Roman diarist (*fl.* 1480), 154
- Jacopo de' Bannisi, servitor of Margaret of Austria-Savoy (*fl.* 1517), 168n
- Jacques d' Aneault, bishop of Lisieux 1539–1557, cardinal 1544–1557: 508n
- Jacques de Bourbon, bastard son of Louis, bishop of Liège; author of an eyewitness account of the second siege of Rhodes, grand prior of France from 1515 (d. 1527), 203, 204n, 206, 209f., 212, 214
- Jacques (II) de Chabannes, seigneur de la Palice, grand marshal of France 1515 (d. 1525), 68f., 98n, 118, 129f., 224
- Jacques de Gernigny, French ambassador to Istanbul from 1579: 840f.
- Jacques de Savoie, duke of Nemours (b. 1531, d. 1585), 664n
- jañ, bishop of, *see* Pedro Pacheco 1545–1554
- Jagiellonians, dynasty in Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia (14th–16th centuries), 313, 315, 938
- Jahāngir (Giangir), son of Suleiman I, 530, 630
- jaime, nephew of Francisco de Sanoguera (d. 1565), 864
- jajce (Jaizca), 253
- James II de Lusignan, bastard son of John II; king of Cyprus 1464–1473: 338
- James IV, son of James III; king of Scotland 1488–1513: 50, 54, 74, 76n, 87, 95n, 99, 107f., 141, 150n; wife of, *see* Margaret Tudor, daughter of Henry VII
- James V, son of James IV and Margaret, daughter of Henry VII of England; king of Scotland 1513–1542: 180; wife of, *see* Marie of Guise 1538–1542 (d. 1560)
- Janiculum (in Rome), 270
- Janis da Tolmezzo, Francesco, traveler in Rome (1519), 140n
- Janissaries, 84, 122f., 126, 128, 146, 208, 209n, 212, 213n, 214, 224n, 235n, 278, 326, 342, 356, 365, 367, 374, 386, 407n, 442, 444, 477, 562, 589f., 622n, 679, 696, 699f., 761, 764f., 830, 833f., 838n, 842, 845, 857, 864, 894, 895n, 896, 898, 942, 976, 995, 1028f., 1032, 1037f., 1041f., 1055, 1057f., 1067, 1086, 1095
- Jarnac, battle of (1569), 949
- Jativa, 14
- Java, 348, 771
- Jean III d' Albret, king of Navarre 1484–1516: 14, 97, 122n, 132, 195n, 229n
- Jean d' Auton, French chronicler (d. 1528), 131n
- Jean d' Avanson, French ambassador to Rome in 1555: 614n, 615n, 616n, 617n, 618n, 621n, 637, 640, 642, 647n, 648, 653, 661, 666n
- Jean de Dinteville, brother of François; French ambassador to England from 1533: 349n
- Jean de Guise, cardinal of Lorraine, bishop of Metz 1505–1547, cardinal 1518–1550, bishop of Verdun (admin.) 1523–1544, archbishop of Narbonne (admin.) 1524–1550, bishop of Albi (admin.) 1535–1550, of Agen (admin.) 1538–1550, of Nantes (admin.) 1542–1553: 221, 515, 517, 519, 524
- Jean de Hornes, letter-writer in the Netherlands in 1567: 918n
- Jean de la Forêt (la Forest), Hospitaller and secretary of Francis I (d. 1537), 392f., 400f., 406, 414, 424, 430, 431n, 441n
- Jean de la Valette, grand master of the Hospitallers from 1557 (b. 1494, d. 1568), 758, 760n, 761, 810, 818, 849n, 852, 854n, 855n, 861, 863n, 866ff., 874ff., 878, 889, 900ff., 905, 905, 936f., 939
- Jean de la Vigne, French ambassador in Istanbul (d. 1559), 679, 681f., 691f., 694f., 697f., 700f., 704f., 707f., 750n, 751n, 766f., 830n, 837
- Jean de Langeac, French diplomat, bishop of Avranches 1526–1552, of Limoges 1532–1541: 302f.
- Jean de Moncluc, brother of Blaise; French diplomat, bishop of Valence and Die 1554–1566 (b. 1508, d. 1579), 456n, 470, 480ff., 487ff., 490, 601
- Jean de Pennans, correspondent of Jean de Hornes in 1567: 918n
- Jean de Save, notary of the Camera Apostolica in 1562: 753
- Jean de Vandenesse, comptroller of the imperial household ca. 1536: 326n, 397, 398n, 464n
- Jean de Vêga, companion of Bertrand d' Ornesan in 1537: 431n
- Jean du Bellay, French diplomat, bishop of Bayonne 1524 or 1526–1532; of Paris 1532–1551; cardinal 1535–1560, bishop of Limoges (admin.) 1541–1544, of Le Mans 1542–1556, archbishop of Bordeaux (admin.) 1544–1551: 321, 406n, 515, 524, 610, 612f., 624n, 637, 643, 653, 681, 690n, 716f., 726, 728n, 730ff., 755f.
- Jedin, Hubert, historian of the Council of Trent (b. 1900, d. 1980), 298n, 445n, 486n, 500, 540, 778
- Jem (modern Turkish: Cem) Sultan, son of Mehmed II; Ottoman pretender (d. 1495), 141, 213n
- Jerba, 235, 552n, 534f., 536n, 555, 745n, 746n, 759ff., 762ff., 765ff., 768, 770, 795, 832f., 834n, 836f., 841f., 846, 853, 855, 856n, 857, 871f., 888, 891, 894, 905, 933, 943; sheikh of, 235, 759
- Jerbians, 759ff., 762f.
- Jerome of Zara, Austrian envoy to Istanbul in 1533: 245n, 363n, 367n, 370ff., 373f., 376f., 379f., 382f., 385, 387ff., 392
- Jerusalem, 21, 24, 28, 32, 34, 39, 50, 54, 85, 126f., 141, 146n, 147, 155n, 187, 191, 210n, 302, 319, 379, 458, 705ff., 954n, 962, 1037; kingdom of, 373, 1034n; kings of, *see* Amaury de Lusignan 1197–1205, Guy de Lusignan 1186–1190; patriarchs of, *see* Antonio Elia 1558–1576, Gianantonio Facchinetti (Innocent IX) 1576–1585?
- Jesuits (Society of Jesus), Order, 741, 768n, 793, 1087; general of, *see* Diego Laynez (from 1558)
- "Jew, the," pirate, *see* Ciphut Sinan
- Jews, 30, 39n, 123, 188, 189n, 215, 306, 347, 378, 445n, 482n, 493, 587, 608, 626, 631, 687, 703f., 714, 761, 834, 849, 878, 899n, 924f., 929f., 934, 936n, 944n, 950, 954n, 965, 1001n, 1011, 1012n, 1092n; and *see* Abraham Abensach, Salomon Askenasi, Ghetto, Rabbi Isaac, Marani, Joseph Nasi, Zionism
- Jiménez de Cisneros, Francisco, archbishop of Toledo 1495–1517, cardinal 1507–1517: 85f.
- Joachim, son of Joachim I and Elizabeth of Denmark; margrave (II) of Brandenburg; elector from 1535 (b. 1505, d. 1571), 435, 453, 461, 476ff., 484, 543, 603n, 658, 716, 722f.
- Joachim de Rye, papal chamberlain in 1552: 563
- Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand I and Anna, daughter of Ladislas

- of Bohemia and Hungary; wife of Francesco de' Medici 1565–1578: **568**
- Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella of Castile; wife of Philip, archduke of Austria and king (I) of Castile 1496–1506 (d. 1555), 35n, 41, 43n, 49, 126
- Joannes de Ragusio, proposed assassin of Maximilian I in 1513: 150n
- Joannes Franciscus de Potentia, bishop of Skara from 1523: 273n, 285n
- Giuliano Ernst, son of Johann the Steadfast and Margaret of Anhalt; duke (Ernestine line) of Saxony (b. 1521, d. 1563), 476
- Johann Friedrich, son of John the Steadfast (Johann der Beständige) and Sophie of Mecklenburg; Elector of Saxony 1532–1554: 354, 405, 416ff., 453, 476, 482, 484, 502
- Johann Jacob von Kuen-Belasy, archbishop of Salzburg 1561–1580? (d. 1586), **810**
- Johann Matthias von der Schulenburg, Saxon soldier in Venetian service, collector of works of art (b. 1661, d. 1747), **1103**
- Johann von Iseburg, elector and archbishop of Trier 1547–1556: 559, 546
- Johann von Weeze, archbishop of Lund from 1522: 405n, 434, 456, **567**
- John, son of Christian I and Dorothea, daughter of Johann of Brandenburg; king of Denmark 1481–1513: 39
- John, son of Manuel of Portugal and Maria, daughter of Ferdinand V of Aragon; king (III) of Portugal 1521–1557: 328
- John Corvinus, bastard son of Matthias; duke of Croatia (b. 1473, d. 1504), 37
- John Sigismund, son of John Zápolya and Isabella, daughter of Sigismund I; king of Hungary (b. 1540, d. 1571), 455, 456n, 461, 478, 530, 566ff., 569, 571, 575, 577f., 580, 650n, 692, 721, 834f., 844n, **845**, 846n, **852**, **862**, **865**, **922**, **1013**, **1015**
- John de Tanczin (Tanczinski, Tęczyński), castellan of Lublin and envoy of Sigismund I to Suleiman I ca. 1528: 315ff., 318f.
- John of Austria, natural son of Charles V and Barbara Blomberg; viceroys of the Netherlands from 1576 (b. 1545, d. 1578), **658**, 853n, **871**, 919f., **933**, **962**, **969**, 998f., 1012ff., 1015ff., 1019ff., 1022ff., 1025f., 1045ff., 1048ff., 1051ff., 1054ff., 1057ff., 1060ff., 1063ff., 1066ff., 1069ff., 1072ff., 1076ff., 1079ff., 1083ff., **1086**, **1090**, **1095**
- John of Leyden, Protestant revolutionary (b. ca. 1509, d. 1536), **565**
- John of Paris (John Quidort), French polemicist (d. 1306), 454
- Johnson, Samuel, English man of letters (b. 1709, d. 1784), 81
- Jonas, Justus, supporter of Luther (b. 1493, d. 1555), **565**
- Joseph II, patriarch of Constantinople 1555–1565: 768n
- Joseph d' Aaron de Segura, alum contractor in Istanbul ca. 1567: 924f., **929**, 936n, 954n
- Joseph von Lamberg, imperial diplomat (b. 1489, d. 1554), 349, 350n, 358, 362ff., 381
- Juan Antonio de Taxis, imperial postmaster in Rome in 1555 and 1556: 611n, 612n, 613n, 652f., 655f., **658**, **689**
- Juan de Ayala, Spanish envoy to Rome in 1561: 774f.
- Juan de Cardona, leader of a relief force for Malta in 1565: **862**, 865n, 871f., 875f., 978ff., **982**, **985**, **1021**, 1024n, **1068**, **1084**
- Juan de Castilla, commander at the siege of Jerba in 1560: **765**
- Juan de la Cerda, duke of Medina Celi; viceroys of Sicily ca. 1559: 758ff., 761f., **764**, 854n
- Juan de Mariana, Spanish historian and philosopher (d. 1623?), 115n
- Juan de Omedes, grand master of the Hospitaliers (d. 1553), 555
- Juan de Soto, secretary of Don John of Austria (fl. 1571), **1055**
- Juan de Vega, imperial envoy to Rome in 1546: 481n, 484n; viceroy of Sicily in 1551: 535, 536n, 554
- Juan de Zúñiga, brother of Luis de Zúñiga y Requesens, Spanish ambassador to Rome in 1568 and 1570: **919**, **951**, 954n, 958n, 960f., **963**, **966**, 967n, **969**, **982**, **984**, 985n, 986n, **993**, 998f., 1013ff., 1016f., 1021n, 1062n, **1063**, 1070f., **1074**, 1076n, **1077**, **1079**
- Judea, **1099**
- Judaism, **703**
- Julius II (Giuliano della Rovere, nephew of Sixtus IV), cardinal 1471–1503, archbishop of Avignon 1474–1503, pope 1503–1513: 3, 5, 8ff., 11, 13f., 15n, 16ff., 23, 33ff., 36ff., 39ff., 42f., 45n, 46, 48f., 49n, 50ff., 54n, 56ff., 62ff., 65ff., 68ff., 71ff., 74ff., 77ff., 80, 85ff., 89n, 92ff., 95ff., 98ff., 101ff., 104, 105n, 106n, **107f.**, 109n, 110, 111n, 112, 115n, **114f.**, 118ff., 121ff., 124n, 125, 127, 129ff., 132ff., 135ff., 138ff., 141, 143ff., 148n, 149, 152f., 166, 169f., 200, 203, 220, 299, 475, 509f., **587**, **644**, **666**
- Julius III (Giovanni Maria Ciocchi del Monte), archbishop of Manfredonia (Siponto) 1513–1544, cardinal 1536–1550, pope 1550–1555: 138, 139n, 289n, 309n, 486f., 489n, 490, 492f., 495ff., 498ff., 501f., 506, 510f., 513ff., 517, 520n, 522ff., 525ff., 528ff., 531, 533, 535, 537ff., 540ff., 543ff., 546ff., 549ff., 552ff., 555ff., 558ff., 561ff., 564, **568**, **572**, 576n, 577n, 579ff., **582**, 587f., 592f., 594n, 595ff., **598**, 600ff., 603ff., 606, 608n, 610ff., 614ff., 617f., 621n, **622**, **628**, **632**, **634**, 650f., 659, 721f., **754**, **769**, **774**, 777n, **779**, **809**, **822ff.**, **860**, **882**, 885n
- Jurisdiction, 540, **710**, **793**, **912**
- Jurisić, Nicholas, envoy of Ferdinand of Hapsburg to Istanbul in 1530: 349, 365, 366n, 370, 379, 381, 491
- Justification by faith, doctrine of, 443n, 453, 460n, 495ff., 498, 513f., 529, 544, 615n, **618**, **683n**, **792**
- Justinian, Joseph, Chian messenger from Istanbul to the western powers in 1570: 970f.
- Justinopolis (Capodistria, Koper), 389
- Kadan (Czech Kadaň, German Kaaden), 460n; compact of (1534), 460
- Kadi, Turkish judge, **898**
- Ka'itbey, Mamluk sultan of Egypt and Syria 1468–1496: 32
- Kalocza, archbishops of, see Paul Tomory 1523–1526, Francesco de' Frangipani 1530–1543, Georg Drasković 1582–1587
- Kalopanayiotis, village in Cyprus, **756**, 757n
- Kameneć-Podolskiy, town southeast of L'vov, 320n; bishop of, see Laurentius Miedzieski 1521–1531
- Kamičac, castle in Croatia, 455n
- Känsüh al-Ghūrī, see al Ashraf Känsüh al-Ghūrī
- Kara Mustafa Pasha, grand vizir under Mehmed IV (d. 1683), **1099**, **1101**
- Karaburun, Turkish village, **894**
- Karamüsel, village in northwestern Turkey, 874n
- Karlowitz, treaty of (1699), **1102f.**
- Kars (Chorsa), **590**
- Kaş (Andifli), **985**
- Kasam Beg, Turkish envoy to Venice in 1523: 217
- Kaschau, see Košice
- Kasim Beg or Kasim Pasha, pasha of Buda ca. 1550: 566f., **584**; vizir (d. after 1552), 278, 382, 386, 407ff., 410, 449n, **573**
- Kaspar von Schwenkfeld, German Protestant theologian (b. 1490, d. 1561), **563**, **791**
- Kassiopi (Casoppo), **988**, **1050**
- Kastellörizon (Meysti), **984**

- Katzianer, Johann (Hans), army commander in 1533 and 1537: 371, 415n, 433
- Kaya Chelebi, Ottoman commander in 1570: 984
- Kemal Pacha Zadeh (Kemal Pasha Zade), Ottoman scholar (b. 1468/1469, d. 1534), 249n
- Kent, 597n
- Kerala, 18
- Kerynia, 979
- Khairuddin, sanjakbey of Herzegovina in 1545: 475n
- Khairuddin Barbarossa, younger brother of Aruj, corsair and grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet (b. ca. 1466, d. 1546), 234f., 328, 344, 345n, 347, 375ff., 379ff., 384n, 385f., 388f., 392f., 395ff., 398, 406f., 408n, 414f., 424, 427, 428n, 429, 431, 439, 445f., 447n, 465, 467ff., 470ff., 473f., 494n, 532, 585, 699n, 765, 832, 860, 1008, 1053, 1086
- Khalil, Ottoman finance minister, ca. 1567: 921
- Kharāj, Turkish poll tax, 53, 156, 332, 439, 894, 896ff., 1041, 1043
- Khāşeki Khurram, *see* Roxelana
- Kisamos, bishop of, *see* Girolamo Ragazzoni (from 1572)
- Kizil-bashis ("red-heads"), followers of Ismā'īl I, 127
- Knight, William, English diplomat, bishop of Bath and Wells from 1541 (b. 1476, d. 1547), 132n
- Knights Hospitaller, or of Rhodes, *see* Hospitallers
- Knin, bishop of, *see* Andrea Duditić (Dudić) Šbardellati 1562–1565
- Knyszyn, 1087
- Kočevje, town in Carniola, 337
- Köller, Wolfgang, envoy of Maurice of Saxony to the Council of Trent in 1552: 543f.
- Kokel river (Tirnavna Mare), 390
- Komorn (Komárno), 766, 835, 844
- Konya, 503, 591, 768
- Koran (*al-Qur'ān*), 141, 833, 845
- Korkud, eldest son of Bayazid II (*fl.* 1511), 84, 123n, 127
- Košice (German Kaschau, Hungarian Kassa), city in southeastern Slovakia, 314, 315n, 565, 568
- Kotor, Bay of, *see* Bocche di Cattaro
- Krka river, 791
- Kronstadt (Rum. Braşov, Hung. Brassó), 566n
- Krosno, 314
- Kružić, Petar (Pietro Crosić), Count, captain under Ferdinand of Hapsburg (d. 1537), 378n, 385, 421
- Krzycki (Cricius), Andreas, bishop of Przemysl 1523–1527, bishop of Płock 1527–1535, archbishop of Gniezno 1535–1537: 315n, 317n, 318, 320
- Kubad, Ottoman cha'ush in Venice in 1568 and 1570: 936, 952f., 955, 971, 991, 1018
- Kurdistan, 152, 589f.
- Kurtoglu (Curtoglu) Turkish pirate, 83, 89, 235
- Kuruczok (*Cruciat*, crusaders), in Hungary, 157n
- Kusani Bali, owner of galleys in 1566: 898
- Kyrenia (Cerines), harbor on Cyprus, 937, 1004n
- L' Aquila, 292f., 307, 309
- L' Esparre, *see* André de Foix
- L' Isle-Adam, Philippe de Villiers de, *see* Philippe de Villiers de La Bicocca, battle of (1522), 201, 284
- La Bormula (Cospicua), area in Malta, 854, 863f., 866f., 870f., 873
- La Cava, bishop of *see* Tommaso di Sanfelice 1520–1550?
- La Chaux, seigneur de, *see* Charles de Poupet
- La Ferté-Milon, 691n
- La Goletta (La Goulette), harbor of Tunis, 235, 397f., 533, 830, 842, 849, 852, 854, 859, 861n, 887n, 889ff., 902f., 905, 951, 955, 957, 1016, 1095, 1099
- La Magliana, 669
- La Mirandola, 310
- La Molca, village on Andros, 83
- La Mota, castle northwest of Madrid, 14
- La Palice, seigneur de, *see* Jacques de Chabannes (d. 1525)
- La Rochelle, treaty of (1573), 1088
- La Rocheport, lord of, *see* François de Montmorency
- La Spezia, 582, 911, 1024
- Laconia, Gulf of, 835, 1081, 1083
- Ladislav, son of Casimir IV of Poland and Elizabeth of Austria; king of Bohemia 1471–1516, of Hungary 1490–1516: 9n, 37, 54, 61, 152, 157f., 159n, 163, 244n
- Lairat Hierusalem, bull of Paul III (1544), 486, 493
- Lago Albano, 656
- Lago di Como, 738n
- Lago di Garda, 52n
- Laguna di Marano, 464
- Lainez, Diego, *see* Lajnez
- Lajazzo, Gulf of, *see* Gulf of Alexandretta
- Lallemand, Jean (Juan Alemán), secretary to Charles V in 1528: 312n, 362
- Lambeth, 185n
- Lamone river, 264
- Lamorat, count of Egmont from 1541 (b. 1522, d. 1568), 691, 914, 917f., 920
- Lampedusa, 871
- Lanciano, archbishop of, *see* Leonardo Marini 1560–1566?
- Lando, Pietro, Venetian diplomat and commander, doge from 1538 (b. 1462, d. 1545), 148n, 150n, 279, 295, 297n, 303f., 306, 309n, 427n, 462, 464f.
- Landriano, cardinal (d. 1529), 328
- Landsknechte, 177, 226, 256f., 261ff., 264f., 270f., 273, 277, 281, 282n, 283, 285ff., 289ff., 292, 293n, 294f., 297, 304f., 330, 342n, 364, 426, 429, 435, 439ff., 889
- Landucci, Luca, Florentine apothecary and diarist (*fl.* 1512), 117
- Lanfranco, Andrea, secretary of Giovanni Carafa in 1559: 711
- Lang, Matthias, bishop of Gurk 1501–1512, archbishop of Salzburg 1512–1540, cardinal 1512–1540: 54, 74, 94, 105f., 112n, 132f., 135f., 159n, 435
- Langer, Gregory, bishop of Wiener Neustadt 1531–1548: 435
- Langres, bishop of, *see* Claude de Givry (admin.) 1528–1561
- Langue de Provence, *see* Provence, Hospitallers from Languedoc, 225, 359, 915
- Lannoy, Philippe, prince of Sulmona (*fl.* 1560), 745
- Lantzperg, Martinus, printer in Leipzig in 1509: 57n
- Laon, 473n, 483n; bishop of, *see* Louis de Bourbon 1510–1552
- Largo Torre Argentina, in Rome, 272
- Larnaca, 757
- Larnaca Bay (on Cyprus), 46, 927, 972, 976, 979
- Lascaris, John (Janus), Greek humanist and French ambassador to Venice until 1509 (b. ca. 1445, d. 1535), 7, 53f., 56f., 113, 157n, 166, 230n, 393
- Laski, Jerome Jaroslav, Polish diplomat (b. 1495, d. 1542), 252f., 301, 312, 313n, 314, 316n, 318, 320f., 323, 324n, 340, 342, 346, 349, 352n, 357n, 360, 383, 386, 390f., 436f., 442f., 458, 459n
- Laski, John, brother of Jerome and nephew of John, archbishop of Gniezno; provost of the church at Gniezno (b. ca. 1499, d. 1560), 323, 324n
- Laski, John, uncle of Jerome; archbishop of Gniezno 1508–1531: 149, 151n, 154, 312, 319, 321, 323, 340
- Lasso, Diego, ambassador of Ferdinand of Hapsburg to Rome in 1551: 548n, 561n, 563n, 577ff., 580, 581n, 582, 596
- Lateran, church and palace (S. John, or S. Giovanni in Laterano, in Rome), 6, 95, 110, 121, 126n, 136, 144, 145n, 151n,

- 154f., 413, 529, **640**, **877**; Lateran Councils, 708n, **714**;  
and see Fifth Lateran Council
- Latin language, 20, 34, 58n, 91n, 123, 139, 142, 157, 165,  
178n, 198n, 214, 316, 331, 363, 365n, 405n, 493, 541,  
573n, 574, 626n, **717**, 734n, **735**, 748f., 772n, 795f.,  
1016n, **1062**, **1099**
- Latins, 21, 147, 208, 211, 215, 401, **710**, 756ff., **899**, 926f.,  
**1030**, **1038**, **1088**
- Latium, 216
- Laudes, **824**
- Laurana, Zuan, skipper of the Venetian ship *Alberta* in 1550:  
531
- Laurato, Anzolo, subordinate of Marc' Antonio Barbaro in  
1571: 1012n
- Laurentii, Jacques, galley commander under Juan de la Cerda  
in 1560: **759**
- Lauro, Lorenzo, steward or carver of Balduino del Monte ca.  
1553: 564n
- Lautrec, viscount of, see Odet de Foix (b. ca. 1485/1484, d.  
1528)
- Lavaur, bishop of, see Pierre Danès 1557–1577
- Layne, Diego, Jesuit theologian (b. 1512, d. 1565), 539, 542,  
**787**, **791**, **792n**, **793**, **808**, **812**
- Lazare de Baif, French diplomat and humanist (b. 1496, d.  
1547), 361, 363n
- Lazaro, Constantine, priest and father of Giacomo di Zante,  
**926**
- Le Bron, Nicholas, anti-Turkish poet (fl. 1541), 461
- Le Catelet, **708**
- Le Mans, bishops of, see Louis de Bourbon (admin.) 1519–  
1535, Jean du Bellay 1542–1556, Charles d' Angennes  
1556–1587
- League of Cambrai (1508), see Cambrai, League of
- Lecavella, Sebastiano, archbishop of Naxos 1542–1562, bishop  
of Lettere 1562–1565? (d. 1566), **776**, **782**
- Leccese, 295, 584n; bishops of, see Gonsalvo de Sangro 1525–  
1530, Braccio Martelli 1552–1559
- Lefèvre d'Étaples, French humanist (b. 1455, d. 1536), 55n  
Lefka, **756**
- Legnago, 93
- Legnano, 69n
- Leipzig, **772**
- Lemnos, **1101**
- Leo I (the Great), Saint, pope 440–461: **794**
- Leo III, pope 795–816: **716**
- Leo IV, pope 847–855: 270n
- Leo X (Giovanni de' Medici, son of Lorenzo and Chiara) cardinal  
1489–1513, pope 1513–1521: 3, 48n, 50n, 75, 101, 103f.,  
108, 109n, 112n, 113n, 114f., 118, 129, 132f., 136n,  
137n, 142n, 143f., 146ff., 149ff., 152ff., 155, 157f., 160n,  
161f., 164f., 167f., 170, 172f., 175, 179n, 180f., 183,  
184n, 185ff., 188ff., 191ff., 194, 195n, 196, 197n, 200f.,  
203, 214, 220, 223, 248, 277, 394, 417, 458n, 506, 520,  
**612**, **620**, **751**
- Leo XIII (Giacchino Vincenzo Pecci), pope 1878–1903: 486n  
Leobersdorf, 366
- León, 35n, 41, 200, 414, **632**; bishop of, see Andrés de Cuesta  
1557–1564
- Leonardi, Gian Giacomo, agent of Francesco Maria della Rovere  
in 1532: 363n
- Leonardo de Cardena (a *Cardine*), relative of the Carafeschi  
(d. 1561), 678n, **711**, 746f., **749**, 750n, **752**, 753n
- Leonardo Grosso della Rovere, nephew of Julius II; bishop of  
Agen 1487–1519, cardinal 1505–1520: 139n
- Leonardi, 367n
- Leonhard, count of Nogarola, member of an Austrian embassy  
to Istanbul in 1532: 350n, 358, 362ff., 381
- Leonhard von Fels, counselor of Ferdinand of Hapsburg in  
1537: 422
- Lepanto (Naupactus), 39, 65, 114n, 156, 447n, **587**, **812**, **1068**;  
battle of (1571), 427, **610**, 746n, **766**, **840**, **849**, **872**, **890**,  
909n, 923n, 928n, 945n, 947n, **970**, **986**, 1020n, 1025f.,  
1045n, 1046f., 1052ff., 1055ff., 1058ff., 1061f., **1064**,  
**1066ff.**, 1070f., 1073ff., 1076ff., **1080**, **1082ff.**, **1085**,  
1091f., 1095f., 1099f.; Gulf of, see Corinth, Gulf of
- Lérída, 716n; bishop of, see Antonio Agostino (Agustín) 1561–  
1576
- Lérin, count of, see Louis de Beaumont (fl. 1507)
- Lérins, îles de, 471
- Lesbos (Mytilene), **933**
- Lescun, lord of, see Thomas de Foix (d. 1525)
- Lesina (Hvar), **770**, **923**, **953**, **967**, **974**, **987**, **1025**, **1074**;  
bishop of, see Zaccaria Delfino 1553–1574?
- Lesparre, see André de Foix
- Lettere, **776**, bishop of, see Sebastiano Leccavella 1562–1565?
- Leveau, Jean, secretary to Andrea da Bocco (fl. 1512), 113n,  
133n
- Leveueur, Jean, bishop of Lisieux 1505–1539, cardinal 1533–  
1543: 370
- Libellus ad Leonem Decimum (1513), 146
- Liber Jurium*, compendium of documents on the trial of the  
Carafeschi, 712n
- Licet ab initio*, bull of Paul III (1542), **626**
- Licet in constitutione*, bull of Clement VI (1351), 520
- Lido (at Venice), 20, 331, 954f., 968n
- Lido di Roma, **940**, **1100**
- Liège, 558; bishops of, see Louis de Bourbon 1455–1482, Énard  
de la Marck 1506–1530?
- Lien, **803**
- Ligny, 462n
- Ligorio, Pirro, architect and painter (b. 1510, d. 1583), **720**
- Liguria, **93**, **416**, **430**, **652**
- Limassol, 46, **756**, **945n**, **962**, **972**, **976**, **979**, **984**, 1004n,  
1031n, 1034f.; bishop of, **1030**; Gate of, 1027f., 1031f.,  
**1040**, **1042**
- Limoges, bishops of, see René de Prie 1514–1516, Jean de  
Langeac 1532–1541, Jean du Bellay (admin.) 1541–1544,  
Antoine de Meudon 1544–1547; Sébastien de l'Aubespine  
1558–1582
- Lincoln, bishop of, see Thomas Wolsey (in 1514)
- Lindau, 543
- Lindus (castle on Rhodes), 213
- Linos, **871**
- Lin, 250n, 329, 349n, 350n, 362n, 363, 366n, 421n, 435n,  
442f., 476
- Lion, Pietro, captain of Famagusta ca. 1510: 25
- Lipari, **582**, **831**
- Lipova (Lippa), 461, 570ff., 573ff., **576**, **578**, 581n, 584f.
- Lippomani dal Banco, Girolamo, correspondent of Marino  
Sanudo in 1517: 173n
- Lippomano, Alvise, bishop of Bergamo 1538–1544; 1558–  
1559, of Modon 1539–1550? of Verona 1548–1557: 353,  
529, 537f., 545, 547, **628**, **632**, 633n
- Lippomano, Giovanni, owner of a palace purchased by the  
Venetian Signoria in 1537: 403n
- Lippomano, Girolamo, Venetian ambassador to Savoy in 1570:  
994n
- Lippomano, Tommaso, brother of Alvise (fl. 1530), 353
- Liri river, **659**
- Lisbon, 1, 22f., 29, 83, 165n, 532; archbishops of, see George  
Costa 1464–1500, Henry of Portugal 1564–1570?
- Lisieux, 565n; bishops of, see Jean Leveueur 1505–1539, Jacques  
d' Aneault 1539–1557?
- Lithuania, 316f., 319, 321, 324
- Lithuanians, **714**

- Liuterius, Jacobus, notary of Paul IV in 1557: **715**
- Livorno (Leghorn), 300, 370, 515, **595**
- Ljubljana (Laibach), 337, 358, 371, 383, 405; captain of, *see* Johann Katzianer
- Lodève, bishops of, *see* Guillaume Briçonnet, son of Cardinal Guillaume 1489–1515, Dominique Dugabre 1547–1558
- Lodi, 135, 224f., 229n, 239; bishops of, *see* Ottaviano Sforza 1497–1519, Giannangelo Capizucchi 1557–1569; peace of (1454), **1, 645**
- Lodovici, Pietro, Venetian host of Yunus Beg in 1530: **333**
- Lodovico Bondoni de' Branchi, "Firmanus," papal master of ceremonies, 509n, 510n, 511, 519, 521n, **595, 603n, 614, 621n, 704n, 717n, 718f., 721n, 722ff., 727, 730, 732ff., 737, 740n, 753n, 762f., 774, 776f., 797, 800, 806, 811n, 825, 877n, 1016**
- Lodovico da Canossa, papal ambassador and bishop of Bayeux 1516–1531: **230n, 266, 268n, 289n**
- Lodovico da Fabriano, correspondent of Francesco Gonzaga in 1509: **57n**
- Lodovico da Ludrone, Italian soldier (d. 1537): **342n**
- Lodovico de Taxis, master of the imperial couriers in 1532: **365n**
- Lódz, city, west-southwest of Warsaw, **312**
- Loffredo, Enrico, bishop of Capaccio 1531–1547: **498**
- Lograto, **225**
- Lombardy, 36n, 44, 60, 93, 98, 101, 107f., 110, 114, 125, 128, 132f., 144, 148f., 167, 196n, 220, 225, 227, 243, 259, 274, 282f., 285f., 288n, 304f., 310, 321, 328, 430, 675ff., **871, 878, 888, 913f., 916f., 920, 990, 1047n, 1088**; iron crown of, 337; prior of, *see* Carlo Sforza
- Lomellini, Genoese family, **871, 872n, 957n, 1048n**
- Lomellino del Campo, Giovanni, son of Pietro (*fl.* 1522), **210**
- Lomellino del Campo, Pietro, Rhodian author of a contemporary account of the *affaire Amiral* (1522), **210n**
- London, 82, 91n, 96n, 104n, 159n, 167, 170, 185, 186n, 237, 248, 254n, 259n, 261n, 288, 318f., 321, 349n, 457, 681n, 683n; treaty of (1518), **186f., 195**
- Longezza, **684**
- Longo, Antonio, author of memoirs of the 1537 Turco-Venetian war, **407n, 446n**
- Longo, Francesco, contemporary authority on the war of Cyprus, 407n, 954n, **993, 1085n**
- Lope de Figueroa, arquebusier commander at Lepanto (b. 1520, d. 1595), **1057**
- Lope de Soria, imperial ambassador to Genoa in 1526: **246n, 310n, 446n**
- López, Andrea, assassin of George Martinuzzi in 1551: **576**
- Loredan, Antonio, brother of Caterina Taddea Loredan; governor of Naxos ca. 1511–1515: **25**
- Loredan, Caterina Taddea, wife of Francesco III Crispo, duke of Naxos (d. ca. 1510), **24**
- Loredan, Giovanni, Venetian commander killed at Lepanto in 1571: **1057**
- Loredan, Leonardo, doge of Venice 1501–1521: **10ff., 20, 24, 29, 39, 57, 64, 68, 77, 88, 90, 101n, 103n, 123, 135, 156n, 157, 159, 165n**
- Loredan, Lorenzo, son of Leonardo the doge (*fl.* 1509), **66**
- Loredan, Lucrezia, aunt of Caterina Taddea Loredan (*fl.* 1510), **24**
- Loredan, Marco, bishop of Nona 1554–1577: **964**
- Loredan, Pietro, doge of Venice 1567–1570 (b. 1481, d. 1570), **933, 954f., 958, 963n**
- Loredan, Zaccaria, Venetian provveditore in 1520: **193n**
- Loredan, Zuan Francesco, correspondent of Cristoforo Zaffardo in 1527: **263n**
- Loredana, Venetian galley present at Lepanto, **1057f.**
- Lorenzo (il Magnifico, "the Magnificent") de' Medici, son of Piero de' Medici; Florentine co-ruler 1469–1478, ruler 1478–1492: **15, 53, 102, 166n, 327**
- Lorenzo de' Medici, son of Piero and Alfonsina Orsini; duke of Urbino 1516–1519: **156, 160ff., 166, 167n, 178n, 190**
- Lorenzo Orsini da Ceri of Anguillara (Renzo da Ceri), Italian soldier (*fl.* 1527, d. 1536), **257, 260, 268ff., 300, 304, 306f., 321, 331, 334n, 342**
- Loretto, 109n, 140, 292, **320, 1047**; shrine of Madonna of, **988n**
- Lorraine, 237n, **657, 773, 910n, 916**; cardinals of, *see* Charles de Guise, Jean de Lorraine; duke of, *see* Charles (b. 1543, d. 1608)
- Loosncy, Stephen, defender of Timişoara in 1551: **572**
- Lottini, Gian Francesco, secretary of Guido Ascanio Sforza in 1555: **634**
- Louis ("the Pious"), son of Charlemagne; emperor of the Franks **814–840, 538**
- Louis I de Bourbon, prince of Condé (b. 1530, d. 1569): **725, 795, 918n**
- Louis II Jagiello, son of Ladislav and Anne, daughter of Gaston II of Foix; king of Hungary 1516–1526: **54, 158, 164n, 180f., 185n, 187n, 192n, 195n, 203ff., 216n, 271f., 219n, 223, 224n, 235f., 237n, 243n, 244n, 245f., 248n, 249f., 252, 312, 316n, 319n, 324n, 352, 355n, 364, 369n, 376, 378, 444, 477**; wife of, *see* Mary, daughter of Philip the Handsome 1522–1526 (d. 1558)
- Louis VII, son of Louis VI; Capetian king of France 1137–**1180**: **175**
- Louis XI, son of Charles VII; king of France 1461–1483: **136, 193, 238, 696, 830**
- Louis XII, son of Charles (of Orléans); duke of Orléans 1465–1498, king of France 1498–1515: **2, 14f., 24, 27, 29, 34f., 38ff., 41ff., 44, 46, 47n, 48ff., 51n, 52ff., 55f., 57n, 58ff., 61, 63, 66ff., 69, 71ff., 74f., 77f., 79n, 80, 86ff., 91f., 94ff., 97ff., 100ff., 103f., 107ff., 111ff., 114ff., 119ff., 122, 123n, 124f., 130ff., 134ff., 137n, 138, 140f., 143ff., 149, 150n, 159, 180n, 263n, 287, 302, 642**
- Louis, younger brother of William of Orange; count of Nassau (b. 1538, d. 1574), **914, 919**
- Louis d' Arco, Bavarian diplomatic functionary in Rome at the time of the First Vatican Council, **827n**
- Louis de Beaumont, count of Lérin (*fl.* 1507), **14**
- Louis de Bourbon, bishop of Laon 1510–1552, cardinal 1517–1557, bishop of Le Mans (admin.) 1519–1535, of Luçon 1524–1527, archbishop of Sens (admin.) 1535–1557, bishop of Tréguier (admin.) 1538–1542: **221, 517f., 520, 610**
- Louis de Bourbon, brother of duke Jean II; bishop of Liège 1455–1482: **203n**
- Louis de Guise, bishop of Troyes 1545–1550?, of Albi 1550–1558; cardinal 1553–1578, bishop of Metz 1558–1578: **614, 641, 642n, 657, 723ff., 729, 732ff., 735ff., 739n**
- Louis de la Trémouille, viscount of Thouars, prince of Talmont (b. 1460, d. 1525), **68**
- Louis de Lansac, French envoy in Rome in 1555, ambassador to the Council of Trent in 1562: **634n, 635, 636n, 660f., 668n, 671, 785, 786n, 788, 794, 808**
- Louis de Lorraine, count of Vaudémont; French commander (b. 1500, d. 1528): **307**
- Louise d' Albrét-Borgia, daughter of Cesare Borgia and mother of Claude de Bourbon, **14**
- Louise of Savoy, daughter of Philip I of Savoy and Marguerite of Bourbon; wife of Charles, count of Angoulême 1487–1496 (d. 1531), 230n, 236n, 237f., 239n, 244, 246n, 273, 290n, 322n, **378**
- Louvre, **809n**
- Low Countries, 481, 914f., **918, 920**

- Loyola, Ignatius, founder of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) (b. 1491, d. 1556), 195
- Lübeck, 357n
- Lublin, castellan of, *see* John de Tanczin (ca. 1528)
- Luca de Rinaldi, agent of Maximilian I in Rome in 1503: 35
- Luca, Giovanni, bishop of Reggio d'Emilia 1503–1510: 76
- Lucca, 15, 81, 96n, 103f., 105n, 110, 219, 332, 412, 442n, 461, 464, 601, 1025n; bishop of, *see* Bartolommeo Guidiccioni 1546–1549
- Luchese, the, 601
- Luchesi, 368
- Lucera, bishop of, *see* Fabio Mignanelli 1540–1553?
- Lucera (Nocera), 293
- Lucerne, diet of, 55n
- Luciano degli Ottoni, abbot of Pomposa; correspondent of Ercole II d'Este in 1547: 502
- Lucido, Angelo, friar, author of a report from the Fifth Lateran Council in 1512: 126
- Lucignano d'Arbia, 598, 602
- Lucio of Como, builder (fl. 1515), 777n
- Luçon, bishop of, *see* Louis de Bourbon 1524–1527
- Lucrezia, wife of Francesco da Montepulciano; *aromataria* (fl. 1505), 36
- Ludovici, Daniele, secretary of the Venetian Signoria in 1533: 388
- Ludwig IV, Wittelsbach duke of Bavaria, king of Germany 1314–1328, emperor 1328–1347: 454
- Ludwig, son of Albrecht IV and Cunigunde, daughter of Frederick III; duke (X) of Bavaria (b. 1495, d. 1545), 435
- Luigi da Porto, author of an account of the battle of Ravenna in 1512: 116f.
- Luis de Ávila, Spanish noble; envoy to Julius III in 1550: 528; Spanish ambassador to Rome in 1563: 806
- Luis de Cardona, companion of Don John of Austria in 1571: 1055
- Luis de Cordova, duke of Sessa, imperial ambassador in Rome in 1523: 221f., 226
- Luis de Mendoza, brother of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and father of Íñigo Lopez de Mendoza, 744n
- Luis de Toledo, son of Pedro, and his replacement in the government of Naples in 1552: 594n, 595
- Luis de Torres, representative of the *Societas charitatis Urbis* in 1560: 748; chief clerk of the Camera Apostolica from ca. 1533: 951, 956f., 958n, 959, 961, 966, 973, 1016
- Luis de Zúñiga y Requesens, Spanish diplomat and soldier (d. 1576), 754n, 821, 853n, 885n, 884f., 887, 900f., 904n, 906, 910ff., 913, 914n, 917n, 918ff., 939, 973n, 1021, 1054, 1057, 1063, 1070f., 1074, 1079
- Luis del Mármol Carvajal, soldier and historian (fl. 1575), 946n
- Luna, count of, *see* Claudio Fernández Vigili de Quiñones (fl. 1563)
- Lund, archbishop of, *see* Johann von Weeze (from 1522)
- Lüneburg, 1101; dukes of, *see* Ernst (b. 1497, d. 1546), reigning with his brothers until 1527; alone 1527–1536; with his brother Franz (b. 1508, d. 1549) 1536–1538; alone from 1539
- Lungotevere, 752
- Luristan, 1097
- Lusatia, 320n, 435
- Lusignan, royal dynasty in Cyprus 1192–1474: 46
- Lussy (Lusi), Melchior, condottiere retained by the Venetian Senate in 1565 and again in 1571: 880, 1019
- Lutfi Beg, Ottoman captain and sanjakbey in 1533: 388
- Lutfi Pasha, father-in-law of Suleiman I; Ottoman grand vizir in 1540: 458, 459n
- Luther, Martin, German reformer (b. 1483, d. 1546), 183n, 190n, 194n, 199, 202, 229n, 298n, 326n, 350, 366n, 379, 405, 417, 418n, 453f., 462, 482, 484, 540, 542, 565, 632n, 660, 790n, 791, 793, 823, 1088
- Lutheranism, 1, 197, 202, 219n, 222, 256n, 238, 288, 339, 353f., 358, 403, 413, 417, 420, 422, 437, 444n, 453, 459f., 473, 482, 484, 487, 496, 498, 565f., 632, 633n, 682, 705, 714, 716f., 720, 734, 909
- Lutherans, 154, 193f., 195n, 202, 223, 230n, 244n, 257, 262, 273, 318, 336, 346f., 352ff., 356, 359ff., 364n, 366, 375, 378f., 381, 385f., 388, 395, 399f., 406, 413f., 416f., 420ff., 431n, 435ff., 440, 450n, 452f., 459f., 463, 467, 473n, 476f., 480n, 482, 484, 487ff., 490, 494f., 497f., 502, 504, 514, 527, 529, 531, 538ff., 541, 544ff., 556, 561, 565f., 609, 624, 628f., 632f., 646, 655, 658, 663f., 679n, 690, 697, 705, 708n, 714, 716f., 749f., 769, 772ff., 779, 781, 786, 790, 809, 828, 882, 890, 914, 1088
- Luxemborg (Luxemburg), 195, 916, 918n
- L'ouv (Lwów, Lemberg), 320n
- Lycia, 150
- Lydia, 150
- Lyon, 80n, 91, 96, 125, 129, 133f., 136, 195n, 221, 230n, 237n, 268n, 283, 457, 472, 507n, 673, 795, 951, 958; archbishops of, *see* Ippolito d'Este (admin.) 1559–1551f., François de Tournon (admin.) 1551–1562; Council of (1274), 70, 512n
- Maastricht, 655
- Macarius, self-described archbishop of Thessalonica in 1551: 541
- Maccabeo, Girolamo, bishop of Castro (Acquapendente) 1543–1568? (d. 1574), 794
- Macedonia, 591
- Macedonian heresy (fourth century), 113
- Macerata, 95n, 539n, 877n, 883; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Domenico de Cupis (admin.) 1528–1553?
- Machiavelli, Niccolò, Florentine statesman and writer (b. 1469, d. 1527), 40n, 53, 60f., 69, 76, 90f., 96n, 98, 106f., 626
- Mâcon, bishop of, *see* Charles de Hémart de Denonville 1531–1538
- Madagascar, 346
- Madonna dell'Orto, church (in Venice), 93, 299n
- Madonna delle Grazie, church (on Chios), 896
- Madrid, 14, 190, 227n, 229, 232, 237, 240, 484, 558, 838n, 846, 884n, 886n, 887n, 888, 901, 912, 913n, 914, 915n, 916, 918, 920, 922, 941n, 972n, 973n, 977, 983, 996f., 1008, 1011n, 1012f., 1017ff., 1020f., 1043n, 1045, 1047, 1048n, 1077, 1079ff., 1092f., 1094n; treaty of (1526), 238f., 242, 244, 246n, 248n, 328n, 367, 399
- Madruzzo, Cristoforo, bishop of Trent 1539–1567, cardinal 1542–1578, bishop of Brixen (admin.) 1542–1578: 487, 490, 492f., 495f., 498, 506, 508, 511, 515, 518, 520n, 521, 523ff., 526n, 527, 537f., 547, 548n, 583, 603n, 610n, 611ff., 617f., 620, 661n, 676, 724, 726, 728, 731f., 734, 737, 740n, 743, 772, 777n, 885
- Madruzzo, Lodovico, cardinal 1561–1600, bishop of Trent 1567–1600: 772, 774, 777f., 787, 791, 800, 807ff., 811, 818ff., 824f.
- Madruzzo, Lodovico, son of Niccolò; soldier and politician (b. 1552, d. 1600), 583
- Madruzzo, Niccolò, brother of Cristoforo and father of Lodovico (b. 1532, d. 1600), 583n
- Maffei (Maffeo), Bernardino, bishop of Massa Marittima 1547–1549; cardinal 1549–1553, archbishop of Chieti 1549–1553: 511n, 513n, 515, 519n, 520, 521n, 522ff.; secretary to Paul III in 1545: 490n
- Magdalena de' Medici, daughter of Lorenzo and Chiara; wife of Franceschetto Cibo 1487–1519 (b. 1473, d. 1528), 506

- Magdeburg, 772; archbishops of, *see* Friedrich of Brandenburg (in 1552), Sigismund of Brandenburg (from 1553)
- Maggio, Vincenzo, French agent in Istanbul in 1541: 458n, 459n
- Magior Consiglio (in Venice), 13, 46, 82f., 139n, 267, 279n, 302f., 531, 632n, 851, 928, 958, 989, 1073
- Maghreb, 1095
- Maghrebin, 24
- Magnatello, Pietro Paolo, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- "Magno Palazzo" (in Trent), 490f.
- Maguelone, bishop of, *see* Montpelier, bishop of
- Magyars, 157n, 158, 235, 250, 530, 565
- Mahdia (al-Mahdiyyah, "Affrica"), 533, 539, 554, 556, 560, 566; siege of (1550), 533f., 536n
- Mahmud, *che'ush* in Transylvania in 1550: 530
- Mahmud Beg, Ottoman dragoman and diplomat, 921, 948ff., 951, 970f., 1049
- Mahón, town on Minorca, 397, 701n
- Mahona, Giovanni, secretary of Ferrante Gonzaga in 1533: 446n
- Mahona, joint-stock company collecting revenues of Chios, 893, 896
- Mahonesi, members of the mahona on Chios, 893ff., 896f.
- Mallezais, bishops of, *see* Pietro de' Accolti 1511–1518?, Geoffrey d'Estissac 1518–1543?
- Maina, 970n, 1046
- Mainates, 990
- Mainz, 179n, 471n, 603n, 628; archbishops of, *see* Albrecht of Brandenburg 1514–1545, Sebastian von Heusenstamm 1545–1555, Daniel Brendel von Homburg 1555–1582
- Maiori, 296
- Maistranz, 943
- Majorca (Mallorca), 891, 946n; bishop of, *see* Gianbattista Campeggio 1532–1561?
- Malabar Coast (in India), 18, 348
- Malacca, 348
- Malaga, bishop of, *see* Francisco Blanco 1565–1574
- Malamocco (at Venice), 1025
- Malatesta, Carlo, brother of Pandolfo (f. 1503), 13
- Malatesta, Giacomo, governor-general of Cattaro in 1571: 1002n
- Malatesta, Giovanni Battista, Mantuan "orator" in Venice *ca.* 1527–1528: 280
- Malatesta, Pandolfo, son of Roberto Malatesta; lord of Rimini 1482–1500 (d. 1534), 9, 12f.
- Malatesta, Sigismondo, son of Pandolfo; lord of Rimini 1527–1528: 277
- Malay peninsula, 348
- Malea, promontory in the Morea, 1082
- Malines, archbishop of, *see* Antoine Perrenot 1561–1583? and *see* Mechlin
- Maliptera, Venetian galley present at Lepanto, 1057f.
- Maliptero, Alvise, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1509: 64
- Maliptero, Caterino, Venetian commander killed at Lepanto in 1571: 1057
- Maliptero, Domenico, Venetian provveditore in Nauplia in 1510: 84n
- Maliptero, Troilo, Venetian senator in 1509: 61
- Malkos (Malcos) Beg, sanjakbey of Ciussa in 1557; later sanjakbey of Bosnia, 694f.
- Malmsey wine, 564n, 627, 830
- Malta, 33n, 235, 238, 340n, 351f., 363n, 539n, 553n, 554f., 581, 583, 588n, 589, 608, 622, 758ff., 761f., 810f., 829, 836, 838f., 842f., 846, 849, 850n, 852, 886f., 889f., 899, 901ff., 905, 915, 920, 925, 930, 932, 940, 943, 945, 947, 951, 956, 957n, 968, 1016, 1017n, 1026, 1048, 1083, 1100; Knights of, *see* Hospitallars; siege of (1565), 755, 765, 834, 845, 852ff., 855ff., 858ff., 861ff., 864ff., 867f., 870ff., 873ff., 876ff., 879f., 891, 894, 899f., 916, 936f., 973, 979, 984, 988n, 1046
- Maltese, 759f., 855f., 860, 861n, 868, 870, 877f., 1100
- Malvezzi, Giovanni Maria, agent of Ferdinand of Hapsburg in Istanbul in 1549 and 1551: 503, 569, 572, 589
- Mamago, suburb of Piacenza, 261
- Mamluks, 21, 23f., 27, 32f., 71, 84, 146f., 158, 163ff., 170, 224; "Burji," slave dynasty in Egypt and Syria 1382–1389: 1390–1517: 18n, 19, 22, 26, 31, 38, 97n, 165f., 181, 185, 191, 338, 937
- Mandra, the, on Malta, 863f., 866
- Mandraki (later Port of Galley), harbor at Rhodes, 208n
- Manelli, Antonio, financial officer at the Council of Trent, 495n, 726
- Manelli, Luigi, recipient of a letter from a certain Giovanni, in 1503: 3
- Manetti, Latino Giovenale, supervisor of works in Rome in 1535: 399
- Manfredi, Astorre, loses Faenza to Cesare Borgia in 1501 (d. 1502), 12n
- Manfredi, Francesco, recalled to Faenza in 1503: 9
- Manfredi, Italian family, 12
- Manfredonia (Siponto), 138, 294n, 295n; archbishops of, *see* Antonio del Monte 1506–1511?, Giovanni Maria del Monte (Julius III) 1513–1544, Giovanni Ricci 1544–1545?, Giannandrea Mercurio 1545–1550, Sebastiano Pighino 1550–1553, Tolomeo Galli 1562–1573?
- "Mangia guerra," wine from Naples, 627
- Manrique, Juan, imperial representative in Florence in 1555: 602, 616n
- Manrique de Lara, Francisco, bishop of Orense 1542–1556, of Salamanca 1556–1560, of Sigüenza in 1560: 545n
- Mantegna, Andrea, Italian painter (b. 1431, d. 1506), 40n, 182
- Mantua, 1, 15, 34, 36n, 40n, 51, 55, 57, 71, 96, 122, 132, 133n, 166, 167n, 182, 220n, 272, 280ff., 284, 287, 293f., 341, 345, 367n, 368, 404f., 412ff., 416f., 419, 420n, 421, 478, 486, 506, 537, 603n, 611, 617, 656, 708, 721n, 722n, 726, 732n, 781, 1099n; cardinal of, *see* Ercole Gonzaga; Council of (to meet in 1537), 413ff., 416ff., 419, 463; bishops of, *see* Ercole Gonzaga 1521–1563, Federico Gonzaga (admin.) 1563–1565, Francesco Gonzaga 1565–1566; castellan of, *see* Francesco Tosabazzi (ca. 1564); rulers of, *see* (Gian) Francesco II Gonzaga 1484–1519, Federico II Gonzaga 1519–1540, Francesco III Gonzaga 1540–1550, Guglielmo Gonzaga 1550–1587
- Mantuans, 7n
- Manuel (Emanuel) I, nephew of Alfonso V; king of Portugal 1495–1521: 39n, 44, 45, 46, 48f., 162f., 180, 328, 338; wife of, *see* Eleonora (sister of Charles V) 1519–1521
- Manuel, Juan, imperial ambassador to Rome in 1522: 193n, 194n, 195n, 244
- Manutius, Aldus, humanist and printer (b. 1450, d. 1515), 166n
- Maone, Turkish galleasses, 836, 844n, 845, 849, 854f., 856n, 934, 939, 942, 981, 982n, 984, 1005, 1028, 1075, 1092, 1094n, 1095
- Map, Walter, English satirist of Welsh origin (d. 1208/1209), 189n
- Maps, 344n, 348n, 458
- Marani, 703
- Marano, 405, 464, 465n, 953n
- Marathassa valley, 756
- Marc-Antoine de Monluc, son of Blaise (d. 1556), 668n
- Marc' Antonio da Mula, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1561, cardinal 1561–1572, bishop of Rieti 1562–1572: 752n, 753n, 763, 770n, 807, 882, 884, 912



- Marc' Antonio di Franceschi, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1557: 686f.
- Marcello, Cristoforo, archbishop of Corfu 1514–1528: 111n, 136f., 164n, 488n, 489n
- Marcello, Girolamo, Venetian bailie in Istanbul (ca. 1492): 607n
- Marcello, Niccolò, doge of Venice 1473–1474: 68n
- Marcellus II (Marcello Cervini), bishop of Nicastro 1539–1540, cardinal 1539–1555, bishop of Reggio d' Emilia 1540–1544, of Gubbio 1544–1555, pope in 1555: 309n, 450n, 452, 467, 486ff., 490n, 492f., 495ff., 498, 499n, 500, 502, 506n, 508f., 511f., 514f., 516n, 517, 518n, 520n, 521n, 522, 538, 579, 606n, 610ff., 613ff., 616f., 621n, 627n, 628, 632, 721n, 722, 777n
- Marches, the, 677, 990
- Marchesano, Antimo, papal datary (ff. 1571), 1015f., 1074
- Marchfeld, 483
- Marciano, 602f.
- Marciano, Pantaleone, correspondent of Battista Ferraro in 1566: 896n, 898
- Marco Giorgio "della Cruz," informant on Piali Pasha's armada in 1566: 895n
- Marco Vigerio della Rovere, bishop of Sinigaglia [Senigallia] 1476–1513, cardinal 1505–1516: 139n
- Marco Vigerio [della Rovere], bishop of Sinigaglia [Senigallia] 1513–1550 (d. 1560), 498
- Maremma, the, 601, 623
- Margaret of Austria, daughter of Maximilian I; wife of Philipbert II of Savoy 1501–1504, Hapsburg regent of the Netherlands 1507–1530: 49, 54, 80n, 86, 94n, 112n, 116n, 133n, 135n, 145, 168n, 208n, 239n, 322n, 323, 529, 914
- Margaret of Parma, natural daughter of Charles V and Johanna van der Gheennst; wife of Alessandro de' Medici, then of Ottavio Farnese; regent of the Netherlands 1559–1567 (b. 1522, d. 1586), 503n, 520, 528, 818, 910, 912n, 914f., 917f., 920n, 1024
- Margaret Tudor, daughter of Henry VII of England and Elizabeth of York; wife of James IV of Scotland 1503–1513 (d. 1541), 76n
- Margariton, Turkish fortress opposite Corfu, 974f., 1050, 1070
- Margherita de' Medici (Medeghini), sister of Giannangelo (Pius IV); wife of Gilberto Borromeo from ca. 1530: 739, 743
- Marguerite, daughter of Francis I and Claude, daughter of Louis XII; wife of Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy from 1559 (b. 1523, d. 1574), 708, 836
- Marguerite, Turkish girl seized ca. 1557: 836ff., 839ff.
- Marguerite d' Angoulême, daughter of Charles, count of Angoulême and Louise of Savoy; sister of Francis I; wife of Henri d' Albrét 1527–1555: 229n
- Marguriti of S. Severino, husband of Sulpizia, niece of Angelo Massarelli, 774n
- Mari, 957n
- Maria, daughter of Charles V and Isabella of Portugal; wife of Maximilian of Austria (Maximilian II) from 1548 (b. 1528, d. 1603), 473, 542
- Maria de Mendoza, mistress of Don John of Austria in 1571: 1020
- Marie of Guise, daughter of Claude of Lorraine; wife of James V of Scotland 1538–1542 (b. 1515, d. 1560), 642
- Marignano, 601f., 605; battle of (1515), 6n, 142n, 160, 166, 181, 186n, 190, 328; marquis of, *see* Giangiacomo de' Medici (b. 1497, d. 1555)
- Marin, Fernando, abbot of Najera and imperial commissioner-general (d. 1527), 262, 263n, 274, 276n
- Marina Militare Italiana, 1100n
- Marini, Leonardo, bishop of Lanciano 1560–1562, archbishop of Lanciano 1562–1566f., bishop of Alba 1566–1572f.: 779, 780n, 789
- Marino (on Lago Albano), 243n, 649, 656, 675
- Marino da Molin, Venetian consul in Egypt (ca. 1507), 22f.
- Marino da Pozzo, secretary of Francesco Pisani in 1523: 221n
- Marino di Cavalli, Venetian ambassador to the Hapsburgs (in 1550) and France (in 1561), bailie in Istanbul (b. 1500, d. 1573), 521, 704, 706f., 767n, 909n, 923ff., 926n, 929, 930n, 990, 1017; provveditore generale of Candia in 1571: 1052n
- Mario, count of S. Fiora, brother of Guido Ascanio Sforza (b. 1530, d. 1591), 592
- Marittima, the, 675
- Mark Sittich von Hohenems, nephew of Pius IV; bishop of Cassano 1560–1561, cardinal 1561–1595, bishop of Constance 1561–1589f.: 743, 773n, 776, 780, 799, 865, 885f., 1090
- Marmara, Sea of (Propontis), 470, 892, 898, 981
- Marmaris (Physkos, Fisco), 206, 210
- Marolles, 471
- Marriage, 499, 502, 542, 710, 734, 735n, 769, 779, 780, 786, 790n, 792n, 793, 796, 810ff., 813, 816ff., 882, 886n; *see also* Tametsi non est dubitandum
- Marsa, 855, 861, 863f., 867f., 870, 873
- Marsamuscetto (Marsamxett), harbor at Malta, 843n, 854, 856f., 861, 863, 866f., 870, 873ff., 876n
- Marsaxirocco (Marsaxlokk), harbor at Malta, 852, 853n, 855ff.
- Marseille, 23, 171, 177, 204, 216, 224, 335n, 344, 345n, 370, 391f., 471, 510, 560, 601, 623, 634, 687, 838, 915, 957; bishops of, *see* Innocenzo Gibo (admin.) 1517–1530, Cristoforo del Monte 1550–1556
- Marsi, bishop of, *see* Marcello Crescenzi 1534–1546
- Marsico Nuovo, bishop of, *see* Martino de' Martini de' Medici 1541–1574?
- Marsiglio of Padua (Marsilio dei Mainardini), Italian political thinker (b. between 1275/1280, d. 1342), 454
- Marsuppini, Giovanni, secretary of Ferdinand of Hapsburg in 1545: 487
- Martelli, Braccio, bishop of Fiesole 1530–1552, of Lecce 1552–1559: 498, 500n
- Martelli, Florentine money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Martelossi, 45, 608
- Martin V (Oddone Colonna), cardinal 1405–1417, pope 1417–1431: 272, 353
- Martin de Portugal, Portuguese ambassador to Rome in 1527: 271
- Martin de Rojas Portalrubio, vicechancellor of the Hospitallers in 1563: 810ff., 829, 856n
- Martin von Schaumburg, bishop of Eichstätt 1560–1590: 810
- Martinelli da Cesena, Biagio, papal master of ceremonies in the 1520s: 197n, 330
- Martinienghi, noble family of Brescia, 495
- Martiningo, Alvise, volunteer on behalf of the Venetians in 1570 (d. 1571), 956n, 1006, 1017, 1031, 1056, 1040
- Martiningo, Antonio, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- Martiningo, Ercole, Count, spared by the Turks at Famagusta in 1571: 1037, 1038n, 1041
- Martiningo, Girolamo, nuncio to Ferdinand of Hapsburg in 1552: 580; Venetian general (d. 1570), 941n, 947f., 952, 954, 956n, 958, 1007n
- Martiningo, Girolamo, would-be hostage after the 1571 siege of Famagusta, 1037n
- Martiningo, Nestor, author of an eye-witness account of the 1571 siege of Famagusta (b. 1548, d. 1630), 1027ff., 1030ff., 1036ff., 1039, 1041ff.
- Martiningo, Pietro, soldier engaged by Venice in 1537: 425n
- Martiningo, Sciarra, infantry commander in Albania in 1571: 1002n

- Martínez de Olivencia, signaler on Gozo in 1565: 872
- Martino de' Martini de' Medici, bishop of Marsico Nuovo 1541-1574: 782
- Martinuzzi, Anna, mother of George Martinuzzi (Utičienović), 455n
- Martinuzzi (Utičienović), George, first minister of John Zápolya 1534-1540, bishop of Csaniid 1536-1539, of Grosswarden from 1539, cardinal 1551 (d. 1551), 434, 436f., 443f., 455, 456n, 459, 465f., 478f., 485n, 489n, 530, 560, 566ff., 569ff., 572ff., 575ff., 578ff., 581, 585n, 605, 609, 839, 907
- Martio, Alessandro, secretarial official under Paul IV, 633n
- Martorano, bishops of, *see* Tolomeo Galii 1560-1562, Girolamo de' Federici 1562-1569
- Martuccia, courtesan (*f.* 1559), 711
- Marcucci (Maurocini), Lodovico, Venetian "dragoman grande" in Istanbul in 1567: 909
- Marcucini, Matteo, translator of a letter of Suleiman I in 1550: 530n
- Marcucini (Maurocini), Matteo, brother of Lodovico; Venetian student of Turkish in Istanbul starting ca. 1567: 909
- Mary I, daughter of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon; queen of England 1553-1558: 597, 603, 628, 643f., 647, 681n, 691, 700n; husband of, *see* Philip II of Spain 1554-1558
- Mary, daughter of Philip the Handsome and Joanna ("the Mad") of Castile; wife of Louis II of Hungary 1522-1526, regent of the Netherlands 1531-1555 (d. 1558), 237, 347n, 364, 370, 376, 383, 397n, 442n, 452, 485n, 557f., 561n, 582, 611n, 914
- Mary Stuart, daughter of James V of Scotland and Marie of Guise; wife of Francis II of France 1558-1560, queen of Scotland 1542-1567 (b. 1542, d. 1587), 642, 725, 767, 809
- Masius, Andreas, Flemish scholar (d. 1573), 510, 596n, 603n, 611n, 613n, 650f.
- Massa Marittima, bishops of, *see* Alfonso Petrucci 1511-1517, Alessandro Farnese (admin.) 1538-1547, Bernardino Maffei 1547-1549; Miguel de Silva (admin.) 1549-1556
- Massarelli, Angelo, secretary of the Council of Trent, bishop of Teleso 1557-1566 (b. 1510, d. 1566), 397n, 487ff., 491f., 497n, 500, 502, 504n, 505, 507ff., 510, 511n, 512f., 515, 517f., 520f., 523n, 524, 526ff., 529, 534f., 537ff., 543, 547f., 552, 554, 564n, 603n, 605, 611, 614ff., 617, 625, 627, 633n, 634, 636, 638, 639n, 640, 642n, 644n, 648n, 649f., 652, 655, 659f., 663, 668, 672, 675, 681, 686, 688f., 713, 717ff., 721n, 722, 742, 759, 762, 769f., 774, 776ff., 780, 782f., 785, 792, 796f., 800, 806, 808f., 810n, 818n, 822ff., 825, 827
- Mataró, 915
- Matera, 294n
- Matre, on the Brenner Pass, 802f.
- Matteo de' Concini, envoy of Cosimo de' Medici to Rome, bishop of Cortona 1560-1562: 736
- Matteo de Via, Genoese merchant (*f.* 1522), 211n
- Matthias Corvinus, son of John Hunyadi; king of Hungary 1458 (crowned 1464)-1490, titular king of Bohemia 1478 (crowned 1469)-1490: 37, 158, 244n, 574
- Maturin de Lescaut (Romegas), French naval officer (d. 1581), 1067, 1082n
- Maulde la Clavière, Marie Alphonse René de, historian (b. 1848, d. 1902), 141
- Maurand, Jérôme, author of an account of Istanbul in 1544: 473n
- Maurice, son of Henry V the Pious and Catherine of Mecklenburg; Albertine duke of Saxony from 1541 (b. 1521, d. 1553), 476, 484, 494, 504, 543f., 546f., 557, 561f, 564, 581, 596, 633, 779
- Maximilian I, son of Frederick III; duke of Burgundy 1477-1482, Hapsburg king of Germany and archduke of Austria 1486-1493, emperor 1493-1519: 2, 15, 34f., 38, 40n, 41f., 44, 46f., 51f., 54ff., 57, 60, 62f., 65ff., 68ff., 71ff., 74f., 77f., 80, 86, 88ff., 91f., 94, 95n, 96, 98, 99n, 108, 109n, 110, 112, 116, 119n, 125, 129ff., 132, 134, 136, 144n, 145, 148n, 149f., 151n, 152, 153n, 158, 159n, 162, 165n, 166f., 169f., 171n, 172f., 175, 178ff., 185, 187, 189f., 193, 222, 244n, 283, 716, 729
- Maximilian II, son of Ferdinand I and Anna of Bohemia; king of the Romans from 1562; emperor from 1564 (b. 1527, d. 1576), 542, 603n, 665, 667, 690, 714, 716, 741n, 760, 766, 772, 796, 803ff., 806, 810, 816f., 827, 834f., 843ff., 852, 860n, 862, 865, 880, 886, 887n, 888f., 898f., 901, 912f., 917, 919ff., 922, 931ff., 938, 941, 950, 953, 954n, 956, 958n, 962f., 993f., 997, 1000, 1014ff., 1017, 1019f., 1061f., 1064n, 1066f., 1071, 1072, 1087, 1097; wife of, *see* Maria, daughter of Charles V 1548-1576 (d. 1603)
- Mazagan, 789n
- Mazocchi, Jacopo, printer in Rome ca. 1509: 57, 58n, 64, 95, 110, 111n, 137n, 140n, 149n
- Medina (Città Notabile, "Old City"), in Malta, 857f., 862, 866ff., 871, 873ff.; military governor of, *see* Pedro Mesquita (in 1565)
- Meaux, bishops of, *see* Guillaume Briconnot the younger 1515-1554, Antoine Duprat (admin.) 1554-1555
- Mecca, 836, 840, 1037
- Mechlin (Malines), 145, 165n, 169
- Medea, 254
- Medgyes (Medias), 390f.
- Medinasidonia, archive of duke of, 906
- Mediceans, 133, 237, 256, 735, 1017
- Medici, Florentine banking family (rulers 1434-1494), 102, 104n, 129, 132f., 142, 145, 161, 166n, 167, 189, 192n, 195n, 196, 215, 222n, 242, 248, 267, 277, 327, 332, 335n, 339, 342, 391, 394, 600n, 633, 641, 645, 711, 734; *and see* Florence, republic, rulers of; *see also* Alessandro, Catherine, Clarice, Giangiocomo, Giovanni "delle Bande Nere," Giovanni (d. 1562), Giuliano, Ippolito, Lorenzo (d. 1519), and Clement VII (Giulio), Leo X (Giovanni)
- Medina Celi, duke of, *see* Juan de la Cerda (*f.* 1559)
- Medina del Campo, 14, 312
- Mediterranean Sea, 2, 24, 29, 81, 85, 110, 141, 170, 181, 191f., 194, 208, 217, 224, 231, 234f., 284, 297n, 310, 340n, 347, 392, 396, 401, 451, 456n, 471, 474, 532, 539, 550, 555, 588f., 609, 651, 666, 682, 695, 703, 705, 759, 758ff., 776, 833f., 842f., 847, 853, 872n, 880, 888, 890f., 900, 905, 907, 911, 913, 919f., 923, 926, 930, 939, 943f., 945ff., 950, 954, 962, 967, 990, 1012, 1021, 1086, 1094, 1098f.
- Mehmed II (Chelebi to 1453, thereafter Fatih, "the Conqueror"), son of Murad II; Ottoman co-sultan 1444/1445-1446, sultan 1451-1481: 39, 77, 141, 199f., 893, 995
- Mehmed IV, Ottoman sultan 1648-1687 (b. ca. 1641, d. ca. 1692), 1099, 1102
- Mehmed, son of Suleiman I, 339n, 342
- Mehmed Beg, sanjakbey of Negroponte (*f.* 1571), 1053n, 1054f., 1096
- Mehmed Pasha, beylerbey of Greece in 1550: 503, 531n; third pasha in 1555: 622
- Mehmed Siroco (Sirocco, Scirocco), governor of Alexandria; commander at Lepanto in 1571: 1054, 1056, 1057n
- Mehmed Sokolli (Sokolović) Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir from 1565 (b. ca. 1509, d. 1579), 568, 570ff., 573f., 575n, 576f., 585, 589, 591, 771, 837ff., 845f., 878, 898f., 897, 921f.,

- 929n, 931, 935, 936n, 938, 942, 946n, 948ff., 951n, 970f., 976n, 995n, 1008, 1011, 1012n, 1018, 1044n, 1075f., 1089f., 1092, 1095n, 1096ff.; wife of, *see* Esma, daughter of Selim II
- Meissen, 485n
- Mejorada, treaty of (31 March 1504), 42
- Melancthon, Philip, humanist and reformer (b. 1497, d. 1560), 198n, 354, 417, 453, 502n, 540ff., 544, 565, 715, 719
- Melchior von Frundsberg, son of Georg (d. 1528), 270
- Melchior von Lichtenfels, bishop of Basel 1555–1575: 810
- Melchor de Robles, leader of a relief force for Malta (d. 1565), 862ff., 866ff., 875f.
- Meldola, 264
- Melfi, 136n, 293; bishops of, *see* Raffaele de Ceva 1499–1513?, Lorenzo Pucci (admin.) 1513–1528; prince of, *see* Andrea Doria
- Melito, prince of, *see* Ruy Gómez (fl. 1556)
- Mellicha Bay, at Malta, 872
- Melos, 755; bishops of, *see* Giorgio Castagnola 1545–1560?, Stefano Gattulio 1560–1564?
- Membre, Michiel, translator for the Venetian Senate in 1552: 530n, 587
- Memmingen, 262
- Mendicant Orders, 496, 557, 631f., 790n, 962
- Menéndez de Avilés, Pedro, Spanish soldier (b. 1519, d. 1574), 888
- Menna, emperor of Ethiopia in 1561: 768n
- Mentuato, Camillo, nuncio in Poland ca. 1557: 628n
- Menzocci, Francesco, Italian painter (b. ca. 1502, d. 1584), 183n
- Mercati, Angelo, prefect of the Venetian Archives (b. 1870, d. 1955), 525n
- Mercenaries, 46, 60f., 81, 117, 125, 241, 316n, 318, 406, 600f., 652, 682, 684, 759, 842, 853n, 868, 878n, 933, 937, 960, 995, 1027, 1043, 1101; and *see* German mercenaries; Swiss mercenaries
- Mercurio, Giannandrea, archbishop of Manfredonia 1545–1550, of Messina 1550–1561, cardinal 1551–1561: 613, 733
- Mérindol, 472n
- Merkle, Sebastian, historian (b. 1862, d. 1945), 827
- Merlini, Giovanni Battista, brother of Martino and recipient of his letters 1508–1512: 102n
- Merlino, Martino, author of letters from Venice to Syria, 1508–1512: 102n
- Merlini, Venetian family of traders, 102n
- Mers-el-Kebir, 85
- Merseburg, bishop of, *see* Michael Holding 1550–1561
- Mesopotamia, 100
- Mesquita, Pedro, military governor of Mdina in 1565: 872
- Messina, 205n, 426, 446n, 534, 539n, 535f., 560, 582, 598, 623, 703, 758, 759n, 762, 832, 843, 844n, 852, 853n, 854, 858n, 856n, 857n, 862n, 869, 873, 877, 879, 891, 902f., 905, 943, 966, 973n, 977, 1017n, 1020n, 1021ff., 1024f., 1042, 1045ff., 1048ff., 1051n, 1059, 1067, 1069f., 1072, 1074, 1077ff., 1080f., 1086, 1090, 1096; archbishops of, *see* Innocenzo Cibo (admin.) 1538–1550, Giannandrea Mercurio 1550–1561; prior of, *see* Pietro Giustinian (fl. 1570); strait of, 532
- Mestria, site of a wharf on Chios, 895
- Mestre, 65
- Metropolitan Museum (in New York City), 207n, 631n, 686n
- Metsaki, Stefan, defender of Eger in 1552: 585
- Metz, 561, 596, 642, 647, 657, 708, 840, 888, 890, 922; bishops of, *see* Jean de Lorraine 1505–1547, Charles de Guise (admin.) 1547–1551?, Louis de Guise 1558–1578
- Mexico, 565, 983
- Mézières, 655n
- Mezzano, 286
- Mgarr, 855
- Miani, Paolo Antonio, duke of Candia ca. 1510: 24, 25n, 27n
- Miccio, Scipione, historian (fl. 1600), 595n
- Michael VII Ducas Parapinakes, Byzantine emperor 1071–1078: 568n
- Michael of Nauplia, fugitive from the Turks ca. 1567: 926n
- Michault, Nicole, correspondent of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq in 1560: 742
- Michel de Codignac, French ambassador in Istanbul in 1555: 623, 691f., 694
- Michelangelo Buonarroti, Florentine artist (b. 1475, d. 1564), 93, 103n, 118n, 140, 167n, 457n, 525n
- Michele Antonio, son of Louis II and Marguerite de Foix; marquis of Saluzzo (d. 1528), 263f., 308f.
- Michele della Torre, bishop of Ceneda 1547–1586, cardinal 1583–1586: 547
- Michiel, Giovanni (Zuan), Venetian ambassador to Philip and Queen Mary of England 1554–February 1557: 628n, 681n; ambassador to France, November 1557–1560 (succeeded by Michele Surian), 709n, 725n, 766; ambassador to the imperial court in the 1560's, 1570–1571: 835n, 950, 953, 993, 994n, 1000, 1009, 1062n; envoy to France in 1572: 1079
- Michiel, Marcantonio, Venetian diarist (b. ca. 1484, d. 1552), 30n, 131n, 132n, 142n, 149n, 152n, 157n, 193n, 200n
- Michiel, Marco (Marchio), Venetian captain-general in 1565: 850ff., 861, 862n, 878n; captain of Famagusta in 1568: 924n, 931, 934
- Micho, Pablo, Maltese seeking shelter from the 1565 siege, 863, 866
- Middle East, 140, 771, 1098
- Miedzieski, Laurenty, bishop of Kamencz-Podolski 1521–1531: 320n
- Mignaneli, Fabio, bishop of Lucera 1540–1553?, cardinal 1551–1557: 433n, 443n, 444, 448n, 484n, 489, 539n, 559, 594, 613, 639, 681
- Mignaneli, Pietro Paolo, volunteer for the Venetians in 1570: 956n
- Miguel de Cervantes, Spanish writer (b. 1547, d. 1616), 1099
- Miguel de Mendivil, artillery officer and correspondent of Philip II in 1567: 917, 918n
- Miguel de Silva, bishop of Viseu 1526–1547?, cardinal 1539–1556, bishop of Massa Maritima (admin.?) 1549–1556: 457n, 458n, 464, 508, 517f., 523f., 813
- Mihrmah, daughter of Suleiman I (fl. 1564), 837, 838n
- Milan, city, 36n, 57, 59, 61, 63, 67ff., 77, 92, 95, 98, 100f., 106, 108, 111f., 114n, 115n, 116, 117n, 120ff., 125, 128ff., 135, 148n, 157n, 161n, 173, 201, 218, 221, 225f., 229n, 230n, 231, 237, 239, 241, 248, 252, 254, 261, 265n, 272, 285ff., 288n, 304n, 328, 363, 403, 410, 412, 415, 536n, 552, 569n, 680n, 684, 701, 722n, 735n, 738n, 739ff., 918n; archbishops of, *see* Ippolito d'Este (admin.) 1519–1550?, Filippo Archinto 1556–1558, Giannangelo de' Medici (Pius IV) 1558–1559, Carlo Borromeo (admin.) 1560–1584
- Milan, duchy, 1, 11, 15, 29, 34, 40, 42, 54ff., 67, 72f., 80, 108, 110, 119n, 125, 129n, 130ff., 133ff., 145, 149, 159ff., 174n, 181f., 193f., 196, 198, 217, 219ff., 223f., 227f., 230, 236n, 238ff., 241f., 246n, 255ff., 259, 266, 284, 309f., 312, 325n, 327, 331, 333, 359, 361, 367n, 368, 392, 399f., 401n, 414, 432, 442, 450f., 457, 464, 467, 473, 481, 500, 504n, 526, 548, 554n, 556, 606n, 612n, 633, 640, 642, 643n, 644ff., 657, 661n, 664f., 667, 674, 676, 688, 709, 845, 900, 909, 911, 1023n, 1063n, 1074, 1079; claimant to, *see* Louis XII; dukes of, *see* Gian Galeazzo

- Sforza 1476-1494, Lodovico Maria Sforza 1494-1500, Massimiliano Sforza 1512-1515, Francesco Maria II Sforza 1521-1525, 1529-1535
- Milanese (area), 118n, 225, 548, 600n, **652, 665, 676**
- Milanese, 125, 128f., 131, 135, 161n, 424, **689, 738**
- Mileto, bishops of, *see* Francesco Alidosi 1504-1505, Andrea della Valle 1508-1525, Iñigo de Aragonia (admin.) 1566-1575?
- Miliana, 234
- Minale, Matteo, suspect treasurer of Pius IV, **932**
- Mincio river, 280
- Mindelheim, castle in Bavaria, 262
- Minerva, **1101**
- Minio, Francesco, brother of Marco (*fl.* 1527), 278
- Minio, Marco, Venetian ambassador in Rome 1516-1520; to Istanbul in the 1520's; to the Hapsburgs in 1532: 166n, 176n, 197n, 199, 200n, 205n, 249n, 251, 278f.
- Minorca (Menorca), **397, 701, 891**
- Minorites, *see also* Franciscans; general of, *see* Clemente Dolera (d. 1568)
- Mirabello, park near Pavia, 229
- Mirabilia* (guidebook to Rome, 1510), *see* Albertini, Francesco
- Mirandola, 93, 552f., 556f., 558n, 559, 561f., 664n; count of, *see* Giovanni Pico della Mirandola 1463-1494
- Mirepoix, bishops of, *see* Claude de la Guiche 1547-1553, Giovanni Suario Reumano 1555-1561?
- Misericordia, church of the, in Famagusta, **1042**
- Misericordia, *scuola* (in Venice), 333
- Miseure, 371
- Missa Papae Marcellii*, Paestrina's mass for Marcellus II (written between 1554 and 1563), **615**
- Missal, the, **823**
- Missionaries, 140
- Mistra, **1103**
- Mocenigo, Alvise, Venetian diplomat, doge 1570-1577: 609n, **627, 647n, 696n, 702f., 709n, 717f., 727, 736, 741, 743, 963, 969n, 970n, 972n, 974, 976, 986, 1007, 1009, 1010n, 1016n, 1019, 1059, 1065, 1071, 1073, 1074n, 1090f., 1097**
- Mocenigo, Alvise, Venetian envoy to Cairo in 1517: 38n, 64, 165n, 180n; in Venice in 1530: 338n
- Mocenigo, Filippo, archbishop of Nicosia 1560-1570?: 755f., **758**
- Mocenigo, Giovanni, son of Tommaso (*fl.* 1530), 342
- Mocenigo, Leonardo, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1509: 64
- Mocenigo, Tommaso, Venetian ambassador in Istanbul in the 1530s: 251n, 302, 333n, 339, 342f., 408ff., 424
- Modena, 93, 114n, 145n, 160, 261, 276, 277n, 285, 287f., 292, 299, 302, 327, 333, 346, 412n, 443, 478n, 518, 552; bishops of, *see* Pirro Gonzaga 1527-1529, Giovanni Morone 1529-1550?, Giulio Canano 1591-1592
- Modesti, Jacopo, author of an account of the sack of Prato in 1512: 133n
- Modon, 30, 37, 38n, 39, 211, 335n, 347, 352, 363n, 425, 533, **587, 696, 837, 852, 854f., 903, 975, 1068, 1083ff., 1086, 1103**; bishop of, *see* Alvise Lippomano 1539-1550?
- Modoneo, Giovanni Domenico, map-maker (*fl.* 1531), 344n
- Modruš (Krbava), 148n, 244, 245n, 406n; bishops of, *see* Simon de Begno 1509-1536, Pietro Paolo Vergerio 1536
- Mohács, battle of (1687), **1102**
- Mohács (Mohač), site of the 1526 battle, 159n, 244n, 247, 249ff., 255, 260, 268n, 274, 278, 301, 312f., 316n, 325, 433n, 434, 444, 459
- Mohammed, founder of Islam (b. **567/569**, d. **632**), 113, 121
- Mola, 293n, 295
- Moldavia, 37, 316n, 391n, 436, 443n, 444, 530, **566, 707n, 921, 1103**; rulers of, *see* Stephen "the Great" 1457-1504, Peter Rareș (in 1538), Alexander IV (d. 1568)
- Moldavians, 179, 316n, 365, 466, **700**
- Molfetta, 136n, 293n; bishops of, *see* Giovanni Battista Gibo (Innocent VIII) 1472-1484, Antonio Celdonio 1508-1517
- Molucans, **771**
- "Monachina, la," cell in the Tor di Nona, **752**
- Monaco, **759**; duke of, *see* Onorato I 1532-1581
- Monastic vows, 499
- Monasticism, 78, 140, 170, 188f., 194, 271, 302, **435, 460, 474n, 484n, 628, 710, 742, 780, 795, 812, 814, 822f., 847, 910, 1020, 1103**
- Moncontour, battle of (1569), **949, 1077**
- Mondonedo, bishop of, *see* Pedro Pacheco 1532-1537
- Mondovi, bishop of, *see* Michele Ghislieri (Pius V) 1560-1566
- Mondragone, duke of, *see* Antonio Carafa (*fl.* 1571)
- Monemvasia (Epidauros Limeria, Malvasia, Malvezia) **368n, 407n, 439, 448, 449n, 451, 843, 923, 926, 939, 990, 1082, 1101, 1103**; titular archbishop of, *see* Manilius Rallo 1517-1520
- Monet nos veritas*, bull of Hadrian VI (1523), 218
- Moniglia, Girolamo, Genoese at the siege of Rhodes (1522), 211
- Monino, Giovanni, would-be assassin of George Martinuzzi in 1551: **576**
- Monitorium contra Venetos*, relating to a bull of Julius II (1509), 57, 58n, 64, 78
- Monolithus (castle on Rhodes), 213
- Monopoli, 293n, 295, 297n, 309n, 329
- Monreale, archbishops of, *see* Pompeo Colonna 1530-1532, Ippolito de' Medici (admin.) 1532-1535, Alessandro Farnese 1536-1573?
- Mont Genève, pass, 130n
- Montalcino, **598, 601f., 604, 605n, 606n, 663, 685**; bishops of, *see* Agostino Patrizzi 1484-ca. 1495, Alessandro Piccolomini 1528-1554?; and *see* Pienza, bishops of
- Montalto, duke of, *see* Ferrante d' Aragona (in 1528)
- Monte Antico, **601**
- Monte Argentario, 623f.
- Monte Cassino, Benedictine abbey, 928n
- Monte Cavallo (the Quirinal), in Rome, **712**
- Monte Giordano (in Rome), **34, 614**
- Monte Mario (in Rome), 529
- Monte S. Savino, 564n, **598**
- Monte Subasio, Carthusian monastery near Assisi, 97; abbot of, *see* Zaccaria Ferreri (ca. 1511)
- Montebello, **713, 733, 736**; marquis of, *see* Antonio Carafa (d. 1588)
- Montedoglio, 266
- Montefano, 613n
- Montefelice, bishop of, *see* Ennio Filonardi (admin.) 1538-1549?
- Montefiascone, 140, 268, 276
- Montefiascone and Corneto, bishops of, *see* Alessandro Farnese (Paul III; admin.) 1501-1519, Guido Ascanio Sforza 1528-1548?, Achille de' Grassi 1551-1555, Carlo de' Grassi 1555-1571
- Montefiore, 39
- Montepaldi, 3
- Montepeloso, 294n
- Montepulciano, 445n, 552n, 554, 615n, **649**; cardinal of, *see* Giovanni Ricci
- Montepulciano-Pienza, 595n
- Monterotondo, 268
- Montesa, Fernando, secretary of Diego de Mendoza in 1550: 534
- Montesarchio, **754**
- Montferrat, **43, 111n, 237n, 341n, 708**; regents of, *see* Costantine Ariantti 1495-1499
- Montgomery, count of, *see* Gabriel de Lorges (b. ca. 1530, d. 1574)

- Montana, 81n  
 Montone river, 115  
 Montorio, 624; counts of, *see* Gian Antonio Carafa (d. 1516), Gian Alfonso Carafa, Giovanni Carafa (d. 1561)  
 Montpellier or Maguelone, 464n, 837; bishop of (before 1536: bishops of Maguelone), *see* Guillaume Pellicier 1526–1568  
 Montpensier, count of, *see* Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier  
 Montserrat, Benedictine monastery, 1020  
 Monza, 211, 337n  
 Monzón, 312n, 385, 427n, 457n, 464; Cortes of, 85  
 Moors, *see* Moslems  
 Moravia, 292n, 317, 320n, 360, 412n, 435, 790; voivode of, *see* Peter (in 1528)  
 Moravians, 778  
 Moray, bishop of, *see* Andrew Forman 1501–1513?  
 More, (Sir) Thomas, English humanist, author of *Utopia* (1516), lord chancellor 1529–1532 (b. 1478, d. 1535), 260  
 Morea (Peloponnese), 27, 30, 54, 71, 72n, 156, 352, 356n, 366n, 367, 371f., 392, 420, 427, 439, 449, 488, 700, 756, 759n, 765, 843, 862, 878, 907, 933, 947, 965, 970, 974, 990f., 1004, 1046, 1065f., 1068, 1078, 1082, 1084, 1101f.  
 "Morea," fort at the Gulf of Corinth, 1052  
 Moret, 661n  
 Morette, M. de, messenger of Paul IV to Henry II in 1556: 673  
 Moriscos, 18n, 744n, 934, 935n, 942, 946, 950, 951n, 957, 998n, 1014, 1021  
 Moro, Marino, Venetian "count" of Sebenico (*fl.* 1507), 45  
 Moro, Tommaso, soldier (*fl.* 1527), 286  
 Morocco, 891, 1095, 1096n  
 Morone, Giovanni, bishop of Modena 1529–1550?, cardinal 1542–1580, bishop of Novara 1552–1560?: 414n, 415, 416n, 417, 418n, 420ff., 430n, 431n, 432ff., 435ff., 440n, 442ff., 467, 478, 497n, 500, 508, 509n, 511f., 519, 523f., 529, 603, 610, 612, 614, 618ff., 621n, 632, 633n, 638ff., 642, 644, 674, 681n, 682, 683n, 710, 714, 721, 724, 726, 733, 737, 741, 772, 777n, 799ff., 802ff., 805ff., 808ff., 813, 815, 816n, 817ff., 820ff., 825ff., 826, 829, 882ff., 885, 912, 965, 993, 1000n, 1001n, 1070f., 1074, 1077n, 1090  
 Morone, Girolamo, father of Cardinal Giovanni; Milanese diplomat (b. 1470, d. 1529), 309, 443n  
 Moroni, Gianbattista, painter (d. 1578), 809n  
 Morosini, Andrea, historian (b. ca. 1558, d. 1618), 1038n  
 Morosini, Domenico, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1555: 621  
 Morosini, Francesco, Venetian captain-general in 1684, elected doge 1688 (d. 1694), 449, 1101f.  
 Moscow, 184n, 775, 1087  
 Moscow, grand duke of, *see* Ivan (Czar Ivan IV) 1533–1547  
 Moses (of Michelangelo), 140  
 Moslems (Moors, Saracens), 18n, 20n, 21, 29, 38ff., 50, 84ff., 108n, 130, 141, 146, 155n, 156, 162, 164, 191, 207, 234, 273, 306, 332, 347, 369, 378, 460, 465, 474, 583, 608, 623, 661, 687, 695, 760f., 789n, 830, 872n, 898n, 905, 951n, 924n, 984, 1008, 1015f., 1037, 1041f., 1091, 1096  
 Mosor, Mount, 343n  
 Mosta, 858  
 Motulla (Motula), 650; bishop of, *see* Scipione Rebiba 1551–1560?  
 Moulins, 511n  
 Mount Zion, church in Jerusalem, 303n, 322n  
 Muda, 343n, 607  
 Müglitz (Mohelnice), 778  
 Mühlbach (Sebey), 568n  
 Mühlberg, battle of (1547), 354, 484, 485n, 502ff., 558  
 Mühlhausen, 565  
 Münster, 565  
 Münster in Westphalia, treaty of (1648), 920  
 Müntzer, Thomas, preacher and Anabaptist (b. ca. 1489, d. 1525), 565  
 Muhammed ibn Ahmed ibn Iyās, witness of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1516: 165n  
 Muley (Maulā) Hassan, ruler of Tunis from 1535: 397n, 535  
 Munich, 57n, 361n  
 Murad III, son of Selim II; Ottoman sultan from 1574 (b. 1546, d. 1595), 840f., 899n, 1097f.  
 Murad, Turkish galliot commander in 1542: 465, 468  
 Murad Beg, son of Jem; Ottoman prince (d. 1523), 213n  
 Murano, 630n  
 Murano glass, 102n  
 Mureş (Maros) river, 461, 567, 570, 576  
 Muret, Marc-Antoine, French humanist (b. 1526, d. 1585), 1099  
 Muro, bishop of, *see* Flavio Orsini 1560–1562?  
 Muscovites (Moscovites), 54n, 700, 830, 842, 852, 919, 937ff., 963, 1087, 1098  
 Musculus, Wolfgang, Protestant theologian (b. 1497, d. 1563), 460n  
 Musi, Agostino (Agostino Veneziano), engraver (*fl.* 1515–1533), 398n  
 Musotti, Filippo, secretary of Girolamo Seripando in 1560, of Louis de Guise in 1563: 775n, 783, 808  
 Musso, castellan of, *see* Giangiacomo de' Medici 1523–1532  
 Musso, Cornelio, bishop of Bertinoro 1541–1544, of Bitonto 1544–1574: 492f.  
 Mustafa II, Ottoman sultan from 1695 (b. 1664, d. 1703), 1102  
 Mustafa, son of Suleiman I (d. 1553), 339n, 342, 493, 530, 562, 589f., 622, 623n, 630  
 "Mustafa," pretenders 1415–1422, 1426 and 1554: 591, 622, 623n, 630, 767  
 Mustafa Chelebi, secretary to Sultan Suleiman in 1533: 378, 380  
 Mustafa Pasha, commander-in-chief of Suleiman I until 1522: 207, 209, 210n, 278  
 Mustafa Pasha, Lala, Ottoman commander at Cyprus in 1570–1571 (b. 1535, d. 1580), 934f., 942, 944f., 972, 976, 984, 992, 995f., 1005ff., 1011, 1027ff., 1030, 1032, 1036ff., 1039ff., 1042f., 1044n, 1096  
 Mustafa Pasha, Ottoman commander at Malta in 1565: 842, 849ff., 852, 855ff., 861f., 866, 868ff., 873f., 878f., 934n  
 Musuro, Marco, Cretan scholar (*fl.* 1512), 128  
 Mutoni, Antonio, commander of gunners in Athens in 1687: 1102n  
 Muzzarelli, Girolamo, papal nuncio, archbishop of Conza 1553–1561: 623n, 749n, 750  
 Mykonos, 99, 407n, 472n, 755, 756n; bishops of (*see also* Tenos), *see* Alessandro Scurarini 1533–1559?, Marco Grimani 1559–1594?  
 Mytilene, 234, 854  
 N. N., copyist of Pietro Valderio (18th century), 927n, 992n  
 Nádasdy, Thomas, Hungarian soldier (b. 1498, d. 1562), 565, 568, 572  
 Nadin, 476, 477n  
 Naillac, Tower of (at Rhodes), 206, 215  
 Nájera (in Spain), 274n, 276, 285; abbot of, *see* Fernando Marín (d. 1527)  
 Nakhichevan (Naxuana), 590  
 Naldi, Dionisio, infantry commander at Famagusta in 1570: 991  
 Nani, alleged plotter against the life of Paul IV (ca. 1555), 639n  
 Nani, Paolo, captain of Bergamo in 1522: 201n  
 Nani, Zorzi, Venetian host of Taghrī Berdī in 1506: 21  
 Nantes, bishop of, *see* Jean de Lorraine (admin.) 1542–1553

- Naples, city, 5, 13f., 36n, 66f., 86, 109, 114n, 118f., 125, 168, 179, 212n, 215n, 222n, 225, 255, 260, 272, 277, 284, 293ff., 296, 297n, 298n, 299, 302ff., 305ff., 308ff., 311, 316n, 356, 392, 403, 410, 425, 431, 446n, 498, 499n, 532ff., 535, 556, 582f., 584n, 598, 617, 623f., 627, 634n, 638, 651, 654, 659, 675, 677, 684, 689, 701, 703, 722n, 746f., 754, 758, 776, 834, 844n, 848, 908, 914, 940, 943, 975n, 990, 992n, 1000, 1012, 1017n, 1021, 1024, 1025n, 1027n, 1045ff., 1049f., 1061n, 1070n, 1072, 1078, 1080, 1093; archbishops of, *see* Ranuccio Farnese (admin.) 1544-1549, Gian Pietro Carafa (Paul IV) 1549-1555, Alfonso Carafa 1557-1565, Paolo Burali 1576-1578; Bay of, 701; cardinals of, *see* Giovanni Pietro Carafa (Paul IV), Alfonso Carafa
- Naples, Kingdom of ("Sicily"; the Regno), 1, 3, 9, 11, 14f., 34, 40f., 53, 55, 69, 78, 86n, 87, 90, 96n, 101, 108, 109n, 114f., 116n, 133, 140, 143, 159, 162, 166, 190, 193, 206n, 208, 217, 223, 226, 227n, 238, 239n, 241f., 250, 257, 259, 263, 265f., 269, 282f., 289f., 292f., 294n, 297, 309f., 327f., 332, 337, 351n, 355, 393, 397, 415, 429, 431n, 445, 450, 473n, 500, 509n, 518, 534f., 539n, 584n, 593, 595, 598, 606n, 620, 623, 632f., 637, 640ff., 643n, 644ff., 648f., 652f., 655, 657f., 662ff., 665, 667, 669ff., 672f., 676ff., 680ff., 683, 686n, 688, 691f., 698, 709, 729n, 754, 766, 807, 821, 831, 841, 845, 848n, 854, 859n, 862, 871, 872n, 875, 879, 887, 890, 894, 899ff., 903n, 907, 909, 911ff., 916f., 920, 936, 947, 955n, 957, 959, 962, 966, 969, 973n, 982, 985, 1015f., 1020, 1022n, 1024, 1026, 1048n, 1055, 1070, 1076n, 1081, 1083, 1088, 1095, 1104; king of, *see* Alfonso II 1494-1495; viceroys of, *see* Ramón de Cardona (in 1512), Charles de Lannoy 1522-1527, Ugo de Moncada (in 1527), Philibert de Chalons (from 1527), Pedro de Toledo (in 1549), Fernando Álvarez de Toledo (in 1557), Pedro Afano de Rivera (1559, 1569), Antoine Perrenot (in 1571), Hernando de Castro (ca. 1600)
- Napoleon I, emperor of the French (b. 1769, d. 1821), 346
- Narbonne, 838; archbishops of, *see* Georges d' Amboise 1491-1494, François Guillaume de Clermont 1502-1507, Guillaume Briçonnet the elder 1507-1514, Jean de Lorraine (admin.) 1524-1550, Francesco Pisani (admin.) 1551-1563
- Nardo, bishop of, *see* Giovanni Domenico de Cupis 1532-1536?
- Narni, 268, 283, 286, 289; bishop of, *see* Pietro Donato Cesi (admin.) 1546-1566?
- Nasi, Alessandro, Florentine ambassador to France in 1509 and 1510; 59, 88, 90
- Nasi, Joseph, Jewish favorite of Selim II; duke of Naxos from 1566 (b. ca. 1524, d. 1579), 830n, 838, 849f., 899, 921f., 937, 939, 944
- Nassau, count of, *see* Louis (b. 1538, d. 1574)
- Nationalism, 413, 484, 807, 828
- Nations, at the Council of Trent, 801ff., 804
- Naumburg, 476, 548n, 772
- Naumburg-Zeitz, bishop of, *see* Julius Pflug 1542-1564?
- Nauplia, 17, 37, 71, 84, 368n, 407n, 427, 439, 448, 449n, 451, 855, 923, 926, 939, 990, 1103
- Naurizio, Elio, painter (fl. 1633), 777n
- Nausea, Friedrich, bishop of Vienna 1539-1552; 422, 539
- Navagero, Andrea, Venetian poet and diplomat (b. 1483, d. 1529), 82, 231, 237n, 239n, 242n, 249n, 250f., 252n, 268, 288, 291, 292n, 309n
- Navagero (Navagier), Bernardo, Venetian diplomat, cardinal 1561-1565, bishop of Verona (admin.) 1562-1565? 443n, 535n, 536n, 550, 555f., 561, 586, 609n, 621f., 625ff., 633, 634n, 638f., 641, 643, 644n, 645f., 647n, 649, 650n, 651f., 654f., 656n, 657f., 659n, 660ff., 663ff., 666ff., 669ff., 672ff., 675, 676n, 677n, 678n, 679ff., 682ff., 685, 687ff., 690, 691n, 696, 702f., 708n, 709f., 714f., 724, 741f., 785, 799, 805, 808f., 818, 823, 825, 931
- Navarre, 856n, 903, 1083ff., 1086
- Navarino, 14, 88, 97, 122, 124n, 132, 134n, 163, 186n, 193, 195f., 200, 223, 237n, 457; kings of, *see* Jean III d' Albret 1484-1516, Henri II d' Albret (titular; d. 1555), Henry IV of France (from 1572)
- Navarrese, 97
- Navarro, Pedro, Spanish naval commander (b. ca. 1460, d. 1528), 85f., 118n, 283, 284n, 286ff., 293, 295f., 306, 308f.
- Naxos, 25, 60, 156, 182, 191, 279, 401, 423, 446, 755, 776; 850, 899, 975, 1101; archbishop of, *see* Sebastiano Lec-cavella 1542-1562; dukes of *see* Francesco III Crispo (ca. 1510), Giovanni IV Crispo (to 1564), Giacomo IV Crispo 1564-1566, Joseph Nasi (from 1566); governor of, *see* Antonio Loredan (ca. 1511-1515)
- Naxxar, 858
- Nazianzus, bishop of, *see* Girolamo Ragazzoni (titular; ca. 1563)
- Neapolitans, 16n, 24, 293f., 296, 582, 633, 760, 850, 875, 906, 959n
- Nebbio, 853n
- Negro, Giorgio, Venetian envoy to Istanbul ca. 1504: 17
- Negro, Giovanni, Venetian secretary of the Senate in 1540: 451n
- Negroponte (Chalcis), city, 37, 447n, 795, 987
- Negroponte (Euboea), island of, 147, 396, 832, 834, 849, 855, 965, 971, 995, 1007, 1065f., 1068, 1078, 1102; *sankajbey* of (1571), *see* Mehmed Beg
- Neisse, 435n
- Nemours, dukes of, *see* Giuliano de' Medici (d. 1516), Jacques de Savoie (b. 1531, d. 1585)
- Neopatras (Hyphate), 192n
- Nepi, 3, 4n, 5, 282; bishops of, *see* Michele Ghislieri (Pius V) 1556-1560, Tiberio Crispi (admin.) 1565-1566; *see also* Sutri, bishops of
- Netherlanders, 706, 909, 913f., 917f., 926, 957; *see also* Dutch
- Netherlands, 1, 42, 49, 86, 94n, 190, 196, 244n, 298, 310, 346, 383, 473, 481, 514, 557, 628, 632, 633n, 641, 644, 656, 704, 720, 740, 772f., 818, 865, 888, 890, 909ff., 912, 914ff., 917f., 920, 922, 963, 983, 1008n, 1014, 1020n, 1024, 1078f., 1088, 1098; Estates General of, 910; governors-general of, *see* Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alva 1567-1575, Luis de Requesens (d. 1576), (Don) John of Austria 1576-1578, Alessandro Farnese (d. 1592); prince of, *see* Charles V 1516-1555; regents of, *see* Margaret of Austria 1507-1530, Mary of Hungary 1531-1555, Margaret of Parma 1559-1567, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo (regent and governor-general)
- Nettuno, 582, 649, 652, 656, 663
- Neunkirchen, 366
- Neustadt, *see* Wiener Neustadt
- Nevers, bishop of, *see* Charles de Bourbon 1540-1545?
- Newspapers, 72n
- Nicaea (Iznik, "Isignich"), 630; Council of (325), 494
- Nicastro, bishops of, *see* Marcello Cervini (Marcellus II) 1539-1540?, Jacopo Savelli (admin.) 1540-1554?, Giannantonio Facchinetti (Innocent IX) 1560-1575?
- "Nicchione," formerly in the Cortile del Belvedere, 881
- Nicolini, Ottone, *see* Ottone di Lapo de' Nicolini
- Niccolò, possible redactor of Antonio Longo's memoirs, 407n
- Niccolò da Ponte, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1547 and 1549, to the Council of Trent in 1551 and 1562; 504n, 511n, 537n, 550, 553f., 560n, 783f., 811, 824n
- Nicolò dalla Torre, papal commander in 1537: 421
- Nicolò de' Fieschi, bishop of Fréjus 1495-1511, 1524, cardinal 1503-1524; 138, 173
- Niccolò de' Gaddi, bishop of Fermò 1521-1544, cardinal 1520-1547

- 1552, archbishop of Cosenza (admin.) 1528–1555, bishop of Sarlat (admin.) 1533–1545: 268n, 291, 506, 511f., 513n, 516, 518n, 524
- Niccolò (Franciotti) della Rovere, nephew of Giuliano della Rovere (Julius II), 139n
- Nice, 351n, 370n, 440f., 442n, 445, 463, 471, 472n, 701, 910n; bishop of, *see* Girolamo Capodiferro 1542–1544; congress of (1538), 440f.
- Nichetto, courier in 1554: 600
- Nicholas V (Tommaso Parentucelli da Sarzana), bishop of Bologna 1444–1447, cardinal 1446–1447, pope 1447–1455: 3n, 40, 140, 170, 399n
- Nicomedia, 934
- Nicopolis (Nikopol), on the Danube, 591
- Nicopolis (in Palestine), bishop of, *see* François Richardot 1554–1561?
- Nicosia, 46, 183, 755ff., 758, 926f., 931f., 934f., 937, 941, 945ff., 948n, 958, 959n, 972, 976, 978f., 981, 985ff., 990f., 993, 994n, 995ff., 999, 1000n, 1004, 1008, 1017n, 1027f., 1030, 1031n, 1033f., 1036, 1043, 1094, 1095n; archbishops of, *see* Aldobrandino Orsini 1502–1524, Livio Podocataro 1524–1552?, Cesare Podocataro 1552–1559?, Filippo Mocenigo 1560–1570?
- Nifo Agostino da Sessa, Neapolitan physician (*f.* 1528), 305
- Nile river, 28, 30
- Nini, Marco Antonio, steward of Alfonso Petrucci (*f.* 1517), 167n, 168f.
- Niño, Rodrigo, imperial envoy in Venice in 1532: 361n
- Nish (Niš), 324n, 1102
- Nobili, Leonardo, Florentine ambassador to Spain in 1570: 997
- Nocento da Cigognera, printer in Milan (*f.* 1537), 407n
- Nocera, 745
- Nogarola, count of, *see* Leonhard (*f.* 1532)
- Nogueras, Diego Gilberto, bishop of Alife 1561–1567?: 808f.
- Nola, Italian city northeast of Naples, 294, 307ff.
- Noli, bishop of, *see* Girolamo Doria (admin.) 1534–1549?
- Nona (Nin), in Dalmatia, bishop of, *see* Marco Loredan 1554–1577
- Nores, Pietro, historian (*f.* 1644), 633n, 634n, 635f., 638, 639n, 640, 642, 645, 659f., 675f., 681, 716, 752f.
- Normandy, 565
- Normans, 116
- North Africa, 38, 84ff., 97n, 141, 147, 151, 155n, 178f., 234, 356, 483, 609, 913n, 955, 962, 983, 1000n, 1008, 1021, 1079, 1086, 1088, 1095f.
- North Sea, 318
- Norway, 417, 852
- Notable Errors Committed by the Venetian Signoria* . . . , anonymous account of the expedition of 1570: 990f.
- Novalosa, 915
- Novara, 113n, 272, 385, 721; battle of (1513), 148f.; bishops of, *see* Antonio del Monte 1516–1525, Giovanni Morone 1552–1560?, Gian Antonio Serbelloni 1560–1574?, Girolamo Ragazzoni 1576–1577
- Novellara, lord of, *see* Alessandro Gonzaga (*f.* 1527)
- Novi, 608
- Novi di Modena, 287
- Novibazar (Novi Pazar), 179
- Novigrad, 254, 970
- Novigradsko more, 970
- Noyon, 167
- Nucci, Lodovico, secretary of Gabriele Paleotti in 1563: 822n
- Nuns, 188, 271, 820, 822
- Nuremberg, 235n, 312n, 416, 463, 466, 484, 544, 795; diet of (1522), 417; diet of (1524), 417; diet of (1532), 358; peace of (1532), 359, 417, 452, 459; Reichstage of, 219, 236n
- Nuti, Ambrogio, Siense envoy in 1555: 604f.
- Obrovac, 960
- Occhiali, *see* Uluj-Ali
- Odescalchi, Paolo, papal nuncio in 1560 and 1571: 747, 1045n, 1071, 1078
- Odet de Châtillon, de Coligny, brother of Gaspard de Châtillon de Coligny, cardinal 1533–1563, archbishop of Toulouse (admin.) 1534–1550, bishop of Beauvais (admin.) 1535–1563 (d. 1571), 370, 515, 722n, 831, 1088
- Odet de Foix, viscount of Lautrec, marshal of France from 1511 (b. ca. 1483/1484, d. 1528), 105, 107f., 132n, 166, 195f., 201, 212n, 277, 282ff., 285ff., 288, 290ff., 293ff., 296ff., 300, 302ff., 305ff., 308ff., 316n, 321, 498, 499n
- Odet de Selve, French diplomat (b. ca. 1504, d. 1563), 555n, 556, 567n, 576n, 580n, 583n, 584n, 588n, 590n, 666n, 668n, 671, 677f., 690n, 712
- Oecolampadius, John, Protestant leader (b. 1482, d. 1531), 791
- Oglio river, 675
- Ogras, 198
- Ogulin, town in Croatia, 337
- Old Seraglio (Topkapı Sarayı), in Istanbul, 72, 84n, 123, 278, 830, 832, 898
- Olivares, Count-Duke of, *see* Gaspar de Guzmán
- Olivi, Peter John, philosopher and theologian (b. 1248, d. 1298), 454
- Olmütz (Olomouc), 435n
- Ombrone river, 601
- Oneglia, 284
- Onorato, duke of Monaco (d. 1581), 759
- Opalifski, Peter, Polish ambassador to Ferdinand of Hapsburg in 1528: 319
- Opium, 858, 864
- Oppel (Opole), 567f., 577f.
- Oran, 85, 234, 842, 853n, 891, 925, 946n, 955
- Oran Bay, 85
- Orange, princes of, *see* Philibert de Chalon (b. 1502, d. 1530), William of Orange (from 1545; b. 1533, d. 1584)
- Orange, house of, 920
- Orbetello, 594f., 599
- Ordelaifi, Antonio Maria, enters Forlì in 1503: 9
- Order of precedence, 806, 808, 810f., 823, 889
- Ordination, 542
- Ornese, 545; bishops of, *see* Francisco Manrique de Lara 1542–1556, Francisco Blanco 1556–1565
- Orio, Lorenzo, Venetian ambassador to Hungary and England (d. 1526), 250n, 232f., 237, 240
- Orléans, bishop of, *see* Antoine de Meudon 1533–1550?; dukes of, *see* Charles and Henry (II), sons of Francis I
- Ormuz (Hormuz), 348, 632
- Orsini, Aldobrandino, archbishop of Nicosia 1502–1524: 183
- Orsini, Camillo, governor of Parma in 1549: 504n, 506, 526, 583, 594n, 595, 648n, 663, 666, 689, 713
- Orsini, Fabio, supposed opponent of Pius III (*f.* 1503), 5n
- Orsini, Flavio, bishop of Muro 1560–1562?, of Spoleto 1562–1580?, cardinal 1565–1581, archbishop of Cosenza (admin.) 1569–1573?: 884
- Orsini, Franciotto, cardinal 1517–1534, bishop of Bojano 1519–1523, of Fréjus 1524–1525, of Rimini (admin.) 1528–1529: 201n, 222, 291
- Orsini, Gentile Virginio, count of Anguillara, commander of papal galleys in 1535: 397n

- Orsini, Gian Giordano, husband of Felice della Rovere (fl. 1512), 119n, 139n
- Orsini, Giordano, prefect of the Torre dell' Annona in 1347: 753n
- Orsini, Girolama, daughter of Lodovico Orsini; wife of Pier Luigi Farnese 1519–1547 (d. 1570), 418n, 621n
- Orsini, Giulio, sent by Carlo Carafa to Henry II in 1556: 671, 675
- Orsini, Luigi (Lodovico), count of Pitigliano and father of Girolama, 621n, 739
- Orsini, Niccolò, count of Pitigliano (b. 1442, d. 1510), 59, 62
- Orsini, Orazio, seeks the Turkish armada in 1571: 1049
- Orsini, Paolo, adherent of the French ca. 1552: 563
- Orsini, Paolo, commander in the expedition of 1570 (d. 1585), 956n, 958n, 982n
- Orsini, Valerio, commander under Odet de Foix in 1528: 307, 424f.
- Orsova, town on the Danube, 254
- Orte, 275, 283
- Orte and Civitá Castellana, 5; bishops of, *see* Johann Burchard 1503–1506, Paolo de' Cesì (admin.) 1523–1537, Scipione Bongallo 1539–1564
- Orvieto, 140, 268, 275n, 276, 282n, 290f., 293f., 297ff.; bishop of, *see* Niccolò Ridolfi (admin.) 1520–1529?
- Osiander, Andreas, German reformer (b. 1498, d. 1552), 417
- Osišek (Eszék), 459n
- Osimio, 803, 884n; bishop of, *see* Cornelius Firmanus 1574–1588
- Osma, bishop of, *see* Juan García de Loaisa 1524–1532?
- Osman I, founder of the Ottoman dynasty (d. 1326), 54, 123, 128, 141, 316, 562; *see also* Ottomans
- Ospedale Grande (in Siena), 604
- Ostera del Sole (in Siena), 600
- Ostera della Scala, 263
- Ostia, 13, 49n, 119, 140, 155n, 208n, 234, 257, 273n, 276, 281f., 288, 299, 311, 347, 353, 412, 470, 509, 582, 617, 624n, 645, 665, 667n, 668, 670, 671n, 675f., 702, 881
- Ostrovica, 254
- Otočac, 608
- Otrantini, 585
- Otranto, 55, 77, 154f., 295, 395n, 431, 433n, 585f., 701, 854, 903f., 939, 969, 975n, 977f., 980, 982, 996, 1013, 1017, 1021n, 1061, 1071f., 1074, 1076n, 1081; archbishops of, *see* Alessandro Cesarini (admin.) 1526–1536?, Pietro Antonio de Capua 1536–1579; Strait of, 532, 607, 907; Turkish occupation of (1480–1481), 585, 690, 795
- Otricoli, Italian town south of Narni, 268, 275
- Otto de Chodcz, palatine of Sandomierz in 1528: 315
- Otto della Guerra (in Siena), 604f.
- Otto di Pratica (in Florence), *see* Signori Otto di Pratica
- Otto von Truchsess, bishop of Augsburg 1543–1573, cardinal 1544–1573: 482n, 487, 507, 516, 518, 520n, 523, 524n, 585n, 603, 610n, 614, 619, 620n, 621n, 638f., 644, 734, 735n, 749f., 883n, 988n, 1015
- Otto Wilhelm von Königsmark, Swedish soldier serving Venice in 1687 (b. 1639, d. 1688), 1101
- Ottoman empire, 1, 12, 18, 86, 100, 122f., 128n, 142, 146, 152, 156, 173, 176, 179, 186, 193n, 278f., 375, 384n, 387, 401f., 406, 410, 448, 455, 567, 590, 650, 700, 705, 795, 815, 830, 931, 945, 946n, 947, 1008, 1068, 1076, 1097ff., 1102
- Ottomans, Turkish caliphal dynasty 1299–1923: 2, 16ff., 26n, 37, 45, 51ff., 57, 66, 69n, 71, 74f., 77, 83n, 84, 88ff., 98n, 99, 104n, 127f., 141, 146, 156, 163, 164n, 175n, 180n, 183, 184n, 185n, 191, 200n, 214, 217f., 235f., 236n, 245, 246n, 249n, 251ff., 254, 278f., 285, 300ff., 303, 313, 315f., 319, 321n, 322n, 325n, 332ff., 336, 337n, 338f., 342ff., 347f., 350, 356ff., 360, 362n, 363f., 366n, 367f., 369n, 371f., 373n, 374, 377ff., 380ff., 384f., 387f., 392f., 396, 399f., 407f., 410f., 414, 421n, 422ff., 425, 428f., 431n, 433n, 438, 439n, 441, 444f., 448, 449n, 450f., 455f., 458f., 461f., 464f., 467n, 468, 470ff., 479ff., 482f., 485, 487f., 490, 494n, 501n, 505, 530ff., 534ff., 550n, 555f., 558, 562f., 566ff., 569ff., 572, 574, 577f., 580, 582n, 584, 586ff., 589ff., 606, 607n, 608, 622, 625n, 631, 647, 650, 651n, 661f., 679, 691ff., 694f., 697ff., 700f., 702n, 703ff., 707f., 742, 754, 759n, 762n, 767, 771, 784, 791, 816, 829, 831ff., 834f., 838ff., 841, 844f., 847, 849, 851n, 852, 878ff., 887, 890, 892, 894, 896ff., 899n, 906, 909, 919, 921ff., 924f., 929ff., 932f., 935, 936n, 938, 940ff., 947f., 950, 952f., 954n, 963, 967, 971, 989, 994, 1001n, 1002n, 1007ff., 1011, 1014f., 1017f., 1037, 1043, 1049, 1058, 1064, 1068f., 1071ff., 1075, 1086ff., 1089ff., 1092, 1094ff., 1097f., 1100ff., 1103f.; *and see* Osman (d. 1326), Mehmed II 1451–1481, Bayazid II 1481–1512, Selim I 1512–1520, Suleiman I 1520–1566, Selim II 1566–1574, Murad III 1574–1595, Mehmed IV 1648–1687, Suleiman II 1687–1691, Mustafa II 1695–1703
- Ottone di Lapo de' Niccolini, Florentine envoy to Rome (fl. 1463), 180
- Oxia, island near the outlet of the Acheloiús, 1052, 1054, 1058
- Pace, Richard, English diplomat and dean of S. Paul's (b. 1482?, d. 1536), 225, 229n
- Pacheco, Francisco, cardinal 1561–1579, bishop of Burgos 1567–1579: 671, 860n, 865f., 876f., 882ff., 885f., 919, 961, 966, 967n, 988n, 988f., 1013, 1015ff., 1074
- Pacheco, Pedro, bishop of Moncedono 1532–1537, of Ciudad Rodrigo 1537–1539, of Pamplona 1538–1545, of Jaén 1545–1554, cardinal 1545–1560, bishop of Sigüenza 1554–1560: 496, 498ff., 510, 515, 517f., 523ff., 571n, 617, 619, 621n, 661, 666, 681, 684, 686f., 691, 717, 723, 726ff., 729f., 732ff., 738f.
- Pacifici regis, bull of Leo X (1521), 196n
- Padovano, 13, 68
- Padua, 55, 57, 59f., 62, 67f., 71, 74f., 77, 78n, 134, 230n, 253n, 272, 279, 335n, 415, 420, 488, 801n, 803, 811, 954, 1055n, 1061n; bishops of, *see* Sisto Gara della Rovere 1509–1517, Francesco Pisani 1524–1555, Alvise Pisani (admin.) 1555–1570
- Pag, 923, 948, 960
- Pagani, Zaccaria, of Belluno, author of an account of Domenico Trevisan's 1512 voyage to Cairo, 30f., 35
- Paget, William, English diplomat (b. 1505, d. 1563), 461n
- Paganano (Pafian), Hércules, Spanish agent (fl. 1562), 788n
- "Paix des Dames," *see* Cambrai, Treaty of (1529)
- Palace (Palazzo), the, on Chios, 895ff.
- Palamidi, 1103
- Palamós, 915
- Palatine, hill (in Rome), 399
- Palazzo Braschi (in Rome), 64, 719n
- Palazzo Capitolino (in Rome), 719
- Palazzo Carafa (in Rome), 746
- Palazzo Colico (in Trent), 777n
- Palazzo Colonna (in Rome), 280f., 646, 1100
- Palazzo Contarini del Zaffo (in Venice), 298n
- Palazzo de' Cesì (in Rome), 270n
- Palazzo del Cardinale di San Clemente (in Rome), 5n
- Palazzo del Monte (in Monte S. Savino), 564n
- Palazzo del Monte (in Trent), 777n
- Palazzo del Podestà (in Bologna), 330n
- Palazzo dell' Inquisizione (in Rome), 718



- Palazzo della Signoria (in Florence), 267  
 Palazzo Donà (on the Fondamenta Nuove in Venice), 946n  
 Palazzo Donà Giovannelli (in Venice), 403n  
 Palazzo Farnese (in Rome), 598  
 Palazzo Geremia (in Trent), 777n  
 Palazzo Girolodi-Prato (*a Prato*), in Trent, 492, 494, 537, 539, 543, 547, 777n  
 Palazzo Grimani (in Venice), 812  
 Palazzo Nani (in Venice), 21n  
 Palazzo Orsini (in Rome), 719n  
 Palazzo Pedrotti (in Trent), 777n  
 Palazzo Pubblico (Palazzo d' Accursio), in Bologna, 161, 350, 357  
 Palazzo Regio (in Nicosia), 927  
 Palazzo Ricci (in Montepulciano), 445n  
 Palazzo Roccabruna (in Trent), 777n  
 Palazzo Salvadori (in Trent), 777n  
 Palazzo S. Marco (now Palazzo Venezia), in Rome, 270, 412n, 638, 640f., 665  
 Palazzo Spannocchi (in Siena), 600  
 Palazzo Tabarelli (in Trent), 777n  
 Palazzo Thun (Municipio), in Trent, 776, 777n, 781f., 794, 811, 819f., 823  
 Palazzo Vecchio (in Florence), 625n, 956  
 Palencia, 206n  
 Paleologina, Margherita, daughter of William IX of Montferrat and Anne, daughter of René d' Alençon; wife of Federico Gonzaga 1531–1540 (b. 1510, d. 1566), 341n  
 Paleologo, Bonifacio, son of William IX of Montferrat and Anne, daughter of René d' Alençon; marquis (V) of Montferrat 1518–1530 (b. 1512), 332  
 Paleologo, Theodoros, agent of Marco Minio in the 1520's: 251, 279, 333  
 Paleotti, Gabriele, cardinal 1565–1597, bishop of Bologna 1566–1582, archbishop of Bologna 1582–1591?: 782f., 787, 792n, 794f., 797, 809, 811n, 813, 815, 817, 818n, 820f., 822n, 825f., 866n  
 Palermo, 85, 223n, 255, 555n, 583, 869, 905n, 1045, 1047, 1077n, 1081; archbishops of, *see* Francisco Remolino (admin.) 1512–1518, Tommaso de Vio of Gaeta 1518–1519?, Pietro Tagliavia d' Aragona 1544–1558  
 Palestine ("the Holy Land"), 28, 32, 38, 48f., 54, 85, 87, 151, 163, 179, 190, 303, 401, 405f., 755, 757, 907, 929, 1069, 1076n  
 Palestrina, 492, 675, 684, 687  
 "Paliana, la," cell in the Tor di Nona, 752  
 Paliano, Colonna fortress, 636n, 640, 649ff., 652, 655f., 663, 667, 669ff., 672, 675, 677, 685, 687f., 692, 712, 729, 736, 738f., 742ff., 745, 754, 968f.; dukes of, *see* Marc' Antonio Colonna (b. 1535, d. 1584), Giovanni Carafa (from 1556; d. 1561)  
 Palioastro (on Chios), 895  
 Pallantieri, Alessandro, papal fiscal procurator, governor of Rome 1563–1566, governor of the March of Ancona 1567–1569 (d. 1571), 655, 721, 743f., 746ff., 750f., 754  
 Pallavicini, Antoniotto, cardinal 1489–1507?: 3  
 Pallavicini, Sforza, soldier in the service of the empire and of Venice, lord of Busseto from 1579 (b. 1520, d. 1585), 570ff., 573, 576, 580ff., 584, 585n, 609f., 907, 932, 933, 955n, 956n, 958n, 959, 967, 974ff., 978f., 981ff., 984ff., 987, 990f., 1000, 1002n, 1004  
 Pallavicino, Pietro Sforza, historian of the Council of Trent and cardinal from 1659 (b. 1607, d. 1667), 458n, 486n, 541n, 793n, 827  
 Palmieri, Andrea Matteo, archbishop of Acerenza and Matera 1518–1528, cardinal 1527–1537: 403  
 Palombara Sabina, 665  
 Pamplona (Pampeluna), 14n, 195f., 201, 274n; bishops of, *see* Alessandro Cesarini 1520–1538, Pedro Pacheco 1538–1545  
 Panaro river, 114n  
 Pandolfini, Francesco, Florentine envoy to France in 1509 and 1511: 59, 94n, 98n, 100, 101n, 111ff., 114ff., 117, 160n, 161f.  
 Pandolfini, Pierfilippo, Florentine envoy to the Hapsburgs in 1552: 593n, 595n  
 Pantelleria, 871  
 Panvino, Onofrio, historian of the papacy (b. 1530, d. 1568), 505, 513, 528, 611ff., 617, 619f., 621n, 624, 661n, 721n, 722f., 734ff., 737f.  
 Paolo de' Cesi, cardinal 1517–1537, bishop of Sitten (admin.) 1522–1529?, of Cervia (admin.) 1525–1528, of Orte and Civita Castellana (admin.) 1525–1537: 243, 247n, 250n, 256n, 270, 291, 330  
 Paolo de' Godi, son of Arrigo Antonio (*fl.* 1527), 275  
 Papacy, 4, 85, 354, 360n, 402, 406, 413, 422n, 430, 434, 438, 455, 484, 544, 565, 616, 618, 635, 644, 646, 710, 720f., 723, 733, 801f., 847, 1003, 1076n  
 Papal elections, 509, 512, 519f., 611f., 614, 616f., 723, 724n, 727, 730ff., 798ff., 805f., 815, 821  
 Papal infallibility, 827n, 828  
 Papal states, 37, 85n, 96, 142, 145, 159, 208, 220, 223, 234, 242, 255, 276f., 291, 355, 389, 406, 411, 516, 525n, 549, 551, 560, 562f., 581f., 592, 595, 601, 640ff., 643, 652, 659f., 665ff., 672n, 676, 681f., 684, 690, 693, 701, 710f., 713, 720, 865, 866n, 900, 932n, 1001f.  
 Papal supremacy, 453f., 460, 496, 499, 542, 545, 778, 784f., 794, 807ff., 828  
 Paphlagonia, 150  
 Paphos (Baffo), 46, 756, 934, 972, 979, 992n, 1004n, 1017; bishop of, *see* Pietro Contarini 1557–1562; captain of, *see* Lorenzo Tiepolo (d. 1571)  
 "Paradiso," cell in the Tor di Nona, 752  
 Parenzo, 1010; bishop of, *see* Lorenzo Campeggio 1533–1537  
 Parga, on the coast of Epirus, 407n, 427, 1102f.  
 Parione, section of Rome, 272n  
 Paris, 142n, 159, 162n, 178, 183n, 187n, 190, 203n, 204n, 277, 283, 302, 313, 320n, 321f., 353n, 397n, 430, 450, 486, 560, 596, 656n, 661n, 666, 684, 688, 697f., 725n, 783n, 785n, 795, 809n, 840, 888, 1088; bishops of, *see* Jean du Bellay 1532–1551?, Eustache du Bellay 1551–1564? Parlement of, 55n, 472n, 794; University of, 120; and *see* Arnaud (Raynaud) du Ferrier  
 Parisano, Giulio, bishop of Rimini 1550–1574?: 782  
 Parisians, 686  
 Parliament, English, 597n  
 Parma, 12n, 114, 129, 132ff., 137, 145, 159ff., 194, 196, 201, 223, 225, 257f., 261, 272, 276, 277n, 287f., 290, 291n, 292, 299n, 329, 366n, 411n, 412n, 440, 459n, 464, 467, 500, 504, 506, 520f., 526, 528, 548ff., 551f., 556ff., 559ff., 562f., 594, 597f., 662, 664, 676, 681, 728, 1024n, 1085; bishops of, *see* Guido Ascanio Sforza (admin.) 1535–1560?, Alessandro Sforza 1560–1573; dukes of, *see* Pier Luigi Farnese 1545–1547, Ottavio Farnese 1547–1586, Alessandro Farnese 1586–1592; war of, 539, 552ff., 555ff., 558ff., 561ff., 564, 581, 588, 592, 605, 617, 634, 754  
 Parmignano, the, 552, 676  
 Paros, 1101; archbishop of, *see* under Naxos; lord of, *see* Niccolò Sommaripa (in 1503)  
 Pargaglia, Vincenzo, abbot of S. Saluto and secretary of Cardinal Pole in 1555: 645  
 Parthenon (in Athens), 1101  
 Paruta, Girolamo, relative of Paolo; governor of Tenos in 1570: 971n

- Paruta, Paolo, Venetian historian (b. 1540, d. 1598), 402, 942n, 956n, 958, 971n, 988, 990, 995n
- Pasqualigo, Francesco, Venetian provveditore of the fleet in 1537: 20, 423
- Pasqualigo, Giovanni, galley commander at Candia in 1511: 25
- Pasqualigo, Marco, Venetian (d. by 1506), 20
- Pasquinades, 63, 138n, 139n, 197n, 719n
- Pasquino (Pasquillo), statue in Rome, 63f., 719n
- Passarowitz, treaty of (1718), 1103f.
- Passau, peace of (1552), 633
- Passerini, Silvio, cardinal 1517–1529, bishop of Cortona 1521–1529, of Assisi (admin.) 1526–1529: 264n, 277
- Pastor aeternus*, bull of Leo X (1516), 162n
- Pastor, Ludwig von, historian of the papacy (b. 1854, d. 1928), 74n, 112n, 121, 139, 167, 337n, 398n, 405, 418, 441n, 445n, 486n, 1094
- Pastrana, duke of, *see* Ruy Gómez (*fl.* 1556)
- Patmos, 446
- Patras, 366, 367n; archbishops of, *see* Stefano Taleazzi (titular) 1485–1514, Antonio Cocco 1560–1574; Gulf of, 1052f.
- Patrizi (Patrizi), Agostino, bishop of Pienza (and Montalcino) 1484–ca. 1495: 137n
- Paul II (Pietro Barbo, nephew of Eugenius IV), cardinal 1440–1464, pope 1464–1471: 4n, 36, 615
- Paul III (Alessandro Farnese), cardinal 1493–1534, bishop of Corseto and Montefascone (admin.) 1501–1519, pope 1534–1549: 10n, 143n, 159n, 173, 183, 206n, 221, 223, 288, 298n, 299, 335, 339n, 340, 394ff., 398ff., 401ff., 404ff., 407n, 410f., 412n, 413ff., 416n, 417, 418n, 420f., 423, 426n, 427, 429ff., 432f., 435n, 436ff., 440f., 442n, 443n, 445, 446n, 447n, 449n, 451n, 455n, 457, 459n, 460ff., 463f., 466f., 469, 471n, 473ff., 476, 478, 482, 483n, 484, 486f., 488n, 489n, 490n, 492ff., 495f., 498ff., 501, 503ff., 506ff., 509n, 510n, 517n, 521, 524, 527ff., 532f., 550, 557, 608n, 617f., 620, 626, 632, 634, 650, 723, 739, 754, 769f., 774, 791n, 796, 809, 815, 822ff., 885, 992
- Paul IV (Giovanni Pietro Carafa), archbishop of Brindisi 1518–1524, cardinal 1536–1555, archbishop of Chieti 1537–1549, of Naples 1549–1555, pope 1555–1559: 394, 415, 443n, 497n, 506, 509f., 513ff., 516ff., 519f., 522, 528n, 580, 608n, 609n, 610, 611n, 612f., 617ff., 620ff., 624ff., 627ff., 632ff., 635f., 638ff., 641ff., 644ff., 647n, 648n, 649ff., 652ff., 655ff., 658ff., 661ff., 664f., 667ff., 670, 672n, 673ff., 676, 678ff., 681ff., 684, 685n, 686, 688ff., 691f., 696, 703f., 706, 708n, 709ff., 712ff., 715ff., 718ff., 721f., 724, 725n, 728ff., 732ff., 735n, 737, 739, 741ff., 744f., 746n, 747f., 750f., 754f., 758, 760, 767, 771f., 846, 865, 871, 872n, 881ff., 885, 893, 965n
- Paul V (Camillo Borghese), pope 1605–1621: 36, 749n, 751, 946n, 1100
- Paul de Foix, French ambassador to Venice in 1570, archbishop of Toulouse 1582–1584: 952, 1049
- Paul de Labarthe, sieur de Termes, French ambassador to Rome in 1551, to Siena in 1552: 553n, 594f., 597ff., 623, 666, 691
- Paul von Liechtenstein, imperial minister in 1507: 44n, 47, 55n, 112n
- Paulus de Varda (Kisvárd), bishop of Veszprém 1521–1526, of Eger 1526–1527, archbishop of Gran 1527–1549: 355n, 384n, 444n
- Pavia, 129, 130n, 131, 201, 225ff., 229, 239, 241, 272, 285ff., 288, 305, 457, 526; battle of (1525), 225n, 229ff., 232f., 235f., 244, 246, 248n, 252n, 286, 310n, 312, 337, 346, 378, 386, 569n, 716; bishops of, *see* Ascanio Maria Sforza 1479–1505, Francesco Alidosi 1505–1511, Antonio del Monte (admin.) 1511–1521, Girolamo Rossi 1530–1541: 1550–1560p
- Paxos (Paxoi), 1021n
- Pazzi, Florentine banking family, 102
- Pazzi conspiracy (1478), 8
- Peasants' War (1524–1525), 353, 565
- Pedro Afano (Per Afán) de Rivera (Ribera), duke of Alcalá, viceroy of Naples from 1559 (b. 1508, d. 1571), 729, 940f., 955n, 957
- Pedro de Ávila, Spanish ambassador to Rome in 1565: 877
- Pedro de Soto, Spanish theologian (d. 1563), 787
- Pedro de Toledo, marquis of Villafranca, Spanish statesman (b. 1484, d. 1553), 509n, 518, 527, 534f., 539n, 584n, 593, 594n, 595f., 625
- Pedro González de Mendoza, bishop of Salamanca 1560–1574: 778n, 818
- Pelargus, Ambrosius, German theologian (d. 1557), 542
- Pellicier, Guillaume, French diplomat, bishop of Montpellier or Maguelonne 1526–1568: 407n, 432, 450n, 451, 452n, 456f., 458n, 459n, 461n, 464n, 470
- Penance, 819
- Pendoso, Federico, Mantuan theologian at the Council of Trent in 1562: 784n
- Penitenzieria, division of the Curia Romana, 5n, 290n, 466, 614, 710, 729
- Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, 85, 234, 376n, 842, 853n, 891, 925, 955
- Pepin, king of the Franks 751–768: 538
- Pepoli, Ugo, Count, commander of Lautrec's Florentine troops (d. 1528), 308f.
- "Pepper wars," 348n
- Pera (Galata), 128n, 156, 165n, 372, 401, 450, 458, 623n, 834, 879, 936n, 944n, 945n, 949n, 1004n, 1068n, 1069n, 1087n, 1091, 1092n; and *see* Galata
- Peraudi (Péralut), Raymond, bishop of Gurk 1491–1501, cardinal 1493–1505: 39, 48
- Pérez, Antonio, secretary to Philip II (b. 1534, d. 1611), 957n, 972n, 985n, 1053
- Pérez, Gonzalo, writer and secretary of Philip II in 1565: 838n, 877n, 887
- Pérez, Juan, secretary of the Spanish embassy in Rome in 1527: 263, 273, 277, 290n, 305, 310
- Pérez de Ayala, Martín, bishop of Gaudix 1548–1560, of Segovia 1560–1564, archbishop of Valencia 1564–1566: 801, 817
- Peri Pasha, minister of Suleiman I in 1520: 194
- Périgueux, bishop of, *see* Claude de Givry (admin.) 1540–1541?
- Perpignan, 838
- Perrennot, Antoine, bishop of Arras 1538–1561?, archbishop of Malines 1561–1583, cardinal 1561–1586, archbishop of Besançon 1584–1586: 367n, 480n, 484n, 540n, 541, 544, 545n, 550n, 556n, 557, 561n, 571n, 582, 611n, 640, 645, 887n, 912, 916n, 920n, 951, 961f., 966, 967n, 998f., 1015, 1022, 1024, 1025n, 1026, 1047n, 1070, 1079
- Perrennot, Nicholas, lord of Granville, imperial minister (b. 1486, d. 1550), 367n, 368n, 399n, 413, 432, 453, 480n, 481n, 484n, 488n, 525n, 541, 545n, 582
- Perrennot de Chantonnay, Thomas, brother of Antoine; ambassador of Philip II (b. 1521, d. 1571), 887n
- Persia, 25, 51, 123n, 127, 146, 164n, 165, 240n, 342, 367, 385, 387ff., 392, 396, 398n, 450, 481, 482n, 483, 485, 501f., 529, 530n, 534n, 550n, 562, 585n, 589f., 592, 624, 630, 646, 692n, 693, 705, 708, 830, 833f., 852, 922, 934, 942, 1063n, 1094, 1096f.; sophis of, *see* Isma'īl I 1502–1524, Tahmasp I 1524–1576, Abbas the Great 1587–1629
- Persian Gulf, 100, 771

- Persians, 38, 104n, 146f., 152f., 158, 163, 170, 174n, 179, 181, 384n, 389, 392f., 502, 590f., 841, 938, 1098
- Pertau (Perrev) Pasha, Ottoman *general de mar* in 1571: 1018, 1022, 1045f., 1053f., 1057f., 1068n, 1069n
- Peru, 565, 983
- Perucci, Roberto, Latin resident of Rhodes (f. 1522), 211f.
- Perugia, 5n, 12n, 39, 40n, 140, 201, 272, 276f., 592, 594n, 602, 646, 713; bishops of, see Agostino Spinola 1509–1529, Fulvio della Corgna 1550–1553?
- Peruzzi, Baldassare, architect and painter (b. 1481, d. 1536), 140
- Pesaro, 3n, 9, 12, 109n, 139, 166, 282, 292, 363n, 680n; bishop of, see Lodovico Simonetta 1537–1561?; lord of, see Giovanni Sforza 1483–1500; 1503–1510, Francesco Maria della Rovere 1513–1516
- Pesaro, Antonio, governor of Andros in 1510: 24, 25n
- Pesaro, Benedetto, Venetian captain-general of the sea in 1502 (b. ca. 1433, d. 1503), 11f.
- Pesaro, Francesco, archbishop of Zara 1505–1530, titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople 1530–1545: 270n
- Pesaro, Francesco, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1527: 266f.
- Pesaro, Girolamo, Venetian captain-general of the sea in 1537–1538: 423f., 426f., 429n
- Pesaro, Pietro, Venetian procurator and diplomat (d. 1528), 266f., 286f., 287n, 291ff., 294f., 303ff., 306f.
- Pescara, 680, 905; marquises of, see Fernando Francisco de Ávalos (d. 1525), Fernando Francisco de Ávalos (d. 1571)
- Peschiera di Garda, 62
- Pescia, 104
- Pest, 355n, 478, 584
- Pesthy (Pesthiensis), Emeric, correspondent of George Martiuzzi in 1551: 567n
- Petalá, 1058f., 1061
- Peter I the Great, czar of Russia from 1682 (b. 1672, d. 1725), 1103
- Peter I of Lusignan, son of Hugh IV; king of Cyprus (1358) 1359–1369, of Cilician Armenia 1368–1369: 27
- Peter of Traù (Trogrin), secretary to Jerome of Zara in 1533: 383, 385
- Peter, voivode of Moravia in 1528: 316n
- Peter van der Vorst (Vorstius); chaplain of Hadrian VI, bishop of Acqui 1534–1549? 416ff., 421
- Peter's Pence, 36n
- Peterwardein (Petrovaradin), 248, 254, 261, 570, 1102; battle of (1716), 1104
- Petrusant a nobis, bull of Julius II (1509), 56
- Petromel, Antoine, French agent in Istanbul ca. 1561–1565: 766n, 830n, 832f., 835ff., 838f., 842, 844, 849f., 852, 855, 856n, 868, 878f., 899n, 930f., 938
- Petrović, Peter, minister of Isabella, widow of John Zápolya (f. 1550), 530, 566, 578
- Petrucchi, Alfonso, bishop of Sovana 1510–1513, cardinal 1511–1517, bishop of Massa Marittima 1511–1517: 115, 167ff., 197n, 748, 751
- Petrucchi, Borghese, brother of Alfonso; removed from the Siense signoria in 1516: 167, 168n
- Petrucchi, Pandolfo, "tyrant" of Siena, father of Alfonso and Borghese (b. 1442, d. 1512), 12n, 167
- Petrucchi, rulers in Siena, 592
- Peutinger, Conrad, humanist and antiquarian (b. 1465, d. 1547), 179n
- Pflug, Julius, Saxon statesman; bishop of Naumberg-Zeitz from 1542 (b. 1499, d. 1564), 358n, 453, 502n
- Phanar, 1103
- "Phanariotes," 1103
- Pharillon, castle near Alexandria, 27, 30
- Phebus, French secretary in Istanbul in 1551: 567n
- Pheraclus (Ferraolo), Rhodian castle, 213
- Phileremus, 213n
- Philibert de Chalon, prince of Orange, soldier and viceroy of Naples in 1527 (b. 1502, d. 1530), 261, 281, 293f., 304ff., 308f., 312n, 342n
- Philiberta of Savoy, daughter of Philip I and Claudia, daughter of John II of Brusse, count of Penthièvre; wife of Giuliano de' Medici 1515–1516 (b. 1498, d. 1524), 145n
- Philip I ("the Handsome"), son of Maximilian I; titular duke (IV) of Burgundy 1482–1506, Hapsburg archduke (I) of Austria 1493–1506, king (I) of Castile in 1506: 35n, 40n, 41, 42n, 43n, 44, 49; wife of, see Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand II of Aragon 1496–1506 (d. 1555)
- Philip II, son of Charles V and Isabella of Portugal; king of Spain (I) from 1556, of Portugal from 1580 (b. 1527, d. 1598), 450, 499n, 503, 525n, 538, 554, 558, 597n, 603, 606n, 612n, 618, 625n, 628, 632ff., 635, 639, 641, 644ff., 647ff., 650n, 651n, 652ff., 655ff., 658f., 661ff., 664ff., 667, 668n, 669ff., 672ff., 675ff., 678, 680ff., 683ff., 686, 688ff., 691ff., 694, 697, 699, 700n, 702n, 704f., 707ff., 711, 713f., 717, 723ff., 726, 727n, 728ff., 731f., 734n, 736, 738f., 742ff., 745, 750f., 754f., 758f., 761ff., 767, 769, 773ff., 777, 779, 781, 783n, 784, 786ff., 789, 794n, 795n, 796n, 799n, 801f., 804ff., 807ff., 810, 817ff., 820f., 831, 835n, 838n, 840n, 842n, 843, 846ff., 849n, 852, 853n, 855n, 856n, 857, 859f., 862f., 865f., 868f., 870n, 871ff., 874f., 877ff., 882, 883n, 884ff., 887ff., 890f., 894, 899ff., 902ff., 905f., 909f., 912ff., 915ff., 918ff., 922, 928, 931, 933f., 938ff., 941ff., 945f., 949ff., 953, 954n, 955ff., 958ff., 961ff., 965ff., 968f., 972f., 977f., 980, 982f., 985n, 987n, 988, 992ff., 995n, 996ff., 999, 1004, 1008ff., 1011ff., 1014ff., 1017ff., 1020f., 1025, 1045ff., 1048ff., 1053, 1059, 1061f., 1064, 1066, 1068n, 1070f., 1073f., 1076n, 1077ff., 1080f., 1084, 1086ff., 1090, 1092ff., 1094n, 1095ff., 1098, 1100; wives of, see Mary I 1554–1558, Elizabeth, daughter of Henry II 1559–1568, Anna, daughter of Maximilian II 1570–1580
- Philip III, son of Philip II and Anna, daughter of Maximilian II; king of Spain from 1598 (b. 1578, d. 1621), 595n
- Philip IV, son of Philip III and Margaret of Styria; king of Spain from 1621 (b. 1605, d. 1665), 920, 1099
- Philip IV ("the Fair"), son of Philip III; Capetian king of France 1285–1314: 360n
- Philip V, son of the dauphin Louis and Maria Anna of Bavaria; king of Spain from 1700, temporarily abdicating in 1724 (b. 1683, d. 1746), 1104
- Philip, son of George I and Amelia von der Pfalz; duke (I) of Pomerania (b. 1515, d. 1560), 417
- Philip, son of William II and Anna of Mecklenburg; landgrave of Hesse 1509–1567: 354, 386, 405, 416f., 418n, 452, 476, 482, 484, 504, 557
- Philippe de Chabot, French admiral (b. 1480, d. 1543), 360f.
- Philippe de la Chambre, cardinal 1533–1550: 370, 517
- Philippe de Montmorency, count of Hoorn (d. 1568), 918ff.
- Philippe de Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, grand prior of France, then grand master of the Hospitaliers from 1521 (b. 1464, d. 1534), 203f., 205n, 206ff., 209ff., 211, 214ff., 223f., 238, 351, 352n, 363n
- Philippopolis (Plovdiv), 179, 489n, 490
- Phrygia, 150, 768n
- Piacentino, 286, 676
- Piacenza, 31, 129, 132ff., 137, 145, 159ff., 194, 196, 223, 225, 256ff., 261, 272, 276, 277n, 286f., 299n, 328f., 366n, 411n, 412n, 420, 440, 459n, 462n, 464, 467, 478, 500, 504, 506, 520f., 548f., 552, 661, 664, 676, 722n, 728, 912n, 918; bishops of, see Gian Bernardino Scotti 1559–

- 1568?, Paolo Burali 1568–1576; duke of, *see* Ottavio Farnese (duke of Parma and Piacenza; d. 1586)
- Piacenza, Scipione, present at meeting of Venetian commanders in 1570: 991
- Piali Agà, Ottoman "capitano del mare" in 1555: 623n
- Piali Pasha, Turkish admiral (b. ca. 1520, d. 1571), 759n, 760ff., 763ff., 841f., 849ff., 855f., 861ff., 868, 870, 873f., 879, 893ff., 896ff., 899n, 901ff., 904ff., 911, 913, 930, 934, 955n, 939, 942n, 945, 947, 950, 960, 963, 971f., 980, 984, 986ff., 992, 995n, 1007, 1011, 1057n, 1094n
- Piazza Maggiore (in Bologna), 330
- Piazza Navona (in Rome), 63, 65, 72, 84n, 95n, 272, 353, 745f.
- Piazza Ponte S. Angelo (in Rome), 529
- Piazza S. Marco (in Venice), 20, 78, 135, 607, 954, 1019, 1059, 1065, 1099n
- Piazza S. Pietro (in Rome), 6, 270n, 271, 508, 513, 517
- Piazza Venezia (in Rome), 272, 663
- Picardy, 430, 473, 624, 691, 701, 705
- Piccolo, Giovanni, Venetian ship's carpenter (*fl.* 1567), 927, 928n
- Piccolomini, Aeneas Sylvius, cardinal, *see* Pius II
- Piccolomini, Alessandro, bishop of Pienza and Montalcino 1528–1554? (d. 1563), 600
- Piccolomini, Enea, Sienese captain (*fl.* 1552), 592, 594, 598ff., 601
- Piccolomini, Giovanni, archbishop of Siena 1503–1529, cardinal 1517–1537, bishop of L' Aquila (admin.) 1523–1525, of Umbratico (admin.) 1524–1531?: 335
- Piccolomini, Sienese family, 142; *and see* Pius III (Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini)
- Picconi da Sanggallo, Antonio, artist patronized by Julius II, 140
- Piceno, 776
- Picenum, 216
- Pico della Mirandola, *see* Giovanni Pico della Mirandola
- Piedmont, 224, 272, 283, 414n, 431ff., 462n, 473, 485, 550, 556f., 558n, 624, 642, 673, 676, 680, 693, 701, 709, 722n, 751n, 911, 1079
- Pienza (Corsignano), 267, 595n; bishops of; *see* Agostino Patrizzi 1484–ca. 1495, Alessandro Piccolomini 1528–1554?; *and see* Montalcino, bishops of
- Piero de' Medici, son of Lorenzo il Magnifico and Chiara Orsini; Florentine ruler 1492–1494 (d. 1503), 15, 166n, 277
- "Piero de Rizo," papal nuncio to England ca. 1510–1511: 96n
- Pierpont Morgan Library, 497n
- Pierre d' Aubusson, Hospitaller prior of Auvergne (to 1476), grand master of the Hospitallers 1476–1503, cardinal 1489–1503: 17, 33n, 39
- Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantôme, French writer (b. ca. 1540, d. 1614), 459
- Pietà, orphanage in Rome, 271
- Pietro Antonio de Capua, archbishop of Otranto 1536–1579: 559
- Pietro de' Accolti, bishop of Ancona 1505–1514, 1523 (admin.), cardinal 1511–1532, bishop of Maillezais 1511–1518?, of Cadix (admin.) 1511–1521, of Arras (admin.) 1518–1523: 65, 72f., 98n, 114f., 213n, 222, 337, 340n
- Pietro del Monte, grand master of the Hospitallers from 1568: 936, 965, 1063n
- Pietro, Giovanni, Venetian secretary in Germany in 1509: 58n
- Pietro Tagliavia d' Aragona, bishop of Girgenti 1537–1544, archbishop of Palermo 1544–1558, cardinal 1553–1558: 559, 611n
- Pieve del Cairo, 118n
- Pieve Santo Stefano, 264f.
- Pighino, Sebastiano, bishop of Alife 1546–1548, of Ferentino 1548–1550, archbishop of Manfredonia 1550–1553, cardinal 1551–1553: 492, 529, 537f., 543, 545, 547, 559
- Pilgrims, 28, 32, 50, 54, 87n, 153, 210n, 215, 401, 517, 705ff., 755, 757, 1037
- Pimpinella, Vincenzo, archbishop of Rossano 1525–1534: 335n, 350n, 371n
- Pinelli, Giovanni Vincenzo, humanist (b. 1535, d. 1601), 1055n, 1061
- Pinerolo, 709
- Pio, Alberto, count of Carpi, imperial ambassador to Venice and Rome (b. 1475, d. 1550), 88, 113n, 134, 136, 144n, 148n, 151n, 153n, 159n, 165n, 168n, 170, 171n, 172f., 222, 226, 264, 266
- Pio, Ercole, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- Pio, Gian Ludovico, brother of Rodolfo, participant in the Carrafa scandal of 1559: 711
- Pio, Rodolfo, of Carpi, bishop of Faenza 1528–1544?, cardinal 1536–1564, bishop of Girgenti (admin.) 1544–1564: 430n, 442n, 466, 470, 505, 508ff., 511, 513, 517f., 523f., 558, 612f., 617f., 621n, 637ff., 642, 681, 721ff., 724ff., 727f., 730, 732ff., 735f., 738f., 751f.
- Piombino, 3n, 12f., 86, 221, 623, 624n, 630, 664, 692n; lord of, *see* Jacopo IV d' Appiano 1474–1510, Jacopo VI d' Appiano (to 1546)
- Piotrków, city in Poland, 316n, 317
- Piperario, Andrea, secretary to the Fifth Lateran Council in 1517: 169n, 170
- Piperno (Priverno), 656, 660
- Piracy, 17, 37, 50n, 151n, 191, 207, 217, 234f., 340, 388, 395f., 408, 465, 532, 585ff., 608, 662, 706, 759, 776, 795, 799, 829, 861f., 891, 923, 1037; *see also* Barbary pirates, corsairs
- Piraeus, 1102n
- Piri Pasha, Turkish commander at the siege of Rhodes (1522), 211n
- Piri Reis (Piri Ra'ad), Turkish captain in 1536: 409
- Pirro dell' Offredo, Neapolitan special envoy of the duke of Alva in 1556: 658f., 689
- Pisa, 13, 34, 81, 90, 92, 95ff., 98ff., 103f., 106ff., 110, 121, 272, 522n, 595, 624, 650, 744n, 973n, 1046; archbishops of, *see* Nofri Bartolino 1518–1555, Scipione Rebiba 1556–1560?, Giovanni de' Medici (admin.) 1560–1562, Giovanni Ricci 1567–1574; Councils of: (1409), 98, 708n and (1511–1512), 81, 92, 94, 98ff., 103, 104ff., 107f., 110ff., 112n, 114n, 115, 120, 125ff., 129, 133f., 136, 139n, 143n, 149f., 708n
- Pisa-Milan, Council of, and Pisa-Milan-Lyon, Council of, *see* Pisa, Council of
- Pisani, Alvise, bishop of Padua (admin.) 1555–1570, cardinal 1565–1570: 803
- Pisani, Alvise, father of Francesco; Venetian provveditore generale in 1528: 196n, 275n, 286, 289n, 290ff., 294f., 303ff.
- Pisani, Domenico, Venetian envoy to Rome ca. 1507: 43n, 56n, 57n, 62n
- Pisani, Francesco, cardinal 1517–1570, bishop of Padua 1524–1555, of Cittanova (admin.) 1526–1535, of Treviso (admin.) 1528–1538?, archbishop of Narbonne (admin.) 1551–1563: 196n, 221n, 255, 286, 289n, 290ff., 311n, 509, 611ff., 620, 638, 723, 725n, 733ff., 885n, 885
- Pisani, Paolo, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1509: 36, 64
- Pisani, Pietro, galleass commander at Lepanto in 1571: 991, 1054, 1058
- Pisans, 104
- Pistoia, 342; bishops of, *see* Lorenzo Pucci 1509–1518?, Antonio Pucci 1518–1541?
- Pistorius (Johann Becker), Lutheran theologian (d. 1583), 453

- Pitigliano, **640**; counts of, see Niccolò Orsini (d. 1510), Luigi Orsini
- Pius II (Aeneas Sylvius, or Enea Silvio Piccolomini), bishop of Siena 1450–1458, cardinal 1456–1458, pope 1458–1464: 4, 142, 147, 153, 180, 474f., 595n
- Pius III (Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini, nephew of Pius II), cardinal and archbishop of Siena 1460–1503, pope in 1503: 3ff., 6ff., 9f., **615**
- Pius IV (Giannangelo de' Medici), archbishop of Ragusa 1545–1553?, cardinal 1549–1559, archbishop of Milan 1558–1559, pope 1559–1565: 443n, 486n, 496, 506n, 515, 523, 528n, 540n, 550n, 600n, **613**, 624n, 637ff., **652**, 657f., 663n, **671**, 677n, 678n, 679n, 713f., 721n, 722n, 723f., **726**, 728ff., 733ff., 736ff., 739ff., 742ff., 745ff., **748**, **751**, 752n, 753ff., **758**, **760**, **762**, **764**, 767n, 769, 770n, 771ff., **774**, 776ff., 779ff., 781n, 784ff., 787ff., **790**, 791n, **792**, **794**, 796ff., 799ff., 802ff., **806**, **808**, **811**, 814ff., 817f., 821f., 823n, 824ff., 827n, **829**, 846f., 851f., 856n, 858ff., **862**, 865f., 872n, 875ff., 880ff., 883ff., 886f., **900**, **907**, **912**, **932**, 965n, 966n
- Pius V (Michele Ghislieri), bishop of Sutri and Nepi 1556–1560, cardinal 1557–1566, bishop of Mondovì 1560–1566, pope 1566–1572: **678**, **712**, **720**, **723**, **733**, 740f., 753f., 792n, 846n, 883ff., 886ff., **889**, 899ff., **904**, 906ff., 909ff., 912ff., 916ff., **919**, 922n, **928**, 932f., 939ff., **942**, **949**, **951**, 955f., 958n, 959ff., 962ff., 965ff., 968f., **973**, **976**, **983**, 988n, **989**, 992ff., 996ff., **999**, 1000n, 1002f., 1004n, 1009ff., 1012f., 1015f., 1018f., **1024**, **1029**, 1045f., **1060**, 1061n, 1062ff., 1066f., 1070ff., 1073f., 1076ff., **1079**, **1087**, 1094n, **1100**
- Pius VI (Giovanni Angelo Braschi), cardinal 1771–1775, pope 1775–1779: 719n
- Pius VII (Barnaba Chiaramonti), pope 1800–1823: 346
- Pius IX (Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti), pope 1846–1878: 494, **827**
- Pizzamano, Gregorio, provveditore di Cividale del Friuli in 1530: 337n
- Pizzighettone, 224f.
- Plague, 102n, 198, 202, 217, 257, 276n, 277, 282f., 292, 305, 311, 328n, 353, 384, 387, 448n, 452n, 499n, 519, **565**, **622**, 623n, 630n, **761**, 830ff., **834**, **842**, **851**, **879**, 918f., **967**, 979f., **991**, **1043**, **1102**; see also typhus
- Plato (b. 428/427 B.C., d. 348/347 B.C.), 136
- Plauen, 502n
- Plautilla de' Massimi, noblewoman involved in the scandal of Carlo Carafa ca. 1558: 711f.
- Plieningen, 542
- Plock (Płoczek), city northwest of Warsaw, 318; bishops of, see Erasmus Vitellius 1503–1522, Andreas Krzycki (Cricius) 1527–1535; castellan of, see John Wiecwieński (in 1530)
- Pluralism, **796**, **798**
- Po river, 63, 76f., 122, 225, 237, 254, 257, 286, 298, 328, 431, 457
- Podacataro, Alessandro, author of an eye-witness account of the siege of Famagusta in 1571: 996n, 1027n, **1028**, 1031n, 1035ff., 1038n, 1041f., 1043n
- Podacataro, Filippo, father of Alessandro and Tuzio; volunteer at Famagusta in 1571: 1027n
- Podacataro, Tuzio, brother of Alessandro (d. 1571), 1027n, 1031n
- Podacataro, Cesare, archbishop of Nicosia 1552–1559?: 755n, **756**
- Podacataro, Livio, brother of Cesare, archbishop of Nicosia 1524–1552?: **756**
- Poggiani, Giulio, humanist of Novara, preached before the conclave which elected Pius IV, **721**
- Poggio, Giovanni, bishop of Tropea 1541–1556?, cardinal 1551–1556: 478n, 559, **613**, **620**
- Poggio, Marino, Venetian secretary to Francesco Pisani in 1526: 255
- Poggioreale, eastern suburb of Naples, 294
- Poisay, 297, 502, 671n, **675**, 698n; Colloquy of (1561), **774**, **819**
- Poitiers, 949n; bishop of, see Claude de Givry 1534–1551?; procurator of, see Jean Bouchet (ca. 1512)
- Pola (Pula, Pulj), bishops of, see Altobello Averoldi 1497–1531, Antonio Elio 1548–1558?
- Poland, **9n**, 36, 48, 149f., 158, 175n, 179, 184, 216, 235f., 250n, 252, 256n, 292n, 312ff., 315, 316n, 317, 319, 321, 323f., 325n, 344, 345n, 349n, 412n, 435f., 437n, 463, 489, 496, 589, 628, 656, 663n, 714f., 741n, **775**, **807**, **812**, 818ff., **825**, **828**, **840**, **852**, 921f., **938**, **955**, **1020**, **1064**, 1087f., 1097, **1103**; kings of, see Sigismund 1506–1548, Sigismund II Augustus 1548–1572, Henry of Anjou (Henry III of France) 1573–1574, Stephen Báthory 1575–1586
- Pole, Reginald, humanist and reformer, cardinal 1536–1558, archbishop of Canterbury (admin.) 1556 (consecr. 1557)–1558: 236n, 394, 407n, 415, 486, 488, 492, 497, 507n, 509ff., 512ff., 515ff., 518ff., 522, 523n, 524n, **580**, 596n, **597**, 603n, **610**, 615n, **616**, **618**, **620**, 621n, 642f., **645**, **681**, **710**
- Poles, 36n, 48, 177ff., 315ff., 318n, 324, 325n, 341n, 412n, 489, **700**, **714**, **919**, **922**, 1087f., **1098**, **1101**
- Polesella, 76f.
- Polesine (region between the Po and the Adige), 63, 76, 122
- Polesine di San Giorgio, 76
- Polignano, 293n
- Polin, Captain, see Antoine des Escalins
- Pollan, Zuan Francesco, Venetian gallej commander (d. 1510), 82n
- Poller, Sebastiano, Sicilian alchemist at the siege of Jerba in 1560: **764**
- Polydore Vergil (P. V. Castellensis), English historian of Italian origins (b. ca. 1470, d. 1555), 44n
- Pomerania, duke of, see Philip I (b. 1515, d. 1560)
- Pompey, Roman triumvir (b. 106 B.C., d. 48 B.C.), 306
- Pomponazzi, Pietro, philosopher (b. 1462, d. 1525), 151
- Pomposa, abbey in the vicinity of Ferrara, abbot of, see Luciano degli Ottoni (in 1547)
- Pon, Master, apostolic envoy ca. 1504: 48
- Ponchino, Zuan, Venetian courier in 1556: **653**
- Ponte del Megio (in Venice), 83n, 201
- Ponte della Paglia (in Venice), 79
- Ponte Milvio (in Rome), 5, 40, 269, 506n
- Ponte Palatino (in Rome), 687n
- Ponte Rotto (in Rome), see Ponte S. Maria
- Ponte S. Angelo (in Rome), **752**
- Ponte S. Maria (ancient Pons Aemilius, later Ponte Rotto), in Rome, **687**, 688n
- Ponte Sisto (in Rome), 270f.
- Ponte Solaro, north of Rome, 275
- Ponte Vecchio (in Pisa), 107
- Pontecorvo, Italian town west of Cassino, 659f.
- Pontedera, **601**
- Pontelli, Baccio, Italian architect (d. 1492), 5n, **668**
- Pontigliano ("Pomigliano d' Arco"), 294
- Pontremoli, 98, 103
- Popes, see Leo I 440–461, Gregory I 590–604, Leo III 795–816, Leo IV 847–855, Sylvester II 999–1003, Gregory VII 1073–1085, Urban II 1088–1099, Celestine III 1191–1198, Innocent III 1198–1216, Celestine IV 1241, Clem-

- ent IV 1265–1268, Gregory X 1271–1276, Boniface VIII 1294–1303, Clement V 1305–1314, Clement VI 1342–1352, Innocent VI 1352–1362, Urban VI 1378–1389, Martin V 1417–1431, Eugenius IV 1431–1447, Nicholas V 1447–1455, Calixtus III 1455–1458, Pius II 1458–1464, Paul II 1464–1471, Sixtus IV 1471–1484, Innocent VIII 1484–1492, Alexander VI 1492–1503, Pius III 1503, Julius II 1503–1513, Leo X 1513–1521, Hadrian VI 1522–1523, Clement VII 1523–1534, Paul III 1534–1549, Julius III 1550–1555, Marcellus II 1555, Paul IV 1555–1559, Pius IV 1559–1565, Pius V 1566–1572, Gregory XIII 1572–1585, Sixtus V 1585–1590, Urban VII 1590, Gregory XIV 1590–1591, Clement VIII 1592–1605, Paul V 1605–1621, Innocent X 1644–1655, Alexander VII 1655–1667, Clement IX 1667–1669, Innocent XI 1676–1689, Clement XI 1700–1721, Pius VI 1775–1779, Pius IX 1846–1878
- Popoli, 293
- Popolonia, 623, 630
- Pordenone, Italian town west of Udine, 63
- Poros, 1102
- Port' Ercole, 599, 600n, 1024
- Port of Commerce (at Rhodes), 208n
- Port of Galleys (Dockyard Creek; at Malta), 854, 864
- Port of Galleys (at Rhodes), 208n
- "Port of the English," at Malta, 862f., 870
- Porta Camollia, in Siena, 592, 595, 600
- Porta Capuana (in Naples), 295
- Porta del Diamante, at Famagusta, 1037, 1039, 1042
- Porta del Popolo or Flaminia (in Rome), 270, 442, 614, 660, 677; Augustinian convent at, 660
- Porta Fontebranda (in Siena), 592, 604
- Porta Nolana (in Naples), 295
- Porta Pertusa (in Rome), 270
- Porta Reale (in Messina), 1067n
- Porta S. Felice (in Bologna), 330
- Porta S. Gennaro (in Naples), 295
- Porta S. Giovanni (in Rome), 290
- Porta S. Lorenzo (in Rome), 646
- Porta S. Pancrazio (in Rome), 269ff.
- Porta Santa (at S. Peter's in Rome), 517, 527, 528n
- Porta Santo Spirito (in Rome), 270f.
- Porta Torrione (Cavalleggeri), in Rome, 270f.
- Porta Viridaria (in Rome), 6
- Porte, *see* Ottomans
- Portici, 303
- Portico of Octavia (in Rome), 626
- Portinari, Antonio, Florentine commissioner in Pisa in 1511: 105f., 107n, 108n
- Porto, town north of Ostia, 470; cardinal bishops of, *see* Giovanni Salviati, Rodolfo Pio
- Porto Cesenatico, Romagna town, 39
- Porto Longone (Porto Azzurro), 623, 624n
- Porto Picorna, 975
- Porto Santo Stefano, 623
- Porto Vecchio (in Corsica), 888
- Portoferraio ("Portoferragio"), on Elba, 623f.
- Portugal, 18, 28, 48, 49n, 130, 177ff., 236n, 237n, 239n, 255n, 272, 348, 351, 415, 463, 517n, 632n, 656, 740, 741n, 768n, 775, 789n, 800, 812, 818f., 840n, 846, 1019n, 1061n, 1064, 1097f.; cardinal of, *see* Henry, son of Manuel of Portugal; Hospitaliers from, 207; kings of, *see* Manuel I 1495–1521, John III 1521–1557, Sebastian 1557–1578
- Portuguese, 1, 18n, 19f., 23f., 26, 32, 38, 84f., 165n, 178, 348, 386, 531f., 632, 771, 789n, 926, 1095, 1096n, 1098
- Porzia, Girolamo, Venetian count (*fl.* 1511), 110n
- Posilipo, 296, 303
- Potenza, 749n; bishop of, *see* Pompeo Colonna (admin.) 1521–1526
- Poveglia, island near Venice, 30
- Poznań (Posen), bishop of, *see* Adam Conarski 1562–1574; castellan of, *see* Lucas Górka (*ca.* 1528)
- Pozzallo, 872
- Pozzuoli, 303, 307n
- Prado (in Madrid), 484, 920
- Pragmatic Sanction (of Bourges), *see* Bourges
- Prague, 317n, 319, 332, 335, 385, 386n, 387ff., 390, 405, 414n, 418n, 421n, 422, 432n, 433n, 434ff., 472n, 577, 579n, 580n, 707n, 766, 771, 950, 1009, 1015n; archbishop of, *see* Anton Brus 1561–1581?
- Pratanus (Prée), Laurentius, imperialist author of an account of the Council of Trent, 500n
- Pratica di Mare, 668
- Prato, 104, 132, 133n
- Preaching, 176, 460, 484, 495, 565, 813, 914
- Precedence, *see* Order of precedence
- Precipola, 1028
- Premoli, family, 60
- Presburg (Bratislava), 580n, 814n, 816
- Pretoriani, supporters of civil government on Chios, 893
- Prevesa (Préveza), 358n, 407n, 430, 446f., 452n, 532, 538, 607n, 696, 765, 862, 903, 906f., 1050f., 1058, 1103
- Prévost, Jacques, sieur de Charry, envoy of Monluc to Margignano in 1555: 606n
- Price revolution, 565
- Primitiva illa Ecclesia, bull of Leo X (1516), 162n
- Primo, Nicolare, correspondent of Giovanni Vincenzo Pinelli (*fl.* 1571), 1061n
- Printing, 49, 58n, 110n, 111n, 565, 719n, 826f., 929, 1099
- Priuli, Alvise, Venetian *sapienter terrae firmae* in 1508: 52; friend of Reginald Pole, 488, 489, 520n
- Priuli, Andrea, Venetian bailie in Istanbul (d. 1523), 217f.
- Priuli, Girolamo, diarist (b. 1476, d. 1547), *fl.*, 11n, 12, 18n, 19f., 23, 28, 37n, 40n, 55n, 74, 83, 102n, 165n
- Priuli, Girolamo, Venetian doge 1559–1567: 763, 767n, 770n, 772, 845, 847, 923, 929, 931
- Priuli, Lorenzo, Venetian envoy to the Hapsburgs in 1525: 231; doge of Venice 1556–1559: 652, 672, 675, 680, 717f.; patriarch of Venice in 1562: 777n; Venetian ambassador to Spain 1573, patriarch of Venice 1591–1600, cardinal 1596–1600: 1092f., 1094n
- Priuli, Matteo, bishop of Citanova 1561–1565, of Vicenza 1565–1579?
- Priuli, Vincenzo Maria, seeks the Turkish armada *ca.* 1570: 986, 988
- Procida, 582, 595, 1024
- Procuratori di San Marco (in Venice), 958
- Prospero d' Arco, imperial ambassador to Rome in 1563 (b. 1522, d. 1572), 799, 800n, 803, 808n, 814n, 815n, 821n, 860n
- Protestantism, 1, 202, 324n, 406, 414, 417, 427, 453, 455, 460, 466, 545, 704, 715, 773, 775, 786, 795, 807, 828, 888
- Protestants, 244, 384n, 403, 405, 413f., 416, 437, 452f., 455, 459ff., 463, 467, 473n, 477, 482, 484, 499, 502f., 540ff., 543ff., 547, 565f., 632f., 715, 720, 725, 766n, 767, 770n, 772f., 783, 791f., 797, 806n, 808, 810, 826, 827n, 828, 888, 910, 916, 918n, 920, 941, 1088, 1097
- Proti, 943
- Protocico, Annibale, correspondent of Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle in 1571: 1047n
- Provence, 177, 216, 351n, 359, 370, 414, 430n, 767n, 849, 915, 958; Hospitaliers from, 207, 758, 854, 863, 870, 875

- Prussia, 144, 150, 341n, 417, 741n, **775, 825**
- Psalme (Psalmus), Nicole, bishop of Verdun 1548–1575: 808n, 809n, 811n
- Pseudo-Mustafa, *see* "Mustafa"
- Przemysl, bishops of, *see* Matthias Drzewicki 1504–1513, Andreas Krzycki (Cricius) 1523–1527
- Pucci, Antonio, nephew of Lorenzo; bishop of Pistoia 1518–1541?; of Vannes (admin.) 1529–1541, cardinal 1518–1544: 173ff., 184, 297
- Pucci, Lorenzo, bishop of Pistoia 1509–1518?; of Melfi (admin.) 1513–1528, cardinal 1513–1531: 98n, 136n, 173, 341n, 394n
- Pucci, Puccio, brother of Lorenzo and husband of Girolama Farnese (*f.* 1494), 394n
- Puglie, Puglia, *see* Apulia
- Puglioni (Puglione), Giovanni Antonio, baron of Burgio and papal envoy (d. ca. 1546, 1548), 219, 236, 243n, 247
- Punta del Faro (in Sicily), **623**
- "Purgatorio," cell in the Tor di Nona, **752**
- Purgatory, 460, 499, 542, **757, 812, 819ff., 822**
- Puteo, Jacopo, archbishop of Bari 1550–1562?; cardinal 1551–1563: 613f., 618ff., **639, 717, 723f., 728, 733ff., 748, 770n, 773, 776**
- Pyrenees mountains, 196
- Qerqenah Islands, **761**
- Quail, Port of, *see* Brazzo di Maina
- Quarantia (in Venice), **1061**; Councilors and Capi of the, 718n
- Quarnaro, 65
- Quartari, Bernardino, host of members of the Orsini faction ca. 1503: 12n
- Querini, Francesco, acquires Astypalaea in 1413: 439
- Querini, Francesco, Venetian appearing before the Senate ca. 1538: 439, 472n
- Querini, Giannantonio, put to death at Famagusta in 1571: **1040**
- Querini, Girolamo, patriarch of Venice 1524–1554: 333
- Querini, Marc' Antonio, naval commander (b. 1531, d. 1581), 974n, 1005f.
- Querini, Marco ("Stenta"), Venetian "captain of the Gulf" ca. 1568: **933, 935, 970, 974ff., 977f., 980ff., 984, 986f., 990, 1004ff., 1007, 1013, 1017, 1021, 1027, 1029, 1039, 1043, 1045, 1047, 1048n, 1051, 1054, 1060, 1082**
- Querini, Vincenzo (Pietro), Venetian envoy and Camaldulensian monk (as Pietro) (b. ca. 1479, d. 1514), 41n, 42ff., 46f., 51, 146f.
- Querini, Vincenzo, Venetian captain (b. 1521, d. 1571), **1057**
- Querini family, lords of Astypalaea, 439
- Quimper, bishop of, *see* Nicolò Gaetano di Sermoneta 1550–1560
- Quiñones, Francisco, general of the Franciscans 1523–1528, cardinal 1527/1528–1540, bishop of Coria 1530–1533, of Acerno (admin.) 1539: 286, 288, 413
- Quinquenio, five-year subsidy, 876f., **887, 899f., 909, 916**
- Quirinal (in Rome), 157n; *see also* Monte Cavallo
- Rabelais, François, French writer (b. ca. 1494, d. ca. 1553), 398f., 450n
- Raffaele de Ceva, bishop of Melfi 1499–1513? (d. 1518), 136n
- Raffaele de' Graziani, secretary in the forces of Francesco Maria della Rovere (*f.* 1524), 228
- Raffaelli, Galeazzo, Florentine agent of Gregorio Gheri in 1526: 257
- Ragazzoni, Giacomo, brother of Girolamo; Venetian envoy to Istanbul in 1571: **1011, 1012n**
- Ragazzoni, Girolamo, titular bishop of Nazianzus in 1563, bishop of Famagusta 1561–1591?; of Kisamos from 1572, of Novara 1576–1577, of Bergamo 1577–1592: **822, 1004, 1011**
- Ragazzoni, Placido, Venetian citizen in Messina (*f.* 1572), **1070, 1077n**
- Ragusa (Dubrovnik), 23, 123, 124n, 128, 152, 164, 181, 198, 200n, 235, 251, 338, 361f., 367n, 383, 385, 401n, 424, 437, 446, 458f., 489f., 553, 562, 585n, 607, 698n, 766f., **837, 905, 904n, 905, 919, 948, 953n, 955, 973n, 1005f., 1068n, 1088ff., 1091, 1094ff., 1097, 1099n**; archbishops of, *see* Giannangelo de' Medici (Pius V) 1545–1553; Lodovico Beccadelli 1555–1564?
- Ragusei, 71, 123, 160n, 164, 181, 191n, 193n, 247n, 362n, 493, **851, 903f., 988, 1016, 1071**
- Raidīnyah, battle of (1517), 165
- Rallo, Manilius, titular archbishop of Monemvasia 1517–1520: 272n
- Rambouillet, 483n; cardinal of, *see* Charles d' Angennes (d. 1587)
- Ramón de Vich, cardinal 1517–1525, bishop of Cefalù (admin.) 1518–1525, of Barcelona 1519–1525: 200
- Rangone, Pallavicino, sent to Famagusta in 1570: **965, 987**
- Rangoni, (Count) Guido, officer of the League of Cognac ca. 1527 (d. 1539), 267, 268n, 270, 275, 308f.
- Ranke, Leopold von, German historian (b. 1795, d. 1886), 626n
- Raphael (Raffaello Sanzio), painter and architect (b. 1483, d. 1520), 140
- Rares, Peter, rebellious voivode in Moldavia in 1538: 444, 466
- Ratisbon, diet of, *see* under Regensburg
- Ravello, bishop of, *see* Lodovico Beccadelli 1549–1555
- Ravenna, 55, 59n, 61f., 93f., 96n, 109, 115f., 118f., 121n, 129, 277, 282, 287, 291n, 297ff., 300, 302, 310, 322n, 323n, 327, 330ff., 339f., 346, 411n, 581n, **674, 879n, 881**; archbishops of, *see* Benedetto de' Accolti 1524–1549; Ranuccio Farnese 1549–1564?; Giulio della Rovere (admin.) 1566–1578; battle of (1512), 28, 32, 80n, 116ff., 119ff., 136, 144, 283, 287
- Ravensburg, 543
- Raverta, Ottaviano, papal nuncio, bishop of Terracina 1545–1562: 767n, **775, 846**
- Ravni Kotari, 608
- Raymond de Rouer, seigneur de Fourquevaux, French ambassador to Spain in 1566 (b. 1509, d. 1574), 887f., **890, 901, 905, 910n, 911, 914f., 922, 926, 946n**
- Raynaldus (Odorico Rinaldi), papal annalist (d. 1671), **723, 877n**
- Real presence, 540, **749**
- Reale, *la*, galley of Don John of Austria at Lepanto: 1054f.
- Rebiba, Scipione, bishop of Amiclae 1541–1551?, of Motulla (Motula) 1551–1560?; cardinal 1555–1577; archbishop of Pisa 1556–1560?: **635, 644, 649f., 655f., 660n, 682, 744, 753**
- Recanati, 109n, 292
- Recusants, **633**
- Red Sea, 24, 386, **771, 926, 934**
- Reform, 91f., 95, 106f., 137, 146n, 147, 154f., 165n, 167, 170, 189, 202, 394f., 403f., 406, 415n, 419, 430, 453, 467, 484, 514, 517, 528, 540ff., 544ff., 547, 603, 611f., **614, 627, 635, 708ff., 712, 718, 720, 741f., 750, 754, 756, 769n, 778ff., 781f., 784f., 787f., 790, 792, 794, 797ff., 800ff., 803ff., 807, 809, 812ff., 815ff., 818ff., 822, 824ff., 828**
- Reformation, **566, 628**; *and see* Anabaptism, Anabaptists, Bucer, Bugenhagen, Calvin, Calvinism, Calvinists, Hubmaier, Huter, Jonas, Luther, Lutheranism, Lutherans, Melancthon, Protestantism, Protestants, Zwingli, Zwinglians, etc.

- Regensburg (Ratisbon), 190, 252, 357f., 359n, 364n, 365, 435, 452n, 459n, 460, 477, 482, 496n, 568n, **658, 769, 810**;  
 bishop of, *see* Georg, marshal of Pappenheim 1548–1563;  
 diet of (1532), 358; Regensburger Reichstag (1541), 453,  
 460n, 476
- Reggio di Calabria, 582f., **1050**; archbishops of, *see* Pietro I-  
 valdes 1497–1506, Roberto Latino Orsini 1512–1520f.,  
 Gasparo dal Fosso 1560–1592
- Reggio nell'Emilia, 114n, 133f., 136f., 145n, 160, 261, 287,  
 292, 299, 302, 333, 346, 412n, **676**; bishops of, *see* Giovanni  
 Luca 1503–1510f., Marcello Cervini (Marcellus II) 1540–  
 1544
- Regimini universalis ecclesiae*, bull of Paul III (1545), 486, 500
- Regno, *see* Naples, kingdom of
- Regular clergy, **820, 822, 847**
- Reichammergericht* (Imperial Chamber), 452, 460, 476, 487
- Relics, 211, 213n, 271, 274n, 312n, 333, 349n, 492, **757**,  
 821f., **910**
- Religion, French wars of (ca. 1562–1598), 455, **720, 766, 834**,  
 840f., **922, 949**
- Remolino, Francesco, bishop of Sorrento 1501–1512f., cardinal  
 1503–1518, bishop of Fermo 1504–1518, archbishop of  
 Palermo (admin.) 1512–1518: 4n, 173
- Renaissance, 140, **660, 777n**
- Renard, Simon, ambassador of Charles V to France in the  
 1550's: 550n, 551n, 556n, 650n, 659n, 661n
- René de Birague, French statesman; cardinal from 1578 (b.  
 1506, d. 1583), 806n
- René de Prie, bishop of Bayeux 1498–1516f., cardinal 1506–  
 1519, bishop of Limoges 1514–1516: 95, 105f., 108,  
 110ff., 113f., 136
- Renée, daughter of Louis XII of France and Anne, daughter  
 of Francis II of Brittany; wife of Ercole II d'Este 1528–  
 1559 (d. 1575), 287, 288n, 302, **642**
- Renier, Alvise, Venetian diplomat, duke of Candia around 1550:  
 475n, 485, 531, 533, 535n, 536, 591n, 607n, 647n, 662n
- Reno river, 263
- Renzi, Gianmaria, Genoese conspirator in Istanbul around 1566:  
**906**
- Renzo da Ceri, *see* Lorenzo Orsini da Ceri
- "Requête, La," petition of Netherlandish nobles (1566), **910**,  
 920n
- Residence, as required of bishops in their dioceses, 496f., **710**,  
**720, 742, 756, 780ff.**, 783ff., 786ff., 789f., 793ff., **796**,  
**798ff.**, **804, 809, 815, 824, 826**
- Respublica Christiana, 141, 153n, 253n
- Retimo (Rethymnon), 853n
- Reumano, Jean (Giovanni) Suario, bishop of Mirepoix 1555–  
 1561f., cardinal 1555–1566: **644, 723, 730ff.**
- Reutlingen, 543
- Rex Christianissimus* (Roi Très Christien), 359n, 360, 413n,  
 480, 538, 559, **596, 705, 841**; *and see* France, kings of
- Rheims, archbishop of, *see* Charles de Guise 1538–1574
- Rhine, counts palatine of, *see* Friedrich II 1544–1556, Friedrich  
 III 1559–1576
- Rhineland, 244, 772f.
- Rhizokarpaso, **1006**
- Rhodes, city and island, 16, 20n, 29, 32f., 37, 39, 81n, 99,  
 104, 128n, 143n, 144, 147f., 151, 166n, 181ff., 187n,  
 191, 193n, 194, 198, 200, 202ff., 205ff., 208ff., 211ff.,  
 214ff., 217f., 224, 231, 235, 248, 274, 278, 284n, 324n,  
 335n, 351, 352n, 376, 395n, 430, 463, 517, 532, 553,  
 759n, 766n, **834, 854, 929, 971, 980, 983f., 986f., 1007**,  
**1068**; Convent of, 47, 182; Knights of, *see* Hospitaliers
- Rhodiens, 122, 206n, 211, 215
- Rhone river, 86
- Rialto (in Venice), 23f., 47, 63, 83, 93, 127, 135, 462, **587**,  
**589, 607, 696**, 849n, **904, 919, 939, 942, 1067**
- Riarii, family associated with Imola, 12, 16n
- Riario, Galeazzo, son of Girolamo Riario and Caterina Sforza  
 (f. 1504), 16n
- Riario, Girolamo, nephew of Sixtus IV, lord of Imola and Forlì  
 (d. 1488), 16n; wife of, *see* Caterina Sforza
- Riario, Ottaviano, son of Girolamo Riario and Caterina Sforza  
 (f. 1504), 16n
- Riario (Sansoni), Raffaele, cardinal 1477–1521: 5, 8, 16, 49,  
 65f., 68n, 72, 74f., 82n, 121, 138, 143n, 155n, 167ff.,  
 173n, 197n, 292
- Ribault, Jean, French commander in Florida (d. 1565), **888**
- Ribnica, town in Carniola, 337
- Ricalcati, Ambrogio, papal secretary in 1535: 397n, 400n, 403,  
 405, 414n, 418n, 420f., 430n, 431n, 433n, 434, 444n
- Ricasoli, Gianbattista, Florentine ambassador to Rome in 1560:  
 441, 746f.
- Ricci, Giovanni, of Montepulciano, archbishop of Manfredonia  
 1544–1545f., bishop of Chiusi 1545–1554f., cardinal 1551–  
 1574, archbishop of Pisa 1567–1574: 445n, 447, 552n,  
 554, 559, **613, 619f., 649, 726, 729, 733f., 865, 882**,  
**883n, 884f., 900, 959n**
- Ricci, Marco, Venetian envoy to Alfonso I d'Este in 1509:  
 63n
- Richard I "the Lionhearted," son of Henry II and Eleanor of  
 Aquitaine; king of England from 1189 (b. **1157**, d. 1199),  
**756**
- Richardot, François, bishop of Nicopolis 1554–1561f., of Arras  
 1561–1574: **811, 818**
- Ridolfi, Niccolò, cardinal 1517–1550, bishop of Orvieto (ad-  
 min.) 1520–1529f., archbishop of Florence 1524–1532f.,  
 bishop of Vicenza (admin.) 1524–1550f., archbishop of Sal-  
 erno (admin.) 1533–1548f., bishop of Imola (admin.) 1533–  
 1546f.: 505, 508, 509n, 515, 517ff., 520n, 525n
- Ridolfi, Rosso, Florentine commissioner in Pisa in 1511: 105f.,  
 107n, 108n
- Rieti, bishops of, *see* Pompeo Colonna 1508–1520; 1528–1529,  
 Mario Algieri Colonna 1529–1555, Marc' Antonio da Mula  
 1562–1572
- Riez, bishop of, *see* François de Dinteville 1527–1530
- Rigaud, Eudes, archbishop of Rouen 1248–1275: 565n
- Rignano, **800**
- Rimini, 3n, 9, 12f., 16n, 18n, 33, 38f., 44, 55, 57f., 62, 67,  
 117n, 129, 277, 292, 539n, **803**; bishops of, *see* Franciotto  
 Orsini (admin.) 1528–1529, Giulio Parisano 1550–1574f.;  
 lords of, *see* Pandolfo Malatesta 1482–1500; 1503, Sigis-  
 mondo Malatesta 1527–1528
- Rinaldi, Luca, agent of Maximilian I in Rome in 1503: 15
- Rincón, Antonio, Spanish diplomat in the service of France (d.  
 1541), 216n, 217n, 235, 251f., 278n, 284n, 312ff., 315,  
 316n, 317ff., 321ff., 325n, 334, 350, 360ff., 363, 365n,  
 431n, 432, 441n, 442, 448n, 450, 451n, 456ff., 459, 462n,  
 483, 695, 698n
- Rinella Bay, **870**
- Rio di Noale (in Venice), 403n
- Rio di S. Girolamo (in Venice), **849**
- Rio S. Severo (in Venice), **812**
- Ripa Grande (in Rome), 281
- Ripetta (in Rome), **718**
- Risorgimento, 454
- Rivoli, **915**
- Rizan, Johann, vicecaptain of Fiume in 1533: 371
- Rizzio (Riccio), Michele, Neapolitan envoy of France to Rome  
 in 1505: 34f.
- Robert de la Marck, duke of Bouillon and lord of Sedan, 195,  
 522n



- Robert de Lenoncourt, bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne 1558–1560, cardinal 1558–1561, archbishop of Embrun 1560–1560, bishop of Auxerre (archib.) 1556–1560: 506, 507n, 510n, **617, 723**
- Robert Guiscard, Norman adventurer in Italy (d. 1085), 291n
- Robertet, Florimond, French treasurer (d. 1522), 91, 95, 111, 120, 195n, 204
- Roberto de' Nobili, cardinal 1553–1559: **610, 613**
- Roberto di Sanseverino, count of Caiazzo (fl. 1527), 259, 263f., 267n
- Roberto di Sanseverino, Italian traveler (in 1458) and condottiere (in 1485), 113
- Roberto Latino Orsini (Roberto de' Orsini), archbishop of Reggio di Calabria 1512–1520? 148n, 158
- Roberts, (Sir) Nicholas, informant on the siege of Rhodes in 1523: 205n
- Rocas (Roucha), count of, *see* Eugenio Sinclitico (fl. 1570)
- Rocca di Soriano, 748n
- Roccamara, Francesco, castellan of S. Angelo (1503), 3
- Roccasparvera, 160
- Roder, bishop of, *see* Georges d' Armagnac 1530–1561?
- Rodomonte, Luigi, relative of the Gonzaga (fl. 1527), 281
- Rodrigo de Ripalda, Spanish captain in 1527: 276
- Rodriguez, Cristóbal, Spanish Jesuit, papal nuncio in Egypt ca. 1561: 768n
- Roeux, count of, *see* Adrian de Croy (in 1535)
- Romagna, 2, 4, 6, 10ff., 13, 15ff., 18, 33ff., 36n, 38f., 41, 42n, 55f., 58n, 62ff., 73, 78, 80, 96, 100n, 101, 103, 108, 113f., 119ff., 122, 125, 145, 262n, 263, 265, 276, 299n, 411n, 412n, 421f., 559, 581f., **603, 677, 740, 742, 990**; duke of, *see* Cesare Borgia 1501–1503
- Roman Academy, 273
- Roman Catholic Church, 1, 10, 13, 16, 28, 41f., 58n, 66, 73, 75, 78f., 86, 91f., 95f., 100, 104n, 107f., 110, 113f., 118f., 120n, 121f., 125f., 130, 132, 134, 137, 139f., 143, 145, 147, 150ff., 154, 165n, 167, 190, 220f., 265, 277, 288f., 299n, 310, 348, 354, 359n, 361, 401, 403f., 406, 415, 415f., 418, 420, 427, 430, 435f., 438, 452f., 466f., 475, 484, 486n, 494, 496, 504n, 505, 507f., 511f., 514, 516, 526, 528, 538, 540f., 544f., 548ff., 552, 556, 558ff., 563, 580, 597n, 598, 601, 603, 612, 627f., 629, 635, 640, 642ff., 645, 656, 659, 662, 672n, 675, 681n, 708ff., 713f., 716ff., 720, 723, 731, 739f., 747, 755f., 769, 773, 779ff., 783f., 787f., 790ff., 794, 796f., 800ff., 803, 805, 807, 809, 811f., 815, 817, 819f., 822f., 826ff., 846f., 862, 868, 893, 900, 917, 942, 964n, 969, 998, 1071, 1088, 1100; states of, *see* Papal states
- Romano, Cristoforo, architect, engraver, sculptor (b. ca. 1470, d. 1512), 140, 182
- Romans, 7, 36, 60, 97n, 143, 153, 221, 227n, 277, 311, 353, 559, 621, 638, 663, 685, 719, 731, 737, 746, 751, 826, 877, 960, 1063
- Romans, kings of, 191f., 354, 413, 415, 460, 716f., 766, 779, 796, 803, 806n, 816; *and see* Germany, kings of
- Rome, 2ff., 3ff., 8f., 11, 13f., 15n, 16n, 29f., 33ff., 36, 39f., 42, 43n, 44, 45n, 47f., 49n, 50ff., 54n, 56, 58n, 59n, 60, 62, 63ff., 66n, 67f., 68n, 69f., 71n, 72, 73n, 74f., 78, 80f., 83f., 85n, 86n, 88ff., 91, 93, 95ff., 98, 99n, 100, 102ff., 104n, 107ff., 110, 111n, 112, 114ff., 117n, 118ff., 121ff., 124, 126, 129f., 133f., 135n, 137f., 139n, 140, 142, 144f., 148, 149n, 150ff., 153f., 157, 158n, 159n, 161f., 164, 165n, 166, 167n, 168ff., 172, 173n, 176n, 178, 180, 181n, 183n, 186n, 187, 189, 191, 192n, 193, 194n, 195n, 196ff., 199, 200n, 202, 204, 206n, 210n, 213n, 214n, 215n, 216, 218ff., 221f., 224ff., 229n, 230f., 236, 239f., 242, 243n, 244, 247, 250n, 254n, 255f., 258, 259n, 260, 262f., 264n, 265f., 268ff., 271f., 274f., 276n, 277, 280ff., 283, 286, 289ff., 293f., 296f., 298n, 299f., 309ff., 312, 320f., 324n, 329f., 337n, 341, 342n, 345n, 346ff., 349ff., 352ff., 356, 357n, 360, 361n, 362f., 369n, 370, 374n, 384, 385n, 387n, 390f., 394f., 396n, 397ff., 402ff., 405f., 407n, 410ff., 413, 415, 420ff., 423, 425ff., 428n, 429ff., 432f., 434n, 435ff., 440, 442, 445n, 447n, 448n, 449n, 452n, 453f., 458n, 459n, 460, 462f., 469f., 471n, 475, 478, 484n, 487f., 490, 492, 495, 501, 504n, 505ff., 508, 510f., 514, 516ff., 519, 521, 522n, 525, 526n, 527ff., 531, 533ff., 536n, 537ff., 541, 545ff., 548ff., 552ff., 556, 557n, 559ff., 562ff., 571, 576n, 577ff., 580, 581n, 582f., 584n, 585n, 587, 589n, 591n, 592ff., 595ff., 598, 600ff., 603f., 605n, 606, 610f., 613n, 614, 615n, 616, 617n, 618n, 619n, 620n, 621f., 624n, 626ff., 629f., 632, 634n, 635n, 636ff., 640f., 643f., 646f., 648n, 650ff., 654ff., 657, 659ff., 662f., 665f., 668ff., 671f., 674n, 675ff., 678, 679n, 680ff., 683f., 686, 687n, 689ff., 693, 696, 701, 703n, 704, 708n, 710f., 713ff., 715f., 721f., 725n, 726, 728f., 735f., 738n, 739ff., 742ff., 745f., 749ff., 752ff., 756, 762f., 768n, 769, 770n, 771f., 774f., 779f., 782ff., 785ff., 789, 793f., 798ff., 801f., 804ff., 807f., 812, 814ff., 817, 821, 823n, 824f., 827n, 828, 831, 846, 852, 853n, 854n, 858f., 860n, 865, 866n, 867n, 873n, 876f., 880, 881ff., 884, 885n, 886, 887n, 889f., 899ff., 904n, 905, 907, 910, 912f., 914n, 916n, 917n, 918f., 928n, 929n, 932, 936, 939f., 941n, 942, 951, 954n, 955f., 958n, 959f., 963, 964n, 965f., 967n, 969, 973n, 975n, 976f., 982f., 988, 989n, 992ff., 995n, 996ff., 1000n, 1001f., 1003n, 1008ff., 1012ff., 1015, 1017, 1019ff., 1022n, 1024n, 1045f., 1048, 1049n, 1050, 1061ff., 1066ff., 1069f., 1072ff., 1076n, 1077, 1079f., 1086f., 1089, 1091, 1093f., 1095n, 1096, 1097n, 1099f.
- Ronciglione, 537
- Ronco river, 115f.
- Rondacchi, Pietro, commander of Greek and Albanian striadioti ca. 1570: 991
- Rorario, Girolamo, papal nuncio in Hungary ca. 1534: 369n, 405
- Rosetto, Alessandro, papal envoy to Charles V in 1550: 527
- Rossano, 586, 689n, 744; archbishops of, *see* Vincenzo Pimpinella 1525–1534; Girolamo Verallo 1544–1549/1550; Gianbattista Castagna (Urban VII) 1553–1573?
- Rossi, Girolamo, bishop of Pavia 1530–1541, 1550–1560? 526
- Rosso, Andrea, Venetian secretary until 1527: 240n, 241, 242n, 254n, 255n, 258n, 266, 268
- Rota, supreme court of appeal of the Romagna, 12
- Rota, tribunal in the Curia Romana, 72, 202, 466, 492, 603, 611, 644, 710, 779, 813n, 824n
- Rotunda (in Rome), 353
- Rouen, 80n, 565n; archbishops of, *see* Eudes Rigaud 1248–1275, Georges d' Amboise 1494–1510, Georges d' Amboise 1511–1550, Charles de Bourbon 1550–1582?
- Roulard le Roux, French sculptor and architect (b. ca. 1465, d. 1527), 80n
- Round ships, 1007n
- Roussillon, 457
- Roverella, Philotes, bishop of Toulon 1515–1518?; of Ascoli Piceno 1518–1550? 505, 516
- Rovereto, Romagnole town, 55
- Rovigo, 63, 76, 77n, 1010
- Roxelana, "sultana" of Suleiman I (b. ca. 1505, d. 1558), 483, 493, 550, 562, 589, 591, 622n, 625n, 693, 699
- Rubiera, 287, 327, 333, 346
- Rucellai, Annibale, nephew of Giovanni della Casa; bishop of Carcassonne 1569–1601: 633n, 636f., 679n
- Rudolf II, son of Maximilian II and Maria, daughter of Charles

- V: German king from 1575, emperor from 1576 (b. 1552, d. 1612), 1020n, 1023, 1097n
- Rufo, Carlos, commander at the siege of Malta (d. 1565), 863, 866
- Ruga Gaiufa (now Giuffa), in Venice, 237, 812
- Ruiz de Castro, Fernando, marquis of Sarria; imperial ambassador to Rome ca. 1555: 635f., 638f., 641, 644ff., 648f., 651ff., 656
- Rumania, 318n, 455n, 567n, 568n
- Rumanians, 570
- "Rumelia," fort at the Gulf of Corinth, 1052
- Russell, (Sir) John, earl of Bedford from 1549/1550, English diplomat (b. 1486?, d. 1555), 258n, 266
- Russi, 264
- Russia, 150, 250n, 312n, 319, 775n, 1103f.; czars of, *see Ivan IV 1547-1584, Peter I 1682-1725*
- Russians, 568n, 1101f.
- Ruska, 585
- Rustem Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir (d. 1561), 209n, 475n, 476, 480n, 481n, 482f., 485, 493, 501n, 502n, 503, 504n, 531, 533f., 536, 555, 562, 585n, 586ff., 589f., 606, 622, 623n, 630f., 647n, 661f., 692ff., 695ff., 698n, 699ff., 704f., 707f., 771, 830, 832f.
- Rusticucci, Girolamo, cardinal 1570-1603, bishop of Sinigaglia 1570-1577? 964f., 968n, 971n, 972n, 973n, 982n, 998n, 999n, 1005n, 1013, 1019n, 1025n, 1060, 1070, 1074
- Ruthenians, 165n, 714
- Šabac, *see* Shabats
- Sabba da Castiglione, Hospitaller at Rhodes (b. 1485?, d. 1554), 182f.
- Sabbioneta, 281
- Sabulich, Marcantonio Coccio, Venetian historian (b. 1436, d. 1506), 82
- Sabina, cardinal-bishops of, *see* Francesco Soderini, Pietro de' Accolti
- Sacchetti, Antonio, secretary of Cardinal Carafa in 1556: 670, 711
- Sacraments, 126, 454, 497, 499f., 539, 541f., 679n, 710, 749, 779, 786, 788ff., 792f., 795, 805, 807, 809f., 816f.
- Sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae*, bull of Julius II (1511), 95, 111n
- Sadoletto, Jacopo, humanist and secretary to Leo X, bishop of Carpentras 1517-1535; cardinal 1536-1547: 111n, 121n, 161n, 165, 169n, 172, 175n, 180, 195n, 255n, 394, 415, 462, 464
- Safad (Zefat), 899n
- Safavid, dynasty in Persia 1502-1736: 25, 1094
- Sagona, bishop of, *see* Girolamo de' Federici 1552-1562
- Sagredo, Bernardo, Venetian *provveditore generale* in Cyprus 1562-1564: 756, 945n
- Sagundino, Alvisé (Luigi), Venetian envoy to the Porte in 1494 and on later occasions, to Cairo in 1505 (d. 1506), 19f.
- Saint Andrew's, archbishops of, *see* Innocenzo Cibo (admin.) 1513-1514, Andrew Forman 1514-1522
- Saint Anne, arm of, 757
- Saint Bartholomew, cathedral church (in Frankfurt), 716
- Saint Bartholomew, massacre of (1572), 840, 1088
- Saint Bernard, monastery near Bayonne, 838
- Saint Blancard, baron of, *see* Bertrand d'Ornesan
- Saint Catherine, Gate of (at Rhodes), 215
- Saint Catherine, monastery near Mount Sinai, 28
- Saint Ferme, abbot of, *see* Étienne Boucher (fl. 1551)
- Saint Francis, 188n, 406; shrine of, at Assisi, 988n
- Saint George, Gate of (at Rhodes), 208n
- Saint George, Tower of (at Rhodes), 208, 210, 215
- Saint George of Skortá, 367n
- Saint George's Bay, at Malta, 857, 874
- Saint Germain, 596; peace of (1570), 949
- Saint Germain-des-Prés, 837; abbots of, *see* Guillaume Briçonnet the elder 1501-1507, Guillaume Briçonnet the younger 1507-1534
- Saint Germain-en-Laye, 313, 623n
- Saint Gilles, M. de, in charge of munitions on Rhodes in 1522: 211
- Saint Helena, mother of Constantine (b. 255, d. 330), 757
- Saint-Honorat, in the îles de Lérins, 471
- Saint James, protector of Spain, 85
- Saint James of Spata, Order of, 367n; commendator of, *see* Francisco de los Cobos (in 1533)
- Saint-Jean de Maurienne, bishop of, *see* Girolamo Capodiferro 1544-1559
- Saint John the Baptist, 213n
- Saint John the Evangelist, 79, 126f.
- Saint John, Hospitaller church (at Rhodes), 207, 208n, 210, 213n
- Saint John, Order of, *see* Hospitallers
- Saint John, village on Malta, 855
- Saint John of Jerusalem, patron of the Hospitallers, 208n
- Saint John Lampadistes, monastic church on Cyprus, 756, 757n
- Saint Julian's Bay, at Malta, 874
- Saint Lazarus, Knights of, Order, 740; protector of, *see* Carlo Borromeo (d. 1584)
- Saint Malo, bishop of, *see* Guillaume Briçonnet the elder 1493-1514; cardinal of, *see* Guillaume Briçonnet the elder
- Saint Mary, Tower of (at Rhodes), 215
- Saint Michael, church (in Alba Iulia), 577
- Saint Michel, Order of, 676f., 744, 747
- Saint Nicholas, Tower of (at Rhodes), 210
- Saint Omer, 596
- Saint-Papoul, bishops of, *see* Bernardo Salviati 1549-1561?, Antonio Maria Salviati 1561-1567?
- Saint Paul, 121, 274n
- Saint Paul, Gate of (at Rhodes), 215
- Saint Paul's Bay (Qala ta San Pawl), at Malta, 857, 874f., 876n
- Saint Peter, 121, 127, 133, 221n, 222, 274n, 455, 716
- Saint Peter, church (at Rome), 6f., 10, 30, 36n, 57, 75, 78, 95n, 110, 126n, 140, 145n, 154n, 175n, 202, 220, 255, 256n, 269, 270n, 271, 274, 283, 398f., 413, 444n, 473n, 506f., 517, 525, 527, 528n, 529, 535, 538, 571f., 603n, 604n, 613, 614n, 615f., 620, 621n, 645, 675, 719, 738, 741n, 753, 784, 815, 825, 846, 852, 881, 1002, 1014, 1063, 1077
- Saint Peter, primacy of, *see* Papacy, Papal supremacy
- Saint-Quentin, 323n, 681n, 685n, 686f., 690f., 697, 698n, 708, 918
- Saint Stephen, king of Hungary 1000-1038: 566, 568n; crown of, 252, 312, 314n, 332, 373, 530, 568f.
- Saint Stephen, Knights of, military Order, 872n, 873n, 1017n
- Sainte Chapelle (in Paris), 302
- Saintes, bishops of, *see* Francesco Soderini (admin.) 1507-1514, Charles de Bourbon 1545-1550?
- Saints, veneration of, 460, 499, 542, 812, 820ff.
- Sala Beg (Sala Reis), Ottoman admiral (fl. 1552), 555, 586ff., 607n, 662
- Sala di Fasi Farnese (in the family villa at Caprarola), 661n
- Salamanca, 203n, 545n; bishops of, *see* Francisco Manrique de Lara 1556-1560, Pedro González de Mendoza 1560-1574
- Salentine peninsula, 446n, 586
- Salerno, 294, 296, 588, 781; archbishops of, *see* Federigo Fregoso 1507-1533, Niccolò Ridolfi (admin.) 1533-1548; Girolamo Seripando 1554-1563, Marc' Antonio Colonna 1568-1574?; Gulf of, 583; prince of, *see* Ferrante di Sanseverino (b. 1507)

- Salians, imperial dynasty 1024–1125: 454  
 Salina, 857  
 Salina Bay, at Malta, 874  
 Salines, harbor on Larnaca Bay in Cyprus, 46, 927, 962, 972, 976, 978, 980, 990ff., 995n, 1004n, 1031n  
 Salisbury, bishop of, *see* Lorenzo Campeggio (admin.) 1524–1539  
 Salmerón, Alfonso, Spanish theologian (b. 1515, d. 1585), 559, 542, 787, 793, 812  
 Salò, 982n  
 Salona (Amphissa), town northwest of Athens, (titular) bishop of, *see* Georg Flach 1544–1555?  
 Salona (Solin), village in southern Croatia, 343n, 421f.  
 Salonika, 591  
 Saltpeper, 102n, 158, 279n, 301, 337, 339, 368n, 585, 654, 675, 698n, 907f., 1032  
*Saluti gregis*, bull of Julius II (1512), 136, 137n  
 Saluzzo, 237n, 268, 730; bishop of, *see* Filippo Archinto 1546–1556; marquis of, *see* Michele Antonio (d. 1528)  
 Salvador, eminence on Malta, 854, 862f., 866f.  
 Salvago, Raffaele, Hospitaller at the siege of Malta, 1565: 858n  
*Salvator noster*, bull of Leo X (1516), 164  
 Salvago, Matteo ("Mateca"), Venetian dragoman in Venice in 1571: 1011, 1012n, 1018  
 Salviati, Antonia Maria, envoy of Pius V in 1571, bishop of Saint-Papoul 1561–1567?, cardinal 1583–1602: 1071  
 Salviati, Bernardo, bishop of Saint-Papoul 1549–1561?, cardinal 1561–1568, bishop of Clermont (admin.) 1561–1568?: 520, 885n  
 Salviati, Chevalier de, relative of Catherine de' Medici, her envoy to Istanbul ca. 1562: 833, 834n  
 Salviati, Florentine family of bankers, 265  
 Salviati, Giacomo, father of Giovanni; imperial hostage in 1527: 288f.  
 Salviati, Giovanni, cardinal 1517–1553, bishop of Fermo 1518–1520, of Ferrara (admin.) 1520–1550, of Volterra (admin.) 1530–1532, of Teano (admin.) 1531–1535, archbishop of Santa Severina 1531–1535, bishop of Bietto (admin.) 1532–1539: 225, 288, 462, 506f., 509, 511f., 515, 517f., 520f., 525  
 Salviati, Jacopo, Florentine banker (*fl.* 1517), 174n; a secretary of Clement VII (d. 1533), 352, 355, 357f., 361n, 367n, 371n, 374n, 384, 387  
 Salzburg, archbishop of, 794, 810; archbishops of, *see* Matthias Lang 1512–1540, Johann Jacob von Kuen-Belasy 1561–1580? (d. 1586)  
 San Bartolomeo, church (in Rome), 688n; monastery of, 688n  
 San Biagio della Pagnotta, church (in Rome), 140  
 San Celso, church (in Rome), 36  
 Sánchez, Alonso, imperial ambassador in Venice in 1525 and 1527: 237, 265, 274, 310  
 Sancho de Leyva, commander of Neapolitan galleys around 1560: 758, 760ff., 765f., 836, 871, 872n, 875, 905f.  
 San Clemente, cardinals of, *see* Francesco Argentino, Gianbattista Cicada  
 Sancta Sanctorum, chapel (in Rome), 641  
 Sander, Michael, secretary of Cardinal Schiner in 1521: 195n  
 San Domenico, church (on Chio), 896  
 San Domenico, church (in Siena), 592  
 San Domenico, church (in Venice), 944  
 San Domenico, convent (in Bologna), 507n  
 Sandomierz, palatine of, *see* Otto de Chodecz (in 1528)  
 Sandomir, castellan of, *see* Nicholas Szydłowiecki (*fl.* 1527)  
 San Felice, castle (at Verona), 950n  
 San Felice sul Panaro, 114n, 261  
 San Francesco della Vigna, church (in Venice), 944  
 Sanga, Giovanbattista, papal secretary in 1532: 364n  
 San Germano (Cassino), 659, 754  
 San Giacomo, church (in Venice), 93  
 San Giacomo degli Spagnoli, church (in Rome), 95n, 1014  
 San Giacomo dell' Orto, parish of Venice, 82, 83n  
 San Giacomo, cardinals of, *see* Raffaele Riario, Girolamo di Capodiferro  
 San Giorgio Maggiore, Benedictine abbey (in Venice), 415  
 San Giovanni Evangelista, *scuola* (in Venice), 333  
 San Girolamo, near Clissa, 421  
 San Gregorio Magno, church (in Rome), 399  
 Sanjak, Turkish province, 898  
 San Jerónimo de Yuste, monastery west of Toledo, 658, 717  
 San Lazzaro, suburb of Siena, 605, 606n  
 San Lorenzo, cathedral (in Genoa), 328  
 San Lorenzo, church (in Florence), 167n  
 San Lorenzo, Hospitaller church on Malta, 870  
 San Lorenzo in Damaso, church (in Rome), 168n  
 San Luigi de' Francesi, church (in Rome), 483n  
 San Marco, 542; bishops of, *see* Coriolano de' Martorani 1530–1551, Guglielmo Sirieto (admin.) 1566–1568?  
 San Marco, church (in Rome), 865, 1014  
 San Marco, church (in Venice), 62n, 83, 92f., 219, 333, 427, 954, 1019, 1059f.  
 San Marco, *scuola* (in Venice), 333  
 San Martino, lord of, *see* Sigismondo d' Este (in 1555)  
 San Martino, hill near Naples, 295f., 297n  
 San Michele (Isola S. Michele, Senglea), spur on Malta, 854, 856ff., 861, 863f., 866f., 869, 872f., 878  
 San Michele de' Camaldoli, church (in Pisa), 106ff.; convent of, 107  
 San Moise, church (in Venice), 954  
 San Niccolò, bay at Cerigo, 1082f.  
 San Niccolò, castle at Sebenico, 970, 1023n  
 San Niccolò (Venice), 1025  
 San Niccolò da Bari, onetime chapel (in the Vatican), 10, 143, 197, 200, 221, 399n, 510n  
 San Nicola di Bari, church (in Bari), 656n  
 San Nicolò, suburb of Piacenza, 261  
 San Paolo, gate (in Rome), 202  
 San Paolo fuori le Mura, church (in Rome), 202, 398, 663  
 San Paolo, priorate (in Sanseverino), 564n  
 San Petronio, church (at Bologna), 40, 93, 105n, 117n, 330, 337, 500, 716  
 San Pietro in Bagno, 264, 265n  
 San Pietro, cathedral (in Bologna), 500  
 San Pietro, church (in Trent), 491, 777  
 San Pietro, papal galley in the expedition of 1572: 1086  
 San Pietro di Castello, church (in Venice), 333  
 San Pietro in Montorio, church (in Rome), 740n  
 San Pietro in Vincoli, church (in Rome), 126, 140; cardinals of, *see* Giuliano della Rovere (Julius II; d. 1513), Sisto Gara della Rovere (d. 1517)  
 San Polo, 675  
 San Prospero, hill outside Siena, 592  
 San Rocco, church (in Rome), 717  
 San Rocco, *scuola* (in Venice), 333  
 San Saluto, abbot of, *see* Vincenzo Parpaglia (in 1555)  
 San Sebastiano, church (in Venice), 756  
 San Sebastiano, gate (in Rome), 398  
 San Sepolcro, oratory (in Siena), 600  
 Sanseverino, 264n  
 San Severo, 293  
 San Silvestro, Theatine convent (in Rome), superior of, *see* Geremia Isachino (*fl.* 1559)  
 San Sisto, cardinals of, *see* Tommaso de Vio di Gaeta (Cajetan; d. 1534), Ugo Boncompagni (Gregory XIII; d. 1585)  
 Sansovino, Andrea, Italian sculptor (b. 1460, d. 1529), 140

- Sansovino, Francesco, Italian historian (b. 1521, d. 1583), 203n  
 Sansovino, Jacopo, architect and sculptor (b. 1486, d. 1570), 21n, 161, 756
- Sant' Agata dei Goti, bishop of, *see* Giovanni Beroaldo 1557–1565
- Sant' Agostino, church (in Rome), 49n
- Sant' Andrea, chapel (in Saint Peter's), 1077
- Sant' Andrea, church (in Paliano), 650
- Sant' Angelo, 135n; cardinals of, *see* Ferrigo di Sanseverino (d. 1516), Matthias Lang (d. 1540)
- Sant' Angelo, bridge (in Rome), 398f.
- Sant' Angelo, section of Rome, 272n
- Sant' Angelo a Scala, 754
- Sant' Antonio, in Famagusta, 1041n
- Sant' Arcangelo, 39, 140, 581n
- Santa Caterina, eminence on Malta, 854f., 856n
- Santa Chiara, church (in Naples), 1024
- Santa Croce, hospital (in Siena), 600
- Santa Croce, Prospero, papal nuncio in France in 1562: 785
- Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, church (in Rome), 663; cardinal-priest of, *see* Marcellus II (Marcello Cervini)
- Santa Cruz (Stavrovouni), monastery on Cyprus, 757
- Santa Cruz, marquis of, *see* Álvaro de Bazán (d. 1588)
- Santa Fiora, 634ff., 872n; cardinal of, *see* Guido Ascanio Sforza (d. 1564); counts of, *see* Bosio II Sforza (d. 1535), Mario Sforza (d. 1591)
- Santa Fosca, section of Venice, 403n
- Santa Maddalena, church in Faenza, 183n
- Santa Margherita, eminence on Malta, 854, 863, 866; Hermitage of, at Malta, 863
- Santa Maria, cathedral in Buda, 459
- Santa Maria, Latin cathedral of Rhodes, 208n
- Santa Maria (Tigné Point), on Malta, 854f., 856n, 858
- Santa Maria Celeste, church and convent (in Venice), 944
- Santa Maria Formosa, church (in Venice), 429n, 812
- Santa Maria Maggiore, church (in Rome), 140, 1077
- Santa Maria Maggiore, church (in Trent), 491f., 777n, 782, 788
- Santa Maria d' Anglona and Tursi, bishop of, *see* Giulio de' Grandi 1548–1560?
- Santa Maria degli Angeli, church (in Rome), 881
- Santa Maria del Popolo, church (in Rome), 100, 134, 140, 183, 219, 660
- Santa Maria del Rosario, feast of, 1100
- Santa Maria de la Mejorada, abbey, 42n
- Santa Maria dell' Anima, German church (in Rome), 220, 270n
- Santa Maria della Carità, *scuola* (in Venice), 333
- Santa Maria della Vittoria, chapel at La Costa, 60
- Santa Maria delle Grazie, monastery near Loo, 52n
- Santa Maria di Gesù, church (in Messina), 1067n
- Santa Maria in Araceli (Araceli), church (in Rome), 143n, 846n, 1063, 1067, 1099; cardinal of, *see* Clemente Dolera
- Santa Maria in Cosmedin, church (in Rome); cardinal-deacon of, *see* Reginald Pole
- Santa Maria in Portico, palace (in Rome), 5n
- Santa Maria sopra Minerva, church and Dominican convent (in Rome), 180, 353, 445n, 458n, 529, 688, 718ff., 770n
- Santa Maria del Fiore, cathedral (in Florence), 161
- Santa Marina, onetime church (in Venice), 68n
- Santa Marina, site of vineyards at Famagusta, 1041
- Santa Maura (Leucadia, Leukas), island of, 11f., 584, 607n, 1051, 1068, 1075, 1083, 1102ff.
- Santa Monica, 49n
- Santa Severa, 701
- Santa Severina, archbishops of, *see* Giovanni Salvati 1531–1535, Giulio Serotio 1535–1554?
- Santa Sofia (in Italy), 264
- Santa Sophia, cathedral (in Nicosia), 948
- Santa Susanna, cardinal-priest of, *see* Girolamo Seripando (d. 1563)
- Santa Trinità, church (in Trent), 491f., 794
- Santander, 244n
- Santarcangelo, 292
- Santiago (Santiago de Compostela), 639n; Order of, 632, 899, 1014
- Santi Apostoli, church (in Rome), 140, 168, 272, 280f., 646
- Santi Giovanni e Paolo, church (in Venice), 40n, 62n, 68n, 1044n, 1100
- Santi Pietro e Paolo, church (in Famagusta), 927
- Santi Quaranta, eminence on Chios, 895
- San Tomà, parish in Venice, 279
- San Tommaso, site of mills on Chios, 895
- Santoni, Ruberto, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- Santorin, 25, 401
- Santoro, Leonardo, Italian historian (d. 1569), 255n, 258n, 263n, 283n, 284n, 294n, 295f., 306ff.
- Santo Spirito, church and hospital in Rome, 270f., 1014
- Santo Stefano, castle at Budua, 1025
- Santo Stefano, hill (on Rhodes), 205
- Santo Stefano in Piscinola, parish in Rome, 272n
- Santo Stefano in Vaticano, church of, 741n
- San Trovaso, church (in Venice), 21
- Sanudo, Angelo, author of a dispatch from Civitavecchia in 1527: 261n
- Sanudo, Leonardo, father of Marino (d. 1476), 83
- Sanudo, Marino ("the Younger"), Venetian historian (b. 1466, d. 1533): 1ff., 5, 12, 19ff., 22n, 26, 27n, 30, 34, 37, 44, 48, 53, 57, 59, 61, 62n, 66, 74n, 76, 80, 81n, 82, 83n, 84f., 92f., 102n, 104n, 111n, 115ff., 123, 125f., 128, 132, 134, 139, 140n, 141, 143n, 149, 151n, 153, 157, 160n, 168n, 173n, 176n, 185, 195n, 201, 205f., 219ff., 224, 233, 237, 245, 249n, 260ff., 280, 283, 288, 298, 301f., 305, 331, 333f., 337n, 341, 348n, 360, 365, 372n, 375
- Sanudo, Pietro, Venetian captain in 1570: 954
- San Vigilio, cathedral (in Trent), 491f., 494, 537f., 547, 777n, 786f., 789n, 795, 808, 809n, 818, 822f.
- San Vio, church (in Venice), 21, 93
- San Vitale, church (in Ravenna), 96n
- San Zaccaria, church (in Venice), 954
- Sanzio, Sigismondo, secretary of Alberto Pio of Carpi in 1525: 227n
- Sapienza, 1084f.
- Sarāb, peace of (1618), 1098n
- Saracens, *see* Moslems
- Saracinospoli, Nicolò, Greek killed during the siege of Famagusta in 1571: 1035n
- Saragossa, 187, 216n, 324, 1020
- Sarajevo, *see* Vrh Bosna
- Sardinia, 171, 216, 392, 397n, 701, 871, 891, 914, 916, 920, 973n, 1047n, 1057, 1104
- Sardinians, 973n
- Sarlat, bishop of, *see* Niccolò de' Gaddi (admin.) 1533–1545?
- Sarno, bishops of, *see* Pompeo Colonna (admin.) 1530–1532, Francesco Sfondrato 1543–1544
- Sarpi, Paolo, historian of the Council of Trent (b. 1552, d. 1623), 486n, 541n, 827, 1100
- Sarria, marquis of, *see* Fernando Ruiz de Castro (ca. 1555)
- Sarzana, 859
- Sassia, 270n
- Satalia (*Setelye*, Adalia), 971
- Sauli, Bandinello, bishop of Gerace and Oppido 1509–1517, bishop of Albenga (admin.) 1513–1517, cardinal 1511–1518: 167f.

- Sauli, Franco, Genoese podestà of Chios (removed 1552–1553), **893**
- Sauli, Genoese family, **957n**
- Sauli, Girolamo, archbishop of Bari 1540–1550, of Genoa 1550–1559; **526**
- Sava river, **442**
- Savelli, Jacopo, cardinal 1539–1587, bishop of Nicastro (admin.) 1540–1554f, archbishop of Benevento (admin.) 1560–1574; **523, 611ff., 618, 620, 638, 733f., 752**
- Savelli, Roman family, **5, 663**
- Savi (in Venice), **21, 474, 954, 1009**
- Savi agli Ordini (in Venice), **82, 1061**
- Savi alla Terraferma, Venetian, **334, 1061**
- Savi del Consiglio (in Venice), **267, 1061**
- Savignano, **39**
- Savona, **10n, 41, 42n, 102, 139n, 140, 284, 623, 701, 915**; bishop of, *see* Agostino Spinola (admin.) 1528–1537
- Savonarola, Girolamo, Dominican prior at Florence (b. 1452, d. 1498), **4n**
- Savorgnan, Ascanio, author of a description of Cyprus in 1574; **941n**
- Savorgnan, Girolamo, bishop of Sebenico 1557–1579; **790**
- Savorgnan, Girolamo, Italian soldier (b. 1466, d. 1529), **76n**
- Savorgnan, Giulio, Count; Venetian governor-general of the militia in Dalmatia in 1570 (b. 1516, d. 1595); **932, 937, 941, 954, 987n, 1005n**
- Savoy, **48, 55, 159n, 160n, 236n, 237n, 338, 368, 399, 414n, 440, 473, 485, 647, 708f., 767n, 786, 801, 807f., 812, 818, 820, 836f., 871, 872n, 903, 910n, 915ff., 955, 957, 994n, 1026, 1047, 1055**; dukes of, *see* Charles III 1504–1553, Emmanuel Philibert 1553–1580; *and see* Philibert of Savoy (d. 1524), Louise of Savoy (d. 1531), Eugene, prince of Savoy (d. 1736)
- Savoy-Piedmont, **709**
- Saxeta, Antonio, papal servitor in 1509; **65**
- Saxons, **530, 570, 788n**
- Saxony, **421, 435, 544f.**; dukes of, *see* Frederick III (Wettin) 1486–1525, George (Albertine) 1500–1539, Maurice (Albertine) 1541–1553, Augustus (Albertine) 1553–1586, Johann Ernst (Ernestine; d. 1563); electors of, *see* Duke Frederick III, Johann Friedrich 1532–1554
- Scala, **149n**; bishops of, *see* Balthazar del Rio 1515–1540, Gasparo dal Fosse 1548–1551
- Scala Santa (in Rome), **641**
- Scanderbeg (George Castriota), Albanian national hero 1443–1468; **795**
- Scandinavia, **628, 755, 828**; *and see* Denmark, Norway, Sweden
- Scaramuccia, would-be assassin of George Martinuzzi in 1551; **576**
- Scardona (Skradin), **206n, 254, 1014**
- Scarpanto (Kárpáthos), **975, 980, 984f., 987n, 988, 993**
- Scarperia, **594n**
- Scarpinello, Agostino, Milanese ambassador to England in 1527; **261n**
- Schepper, Cornelius, Austrian envoy to Istanbul in 1533; **245n, 363n, 367n, 371n, 373ff., 376ff., 379ff., 382ff., 385ff., 388ff., 392**
- Scheyern, alliance of (1532), **361n**
- Schiner, Matthias, bishop of Sitten 1499–1522, cardinal 1511–1522; **87, 88n, 101n, 113n, 117n, 118f., 125, 128f., 130n, 132n, 133, 160, 165n, 181n, 195n, 200**
- Schiner, Peter, nephew of Matthias; Hospitaller at Rhodes (*f.* 1517), **181n**
- Schiam, **3, 92, 100, 104, 105n, 107f., 110ff., 121, 123, 125f., 134, 136, 139, 145n, 149f., 154, 170, 415, 500, 504, 510ff., 541f., 544, 559, 651, 657f., 665, 679n, 749, 757, 786f., 798, 808, 846**
- Schmalkalden, **405, 406n, 416ff., 421**; League of (1531), **354, 361, 400, 405, 415f., 452, 473n, 482n, 484, 494ff.**; "Schmalkaldic War" (1546), **484, 503**
- Schnepff, Anton, vicar of the church of Speyer *ca.* 1527; **274n, 290n**
- Scholasticism, **497**
- Schönberg (Schomberg), Nicholas, Dominican; archbishop of Capua 1520–1536, cardinal 1535–1537; **184n, 223, 224n, 226, 242n, 249n, 258n, 311**
- Schweinfurt, diet of (1532), **358**
- Sciberras, Mount, on Malta, **854, 856f., 863, 870**
- Scipione d' Arco, imperial official; envoy to Rome in 1560; **741, 742n, 802, 865**
- Scoppiettieri (fusiliers), **14**
- Scotists, **497**
- Scotland, **48, 76, 87, 99, 142n, 150, 236n, 237n, 847**; rulers of, *see* James IV 1488–1513, James V 1513–1542, Mary 1542–1567; regent of, *see* John Stuart 1514/1515–1524
- Scots, **87, 150, 788n**
- Scotti, Gian Bernardino, archbishop of Trani 1555–1559, cardinal 1555–1568, bishop of Piacenza 1559–1568; **644, 885**
- Scotti, Tommaso, Dominican inquisitor in Rome in 1559; **718**
- Scoto, Honorio, head of infantrymen sent to aid Famagusta in 1571; **1007n**
- Scrittura presentata alli Eccellenissimi, La, petition for surrender during the 1571 siege of Famagusta, **1033**
- Scuola della Carità (in Venice), **93**
- Scuole, in Venice, **1019**
- Scutari (Chryposolis, Üsküdar), suburb of Istanbul, **205, 253, 278, 387, 591, 707n**
- Scutarini, Alessandro, bishop of Tenos and Mykonos 1533–1559; **755**
- Sebastian, son of Prince John of Portugal and Joanna, daughter of Charles V; king of Portugal from 1557 (b. 1554, d. 1578), **775, 1016, 1019, 1063n, 1064, 1095f.**
- Sebastian von Heusenstamm, elector of Mainz 1545–1555, archbishop of Mainz 1545–1555; **539, 546, 628**
- Sebastiano, brother-in-law of Pietro Dovizi da Bibbiena (*f.* 1512), **133**
- Sébastien de l' Aubespine, French ambassador to Spain in 1560, bishop of Limoges 1558–1582; **767**
- Sebenico (Šibenik), **45, 193n, 301f., 407n, 423, 459, 469, 694f., 790, 922n, 923, 927, 929, 948, 955, 970, 1014, 1023n, 1026n**; bishops of, *see* Giovanni Staffileo 1512–1528, Giovanni Lucio Staffileo 1528–1557, Girolamo Savorgnan 1557–1573; "count" of, *see* Marino Moro (*f.* 1507)
- Sebez (Mühlbach), **318n, 576**
- Secca, jetty at Famagusta, **1038n**
- Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), **494**
- Seda, Pietro Paolo, attendant of Marc' Antonio Bragadin at Famagusta in 1571; **1039**
- Sedan, lord of, *see* Robert de la Marck
- Sées, **565n**
- Segna (Senj, Zengg), **37, 200n, 244n, 355, 358n, 361n, 378n, 477n, 482, 532, 608, 843, 933, 1100**; counts of, *see* Bernardino de' Frangipani (until *ca.* 1525), Cristoforo de' Frangipani (d. 1527)
- Segnatura, **625, 627, 710**
- Segovia, **42n, 890, 905, 906n, 910**; bishop of, *see* Martín Pérez de Ayala 1560–1564; Park of, **910n, 911**
- Seld, Georg, imperial vicechancellor in 1563; **803f.**
- Selim I (Yavuz, "the Grim"), son of Bayazid II; Ottoman sultan 1512–1520; **38n, 84, 122ff., 127, 133, 141, 148n, 150ff., 156, 158, 163ff., 166, 169f., 174f., 180n, 181, 183ff., 187, 190n, 191, 193, 194n, 198, 203, 214, 234, 409, 449n, 929**

- Selim II ("the Sot") son of Suleiman I and Roxelana; Ottoman sultan 1566–1574: 339n, 342, 367, 401, 530, 562, 591f., 698n, 699, 708n, 758, 830n, 833n, 834, 837f., 840, 846, 856n, 879, 899, 907, 912f., 921f., 924, 926, 930ff., 933f., 939f., 945, 948f., 951, 953, 954n, 960, 970, 990, 1001, 1007, 1011, 1015, 1037, 1053n, 1061, 1067, 1068n, 1069, 1075, 1087f., 1089n, 1091, 1092n, 1095ff.
- Selimiye, mosque (in Nicosia), *see* Santa Sophia
- Semendria (Smederevo), 84, 199, 334n, 442, 472, 479n
- Seminaries, 826
- Semlin (Zemun, Hung. Zimony), 204, 254, 845
- Senate, Milanese, 111
- Senese, 598ff., 603, 709
- Sens, archbishops of, *see* Antoine Duprat 1525–1535, Louis de Bourbon (admin.) 1535–1557, Jean Bertrand (admin.) 1557–1560
- Sensa, Venetian ceremony, 61
- Septizonium, 399
- Seraglio, *see* Old Seraglio (Topkapı Sarayı)
- Seraphina, Spanish ship (ca. 1565), 871, 872n
- Serbelloni, family, 739n, 885
- Serbelloni, Gabrio, captain in the Swiss guard at the Vatican in 1560: 746
- Serbelloni, Gian Antonio, bishop of Foligno 1557–1560, cardinal 1560–1591, bishop of Novara 1560–1574: 739
- Serbia, 150, 199, 444, 570, 1104; "despot" of, *see* Jacob Basilicus
- Serbs, 209, 570, 574
- Sereni, Battista, Venetian messenger in 1503: 2
- Sereno, Bartolomeo, author of an account of the war of Cyprus (*ff.* 1574), 928n, 958, 960, 983f., 988, 1024, 1027n, 1074n, 1075n, 1078, 1083n, 1084, 1091
- Seripando, Girolamo, archbishop of Salerno 1554–1563, cardinal 1561–1563: 498, 581n, 583n, 610, 615n, 621n, 626, 701, 717n, 773ff., 776ff., 779n, 780ff., 783, 785ff., 788, 796f., 803, 807f.
- Sermoneta, lord of, *see* Onorato Caetani (from 1574)
- Sernini, Nino, Mantuan agent in Rome in 1542: 462
- Serrano, Luciano, historian (b. 1879, d. 1944), 966n, 977, 1024, 1084n, 1094
- Serravalle all' Adige, 47n
- Serristori, Averardo, Florentine ambassador to Rome in 1554: 427n, 599n, 600n, 601, 618n, 619n, 641, 662n, 814n, 860n
- Sertorio, Giulio, archbishop of Santa Severina 1535–1554: 518n, 525n
- Servanzio da S. Severino, Astolfo, diarist of the Council of Trent ca. 1561–1563: 776
- Servi (Elafonisi), 1082
- Servia, Miguel, author of a contemporary account of the battle of Lepanto (d. 1574), 1053n, 1081ff., 1084, 1086f.
- Servites, Order of, 95; *and see* Costantino da Parenzo
- Sessa (Sesa), 273, 307; dukes of, *see* Luis de Cordova (*ff.* 1523), Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba (d. 1578)
- Sessa Aurrancia, bishop of, *see* Tiberio Crispi 1543–1546?
- Sessola, 295n
- Severoli, Ercole, procurator of the Council of Trent in 1545: 492, 496n, 499n
- Seville (Sevilla), 203n, 239n, 243n, 554, 865, 915, 957, 958n, 961, 962n, 983; archbishop of, *see* Juan García de Loaisa 1539–1546
- Sfax, 762
- Sfondrati, Niccolò, *see* Gregory XIV
- Sfondrato, Francesco, bishop of Sarno 1543–1544, archbishop of Amalfi 1544–1547, cardinal 1544–1550, bishop of Caccoppio 1547–1549, of Cremona 1549–1550: 509, 510n, 513, 519, 522
- Sforza, Alessandro, brother of Guido Ascanio, bishop of Parma 1560–1573; cardinal 1565–1581: 634, 636, 884
- Sforza, Ascanio Maria, son of Francesco and Bianca; bishop of Pavia 1479–1505; cardinal 1484–1505, bishop of Cremona (admin.) 1486–1505: 4, 18f., 156n, 140
- Sforza, Bona, daughter of Gian Galeazzo and Isabella d' Aragona of Naples; wife of Sigismund I of Poland 1518–1548 (d. 1557), 312, 316n, 317n, 319, 656, 689n, 744
- Sforza, Bosio, son of Federico; count (II) of Santa Fiora (d. 1535), 403; wife of, *see* Costanza Farnese
- Sforza, Carlo, son of Bosio and Costanza Farnese; prior of Lombardy (b. 1524, d. 1571?), 533, 535, 548, 634
- Sforza, Caterina, bastard daughter of Galeazzo Maria Sforza; wife of Girolamo Riario (1473) 1477–1488 (d. 1509), 16n
- Sforza, Francesco Maria, son of Lodovico Maria and Beatrice d' Este; duke of Milan (II) 1521–1525, 1529–1535: 196, 219, 224ff., 228, 230ff., 239, 241f., 261n, 266, 285, 298n, 304n, 322, 323n, 329f., 332f., 338n, 738n
- Sforza, Gian Galeazzo, son of Galeazzo Maria and Bona of Savoy; duke of Milan 1476–1494: 312, 656n; wife of, *see* Isabella of Aragon (d. 1524)
- Sforza, Giovanni, cousin of Lodovico Maria Sforza; lord of Pesaro 1483–1500, 1503–1510: 9, 11f.; wife of, *see* Lucrezia Borgia 1493–1497
- Sforza, Guido Ascanio, son of Bosio and Costanza Farnese; bishop of Montefascone and Corneto 1528–1548; cardinal 1534–1564, bishop of Parma (admin.) 1535–1560: 403, 404n, 495, 507f., 514ff., 518, 520ff., 523, 533, 549, 552, 585n, 592, 603n, 611ff., 614, 617ff., 620, 634f., 638, 640f., 646, 648, 666, 668f., 687, 721f., 724ff., 727f., 730f., 733f., 736f., 739n, 742f., 751, 885n
- Sforza, Lodovico Maria ("il Moro"), son of Francesco and Bianca Maria Visconti; duke of Bari 1479–1494, of Milan 1494–1500 (d. 1508), 68n, 129n, 130f., 135, 196, 645, 665, 668
- Sforza, Mario, son of Bosio and Costanza Farnese; count of Santa Fiora in 1571 (b. 1530, d. 1591), 634, 1061
- Sforza, Massimiliano, nephew of Maximilian I and son of Lodovico Maria and Beatrice d' Este; duke of Milan 1512–1515 (d. 1530), 125n, 130ff., 134f., 145, 148n, 161, 230n
- Sforza, Ottaviano, bishop of Lodi 1497–1519, of Arezzo 1519–1525: 130
- Sforza, Paolo, commissioner-general of relief force for Malta in 1565: 871, 872n
- Sforzeschi, 131, 161n, 230, 248, 634, 750
- Sfratati, 710
- Shabats (Sabac), 199, 204, 224, 254
- Shiites (Shi'ites), 38, 104n, 127, 164n, 589f.
- Shusha (Karabagh), 590
- Si summus rerum opifex*, bull of Julius II (1513), 138
- Sicco, Niccolò, imperial envoy to Istanbul ca. 1545, conclave of Otto von Truchsess in 1549: 480n, 490, 493, 520n
- Sicilians, 644, 760, 764, 850, 875, 890, 906, 918
- Sicily, 14, 34, 53, 71f., 99, 115, 119, 155n, 156n, 172, 177, 179, 184, 190, 192ff., 208n, 212, 213n, 214ff., 235, 274, 295, 304, 329n, 344, 345n, 347, 352, 355f., 361, 392f., 395, 397, 429, 431, 445f., 450, 470, 500, 533, 535, 539, 544, 554, 556, 560f., 582, 585, 589, 609, 623, 632, 635, 637, 642, 644f., 647, 653, 664f., 674, 678, 686n, 691, 698, 701, 722n, 758, 760, 762, 765f., 776, 811, 823, 831, 834, 841, 843, 844n, 854, 857ff., 861f., 866, 870ff., 873, 876, 878, 887, 889ff., 894, 899, 901f., 905, 907, 911f., 914, 916, 920f., 922n, 936f., 940, 947, 957ff., 960, 962, 965f., 967n, 969, 972n, 973, 979, 982, 985, 998n, 1001, 1008, 1012, 1016, 1020, 1022f., 1025, 1045, 1047n, 1048n, 1055, 1062, 1063n, 1066, 1070, 1076, 1081, 1088

- 1094f., 1104; *see also* Naples, kingdom of ("Sicily"); "Two Sicilies." 177, 195, 238, 678n; viceroys of, *see* Ferrante Gonzaga (from 1535), Juan de Vega (in 1551), Juan de la Cerda (ca. 1559), Garcia de Toledo (in 1565), Ferdinando Francesco d' Avalos 1568–1571
- Sidon, bishop of, *see* Michael Holding (titular) 1558–1550
- Siena, 7, 12n, 15, 102, 110, 112, 151, 167f., 219, 242, 255f., 264, 265n, 267, 272, 332, 412, 464, 537, 564n, 592ff., 595, 598ff., 603ff., 623, 637, 642, 647f., 651, 655f., 661f., 664n, 670f., 676f., 683, 684n, 685f., 709, 711, 735, 738, 750, 811, 818, 956, 1017; archbishops of, *see* Francesco Todeschini Piccolomini (Pius III) 1459–1503, Giovanni Piccolomini 1503–1529, Francesco Bandini de' Piccolomini 1529–1588; bishop of, *see* Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pius II) 1450–1458; council of, 505; duke of, *see* Cosimo I de' Medici (d. 1574); tyrant of, *see* Pandolfo Petrucci (d. 1512); war of, 592ff., 595ff., 598ff., 601f., 604ff., 625, 749, 754, 1028
- Siense, 368, 470n, 549, 592ff., 595f., 599ff., 602, 604, 606n, 633, 664, 709, 738n
- Sieradz, 312, 323; palatine of, *see* Jerome Laski (ca. 1528)
- Sigismondo d' Este, lord of S. Martino in 1555: 618n, 621n
- Sigismondo de' Conti (da Foligno), papal secretary (b. ca. 1440, d. ca. 1512), author of the *Historiae sui temporis* (1475–1510), 3f., 10n, 33, 39, 56, 58n, 65, 72, 95, 105n, 110
- Sigismondo della Torre (Fanzino), Mantuan envoy to Charles V in 1551: 263, 280, 344f.
- Sigismondo di Cavalli, Venetian ambassador to Spain around 1567 (b. 1530, d. 1579), 909n, 928, 933, 945f., 950f., 953, 957n, 958, 961, 962n, 965n, 966f., 972; Venetian ambassador to France ca. 1571: 1049n
- Sigismund I, son of Casimir IV and Elizabeth, daughter of Albrecht II of Austria; king of Poland 1506–1548: 54n, 67n, 144, 158, 159n, 180, 192, 198, 208n, 216n, 217n, 219n, 235f., 237n, 250n, 252, 255n, 256n, 273n, 285, 300, 312f., 315f., 318f., 321, 323f., 335f., 341, 357n, 371, 377, 412, 416n, 444n, 489, 656n, 714
- Sigismund II Augustus, son of Sigismund I and Bona Sforza; king of Poland from 1548 (b. 1520, d. 1572), 503, 628, 656n, 714f., 744, 775, 809, 922, 938, 963, 1014ff., 1019, 1061n, 1063n, 1087, 1089n
- Sigismund, son of Joachim II of Brandenburg and Hedwig, daughter of Sigismund I of Poland; archbishop of Magdeburg from 1553 (Protestant from about 1561), b. 1538, d. 1566: 773n
- Sigismund von Herberstein, envoy of Ferdinand I (b. 1486, d. 1566): 317
- Sigismund von Thun, Count, layman in attendance at the Council of Trent in 1562: 778f., 791, 824n
- Signori Capitani, defenders of Famagusta in 1571: 1036
- Signori governatori, governors (12) of Chios, 895f., 898
- Signori Otto di Pratica (in Florence), 265n, 274, 275n, 278n
- Signoria Procuratori (in Venice), 82
- Signoria (in Florence), 81, 91f., 97n, 99, 105, 108f., 111, 114f., 119f., 121n, 144
- Signoria (in Geneva), 131, 893, 1023
- Sigüenza, 545n; bishops of, *see* Bernardino de Carvajal 1495–1519; Juan Garcia de Loaisa 1532–1539, Pedro Pacheco 1554–1560, Francisco Manrique de Lara (in 1560), Diego Espinosa 1568–1572
- Siklós, in southern Hungary, 845
- Silber, Euchario, Roman printer (fl. 1480), 111n
- Silber (or Franck), Marcello, printer and bookseller in Rome (fl. 1511–1512), 111n
- Silesia, 292n, 320n, 435, 459, 567, 790
- Silesians, 178
- Siliceo, Juan, bishop of Cartagena 1541–1546, archbishop of Toledo 1546–1557, cardinal 1555–1557: 644
- Silvestro de' Gigli, bishop of Worcester 1498–1521: 44, 162n
- Simitecolo, Niccolò, owner of a Venetian ship seized at Naples in 1522: 212n
- Simon de Begno (Begnium), bishop of Modruš 1509–1536: 147f., 406n
- Simon de Zereni-Erdevd, bishop of Zagreb 1519–1543: 430n
- Simonetta, Lodovico, bishop of Pesaro 1537–1561; cardinal 1561–1568: 773, 776ff., 780f., 783ff., 786n, 787ff., 794, 796, 797n, 800, 805, 808f., 811f., 821, 823, 825f.
- Simony, 3, 113, 138, 434n, 509f., 611, 626, 710, 796, 808
- Sinai, Mount (Jabal Mūsā), 28
- Sinan, Ottoman architect (b. 1489, d. 1578 or 1588), 530
- Sinan Pasha, brother of Rustem; Ottoman admiral (d. 1578), 554f., 585, 588, 765
- Sinan Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir and commander at Tunis in 1574 (d. 1596), 1095
- Sinclitico, Eugenio, count of Rocas, cavalry commander ca. 1570: 991, 992n
- Sinclitico, Giovanni, killed by the Turks after the siege of Famagusta (1571), 1042
- Singmoser, Marco, secretary to Ferdinand I in 1563: 803f.
- Singrenius, Ioannes, publisher in Vienna (fl. 1532), 414n
- Sinigiaglia (Senigallia), 4, 5n, 6, 12n, 118, 166; bishops of, *see* Marco Vigerio della Rovere 1476–1513, Marco Vigerio della Rovere 1513–1550; Girolamo Rusticucci 1570–1577?
- Sipahis, Turkish cavalry, 53, 128, 278, 342, 367, 700, 759n, 761, 767, 834, 842, 855, 856n, 894, 895n, 898, 965, 976, 1055, 1059, 1095
- Siphnos (Sifanto), 899; ruler of, *see* Niccolò Gozzadini (ca. 1571)
- Siponto, *see* Manfredonia
- Sirigo, Bartolommeo, bishop of Castellaneta 1544–1577: 794, 810n, 821f., 824
- Sirleto, Guglielmo, cardinal 1565–1585, bishop of S. Marco (admin.) 1566–1568; of Squillace 1568–1573: 884
- Sirmium (Mitrovica), bishop of, *see* Stephen Broderic 1526–1539
- Sirvan, 1092
- Sis (Kozan), katholikos of, *see* Christopher (ca. 1561)
- Sistine Chapel (Sistina, in the Vatican), 10, 140n, 143, 196f., 200, 220f., 260, 266, 282n, 506ff., 509, 511, 519, 527, 529, 617ff., 620, 628, 645, 649, 717, 719, 722, 724, 732, 734f., 737f., 753, 956
- Sitia, 980n, 981ff., 984, 987n, 988; Gulf of, 984
- Sitten, bishops of, *see* Matthias Schiner 1499–1522, Paolo de' Cesi (admin.) 1522–1529?
- Sivas, 503, 591
- Sixtus IV (Francesco della Rovere), Franciscan, cardinal 1467–1471, pope 1471–1484: 4n, 34, 36, 39, 58, 72, 140, 153ff., 519n
- Sixtus V (Felice Peretti), Franciscan, cardinal 1570–1585, pope 1585–1590: 1077
- Skara (Scaresini), bishop of, *see* Joannes Franciscus de Potentia (from 1523)
- Skiathos, island in the Aegean, 17
- Skrofa, promontory near Lepanto, 1052ff., 1055
- Skyros, largest of the northern Sporades, 17, 446
- Slankamen, village in northern Serbia, 254, 570
- Slavonia, 253, 310n, 442, 444n, 921
- Slavonic language, 91n, 385
- Slavs, 99, 608; *and see* Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Uskoks
- Sleidan, Johann, historian and reformer (b. 1506 or 1508, d. 1556), 528, 543
- Sliema, on Malta, 854

- Slovakia, 314, 315n, 584, 814n  
 Smederevo, *see* Semendria  
 Smyrna (Izmir), 347n, 395n, 1102n  
*Societas charitatis Urbis*, Roman legal-aid society, 748; *see also* Luis de Torres  
 Socrates of Athens (c. 399 B.C.), 564  
 Soderini, Francesco, bishop of Volterra 1478–1509, cardinal 1503–1524, bishop of Saintes (admin.) 1507–1514, of Vicenza 1514–1524, of Anagni (admin.) 1517–1523: 3f., 147, 167f., 218, 222  
 Soderini, Giovanni Battista, Florentine observer in the camp of Lautrec in 1528: 308n  
 Soderini, Giuliano, Florentine envoy to France in 1528: 297  
 Soderini, Piero, appointed gonfalonier of Florence for life in 1502 (b. 1452, d. 1522), 91, 103, 114n, 131f.  
 Sofia, 383, 478f., 766  
 Soissons, 708n  
 Solarolo, 264  
 Soliman di Rossi, present on Cyprus in 1568: 934  
 Somerset, Charles, Lord Herbert, English ambassador to France in 1506 (b. 1460?, d. 1526), 48  
 Sommaripa, Francesco, uncle of Niccolò; lord of Andros in 1506: 38n  
 Sommaripa, lords of Andros and Zia, 899  
 Sommaripa, Niccolò, Venetian lord of Paros and Andros (d. 1506), 17, 38n  
 Soncino, town near Crema, 298n  
 Sopoć, 1025, 1050, 1069f., 1091  
 Soranzo, Benedetto, Venetian commander on the Adriatic around 1564: 842  
 Soranzo, Giacomo, Venetian ambassador to France in 1556 and to Rome in 1565, *baillie* in Istanbul from 1566: 645n, 648, 666, 671, 675, 680, 683, 685n, 686, 694, 697, 698n, 740f., 815, 847, 851n, 886n, 891f., 923, 925, 931, 933, 950n; special envoy to Maximilian II in 1570: 954n, 993, 994n, 1000; appointed *provveditore generale* in 1571: 1065, 1078f., 1082f.  
 Soranzo, Giovanni, Venetian ambassador to Spain in 1563: 726n, 810n; Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1570: 992, 994f., 998, 1001n, 1002, 1009, 1013f., 1016, 1063, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1076n, 1077  
 Soranzo, Girolamo, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1563: 740f., 886n  
 Soranzo, Vettore, Venetian *provveditore* in 1528: 295  
 Sorbonne, 777n, 793; *see also* Paris, University of  
 Soriano, 743, 748  
 Sorrento, 297, 305, 701; bishop of, *see* Francesco Remolimo 1501–1512?  
 Sovana, bishop of, *see* Alfonso Petrucci 1510–1513  
 Sozomeno, Giovanni, author of a contemporary account of the events of 1570: 992n, 995n  
 Sozzini, Alessandro, author of an account of the War of Siena (b. 1518, d. 1608), 593n, 597f., 600f., 604f., 606n  
 Spain, 1, 6n, 7, 14f., 16n, 18n, 26f., 29, 34f., 39, 41f., 46, 48, 52, 59n, 60, 62n, 63, 69, 71, 84f., 96n, 98n, 100, 101n, 102f., 109, 114, 117, 119, 120n, 125f., 132n, 137, 140n, 156, 175, 177f., 183, 187f., 191, 193, 198, 200, 209n, 210, 216, 222f., 230n, 239, 246, 249n, 252n, 257, 258n, 268, 272, 274, 286, 290f., 298, 300, 311, 315, 322, 328, 329n, 332, 337n, 344, 356, 358n, 360, 366n, 369, 377f., 380, 385, 389, 393, 395f., 397n, 400n, 414, 424, 427, 431, 445f., 448n, 450, 451n, 453, 456, 457n, 461, 464, 466, 503, 514, 534, 538, 540, 546, 554, 558, 565, 567, 600, 623n, 626n, 632f., 642n, 644f., 647, 650, 657, 661f., 664n, 665, 666n, 667f., 670f., 674, 676, 679n, 680n, 684, 687, 691, 693, 697f., 701, 705f., 708n, 709n, 714, 717, 719f., 726f., 729, 731f., 734f., 739, 741, 743f., 747, 750, 752f., 755, 758, 764, 766f., 769f., 775, 779, 784, 789, 794, 797, 801, 803, 805, 806n, 808, 812, 817, 819, 828, 833f., 838, 840, 842f., 846f., 859, 865n, 869n, 871, 872n, 873, 877n, 882, 883n, 884f., 887f., 889n, 890f., 894, 899f., 902, 906f., 910n, 911f., 914f., 917, 919f., 929, 932f., 935n, 938f., 941f., 944f., 949f., 953n, 955f., 958, 960n, 961f., 966n, 969, 972, 973n, 979, 982f., 989, 995n, 996f., 999, 1000n, 1008f., 1011, 1014, 1016, 1018n, 1019n, 1020n, 1021, 1022n, 1023, 1024n, 1048, 1051, 1055, 1059, 1062n, 1064, 1067f., 1070, 1079, 1081, 1086f., 1089n, 1093, 1096ff., 1100; Hospitaliers from, 207; kings of, *see* Ferdinand II 1504–1516, Charles I (Emperor Charles V) 1516–1556, Philip II 1556–1598, Philip III 1598–1621, Philip IV 1621–1665, Philip V 1700–1746  
 Spalatin, George, humanist, chancellor to Frederick the Wise of Saxony (b. 1484, d. 1545), 229n  
 Spalatin, Nicholas, doctor present at the meeting at Schmal-kalden in 1537: 417  
 Spalatin, 695  
 Spalato (Split), 123f., 343n, 378n, 383, 421, 423, 451n, 476, 608, 691, 694f., 923, 932, 948, 953, 1026n; archbishops of, *see* Bernardino Zane 1503–1524, Andrea Corner 1527–1532?  
 Spandugino, Teodoro, historian of the Turks, papal commissioner in 1525: 411  
 Spaniards, Spanish, 1, 3, 5, 6n, 11, 15, 17, 23f., 40, 46, 53, 76f., 85, 91, 100f., 107, 109, 112, 114, 116f., 119, 122n, 132f., 137, 142f., 147, 177f., 226, 228, 234, 257, 259, 261f., 264, 270f., 273, 281f., 283n, 286, 289n, 290ff., 293f., 300, 304f., 363n, 364, 371f., 375, 378, 397, 442, 457, 466, 500, 519, 533, 539n, 546, 558, 569, 583f., 592f., 595, 600, 612n, 617f., 625n, 630, 632, 637, 641, 644, 645n, 649, 651ff., 654, 656f., 658n, 659, 662, 665ff., 668, 674, 676f., 679f., 682f., 685n, 686, 688n, 691, 693, 698, 708, 710, 720, 722f., 725, 727f., 730f., 733f., 739, 741, 743, 750, 754f., 759f., 764n, 765, 774, 777f., 781, 783f., 788, 791, 793, 796f., 805, 807, 809, 812, 816, 821, 822n, 826, 827n, 831f., 836, 838, 840f., 843, 848n, 850, 854n, 857, 870f., 875f., 878f., 883n, 884, 887f., 890f., 901f., 905f., 908f., 911, 913n, 914, 916ff., 920, 926, 939f., 943, 957, 962f., 970, 978, 998n, 1008n, 1009f., 1012f., 1015, 1017, 1020n, 1021, 1024, 1026, 1029, 1047f., 1051, 1066f., 1070f., 1073f., 1077f., 1081, 1084n, 1085n, 1086, 1089, 1094f., 1098f.  
 Spanish empire, 1098  
 Spanish Inquisition, 140, 914, 1098; *see also* Inquisition, In-quisitors  
 Spanish language, 91n, 399, 626n, 795, 855, 1016n  
 Spannocchi, Ambrogio, owner of a palace in Siena, 599  
 Spanocchi (or Spanocchi), Siense banking family, 7, 102  
 Sparlarga, Domenico, Venetian merchant in Cairo (*fl.* 1511), 26  
 Sparta (Lacedaemon), 136n, 193  
 Spedale di S. Maria della Scala (in Siena), 604n; rector of, *see* Scipione Venturi (in 1554)  
 Spedt, Friedrich, agent of Albrecht of Brandenburg, friend of Carlo Carafa *ca.* 1556: 749f.  
 Spenser, Edmund, English poet (b. 1552?, d. 1599), 1  
 Speyer, 322n, 348, 353, 452, 466, 476f., 557n, 595, 993, 994n; "Protestation" of (1529), 353; vicar of, *see* Anton Schnepff (*ca.* 1527)  
 Sphacteria, 1084  
 Spina, Aurelio, chamberlain of Cardinal Borromeo in 1560: 746  
 Spina, Cesare, Calabrian assassin allegedly sent against Paul IV, *ca.* 1555: 639n



- Spinalonga, fortress near Candia, 1101n
- Spinelli, Francesco, brother-in-law of Marino da Pozzo (*f.* 1523), 221n
- Spinelli, Gasparo, Venetian secretary in England ca. 1526 and 1527: 237n, 249n, 254n, 255n, 259n
- Spinelli, Marchio, Venetian holder of a bursary to study Turkish in Istanbul ca. 1573: 909n
- Spini, Francesco, secretarial functionary under Paul IV: 635n
- Spinola, Agosino, bishop of Perugia 1509–1529, cardinal 1527–1537, bishop of Savona (admin.) 1528–1537: 268n
- Spinola, money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Spšská Nová Ves (German Zipser Neudorf, Hung. Igló), town in east central Slovakia, 315n
- Spšské Podhradie, castle and town northwest of Košice, 315n
- Spoleto, 268, 412n; bishop of, *see* Flavio Orsini 1562–1580?
- Spot, Ruloff, German "newspaper" printer, ca. 1509: 72n
- Squarcialupi, Dardano, Famagustan nearly killed by the Turks in 1571: 1040f.
- Squarcialupi, Zorzi, present on Cyprus in 1568: 934
- Squillace, bishop of, *see* Guglielmo Sirleto 1568–1573?
- Squillace, Gulf of, 765
- Stabia, castle of, 394n
- Stadtturm (in Waidhofen an der Ybbs), 366n
- Staffleio, Giovanni (Ivan Stafilić), bishop of Sebenico 1512–1528: 173, 174n, 175, 180n, 184
- Staffleio, Giovanni Lucio, bishop of Sebenico 1528–1557: 494
- Stampalia, *see* Astypalaea
- Staphylus, Friedrich, German theologian (b. 1512, d. 1564), 804
- Statilius, John, bishop of Alba Iulia 1539–1554: 318f., 321f., 436f., 444n
- Stavrovouni, 757
- Stefano de' Mari, owner of a flagship in the relief force for Malta in 1565: 871, 872n
- Stellata, 76
- Stendardo, Matteo, leader of the papal lancers in Rome in 1556: 660, 670
- Steno, Michele, doge of Venice 1400–1413: 68n
- Stepanakert, 590
- Stephen ("the Great"), ruler of Moldavia 1457–1504: 37
- Stern (von Labach), Peter, author of an account of the siege of Vienna in 1529: 326n
- Steyr, 444n
- Stile, John, correspondent of Henry VIII in 1512: 132n
- Stradión, 14, 53, 238n, 304, 932, 937, 991
- Strasbourg (Strasbourg), 111n, 543
- Strasoldo, Federico, of Gorizia, imperial envoy to Feriz Beg in 1510: 88f.
- Strazzola (a Strasoldo), Panfilo, papal nuncio in Poland in 1536: 416n
- Street of the Knights (in Rhodes), 208n, 216
- Strettura, 268
- Strongoli, bishop of, *see* Timoteo Giustiniani 1568–1571
- Strophades (Stamphane), 903, 1084
- Strossmayer, Joseph, bishop of Djakovo from 1849 (b. 1815, d. 1905), 795n
- Strozzi, Antonio, Florentine ambassador to Rome from 1511: 109n, 112, 114f., 120
- Strozzi, Filippo, father of Leone and Pietro (b. 1489, d. 1538), 599n; wife of, *see* Clarice de' Medici (d. 1528)
- Strozzi, Florentine banking family, 265, 684
- Strozzi, Giovanni, Florentine ambassador at the Council of Trent in 1562: 781
- Strozzi, Leone, brother of Pietro, admiral (b. 1515, d. 1554), 583
- Strozzi, Lorenzo, brother of Pietro; bishop of Béziers 1547–1561, cardinal 1557–1571, bishop of Albi (admin.) 1561–1568, archbishop of Aix 1568–1571: 678, 724, 725n, 733
- Strozzi, Pietro, son of Filippo; Italian soldier and partisan (d. 1558), 465n, 495, 552f., 563, 583, 599ff., 602ff., 605n, 630, 660f., 668, 673, 675, 677, 678n, 682ff., 685ff., 712, 751n
- Stuart, John, son of Alexander, duke of Albany and Anne, daughter of Bertrand II, count of la Tour d' Auvergne; duke of Albany and regent (1514/1515–1524) of Scotland (b. 1481, d. 1536), 224ff., 231
- Stuart d' Aubigny, Robert, count of Beaumont-le-Roger, French commander in the Neapolitan campaign of 1501: 118n
- Stuhlweissenburg (Alba Regia, Székesfehérvár), 251f., 355n, 472, 479, 697, 1102; governor of, *see* Arslan Beg (in 1552)
- Stura di Demonte, 160
- Sturion, Giorgio, Venetian infantry captain in 1527: 286
- Sturm, Johannes, German educationist (b. 1507, d. 1589), 415n
- Styria, 192, 231, 244, 249, 365f., 433n, 442, 574, 661, 790, 792n; duke of, *see* Emperor Frederick III 1435–1486
- Styrians, 921
- Suardino, Giacomo, Mantuan ambassador to the imperial court in 1525 and 1527: 229n, 232n, 260n, 280
- Suarez, Lorenzo, Spanish ambassador in Venice in 1504: 35n, 41n
- Subashi, Turkish chief of police, 898
- Subiaco, 1087
- Sublime Porte, 156, 477n, 940n, 949n, 1075, 1091, 1092n; *and see* Ottomans
- Sublimis Deus, bull of Paul III (1535), 417
- Suceava, capital of Moldavia, 444
- Suda, fortress near Candia, 1101n
- Suda Bay, harbor at Crete, 970, 975, 978ff., 985ff., 988, 1022
- Suez, 926
- Suleiman I (Kanuni, "the Lawgiver"; "the Magnificent"), son of Selim I; Ottoman sultan 1520–1566: 28, 164, 193ff., 198ff., 201ff., 204f., 206n, 207ff., 210n, 211f., 213n, 214f., 217f., 223f., 227n, 233, 235f., 240, 245f., 247n, 249, 250n, 251ff., 254, 274, 278f., 284, 292n, 301f., 303n, 314f., 316n, 318f., 321, 322n, 324ff., 327, 329, 332, 336, 339, 341ff., 344n, 346ff., 349n, 350n, 352, 354f., 357n, 358n, 359n, 360ff., 363ff., 366ff., 370f., 374f., 378, 380ff., 383, 384n, 385ff., 388f., 391n, 392f., 396, 398n, 400f., 406f., 409, 414f., 420, 421n, 422f., 427, 430ff., 433n, 437, 442, 444, 448, 449n, 450f., 455f., 458ff., 461n, 464f., 468, 470ff., 475f., 477n, 478f., 481f., 485, 487n, 489n, 490f., 493, 494n, 501ff., 517, 529f., 532f., 534n, 536, 550n, 556, 562, 566ff., 569, 574, 578, 584, 586, 588ff., 591, 607, 622, 623n, 624, 630f., 645f., 650, 653, 661, 665, 678f., 682f., 690, 692f., 694n, 695ff., 698ff., 702, 704n, 705ff., 708, 714, 758, 759n, 762n, 763n, 765, 767f., 772, 786, 815f., 829ff., 832ff., 835ff., 838f., 841f., 843n, 845f., 852, 856n, 861n, 862, 865, 878f., 889ff., 894n, 895n, 896ff., 899, 907, 912f., 921ff., 929ff., 990, 1037, 1091; wife of, *see* Roxelana (d. 1558)
- Suleiman II, brother of Mehmed IV; Ottoman sultan from 1687 (b. 1641, d. 1691), 1102
- Suleiman Pasha, Ottoman grand vizir in 1687: 1102
- Suleiman Reis, Turkish corsair (*f.* ca. 1567), 923f.
- Süleymaniye Camii, great mosque of Suleiman I, in Istanbul (finished 1557), 530, 645
- Sulmona, 293; bishops of (bishops of Valva and Sulmona), *see* Andrea della Valle (admin.) 1519–1521, Pompeo Zambeccari 1547–1571; prince of, *see* Philippe Lannoy (*f.* 1560)
- Sulpizia, niece of Angelo Massarelli and wife of Marguritus de S. Severino, 774n, 827
- Sumatra, 348, 771, 926

- Sunni (Sunnites), 38, 104n, 127, 164n, 590  
*Superna illius ordinatione*, bull of Leo X (1513), 148n  
 Surian, Agostino, brother of Antonio (*f.* 1530), 353  
 Surian, Angelo, seeks the Turkish armada *ca.* 1570: 986, 988  
 Surian, Antonio, Venetian ambassador to England and Florence in the 1520's: 159n, 186n, 195n, 199n, 206n, 225, 229n, 276n, 308, 331n, 338n, 340f., 345n, 347, 353, 410n  
 Surian, Anzolo, owner of a galley *ca.* 1568: 934  
 Surian, Michele (Michiel), Venetian ambassador to Charles V and to Philip and Mary in the Netherlands and in England 1554f., 1557f.: 632n, 668n, 681n, 685n, 690, 691n, 709n; ambassador to France in 1560–1561: 767n; ambassador to Rome 1568–1571: 951, 955f., 961f., 963n, 969, 989n, 992, 994, 995n, 998, 1001n, 1002, 1009, 1013f., 1016, 1019, 1046f.  
 Surian, Niccolò, Venetian naval commander in the Adriatic *ca.* 1565: 843, 844n  
*Suriana*, Venetian galley, 954  
 Surier, Nicolino, citizen of Famagusta and bearer of letters from Ismā'īl to Venice in 1510: 25  
 Surrey, earl of, *see* Thomas Howard (b. 1443, d. 1524)  
 Susa, 130n, 160, 224, 283, 915  
 Sussida, 771, 959f., 969, 1014, 1094n  
 Sutri, 282; bishops of, *see* Michele Ghislieri (Pius V) 1556–1560, Tiberio Crispi (admin.) 1563–1566; *see also* Nepi, bishops of  
 "Suzahī Zauso," Turkish envoy to Venice in 1543: 472n  
 Suzanne de Bourbon, daughter of Pierre II de Beaujeu and Anne de France; wife of Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier (b. 1491, d. 1521), 238  
 Sveti (Saint) Jakov, church (in Šibenik), 174n  
 Swabia, 790  
 Sweden, 417, 769, 773n  
 Swiss, 29, 43n, 47, 53, 77, 87, 88n, 106n, 111, 112n, 114n, 118f., 122, 125, 128f., 131ff., 135, 137, 147f., 159f., 165n, 173, 175, 177, 184, 186n, 200, 224, 227n, 231, 237n, 263, 286, 305, 361n, 483n, 550, 664n, 676, 680, 682f., 707n, 751n, 786, 911, 1019  
 Swiss guard (Vatican), 36, 746  
 Swiss mercenaries, 73, 145, 181n, 196, 257, 275, 297, 601, 666, 675, 681, 684f., 916, 1019  
 Switzerland, 87n, 91n, 125, 136, 173, 184n, 186n, 231, 237, 361n, 457, 539n, 557, 918n; Catholic cantons of, 740, 781, 916  
 Sylvester II, pope 999–1003: 568n  
 Synods, 813  
 Syracuse, 235, 352, 539, 554, 758, 761n, 866, 869, 871, 872n, 875n, 876, 890, 1045  
 Syria, 1, 19f., 29, 31, 33, 102n, 128, 151, 164f., 169f., 174, 175n, 176, 179, 183ff., 198, 200, 214, 218, 240n, 338, 343, 344n, 356n, 428, 451, 503, 532, 833, 842, 907, 926, 927n, 929, 963, 970, 1027, 1032n, 1043, 1049  
 Syrians, 99  
 Szakmári, George, bishop of Grosswarden 1502–1505, of Fünfkirchen 1505–1523, archbishop of Gran 1523–1524: 236  
 Szalkai, Ladislas, bishop of Vacium (Waitzen) 1515–1523?, of Erlau 1523–1524, archbishop of Gran 1524–1526: 236, 244n  
 Szatmar-Bereg, in northeastern Hungary, 854  
 Szeged, 254, 323, 434n, 466, 573, 581, 584  
 Szekesfehérvár, *see* Stuhlweissenburg  
 Szeklers, 570  
 Szepes (German Zips, Slovak Spiš, Polish Spisz), region in Hungary, 315, 363; count of, *see* John Zápolya (d. 1540)  
 Szepsi, 566  
 Sziget (Szigetvár), 679n, 700, 845f., 890, 907  
*Szlachta*, Polish gentry, 714  
 Szolnok, 585  
 Szydłowiecki, Christopher, Polish chancellor and castellan of Cracow *ca.* 1528: 313, 318n, 319, 335n  
 Szydłowiecki, Nicholas, kinsman of Christopher; castellan of Sandomir and treasurer of Sigismund I (*f.* 1527), 319  
 Tabriz, 152, 483n, 503, 590, 1097f.  
 Taddeo de' Gaddi, archbishop of Cosenza 1535–1561, cardinal 1557–1561: 733, 736  
 Taghri Berdi, Mamluk dragoman in 1506: 20ff., 23, 26, 29f., 32  
 Tagliacozzo, 260  
 Tagus river, 744, 915  
 Tahmāsp I, shah or "sophi" of Persia 1524–1576: 384, 503, 562, 582, 590ff., 622, 645, 768, 833, 942, 1094, 1097  
 Taleazzi, Stefano, archbishop of Antivari 1473–1485, bishop of Torcello 1485–1514, titular archbishop of Patras 1485–1514 (d. 1516?), 154f., 357n  
 Talmonte, prince of, *see* Louis de la Trémouille (b. 1460, d. 1525)  
*Tametsi non est dubitandum*, Tridentine decree on clandestine marriages (1563), 818  
 Tana (Azov), 830  
 Tangier, 1095  
*Tanta est clavium*, bull of Julius II (1511), 110, 111n  
 Taranto, 586, 644, 1026; Gulf of, 895n  
 Taranto, archbishops of, *see* Francesco Armellino de' Medici 1525–1528, Antonio di Sanseverino 1528–1543, Marc' Antonio Colonna 1560–1568  
 Tarnów, 314f., 318f., 321  
 Tarnowski, John, Polish noble and soldier (b. 1488, d. 1561), 319  
 Tarquinia, 713; *see also* Corneto  
 Tarragona, archbishops of, *see* Girolamo Doria (admin.) 1533–?, Antonio Agostino 1576–1586  
 Tartaro river, 69n  
 Tasso, Bernardo, Italian poet (b. 1493, d. 1569), 826  
 Tassoni, Lucrezio, correspondent of Sigismundo d'Este in 1555: 618n  
 Tata (Dotis), 472, 479, 699f., 707, 921  
 Tatars, 150, 184n, 250n, 256n, 314, 316, 324, 356f., 365, 374, 412, 448n, 466, 830, 1068, 1087  
 Taxation, 1, 78, 178, 223, 240, 276, 412, 454, 474, 481, 505, 525, 532, 565, 595n, 642, 681, 685, 719, 771, 812f., 820, 823, 900, 909f., 921, 959, 1043  
 Taylor, John, English diplomat and master of the rolls (d. 1534), 297  
 Teano, 109; bishops of, *see* Francesco Borgia 1495–1508, Giovanni Salviati (admin.) 1531–1535  
 Tebaldeo, Giacomo, Ferrarese ambassador in Venice in 1531: 288n, 346  
 Tegernsee, 827n  
 Teldi, Francesco, merchant sent by Venice to the soldan in 1504: 19  
 Telese, 713; bishops of, *see* Giovanni Beroaldo 1548–1557, Angelo Massarelli 1557–1566  
 Temesvár (Timișoara), 556n, 570, 572ff., 584f., 590, 844, 1104; Banat of, 584, 1104  
 Tendilla, count of, *see* Inigo Lopez de Mendoza (*f.* 1560)  
 Tenos, 1101  
 Tenes, 234  
 Tenizyński (Tęczyński), Stanislaus, Polish envoy to Istanbul in 1553: 589  
 Tenos, 407n, 735, 756n, 899, 948, 971, 1080, 1102f.; bishops of (*see also* Mykonos), *see* Alessandro Scutarini 1533–1559, Marco Grimani 1559–1594?; governor of, *see* Girolamo Paruta (in 1570)

- Teramo, 292; bishops of, *see* Bartolomeo Guidiccioni 1539-1542, Giovanni Jacopo Barba 1546-1553
- Tercios*, Spanish regiments, 916, 1021
- Termes, sieur de, *see* Paul de Labarthe
- Terni, 268, 283; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Jacopo Barba 1553-1565
- Terra d' Otranto, 431n
- Terra di Lavoro, 309
- Terracina, 412, 593, 652, 656, 660, 881; bishop of, *see* Ottaviano Raverta 1545-1562
- "Tetrarchs," sculpture on the church of S. Marco in Venice, 95
- Teufel, Erasmus, baron of Gundersdorf, commander at Filakova in 1552 (d. 1552), 584
- Teuffenbach, Christoph, imperial ambassador to Istanbul in 1567-1568 (d. 1598), 921f.
- Teutonic Knights, 144
- Theater of Marcellus (in Rome), 626
- Theatines, Order of, 625n, 711f.; *see also* Geremia Isachino, Paul IV, San Silvestro, Bernardino Scotti
- Thebes, 1101
- Theiner, Augustin, historian, prefect of Vatican Archives (b. 1804, d. 1874), 827
- Theiss (Tisza) river, 570, 1103
- Thenaud, Jehan, guardian of the convent of Cordeliers in Angoulême and companion of André Le Roy ca. 1512: 27f.
- Théroutanne, 596
- Thessalonica (Saloniki), 542; *and see* Macarius, "archbishop" in 1551
- Thomas Aquinas, Saint (b. ca. 1225, d. 1274), 454, 626n, 794
- Thomas de Foix, brother of Gaston; lord of Lescun, grand marshal of France 1515 (d. 1525), 166, 173, 196n, 224
- Thomas de Lazzano, captain of Gran (Esztergom) in 1533: 371
- Thomas of Canterbury, Saint (b. 1117/1118, d. 1170), 462n
- Thomists, 497
- Thouars, viscount of, *see* Louis de la Trémouille (b. 1460, d. 1525)
- Thrace, 150, 177, 591
- Thuringia, 543
- Tiber river, 3, 5, 7, 8n, 12n, 40, 155n, 234, 266, 270, 277, 281f., 310, 353, 470, 560, 626, 643, 665, 667n, 668, 687, 688n, 718f., 742, 752, 753n, 804, 1099
- Tiberias, 899n
- Ticino river, 220, 225n, 229, 285
- Tiepolo, Almorò, Venetian captain of the fuste in 1570 (d. 1597), 969
- Tiepolo, Antonio, Venetian ambassador to Spain in 1565 and 1571; baillie in Istanbul in 1573 (b. 1526, d. 1582), 843, 879, 888, 890f., 909n, 1021f., 1048n, 1062n, 1064, 1068, 1092n, 1095f.; envoy to Spain in 1572: 1079
- Tiepolo, Bajamonte, Venetian conspirator in 1310 (d. ca. 1328), 83n
- Tiepolo, Lorenzo, Venetian captain of Paphos, defender of Famagusta (d. 1571), 1017, 1027f., 1032f., 1036f., 1039, 1042
- Tiepolo, Niccolò, Venetian diplomat (d. 1551), 338n, 347, 358, 360n
- Tiepolo, Paolo, Venetian ambassador to Spain in 1559, to Rome in 1565-1568 (d. 1585), 726, 846, 907, 928, 1011n; special envoy of Venice to Rome in 1571: 1070n, 1072, 1074, 1076n, 1077, 1090, 1094
- Tiepolo, Stefano, Venetian captain-general in 1543, envoy to Istanbul ca. 1554 (d. 1557), 469, 472n, 480n, 481n, 536
- Tiepolo, Tommaso, gallej commander ca. 1510: 90, 228n
- Tighina (Bender, Bendery), Moldavian customs fortress, 444n
- Tigris river, 590
- Timar, Turkish "fef," 700
- Tintoretto, Domenico, son of Jacopo; painter (b. 1562?, d. 1635), 1100
- Tintoretto, Jacopo, Venetian painter (b. 1518, d. 1594), 1100
- Tisza river, 314, 585
- Titel, village in northern Serbia, 570
- Titian (Tiziano Vecelli), Venetian painter (b. 1477, d. 1576), 457n, 484, 631n, 1100
- Tivoli, 646, 663, 675, 717, 803, 1047
- Tlemcen, 234
- Todeschi, money-lenders in Rome, 102
- Todi, 6n, 290ff.; bishop of, *see* Federico de' Cesì 1523-1545
- Tokaj (Tokay), town in Hungary, 252, 314, 845, 921
- Tokat, 589
- Toledo, 86, 107, 237f., 369, 658, 726, 744, 751n, 774n, 846; archbishops of, *see* Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros 1495-1517, Juan Silíceo 1546-1557, Bartolomé Carranza de Miranda 1557-1576
- Toledo, Francisco, Jesuit scholar and diplomat, nominated as cardinal in 1578 (b. 1532, d. 1596), 1087
- Tolfa, alum mines at, 49, 475
- Tolommei, Claudio, Siamese humanist (b. 1492, d. 1555), 470, 471n
- Tomicki, Peter, Polish vicechancellor, bishop of Cracow 1523-1536: 313f., 316n, 317f., 320f., 324n, 325n, 335n, 341n, 352n
- Tommaso de Vio (Cajetan), Dominican general from 1508, cardinal 1517-1554, archbishop of Palermo 1518-1519; bishop of Gaeta 1519-1534: 111n, 125f., 183, 191n, 192n, 219, 392
- Tommaso di Sanfelice, bishop of La Cava 1520-1550?: 682f., 721, 772, 775n, 776
- Tomory, Paul, archbishop of Kalocza 1523-1526: 247n, 249
- Tonina, Francesco, Mantuan ambassador to Rome in 1561: 752n
- Tor di Nona (in Rome), prison, 718, 752, 753n, 754
- Toralta, Gasparo, prospective recruiter for the Holy League in 1571: 1026
- Torcello, bishops of, *see* Stefano Taleazzi 1485-1514, Girolamo di Porzia 1514-1526, Giovanni Delfino 1563-1579
- Toresti, church (in Venice), 944
- Torre Borgia (in the Vatican Palace), 528, 880, 882, 885
- Torre dell' Annona, *see* Tor di Nona
- Torre di Piazza (in Siena), 600
- Torre Massarelli (in Trent), 777n
- Torre Savella (in Rome), 718
- Torremaggiore, marquis of, *see* Gianfrancesco di Sangro (fl. 1570)
- Torrenieri, 601
- Torrente Fersina, 777n
- Torrente Nure, 261
- Torresella, prison in the doges' palace in Venice, 79
- Tortona, bishop of, *see* Uberto di Gamba 1528-1548?
- Tortosa, bishops of, *see* Hadrian Florisz (Hadrian VI) 1516-1522, Wilhelm van Enkevoirt 1523-1534
- Tosabazzi, Francesco, castellan of Mantua ca. 1564: 826
- Toscanello (Tuscania), 140, 282
- Tosinghi, Pierfrancesco, Florentine ambassador to Rome in 1511: 95n, 97f., 100, 102n, 103f., 106n, 108, 109n, 112
- Tossignano, 39
- Totila, leader of the Ostrogoths (d. 552), 274, 306
- Toul, 561, 596, 647, 708, 888, 890
- Toulon, 471f., 656, 699n, 1088; bishops of, *see* Philas Roverella 1515-1518?, Agostino Trivulzio (admin.) 1524-1535, Antonio Trivulzio 1535-1559
- Toulouse, 838; archbishops of, *see* Odet de Châtillon de Coligny (admin.) 1534-1550, Antoine de Meudon (admin.) 1550-1559, Georges d' Armagnac (admin.) 1562-1582; 1584-1585, Paul de Foix 1582-1584

- Tournai, 914  
 Tours, 91, 136; archbishop of, *see* Georges d' Armagnac (admin.) 1548–1551?  
 "Tract of 1518," 188  
 Trani, 55, 293n, 294f., 309n, 329, 331n; archbishops of, *see* Giovanni Domenico de Cupis (admin.) 1517–1551?; Gian Bernardino Scotti 1555–1559?  
 Tranquillo, secretary to Antonio Rincón in 1527: 314  
*Translatio imperii*, 716, 742  
 Translations, 496, 530n, 536, 568n, 587, 589n, 631, 694, 699, 762n  
 Transubstantiation, 453, 460, 540  
 Transylvania (German Siebenbürgen, Hungarian Erdély), 54n, 216n, 235, 248n, 252ff., 291, 292n, 312, 314, 318, 321, 342, 352n, 390, 391n, 407, 436, 442ff., 455n, 461, 466, 479, 485n, 487, 530, 546, 555f., 560, 565ff., 568ff., 571ff., 574ff., 577ff., 580f., 582n, 609, 630n, 635n, 646, 692, 698, 705, 707, 755, 771, 830, 832, 834f., 844f., 852, 865, 880, 886, 890, 899, 921f., 1015, 1098, 1103; prince of, *see* Stephen Báthory (from 1571); voivode of, *see* John Zápolya (from 1511)  
 Transylvanians, 466, 569f.  
 Trapani (in Sicily), 397, 555n, 871, 890, 1095  
 Trapesa, village northwest of Famagusta, 1035  
 Trastevere, 269ff., 272, 685  
 Traù (Trogir), 421, 423, 923, 929, 948, 953, 1026n; count of, 1100n  
 Trautesdorf, 388  
 Trebbia river, 261  
 Trebisacce, 586  
 Trebizond, 128n, 147, 156, 949n; governor of, *see* Selim I  
 Tréguier, bishops of, *see* Louis de Bourbon (admin.) 1538–1542; Ippolito d' Este (admin.) 1542–1548  
 Trent, 52, 63, 69, 74, 96, 125, 341, 405, 420, 462f., 466, 470, 482, 487ff., 490f., 493, 495, 518, 554, 603n, 611, 773f., 776, 777n, 800, 809; bishops of, *see* Johann IV Hinderbach 1466–1486, Bernhard von Cles 1514–1539, Cristoforo Madruzzo 1539–1567, Lodovico Madruzzo 1567–1600; Council of (1545–1563), 142, 309n, 397n, 432n, 443n, 462ff., 466f., 471n, 478, 480n, 481, 484, 486ff., 489ff., 492ff., 495f., 498ff., 501ff., 506, 508, 510, 513ff., 518, 520n, 526f., 529, 537ff., 540ff., 543ff., 546ff., 550, 554n, 557, 559, 561, 563, 566, 612ff., 615n, 618, 626, 682, 708n, 720, 723, 725n, 726n, 741f., 744n, 756, 758, 768ff., 771ff., 774f., 778ff., 781ff., 784ff., 787ff., 790ff., 793ff., 796ff., 799ff., 802ff., 805ff., 808ff., 811ff., 814ff., 817ff., 820ff., 825ff., 826ff., 829, 831, 834, 853n, 856n, 881, 883  
 Treviglio, 59, 61  
 Treville, 488, 497  
 Trevisan, Andrea, Venetian envoy to Milan in 1516: 161n  
 Trevisan, Angelo, Venetian captain-general of the sea in 1509: 59n, 76f.  
 Trevisan, Domenico, Venetian baillie in Istanbul ca. 1553–1554: 550n, 582, 584n, 586ff., 597n, 606, 607n  
 Trevisan, Domenico, Venetian envoy to Rome in 1509, to Egypt in 1511: 27ff., 30ff., 33, 64f., 72f., 80; captain-general of the sea in 1522: 205n, 206n, 207, 209n, 213f.  
 Trevisan, Giovanni, patriarch of Venice 1560–1590: 794  
 Trevisan, Lorenzo, secretary to Gasparo Contarini 1521–1525: 206n  
 Trevisan, Marc' Antonio, son of Domenico (*f.* 1512), 30ff., 33  
 Trevisan, Melchiorre, Venetian galley commander in 1530: 342  
 Trevisan, Michele, Venetian official in 1528: 303  
 Trevisan, Paolo, Venetian guide of Taghri Berdi in 1506: 20  
 Trevisan, Pietro, son of Domenico (*f.* 1512), 30  
 Trevisana, Venetian galley (ca. 1530), 302  
 Treviso, 55, 60, 65ff., 76, 134, 425, 547; bishops of, *see* Francesco Pisani (admin.) 1528–1538?; Giorgio Corner 1538–1577?  
 Tricarico, 294n  
 Tricquerie, Sieur de la, French agent in Istanbul ca. 1572: 840  
 Trier, archbishop of, *see* Johann von Isenburg 1547–1556  
 Trieste, 52, 63, 249, 389, 405, 421, 582, 904  
 Triesting river, 366  
 Trignano ("Tressenaner"), 261n  
 Tripoli (in Africa), 23, 85, 234, 351, 352n, 373, 396n, 553n, 555f., 560, 758ff., 762f., 765, 831, 833, 835, 857, 874, 930, 934, 943, 961, 963, 968, 1015f., 1021, 1081, 1086; sheikh of, 759n  
 Tripoli (in Syria), 21, 25, 343, 1042f.  
 Tripolitania, 86, 1093  
 Tristamo, 985  
 Trivigiani, *see* Treviso  
 Trivulzio, Agostino, bishop of Asti 1509–1519, cardinal 1517–1548, bishop of Alessano 1521–1526, of Toulon (admin.) 1524–1535, of Brugnato (admin.) 1539–1548, of Bayeux (admin.) 1541–1548: 291, 311n, 403, 413, 414n  
 Trivulzio, Antonio, bishop of Toulon 1535–1559, cardinal 1557–1559: 664, 676n, 678, 682, 689, 706  
 Trivulzio, [Gian] Anastro, bishop of Como 1487–1508, cardinal 1500–1508: 205n  
 Trivulzio, Gian Giacomo, "il Magno," Milanese commander of French troops (b. 1441, d. 1518), 68, 93f., 100, 122, 129, 135, 160  
 Trivulzio, Scaramuccia, bishop of Como 1508–1517, cardinal 1517–1527: 205n, 269n  
 Trivulzio, Teodoro, Milanese commander (b. 1474, d. 1551), 225n, 268n, 276n, 284  
 Troia, 290, 293  
 Tron, Antonio, Venetian procurator in 1509: 61f.  
 Tron, Francesco, galley commander in the expedition of 1570: 988  
 Tron, Pietro, Venetian galley commander, 766n, 982, 984n, 1005  
 Tron, Santo, Venetian galley commander, 982, 984, 988n, 1006  
 Troni, family related to Girolamo Savorgnan, 76n  
 Tronto river, 292  
 Troödos, 756, 991  
 Tropea, 1025; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Poggio 1541–1556?  
 Troy, 203n  
 Troyes, bailli of, *see* Jean de Dinteville (*f.* 1533); bishop of, *see* Louis de Guise 1545–1550?  
 Tübingen, 248n, 543  
 Tumanbey (Tūmān Bai), viceroy, then sultan of Egypt (1516–1517), 165f.  
 Tunis (Tunisia), city and kingdom of, 23, 38n, 85n, 235, 392f., 395ff., 398, 400, 405f., 412f., 431, 446, 458, 460, 472f., 535, 830, 832f., 859, 905, 961, 963, 968, 973n, 977, 984, 1000n, 1008, 1015f., 1021, 1070, 1074, 1081, 1086, 1095, 1099; Bay of, 533, 1095; Gulf of, 891, 905; kings of, *see* abū-'Abd-Allāh Muḥammad V 1494–1526, abū'l-Abbās Aḥmad III ibn-Muḥammad VI 1542–1569; Lake of, 905; ruler of, *see* Muley Hassan (from 1535)  
 Tunista, 234, 533, 560, 760, 1076f., 1095  
*Turcica*, 795; *see also* *Türkenbüchlein*  
 Turda (Hung. Torda, Germ. Thorenburg), 568n  
 Turenne, viscount of, *see* François de la Tour  
 Turin, 224, 399, 404, 457, 518n, 675f., 709, 915; bishops of, *see* Domenico della Rovere 1482–1501, Inigo de Aragona (admin.) 1563–1564?  
*Türkenbüchlein* (anti-Turkish tract), 188n, 189n, 192n, 477; *see also* *Turcica*

- Turkey, 9n, 12, 17, 53, 84, 87n, 104n, 130, 141, 156, 164n, 191, 212, 224, 235, 278, 315, 354, 368, 372n, 456, 475, 480, 481n, 630n, 692n, 696n, 710, 767, 834, 840, 874n, 912, 984, 1016, 1041, 1096
- Turkish language, 27n, 254, 516, 531, 458, 631, 662, 704n, 772n, 837, 908f., 1040, 1096
- "Turkish towers," on south Italian coast, 586, 807, 881
- Turks, 1, 4, 6n, 8ff., 11f., 14, 16f., 23n, 24f., 30, 33ff., 36ff., 39, 41f., 43n, 44, 46ff., 49f., 52ff., 55f., 58, 61, 63ff., 66f., 69n, 70ff., 73f., 77, 78n, 79n, 81, 84, 86ff., 89f., 94f., 100, 102n, 110, 114n, 120n, 121ff., 124, 130, 132, 133n, 134n, 135n, 138, 141, 142n, 145ff., 146ff., 149ff., 152ff., 155ff., 158f., 160n, 162f., 164n, 165n, 166f., 169ff., 172f., 175ff., 178f., 181, 183f., 185n, 186ff., 189f., 192ff., 195n, 196n, 197, 198n, 200ff., 204ff., 207f., 210f., 215f., 216ff., 219, 222f., 226, 227n, 230ff., 233f., 236ff., 242n, 243ff., 247ff., 250ff., 253f., 256f., 260f., 268n, 273f., 278, 280, 285, 288, 292n, 299ff., 302, 310, 312, 314f., 317f., 320ff., 324, 325n, 326n, 327f., 329n, 330ff., 333f., 336ff., 340f., 345n, 344, 345n, 346ff., 349ff., 352f., 355f., 358ff., 361n, 362ff., 365f., 368ff., 371f., 374f., 377f., 380ff., 383ff., 386ff., 389, 391f., 395f., 398, 400f., 404, 406, 408ff., 411f., 414f., 417, 419ff., 422ff., 425f., 428ff., 431f., 434ff., 437ff., 440ff., 443ff., 446f., 448n, 449f., 452f., 455, 459ff., 462ff., 466ff., 469f., 472f., 475f., 478ff., 481, 484, 486ff., 489f., 491n, 492f., 495, 500, 501ff., 504n, 527, 529ff., 533, 536ff., 539, 540, 544, 546, 549ff., 553f., 556, 559f., 562f., 566ff., 569ff., 572f., 576ff., 579ff., 582ff., 585f., 588ff., 591, 593, 594n, 596, 603, 605ff., 608ff., 622, 623n, 624, 628ff., 631, 633n, 635, 637, 645f., 647n, 650, 661f., 664n, 665ff., 668, 674, 677, 679n, 681n, 682f., 687, 690ff., 693, 694n, 696ff., 699ff., 702, 704ff., 707f., 714f., 717f., 720, 742, 748n, 750, 751n, 754ff., 758ff., 761ff., 764ff., 767f., 770f., 779, 781, 786, 789n, 790f., 795, 799f., 807, 811f., 815f., 829ff., 832ff., 835ff., 838ff., 841f., 844f., 847f., 850f., 853ff., 856ff., 859ff., 862ff., 865f., 868ff., 871f., 874f., 877, 879ff., 886ff., 889f., 893f., 896, 898ff., 901f., 904ff., 907ff., 911f., 914, 916f., 919ff., 922, 924f., 928ff., 931f., 934ff., 937f., 941f., 944ff., 947f., 950ff., 953, 954n, 955, 956n, 957f., 960ff., 963ff., 966n, 967, 969ff., 972f., 975ff., 979ff., 983f., 986f., 990ff., 993f., 996ff., 999ff., 1002, 1004ff., 1007ff., 1010f., 1013f., 1016, 1018f., 1022, 1025f., 1028ff., 1031f., 1034f., 1037f., 1040f., 1045, 1044n, 1045ff., 1048ff., 1051f., 1054f., 1057f., 1060ff., 1063f., 1066ff., 1069f., 1072ff., 1075ff., 1078f., 1081f., 1084ff., 1087f., 1090f., 1093f., 1096ff., 1099f., 1102ff.; *see also* Ottomans, Seljuks
- Tuscans, 869n
- Tuscany (Tuscia), 91, 167, 190, 257, 263f., 286f., 603, 606n, 641, 643n, 652, 677, 680, 684, 701, 722n, 736, 811, 841, 869, 871, 956, 994, 1017, 1020f., 1063n; grand dukes of, *see* Cosimo I de' Medici 1569-1574, Francesco de' Medici 1574-1587, Cosimo II de' Medici 1609-1621
- Tutavilla, Pompeo, messenger of Philip II to Rome in 1559: 729
- Typhus, 306f., 308n, 309, 494, 498f., 520n, 538, 761, 967f., 1005, 1010f., 1022
- Tyrol (Tirol), 192, 249, 435n, 491, 495, 661; marshal of, *see* Paul von Liechtenstein (cf. 2607)
- Tyrrhenian Sea, 151, 155, 170f., 200, 344, 594, 596n, 623, 630, 704n, 1100; coast of, 940
- Uberto di Gamba, bishop of Tortona 1528-1548; cardinal 1539-1549: 345n, 459n, 462n
- Ubi periculum*, constitution of Gregory X (1274), 509f., 512f., 517, 520, 730
- Udine, 60n, 66, 93n, 326n, 366n, 420, 907
- Ugento, 553
- Ugljan, island and town off the coast of Zara, 148n
- Ugo de Moncada, Spanish admiral and general, viceroys of Naples in 1527 (b. 1476; d. 1528), 242f., 248n, 255f., 258n, 259n, 285, 288, 299n, 295f., 297n, 303f.
- Ulama Beg, Persian commander of Turkish troops (*f.* 1551), 572ff., 575f., 578
- Ulm, 498
- Ulrich, son of Duke Henry and Elizabeth of Zweibrücken-Bitsch; duke (VI) of Württemberg 1503-1519; 1534-1550: 386, 417, 460
- Ulrich von Hutten, humanist and poet (b. 1488, d. 1523), 179n, 189, 190n
- Ultramontanes, 783
- Uluj-Ali (Occchiali, Kilij-Ali), Algerian corsair and "king of Algiers"; commander at Lepanto (d. 1617), 937, 961n, 973n, 983, 1008, 1018n, 1025n, 1045f., 1055ff., 1058, 1060f., 1064, 1068f., 1075f., 1080ff., 1083ff., 1091, 1094n, 1095
- Umbria, 412n, 603, 677, 742
- Umbriatico, bishop of, *see* Giovanni Piccolomini (admin.) 1524-1537
- Unitarianism, 714
- United Fratrur, 565
- United Provinces, 920; Estates General of the, 920
- Universalis gregis dominici*, bull of Paul III (1545), 486, 493
- Urania, 477n
- Urban I (Odo of Lagery), pope 1088-1099: 85, 448n
- Urban VI (Bartolomeo Prignano), pope 1378-1389: 201n
- Urban VII (Giovanni Battista Castagna), archbishop of Rossano 1553-1573; cardinal 1583-1590, pope in 1590: 778, 782, 787f., 791, 886, 887n, 904n, 910n, 912ff., 916, 917n, 918n, 941n, 957, 960n, 996f., 1013f., 1016n
- "Urban VII," *see* Bernardino de Carvajal
- Urbino, 12, 122, 139, 165n, 166f., 248, 268, 270, 273, 275n, 282n, 283n, 290, 291n, 370, 402, 411, 412n, 528, 603, 637, 640, 642n, 656f., 681, 722n, 869, 873, 1024n; bishops of, *see* Gregorio Cortese (admin.) 1542-1548, Giulio della Rovere (admin.) 1548-1551; cardinal of, *see* Giulio della Rovere; dukes of, *see* Guidobaldo da Montefeltro 1482-1508, Francesco Maria I della Rovere 1508-1516; 1521-1538, Lorenzo de' Medici 1516-1519, Guidobaldo della Rovere 1538-1574, Francesco Maria II della Rovere 1574-1631
- Ursinus Velius, Caspar, writer (b. 1493, d. 1539), 214n
- Uskoks (Uscocchi), 385, 422, 474n, 482, 531f., 608, 843f., 851, 933, 1023n, 1100
- Usury, 820
- Utienić, Gregory, father of George Utienićević (Martinuzzi), 455n
- Utraquists, 565; *see also* Communion *sub utraque specie*, Hussites
- Utrecht, 200, 914, 920n; bishop of, *see* Wilhelm van Enkevoort (admin.) 1529-1534; Union of (1579), 920
- Uzun Hasan, Turkoman ruler of Diyār-Bakr 1466-1478: 26n, 38, 342
- Vabres, bishop of, *see* Georges d' Armagnac (admin.) 1536-1548?
- Vacium (Vác, Waitzen), 436; bishops of, *see* Ladislav Szalkai 1515-1523, Stephen Broderic (in 1539)
- Vafer, Theodericus (alias Dietrich Gescheid), *scriptor brevium apostolicarum* in 1527: 274n
- Vailate, 59
- Val Camonica, 675
- Val d' Alessandria, 1052
- Val di Chiana, 597, 602
- Val d' Ocia, 597

- Valderio, Pietro, vicount of Famagusta (of an eye-witness account of the siege of Famagusta (*f.* 1570–1571), 908, 926f., 934, 954, 991, 992n, 995n, 996, 1006f., 1027ff., 1030, 1032ff., 1035ff., 1038ff., 1041f.
- Valdrino, Lodovico (Alvise), Venetian secretary in Istanbul in 1510: 83n, 88f.
- Valeggio, 77
- Valence, 27, 86
- Valence and Die, bishop of, *see* Jean de Monluc 1554–1566
- Valencia, 42, 85, 347, 632; archbishops of, *see* Érad de la Marck (admin.) 1520–1538, Francisco de Navarra 1556–1563, Martín Pérez de Ayala 1564–1566
- Valentinois, 2, 14, 27; duke of, *see* Cesare Borgia 1498–1507
- Valladolid, 66, 70, 77, 203n, 213n, 252n, 260, 268, 280, 868, 869n, 1079n
- Vallaresso, Girolamo, son of Paolo and brother of Pietro (*f.* 1536), 408n
- Vallaresso, Paolo, father of Pietro, Venetian debtor of the Turks, 407
- Vallaresso, Pietro, son of Paolo; Venetian merchant in the Levant in the 1530's, debtor to the Turks, 407ff., 410, 425, 607, 662
- Valle d' Aosta, 911
- Valletta, 351n, 854, 901n
- Valmontone, 660, 684
- Valois, dynasty in France 1328–1589: 186n, 244, 287, 394, 406, 415, 430, 460, 461n, 473, 327, 605, 618, 624, 632n, 643, 645, 648, 650n, 654ff., 704, 743, 753, 758, 840, 1088
- Valona (Avlona, Vlorë), 37, 51f., 71, 90, 182n, 233, 358n, 402, 411, 422ff., 425, 426n, 429f., 431n, 587, 607, 665, 698, 903, 906f., 911, 939, 987, 996, 1000n, 1014
- Valva (and Sulmona), bishops of, *see* Andrea della Valle (admin.) 1519–1521, Pompeo Zambecari 1547–1571
- Van, 503
- Vanga, Federico, bishop of Trent 1207–1218: 491
- Vanino de' Teodoli, Lodovico, supporter of residence at the Council of Trent in 1562: 782
- Vannes, bishops of, *see* Antonio Pucci (admin.) 1529–1547, Charles de Marillac 1550–1557
- Vannoza de' Catanei, mother of Cesare and Lucrezia Borgia (d. 1518), 272n
- "Varadino," 444n
- Varani, family associated with Camerino, 402, 743
- Varano, Ercole, rival of Guidobaldo della Rovere for Camerino in 1536: 402
- Varano, Gianmaria, son of Giulio Cesare (*f.* 1503), 12, 402
- Varano, Giulia, daughter of Giovanni Maria Varano and Caterina Cibo-Varano; wife of Guidobaldo della Rovere (d. 1547), 402
- Varano, Giulio Cesare, loses Camerino to Cesare Borgia in 1502: 12n
- Varazdin, 244n
- Vargas, Dimitri, Famagustan serving as interpreter in 1571: 1040f.
- Varna, 1075n
- Varvassi (on Chios), 895
- Vasari, Giorgio, Italian painter and architect (b. 1511, d. 1574), 623n, 1100
- Vasto (Guasto), 905; marquises of, *see* Alfonso de Ávalos (d. 1546), Fernando Francisco de Ávalos (d. 1571)
- Vatican Archives, 416f., 486n, 827, 880
- Vatican Gardens, 270, 881
- Vatican Library, 710, 849n, 880
- Vatican Palace (in Rome), 4ff., 7f., 10f., 13, 124, 126, 140, 143, 149, 200, 221f., 259, 260n, 269, 270n, 273, 399, 466, 505, 507f., 511, 513, 525, 527ff., 534f., 537, 572, 581, 602n, 615ff., 620ff., 639, 645, 648f., 651f., 655, 663, 666, 668, 670, 677, 688, 711f., 719, 722, 730f., 733, 738, 743ff., 746f., 749n, 752f., 784n, 814, 824, 876f., 880n, 881f., 884, 890, 964, 993, 1013, 1070, 1074, 1078, 1100
- Vaucelles, abbey near Cambrai, 647; truce of Vaucelles (1556), 647ff., 650, 655f., 663, 672, 675, 679n, 692f., 697, 699, 750
- Vaudémont, count of, *see* Louis de Lorraine (d. 1528)
- Vaudou, 472n
- Veglia (Krk), 608
- Velázquez, Diego Rodríguez de Silva y, Spanish painter (b. 1599, d. 1660), 920
- Velin, 483n
- Velletri, 282, 509, 617, 643, 652, 656, 663, 675, 685
- Veltyck, Gerard (Gerhard), Dutch diplomat, imperial ambassador to Istanbul (r. 1545: 479n, 480ff., 485f., 487f., 490, 493, 502, 567, 571
- Venaisian, 412
- Vendôme, cardinal of, *see* Charles de Bourbon
- Vendramin, Domenico, secretary of Alvise Pisani (d. 1528), 304
- Venetians, 1f., 4, 6f., 9n, 13, 15n, 16ff., 19ff., 22f., 25ff., 28, 30ff., 34f., 37f., 39n, 40ff., 43ff., 46, 48, 51ff., 54ff., 57f., 60ff., 63ff., 66ff., 69ff., 72n, 73ff., 76f., 79n, 80, 81, 85f., 86, 88ff., 92, 94, 97n, 98ff., 101, 102n, 104, 108ff., 110n, 115f., 117n, 122, 125, 128, 129n, 131n, 132ff., 135, 137, 141, 143f., 148, 150, 152, 155ff., 159n, 164n, 165n, 175n, 177, 179f., 184, 185n, 194, 195n, 199f., 201n, 202, 205, 207, 219n, 220f., 225f., 228f., 231f., 234, 236n, 237f., 240, 241n, 242n, 244, 246, 248, 249n, 250f., 254, 256, 258ff., 262n, 265f., 274, 276, 278, 283ff., 286f., 291f., 295, 297n, 298ff., 302, 305n, 304, 309f., 316, 322f., 325, 327, 329ff., 332f., 335n, 336ff., 339f., 342ff., 345ff., 348, 356, 357n, 358, 360, 366n, 368, 369n, 371, 376, 377n, 388, 390, 395n, 401f., 407ff., 410f., 411, 420, 422ff., 425f., 428, 430ff., 433ff., 438ff., 444f., 446n, 448n, 449n, 451, 456, 458n, 459, 462, 464f., 467f., 470, 472n, 473, 475f., 481n, 482, 483n, 485, 487, 493, 495, 503, 529ff., 532f., 536ff., 551, 553, 555, 561ff., 582, 586ff., 589, 591, 607ff., 629, 635, 637f., 643f., 647n, 654, 657, 661, 663f., 665n, 667, 669, 671, 674f., 679n, 682, 684, 695, 700f., 703, 704n, 707, 709n, 733, 742, 755, 758f., 763, 766, 770ff., 784, 808, 854n, 855n, 856, 839, 842f., 847f., 854n, 861f., 879f., 884, 888, 891ff., 894, 902, 904ff., 907f., 912f., 918, 922ff., 926, 929f., 933ff., 936, 939ff., 942ff., 945ff., 949, 951f., 955f., 958ff., 961ff., 964ff., 967ff., 970f., 973n, 976f., 979f., 983f., 985n, 989f., 992ff., 995, 998ff., 1002, 1004, 1008ff., 1011ff., 1016f., 1019f., 1022, 1024f., 1027, 1029, 1038, 1040, 1043, 1047n, 1048f., 1051f., 1057, 1059, 1061n, 1062f., 1065ff., 1069ff., 1072, 1074, 1076, 1077n, 1078ff., 1081, 1084ff., 1088ff., 1093ff., 1096ff., 1100ff., 1103ff.; *see also* Venice, Republic of
- Veneto, 34, 51, 61, 76, 83, 220, 279n, 292, 358n, 400n, 440, 469, 474f., 554, 608f., 629, 654, 674, 676, 721, 948
- Venice, city, 783; "Gulf of," *see* Adriatic Sea; patriarchs of, *see* Girolamo Querini 1524–1554, Giovanni Trevisan 1560–1590, Lorenzo Priuli 1591–1600
- "Venice, myth of," 81
- Venice, Republic of (or "of S. Mark," the "Serenissima"), 1ff., 4, 6ff., 9ff., 12f., 15ff., 18ff., 21ff., 25ff., 28ff., 31f., 33n, 34ff., 37ff., 40ff., 43ff., 47, 50n, 51ff., 54ff., 57ff., 60ff., 63ff., 66ff., 69ff., 72ff., 75ff., 78, 79n, 80ff., 83f., 85n, 87f., 88n, 89ff., 92ff., 95n, 96n, 101n, 102f., 109n, 111n, 113n, 114, 117n, 118, 122ff., 125, 127f., 130n, 132, 134ff., 139n, 141f., 145f., 148ff., 152, 154ff., 157, 159n, 163n,

- 164n, 165n, 166, 175, 176n, 177, 180, 183, 185, 186n, 187n, 191, 193n, 194ff., 197n, 198, 199n, 200f., 204f., 206n, 212n, 213n, 217ff., 220f., 224f., 227, 229, 230n, 231ff., 234, 236n, 237, 239ff., 244n, 247, 249, 251, 253n, 254, 256ff., 259f., 262n, 263n, 264ff., 267f., 270n, 272, 273n, 274f., 277ff., 280, 283ff., 286ff., 289n, 291f., 294f., 297ff., 300ff., 303f., 308, 310, 313, 319, 321, 323, 326n, 329n, 330n, 331ff., 334, 337n, 338ff., 343f., 345n, 346ff., 349, 353, 356, 358, 360f., 363, 365n, 366n, 368, 369n, 371, 377, 384n, 388, 390f., 395n, 396, 397n, 398f., 401f., 403n, 404f., 407ff., 410f., 415, 420, 421n, 422ff., 425ff., 428f., 433, 434n, 437ff., 440f., 445n, 447n, 448f., 450n, 451, 452n, 456ff., 459, 461f., 464f., 468ff., 471, 472n, 474f., 479n, 480, 483n, 485ff., 488ff., 493, 494n, 495, 501ff., 504, 506, 526n, 528n, 529, 530n, 531ff., 534n, 536ff., 539n, 550, 554ff., 557f., 560f., 567n, 576n, 578, 580n, 582, 583n, 584, 586ff., 589, 591n, 604n, 606ff., 609ff., 621f., 629ff., 633, 637f., 642, 645, 649, 652ff., 655, 657f., 661ff., 664f., 667ff., 670ff., 673ff., 676, 677n, 678n, 679n, 680ff., 684, 685n, 686ff., 689, 690n, 691n, 692ff., 695f., 698n, 700, 701n, 702f., 704n, 705, 707n, 709n, 710, 715, 717, 718n, 720, 722n, 742, 744n, 745, 746n, 749f., 755f., 763, 766f., 771f., 783n, 784f., 795, 801n, 808, 812, 815, 818f., 824n, 826, 830ff., 834, 837, 840, 842ff., 845f., 848ff., 851, 861, 878ff., 888, 890ff., 894, 898n, 899n, 901, 903ff., 906ff., 909n, 913, 918f., 921ff., 924ff., 927ff., 930, 932ff., 935ff., 938ff., 941ff., 944ff., 947ff., 950ff., 953ff., 956n, 957ff., 960ff., 963ff., 966ff., 969ff., 972ff., 975f., 980f., 982n, 983, 986ff., 989ff., 992f., 994n, 995n, 997ff., 1000n, 1001f., 1004f., 1006n, 1007ff., 1010ff., 1013ff., 1016, 1018f., 1020n, 1022f., 1025, 1027, 1034ff., 1043n, 1044n, 1045ff., 1048n, 1049, 1055, 1057, 1059ff., 1062f., 1065ff., 1069, 1070n, 1071ff., 1074f., 1076n, 1077, 1079f., 1086f., 1089n, 1090ff., 1093, 1096f., 1099ff., 1102ff.; doges of, *see* Michele Steno 1400-1415, Nicolò Marcello 1473-1474, Leonardo Loredan 1501-1521, Antonio Grimani 1521-1523, Andrea Gritti 1523-1538, Pietro Lando (from 1538), Francesco Donato 1545-1553, Francesco Venier 1554-1556, Lorenzo Priuli 1556-1559, Girolamo Priuli 1559-1567, Pietro Loredan 1567-1570, Alvise Mocenigo 1570-1577, Sebastiano Venier 1577-1578, Leonardo Donato 1606-1612, Marc' Antonio Giustinian 1684-1688, Francesco Morosini (from 1688)
- Venier, Domenico, Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1526: 240n, 242, 254n, 255ff., 258ff., 260n, 266f., 270n, 281, 282n
- Venier, Francesco, Venetian ambassador to Rome ca. 1543: 469n; doge 1554-1556: 602n, 608n, 609n, 621, 629, 638, 647, 652
- Venier, Gabriele, Venetian ambassador to Milan in 1530, to Rome in 1543: 298n, 338n, 469
- Venier, Giovanni (Zuan) Antonio, Venetian ambassador to France in 1531: 346, 359, 361n; ambassador to Rome in 1547: 504n
- Venier, Marc' Antonio, Venetian ambassador to Milan in 1524 and 1525, to England in 1527: 234, 231, 254n, 255n, 259n, 265, 288; Venetian ambassador to Rome in 1531: 352, 357, 359n
- Venier, Pelegrin, Venetian observer in 1510: 85; letter of, to Andrea Gritti in 1525: 235
- Venier, Sebastiano, Venetian captain-general, doge 1577-1578 (b. ca. 1496, d. 1578): 361n, 935, 965, 974f., 987, 989, 991, 1001, 1005, 1006n, 1009n, 1010, 1013f., 1015n, 1016f., 1021ff., 1024n, 1025ff., 1045ff., 1048, 1049n, 1050ff., 1054f., 1057ff., 1060, 1064ff., 1069f., 1072ff., 1078, 1100n
- Venosa, 293n; bishop of, *see* Álvaro de la Quadra 1542-1552
- Ventura, papal police chief (fl. 1552), 593n
- Venturi, Scipione, rector of the Spedale di S. Maria della Scala in Siena in 1554: 604n
- Venzone, 261
- Verallo, Girolamo, bishop of Bertinoro 1540-1541, of Caserta 1541-1544, archbishop of Rossano 1544-1549/1550?, cardinal 1549-1555, bishop of Capaccio 1549-1553?: 482n, 484n, 489, 498, 509n, 515, 521n, 558, 560f., 613
- Verantius [Vrančić], Anton, bishop of Fünfkirchen 1554-1560, of Erlau 1560-1567, archbishop of Gran 1570-1573: 921f.
- "Verbonia," *see* Vrh Bosna (Sarajevo)
- Vercelli, 96, 110, 709, 851; bishops of, *see* Bonifazio Ferreri 1509-1511, Guido Luca Ferreri (admin.) 1562-1572
- Verdun, 561, 596, 647, 708, 888, 890; bishops of, *see* Jean de Lorraine (admin.) 1523-1544, Nicole Paulme 1548-1575
- Vergerio, Pietro Paolo (the Younger), jurist and reformer, bishop of Modrus 1536, of Capodistria 1536-1549 (b. 1498, d. 1565): 219n, 370n, 371n, 374n, 384f., 387ff., 390f., 397n, 400n, 403ff., 406, 413, 416ff., 421n, 422, 432, 437
- Vergil, Polydore (P. V. Castellensis), *see* Polydore Vergil
- Vernaucular, 1, 142, 496, 735, 792; *and see* individual languages
- Veroli, 660; cardinal of, *see* Ennio Filonardi
- Verona, 30, 52, 55, 60ff., 69n, 72, 74, 76f., 90, 93, 96, 134f., 148n, 149f., 160, 257n, 279, 283, 404, 420, 537, 547n, 609, 628n, 657, 674n, 675, 825, 950, 971, 982n, 1049, 1103n; bishops of, *see* Marco Corner (admin.), 1503-1524, Giovan Matteo Giberti 1524-1545, Alvise Lipomano 1548-1557?, Bernardo Navagero (admin.) 1562-1565?
- Veronese (area), 69, 220, 680, 1087, 1092n
- Veronese, Paolo, painter (b. 1528, d. 1588), 1100
- Veronesi, 62
- Verucchio, 39
- Vervins, peace of (1598), 633
- Vesuviani, supporters of ecclesiastical authority on Chios, 893
- Vespasian of Zara, son of Jerome (fl. 1533), 371ff., 382n
- Veszprém, 584f., 921; bishops of, *see* Peter Berizilo 1513-1520, Paulus de Varda 1521-1526, Thomas Zalazhzy 1526-1529
- Vetralla, 275
- Vettori, Francesco, Florentine historian (b. 1474, d. 1539), 131n, 132n, 143, 162n, 269n
- Via Appia, 398
- Via del Palazzo (in Rome), 6
- Via della Conciliazione (in Rome), 5n
- Via Flaminia, 270, 275
- Via Garibaldi (in Rome), 270n
- Via Giulia (in Rome), 140, 353
- Via Larga (in Florence), 133
- Via Lata (Corso), in Rome, 270, 272
- Via Lata (Via Belenzani), in Trent, 776
- Via Latina, 290
- Via Panisperna, in Rome, 273
- Via San Vitale (in Ravenna), 96n
- Viana, 14
- Vicentino, Andrea, painter in Venice in the late sixteenth century, 1100
- Vicenza, 52, 55f., 60, 62, 68f., 72, 74ff., 93, 116n, 122n, 134f., 148n, 150, 275, 279, 344n, 420f., 427, 440, 460, 463, 486, 501, 770; battle of (1513); bishops of, *see* Sisto Gara della Rovere (admin.) 1507-1509, Francesco della Rovere 1509-1514, Francesco Soderini 1514-1524, Niccolò Ridolfi (admin.) 1524-1550?, Giulio della Rovere 1560-1565?, Matteo Priuli 1565-1579?
- Vico, 304
- Vicolo Colico (in Trent), 782

- Vicovaro, town northeast of Tivoli in central Italy, **663, 675**  
 Vicus Pellegrini, street in Rome near Campo dei Fiori, 111n  
 Vidin, **1102**
- Vienna, 190, 251n, 302, 315, 319, 323f., 327n, 332, 349, 355,  
 357, 361n, 365f., 368, 370n, 371n, 372ff., 375, 376n,  
 379n, 381n, 382ff., 385, 387n, 390, 391n, 403, 405, 413,  
 414n, 415n, 416n, 420f., 422n, 433n, 435n, 436n, 443f.,  
 448n, 459n, 463n, 465ff., 471, 478, 483, 487n, 488, 490n,  
 546n, 548n, 568n, **569, 571, 572n, 574n, 575f., 580n,**  
**591, 608, 629, 633n, 700, 717f., 766, 772f., 792, 804,**  
**812n, 835, 844, 887n, 912, 922, 931, 935, 953n, 1023,**  
**1027n, 1043n, 1064, 1066, 1071, 1087, 1094f., 1098;**  
 bishops of, *see* Johann Fabri 1530–1539; Friedrich Nausa,  
 1539–1552; siege of (1529), 301n, 322n, 324n, 325f.,  
 327n, 328f., 330n, 341n, 346, 348, 350n, 352, 354, 378,  
**585;** siege of (1683), 326n, **1099, 1101**
- Vienne, archbishop of, *see* Charles de Marillac 1550–1557
- Vieste, 293, **607;** bishop of, *see* Ugo Boncompagni (Gregory  
 XIII) 1558–1560?
- Vietri, 296
- Vigevano, 285
- Vigilius ab Aytta (Wigle van Aytta), Dutch jurist and statesman  
 (b. 1507, d. 1577), **918**
- Vignoso, Simone, Genoese admiral, conqueror of Chios (in  
 1346), **893**
- “Villa Madama,” begun by Giulio de’ Medici (Clement VII),  
 in Rome, 529
- Villa Maser, built by Daniele and Marc’ Antonio Barbaro *ca.*  
 1560: 936n
- Villach, 547, 564, **582**
- Villafranca di Forlì, 264
- Villamagna, 904f.
- Villefranche-sur-Mer, Ital. Villafranca, 204, 471, **701**
- Villers-Cotterêts, **840**
- Villers, M. de, French envoy to Venice in 1521: 199n
- Vilna (Vilnius), Germ. Wilna, Pol. Wilno, 208n, 317, 319, 321
- Vincenzo da Treviso, author of a letter written in Rome in  
 1527: 283n
- Violante, wife of Pandolfo Malatesta (*fl.* 1503), 13
- Virton, 195
- Virginia della Rovere, daughter of Guidobaldo II and Giulia  
 Varano; wife of Federico Borromeo from 1560: **739, 740n,**  
**743**
- Visbroc (Vischbroek), Johann, secretary of Cardinal Morone  
 in 1555: 603n
- Visegrád, 355n
- Viseu, 517n; bishops of, *see* Miguel de Silva 1526–1547?, Ales-  
 sandro Farnese (admin.) 1547–1552?
- Visitations, **813, 819**
- Vistula river, 321
- Vitelli (Vitiello), Alessandro, condottiere hired by Venice in  
 1537: 425n; imperialist officer in 1549: 505
- Vitelli, Chiappino, Italian commander (*fl.* 1565, 1567), **869,**  
**871, 872n, 874, 916**
- Vitelli, Vincenzo, supporter of Giannandrea Doria in 1571:  
 1069n
- Vitelli, Vitellozzo, adherent of the Orsini (d. 1503), 12n
- Vitelli, Vitellozzo, bishop of Città di Castello 1554–1560, car-  
 dinal 1557–1568, bishop of Imola (admin.) 1560–1561?,  
 of Carcassonne (admin.) 1567–1568: **687, 711f., 725, 732,**  
**734ff., 737f., 755, 865**
- Vitellius, Erasmus, bishop of Płock 1503–1522: 36n
- Viterbo, 140, 161f., 206n, 215n, 224, 268, 272, 275f., 282f.,  
 284n, 294, 298n, 299f., 307, 309ff., 320, 445n, 598f.,  
**601, 646;** bishops of, *see* Sebastiano Gualterio 1551–1565,  
 Gian Francesco di Gamba (admin.) 1566–1576?; treaty  
 of (1515), 161n; *and see* Egidio Canisio
- Victoria, 201
- Vittoria, Alessandro, Italian sculptor (b. 1524, d. 1608), 21n,  
**1099**
- Vittoria della Tolfa, *see* Elisabetta Carafa
- Vituri, Giovanni, Venetian provviditore in 1524 and 1526:  
 233, 257n, 264
- Vives, Juan Luis, Spanish humanist and philosopher (b. 1492,  
 d. 1540), 250n, 406
- Vlachs, *see* Wallachians
- Volterra, bishops of, *see* Francesco Soderini 1478–1509, Fran-  
 cesco della Rovere 1514–1530, Giovanni Salviati (admin.)  
 1530–1532
- Volto Santo (at S. Peter’s), 283
- Vonitza, **1103**
- Vorarlberg, **743**
- Vrh Bosnia (Sarajevo), 88
- Waidhofen an der Ybbs, town southwest of Vienna, 366n
- Waldensians, heretical sect, 113
- Wallachia, 54, 205n, 246n, 390, 442, 530, **566, 921, 1087,**  
**1105f.**
- Wallachians (Vlachs), 37, 84, 99, 179, 209, 356f., 365, 412n,  
**790, 1087**
- Walloon, 1020n
- Walpo (Valpovo), 433n
- Walter, Hans, leader of the duke of Alva’s German mercenaries  
*ca.* 1557: **677**
- Warasdin (Varaždin), 415n, 444n
- Warmia (Polish Warmja, German Ermland), **825;** bishop of,  
*see* Stanislaus Hosius 1551–1570?
- Warsaw, 341n, **938, 1087, 1088n**
- Warta river, 312
- Wartburg, 298n
- Wawel Hill, site of the royal palace in Cracow, 314
- Weingarten, abbot of, *see* Gerwick Blarer (d. 1567)
- Weixelberger, Sigismund, envoy of Ferdinand of Hapsburg to  
 Istanbul in 1528: 254, 381
- Welser, banking family of Augsburg, 102
- Wiecwieński, John, castellan of Płock in 1530: 541n
- Wiener Neustadt, 365f., 437n; bishop of, *see* Gregory Langer  
 1531–1548
- Wilhelm, son of Albrecht IV and Cunigunde, daughter of  
 Frederick III; duke of Bavaria (b. 1493, d. 1550), 435
- Wilhelm van Enkevoirt, datary of Hadrian VI, bishop of Tortosa  
 1523–1534, cardinal 1523–1534, bishop of Utrecht (ad-  
 min.) 1529–1534: 220, 239n, 337, 392
- Wilhelm von Roggendorff, lord-high-steward of Ferdinand of  
 Austria (b. 1481, d. 1541), 367n, 422
- William of Ockham, Franciscan theologian (d. 1349), 454
- William of Orange (William the Silent), son of William I of  
 Nassau-Dillenburg and Juliane of Stolberg-Wernigerode;  
 prince of Orange from 1545 (b. 1533, d. 1584), **914, 919**
- Winchester, **644**
- Windmills, the (at Malta), **856, 863f., 874**
- Windmills, Tower of (at Rhodes), 206, 215
- Windsor, treaty of (1522), 219n
- Wittelsbachs, Bavarian ducal family 1180–1918: 354
- Wittenberg, 229n, 354, 405, 415, 452f., 460, 541, **565, 795;**  
 capitulation of (1547), 484
- Włocławek (Wladislawien, Leslau), 318n; bishops of, *see* Mat-  
 thias Drzewicki 1513–1531, John Drohojowski 1551–1557
- Wolder, Simon, advocate of the crusade, 189
- Wolsey, Thomas, bishop of Lincoln in 1514, archbishop of  
 York 1514–1530, cardinal 1515–1530, lord chancellor of  
 England 1515–1529: 132n, 160n, 165n, 183, 185f., 193n,  
 194n, 200n, 206n, 219n, 231f., 236n, 237n, 240f., 248,  
 255, 265, 288, 321, 328



- Worcester, bishop of, *see* Silvestro de' Gigli 1498–1521
- Worms, 298n, 480n, 484n, 487ff., 557n; colloquies of (1540, 1557), 713; diet of (1521), 192n, 195, 199n, 298n
- Württemberg, 386, 387n, 460, 545, 557; Confession of (1552), 543; dukes of, *see* Ulrich VI 1503–1519; 1534–1550, Christopher 1550–1568
- Württembergers, 544, 788n
- Würzburg, 416, 548n, 766
- Wyclif, John, English reformer (d. 1384), 454
- Wycliffites, 113
- Yahya Pasha, sanjakbey of Bosnia in 1513: 155
- Yesil Irmak (ancient Iris), river in Asia Minor, 589
- York, archbishops of, *see* Christopher Bainbridge 1508–1514, Thomas Wolsey 1514–1530
- Yunus, renegade Christian from Verona; chief dragoman of al-Ashraf Kāshūf al-Ghūrī in 1512: 50
- Yunus, subashi and lieutenant of Kasim Pasha in 1540: 449n
- Yunus Beg, Turkish envoy in Venice in 1522, 1529–1530, 1539–1553: 331ff., 334f., 338, 372, 378, 380, 382f., 384n, 386, 407f., 409f., 422, 424f., 461n, 464, 465n
- Yves d'Alègre, French envoy to Rome in 1563: 806n
- Zaffardo, Cristoforo, father of Niccolò, 263n
- Zaffardo, Niccolò, visitor to Ferrara in 1527: 263
- Zagreb, 244; bishops of, *see* Simon de Zereni-Erdved 1519–1543, Paul Gregoriancz 1550–1554?, Georg Drasković 1564–1578
- Zagyva river, 585
- Zalaházy, Thomas, bishop of Veszprém 1526–1529, of Erlau 1529–1537: 565
- Zambecari, Alessandro, commander in the expedition of 1570: 982n
- Zambecari, Pompeo, bishop of Valva and Sulmona 1547–1571: 822
- Zanchi, Basilio, of Bergamo, humanist (b. 1501, d. 1558), 710
- Zane, Bartolommeo, Venetian (*fl.* 1528), 303
- Zane, Bernardino, archbishop of Spalato 1503–1524: 123f.
- Zane, Girolamo, Venetian bailie in 1543: 439n, 464n, 465n, 467n, 468n; captain-general of the sea in the expedition of 1570: 904, 925, 926n, 935, 948, 953ff., 959, 961f., 964, 965n, 967ff., 970ff., 973ff., 976ff., 979ff., 982, 983n, 984ff., 987ff., 990f., 994, 1001, 1005, 1086
- Zanoguera, Juan, agent of García de Toledo in 1566: 902f.
- Zante, 23, 51, 60, 156, 199, 217, 227n, 278f., 309n, 352, 358n, 363n, 367n, 388, 402, 431, 449n, 468, 531, 536, 582, 584, 662, 700, 850f., 892n, 902f., 923, 925f., 929, 941, 947, 959, 965, 975, 978, 985, 989, 1008, 1021n, 1023, 1025n, 1045, 1050, 1052n, 1073, 1082ff., 1085f., 1091, 1102; bishop of, *see* Giovanni Francesco Commendone 1555–1560?
- Zanthani, Vincenzo, Venetian bailie in Istanbul in the 1540s: 468n
- Zápolya, John, son of the palatine Stephen Zápolya and Hedwig of Teschen; voivode of Transylvania 1511, king of Hungary 1526–1540: 216n, 217n, 235, 244n, 250ff., 253, 256n, 258, 261, 278n, 291, 292n, 300ff., 312ff., 315f., 318ff., 321ff., 324f., 326n, 327, 329n, 332, 334f., 337n, 338ff., 341f., 346, 347n, 348ff., 354, 357, 360f., 363, 364n, 369ff., 372f., 375ff., 378, 381, 383, 386f., 390f., 404ff., 412, 413n, 422n, 434, 436f., 440, 442ff., 445n, 447, 455, 458, 466, 479, 487, 530, 565ff., 568f., 571, 577, 650n, 835n, 1013, 1015; wife of, *see* Isabella, daughter of Sigismund I and Bona Sforza 1539–1540 (d. 1559)
- Zara (mod. Zadar), 45, 59n, 60, 84, 148n, 193n, 361, 421n, 423, 469, 485n, 533n, 923, 929, 932, 936n, 947, 955ff., 961, 967, 969ff., 974, 987f., 991, 1002n, 1005n, 1010, 1022n, 1025f., 1073; archbishop of, *see* Francesco Pesaro 1505–1550
- Zaratina, Venetian galley, 425f.
- Zawilah gate (Cairo), 166
- Zecca, mint in Venice, 958
- Zeeland, 910, 920n, 1078f.
- Zeitz, 417n
- Zen, Carlo, son of Pietro; Venetian vice-bailie in Istanbul in 1523–1524: 218
- Zen, Caterino, Venetian envoy to Uzun Hasan in 1471–1472: 26n
- Zen, Pietro (Piero), son of Caterino, Venetian consul at Damascus, vicebailie and envoy in Istanbul (d. 1539), 25f., 31ff., 71n, 217f., 258, 278f., 300, 302f., 324n, 332, 333n, 336, 338, 340ff., 343, 344n, 356, 358, 368, 371, 372n, 377, 380, 383, 388, 448n, 607n
- Zeno, Caterino, Venetian envoy to Istanbul in 1550: 530n, 534n, 550n
- Zenta, battle of (1697), 1102f.
- Zia, 899; lords of (along with Andros), *see* Sommaripa
- Zionism, 899n
- Ziyānids (Zayānids), Berber dynasty of kings of Tlemcen 1236–1554: 254
- Znojmo (Znaim), 317
- Zonchio, 371
- "Zoppetta, La," cell in the Tor di Nona, 752
- Zorzi, Andrea, of San Marcuola, father of Girolamo (d. by 1509), 61
- Zorzi, Girolamo, Venetian associate of the Turks (*fl.* 1509), 61
- Zorzi, Marino, bishop of Brescia 1596–1631: 1100
- Zorzi (Giorgi), Marino, Venetian ambassador in Rome 1515–1517: 155n, 164, 167, 172n, 197n
- Zrinyi, Nicholas, Count, defender of Sziget against the Turks (b. ca. 1508, d. 1566), 679n, 845f.
- Zaitva creek, 1097n
- Zaitvorok, treaty of (1606), 1097f.
- Zuccantini, Claudio, Italian revolutionary in 1554: 599
- Zuccaro, Taddeo, of a Milanese painter (b. 1529, d. 1566), 661n
- Zwingli, Huldreich (Ulrich), Swiss reformer (b. 1484, d. 1531), 542, 791
- Zwinglians, 353, 453, 539f., 565, 633n



THE PAPACY

and

THE LEVANT

(1204-1571)

Volume IV

The Sixteenth Century

from Julius III to Pius V

THIS is the last of four volumes which trace the history of the later Crusades and papal relations with the Levant from the accession of Innocent III (in 1198) to the reign of Pius V and the battle of Lepanto (1566-1571). From the mid-fourteenth century to the conclusion of his work the author has drawn heavily upon unpublished materials, collected in the course of more than twenty "palaeographical journeys" to the Archivio Segreto Vaticano and the Archivi di Stato in Venice, Mantua, Modena, Milan, Siena, Florence, and the Archives of the Order of the Hospitallers at Malta.

Mr. Setton has recently retired as professor of history at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. He has twice won the John Frederick Lewis Prize of the American Philosophical Society (1957, 1984), and has received the Premi Catalònia from the Institut d'Estudis Catalans in Barcelona (1976), the Prix Gustave Schlumberger from the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in Paris (1976), the John Gilmary Shea Prize from the American Catholic Historical Association (1979), and the Haskins Medal from the Mediaeval Academy of America (1980). In 1979 he was awarded an honorary degree by the University of Kiel in Germany.

THE AMERICAN  
PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY  
104 South Fifth Street  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

# THE PAPACY AND THE LEVANT (1204-1571)

## Vol. I. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

CONTENTS: (1) Innocent III, the Fourth Crusade, and the Establishment of the Latin States in Greece. (2) The Apogee of the Latin Empire under Henry of Hainaut (1206-1216). (3) The Changing Fortunes of Constantinople and Achaia, Epirus and Nicaea (1216-1246). (4) The Advance of Nicaea and the Decline of the Latin Empire (1246-1259). (5) Pelagonia, the Loss of Constantinople, and the Rise of the Angevins (1259-1268). (6) The Papal Interregnum, Gregory X, and the Second Council of Lyon (1268-1274). (7) The Holy See, Greek Opposition, and the Failure of Church Union (1276-1282). (8) The Sicilian Vespers and a Century of Angevin Decline (1282-1383). (9) The Avignonese Papacy, the Crusade, and the Capture of Smyrna (1309-1345). (10) Clement VI, Humbert of Viennois, and the End of the Smyrniote Crusade (1345-1352). (11) Pierre Thomas and Peter I of Cyprus, the Crusade and the Revolt of Crete (1352-1364). (12) The Sack of Alexandria and the Restoration of Peace with Egypt (1365-1370). (13) The Crusade of Amadeo VI of Savoy, John V Palaeologus in Rome and Venice (1366-1371). (14) The Crusades of Barbary (1390) and Nicopolis (1396). (15) Manuel II, Marshal Boucicaut, and the Clash between Venice and Genoa. (16) The Athenian Church and Lordship under the Burgundians (1204-1308). (17) The Catalans and Florentines in Athens to the End of the Fourteenth Century.

MEMOIRS of the American Philosophical Society  
Vol. 114, 512 pp. Cloth. ISBN 0-87169-114-0 \$40.00

---

# THE PAPACY AND THE LEVANT (1204-1571)

## Vol. II. The Fifteenth Century

CONTENTS: (1) Venice and the Latin Failure to Halt the Ottoman Advance in Greece (1402-1451). (2) Martin V and Eugenius IV, Constance and Ferrara-Florence, Opposition to Murad II. (3) The Crusade of Varna and its Aftermath (1444-1453). (4) The Siege and Fall of Constantinople (1453). (5) Perils and Problems after the Fall of Constantinople (1453-1455). (6) Calixtus III and the Siege of Belgrade, Mehmed II and Albania (1455-1458). (7) Pius II, the Congress of Mantua, and the Turkish Conquest of the Morea (1458-1461). (8) Pius II, the Crusade, and the Venetian War against the Turks. (9) Paul II, Venice, and the Fall of Negroponte (1464-1471). (10) Sixtus IV and the Turkish Occupation of Otranto (1471-1480). (11) Pierre d'Aubusson and the First Siege of Rhodes (1480). (12) Sixtus IV and the Recovery of Otranto (1480-1484). (13) Innocent VIII, Jem Sultan, and the Crusade (1484-1490). (14) Innocent VIII and Alexander VI, Charles VIII and Ferrante I (1490-1494). (15) Alexander VI and Charles VIII, the French Expedition into Italy (1494-1495). (16) The French in Naples, the League of Venice, and Papal Problems (1495-1498). (17) The Diplomatic Revolution: France and Spain, the Papacy and Venice (1498-1503).

ISBN 0-87169-162-0



9 780871 691620