



KING MITHRADATES II

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A POLITICAL HISTORY OF PARTHIA

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PREFACE

IN 1873 George Rawlinson published his *Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy*. Since that time no other extensive study devoted to Parthia has been written, although Rawlinson's admirable work did not include all of the classical references and obviously does not include the new source material which has since appeared. Because of these facts it was felt advisable to insert in this volume extensive references, both old and new, to the source material for the political history. The large amount of evidence for the cultural history of Parthia from Dura-Europus and Seleucia on the Tigris now in press and in preparation makes discussion of the cultural aspects inadvisable at present. This must be reserved for some future work on Parthia where the necessity of less documentation will allow of fuller interpretation of the political side of Parthia and the presentation of the new cultural material.

The present study was begun in 1927 as a dissertation at the University of Illinois under the direction of Professor A. T. Olmstead, now Oriental Institute Professor of Oriental History in the University of Chicago. It has been rewritten more than once since the writer came to the University of Chicago in 1929—a task which has been interrupted at intervals by

four seasons of excavating in the Near East. The work owes much more than appears in the footnotes to the advice and support of Professor Olmstead, who has furnished encouragement, friendly criticism, and references on many obscure points.

Dr. Robert H. McDowell of the University of Michigan by voluminous letters written in the press of field work and by frequent conversations has been of great assistance. The manuscript was read at Seleucia by Professor Clark Hopkins of the same institution, and many of his suggestions are embodied in the text. Professor Arthur E. R. Boak, also of Michigan, read through the galleys and gave freely of his time during the preparation of the manuscript.

For aid in specialized fields Dr. G. G. Cameron, Dr. Raymond A. Bowman, and Dr. Waldo H. Dubberstein, all of the Oriental Institute, were of great assistance; and many other members of the staff have at one time or another rendered aid.

The painstaking work of Dr. T. G. Allen, one of the editors of the Institute's publications, has eliminated many inconsistencies and infelicities of English. In the final preparation of the manuscript Miss Elizabeth Stefanski has been of great assistance. Members of the Chinese section of the Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures have kindly helped in standardizing the spelling of Chinese names. Both my wife and the editorial staff of the Oriental Institute have spent many hours in working on the manu-

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script and in proofreading and indexing. The librarians of the University of Illinois and of the Oriental Institute and the Classics Library at the University of Chicago have been very helpful.

Finally, the whole project was made possible by the late Professor James Henry Breasted, first director of the Oriental Institute, who was never too busy to hear and encourage a young scholar, and by his successor, Professor John A. Wilson, who together have made it possible to devote the time necessary to the preparation of this study.

The portrait of King Mithradates II used as a frontispiece is reproduced about three times original size from a silver drachm in my own collection.

NEILSON C. DEBEVOISE

July 29, 1937

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ABBREVIATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, references to classical authors are to the "Loeb Classical Library" editions.

Acad. des inscr. et Académie royale des inscriptions et belles-
belles-lettres, lettres, *Mémoires de littérature*, t. L
Mém. de litt., L (Paris, 1808)

- A. E. Arsacid era
- AJA* *American Journal of Archaeology* (Baltimore, etc., 1885—)
- AJSL* *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (Chicago, etc., 1884—)
- AMI* *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* (Berlin, 1929—)
- Amm. Marcel. AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS
- Ampelius LUCIUS AMPELIUS *Liber memorialis*, ed. ERWIN ASSMANN (Lipsiae, 1935)
- Année épig.* *L'Année épigraphique* (Paris, 1880-87; later included in *Revue archéologique*)
- Ann. Rep. Archaeol. Survey of India* India. Archaeological Survey, *Annual Report* (Calcutta, 1904—)
- Anthol. Palat.* *Anthologia Palatina*
- APAW* Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, *Abhandlungen* (Berlin, 1746-1907), and *idem*, philos.-hist. Klasse, *Abhandlungen* (Berlin, 1908—)

Appian <i>Bell. civ.</i>	APPIANUS <i>Bella civilia</i>
<i>Mith.</i>	<i>Mithridatica</i>
<i>Syr.</i>	<i>Syriaca</i>
<i>Archiv or.</i>	<i>Archiv orientální</i> (Praha, 1929—)
Aristides <i>Or. sac.</i>	AELIUS ARISTIDES <i>Orationes sacrae</i> , ed. GUILIELMUS DINDORFIUS (Lipsiae, 1829)
art.	article
Asin. Quad.	ASINIUS QUADRATUS <i>Parthica</i> (frs. in <i>FHG</i> and J)
Athen. <i>Deip.</i>	ATHENAEUS <i>Deipnosophistae</i>
A.U.C.	<i>anno urbis conditae</i>
<i>Babyl. and Or. Rec- ord</i>	<i>The Babylonian & Oriental Record</i> (London, etc., 1887-1901)
<i>Berl. philol. Wo- chenschr.</i>	<i>Philologische Wochenschrift</i> (Berlin and Leipzig, 1881—; called <i>Berliner philo- logische Wochenschrift</i> , 1884-1920)
<i>Bull. School of Or. Studies</i>	London. University. School of Oriental Studies, <i>Bulletin</i> (London, 1917—)
Caesar <i>Bell. civ.</i>	C. JULIUS CAESAR <i>Bellum civile</i>
<i>Bell. Gall.</i>	<i>Bellum Gallicum</i>
CAH	<i>The Cambridge Ancient History</i> (Cambridge, Eng., 1923—)
Capit.	JULIUS CAPITOLINUS (in "Scriptores histo- riae Augustae")
CHI	<i>The Cambridge History of India</i> (New York, 1922—)

ABBREVIATIONS

Cicero <i>De div.</i>	M. TULLIUS CICERO <i>De divinatione</i>
<i>De domo sua</i>	<i>Oratio de domo sua</i>
<i>Ep. ad Att.</i>	<i>Epistolae ad Atticum</i>
<i>Ep. ad fam.</i>	<i>Epistolae ad familiares</i>
<i>Manil.</i>	<i>Oratio pro lege Manilia</i>
<i>Pro rege</i>	<i>Oratio pro rege Deiotaro</i>
<i>Deiotaro</i>	
<i>Pro Scauro</i>	<i>Oratio pro Scauro</i>
CIG	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum</i> (Berolini, 1828-77; cont. as IG)
CII	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Indicarum</i> (Calcutta, 1892—)
CIL	<i>Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum</i> (Berolini, 1862—)
<i>Class. Philol.</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i> (Chicago, 1906—)
<i>Class. Rev.</i>	<i>Classical Review</i> (Boston, 1887—)
Claudian <i>Paneg. tertio (etc.) cons. Hon.</i>	CLAUDIUS CLAUDIANUS <i>Panegyricus de tertio (etc.) consulatu Honorii Augusti</i>
CR	Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, <i>Comptes rendus des séances</i> (Paris, 1858—)
CSCO Syr.	"Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium." <i>Scriptores Syri</i> (Parisiis, 1903—)
Dessau	HERMANN DESSAU, <i>Inscriptiones Latinae selectae</i> (Berolini, 1892-1916), cited by number
Dio Cass.	CASSIUS DIO COCCEIANUS

ABBREVIATIONS

Diod. Sic.	DIODORUS SICULUS, ed. CAROLUS MÜLLERUS (Parisiis, 1855)
<i>Encyc. Brit.</i>	<i>Encyclopaedia Britannica</i> (14th ed.; London and New York, 1929)
<i>Epig. Ind.</i>	<i>Epigraphia Indica</i> (Calcutta, 1892—)
Euseb. <i>Chron.</i>	EUSEBIUS PAMPHILI <i>Chronicon</i> ("Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte." Euseb. V, ed. JOSEF KARST [Leipzig, 1911])
<i>Hist.</i>	<i>Ecclesiasticae historiae</i> ("Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller" Euseb. II, 1, ed. EDUARD SCHWARTZ and THEODOR MOMMSEN [Leipzig, 1903])
Eutrop. <i>Brev.</i>	EUTROPIUS <i>Breviarium historiae Romanae</i> , ed. FRANCISCUS RUEHL (Lipsiae, 1887)
FHG	<i>Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum . . .</i> , ed. CAROLUS MÜLLERUS (Parisiis, 1848-74)
fr.	fragment
Frontinus <i>Strat.</i>	SEXTUS JULIUS FRONTINUS <i>Strategematon</i>
Fronto <i>De bell. Parth.</i>	M. CORNELIUS FRONTO <i>De bello Parthico</i>
<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistolae</i>
<i>Princ. hist.</i>	<i>Principia historiae</i>
Gellius <i>Noct. Att.</i>	AULUS GELLIUS <i>Noctes Atticae</i>

ABBREVIATIONS

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Grattius	GRATTIUS <i>Cynegeticon</i>
Herod.	HERODOTUS
Herodian	HERODIAN, ed. K. STAVENHAGEN (Lipsiae, 1922)
Horace <i>Carmen saec.</i>	Q. HORATIUS FLACCUS <i>Carmen saeculare</i>
<i>Ep.</i>	<i>Epodi</i>
<i>Epist.</i>	<i>Epistolae</i>
<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odae</i>
<i>Sat.</i>	<i>Satirae</i>
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> (Berolini, 1877—; cont. of <i>CIG</i>)
IGRR	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae ad res Romanas pertinentes</i> , ed. R. CAGNAT (Parisii, 1906—)
Isid. Char. <i>Mans.</i> <i>Parth.</i>	ISIDORUS CHARACENUS <i>Mansiones Parthicae</i> , ed. WILFRED H. SCHOFF, <i>Parthian Stations</i> , by Isidore of Charax (Philadelphia, 1914)
J	FELIX JACOBY, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin, 1923—)
JA	<i>Journal asiatique</i> (Paris, 1822—)
JAOS	American Oriental Society, <i>Journal</i> (Boston, etc., 1849—)
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i> (London, 1880—)
Joan. Antioch.	JOANNES ANTIOCHENUS (in <i>FHG</i> , IV, 535-622)
Josephus <i>Ant.</i>	FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS <i>Antiquitates Judaicae</i> , ed. B. NIESE (Berolini, 1885-95)
<i>Bell.</i>	<i>Bellum Judaicum</i> (<i>ibid.</i>)

<i>Journ. Anthropol. Inst.</i>	Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, <i>Journal</i> (London, 1872—)
JRAS	Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, <i>Journal</i> (London, 1834—)
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i> (London, 1911—)
Justin	M. JUNIANUS JUSTINUS, ed. OTTO SEEL (Lipsiae, 1935)
Juvenal <i>Sat.</i>	DECIMUS JUNIUS JUVENALIS <i>Satirae</i>
Lev.	Leviticus
Livy <i>Ann.</i>	TITUS LIVIUS <i>Annales</i> , ed. GUILIELMUS HERAEUS (Lipsiae, 1912)
<i>Epit.</i>	<i>Epitomae</i> (i.e., <i>Periochae; ibid.</i>)
Lucan <i>De bell. civ.</i>	MARCUS ANNAEUS LUCANUS <i>De bello civili</i>
Lucian <i>Alex.</i>	LUCIANUS <i>Alexander</i> , ed. CAROLUS IACOBITZ (Lipsiae, 1913-21)
<i>Long.</i>	<i>Longaevi (ibid.)</i>
<i>Quomodo hist.</i>	<i>Quomodo historia conscribenda sit (ibid.)</i>
Malalas	JOANNES MALALAS <i>Chronographia</i> ("Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae," XV [Bonnae, 1831])
Martial <i>De spect. Epig.</i>	M. VALERIUS MARTIALIS <i>De spectaculis Epigrammata</i>
MDOG	Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft, <i>Mitteilungen</i> (Berlin, 1899—)
<i>Mem. Archaeol. Survey of India</i>	India. Archaeological Survey, <i>Memoirs</i> (Calcutta, 1919—)

ABBREVIATIONS

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- Mém. Dél. en Perse* France. Délégation en Perse (heading varies), *Mémoires* I–XIV (Paris, 1900–1913)
- Mém. Miss. archéol. de Perse* France. Mission archéologique de Perse, *Mémoires* (title varies) XV—(continues preceding; Paris, 1914—)
- Mém. Soc. d'arch. et de num. de St. Pétersbourg* Société d'archéologie et de numismatique de St. Pétersbourg, *Mémoires* (St. Pétersbourg, 1847–52)
- Mon. Ancyr.* *Monumentum Ancyranum*
- Moses Chor. MOSES CHORENENSIS *Historia Armeniaca*, ed. GULIELMUS and GEORGIUS WHISTON (Londini, 1736)
- Mšiša Zkha MŠIŠA ZKHA (in *Sources syriaques*, ed. A. MINGANA, I [Leipzig, 1907])
- Nazarius Paneg. NAZARIUS *Panegyricus Constantino Augusto*, ed. GUILIELMUS BAEHRENS in *XII Panegyrici Latini* (Lipsiae, 1911)
- NGWG K. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philol.-hist. Klasse, *Nachrichten* (Berlin, 1895–1933)
- Nic. Dam. *De Caes.* NICOLAUS DAMASCENUS *De Caesare*, ed. C. M. HALL, *Nicolaus of Damascus' Life of Augustus* ("Smith College Classical Studies," No. 4 [Northampton, Mass., 1923])
- Num. Chron.* *Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society* (London, 1839—)
- Octavianus OCTAVIANUS, ed. A. BAEHRENS in *Poetae Latini minores*, IV (Lipsiae, 1882)

ABBREVIATIONS

- OGIS* *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae*, ed. W. DITTENBERGER (Lipsiae, 1903-5)
- Orac. Sibyl.* *Oracula Sibyllina*, ed. J. GEFFCKEN in "Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte" (Leipzig, 1902)
- Orosius PAULUS OROSIUS *Historiae adversum paganos*, ed. CAROLUS ZANGEMEISTER (Lipsiae, 1889)
- Ovid *Ars amat.* P. OVIDIUS NASO *Ars amatoria*
Metamorph. *Metamorphoses*
- (Ovid) *Consol. ad Liviam* *Consolatio ad Liviam Augustam*
- Philol. Wochenschr.* *Philologische Wochenschrift* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1881—)
- Photius PHOTIUS *Bibliotheca*, ed. IMMANUEL BECKER (Berolini, 1824-25)
- Pliny *Epist.* C. PLINIUS CAECILIUS SECUNDUS (minor) *Epistolae*
- Pliny *Hist. nat.* C. PLINIUS SECUNDUS (major) *Historia naturalis*, ed. C. MAYHOFF (Lipsiae, 1892-1933)
- Plut. *Moralia* PLUTARCHUS *Moralia*
Reg. imp. apophtheg. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata*
- Polyaenus *Strat.* POLYAENUS *Strategemata*, ed. EDUARD WOELFFLIN and JOHN MELBER (Lipsiae, 1887)
- Polyb. POLYBIUS
- Proc. Brit. Acad.* British Academy, *Proceedings* (London, 1904—)

ABBREVIATIONS

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PW	PAULYS <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> . Neue Bearbeitung, begonnen von GEORG WISSOWA, hrsg. von WILHELM KROLL (Stuttgart, 1893—)
Rawlinson, <i>Sixth Mon.</i>	GEORGE RAWLINSON, <i>The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy</i> (London, 1873)
<i>Recueil de travaux</i>	<i>Recueil de travaux relatifs à la philologie et à l'archéologie égyptiennes et assyriennes</i> (Paris, 1870-1923)
Reisner, <i>Hymnen</i>	GEORGE A. REISNER, <i>Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen nach Thontafeln griechischer Zeit</i> (Berlin, 1896)
<i>Rev. archéol.</i>	<i>Revue archéologique</i> (Paris, 1844—)
<i>Rev. num.</i>	<i>Revue numismatique</i> (Paris, 1836—)
<i>Revue d'assy.</i>	<i>Revue d'assyriologie et d'archéologie orientale</i> (Paris, 1884—)
Ruf. Fest.	RUFUS FESTUS, ed. WENDELINUS FOERSTER (Vindobonae, 1874)
Sallust <i>Hist.</i>	C. SALLUSTIUS CRISPUS <i>Historiae</i> , ed. BERTOLDUS MAURENBRECHER (fasc. 2; Lipsiae, 1893)
<i>SAWW</i>	Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, phil.-hist. Klasse, <i>Sitzungsberichte</i> (Wien, 1848—)
s.e.	Seleucid era
Seneca <i>De brev. vit.</i>	L. ANNAEUS SENECA <i>De brevitate vitae</i>
<i>De cons. ad Helviam</i>	<i>De consolatione ad Helviam matrem</i>
<i>De cons. ad Polyb.</i>	<i>De consolatione ad Polybium</i>

Seneca <i>De const. sap.</i> <i>Epist.</i> <i>Herc. Oet.</i>	<i>De constantia sapientis</i> <i>Epistolae</i> <i>Hercules Oetaeus</i>
Spart.	AELIUS SPARTIANUS (in "Scriptores historiae Augustae")
SPAW	Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, <i>Sitzungsberichte</i> (Berlin, 1882-1921), and <i>idem</i> , philos.-hist. Klasse, <i>Sitzungsberichte</i> (Berlin, 1922—)
Steph. Byz.	STEPHANUS BYZANTINUS, ed. GUILIELMUS DINDORFIUS (Lipsiae, 1825)
Suet. <i>Augustus</i> <i>Julius</i>	C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS <i>Divus Augustus</i> <i>Divus Julius</i>
Syncellus	GEORGIUS SYNCELLUS, ed. GUILIELMUS DINDORFIUS ("Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae," XII-XIII [Bonnae, 1829])
Tac. <i>Ann.</i> <i>Germ.</i> <i>Hist.</i>	C. CORNELIUS TACITUS <i>Annales</i> <i>Germania</i> <i>Historiae</i>
tr.	translated
Trog. Pomp.	TROGUS POMPEIUS <i>Prologi</i> (<i>see</i> Justin)
Val. Max.	VALERIUS MAXIMUS, ed. CAROLUS KEMPF (Lipsiae, 1888)
Veget. <i>Epit. rei mil.</i>	F. VEGETIUS RENATUS <i>Epitome rei militaris</i> , ed. CAROLUS LANG (Lipsiae, 1885)
Vell. Pat.	VELLEIUS PATERCULUS
Vergil <i>Ecl.</i> <i>Georg.</i>	P. VERGILIUS MARO <i>Eclogae</i> <i>Georgica</i>

ABBREVIATIONS

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Victor <i>De Caes.</i>	SEXTUS AURELIUS VICTOR <i>De Caesaribus</i> , ed. FRANCISCUS PICHLMAYR (Lipsiae, 1911)
<i>De vir. ill.</i>	<i>De viris illustribus Romae (ibid.)</i>
<i>Epit.</i>	<i>Epitome (ibid.)</i>
Vul. Gall.	VULCACIUS GALLICANUS (in "Scriptores historiae Augustae")
Wroth, <i>Parthia</i>	British Museum, <i>Catalogue of the Coins of Parthia</i> , by WARWICK WROTH (London, 1903)
<i>WVDOG</i>	Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft, "Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen" (Leipzig, 1900—)
<i>ZA</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete</i> (Leipzig, 1886—)
<i>ZDMG</i>	Deutsche morgenländische Gesellschaft, <i>Zeitschrift</i> (Leipzig, 1847—)
Zonaras	JOANNES ZONARAS ("Corpus scriptorum historiae Byzantinae," XLIV–XLV, ed. MAURICIUS PINDERUS [Bonnae, 1841–44])

SOURCES

THE peculiarity of the source material for a history of Parthia lies not in its scarcity but in the wide extent to which it is scattered through documents of much diversified character. Unfortunately none of the numerous histories of the country written in antiquity has survived, and we must therefore piece together the story from casual notices and from ancient authors who in their narrative occasionally touched upon some phase of Parthian history. By far the largest body of source material is in the classical writers, particularly those who dealt with military affairs and those who were themselves born in the Orient. To these may be added inscriptions from Greece, Italy, and the Near East as well as a certain number of parchments. Those authors who wrote in Armenian, Syriac, and Arabic, though all later than the Parthian period, add some information not otherwise available. But the fact that the evidence is to an overwhelming extent given by natives of or sympathizers with countries hostile to Parthia makes it impossible to present the picture wholly from the Parthian viewpoint.

Evidence from the Orient is scanty but of the utmost importance. Besides the late writers mentioned above, most of whom suffered from lack of good

sources on which to draw, we have the contemporary cuneiform tablets. These, though they are but imperfectly and incompletely published, provide us with occasional glimpses of the political scene from the eastern side. Documents in Pahlavi, the official language of the Parthians, are so scarce as to be negligible. The extensive and well published Parthian coinage is the basis on which any chronology of the rulers must rest.

For the eastern frontier of the empire the Chinese sources provide us with accurate and, for certain periods, fairly complete information. On the Indian frontier we must again depend upon coins and inscriptions, the uncertain dating of which makes their use peculiarly difficult.

An extended criticism of the classical sources is both impossible and unnecessary here. A good brief statement on the general value of the more important writers and their sources may be found in the *Cambridge Ancient History*, Volumes IX–XI, together with additional bibliography of more detailed criticisms. The brief remarks that follow will be confined to the value and problems of the sources only in so far as they relate to Parthian history.

By far the most difficult period is that prior to the Parthian invasion of Mesopotamia in 141 B.C., for which the bulk of the information is far from contemporary, widely scattered, and small in quantity. We know that numbers of Parthians were in Syria as well

as at Rome; hence the statements which classical writers make with regard to Parthian origins may have a basis in Parthian tradition. In any case we cannot profitably abandon all the traditional history of this early period as legendary merely because we are unable to check its accuracy in more than one source or because the sources themselves are much later in date. Such action, though perhaps based on better historical method, would leave the ancient historian small framework upon which to build in future years. The reader must bear in mind the sources from which the narrative for these early years is drawn and evaluate it accordingly.

The most important single source for this early period is Justin's epitome of Trogus Pompeius' history. This work suffers from the combined errors of two persons, plus the copyists' mistakes, but some of the severe criticism leveled at it comes from readers who are prone to forget that it is an epitome. At many points it is so abridged that, without the necessary background, compression appears as error. In a number of cases the prologues of the original work supply additional facts and correct or make clear the epitome.

For the history before 141 B.C. the other classical sources consist largely of scattered references in such generally reliable writers as Strabo, Arrian, and Polybius, most of whom are not contemporary with events described but can in general be trusted. The prob-

lem with such material is often one of arrangement in chronological order or of placement in the proper position in the narrative.

From the time of Crassus onward classical sources are extensive, though, for years when no military activity aroused interest, large gaps appear. The history of Cassius Dio Cocceianus covered the period from the first contacts with Rome to the downfall of the empire. The work is invaluable, since it contains much not found elsewhere; but its accuracy must often be questioned, and portions of it are very fragmentary. The arrangement of these fragments, generally quotations from other writers, is not yet entirely satisfactory. In many cases they are probably much abridged—a condition which leads to still further complications. For the period of the downfall of the empire, with which he was contemporary, the very brief statements of Dio have unusual value. The information furnished by Plutarch in his *Lives*, especially those of Crassus and Antony, is based on first-rate sources. With allowance for such patriotic biases as the attempts of the military to find an excuse for the defeat of Crassus, this biographer provides us with some of our most extensive connected narratives in Parthian history.

In the letters which Cicero wrote to his friends and in his dispatches to the Senate during his governorship of Cilicia we find the only connected day-by-day account which has come down to us of any phase of

Parthian history. This account is contemporary, and when it deviates from strict fact because of personal bias the change is fairly evident. Of other classical sources, among the most valuable for Parthian history are the works of the Jew Josephus. Time after time from numismatic or written sources Josephus can be proved correct, even against such factually accurate writers as Tacitus. Passages in Josephus containing apparent errors can often be understood when considered as brief résumés which omit much not directly connected with the main thread of the narrative. Josephus utilized the works of another oriental, Nicolaus of Damascus; his first edition of the *Jewish War* was prepared for Jews living under the Parthian empire. Babylonian Jews were passing to and fro across the frontiers, and Josephus was probably able to correct and supplement his sources from them. Possibly the story of Anilaeus and Asinaeus represents such firsthand information.¹

The brief notices concerning Parthia in Velleius Paterculus have an especial value, since he was with Gaius in the east. In the *Stratagems* of Frontinus there are several detailed references to military events of the period from around 50 B.C. to A.D. 50, based on excellent and extensive accounts. The difficulty in dealing with these is one common to all such isolated bits of information, namely that of placing them in the narrative.

¹ On the sources used by Josephus see Eugen Täubler, *Die Parthenachrichten bei Josephus* (Berlin, 1904).

For a long section of Parthian history, particularly the campaign of Corbulo, Tacitus is almost the sole source. His knowledge of eastern affairs was fairly accurate, but his knowledge of eastern geography was not. These facts and his personal biases, which must often be taken into account, make us long for additional checks upon our source. In the long run, however, the picture which we secure is probably substantially correct.

Since the internal condition of Parthia at the time when Vardanes had been ruling "two years and eight months," as described in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, fits the facts as far as we know them, it seems unfair to condemn this whole work as unhistorical. These very figures speak for the accuracy of some details, since they are numbers not usually utilized in fictitious accounts. But the question of how much may be employed with safety remains a difficult one. Of a somewhat similar nature are the *Sibylline Oracles*, which among much else contain a certain amount of historical data. When, however, it is impossible to tell with any certainty to what individuals or events or period the information pertains, speculation along these lines would seem of little real value. The best one can do is to point out the existence of the material and its most probable place in the general narrative. Certain books seem a unity, free from much or any later interpolation, and these prove extremely useful.

Of all the Roman campaigns against the Parthians, that under the command of the co-emperor Lucius Verus probably presents the greatest difficulties. The essayist Lucian, who had before him not only the bad but also the good histories of the war, has scattered through his essays numerous references to events of the campaign, almost all from writers now lost. The correspondence of Fronto, tutor of the Roman emperors, contains several passages of value, especially in the *Principia historiae* and in letters from Lucius at the front. Some of this material was not available for the standard edition of Naber, but as a result of further work by Hauler on the palimpsest the Loeb edition by Haines is much more complete. If the campaign of Verus can be worked out more fully than has been done here, it will probably be through further study of the place names and routes involved and by comparison with the usual form of Roman campaign against Parthia, which since the death of Caesar had become fairly well standardized.

Possibly when our knowledge of Parthia in the time of Trajan is much further advanced, we shall be able to untangle the confused account of Malalas and make use of such facts as are present. Now only a small part of the work can be utilized safely.

Concerning other sources not heretofore mentioned, such as Appian, Herodian, those of the Livy tradition, Florus, Orosius, and Rufus Festus, as well as the biographers Suetonius and the "Scriptores," the

writer has little to add beyond the general estimate of classical scholars.

There were in existence in antiquity various histories of Parthia, some written by men of unquestioned ability. The Parthian histories of Arrian and of Apollodorus of Artemita would have answered many questions, and those of Asinius Quadratus and Quintus Dellius might have been nearly as useful. According to the estimate of Lucian, the work of Crepereius Calpurnianus of Pompeiopolis would have been of little value. Fragments of Quadratus and Arrian exist, the latter of particular value in the campaign of Trajan provided we can place them in the narrative.

The bulk of the inscriptional evidence pertains to Roman military affairs, but exceptions are noteworthy. There are two Parthian inscriptions in Greek on the Parthian reliefs at Behistun. From Susa in Iran come various important inscriptions, especially a letter of Artabanus III to the city. Dura-Europus on the Euphrates has provided a valuable series, particularly graffiti, though many of the latter relate to the military. The last-named site has also furnished an amazing series of parchments, of primary importance for the cultural history of the area.

The question of the value of the Armenian sources for Parthian history is a perplexing one. There is much information not known from other sources in such writers as Moses of Chorene, but many of the

statements which can be checked are found to be in error. Whole sections of the Armenian narratives seem to bear no relation to known facts, and the tradition which they were following is apparently not a direct one. We have seldom cited these sources, both because it would be unsafe to follow their unsupported statements and because there was no point in adding them only where other and better authorities could be quoted. Further detailed study by some scholar well grounded in historical method and equipped with the necessary linguistic training to handle the original manuscripts may well yield important new facts.

Little information of a political character regarding the Parthians is given by Arabic writers; they seem to have possessed neither sources nor reliable tradition going back this far. Some details of the downfall of the empire are preserved by the Arab historians, and among stories in the literature there are mentioned titles and remnants of the political organization of the early Sasanian state which almost certainly descend from its predecessors. On the other hand the Syriac writers had excellent sources. Very probably these included histories of the early Christian bishoprics along with marginal notes on such manuscripts. In addition the Syriac documents possess the advantage of having originated under Parthian rule in the heart of the western empire. The Talmud supplements the fragmentary classical refer-

ences to Jewish-Parthian relations and makes the actions of the pro-Parthian party among the Jews much clearer.

Though most of the cuneiform sources are both fragmentary and scattered, many are contemporary and therefore of especial value. Here a word of warning is necessary: A number of the astronomical tables found on the tablets are not derived from observation, but are calculated, while others are merely copies of earlier tablets. Tablets of these types lose part of their value as sources; moreover, they cannot be considered as strictly contemporary. It must also not be forgotten that the contemporaneousness of a document does not guarantee the truth of the statements therein. In the case of many cuneiform tablets their fragmentary nature makes much interpretation necessary, and this work is always subject to revision. In the cuneiform field lies the greatest possibility of securing further information not only by the discovery of new documents but also by the publication of those now known to be in museums. The double dating of the tablets provides us with definite chronological evidence, but unfortunately the use of the throne name Arsaces to some extent negates their value for historical purposes. When on rare occasions a king is mentioned by his personal name, he is usually otherwise unknown; thus new problems are raised rather than old ones solved by the date lines. For the calculation of such dates it is highly advisable to make

use of a table, as the frequent errors in published works prove. Thus the second year of the Seleucid era in Babylonia, if obtained by subtraction, is $311/10$ minus 2, that is, $309/8$. But actually, as one can see in this case by inspection, the second year is $310/9$. The error is not apparent with larger figures. It automatically adjusts itself after the beginning of the Christian era, since 311 S.E. is not year 0 but 1 B.C., while 312 S.E. is A.D. 1.

Documents in Arsacid Pahlavi are so scarce that those which exist present many difficulties to translators. Besides a few inscriptions on coins, the single Pahlavi parchment from Avroman in Kurdistan remains the most important item of this character among the sources.

Dated Parthian coinage began shortly after the Parthians entered Mesopotamia, and it continued to increase in volume for some years. This has been and must remain the primary basis for Parthian chronology. Many of the coins, in addition to the year date in the Babylonian Seleucid era, bear also the month of issue, which in times of disturbance is very useful to the historian. Unfortunately relatively few of these coins bear the king's name, and when they do we may assume that two or more men were contending for the throne. The remainder of the coins must, by means of the portraits on the obverses, or on stylistic grounds, be assigned to rulers known from written sources. The task is difficult; but the work of Gard-

ner, Wroth, and more recently McDowell has been very successful.

If the proveniences of the coins were known, assignment to the various rulers would be greatly facilitated. Unfortunately few of the coins come from excavations, and collections seldom possess records of provenience. The studies of McDowell on coins from the Iranian plateau (still to be published) and on the large amount of numismatic material from Seleucia on the Tigris will help to alleviate this difficulty.

While the writer must deal with the Chinese sources in translation only, the major problem connected with them appears clear. Though much has been done with the identification of personal and place names, many still remain uncertain quantities. Further studies in early Chinese onomatology will increase the certainty and number of identifications. On the Indian frontier numismatics again plays an important part, but here unfortunately there is less historical information to assist in the task of assigning the coins. Furthermore, the inscriptions, though dated, create as many problems as they solve, since in some cases the beginnings of the eras by which they are dated cannot be fixed. Excavations, especially that of Marshall at Taxila, promise to provide the solution to many difficulties on the eastern frontier.

INTRODUCTION

UPON the ashes of Persepolis arose a new Orient, a world in which Greek and oriental elements were strangely intermingled. The task of holding together as a political entity this vast area extending from the Mediterranean to the Indus proved too great for the successors of Alexander; their strength was eventually spent in fratricidal wars, and the East once more lapsed into the control of petty kinglets. The time was ripe for the formation of a new empire. Rising out of the obscure mists to the east of the Caspian Sea, Parthian horsemen rode victoriously over all Iran. Governed by strong, able, and resolute kings, they subdued nation after nation until from the slopes of the Zagros Mountains they could look out over the colorless alluvium of Mesopotamia. In 141 B.C. their squadrons clattered down the passes and conquered these fertile lands. Under Parthian administration commerce greatly increased, and cities long abandoned and then nothing more than mounds of dun-colored earth rose again to life. New canals were dug and old ones cleaned of the silt accumulations of centuries.

Unlike other invaders from the northeast, the Parthians did not kill and destroy for the sake of booty, but often took over new territory without creating

more than a ripple in the life of the common man. The greatest changes which they brought about probably took place within the administrative machinery, but unfortunately little firsthand information is available on the internal structure of the Parthian empire, because we possess very few official documents. Most of our knowledge comes from excavations at sites such as Susa and Dura-Europus or by inference from casual statements made by classical authors. Our best information, then, comes from areas on the periphery of the empire, and general conclusions drawn from it can be accepted only with great caution.¹

In effect the Parthian empire became a vast feudatory power, a pyramid the apex of which was the King of Kings, beneath whom came the satraps, the nobles, the Greek merchants, and finally the native tillers of the soil, the ultimate basis upon which any such system must rest. The nobles who controlled the land probably lived in the larger cities, where they and the wealthy Greek merchants who depended upon them for protection would naturally form alliances. The parallel with the Middle Ages in Europe is striking, and the decay of the two systems came about in much the same manner. During much of the period before the Christian era the royal power was

¹ On the organization of the Parthian empire see the publications of the excavations at Dura-Europus, Seleucia on the Tigris, and Susa and the excellent statement by Rostovtzeff in *CAH*, XI, 113-20.

supreme; but after that time the nobles, then firmly rooted and grown wealthy from lands and war, began to usurp more and more authority. Their defiance of the king brought about frequent periods of disruption and eventually the downfall of the empire. Very probably the decline of the royal power and the rise of the nobles were closely connected with the religious revival of the latter half of the first century after Christ. Parallels for the struggle between the nobles and Magi on one hand and the king on the other can easily be found in Achaemenian and Sasanian history.

Some years before the death of Mithradates II in 87 B.C. he had carved on the rock at Behistun a relief in which he and his principal officials appear. The chief of these is called satrap of satraps, the other three simply satraps. Probably these men belonged to the great families of Iran such as the Surens and Karens. Their positions with attendant rights and duties gradually became hereditary. A Suren always placed the crown upon the head of a new king, and, as at Carrhae, a Suren frequently led the Parthian armies in battle.

Evidently the form of government of Parthian dependencies varied widely and changed from time to time. Mithradates apparently appointed a governor to rule over newly conquered Media; Himerus served in the same capacity in Babylonia; and at a later date Mesopotamia was governed by this method. In other

cases, however, either the local dynasty was retained or some other ruler acceptable to the Parthians was installed. Armenia was ruled by a member of the Arsacid family, as was Media Atropatene at times. Vassal kings remained in Adiabene, Characene, Elymais, and Persis and in some of the city-kingdoms such as Hatra and Osroene. Of all these only Characene, Elymais, and Persis were permitted to strike money while under Parthian control. Of the important cities, Seleucia alone seems to have been accorded the right to issue civic coinage; and its small bronze issues, contrary to generally accepted numismatic principles, traveled fairly long distances, for example as far as Susa. However, numismatics must be applied with caution to questions of territorial control. Dura-Europus in the Parthian period used money from Syrian Antioch. Southeastern Iran, though at times directly under Parthian control, does not seem to have used the royal coinage.² Parthian coins traveled eastward along the great silk route into Turkestan; but none has been reported in China, and they are rarely, if at all, found in India proper.

That the royal power extended even to matters of local government is proved by a letter of Artabanus III to the city of Susa validating a contested election. Incidentally it is interesting to note that the letter

² H. H. Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua. A Descriptive Account of the Antiquities and Coins of Afghanistan . . .* (London, 1841); H. T. Prinsep, *Note on the Historical Results Deducible from Recent Discoveries in Afghanistan* (London, 1844).

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was in Greek, though documents sent to the eastern part of the empire would probably be in the official Pahlavi. That an election case was of such vital importance as to force the king to intervene over the heads of the properly constituted authorities seems doubtful; hence we must conclude that certain places were more or less under royal jurisdiction.

Careful distinction is made by some contemporary writers between Greek and Parthian cities within the Parthian empire. This may well imply a difference in administration as well as population, for documents from Dura and Susa show that the governments of these places preserved the pattern of the Hellenistic city-state. Such places rarely held Parthian garrisons. Ctesiphon, for example, is said to have been built to house Parthian troops, which evidently could not be installed in Seleucia across the river.

The Parthians secured their revenues as did the Achaemenidae by means of tribute and customs duties, and they were anxious to further peace and the free interchange of commerce to increase the royal income. Although the Parthian revolt was originally a reaction against Iranian Hellenism, its character as a steppe culture modified by Iranian and Bactrian contacts underwent considerable alteration in the presence of the more ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and the strong Hellenistic influence there. For a hundred or more years after the Parthians entered the Land of the Two Rivers, Greek elements formed an

important part of their culture, until at last they were overshadowed by another oriental reaction.

When the Parthian feudal system was at its height, its military power was immense. In addition to mere numbers, the Parthians possessed the compound bow and complete scale armor for man and horse, arms of offense and defense against which the Roman legions had never before been matched. In 53 B.C. the consul Crassus and thirty thousand of his men fell under a hail of Parthian arrows, and the succeeding years saw raids into the rich territory about the pleasure center of Antioch. The armies which humbled the "invincible" legions were almost entirely composed of cavalry, both light- and heavy-armed. Because of the expense of maintaining horses and armor the heavy-armed was recruited from the nobility, who were also expected to supply and equip some light cavalry, not armored, but furnished with the bow as a weapon of offense.

As a result of their exploitation of the land, the success of their commercial alliances, and the profits of the booty from raids into Roman territory, the nobility gained tremendously in power and importance. On the other hand the royal family, the Arsacidae, in whom the succession to the throne remained, was torn asunder and weakened by intrigue, murder, and quarrels between members of the dynasty. The result was inevitable, just as in Europe. The feudal lords no longer responded to the call to arms, no

longer paid their annual tribute, but engaged in plots against the king and were ready to defy him by force of arms should he interfere with their rights. Disorganization within the empire, not force of arms, opened the way for the Roman legions into Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the plundering of great commercial centers and royal treasures, as well as losses in man power and territory occasioned by the wars with Rome, greatly contributed to the decline of Parthia.

In the last years of the empire the name "Arsaces" became but a shuttlecock, bandied back and forth by claimants who possessed little if any real power. Under such conditions a strong leader backed by a powerful army had little difficulty in overcoming the disunited efforts of the nobles, many of whom must have longed for another strong central authority which should restore peace and prosperity. The Parthians had originally been alien to both Iran and Mesopotamia; their conquerors the Sasanidae came from Persis, where the ruined cities and the tombs of the great Achaemenid monarchs were a constant reminder of former Iranian glories. Ardashir, first of the new dynasty, found it no difficult task to overthrow the tottering and decrepit Arsacid line and thus to write the last chapter in the political history of Parthia.

CHAPTER I

THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

THE racial origin of the earliest Parthians is largely a matter of conjecture, since our few authorities differ widely from one another as to who they were and whence they came, and archaeological and anthropological evidence is not yet forthcoming. Skeletal remains from Mesopotamia cannot be expected to yield much information, for we know in advance that they contain a large percentage of native population, a sprinkling of Macedonian or Greek stock, and possibly Negro, Chinese, Indian, and Mongoloid individuals.¹ Because of the heavy beards and the lack of detail, little if any anthropological information can be secured from the portraits on Parthian coins.² Language provides no clue to the origin of the Parthians, for their speech as we know it was adopted

¹ Marcel A. Dieulafoy, *L'Acropole de Suse* (Paris, 1893), pp. 109-13, has analyzed three skulls from the Parthian strata at Susa, but there is no reason to suppose they are Parthian. The graves and grave objects from Seleucia on the Tigris, not including the skeletal remains, will be treated by Samuel Yeivin in a volume of the "University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," the manuscript for which is now in preparation.

² Dr. Henry Field, curator of physical anthropology, Field Museum of Natural History, Chicago, was kind enough to examine Wroth's publication of British Museum coins (see n. 7 below); cf. Charles E. de Ujfalvÿ, "Iconographie et anthropologie irano-indiennes," *L'Anthropologie*, XI (1900), 199-203.

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after they entered the Iranian plateau. Their customs give us more extensive and more certain information, but nothing beyond what we already know from classical writers. Love of the hunt and of hard drinking, extensive use of the bow, especially as a weapon on horseback, are all suggestive of the nomadic or seminomadic life of the steppe country.

Early historians paid little attention to the Parthians; when the western world came into contact with them their story had been much obscured by time. They were reported to have been a division of the Parni, who in turn were one of a group of tribes known to the Greeks as the Dahae.³ We first meet them on the banks of the Ochus (Tejend) River, although this was probably not their original homeland.⁴ These people would not be known as Parthians until they moved southward into the Persian province of Parthava, an event which took place sometime before 250 B.C. Achaemenian and early Greek references to the "Parthians" refer, therefore, to earlier inhabitants of Parthava, not to the Parthians with whom we are dealing.⁵

That as early as the seventh century B.C. the As-

³ Strabo xi. 7. 1 and 9. 2-3, followed by Edwyn R. Bevan, *The House of Seleucus* (London, 1902), I, 284, and Percy M. Sykes, *A History of Persia* (2d ed.; London, 1921), I, 307. Cf. George Rawlinson, *The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy* (London, 1873), pp. 17 and 42 f.

⁴ Strabo xi. 9. 2; Apollodorus *Parthica* in Strabo xi. 7. 3; Justin xli. 1; *Arrian Parthica* fr. 1 in Photius 58.

⁵ E. Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 36; William Montgomery McGovern, *Early Empires of Central Asia* (in press).

syrians knew the district which was later called Parthava is suggested by reports of a raid by Esarhaddon⁶ which penetrated the country south of the Caspian Sea. Among those captured were Zanasana of Partukka and Uppis of Partakka. The raid must have taken place shortly before 673 B.C. Though Assyria's boundaries certainly did not include Parthava,⁷ the latter perhaps formed a part of Media.⁸ Cyrus the Great, who conquered the Medes, conducted a campaign in the eastern part of his newly won empire between 546 and 539 B.C.⁹ He founded

⁶ E. G. Klauber, *Politisch-religiöse Texte aus der Sargonidenzeit* (Leipzig, 1913), Nos. 21-22; R. Campbell Thompson, *The Prisms of Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal* (London, 1931), p. 21; E. Herzfeld, "Medisch und Parthisch," *AMI*, VII (1934), 26-29; George G. Cameron, *History of Early Iran* (Chicago, 1936), pp. 170-74.

⁷ Cf. A. T. Olmstead, *History of Assyria* (New York, 1923), pp. 46-47; *CAH*, III, map facing p. 1. The following maps also may be of use: W. W. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, facing p. 612; British Museum, *Catalogue of the Coins of Parthia*, by Warwick Wroth (London, 1903), facing p. 1; British War Office, General Staff, Geographical Section, No. 2149, *Persia and Afghanistan*, 1 inch = 64 miles, a copy of which may be found in Sykes, *Hist. of Persia*, Vol. II; Heinrich Kiepert, *Atlas antiquus*; "Murray's Handy Classical Maps": *The Eastern Empires and Asia Minor*.

⁸ Ctesias in Diod. Sic. ii. 2 and 34. Ctesias is not trustworthy; see Cameron, *History of Early Iran*, p. 176, n. 15. I am greatly indebted to Dr. Cameron for suggestions embodied in this chapter.

⁹ An inference from Herod. i. 153, who says that Cyrus conquered the Bactrians and the Sacae; cf. Ctesias *De rebus Persicis* fr. 29. 3f. (pub. with Herodotus, ed. Müller [1844]; Gilmore ed. not available), who places this event before the Lydian war (impossible), and Herod. i. 177, where the account of the conquest of Upper Asia immediately follows that of Lydia. The inclusion of Parthava in the Behistun inscription is almost certain evidence that it was conquered by Cyrus, since Cambyses after his accession went immediately to Egypt.

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Cyra on the Jaxartes River¹⁰ and three other cities on or near the Tanais (Oxus) River.¹¹ The conquest of Parthava probably took place during this campaign. The country was placed under the control of Hystaspes, patron of Zoroaster and father of Darius.¹² Cyrus lost his life fighting against the Dahae in an attempt to expand his empire to the north-east.¹³ At that time the satrapy of Parthava included Hyrcania, which lay between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea.¹⁴ The satrapy revolted about 521 B.C. against Hystaspes and upheld the cause of the Median pretender Fravartish. The first battle was fought at Vishpauzatish¹⁵ on the twenty-second

¹⁰ Strabo xi. 11. 4; Arrian *Anabasis* iv. 3; Curtius Rufus vii. 6. 16. Cyra is perhaps Ura Tepe; see Wilhelm Tomaschek, "Centralasiatische Studien. I. Sogdiana," *SAWW*, LXXXVII (1877), 121 f.

¹¹ Justin xii. 5. 12; PW, art. "Tanais," No. 1.

¹² Behistun inscription, § 35, in F. H. Weissbach, *Die Keilinschriften der Achämeniden* (Leipzig, 1911), pp. 42 f. Cf. Herod. i. 204 ff.; F. Spiegel, "Ueber das Vaterland und Zeitalter des Awestâ" (II), *ZDMG*, XLI (1887), 292-96; F. Justi, "Die älteste iranische Religion und ihr Stifter Zarathustra," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, LXXXVIII (1897), 255-57; A. V. Williams Jackson, *Zoroastrian Studies* ("Columbia University Indo-Iranian Series," XII [New York, 1928]), pp. 17 f.; A. T. Olmstead, "New Testament Times—and Now," *JASO*, LIII (1933), 313.

¹³ Berossus fr. 55 (Schnabel, p. 275), from Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Karst, p. 15, lines 11 f.

¹⁴ Behistun inscription in Weissbach, *loc. cit.*; cf. Herzfeld, "Zarathustra. I. Der geschichtliche Vištâspa," *AMI*, I (1929-30), 95-97.

¹⁵ Herzfeld, "Medisch und Parthisch," *AMI*, VII (1934), 30 f., identifies the place as Hecatompylos.

THE GROWTH OF PARTHIA

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day of Viyakhna.¹⁶ Aid arrived from the army at Rhages (Rayy), and another battle was waged at Patigrabana on the first day of Garmapada,¹⁷ when 6,520 of the rebels were reported killed and 4,192 wounded. About this time Margiana revolted, and the satrap of Bactria was sent to put down the uprising.¹⁸ Parthava probably remained united with Hyrcania at the death of Darius.¹⁹

The mention of Parthava in the Behistun inscrip-

¹⁶ Weissbach, *Die Keilinschriften der Achämeniden*, p. 43, makes this February 5, 521 B.C. The translation of Achaemenid dates into the Julian calendar is very uncertain; cf. Charles J. Ogden, "A Note on the Chronology of the Behistūn Inscription of Darius," *Oriental Studies in Honour of C. E. Pavry*, ed. J. D. C. Pavry (London, 1933), pp. 361-65 and bibliography cited therein, also D. Sidersky, "Contribution à l'étude de la chronologie néo-babylonienne," *Revue d'assyriologie*, XXX (1933), 63.

¹⁷ Cf. preceding note. Herzfeld, "Zarathustra," *AMI*, I (1929-30), 109, n. 1, and II (1930), 65, equates Patigrabana with Bagir and Bagir with Nisa.

¹⁸ Weissbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 f., § 38. The Aramaic copy from Elephantine in Egypt merely summarizes the Parthian campaign; see A. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1923), p. 258.

¹⁹ Naqsh-i-Rustem inscription, § 3, in Weissbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89, and the Xerxes inscription found by the Oriental Institute, for which see Roland G. Kent, "The Present Status of Old Persian Studies," *JAOIS*, LVI (1936), 212 f., and "The Daiva-Inscription of Xerxes," *Language*, XIII (1937), 294, lines 19 f. In the Behistun and the Persepolis E inscriptions Parthava is the thirteenth satrapy listed; in the new Xerxes inscription it is sixth; in the Tell el-Maskhūtah inscription from Egypt it is fifth (W. Golénischeff, "Stèle de Darius aux environs de Tell el-Maskhoutah," *Recueil de travaux*, XIII [1890], 102-6); and in the Naqsh-i-Rustem and Susa inscriptions it is third (on the Susa inscription see V. Scheil, "Conquêtes et politique de Darius," *Mém. Miss. archéol. de Perse*, XXIV [1933], 119). The name of the satrapy is written in Akkadian as *Partu*; in Elamite, *Partuma*; in Egyptian, *Prtyw*³.

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tion seems clear indication that it was acquired by Cyrus; the fact that it appears in the Naqsh-i-Rustem inscription shows that it was still a portion of the kingdom at the death of Darius. The army list preserved in Herodotus vii. 60-81²⁰ can be dated as previous to 479 B.C., and therefore reveals the condition of the satrapies shortly after the death of Darius. Hyrcania had been separated from Parthava and made a province by itself, while the former satrapy of Chorasmia was then joined with Parthava.²¹ Other indications suggest possible losses on this eastern frontier. In the army of Xerxes there was a contingent of Parthians under the command of Artabazus the son of Pharnaces. Since Herodotus tells us elsewhere that the satraps led their contingents to battle, Artabazus was probably satrap of Parthia. Aeschylus²² reports that among those killed in the fighting in Greece was a cavalry leader called Arsaces, a name which later became the throne name of the Parthian kings.

The official tribute list quoted by Herodotus (iii. 89-95) is clearly from his own time, that of Artaxerxes I, not, as he states, from that of Darius.²³ Here again the tendency toward union of the provinces makes us

²⁰ Cf. PW, art. "Artayktes."

²¹ Hecataeus fr. 292 f. (J, I, p. 38) notes the proximity of the Parthians and Chorasmians.

²² *Persae* 995; the names in Aeschylus are generally proper to the country but not historical.

²³ This discussion of the satrapies is based on an unpublished study by Olmstead, "The Persian Satrapies and Their History."

suspect further shrinkage of the frontiers. Parthia was now joined with Chorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria to form one province, and Hyrcania was united with Media.

When Alexander invaded Asia, the Parthians fought on the Persian side at Arbela.²⁴ Parthia fell to Alexander at the death of Darius III, and its satrap Phrataphernes surrendered himself in Hyrcania.²⁵ Amminaspes, a Parthian who had been in Egypt, was made satrap; and Tlepolemus, one of the Companions, was selected to represent Alexander's military interests.²⁶ Under Alexander, Parthia was reunited with Hyrcania, but the other districts mentioned by Herodotus as joined with it were then definitely separate satrapies.²⁷ Bessus in his attempt to seize the power after the death of Darius III also appointed a Parthian satrap, Barzanes by name,²⁸ who probably never enjoyed opportunity for action.

By the Treaty of Triparadisus in 321 B.C. a certain Philippus was transferred from Bactria to Parthia.²⁹

²⁴ Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 11; Curtius Rufus iv. 12. 11.

²⁵ Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 23; cf. also Plut. *Alexander* 45.

²⁶ Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 22. The name of the satrap is given as Andragoras by Justin xii. 4. 12. See G. F. Hill, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia* (London, 1922), pp. cxlviii-clx, for a discussion of the attribution of the coins bearing the name Andragoras.

²⁷ Arrian *Anabasis* iii and iv.

²⁸ *Ibid.* iv. 7.

²⁹ Arrian *Res successorum Alexandri* fr. 9. 35 (J, II B, p. 846); Dexippus *Res successorum Alexandri* fr. 8. 6 (J, II A, p. 462) calls him satrap of Sogdiana.

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In 318 B.C. Pithon, satrap of Media, seized the province of Parthia, did away with Philippos, and installed his brother Eudamus. The other satraps became alarmed and joined together under the strongest, Peucestas of Persis. The combined armies of Iran drove Pithon out of Parthia, and he retreated to his own province of Media.³⁰ After 316 B.C. the province apparently was joined to Bactria under the command of Stasanor.³¹ By the middle of the third century the Seleucid empire was in difficulty. Antiochus II continued the war which his father had begun in Egypt about 276 B.C. When peace was made Antiochus put away his wife Laodice, who retired to Ephesus, and married Berenice, daughter of Ptolemy II (253 B.C.). Although Antiochus had thus secured peace, his relations with Ptolemy were none too secure. About the time of the marriage Diodotus,³² satrap of Bactria, revolted and assumed the title of king.³³

³⁰ Diod. Sic. xix. 14; Justin xiii. 4. 23. Cf. Bevan, *House of Sel.*, I, 42, 267 n. 6, and 294, and in *CAH*, VI, 417 and 477; Alfred von Guttschmid, *Geschichte Irans* (Tübingen, 1888), pp. 20 ff.

³¹ Justin xli. 4. 1, as Bevan, *House of Sel.*, I, 267 f. and notes, interprets him.

³² Trog. Pomp. xli; cf. Justin xli. 4. 5. Trogus is proved correct by the coins; see *Cambridge History of India*, I, ed. E. J. Rapson, Pls. II 13 and III 9, which apparently O. Seel, editor of the Teubner text of Justin, did not know. My account of events in the Seleucid empire is drawn largely from Tarn in *CAH*, VII, chap. xxii, which agrees substantially with the earlier works of Bevan and Bouché-Leclercq.

³³ Justin xli. 4. 5.

Encouraged by the Bactrian success, the Parthians also rose against Seleucid control. This took place shortly before 247 B.C.,³⁴ the beginning of the Parthian era,³⁵ when two brothers, Arsaces³⁶ and Tiridates, led a revolt against Andragoras,³⁷ satrap of Antiochus II Theos (261–247 B.C.). Even the Greeks

³⁴ Probably about 250 B.C. There is the possibility that 247 B.C., the beginning of the Parthian era, represents the date of the revolt; so Percy Gardner, *The Parthian Coinage* ("International Numismata Orientalia," Part V [London, 1877]), p. 3. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576, feels that it marks the coronation of Tiridates I; but it seems unlikely that the event was of sufficient importance to date the era. Moses Chor. ii. 1 refers to the revolt, but the Armenian sources are so varied and distorted that they have not been used except where they can be verified by some reliable historian or by archaeology. J. Saint-Martin, *Fragments d'une histoire des Arsacides* (Paris, 1850), has attempted rather unsuccessfully to make use of the Armenian historians. Cf. also Pseudo-Agathangelus (*FHG*, V 2, pp. 198 f.), Agathangelus (*ibid.*, pp. 109–21), Pseudo-Bardanes (*ibid.*, p. 86). On the revolt see Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Karst, p. 97, Olympiad 133.

³⁵ There is an extensive literature on the question of the Parthian era, but since the matter is now definitely settled there is nothing to be gained by taking it up in detail. Solution of the problem dates from George Smith's discovery of a double-dated tablet (*Assyrian Discoveries* [London, 1875], p. 389), though, owing to an error in his dating of the Seleucid era, his figure was one year too early. Cf. F. X. Kugler, *Sternkunde und Sternkunde in Babel* (Münster in Westfalen, 1907–37), II, 443–63.

³⁶ The figure of the first Arsaces is even more obscure than those of his immediate successors. Until the period of dated coinage, about 140/39 B.C., there is no certain basis for the arrangement of the Parthian kings. The traditional list as found in Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 273 f., is not, however, purely fictional. W. W. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 613, has largely discarded this arrangement and based his new list on the cuneiform sources, though they rarely give the king any other name than Arsaces.

³⁷ Justin xli. 4. 6–7. Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58, gives the name as Pherecles; but Syncellus, p. 539, presumably also quoting Arrian, makes it Agathocles. This Andragoras is not the one of the coins (cf. p. 7, n. 26).

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themselves were quite uncertain as to the historicity of their accounts of this early period. There is a story that the first Parthian leader, Arsaces, was a Bactrian who became discontented with the rule of the satrap Diodotus of Bactria, invaded Parthia, and successfully fomented a revolt.³⁸ Still a third and more detailed version is to be found in Arrian,³⁹ according to which either Arsaces or Tiridates was insulted by the Seleucid satrap. The brothers thereupon took five men into their confidence, killed the offender, and persuaded the people to revolt. Without additional evidence it is impossible to determine the correct account.

The two brothers who led the revolt were reputed to be descendants of Arsaces⁴⁰ the son of Phriapites.⁴¹ Later the Parthian kings claimed descent from Artaxerxes II, possibly to support the belief that they were continuing the glories of Achaemenian Iran.⁴² Andragoras, satrap of Antiochus, apparently perished in the struggle. Arsaces may have been crowned in Asa-

³⁸ Strabo xi. 9. 3.

³⁹ *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58.

⁴⁰ To the discomfiture of historians both ancient and modern, all Parthian kings used this name as a title. See Justin xli. 5. 5-6; Strabo xv. 1. 36 and xvi. 1. 28; Moses Chor. ii. 1; Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 5. So regularly the Babylonian documents.

⁴¹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Photius 58.

⁴² Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syncellus, p. 539. Cf. Tarn, "Queen Ptolemais and Apama," *Classical Quarterly*, XXIII (1929), 138-40, who feels the claim was made to substantiate the Arsacid control of the territory of the Seleucidae, who were also connected with the Persian line.

ak (near Kuchan in the upper Atrek River valley) in Astauene.⁴³ For the first years of the new kingdom, if such it might be called, the rulers were busy with warfare,⁴⁴ in the course of which Arsaces must have lost his life.⁴⁵ Not long after the succession of Tiridates to the throne he invaded and conquered Hyrcania.⁴⁶

The death of Diodotus calmed any fears which Tiridates may have had, and an alliance with the Bactrian's son, also called Diodotus, gave the Parthian ruler additional strength.⁴⁷ Through fear of the elder Diodotus and of Seleucus II Callinicus (247-226 B.C.), Tiridates had built a formidable military force, the value of which he was to appreciate later.⁴⁸ The situation had become extremely serious for Seleucus. Laodice his mother and her friends had

⁴³ Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* (*Parthian Stations*, by Isidore of Charax, ed. Wilfred H. Schoff [Philadelphia, 1914]) 11; Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 575; cf. PW, art. "Asaak." If Isidore refers to the first Arsaces it is significant that the sacred flame was kept burning in this city, for the Parthians of that period were probably Zoroastrians.

⁴⁴ Strabo xi. 9. 2; Justin xli. 4. 7 f.

⁴⁵ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syncellus, p. 539.

⁴⁶ Justin xli. 4. 8. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576, following PW, art. "Hyrcania," col. 501, says the conquest must have been made after 217 B.C. because Antiochus III in his campaign of 219-217 in Coele Syria had Cadusian and Dahaeian contingents in his army (Polyb. v. 79. 3 and 7) and hence the Seleucid power must have extended to the Caspian Sea. But mercenaries were common in armies of this period and earlier, even to Greeks among the forces of Nebuchadnezzar, and I do not see how such conclusions can be based on these facts.

⁴⁷ Justin xli. 4. 9.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 4. 8.

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done away with Berenice and her son, thus incurring the enmity of Ptolemy III, Berenice's brother. The Egyptian monarch invaded Seleucid territory and marched victoriously at least as far as Syria and perhaps to the Tigris,⁴⁹ though later writers extended his conquests to Bactria and even as far eastward as India. But a revolt in the Delta forced Ptolemy to return home before he could consolidate his position.

Sometime in the course of the struggle between Ptolemy and Seleucus, the latter was forced to conclude a peace with his brother which left Antiochus Hierax an autonomous sovereign in Asia Minor. The war with Egypt once ended, Seleucus soon attempted to recover the lost territory; but after some preliminary successes he was completely defeated at Ancyra (Ankara) about 240 B.C.⁵⁰ by Antiochus and his Galatian allies. For a time it was supposed that Seleucus himself had perished in the fighting, but he escaped in disguise to Antioch.

About 228 B.C. Seleucus gathered an army at Babylon⁵¹ and marched eastward. Tiridates retreated

⁴⁹ Professor Olmstead draws my attention to the fact that the Babylonian documents do not mention Ptolemy and that the dates make his rule in Babylonia improbable.

⁵⁰ The date is very uncertain; see Rapson in *CHI*, I, 440; Bevan, *House of Sel.*, I, 194 and 285. Tarn in *CAH*, VII, 720, refuses to commit himself. See also E. V. Hansen, "The Great Victory Monument of Attalus I," *AJA*, XLI (1937), 53, n. 3.

⁵¹ In later times Seleucia and Babylon were often confused by Greek writers, though contemporary tablets show that natives of Babylonia did not make this error. The importance of this confusion in the Parthian period has been exaggerated.

before him and eventually sought refuge with the Apasiacae, the Apa-Saka or Water Saka,⁵² who lived on the steppes of the Caspian region. In the meantime, about 227 B.C. Stratonice incited a rebellion in Antioch, and in concert with her Antiochus invaded Mesopotamia.⁵³ These domestic troubles caused Seleucus to return to Syria⁵⁴ and left the Parthians in a position to claim the ultimate victory.⁵⁵

Seleucus III Soter, the elder son of Seleucus II Callinicus, after a brief reign of three years was murdered in Phrygia as the result of a court intrigue,⁵⁶ and Antiochus III, the younger son of Seleucus II, succeeded to the throne (223 B.C.). Two of his generals, the brothers Molon and Alexander, were intrusted with the satrapies of Media and Persis. Not long thereafter Molon, possibly inspired by the Bactrian and Parthian successes,⁵⁷ revolted and declared himself king. Liver omens copied in Uruk April 30,

⁵² Polyb. x. 48; Strabo xi. 8. 8; Wilhelm Tomaschek, "Zur historischen Topographie von Persien," *SAWW*, CII (1883), 218; Tarn, "Seleucid-Parthian Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 113.

⁵³ Tarn in *CAH*, VII, 722; but cf. Bevan, *House of Sel.*, I, 289 and n. 4.

⁵⁴ Justin xli. 5. 1.

⁵⁵ On the basis of Posidonius *Hist.* xvi. fr. 12 (J, II A, p. 228) in Athen. *Deip.* iv. 153 and of the coinage, Gardner (*Parthian Coinage*, p. 4) argues that Seleucus was once a captive of the Parthians, either after Ancyra or during the campaign under discussion. It must be granted that the beard which appears on his coin portraits is paralleled on the coins of only those rulers who were captives in the east. Cf. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 49, n. 1. Josephus *Contra Apionem* i. 206 mentions the campaign.

⁵⁶ Appian *Syr.* 66.

⁵⁷ Tarn in *CAH*, VII, 724.

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221 B.C., picture the thoughts passing through the mind of a priest. Who was to be the victor in the coming struggle for power? Would the city be destroyed? The omen of "Who was king, who was not king?," once applied to the period of disintegration at the close of the Agade dynasty, was now fully appropriate.⁵⁸ Babylonia was secured; but Antiochus himself took the field and defeated Molon, who committed suicide (220 B.C.). Seleucia, the royal city, was recaptured, and Diogenes of Susa, who had held out against Molon, was rewarded with Media. Antiochus crossed the Zagros and invaded the kingdom of Atropatene, southwest of the Caspian, then under the control of Artabazanes, who was forced to admit vassalage.⁵⁹ Additional omen tablets from Uruk, dated February 7, 213 B.C., make more certain the identification of the Parthians with that ancient enemy from the northeast, the Guti.⁶⁰ Could the expedition of Antiochus have been a feint in the direction of a Parthia which had already begun to expand? Did Parthia lend support to Molon? These are questions which as yet we cannot answer.

Meanwhile Tiridates had employed himself in consolidating his position. He increased the army, built

⁵⁸ F. Thureau-Dangin, *Tablettes d'Uruk à l'usage des prêtres du temple d'Anu au temps des Séleucides* (Musée du Louvre, "Textes cunéiformes," VI [Paris, 1922]), No. 1 rev., esp. line 23. Cf. A. T. Olmstead, "Intertestamental Studies," *JAOs*, LVI (1936), 245.

⁵⁹ Polyb. v. 40-54.

⁶⁰ Thureau-Dangin, *Tablettes d'Uruk*, No. 3 rev., lines 28 and 43.

forts, strengthened existing cities, and built a new one, Dara, on Mount Apaortenon, an almost impregnable position,⁶¹ which he perhaps intended to make the capital of his kingdom.⁶² Tiridates or one of his immediate successors refounded Rhages-Europus under the name Arsacia,⁶³ a designation which it did not long retain. In later times the royal residence of central Parthia was certainly Hecatompylos.⁶⁴ Tiridates

⁶¹ Justin xli. 5. 1-4; incorrect variant, Zapaortenon.

⁶² Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 53. Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 46 gives the city as Dareium and the place Apavortene; cf. Apauarktice, Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* 1 and 13. The site has been variously identified as the oasis of Attek east of the "Achal-Tekke" (PW, art. "Dara," No. 1), as "probably near Abivard in Apavartikene" (Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 575), as Kala Maran (Sykes, *Hist. of Persia*, I, 310), as perhaps Kelat (Ed. Meyer in *Encyc. Brit.*, art. "Parthia"), and as near Kelat-i-Nādirī (Herzfeld, "Zarathustra," *AMI*, I, 109, n. 1). Victor Chapot, *La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe* (Paris, 1907), p. 314 and n. 1, confuses the Dara of Tiridates with the Dara founded by Anastasius near Nisibis about A.D. 504, and therefore charges Justin, not his original, Trogus Pompeius, with a bad eye for topography.

⁶³ Apollodorus in Strabo xi. 13. 6; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* 'Πάρια; Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 113. Cf. the boundaries of Parthia as given by Strabo xi. 9. 1.

⁶⁴ Baeton fr. 2 (J, II B, p. 623); Diogenes fr. 1 (J, II B, p. 626); Strabo xi. 9. 1; Ptolemy vi. 5. 2. Polyb. x. 28 says all roads converge on Hecatompylos. The site is not yet identified, as recent excavations at Damghan failed to produce Parthian material. A. V. Williams Jackson, *From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam* (New York, 1911), pp. 161 ff. and 176 ff., places it between Frat and Damghan at Shahr-i-Kūmis. See also A. D. Mordtmann, "Hekatompylos. Ein Beitrag zur vergleichenden Geographic Persiens," *Bayerische Akad. der Wiss., Sitzungsberichte*, 1869, I, pp. 497-536; A. H. Schindler, "Beschreibung einiger wenig bekannten Routen in Chorassân," *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, XII (1877), 216, and "Notes on Some Antiquities Found in a Mound near Damghan," *JRAS*, N.S., IX (1877), 425-27; PW, art. "Hekatompylos," No. 1. P. M. Sykes, "A Sixth Jour-

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died in peace about 211 B.C. after a reign of thirty-seven years.⁶⁵ He left the throne to his son, whose name was apparently Artabanus (I).⁶⁶

In the death of the powerful Tiridates, Antiochus III may have seen an opportunity to regain his eastern possessions; in any case in that same year he turned eastward⁶⁷ and advanced to Ecbatana (Hama-dan), where loot from the temple of Anahita served to replenish his treasury.⁶⁸ In 209 B.C. Antiochus continued his eastward march along the great road with

ney in Persia," *Geog. Journal*, XXXVII (1911), 17 f., suggests Darra Gaz, some fifty miles northeast of Astrabad.

⁶⁵ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 1, quoted in Syncellus, p. 539.

⁶⁶ Our only source, Trog. Pomp. xli, must be corrected, either by the substitution of the name Mithradates for Tigranes or by the rearrangement of the text as proposed by Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 81. Of the two, the substitution appears preferable. Gutschmid's rearrangement has been accepted by Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator* (Paris, 1890), p. 310; Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xxxi-xxxii; A. R. von Petrowicz, *Arsaciden-Münzen* (Wien, 1904), p. 9; J. de Morgan, *Numismatique de la Perse antique*. Fasc. 1. *Introduction*.—*Arsacides* (E. Babelon, *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines*. III. *Monnaies orientales*. I 1), col. 85 and n. 2; and Ed. Meyer in *Encyc. Brit.*, art. "Parthia." J. de Morgan and Meyer call the ruler in question Arsaces II. The following scholars have preferred the substitution: F. Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch* (Marburg, 1895), pp. 31 and 412; Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Nouveau classement des monnaies arsacides," *Rev. num.*, 1904, pp. 320-22; E. H. Minns, "Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan," *JHS*, XXXV (1915), 40 f. and n. 58; Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 119 and n. 4.

⁶⁷ Polyb. ix. 43 shows Antiochus at the Euphrates in the fall of 211 B.C.; he invaded rebel Media and Parthia according to Appian *Syr.* i. 1.

⁶⁸ Polyb. x. 27.

a large army.⁶⁹ While no excuse for this attack on Parthia is known, none was necessary beyond the fact that the territory had once been Seleucid domain. On the edge of the vast salt plains to the east the only available water supply was and still is carried through underground canals to prevent evaporation. Artabanus followed the obviously wise policy of retreating and destroying the wells and canals before him. Cavalry was sent forward which established contact with the Parthian horsemen engaged in this work and drove them away, and the Seleucid forces reached Hecatompylos practically unopposed. Antiochus determined to advance into Hyrcania and moved forward to Tagae (Tak?) near Damghan.⁷⁰ His ascent to the summit of Mount Labus (Lamavu) was hotly contested by Parthian troops or their allies posted on the heights above, but he reorganized his system of advance and forced the passage. At the pass itself a pitched battle was fought and the Parthians defeated. Antiochus managed to restrain his troops from headlong pursuit and advanced in good order down into Hyrcania, where he occupied the walled town of Tambrax (Sari?).⁷¹ The important

⁶⁹ Justin xli. 5. 7 grossly exaggerates the figures, giving 100,000 foot and 20,000 cavalry!

⁷⁰ PW, art. "Tagai."

⁷¹ Mordtmann, "Hecatompylos," pp. 531-34; B. Dorn, *Caspia* (Académie impériale des sciences de St.-Petersbourg, *Mémoires*, 7. sér., XXIII 1 [1875]), pp. 15 and 129-30; PW, art. "Tambrax"; Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 37.

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center of Syrinx⁷² was taken after a siege of some duration, and all the Greek inhabitants were put to death by the Parthians just before the town was carried by assault.⁷³ What happened thereafter is uncertain, but Antiochus found it prudent to make peace and a treaty of alliance with Artabanus.⁷⁴ Twenty-one years later Antiochus met his death in a vain attempt to recoup his fortune by the sack of a temple of Bel in Elymais.⁷⁵ We know nothing more of Artabanus I except that his reign is conventionally represented as ending in 191 B.C.⁷⁶

Priapatius, the succeeding monarch, ruled for fifteen years,⁷⁷ but beyond this fact our sources are silent. He left two sons, Mithradates and Phraates. As the latter was the elder,⁷⁸ he inherited the throne at his father's death, as was the Parthian custom.⁷⁹

⁷² Dorn, *op. cit.*, p. 127; W. Tomaschek, "Zur hist. Topographie," *SAWW*, CII (1883), 224 f.; J. Marquart, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte von Eran* (Göttingen, 1896-1905), II, 62; PW, art. "Syrinx," No. 3. Possibly Turunga, a day's trip west of Sari.

⁷³ Polyb. x. 27-31; at this point the fragment unfortunately breaks off.

⁷⁴ Justin xli. 5. 7.

⁷⁵ Strabo xvi. 1. 18; Diod. Sic. xxviii. 3 and xxix. 15; Justin xxxii. 2. 1 f.; Porphyry frs. 32. 10 and 47 (J, II B, pp. 1216 and 1224 f.).

⁷⁶ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xix; cf. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 59, who makes it 196 B.C.

⁷⁷ Justin xli. 5. 9; until 176 B.C., Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xx; until 181 B.C., Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 59, and Sykes, *Hist. of Per.*, I, 321. The name Priapatius would seem to be the same as that of Arsaces' ancestor Phriapites; cf. n. 41.

⁷⁸ Justin xli. 5. 9.

⁷⁹ Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 85.

Phraates soon turned his arms against the peoples who dwelt in the Elburz range, south of the Caspian Sea. The Mardians⁸⁰ in particular he deported and settled in Charax near the Caspian Gates.⁸¹ Not long after this victory Phraates died and left the throne to his brother Mithradates, for whom he cherished a special affection, although he had several sons presumably of age.⁸² If we follow the traditional date, Mithradates came to the throne about 171 B.C.;⁸³ with his accession we enter one of the greatest periods of Parthian history.⁸⁴

About 175 B.C. the usurper Eucratides wrested control of Bactria from Demetrius, who was more interested in his conquests in the Punjab.⁸⁵ Taking advantage of Bactrian weakness which had doubtless resulted from continued warfare, Mithradates may have invaded Tapuria and Traxiana at this time.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ On these peoples see Arrian *Anabasis* iii. 24; Strabo xi. 8. 1 and xi. 13. 6.

⁸¹ Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 7. Charax is the Greek translation of the native word for "stockade."

⁸² Justin xli. 5. 9-10.

⁸³ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xx.

⁸⁴ E. Breccia, "Mitridate I il Grande, di Partia," *Klio*, V (1905), 39-54.

⁸⁵ Cf. Apollodorus *Parthica*(?) in Strabo xv. 1. 3; see also xi. 9. 2.

⁸⁶ There is no evidence to date this campaign. On these districts cf. Strabo xi. 11. 2, whose Aspionus and Turiva are so identified by Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 122-26. Tarn believes the campaign took place after 163; but his argument in *CAH*, IX, 578 and n. 1, that Parthia was a bar to the transmission of even coinage designs, does not seem strong. Cf. Rostovtzeff in *CAH*, VII, 174.

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The belief that Mithradates extended his power as far south and east as Seistan, part of Aria, and Gedrosia rests solely on the identification of the Hydraspes of Orosius with the modern Porali.⁸⁷

The hasty departure of Antiochus IV Epiphanes from Palestine for the far eastern portion of the empire suggests an advance by the Parthians.⁸⁸ True, Palestine was unsettled—not an unusual condition for that region—but such an event as the invasion of the eastern lands by Mithradates at this time would have loomed as far more important in the eyes of the Seleucid ruler. In 165 B.C. Antiochus crossed the Euphrates⁸⁹ and marched into Armenia, where the king, Artaxias, was captured and forced to acknowledge the supremacy of the Seleucid ruler.⁹⁰ Thence Antiochus apparently returned to the great road,

⁸⁷ On this matter see pp. 56 f. There are other possibilities than the Porali. The southern and eastern conquests are doubtfully accepted by Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 579. The elephant on the coins of Mithradates is not evidence for Indian conquests; cf. the coins of Phraates II, Artabanus "II" (my III), and Mithradates III in Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 262, also G. H. Abbott, *The Elephant on Coins* (Sydney, 1919), p. 6. The Parthians apparently made little use of this animal; *Tac. Ann.* xv. 15 and Dio Cass. lxxii. 21. 4 are the only literary mentions. This is peculiar, since both the Seleucidae and the Sasanidae made much of their elephants.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Tac. Hist.* v. 8.

⁸⁹ Josephus *Ant.* xii. 295-97. Cf. IV Maccabees 18:5 and Walther Kolbe, *Beiträge zur syrischen und jüdischen Geschichte* ("Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament," XXXV [Stuttgart, 1926]), pp. 106 and 155-59.

⁹⁰ Appian *Syr.* 45 and 66; Diod. Sic. xxxi. 17a (ed. Dindorf, 1868).

passed through Ecbatana, and attacked Persepolis, where the enraged populace drove him out.⁹¹ Perhaps he entered Elymais also.⁹² Eventually he was defeated and forced to retreat, and on the return journey he died at Gabae (Isfahan).⁹³

The incursion of Mithradates into Elymais must have alarmed Timarchus, king of Media, since he was obviously the next victim of further expansion by Parthia. Timarchus was king of Media as late as 161 B.C.,⁹⁴ and we are told that the invasion of Media by Mithradates was contemporaneous with the murder of Eucratides of Bactria by his son,⁹⁵ which took place about 155 B.C. Between 161 and 155 B.C., therefore, Mithradates waged a long war with Media, the success of which remained for some time in the balance. At length victorious, he set a man by the name of Bacasis to rule over the new territory.⁹⁶

The acquisition of Media opened the door of Mesopotamia for Parthian expansion into that fertile terri-

⁹¹ II Maccabees 9: 1-2.

⁹² Josephus *Ant.* xii. 354 f.; cf. F. Cumont, "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1932, pp. 284 f., an inscription for the safety of an Antiochus and a Laodice, referred by Cumont on paleographic grounds to Antiochus Eiphanes.

⁹³ Polyb. xxxi. 9.

⁹⁴ PW, art. "Timarchos," No. 5; *CAH*, VIII, 518-20.

⁹⁵ Justin xli. 6. 6.

⁹⁶ Justin xli. 6. 7. This was contrary to the usual Parthian custom of feudatory kingdoms.

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tory.⁹⁷ A badly broken cuneiform tablet, which must be freely interpreted, gives us a contemporary account of the advance of Mithradates. When news of his approach reached the Seleucid ruler, Demetrius Nicator, then in Babylonia and very possibly at Seleucia on the Tigris, the latter quickly gathered together what men he could secure⁹⁸ and marched into Media to meet the enemy.⁹⁹ Apparently the Parthian managed to outmaneuver him and continued his advance. In the meantime Demetrius had left orders to

⁹⁷ The Parthian invasion is referred to in *Orac. Sibyl.* iii. 303-13. This section of book iii has been dated on other grounds to about 140 B.C. by R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1913), II, 384, n. on lines 295-488.

⁹⁸ That the person referred to is Demetrius, not Mithradates, is shown by the fact that he gathered "men of all sorts." The Parthian ruler would have had with him the army with which he had just invaded the country.

⁹⁹ This account of the campaign is drawn from British Museum tablet SH 108, described by F. X. Kugler, *Sternkunde und Sterndienst in Babel* (Münster in Westfalen, 1907-35), II, 442, and partially published in his *Von Moses bis Paulus* (Münster in Westfalen, 1922), pp. 338 ff. Olmstead restores lines 2-9 as follows:

" . . . Men of all sorts [Demetrius collected]; to the cities of Media [he marched] In the beginning of that month, on the 22d day *su-bu*(?) . . . the *rab uqu* (general) entered the land of Akkad. [Against him] Arshaka the king to Seleucia [went. The city of . . . , of] the land of Ashur, which before the face of Arshaka the king [had bowed down], [Into Seleucia], the royal city, he entered; that month, on the 28th day, [he sat on the throne].

"Year 171, Arshaka the king, on the 30th of the month Du²uzu"

This passage was followed by astronomical data. While not certain, the restorations are much more probable than would appear to the uninitiated, for they are the common formulas of contemporary documents. Kugler's widely different interpretation of the text is followed by Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 579 f. See now Olmstead, "Cuneiform Texts and Hellenistic Chronology," *Class. Philol.*, XXXII (1937), 12 f.

gather additional troops, and one of his generals entered Mesopotamia, coming probably from Syria, with reinforcements. Mithradates turned southward to Seleucia and defeated him. At Seleucia the Parthian monarch received a deputation which brought word of friendship from some city in the land of Ashur,¹⁰⁰ for that territory must have been fully aware of the turn affairs had taken after the defeat of the general of Demetrius. Mithradates entered the royal city of Seleucia late in June or early in July; he was recognized as king on or before July 8, 141 B.C. Before October 14 of that year Mithradates' sovereignty was acknowledged as far south as Uruk.¹⁰¹ Naturally the inhabitants of Susa and the surrounding region felt uneasy, as is shown by a dedicatory inscription of 171 S.E. (141 B.C.) for the safety of a king and queen whose names are cautiously omitted.¹⁰² Susa was the next logical point in the advance of the Great King.

Sometime between October and December, 141

¹⁰⁰ Moses Chor. i. 7 and ii. 4. 1 makes Assyria subject to Mithradates.

¹⁰¹ The double-dated tablet in Otto Schroeder, *Kontrakte der Seleukidenzeit aus Warka* ("Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler," XV [Leipzig, 1916]), No. 37, proves no more than that Uruk then acknowledged Mithradates as king. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 576 and 579 f., operating with the *rēš šarriiti*, "accession year," places the capture of Babylon before 1 Nisan, 141 B.C.; but "accession years" were never employed by the Seleucidae, and therefore documents would have been double-dated as soon as the sovereignty of Mithradates was acknowledged.

¹⁰² F. Cumont, "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1932, pp. 278 f.

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B.C., Mithradates was on his way to Hyrcania.¹⁰³ The cause of his departure from Mesopotamia at this critical juncture in his campaign was probably a raid by the Sacae, who shortly before 165 B.C. had been forced from their homeland in Turkestan by the Yüeh-chi¹⁰⁴ and by this time were certainly close to the eastern borders of Parthia. The forces in Mesopotamia were turned over to a Parthian commander, and Mithradates never returned to that region, for the remainder of his reign was occupied with campaigns in southern and central Parthia.¹⁰⁵ His departure from the Land

¹⁰³ Justin xli. 6. 6-9, after the Median campaign, omits the capture of Babylonia and then speaks of Mithradates' setting out for Hyrcania. Orosius v. 4. 16 preserves the tradition of activity in the east between the first and second campaigns of Demetrius; cf. p. 25. See also discussions of British Museum tablet Sp. I 176 by Kugler, *Von Moses bis Paulus*, pp. 342 f., and T. G. Pinches, *The Old Testament in the Light of Historical Records and Legends of Assyria and Babylonia* (2d ed.; London, 1903), p. 484 and p. 553, n. Kugler dates the tablet astronomically to Kislimu, 171 S.E., i.e., December, 141 B.C. The passage concerned here says, as translated by Strassmaier for Kugler:

"In the same month I heard that Arshaka the king and his troops in (Pinches, 'to') the city of Arqania, the king (Pinches omits) On the 6th the Elamites with their soldiers marched against the city of Apamea on the river Šilbu" Elsewhere in the tablet Seleucia is mentioned.

¹⁰⁴ See pp. 55 f.

¹⁰⁵ I Maccabees 14:1-3 states positively that Demetrius was captured (see p. 25) by a Parthian general. Other sources on the campaign do not mention Mithradates. Note that Justin xxxvi. 1. 5 f. says that Demetrius, captured not long after Mithradates left Mesopotamia, was sent to Hyrcania; the logical inference is that he was sent to the Parthian monarch. Cf. British Museum tablet SH 108 (see p. 22, n. 99), line 20, Olmstead's restoration:

"That month (Ululu or later), on the 3d day, Nica[tor the king was made prisoner]."

Farther on the text mentions "Arshaka the king" and "Seleucia."

of the Two Rivers for Hyrcania enabled the Elamites to raid the city of Apamea on the Şilhu River.¹⁰⁶

Mithradates had no sooner gone than Demetrius returned to the attack. Doubtless he was justifiably encouraged by appeals for help from recently conquered peoples,¹⁰⁷ particularly from the Greek elements. As Demetrius advanced, large numbers flocked to his standards; we hear of contingents from Bactria, Elymais, and Persis. He won several victories,¹⁰⁸ but eventually, by either strategy or force, was taken by the Parthians and as a pointed example paraded through the streets of those cities which had aided him. Demetrius was then sent to Hyrcania to Mithradates. There he was treated as became his rank¹⁰⁹ and was given Rhodogune, daughter of Mithradates, in marriage.¹¹⁰

His enemy safely disposed of, Mithradates turned to punish those who had furnished aid to the Seleucid ruler. Not only had the Elymaeans thus provoked an attack, but the wealth of their temples would replenish a treasury depleted by warfare. The loot from

¹⁰⁶ See p. 24, n. 103, also PW, arts. "Apamea," No. 3, "Σελας," No. 2 and "Dialas," and H. H. Schaeder, "Ḥasan al-Başrî," *Der Islam*, XIV (1925), 15 ff.

¹⁰⁷ Justin xxxvi. 1. 2-4.

¹⁰⁸ Justin xxxvi. 1. 4. This is the second campaign of Plut. *Reg. imp. apophtheg.* 184. 1 (Loeb, III, p. 86) and Orosius v. 4. 17. Cf. Kolbe, *Beiträge*, pp. 38-40.

¹⁰⁹ I Maccabees 14:1-3; Justin xxxvi. 1. 5-6 and xxxviii. 9. 2-3.

¹¹⁰ Appian *Syr.* 67.

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the temples of "Athena" and Artemis alone is reported as ten thousand talents,¹¹¹ and no doubt there were others. The city of Seleucia (Mange?), formerly Solace, on the Hedyphon (Jarrāḥī) River was captured.¹¹² Since the Parthians were established in Susa shortly after the death of Mithradates,¹¹³ that territory was probably added to the empire by the Great King himself. Mithradates died peaceably in 138/37 B.C., the first Parthian date fixed accurately by numismatic and cuneiform evidence.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Strabo xvi. 1. 18. Note that Justin xli. 6. 7-8 mentions the campaign in Elymais after that in Hyrcania. There was a temple of Artemis on the Eulaeus River below Susa; see Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 135 and PW, art. "Eulaios." The Eulaeus is the modern Karun.

¹¹² Strabo xvi. 1. 18. For the identifications see PW, 2d ser., IV, col. 2561, "Σελεύκεια," No. 13.

¹¹³ F. Cumont, "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1932, p. 281, dated to 130 B.C. J. M. Unvala, "Inventaire des monnaies recueillies dans les fouilles," *Mém. Miss. archéol. de Perse*, XXV (1934), 115, No. 129, publishes without illustration a coin of Mithradates I from Susa, "161 Sél. = 152/151 ap.(!) J.-C.," actually 151/50 B.C.

¹¹⁴ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 15. Dates on Parthian coinage throughout this volume are computed on the basis of the Babylonian calendar, with New Year on 1 Nisan (April), and of the Seleucid era, which began in Babylonia in 311 B.C. For numismatic proof of the use of the Babylonian calendar see Robert H. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia on the Tigris* ("University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," XXXVII [Ann Arbor, 1935]), pp. 147-53, and review by E. T. Newell in *AJA*, XLI (1937), 515-17. A tablet from Uruk dated "day 8, year 109 Arisak, equals year 173(?)," i.e., 139/38 B.C., is published by A. T. Clay, *Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan*. II. *Legal Documents from Erech Dated in the Seleucid Era* (New York, 1913), No. 52. His No. 53, without year but written by the same scribe, is dated in the reign of Arsak'u and Ri-in'(?)-nu his mother, who was regent. This king must be the successor of Mithradates. Cf. also Justin xli. 6. 9.

The empire of Mithradates at his death included Parthia proper, Hyrcania, Media, Babylonia, Assyria, Elymais, Persis(?), and the districts of Tapuria and Traxiana.¹¹⁵ Mithradates was the first Parthian ruler whose name did honor to the god Mithra; and the worship of this god, hitherto largely officially ignored, must have received official sanction. The Mithra *yasht* of the *Vendidad* must have been composed in the last years of the reign of Mithradates.¹¹⁶

The language of official communication of the Parthian government was probably Pahlavi, that is, Persian written in Aramaic characters. Whole Aramaic words are rather frequently written, for which the reader substitutes their Persian equivalents. Persian in Aramaic characters appears on the tomb of Darius I. The writing on the early coins of Persis, which date roughly about 250-150 B.C., could be either Aramaic or Pahlavi. The introduction of Pahlavi into the government offices may well have been coincident with Parthian expansion over Iran; cer-

¹¹⁵ It is often assumed that the lands listed in the *Vendidad*, *fargard* i, belonged to Mithradates I; cf. E. Benveniste, "L'Êrân-vêz et l'origine légendaire des Iraniens," *Bull. School of Or. Studies*, VII (1933-35), 272. This cannot be, since it is very doubtful, for example, whether Mithradates I ever held Mesene. Even if he did, its conquest must be placed after the occupation of Sogdiana by the Yüeh-chi.

¹¹⁶ Besides the points noted above, the Mithra *yasht* was evidently written in a period of expansion. The western boundary had reached the Tigris but not the Euphrates; see *ibid.* xxvii. 104. Cf. also Olmstead, "Intertestamental Studies," *JAOs*, LVI (1936), 253, n. 40, and Debevoise, "Parthian Problems," *AJSL*, XLVII (1930/31), 81.

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tainly it could not have been later than the conquest of Mesopotamia.

After the Parthians occupied the ancient and fertile Land of the Two Rivers, conflict with western powers became inevitable. Expansion to the east also brought with it further responsibilities. The story of these contacts on the frontiers of the empire will be dealt with in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

EARLY FOREIGN RELATIONS

MITHRADATES THE FIRST established Parthia as a world power; whether or not his successors could maintain that position against the Seleucidae remained to be seen. Phraates II came to the throne about 138/37 B.C. on the death of his father Mithradates.¹ He must have been very young, for his mother, whose name was Ri-ʿinl(?) -nu, acted as regent.²

Babylonia remained for the next seven years in the hands of the Parthians, as cuneiform documents from there show;³ but the coinage of Phraates suggests

¹ Justin xlii. 1. 1.

² A. T. Clay, *Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpont Morgan*. II. *Legal Documents from Erech Dated in the Seleucid Era* (New York, 1913), No. 53 and p. 13.

³ A copy of an old astronomical work, dated 27 Aiaru, 111 A.E., 174 S.E. (to be corrected to 175 S.E.; cf. same date correctly written in Reisner, *Hymnen*, No. 5, referred to below), i. e., 137 B.C., Epping and Strassmaier in *ZA*, VI (1891), 228 and 244; a copy of an ancient hymn, dated same year, George A. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen nach Thontafeln griechischer Zeit* (Berlin, 1896), No. 5; a copy of another, dated 114 A.E., i. e., 134 B.C., *ibid.*, No. 35, Pl. 153; a tablet dated in year 6 of "Arʿsiuqqa, king" (i. e., about 132/31 B.C. on the probable assumption that this is Phraates II), Clay, *Babylonian Records*, II, No. 51. Ephemerides from slightly later years calculate a number of dates during this period and always give them to Arsaces; the last is 180 S.E., i. e.,

that he spent little time there,⁴ occupied as he was with nomadic invaders in the east. Proof for Parthian control over Susa appears for the first time in a double-dated inscription of the early part of 130 B.C.;⁵ but, as has been pointed out, the conquest was probably made by Mithradates.

Phraates like his father treated the captive Demetrius in a kindly manner, for he too may have entertained some notion of a Syrian expedition. The Parthian might hope indirectly to control Syria if Demetrius, backed by Parthian arms and money, made a successful attack on the seat of the Seleucid power. Demetrius could not be won over so easily; with the aid of a friend he attempted to escape. Because of their swift horsemen and better knowledge of the terrain, the Parthians were able to recapture the fugitives and bring them before Phraates. The friend was pardoned and recompensed for his fidelity, but Demetrius was severely censured and returned to Hyrcania and his wife. Sometime afterward, when he had become the father of several children, guard was relaxed. Parental cares failed to restrain Demetrius,

132 B.C., Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 446. The next document is dated by Antiochus, after his invasion of Mesopotamia; see pp. 31 f.

⁴ Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 16-19; note the preponderance of drachms, a denomination struck almost exclusively in the east. No coins of Phraates II were found at Seleucia; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 182 f.

⁵ Cumont, "Nouvelles inscr. grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1932, pp. 280 f.; dated 117 A.E. (not 116 as restored by Cumont), Xandicus (Addaru), 181 S.E., i.e., 13 March-10 April, 130 B.C. (not 131 as in Cumont).

who fled again with the same friend but was caught almost within the boundaries of his own kingdom. He was led again to Phraates, who refused to see him but returned him to his wife and children. To keep Demetrius amused and make him ashamed, the Parthian king presented him with a pair of golden dice.⁶

In the meantime Antiochus VII Sidetes (139/38–129 B.C.),⁷ having disposed of Tryphon, his rival to the Syrian throne, and defeated the Jews, prepared to secure his brother Demetrius and so remove him as a potential menace to his throne.⁸ He set out in 130 B.C. with a large force, the size of which made a great impression upon later historians.⁹ The Parthian army, whose strength was likewise greatly exagger-

⁶ Justin xxxviii. 9. 2–10.

⁷ See the account of Seleucid history in this period by E. R. Bevan in *CAH*, VIII, chap. xvi.

⁸ Cf. Trog. Pomp. xxxv: "Repetit inde superioris Asiae motus factos per Araetheum et Arsacem Parthum." The problem of who Araethus was appears to have been neglected. In addition to the sources cited below for this campaign, see Euseb. *Chron.*, ed. Karst, p. 120; Livy *Epit.* lix; Orosius v. 10. 8; Val. Max. ix. 1 ext. 4; cf. also J, II C, pp. 166 f.

⁹ Justin xxxviii. 10. 2 says 80,000 foot and 300,000 others, most of whom were noncombatants; Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 17. 1 says that 300,000 exclusive of camp followers were killed; Orosius v. 10. 8 numbers the fighting force at 100,000 and supernumeraries at 200,000. Bevan, *House of Sel.*, II, 242, speaks of the army as numbering 80,000, but on his p. 247 mentions the loss of 300,000 men! Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, pp. 98 f., is incorrect in his statement that Orosius gives the camp followers as one-third the fighting men. Even the smallest figures given above are absurdly large. The campaign is mentioned by Posidonius *Hist.* xiv. fr. 9 (J, II A, p. 227) in Athen. *Deip.* xii. 540 and by Josephus *Bell.* i. 50 and 62.

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ated,¹⁰ was to have been supplemented by Saca mercenaries who had been hired but who failed to arrive until after the termination of hostilities.¹¹ The troops of Antiochus, magnificently appointed and supported by a contingent of Jews under John Hyrcanus,¹² were also joined by several monarchs who had formerly been Parthian tributaries.¹³ Antiochus was the victor in three battles. In one, on the river Lycus (Greater Zab),¹⁴ he defeated the Parthian general Idates and raised a trophy in honor of his victory.¹⁵ Another of the Parthian leaders, Enius, met his death at the hands of the people of Seleucia.¹⁶ Because of these successes Antiochus laid claim to the title of "Great."¹⁷ Other Parthian dependencies, when they saw him master of Babylonia (130 B.C.),¹⁸ believed the newly established empire tottering and joined the Seleucid monarch.

When winter closed in, Antiochus went into quarters in Media instead of retiring to Syria as Phraates

¹⁰ Porphyry in Euseb. *Chron.* fr. 32. 19 (J, II B, p. 1217); Moses Chor. ii. 2. 4.

¹¹ Justin xlii. 1. 1-2.

¹² Nic. Dam. fr. 92 (J, II A, p. 381) in Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 251-52.

¹³ Justin xxxviii. 10. 5. ¹⁴ PW, art. "Lykos," No. 12.

¹⁵ Nic. Dam. fr. 92 in Josephus *loc. cit.*

¹⁶ Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 19. ¹⁷ Justin xxxviii. 10. 6.

¹⁸ A cuneiform copy of an old hymn is dated under Antiochus, 22 Aiaru, 182 s.e., i.e., June 2, 130 B.C.; see Reisner, *Hymnen*, text No. 25. On his p. xiv the date is given as "129 B.C. (?130?)."

had hoped. Because of the numbers of his troops he found it advisable to billet them in several cities, where they formed a burden to the populace, only a part of which was friendly. Since Phraates had been thrice vanquished by force, he turned to methods of greater finesse¹⁹ when the coming of spring brought about the renewal of the campaign. Messengers were sent to ask terms of peace from Antiochus, who named three conditions: Demetrius should be set free, all territory outside Parthia proper should be surrendered, and the Parthian king should pay tribute. Phraates peremptorily refused, as indeed he must except in the last extremity.²⁰ At this critical juncture Phraates played his trump card by sending Demetrius back to Syria at the head of a Parthian squadron in the hope that he might thus force Antiochus to return home. But relief came from the people of the invaded territory themselves, for, exasperated by months of violence from the rough Seleucid mercenaries and by demands for provisions, these garrison cities became pro-Parthian. The Seleucid soldiers were undoubtedly weakened by prolonged inactivity, and, scattered as they were, they lost their numerical advantage over the Parthians. Incited by agents of Phraates, the inhabitants of the various cities rose simultaneously and attacked most of the troops quartered in their districts. Antiochus, who may have

¹⁹ Justin xxxviii. 10. 7 ff.

²⁰ Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 15.

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passed the winter at Ecbatana (Hamadan),²¹ hastened to aid the nearest contingent, only to discover that Phraates had anticipated that movement. He was urged by his staff not to engage the superior enemy forces, who had but to fly to the neighboring hills to escape pursuit by the Seleucid cavalry. Spring was at hand and travel difficult, but a successor of Alexander the Great could not give ground before a foe whom he had defeated three times, and the Parthian attack was received on the spot. The Seleucid troops, in poor condition, were easily put to flight by the Parthians, and Antiochus died, abandoned by all his men;²² perhaps he was killed in the fighting,²³ or he may have committed suicide.²⁴ So complete was the Parthian victory that Antiochus' young son Seleucus²⁵ and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius,²⁶ were among those captured. Athenaeus, commander of the Syrian forces, was among the first to flee. The number of the slain was placed at the absurdly large figure of three hundred thousand.²⁷ The body of Antiochus was treated with all respect due a monarch and was sent

²¹ Suggested by Bevan, *House of Sel.*, II, 244.

²² Justin xxxviii. 10. 10; cf. Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 16-17.

²³ Justin *loc. cit.*; Orosius v. 10; Porphyry fr. 32. 19 (J, II B, p. 1217); Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 253 and 271; Posidonius *Hist.* xvi. fr. 11 (J, II A, p. 228) in Athen. *Deip.* x. 439; *Chronicon Maroniticum* in *CSCO Syr.*, 3. ser., t. IV, Versio (1903-5), p. 42, lines 14 f.

²⁴ Appian *Syr.* 68; Aelian *De natura animalium* x. 34.

²⁵ Porphyry in Euseb. *Chron.* (J, II B, pp. 1217 f., fr. 32. 19).

²⁶ Justin xxxviii. 10. 10.

²⁷ Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 17.

by Phraates to Syria in a silver casket. The daughter of Demetrius proved so charming to the Parthian king that he took her into his harem, and Seleucus was treated in a fashion befitting royalty. Thus the last serious attempt by a Seleucid monarch to regain the lost eastern provinces ended in complete failure. Incompetent kings and internal struggles rendered farther Parthian advance relatively easy.²⁸

Now that victory was his, Phraates regretted the release of Demetrius and ordered a body of cavalry to recapture him. Once free, however, Demetrius had sought his own country immediately, and the Parthian troops returned empty-handed.²⁹

Encouraged by his success against Antiochus, Phraates determined to invade Syria and entered Babylonia; but he was forced to abandon the whole plan by a Saca invasion in the east. Before leaving Mesopotamia to repel the invaders, he appointed his favorite, Himerus, a Hyrcanian,³⁰ as governor.

The Saca mercenaries hired for the war against Antiochus were probably an advance group of this eastern horde whom Phraates attempted to quiet for a time by a subsidy. If the failure of the sources to mention the presence of Phraates in Babylonia to meet the attack of Antiochus in person is an indication that he was engaged elsewhere we may have additional

²⁸ Strabo xiv. 5. 2.

²⁹ Justin xxxviii. 10. 11 and xxxix. 1. 1.

³⁰ Justin xlii. 1. 3; Posidonius *Hist.* xvi. fr. 13 (J, II A, p. 228) in Athen. *Deip.* xi. 466. Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21 gives the name as *Εὐήμερος*.

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evidence that the Saca invasion had begun by 130 B.C.³¹ The story that the mercenaries arrived after hostilities had ceased, and consequently were refused their pay, must not be taken too literally. They are said to have demanded either reimbursement for their trouble or employment against some other enemy. When this was refused, they began to ravage the Parthian territory as far west as Mesopotamia.³² Whether any considerable number of them ever reached the Land of the Two Rivers is doubtful.

The question of whence these invaders came and what caused their movement is part of the story of the Indian frontier and will be discussed in the succeeding chapter. Those who entered Parthia were probably a portion of the Sacaraucae (Saca Rawaca)³³ together with a still larger body of the Massagetae and other groups attracted by the opportunity for new territory and plunder. The invasion naturally followed the two main branches of the great road (cf. pp. 205 f.), one leading to Mesopotamia through Merv, Hecatompylos, and Ecbatana, and the other, utilized when resistance to the westward advance turned the hordes southward, leading to India through Merv, Herat, and Seistan.³⁴

³¹ As Tarn points out in *CAH*, IX, 581 f.

³² Joan. Antioch. fr. 66. 2 (*FHG*, IV, 561).

³³ PW, art. "Sacaraucae"; Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 111-13, and in *CAH*, IX, 582 f.

³⁴ Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," pp. 117 f.

In the army which Phraates led eastward against the Sacae were Greek troops, made prisoners during the war with Antiochus. The Parthian is said to have treated these Greeks with great cruelty. Phraates perhaps counted on the fact that they were facing unknown foes far from their homeland and would therefore be fighting for their lives; but when in the battle which eventually resulted between the Parthians and the Sacae the Greeks saw their captors hard pressed, they at once deserted to the enemy. The tide was turned against the Parthians, and in the massacre which ensued, about 128 B.C.,³⁵ Phraates perished.

Artabanus II, son of Priapatius and uncle of Phraates,³⁶ inherited the problem of the Sacae, to whom he may have paid tribute.³⁷ With the invaders in possession of the larger part of his kingdom, Artabanus was soon forced to arms. In an offensive movement somewhere in the region of Bactria against the "Tochari," perhaps the Yüeh-chi of the Chinese records,³⁸ he received a wound in the forearm, possibly from a poisoned weapon, which almost im-

³⁵ Justin xlii. 1; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 183.

³⁶ Justin xlii. 2. 1. ³⁷ Joan. Antioch. fr. 66 (*FHG*, IV, 561).

³⁸ Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," pp. 106-11 and 115-16, believes the Yüeh-chi are historically improbable in this particular case and suggests the Pasiani, whose name might have been miscopied as Asiani, for which the name Tochari would then have been substituted, in the text of Justin xlii. 2. 2. H. W. Bailey, "Taugara," *Bull. School of Or. Studies*, VIII (1935-37), 912, denies that *ārśi* = Asii.

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mediately caused his death. This must have occurred in 124/23.³⁹

In the meantime Seleucia and the other cities of Mesopotamia had become dissatisfied with the rule of Himerus, the viceregent appointed by Phraates II in the year 129 B.C. Among other crimes he is charged with selling numerous Babylonians into Media as slaves.⁴⁰ Besides these internal troubles Himerus was soon face to face with a new power to the south, a new state arising in the territory once occupied by the old Seleucid province of the Erythrean Sea created by Antiochus III before Molon's revolt.⁴¹ Shortly after 129 B.C. the ancient city of Alexandria-Antioch near the head of the Persian Gulf was re-founded as Charax Spasinu by the Arab Hyspaosines, son of Sagdodonacus.⁴² Under the leadership of Hyspaosines the surrounding country was rapidly conquered, and thus was founded the kingdom of Characene. Not long after Himerus was appointed governor of Babylonia he engaged in a war with this king but was defeated.⁴³ By 127 B.C. Hyspaosines was in

³⁹ Justin xlii. 2. 2; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 183. The "Victory" coins of 124/23 were probably struck at Seleucia by Himerus at the order of Artabanus.

⁴⁰ Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21. Posidonius *Hist.* xvi. fr. 13 (J, II A, p. 228) in Athen. *Deip.* xi. 466 records a banquet given by Lysimachus of Babylon for Himerus and 300 Seleucians (the Senate?).

⁴¹ Polyb. v. 46.

⁴² On Charax see PW, arts. "Mesene" and "Alexandria," No. 13.

⁴³ Trog. Pomp. xlii mentions a war with Mesene, a part of Characene.

possession of Babylon⁴⁴ and probably also of Seleucia. His only dated coins are from 124/23 B.C., and by the next year Himerus again controlled central Babylonia and the mint city of Seleucia.⁴⁵ He celebrated his victory by striking coins which bore a Victory and the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ ΑΡΞΑΚΟΥ ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥ,⁴⁶ and his assumption of the title "king"⁴⁷ probably dated from this time. With the Sacae in possession of the larger portion of the eastern empire, Himerus now occupied the most important territory still under Parthian control.

Other interesting details of this period are cited by Pinches from unpublished tablets in the British

⁴⁴ T. G. Pinches, "A Babylonian Tablet Dated in the Reign of Aspasinē," *Babyl. and Or. Record*, IV (1889/90), 131-35; Terrien de Lacouperie, "Hyspaosines, Kharacenen King of Babylon," *ibid.*, pp. 136-44; Pinches, *The Old Testament* (2d ed.), pp. 481-84; Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 584.

⁴⁵ Until recently the attribution of certain coins to Himerus has been considered reasonably definite: Gardner, *Parthian Coinage*, pp. 7 and 34; Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xxi, xxiii, and 23 (somewhat doubtful); E. T. Newell, "A Parthian Hoard," *Num. Chron.*, 5th ser., IV (1924), 169 ff.; Newell, *Mithradates of Parthia and Hyspaosines of Characene* ("Numismatic Notes and Monographs," No. 26 [New York, 1925]), pp. 13 f. Mr. Newell now prefers to assign them to Phraates II (in *Survey of Persian Art*, ed. Arthur Upham Pope, in press), following Maurice Dayet, "Un tétradrachme arsacide inédit," *Arethuse*, II (1925), 63-66. The problem hinges on the only dated coin of Himerus, 189 S.E., i.e., 123/22 B.C., now considered by Mr. Newell to be of questionable status.

⁴⁶ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 23, No. 2; his other coins bear the title ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΡΞΑΚΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝΟΥΣ. The titles at once suggest Mithradates II; but the portraits will not allow this identification, and, if Himerus is rejected, Phraates remains the only other possibility.

⁴⁷ Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21 and the coins cited in the previous note.

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Museum of which not even English translations are available:

From this we learn that the Elamites made incursions in the neighborhood of the Tigris. Pilinussu, the general in Akkad, apparently carried on operations against another general, and seems to have gone to the cities of the Medes before Bāgā-asā [an Iranian name], the brother of the king. A man named Te'udišī [Theodosius] also seems to have opposed the general in Akkad. Yet another inscription of the same period states that Ti'imūṭusu [Timotheus], son of Aspāsinē, went from Babylon to Seleucia (on the Tigris). . . .⁴⁸

Mithradates II, son and successor of Artabanus, ascended the throne about 123 B.C. As in the case of his illustrious predecessor of the same name, his reign was important, and eventually he was called "the Great."⁴⁹ His first task was the reduction of Babylonia and the defeat of the Characenean ruler; bronze coins of Hypsaosines overstruck with the titles and portrait of Mithradates in 121/20 B.C. furnish proof that this was accomplished.⁵⁰

How much of eastern Parthia remained in the hands of the Sacae we do not know. Perhaps by this date the main force of the westward movement had been spent and the bulk of the invaders had turned southward.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Pinches, *The Old Testament* (2d ed.), p. 483. The words in brackets are my own.

⁴⁹ Trog. Pomp. xlii; Justin xlii. 2. 3.

⁵⁰ Newell, *Mithradates of Parthia and Hypsaosines of Characene*, pp. 11 f.

⁵¹ Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 116-19, believes that the Chinese sources prove the Parthians were in possession

Mithradates undoubtedly did recover much lost ground, for, as we have seen, he regained Babylonia and probably a number of provinces to the east.⁵² In far-off Delos at the shrine of Asclepius a dedicatory inscription of about 110 B.C. commemorates a "king of kings," Arsaces the Great, who to judge from the title must be Mithradates.⁵³ Fragments of other records of about the same period, written in Greek, have been found in Babylonia.⁵⁴ Another campaign of Mithradates was against Artavasdes of Armenia, as a result of which Tigranes, the eldest son of the Armenian

of Merv by 115 B.C. and suggests that this reconquest was due to a hypothetical "king of the campaign coins," a joint ruler controlling the eastern provinces. As Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xxxi-xxxii, had already pointed out, these coins cannot on numismatic grounds be assigned to Mithradates II but must be later. A study of a large hoard of Mithradates II strongly confirms this view; see Newell, "Coinage of Parthia" (in *Survey of Persian Art*, in press). McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 211, suggests that the "campaign coins" might plausibly be assigned to Mithradates' successor, Sinatruces, who struck them to celebrate his early victories as he advanced from exile among the "Scythians"; cf. p. 52.

⁵² Justin xlii. 2. 4-5 states that he added many peoples to the empire. Perhaps the Bactrian conquests, taken from the Scyths according to Strabo xi. 9. 2, should be placed in his reign.

⁵³ *OGIS*, I, No. 430; S. Reinach, "Fouilles de Délos," *Bull. de correspondance hellénique*, VII (1883), 349-53; A. von Sallet, "Beiträge zur antiken Münzkunde: Arsaciden-Inschrift von Delos," *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XII (1885), 372-75.

⁵⁴ Bernard Haussoullier, "Inscriptions grecques de Babylone," *Klio*, IX (1909), 353, a stone dated 121/20 B.C., and 352 f., a tablet dated 110/9 or 111/10 B.C.; cf. M. I. Rostovtzeff and C. B. Welles, "A Parchment Contract of Loan from Dura-Europus on the Euphrates," *Yale Classical Studies*, II (1931), 40 f. See also Woldemar Schileico, "Ein babylonischer Weihetext in griechischer Schrift," *Archiv für Orientforschung*, V (1928-29), 11-13.

king, was a hostage among the Parthians for a number of years.⁵⁵ From this time onward Armenia was destined to play a major role in Parthian affairs. Eventually its ruling family became a branch of the royal Arsacid line, and its territory a bone of contention over which Rome and Parthia waged a long and bitter struggle.

The increased political importance of Parthia during the reign of Mithradates II was due in large part to the wealth accruing to her treasuries from the development of overland trade. While this certainly began before the Parthian invasion of Mesopotamia,⁵⁶ unification of political control along the whole route from the Roman frontier to the point where the trade was taken over by Chinese merchants proved a tremendous stimulus to business. Our first definite information comes from Chinese sources,⁵⁷ which report

⁵⁵ Strabo xi. 14. 15; Justin xxxviii. 3. 1; cf. Trog. Pomp. xlii, where the war is mentioned.

⁵⁶ G. M. A. Richter, "Silk in Greece," *American Journal of Archaeology*, XXXIII (1929), 27-33.

⁵⁷ A. Wylie, "History of the Heung-noo in Their Relations with China," *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, III (1874), 401-51, and V (1876), 41-80; Thomas W. Kingsmill, "The Intercourse of China with Eastern Turkestan and the Adjacent Countries in the Second Century B.C.," *JRAS*, 1882, pp. 74-104; Wylie, "Notes on the Western Regions," *Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, X (1881), 20-73, and XI (1882), 83-115; Friedrich Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient* (Shanghai, 1885); Édouard Chavannes, *Les mémoires de Se-ma Ts'ien* (Paris, 1895-1905), pertinent chapters not published, but see Introduction; Sylvain Lévi and É. Chavannes, "L'Itinéraire d'Ou K'ong," *JA*, 9. sér., VI (1895), 341-84; Edward Harper Parker, "Chinese Knowledge of Early Persia," *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 3d ser., XV (1903), 144-69; O. Franke, *Beiträge aus chinesischen Quellen*

that about 128 B.C. the famous Chinese traveler Chang K'ien spent a year in that part of Bactria which lay east of the Oxus, territory then in possession of the Sacae. Sometime later the first Chinese embassy journeyed to the Parthian capital. The members of the mission, sent by Wu-ti (141-87 B.C.) of the Han dynasty, were received with great honor, and when they returned they were accompanied by a Parthian delegation which took with it ostrich eggs and conjurers.⁵⁸ Trade between Parthia and China probably preceded rather than followed these events, although the movements of the Sacae and the Yüeh-chi obviously made such ventures hazardous from 165 B.C. onward.

Credit for the discovery and use of the monsoon as an aid to navigation in the Indian Ocean is given to a

zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker und Scythen Zentralasiens (*APAW*, 1904, No. 1 [part translated into English in *Indian Antiquary*, XXXV (1906), 33-47]); Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le Wei liou," *T'oung pao*, 2. sér., VI (1905), 519-71; Chavannes, "Trois généraux chinois de la dynastie des Han orientaux," *ibid.*, VII (1906), 210-69; Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le Heou Han chou," *ibid.*, VIII (1907), 149-234; Friedrich Hirth, "The Story of Chang K'ien, China's Pioneer in Western Asia," *JAO*S, XXXVII (1917), 89-152; J. J. M. de Groot, *Chinesische Urkunden zur Geschichte Asiens*. I. *Die Hunnen der vorchristlichen Zeit*; II. *Die Westlande Chinas in der vorchristlichen Zeit* (Berlin, 1921-26); Léon Wieger, *Textes historiques* (2. éd.; Hien-Hien, 1922-23); O. Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*. I. *Das Altertum und das Werden des Konfuzianischen Staates* (Berlin, 1930); McGovern, *Early Empires of Central Asia* (in press). Of these, the works of Hirth, Franke, and de Groot and the translations of Chavannes are the most trustworthy.

⁵⁸ Hirth, "Story of Chang K'ien," *JAO*S, XXXVII (1917), 107; on the date see *ibid.*, p. 135.

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merchant named Hippalus about the year 100 B.C.⁵⁹ As might be expected, full utilization of this knowledge was not made until later, roughly the middle of the first century of our era.⁶⁰

His widely extended empire undoubtedly forced Mithradates to delegate extraordinary powers to his subordinates and gave greater opportunities than ever for self-aggrandizement. The satrap of satraps, Gotarzes, who appears on a relief cut by Mithradates in the great rock at Behistun, must by that time already have embarked on a career which eventually brought him into open revolt against his sovereign. If we accept the restoration by Herzfeld,⁶¹ based on a copy made before the partial destruction of the relief, the inscription⁶² should read

1 ΚΩΦΑΣΑΤΗΣ ΜΙΘΡΑΤΗΣ ΠΕΤΤ[ΙΣΤΕΥΜΕ-
ΝΟΞ] ΓΩΤΑΡΖΗΣ

2 ΣΑΤΡΑΠΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΣΑΤΡ[ΑΤΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ
ΜΕΓΑΣ ΜΙΘΡΑΔΑ]ΤΗΣ

“Kophasates, Mithrates the overseer(?), ,
Gotarzes the satrap of satraps, (and) the Great
King Mithradates.”

⁵⁹ Date uncertain. See PW, art. “Hippalos,” No. 3; W. L. Westermann, “On Inland Transportation and Communication in Antiquity,” *Political Science Quarterly*, XLIII (1928), 384 f.

⁶⁰ E. H. Warmington, *The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India* (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 35 ff.

⁶¹ *Am Tor von Asien* (Berlin, 1920), pp. 35 ff.

⁶² *OGIS*, I, No. 431.

The figures thus named represented Mithradates, the chief satrap Gotarzes,⁶³ and three others, probably also satraps.

About 94 B.C., probably on the death of his father Artavasdes, the Armenian prince Tigranes,^{63a} for some years past a hostage among the Parthians, was returned to his country and placed on the throne with the aid of Parthian troops. In payment for their services the Parthians received "seventy valleys."⁶⁴ Tigranes proved an able monarch. Soon after his establishment as king of Armenia he formed an alliance with Mithradates of Pontus, who between 112 and 93 B.C. had built a great and powerful state to the northwest. To further cement the union he married Cleopatra, daughter of his ally. The two kings then proceeded to drive Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia from his throne.

In the meantime Mithradates of Parthia, safe from interference by the growing power of Armenia, pushed rapidly westward. Antiochus X Eusebes Philopator was contending for the doubtful honor of the Seleucid throne with Demetrius III Eucærus and Ptolemy

⁶³ This might be the Gotarzes of A.D. 38-51 (see pp. 166-74), but there are several arguments against such attribution. Tacitus *Ann.* xi. 10 gives the name of the ruler contemporary with Gotarzes II as Meherdates, a form definitely later than that of the inscription. The forms of the letters agree with the earlier rather than the later date. Finally, the name Gotarzes ceases to appear in the same year as the commonly accepted date for the death of Mithradates II, 87 B.C. On this point see p. 44 and Herzfeld, *Am Tor von Asien*, pp. 39 f.

^{63a} PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 1.

⁶⁴ Strabo xi. 14. 15.

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VIII Lathyrus. A certain Laodice, when she was attacked by the Parthians, who had now reached the Euphrates,⁶⁵ summoned Antiochus, who fell in the fighting.⁶⁶

Rome deemed it time to interfere in 92 B.C. and commissioned Sulla to replace Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia on his throne. The real but not avowed object was to curb the growing power of Mithradates of Pontus. The rapid advance of Parthia toward the Roman frontier was no doubt a matter of some concern. Orobazus was sent as ambassador of Parthia to meet Sulla on the Euphrates, probably near Melitene. The Parthian asked for the friendship of the Roman people and perhaps also an alliance both offensive and defensive. Schooled in Hellenistic rather than Latin tradition as Orobazus undoubtedly was, he assumed his request would be taken literally, and never dreamed it implied an offer to become tributary. Sulla had little realization of Parthia's military strength and still less of her future potentialities. In Roman eyes Parthia was overshadowed by the more obvious peril of Armenia and Pontus.⁶⁷ Sulla

⁶⁵ Plut. *Sulla* 5.

⁶⁶ Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 371. The text calls her queen of the Γαλιηνῶν—perhaps an attempt by a copyist to make them Gauls. Some correction is demanded. The Sameni (see Steph. Byz. *s.v.*), an otherwise unknown Arab tribe, have been suggested. See Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, pp. 80 f., and J. Dobiáš, "Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes," *Archiv or.*, III (1931), 221–23 (full discussion and bibliography).

⁶⁷ On the mission of Sulla and the meeting with the Parthian ambassador see Plut. *Sulla* 5; Livy *Epi.* lxx; Ruf. Fest. 15; Vell. Pat. ii. 24. 3. Dobiáš, *op. cit.*, pp. 215–56, gives an excellent treatment of the subject.

overplayed his hand and treated Orobazus with some arrogance; nevertheless a treaty seems to have been concluded, or at any rate some understanding was reached.⁶⁸ Orobazus was later executed because he had meekly submitted to the treatment accorded him by Sulla and had thus failed to uphold the dignity of Parthia.⁶⁹ This diplomatic blunder on the part of Sulla must have drawn the three great proponents of oriental imperialism closer together than ever before. Mithradates of Parthia took to wife Aryazate,⁷⁰ surnamed Automa, the daughter of the Great King

⁶⁸ Livy *Epit.* c refers to the treaty with Lucullus; but Ruf. Fest. 15' Florus i. 46. 4, and Orosius vi. 13. 2, all following Livy, seem to indicate some agreement with Sulla. Cf. Dobiáš, *op. cit.*, pp. 219 f.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Sulla* 5.

⁷⁰ Our source, Avroman parchment I, is dated 225 of an unspecified era which, following the arguments of E. H. Minns, "Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan," *JHS*, XXXV (1915), 22-65, I take to be the Seleucid, making the date 87 B.C. If it were the Arsacid era, the date would be 23 B.C. The question cannot yet be settled with certainty; but the Avroman parchments show undoubted relationships to contemporary Babylonian business documents, which in every known case where single dating is found employ the Seleucid, not the Arsacid, era. The year 87, not 23, is the time when a Parthian king would boastfully place his Armenian wife between his two sister-wives in his titulary. Tigranes II, who cannot have come to the throne much before 20 B.C., likewise bore, however, according to his coins, the title "great king"; see E. T. Newell, *Some Unpublished Coins of Eastern Dynasts* ("Numismatic Notes and Monographs," No. 30 [New York, 1926]), p. 13. On the arguments for the Arsacid era see Rostovtzeff and Welles, "A Parchment Contract Loan," *Yale Classical Studies*, II (1931), 41 f. Other articles on the Avroman documents are: Ludwig Mitteis, "Miscellen," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung*, XXXVI (1915), 425-29; A. Cowley, "The Pahlavi Document from Avroman," *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 147-54; P. M. Meyer, *Juristische*

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Tigranes, and allied himself with Mithradates of Pontus.⁷¹

Some business documents dated in the reign of Arsaces, king of kings, with a date corresponding to 93 B.C.,⁷² and astronomical ephemerides dated under Arsaces in years corresponding to 92/91 B.C.⁷³ suggest that Mithradates was then in control of Babylonia. But early in 91 B.C.⁷⁴ a Gotarzes (I), king, with his queens Ashi³abatam and another whose name we cannot read,⁷⁵ appears on tablets from Babylon. Gotarzes, the former satrap of satraps, had now set

Papyri (Berlin, 1920), pp. 120-24; J. M. Unvala, "On the Three Parchments from Avroman in Kurdistan," *Bull. School of Or. Studies*, I (1920), 125-44.

⁷¹ Appian *Mith.* 15.

⁷² R. Campbell Thompson, *A Catalogue of the Late Babylonian Tablets in the Bodleian Library, Oxford* (London, 1927), pp. 28 f.; Strassmaier in *ZA*, III (1888), 133 f.

⁷³ 156 A.E., [220] S.E., on one; 15[6] A.E., [220] S.E., on the other. See Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 500.

⁷⁴ The date in Reisner, *Hymnen*, No. 51, was miswritten by the ancient scribe as 6 II Addaru, 155 A.E., 221 S.E.; but since 155 A.E. had no second Addaru the Arsacid date must be changed to 157 to correspond to the correct Seleucid one. The Arsaces of this hymn is almost certainly Gotarzes, for in 89 B.C. Queen Ashi³abatam appears as his consort; see *ZA*, VI (1891), 222.

⁷⁵ Reisner, *loc. cit.* Minns, "Avroman Parchments," *JHS*, XXXV (1915), 34 f., texts *h-j*, transliterates the GAŠAN sign as *bēltu* ("lady"), whereas *ibid.*, p. 35, *n*, and p. 36, *p*, he transliterates exactly the same sign as *šarratu* ("queen"). This is correct, though confusing, for the GAŠAN sign may be transliterated either way; but Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 587, attempts to deduce historical evidence on the basis of the titles *bēltu* and *šarratu!* Strassmaier in *ZA*, VIII (1893), 112, the source for both Minns and Tarn, was aware of the double value: ". . . *bilit* (oder: *šarratu*)."

himself up as an independent ruler in Babylonia;⁷⁶ but, as we shall see, there is evidence which leads us to believe that Mithradates still retained control of Iran and northern Mesopotamia, a district always more closely united with the plateau and with Syria than with Babylonia.⁷⁷

Shortly before his death Mithradates received as a prisoner the Seleucid king Demetrius III, nicknamed Eucærus, brother of Philippos Epiphanes Philadelphus, the ruler of northern Syria, who had established his capital at Damascus. In 88 B.C. a war broke out between the two brothers. When Philip was besieged in Beroea (Aleppo), his ally Strato, dynast of Beroea, appealed for aid to a pro-Parthian Arab tyrant, Aziz,⁷⁸ probably the ruler of Emesa (Homs), and to the Parthian governor of northern Mesopotamia, Mithradates Sinaces. The response was immediate, and Demetrius found himself the besieger besieged; forced at length to surrender, he was taken to Mithra-

⁷⁶ The sole *fact* which these tablets provide is that Gotarzes was then recognized as king in Babylon; the inference regarding the extent of his territory remains uncertain.

⁷⁷ Gotarzes and his immediate successor, Orodes, are the only Parthian kings in all the numerous documents of the period mentioned by name rather than by their title Arsaces. The conclusion is obvious: the name was necessary to denote *which* Arsaces was meant, and we have here evidence of conflict between Mithradates and his former satrap of satraps. On the parallel usage of the coins cf. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 223.

⁷⁸ Mss., Ζιζοῦ.

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dates II, by whom he was well treated.⁷⁹ This event, which took place in 87 B.C.,⁸⁰ is the last dated occurrence in the reign of Mithradates II, and we have evidence which suggests that he died soon thereafter. Mithradates had controlled Iran, including Kurdistan, and northern Mesopotamia,⁸¹ while Gotarzes held sway in Babylonia.⁸² Upon the death of his great opponent the personal name of Gotarzes was immediately dropped from the tablets, since there was no longer necessity for a distinction between contenders for the title, and he appears simply as Arsaces, king.⁸³

Mithradates II had been a friend and ally of Tigranes of Armenia. On his death the latter felt free, not to say urged, to proceed against Gotarzes, who

⁷⁹ Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 384-86. Justin xlii. 4 is confused between Mithradates II and Mithradates III; Trog. Pomp. xlii was apparently not the source of error, since he places a number of kings between Mithradates and Orodes.

⁸⁰ The last coins of Demetrius are dated 88/87 B.C.; see Ernest Babelon, *Les rois de Syrie, d'Arménie, et de Commagène* (Paris, 1890), p. clxxii, and J. Eckhel, *Doctrina numorum veterum*, III (2d ed.; Vindobonae, 1828), 245.

⁸¹ Note the Iranian characteristics of his drachms, Wroth, *Parthia*, Pl. VIII, on which Mithradates appears as an old man. Ms. Avroman I, dated 87 B.C., was found in Kurdistan. On Mesopotamia see p. 48.

⁸² Tablets dated in the reign of "Arsaces who is called Gotarzes" continue until 87 B.C.; see Epping and Strassmaier in *ZA*, VI (1891), 222 and 226.

⁸³ Reisner, *Hymnen*, Nos. 27, 49, and 55; Epping and Strassmaier in *ZA*, V (1890), 355.

was perhaps not of the Arsacid line. Tigranes took back the seventy valleys;⁸⁴ he invaded Gorduene, besides overrunning the region about Nineveh; and Adiabene, with the important center of Arbela, fell into his hands.⁸⁵ Thence he advanced into Media, where he burned the royal palace at Adrapana (Artaman) on the great road to the west of Ecbatana.⁸⁶ Atropatene became his vassal state. Eventually Tigranes carried his arms victoriously throughout northern Mesopotamia and as far west as Syria and Phoenicia, flaunting in the very faces of the Parthians their customary title, king of kings,⁸⁷ never claimed by Gotarzes.

Gotarzes continued to control Babylonia until 81/80 B.C.⁸⁸ But in April, 80, there appears on the tablets an Orodes (I),⁸⁹ the use of whose personal

⁸⁴ This is implied in his subsequent offer (Memnon [*FHG*, III, 556 f., fr. 58. 2]) to return them.

⁸⁵ Strabo xi. 14. 15; Plut. *Lucullus* 21 and 26.

⁸⁶ Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 6; cf. Orosius vi. 4. 9. Plut. *Lucullus* 14 says that Tigranes cut the Parthians off from Asia.

⁸⁷ Appian *Syr.* 48; Plut. *Lucullus* 14; Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 419-21; Justin xl. 1; Eutrop. *Brev.* vi. 8.

⁸⁸ [167] A.E., [2131 S.E., i.e., 81/80 B.C., Reisner, *Hymnen*, No. 49. The insertion in the Parthian line of an "Artabanus II" to rule from 88 to 77 B.C. has been suggested by Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 81 and n. 1, followed by Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xxxi, but this is now generally rejected; see p. 16, n. 66. The coins formerly assigned to him must follow those of Mithradates II, and they should be given to Gotarzes, Orodes, or Sina-truces.

⁸⁹ Strassmaier in *ZA*, III (1888), 135, and VIII (1893), 112; Epping in *ZA*, IV (1889), 78. E. Schrader in *SPAW*, 1890, p. 1327, n. 1, on the basis of a re-examination by Bezold of the tablet published in *ZA*, VIII,

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name again suggests conflict with the reigning Arsaces, presumably Gotarzes, who is henceforth no longer known to us. Orodes ruled but a brief span, for in 76/75 B.C. an Arshakan, king, and his sister-wife, Isbubarza, queen, appear on the tablets.⁹⁰ This must be Sinatruces, who was undoubtedly on the throne by that date.⁹¹ Sinatruces⁹² was an old man of eighty⁹³ when recalled from among the Sacaraucae to rule over Parthia. Although assisted by these nomads, he presumably was related to the Arsacidae,⁹⁴ and this would explain why he was summoned to end a period of dissension. In the winter of 72/71 B.C. Mithradates of Pontus requested assistance against the Romans, but the aged Sinatruces was in no position to antagonize such powerful opponents and re-

112, rejects *šar šarrâni*, but he restores it in his transliteration. Strassmaier's cuneiform copy should certainly be read *šar šarrâni*. See also Kugler (*Sternkunde*, II, 447, No. 26), who follows Strassmaier.

⁹⁰ Strassmaier in *ZA*, VIII (1893), 112; Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 447 f.

⁹¹ Sinatruces died in 70 or 69 B.C.; see Phlegon fr. 12. 6 (J, II B, p. 1164). He ruled seven years according to Lucian *Long*, 15.

⁹² Spellings are: Sintricus, Appian *Mith.* 104; Sinatrocles or Sinatroces, Lucian *Long*, 15; Sinatruces, Phlegon fr. 12. 7 (J, II B, p. 1164).

⁹³ Lucian *Long*, 15; cf. his appearance on the coins, Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 42 f. and Pl. X.

⁹⁴ Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 139 and n. 4, suggests that he was a son of Mithradates I and a brother of Phraates II. Had he been a candidate from among the Sacaraucae, they would surely have selected a younger man.

fused.⁹⁵ The old king died in 70 or 69 B.C. and was succeeded by his son Phraates III.

With the reigns of Sinatruces and his successors we reach a period for which our sources are both more extensive and easier of interpretation. Let us turn therefore from the western part of the empire to the eastern frontier and examine the events of the past hundred years, events which molded and shaped new boundaries and new customs and which had a powerful effect on the politics of the empire as a whole.

⁹⁵ Memnon (*FHG*, III, 549, fr. 43.2).

CHAPTER III

THE INDO-IRANIAN FRONTIER

EVIDENCE for the story of the eastern frontier of Parthia is scanty, for events there were too remote to interest western historians and archaeological work in eastern Iran has hardly begun. Indian history, which might supplement our inadequate information from the west, helps but little, since, in spite of considerable evidence both literary and archaeological in character and years of study by excellent scholars, the chronology of the period remains still uncertain. Fortunately the accounts of Chinese travelers and historians are fairly complete and accurate, and they possess the additional advantage that events mentioned can be accurately dated. From them, more than from any other source, we can obtain a few clues to the still uncertain question of the Indo-Scythian kingdoms.¹

In the period between 174 and 165 B.C.² a tribe

¹ Little new evidence has been uncovered in the past twenty years, and most of the articles go back to common sources. The bibliography in this chapter is not complete; additional titles will be found in the works cited and in the *Annual Bibliography of Indian Archaeology* (Leyden, 1928—).

² J. Klaproth, *Tableaux historiques de l'Asie depuis la monarchie de Cyrus jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1826), p. 132; S. K. Shiratori, "Ueber den Wu-sun-Stamm in Centralasien," *Keleti Szemle*, III (1902), 115 f.;

known to the Chinese as the Yüeh-chi, who dwelt in the province of Kansu, were attacked by their neighbors, the Hsiung-nu or Huns. As a blow delivered on the last of a series of balls is transmitted to others in contact with it, so this movement of the Huns was reflected far and wide among the tribes to the west. The Greek name for the Yüeh-chi is somewhat uncertain; they were a composite group of which the Tochari formed the bulk and the Arsi the ruling or most important element.³ When the Yüeh-chi were driven from their homeland, they came into conflict with a tribe known as the Sak (modern Sai or Sē), who lived in the region of the Jaxartes River. These were the Sacae or Scyths of the Greek and Roman writers, and in this case probably the Sacaraucae, one of the two principal divisions of the Sacae.⁴ The

O. Franke, *Beiträge aus chinesischen Quellen zur Kenntnis der Türkvölker und Skythen Zentralasiens* (APAW, 1904, No. 1), pp. 29 and 46; Hirth, "The Story of Chang K'ien," *JASOS*, XXXVII (1917), 133; W. E. Clark, "The Importance of Hellenism from the Point of View of Indic-Philology" (I), *Classical Philology*, XIV (1919), 312; Rapson in *CHI*, I, 565; V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India* (4th ed.; Oxford, 1924), p. 240; de Groot, *Chinesische Urkunden zur Geschichte Asiens*. II. *Die Westlande Chinas*, p. 17; Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches*, I, 332. On the language of the Yueh-chi see Berthold Laufer, *The Language of the Yüeh-chi or Indo-Scythians* (Chicago, 1917).

³ Jarl Charpentier, "Die ethnographische Stellung der Tocharer," *ZDMG*, LXXI (1917), 347-88, esp. pp. 387 f.; cf. similar conclusions reached by W. W. Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 106-11. See also Sylvain Lévi, "Le Tokharien," *J.A.*, CCXXII (1933), 1-30, and H. W. Bailey, "Taugara," *Bull. School of Or. Studies*, VIII (1935-37), 883-921.

⁴ Tarn, *op. cit.*, p. 116, and in *CAH*, IX, 582 f. See also Franke, "The Identity of the Sok with the Sakas," *JRAS*, 1907, pp. 675-77;

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Yüeh-chi occupied the lands of the Sak and forced the Sak to move westward before them into Bactria.⁵ The Sacae, by this time a large horde consisting partly of Sacaraucae and Massagetæ and partly of other smaller groups gathered en route, were thus forced into Ta-hsia (Bactria).⁶

Determination of the time when this migration came into conflict with the Parthians depends upon the uncertain date of the Parthian expansion to the east. While the Parthian invasion of India under Mithradates I (171-138 B.C.) can hardly be styled a "legend,"⁷ there is no good evidence as yet for such conquests beyond the statement of Orosius, a late writer of uncertain accuracy.⁸ If by Hydaspes he

V. A. Smith, "The Śakas in Northern India," *ZDMG*, LXI (1907), 403-21; Heinrich Lüders, "Die Śakas und die 'nordarische' Sprache," *SPAW*, 1913, pp. 406-27; Sten Konow, "On the Nationality of the Kuşāṇas," *ZDMG*, LXVIII (1914), 85-100; PW, art. "Sakai" (1920).

⁵ For the Chinese sources see pp. 42 f., n. 57. The late Dr. Laufer of Field Museum, Chicago, was kind enough to offer suggestions as to the relative merits of the translations.

⁶ Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 21-25, believes that Ferghana was the point from which the Sacae began their wanderings. His identification of Wu-sun as Ferghana is against the almost universal opinion of Sinologists, who believe Ferghana to be Ta-yüan.

⁷ As does Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 579.

⁸ Orosius v. 4. 16. Note that the drachms collected by G. P. Tate in Seistan (Rapson, "Note on Ancient Coins," *JRAS*, 1904, p. 677) begin with Mithradates II. The small number of coins, however, largely negates the value of the evidence. For a chronological table based on an acceptance of Orosius see V. A. Smith, "The Indo-Parthian Dynasties," *ZDMG*, LX (1906), 71 f.

meant not the Indian Jhelum but some other stream, the Porali, or possibly even the Median Hydaspes of Vergil,⁹ then Parthian conquests in India must remain in doubt. Orosius was influenced by the post-Augustan literary tradition, in which the gem-bearing Hydaspes figured prominently.¹⁰

If the identification of Turiva¹¹ with Traxiana¹² in the upper Ochus River valley be accepted, then the reign of Mithradates I brought the Parthians into a position where contact with the advancing Sacae was inevitable. In 130 B.C. Phraates II engaged the services of a body of Saca mercenaries (see pp. 35 f.), and shortly thereafter the flood of invaders must have reached the eastern provinces. The remnants of the Bactrian kingdom were swept away by these hordes,¹³

⁹ *Georg.* iv. 211. Cf. PW, art. "Hydaspes," No. 2, followed by Rapson in *CHI*, I, 568. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, pp. 78 f., saw the situation correctly. Cf. also Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 40, who suggests the Choaspes near Susa.

¹⁰ Horace *Od.* i. 22. 8; Seneca *Medea* 723 ff. and *Herc. Oet.* 628; Lucan *De bell. civ.* iii. 236 and viii. 227; Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 71; Statius *Thebais* viii. 237; Dionysius Periegetes 1138 f.; Claudian *Paneg. dictus Probino et Olybrio* 70-80, *In Rufinum* ii. 243, *Paneg. tertio cons. Hon.* 4, *Paneg. quarto cons. Hon.* 601, *Paneg. dictus Manlio Theodoro* 29, and *De raptu Proserpinae* ii. 82 and iii. 325. Note the frequency of the references in Claudian, who immediately preceded Orosius.

¹¹ Strabo xi. 11. 2.

¹² Tarn, "Sel.-Parth. Studies," *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, XVI (1930), 122-26. On the "campaign coins" which mention Traxiana, see p. 59 and n. 16.

¹³ Tarn, "Notes on Hellenism in Bactria and India," *JHS*, XXII (1902), 268-93; Hugh George Rawlinson, *Bactria—the History of a Forgotten Empire* (London, 1912); Eduard Meyer in *Encyc. Brit.*, art. "Bactria."

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against whom the Parthians threw the full weight of their military forces. The severity of this struggle is shown by the fact that two Parthian kings, Phraates II (138/37-*ca* 128 B.C.) and his successor Artabanus II (*ca* 128-124/23 B.C.), lost their lives in battle against the Sacae.

Individual groups may have penetrated into the heart of the Parthian empire, perhaps even as far as Mesopotamia; but the majority of the Sacae were turned back by the exertions of the Parthians, and thus the Roman orient was spared their ravages. The explanation for the close interrelation in later times between the Sacae and the Parthians lies in the contacts which occurred as the hordes moved slowly southward toward India, contacts which must also explain the Parthian cultural influences at Taxila in India. While a portion of the Sacae evidently turned southward from the great road and entered India through Ki-pin,¹⁴ others must have passed through

¹⁴ Ki-pin, which shifted its position at various periods, has not been identified with certainty. Christian Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde* (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1867 and 1874), II, 369 and n. 5, and Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 31-35, on historical grounds believe it part of Arachosia. Lévi and Chavannes, "L'Itinéraire d'Ou K'ong," *J.A.*, 9. sér., VI (1895), 371-84; Franke, *Beiträge (APAW)*, 1904, No. 1), pp. 55 f., and Hirth, "Story of Chang K'ien," *J.AOS*, XXXVII (1917), 133, suggest Kashmir, an identification to which the late Dr. Laufer agreed. Klaproth, *Tableaux hist.*, p. 133, and Wieger, *Textes historiques*, I, 716, identify Ki-pin with Kabul; but, as Rapson in *CHI*, I, 563, pointed out, the Kabul valley was still in the possession of the Yavana princes and no numismatic evidence of the early Saca kings has been found there. See also H. W. Jacobson, *An Early History of Sogdiana* (unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago, 1935), pp. 14 f. Both Rapson, *loc. cit.*, and F. W. Thomas,

eastern Parthia and entered India perhaps through the Bolân Pass in the Brahui Mountains.¹⁵

Even the energetic Mithradates II was apparently unable to regain complete control of the eastern provinces, though the Sacae may have acknowledged some form of vassalage. After his death one of his successors sometime between 87 and 75 B.C. made a series of campaigns in the east and struck coins to commemorate the recovery of Margiana, Traxiana, and Aria.¹⁶

When the Sacae entered India remains uncertain, and new evidence must be forthcoming to settle the question. The date of the first Indo-Scythian king,

"The Date of Kaniska," *JRAS*, 1913, pp. 634 f., feel that the physical difficulties of the Kashmir route preclude a large tribal migration. Obviously all the Sacae could not have entered India by this route, or so large a Parthian element would not be present in their culture.

¹⁵ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 564. The writer does not agree with the view of F. W. Thomas, "Sakastana," *JRAS*, 1906, pp. 181-216, that the Sacae had long been in eastern Iran.

¹⁶ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 40 and n. 1. On the assignment of these coins see pp. 40 f., n. 51. Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 18 f. offers only a *post quem* date of about 1 B.C. on the acquisition of Seistan and Arachosia. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 587, cites the Chinese sources as recording an independent kingdom, "Woo-yi-shan-li," which occupies the same territory as these provinces about 75 B.C. A similar statement was earlier made by Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, pp. 79 f., also without reference. Neither V. A. Smith, "The Indo-Parthian Dynasties," *ZDMG*, LX (1906), 55, nor the writer has been able to locate the source for this statement; cf. de Groot, *Chinesische Urkunden. II. Die Westlande Chinas*, pp. 91-93. Note that the Chinese sources almost invariably use such names as Parthia, Chaldaea, Bactria, and Arachosia in a provincial sense rather than in a more all-embracing meaning.

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Maues,¹⁷ offers no solution, since it hinges on the doubtful interpretation of a much discussed word in the Taxila copper-plate inscription of the satrap Patika¹⁸ and on the uncertain dating of an era. Probably Maues should be identified with the Great King Moga of the inscription, which is dated in the year 78 of some unspecified era. The month name is Parthian. Since 169 B.C. is out of the question, this cannot be the Arsacid era, which began in 247 B.C.; even if the 78 stands for 178, the date would be 69 B.C.¹⁹ Rapson suggested that the era may possibly mark the capture of Seistan by Mithradates I;²⁰ but a date

¹⁷ V. A. Smith, *Early Hist. of India* (4th ed.), pp. 241 f., because of his acceptance of an Indian invasion by Mithradates I, dates Maues about 95 B.C. Rapson in *CHI*, I, 570, places the invasion between 88 and 72 B.C. Cf. Louis de la Vallée-Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas* (Paris, 1930), pp. 262 ff. On the Indo-Scythians see Alexander Cunningham, "Later Indo-Scythians," *Num. Chron.*, 3d ser., XIII (1893), 93-128 and 166-202; Sylvain Lévi, "Notes sur les Indo-Scythes," *J.A.*, 9. sér., VIII (1896), 444-84, and IX (1897), 5-42 (tr. into English in *Indian Antiquary*, XXXII [1903], 381-89 and 417-26, and XXXIII [1904], 10-16); V. A. Smith, "The Kushân, or Indo-Scythian, Period of Indian History," *JRAS*, 1903, pp. 1-64, and "Indo-Parthian Dynasties," *ZDMG*, LX (1906), 49-72; J. F. Fleet, "Moga, Maues, and Vonones," *JRAS*, 1907, pp. 1013-40; R. D. Banerji, "The Scythian Period of Indian History," *Indian Antiquary*, XXXVII (1908), 25-75; Sten Konow, "Indoskythische Beiträge," *SPAW*, 1916, pp. 787-827.

¹⁸ G. Bühler, "Taxila Plate of Patika," in *Epigraphia Indica*, IV (1896/97), No. 5, pp. 54-57; Rapson in *CHI*, I, 570. For a good general discussion see L. de la Vallée-Poussin, *op. cit.*, pp. 272 f.

¹⁹ Edward Thomas, "Bactrian Coins and Indian Dates," *Academy*, Dec. 26, 1874, pp. 686 f.; *Archaeological Survey of Southwest India*, II (1878), 31 (not available).

²⁰ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 570; cf. pp. 19 f.

as late as 9-6 B.C. for the inscription is favored by some on the theory that the era began after the death of Mithradates II in 88/87 B.C.²¹

Heretofore Parthia has been considered almost solely from the Graeco-Roman viewpoint. Parthian influence in India must be regarded as an Indo-Iranian culture in which other elements such as the Hellenistic are present. In a similar manner many phases of the Parthian occupation of Dura-Europus and Seleucia on the Tigris which hitherto have found no counterpart in western Hellenism may be explained as local Graeco-Iranian. That in the Parthian period both India and Mesopotamia faced more toward Iran than toward Hellenized Syria has only recently been recognized.²² Proof for this lies in material excavated at Taxila, Seleucia, and Dura-Europus, some of which has already appeared in print, though much is still in press or remains unpublished in museums.

From the time of the Indian invasion by the Sacae, the latter are so closely connected both politically and culturally with the Parthians that they cannot be distinguished one from the other. The fact that "very few true Parthian coins are found in India"²³ furnishes additional evidence for the belief that the

²¹ See the articles by Konow cited on p. 64, n. 30, and McGovern, *Early Empires* (in press).

²² So both Rapson in *CHI*, I, 568, and M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Caravan Cities* (Oxford, 1932), pp. 157 and 214 f., and in "Dura and the Problem of Parthian Art," *Yale Classical Studies*, V (1935), 298 f.

²³ Sir John Marshall in a letter of April 19, 1935, to the writer.

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Sacae and the Pahlavas were independent of the Parthian empire, though they had been vassals of that power.²⁴ In spite of the warlike reputation which the Parthians attained in the west by virtue of their successes against the Romans, they were a people quick to realize and profit by the advantages of peace. Wanton destruction was not one of their characteristics; they had rather a canny instinct for a pact advantageous to both parties. The ability of Mithradates, combined with his victories on the battlefield, would result in agreements for mutual benefit. Treaties would be drawn up which according to the usual Parthian custom bound the signatories within their loose feudal system and guaranteed commercial rights. Indian officialdom probably contained both Parthians and Sacae, but little evidence can be obtained from their names, for one of the first acts of a newly elevated officer would be the adoption of a garb and name suitable to his new station.

For the organization of the Indo-Scythian kingdoms and their relations with the feudatories of southeastern Iran we must depend almost entirely upon numismatic evidence of unknown provenience. Though Rapson's arrangement²⁵ may fit all the facts

²⁴ Note that the Seleucids and the Sasanids both utilized elephants when their possessions extended far enough east to enable them to secure the beasts. There is no record of the Parthians using them in war.

²⁵ *CHI*, I, chap. xxiii. For a different interpretation see Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 91-98, and a briefer account in the *Cambridge Shorter History of India* (ed. H. H. Dodwell; Cambridge, 1934),

now available, new evidence may bring radical changes at any time.

Normally there were three contemporary rulers of royal rank in eastern Iran and northwestern India: a "king of kings" in Iran, some junior member of his family associated with him, and another "king of kings" in India. The junior member in Iran usually became in due course the supreme ruler in India.²⁶ The belief that the title "king of kings" was not used in Parthia from 88 to 57 B.C.²⁷ led logically to the correct conclusion that the rulers of Iran and India were independent of Parthia; but at least one case of its use in Parthia in 64 B.C. is known.²⁸

In eastern Iran the ruler issued coins together with that member of the family associated with him in the government. The legend of the king is in Greek, and that of the prince, on the reverse, in Kharosthi; since the use of Kharosthi in this period is known from Arachosia only, we may infer that the prince governed that territory.

The evidence of the coins²⁹ and the Taxila plate

pp. 62-85. Under Herzfeld's arrangement there would reign only two kings before Gondopharnes, i.e., Maues and Azes; but cf. pp. 64 f.

²⁶ An interesting, though earlier, parallel to this custom is found in Elam; see Cameron, *Hist. of Early Iran*, pp. 20 and 71 f.

²⁷ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 569.

²⁸ Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 447, No. 31.

²⁹ For coins of the Indo-Scythian period see Percy Gardner, *The Coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria and India in the British Museum* (London, 1886); E. Drouin, "Chronologie et numismatique des rois indo-

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inscription suggests that Maues conquered Gandhara, including Pushkalavati to the west and Taxila to the east of the Indus River. But in the eastern Punjab the conquests of Maues remained to be completed by two of his successors, the first of whom was Azes I.³⁰ This king associated with himself one Azilises, who eventually succeeded him.³¹ The arrange-

scythies," *Rev. num.*, 3. sér., VI (1888), 8-52; A. Cunningham, *Coins of the Indo-Scythians* (London, 1892), reprinted from *Num. Chron.*, 1888, pp. 199-248; 1889, pp. 268-311; 1890, pp. 103-72; 1892, pp. 40-82 and 98-159; Rapson, "Indian Coins," in G. Bühler, *Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, II 3, Heft B (Strassburg, 1897); V. A. Smith, *Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta*, Vol. I (Oxford, 1906); J. H. Marshall, "Excavations at Taxila," *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India*, 1912/13, pp. 1-52; Richard B. Whitehead, *Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore. I. Indo-Greek Coins* (Oxford, 1914).

³⁰ J. H. Marshall, "The Date of Kanishka," *JRAS*, 1914, p. 986, followed by Rapson in *CHI*, I, 570 f., makes Azes the founder of the Vikrama era in 58 B.C. L. de la Vallée-Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas*, p. 267, places his death in that year. On the inscriptional evidence see A. F. Hoernle, "Readings from the Arian Pâli," *Indian Antiquary*, X (1881), 324-31; G. Bühler, "Taxila Plate of Patika," *Epig. Ind.*, IV (1896/97), No. 5, pp. 54-57; A. M. Boyer, "L'Inscription en Kharoṣṭhī du 15 Aṣāḍha 136," *JĀ*, II. sér., V (1915), 281-98; Sten Konow, "Taxila Inscription of the Year 136," *Epig. Ind.*, XIV (1917/18), No. 20, pp. 284-95; Ramaprasad Chanda, "Taxila Inscription of the Year 136," *JRAS*, 1920, pp. 319-24; Konow, "The So-called Takht-i-Bahi Inscription of the Year 103," *Epig. Ind.*, XVIII (1925/26), No. 28, pp. 261-82; Konow, "The Zeda Inscription of the Year 11," *Epig. Ind.*, XIX (1927/28), No. 1, pp. 1-15; Konow in *CII*, II 1, pp. lxxxii-xciv and 1 ff.; Konow, "Notes on Indo-Scythian Chronology," *Journ. of Indian History*, XII (1933), 1-46.

³¹ Konow, "The So-called Takht-i-Bahi Inscription," pp. 273 f., suggested that Azes and Azilises were the same person; but he now rejects this idea in his "Notes on Indo-Scythian Chronology," p. 24. Cf. for evi-

ment of these and the following rulers is based solely on the coinage; in the present case Azes, as the elder, appears on the obverse with a Greek inscription, and Azilises, on the reverse, with one in Kharosthi.³²

Shortly after the first Saca king commenced his rule in India, a monarch with the Parthian name of Vonones established himself in eastern Iran and took the imperial title. His reign cannot be dated, and it seems impossible to identify him with Vonones I of Parthia (A.D. 8-11).³³ The dynasty established by Vonones is often called "Pahlava" to distinguish it from the contemporary ruling family of Parthia. Azilises as king of kings in India made further conquests in the Punjab; but either voluntarily or perforce he relinquished Arachosia, which came under the control of Vonones. It was ruled by Vonones' brother Spalahores, who held the territory conjointly with his son Spalagadames.³⁴ One of the Indian princes, Azes II, became associated with Azilises in the Indian kingship and eventually succeeded to the supreme power.

dence against the identity of the two N. G. Majumdar, "Notes on the Coins of Azes," in *Ann. Rep. Archaeol. Survey of India*, 1928/29, pp. 169-74 and Pl. LXIV, and Marshall, "Excavations at Taxila," *ibid.*, 1929/30, pp. 72 ff.

³² Gardner, *Coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings*, p. 173 and Pl. XXXII 9.

³³ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 573. But cf. Konow in *CII*, II 1, pp. xl-xliii.

³⁴ This is based on the assumption that Spalahores is the equivalent of the Greek Spalyris; so Whitehead, *Cat. of Coins in the Pan. Mus.*, I, 143, followed by Rapson in *CHI*, I, 574.

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Vonones was succeeded by Spalirises, who has been identified as a brother of Vonones solely because the coins of Spalirises bear the legend "the king's brother" and Vonones is generally believed to be the king in question.³⁵ Spalirises' son Azes became ruler in Arachosia; and, as we have seen, he was later king of kings in India as Azes II. The next successor whom we know in the Iranian line was a certain Orthagnes. His Iranian name means "victorious," and his coins bear a winged Victory similar to those on the coinage of Vonones I of Parthia, though whether the symbol refers to some conquest or merely to the king's name we cannot tell.

In Arachosia two men were associated at this time in joint rule, Gondopharnes and Guda (or Gudana), possibly a brother of the king of kings Orthagnes. Gondopharnes left Arachosia in A.D. 19 to assume supreme command in India, where he became the most famous of the Pahlava kings. His name also is Iranian, "winner of glory." The coins lead us to suspect that he included within his realm the Pahlava and Saca territory in southeastern Iran and northwestern India as well as the Kabul valley, where large numbers of his coins were found. Abdagases, a nephew(?) of Gondopharnes, acted as viceroy in the new Iranian provinces. Gondopharnes was still in power in A.D. 45, but we do not know the date of his

³⁵ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 573.

death.³⁶ On the basis of numismatic evidence Rapson has suggested that Gondopharnes may have captured some territory from the Parthians. His coins, whether struck alone or with his nephew or his commanders in chief, usually bear the symbol ☉; this mark is found counterstruck on coins of Orodes II (57-37/36 B.C.) and Artabanus III (A.D. 12-38).³⁷

Gondopharnes was succeeded by Pacores, who bears a good Parthian name. Numismatic evidence suggests that he was suzerain in southeastern Iran and that he controlled at least a part of India. His coins, bearing a figure of Victory similar to those of Orthagnes, have been discovered at Taxila; they have also the Gondopharnes symbol and the legend of a well known commander in chief. One more ruler of Seistan is known, Sanabares, conjecturally assigned to that territory because of the Greek legends on his coins.³⁸

The Saca power in India began to dwindle away rapidly under the successors of Gondopharnes. Here the Chinese sources again bring some light. A hundred years or more after the settlement of the Yüeh-

³⁶ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 574-80; J. F. Fleet, "St. Thomas and Gondopharnes," *JRAS*, 1905, pp. 223-36.

³⁷ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 578; Rapson, "Note on Ancient Coins," *JRAS*, 1904, p. 677; A. Cunningham, "Coins of the Sakas," *Num. Chron.*, 1890, p. 119. To this period belongs the "Phraotes" of India whom Apollonius of Tyana visited according to Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* ii. 26 ff. See also Werner Schur, "Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero," *Klio*, Beiheft XV (1923), pp. 69-80.

³⁸ Rapson in *CHI*, I, 580; cf. A. von Sallet, *Die Nachfolger Alex. des Grossen* (Berlin, 1879), pp. 52 f.

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chi in Bactria and the departure of the Sacae for India a chief of the Kushans, one of the tribes of the Yüeh-chi, gained supremacy over the entire group (about A.D. 25-81?) and established a kingdom which became known by the name of his tribe. This king, Kujula Kadphises, rapidly expanded his power over Gandhara, Arachosia, and Kabul at the expense of either Gondopharnes or Pacores. Perhaps the Parthian conquests to which the Chinese sources refer³⁹ are those of the Kushans in the Indo-Scythian kingdoms; possibly they may indicate attacks on Parthia proper. The second of the Kushan rulers, V'ima Kadphises, ended his reign not long before the accession of Kanishka, whose date has been so long a subject of discussion (A.D. 125?).⁴⁰

³⁹ Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le Heou Han chou," *T'oung pao*, 2. sér., VIII (1907), 190-92; Wieger, *Textes historiques*, I, 716 f.

⁴⁰ Édouard Specht, "Les Indo-Scythes et l'époque du règne de Kanishka," *J.A.*, 9. sér., X (1897), 152-93; Sylvain Lévi, "Note additionnelle sur les Indo-Scythes," *ibid.*, pp. 526-31, tr. into English in *Indian Antiquary*, XXXIII (1904), 110 ff.; A. M. Boyer, "L'Époque de Kanishka," *J.A.*, 9. sér., XV (1900), 526-79; H. Oldenberg, "Zwei Aufsätze zur altindischen Chronologie und Literaturgeschichte. 1. Zur Frage nach der Aera des Kanishka," *NGWG*, 1911, pp. 427-41, tr. into English in Pali Text Society, *Journal*, 1910-12, pp. 1-18; J. Kennedy, "The Secret of Kanishka," *JRAS*, 1912, pp. 665-88 and 981-1019; J. F. Fleet, "The Question of Kanishka," *JRAS*, 1913, pp. 95-107; Kennedy, "Sidelights on Kanishka," *ibid.*, pp. 369-78; F. W. Thomas, "The Date of Kanishka," *ibid.*, pp. 627-50; discussion by Rapson, Fleet, Kennedy, V. A. Smith, Barnett, Waddell, Dames, Hoey, and Thomas *ibid.*, pp. 911-1042; J. H. Marshall, "The Date of Kanishka," *JRAS*, 1914, pp. 973-86, with comments by Thomas and Fleet *ibid.*, pp. 987-92. See also bibliography cited by L. de la Vallée-Poussin, *L'Inde aux temps des Mauryas*, pp. 318-74, and articles by Konow cited on p. 64, n. 30.

A remnant of the old Saca power existed in the Indus delta for some time. The author of the *Periplus* speaks of the "Parthians" as still in control there and describes the struggles of the various petty chiefs for supremacy.⁴¹

⁴¹ *Periplus* 38; J. W. McCrindle, "Anonymi [Arriani ut fertur] Periplus Maris Erythraei," *Indian Antiquary*, VIII (1879), 107-51; J. Kennedy, "Some Notes on the *Periplus* of the Erythraean Sea," *JRAS*, 1916, pp. 829-37; W. H. Schoff, "As to the Date of the *Periplus*," *JRAS*, 1917, pp. 827-30; J. Kennedy, "Eastern Kings Contemporary with the *Periplus*," *JRAS*, 1918, pp. 106-14.

CHAPTER IV

DRUMS OF CARRHAE

PHRAATES III THEOS¹ succeeded his father Sinatruces on the Parthian throne at a time when the fortunes of Mithradates of Pontus were at a low ebb. Tigranes of Armenia, the Pontian ally, though stripped of much of his territory, remained one of the great figures in the Orient. That the Parthian king should be drawn into the maelstrom of international politics was inevitable.

Shortly before the Battle of Tigranocerta in 69 B.C., Mithradates and Tigranes sent pleas for aid against Rome to Phraates, offering the "seventy valleys," Adiabene, and northern Mesopotamia as an inducement.² Mithradates proposed that the Parthian should attack Mesopotamia while he and his ally advanced on Armenia, thus cutting Lucullus off from supplies.³ After his victory Lucullus, learning of

¹ Phlegon fr. 12. 7 (J, II B, p. 1164); Appian *Mith.* 104; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45; cf. the coins assigned Phraates by Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 45-55.

² Memnon fr. lviii. 2 (*FHG*, III, 556 f.), "Phradates"; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 1; Appian *Mith.* 87; Plut. *Lucullus* 30.

³ Sallust *Hist.* iv. fr. 69. In the letter of Mithradates as reported by Sallust the last historical reference (line 15) concerns the defeat of a large Pontian force in a defile. This is obviously the defeat described in Plut. *Lucullus* 25, which occurred before the Battle of Tigranocerta. Mauren-

these negotiations, sent some of his allies to threaten the Parthian king, should he join forces with Mithradates and Tigranes, and to promise rewards for his friendship. Phraates replied in a conciliatory manner to the overtures of both parties, and both felt that he had promised them support. The Parthian response reached Lucullus in Gorduene, and the legate Sextilius⁴ was sent to continue negotiations. Phraates suspected, perhaps rightly, that the officer was sent to report Parthian movements; the net result was that he did not give aid to either side, but attempted the dangerous procedure of straddling the diplomatic fence. Lucullus, who felt that Mithradates and Tigranes were both so exhausted from the prolonged struggle that they were not dangerous, determined to attack Parthia.⁵ Sornatius⁶ was ordered to bring the army from Pontus to Gorduene, but the troops refused to move and even threatened to leave Pontus undefended. When this news reached the legions with Lucullus they also mutinied, and the Parthian

brecher's edition of Sallust's history, where the letter is placed after the battle, must therefore be corrected. With this rearrangement we understand why in line 16 Sallust could say that the kingdom of Tigranes was still unimpaired. Cf. also line 21: "Quod haud difficile est, si tu Mesopotamia, nos Armenia circumgredimur exercitum sine frumento, sine auxiliis, fortuna aut nostris vitiiis adhuc incolumem." If we may trust Orosius vi. 13. 2, the Euphrates was recognized as the boundary.

⁴ PW, art. "Sextilius," No. 2.

⁵ Plut. *Lucullus* 30; Appian *Mith.* 87; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 3.

⁶ PW, art. "Sornatius."

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expedition had to be abandoned for one against Tigranes.⁷

In 66 B.C., under the Lex Manilia, Pompey was appointed to replace Lucullus and at once secured an agreement with Phraates to insure Parthian neutrality in the same manner as under the previous treaty. But Tigranes the Younger, after an unsuccessful revolt against his father, sought refuge with Phraates and urged him to invade that part of Armenia held by the elder Tigranes.⁸ Phraates acquiesced, though with some hesitation because of his agreement with Pompey. News of the Parthian treaty with the Romans alarmed Mithradates, and he began to negotiate for a truce.

The Parthian forces advanced to Artaxata (Artashat). When the siege promised to be of considerable duration, Phraates left a detachment of his troops with the younger Tigranes and returned to his own country. Tigranes the Elder then took the field and

⁷ Cicero *Manil.* 23-24; Plut. *Lucullus* 30; Sallust *Hist.* iv. fr. 72. See also PW, arts. "Licinius (Lucullus)," No. 102, and "Mithradates," No. 12. From about this time comes a tablet of the year 68 B.C. mentioning an Arshakan, king, and Pi-ir(?) -us(or -ri) -ta-na-a, his wife, queen. The king must be Phraates III; cf. Strassmaier in *ZA*, VIII (1893), 112; Kugler, *Sternkunde*, II, 447 and n. 3; Minns, "Avroman Parchments," *JHS* XXXV (1915), 36.

⁸ Cf. Dio Cass. xxxvi. 45, where the invasion of Armenia seems to have been required by the treaty with Pompey, and *ibid.* 51, where it is the result of the efforts of Tigranes the Younger. But since the treaty was the same as that made by Lucullus, and Phraates had misgivings about violating his agreement with Pompey, the version of xxxvi. 51 is correct. See also Appian *Mith.* 104. On the younger Tigranes see PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 2.

defeated his son. The young man thought of seeking refuge with Mithradates of Pontus, but felt that Mithradates was now little stronger than he; so, perhaps at the suggestion of Phraates, he threw himself on the mercy of Pompey. The Roman commander was already marching on Artaxata, and Tigranes acted as guide. Tigranes the Elder despaired of further resistance and submitted to Pompey. In the partition which followed, Sophene and Gorduene were to be given to Tigranes the Younger.⁹ His father retained Armenia proper, but was forced to relinquish his conquests in Syria. Almost immediately after this decision there were fresh disputes, and Pompey seized the younger Tigranes. Cappadocia was then restored to its king Ariobarzanes I, and along with it went the districts of Sophene and Gorduene;¹⁰ but the latter at least was never effectively occupied.¹¹

In 65 B.C. Pompey made an extended campaign against the Iberians and Albanians, leaving L. Afranius to maintain control of Armenia. Pompey was within three days' march of the Caspian Sea and was even inquiring the distance to India when he was forced to abandon his advance.¹² In the meantime A. Gabinius, then a legate under Pompey, made a

⁹ Strabo xvi. i. 24; Appian *Mith.* 105. Plut. *Pompey* 33 and Dio Cass. xxxvi. 53 mention only Sophene. On this district see PW s.v. Cf. also Eutrop. *Brev.* vi. 13 and Zonaras x. 4.

¹⁰ Appian *Mith.* 105.

¹¹ See p. 74.

¹² Plut. *Pompey* 36; Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 52.

raid across the Euphrates as far as the Tigris,¹³ and Phraates, who had learned of the seizure of Tigranes the Younger, again invaded Gorduene, which he rapidly won from Tigranes the Elder.¹⁴ While Pompey was returning through Lesser Armenia he received ambassadors of the Medes and the Elymaeans,¹⁵ who came perhaps because of the Roman attack on Darius of Media Atropatene, who had befriended Antiochus I of Commagene or Tigranes.¹⁶ Phraates too sent an embassy, perhaps inspired by Gabinius' raid, requesting that Tigranes the Younger, his son-in-law, be delivered over to him, and at the same time demanding formal recognition of the Euphrates as the boundary between Rome and Parthia.

Pompey asked the return of the newly captured district of Gorduene and refused to surrender Tigranes. As for the boundary the only satisfaction Phraates could obtain was the lofty sentiment that the Romans set justice as their boundary toward the Parthians.¹⁷ Since the ambassadors were not instructed with regard to Gorduene, Pompey wrote briefly to Phraates, addressing him merely as "king," not "king of kings," a title which he wished to reserve for Tigranes, and without waiting for a reply sent Afranius to occupy the disputed territory. Whether this was

¹³ Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5. 2.

¹⁴ Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5. 3; Appian *Mith.* 106; Plut. *Pompey* 36.

¹⁵ Plut. *Pompey* 36. ¹⁶ Appian *Mith.* 106 and 117; Diod. Sic. xl. 4.

¹⁷ Plut. *Pompey* 33 and *Reg. imp. apophtheg.* 204. 8 (Loeb, III, p. 210).

accomplished without fighting we cannot be sure;¹⁸ but Gorduene was given again to Tigranes of Armenia. Contrary to a treaty with the Parthians, Afranius returned through Mesopotamia to Syria, encountering many hardships and nearly losing his army.

The quarrel between Tigranes and Phraates was not yet ended. In 64 B.C., while Pompey was in Syria, ambassadors from both parties arrived to consult him. As an excuse for not supporting his Armenian appointee, Pompey replied that he could take no action without orders from the Senate; but he did send three commissioners to settle the boundary dispute.¹⁹ Apparently Phraates retained Adiabene, and Tigranes Gorduene and Nisibis. No doubt the ambassadors found the matter somewhat simplified by the fact that both kings now realized they must conserve their strength for attacks on their common enemy, Rome, rather than waste it in petty quarrels.²⁰ About 58/57 B.C.²¹ Phraates III was murdered by his sons

¹⁸ Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5 says the district was taken without a battle, whereas Plut. *Pompey* 36 states that Afranius drove Phraates from the district and pursued him as far as Arbela. Strabo xvi. 1. 24 mentions Pompey's giving of Gorduene to Tigranes.

¹⁹ Appian *Mith.* 106; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5; Plut. *Pompey* 39.

²⁰ Plut. *Pompey* 39; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7.

²¹ J. Saint-Martin, *Fragments d'une histoire des Arsacides* (Paris, 1850), II, 107; Friedrich von Spiegel, *Erânische Alterthumskunde* (Leipzig, 1871-78), III, 98; J. H. Schneiderwirth, *Die Parther oder das neupersische Reich unter den Arsaciden nach griechisch-römischen Quellen* (Heiligenstadt, 1874), p. 50; Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xxxii; K. Regling, "Crassus' Partherkrieg," *Klio*, VII (1907), 359 f. and n. 1. Cf. L. du Four de Longuerue, *Annales Arsacidarum* (Argentorati, 1732), p. 22 (not available).

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Orodes and Mithradates,²² who immediately began a lengthy and bitter quarrel over the kingdom.

Numismatic evidence appears to support the claims of earlier historians that the elder brother, Mithradates III, succeeded to the throne upon the murder of his father.²³ Mithradates, whose chief center of power was in Iran,²⁴ made himself so objectionable that he was expelled by the nobles,²⁵ who installed Orodes as ruler. Compelled to flee, Mithradates took

²² Dio Cass. xxxix. 56. The name Orodes is more properly spelled Hyrodes; its forms are as follows: cuneiform, Strassmaier in *ZA*, III (1888), 147, No. 9, line 3, Ú-ru-da-a; coins, Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 96, ΥΡΩΔΟΞ; Plut. *Crassus* 21 and Polyænus *Strat.* vii. 41, Ἰρωδης; Appian *Syr.* 51 and Dio Cass. xl. 12, Ὀρωδης. Justin xlii. 4. 2, Vell. Pat. ii. 46, Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 47, Ampelius 31, and Eutrop. *Brev.* vi. 18 all use Orodes; Orosius vi. 13. 2, Horodes.

²³ Justin xlii. 4. 1; cf. Dio Cass. xxxix. 56, who apparently makes Orodes the first to attain the throne, and assigns Media to Mithradates. But Dio is only sketching Parthian affairs and may not refer to the accession. See Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 147 and notes. Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 86 and n. 2, corrects Justin to support Dio; but on the numismatic evidence see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 212, and Newell, "Coinage of the Parthians," in *Survey of Persian Art* (in press). The coins assigned by Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 56-60, to an "unknown king" (about the time of Phraates III or Mithradates III) are given to Mithradates III by Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 86, n. 1; Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Nouveau classement des monnaies arsacides," *Rev. num.*, 1904, pp. 349 f.; Petrowicz, *Arsaciden-Münzen*, pp. 52-55; J. de Morgan, *Num. de la Perse antique*. Fasc. 1. *Introduction.—Arsacides* (Babelon, *Traité des monnaies gr. et rom.* III. *Monnaies or.* I1), pp. 261-64, Nos. 95-105; and Newell, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Dio Cass. xxxix. 56; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 214 f.

²⁵ Justin xlii. 4. 1.

refuge with the Roman commander, A. Gabinius,²⁶ whom he persuaded to lend him assistance in recovering the lost territory. In this case Gabinius might grasp some straw of legality, since the decree of the Senate had included in his command the Syrians, Arabs, Persians, and Babylon.²⁷ The proconsul crossed the Euphrates with a detachment; but Ptolemy XI Auletes (80-51 B.C.), who likewise had been expelled from his country, backed a request for aid with more money than the Parthian could offer. Mithradates, with Orsames, one of his aides, remained with Gabinius and did not give up hope until after the Roman victory over the Nabateans won en route to Egypt in the spring of 55 B.C.²⁸

Undaunted by this failure, Mithradates started a civil war, in the course of which he won over the city of Babylon²⁹ and also the royal city of Seleucia, where he struck coins depicting the Tyche, palm of victory in hand, welcoming the new ruler.³⁰ Not long afterward

²⁶ Proconsul of Syria, 57 B.C. Cf. W. Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, III (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1906), 39 ff.; F. Vonder Mühlh, "Zur Lebensgeschichte des A. Gabinius cos. 58," *Juvenes dum sumus* (Basel, 1907), pp. 75-81; PW, art. "Gabinius," No. 11.

²⁷ Cicero *De domo sua* 60 and 124.

²⁸ Dio Cass. xxxix. 56; Appian *Syr.* 51; Josephus *Bell.* i. 175 and 178 and *Ant.* xiv. 98-104; cf. also Strabo xii. 3. 34; xvii. 1. 11.

²⁹ Justin xlii. 4. 2.

³⁰ This issue apparently never circulated, for no examples were found at Seleucia. This is understandable, since the rule of Mithradates in Seleucia must have been very short and the condition of the coins would make the identification of the issue as restruck by Orodes difficult; see n. 33.

the troops of Orodes retook Seleucia under the leadership of his very able commander in chief,³¹ who was the first to mount the walls. Babylon capitulated as the result of a famine caused by the long siege. Mithradates then voluntarily surrendered to Orodes, who considered him more enemy than brother and ordered him killed before his eyes.³² Orodes apparently seized the entire issue of coins struck at Seleucia by Mithradates and restruck them with a design which shows Seleucia kneeling in submission while Orodes stretches out his right hand to assist her to rise.³³ By the execution of Mithradates late in 55 B.C.³⁴ Orodes was left sole ruler of the Parthians.

While this struggle between the two brothers was in progress, M. Licinius Crassus, then over sixty years of age,³⁵ was appointed to the Syrian command.³⁶ In

³¹ Plut. *Crassus* 21.

³² Justin xlii. 4. 4.

³³ Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Monnaies arsacides de la collection Petrowicz," *Rev. num.*, 1905, pp. 155 f.; H. Dressel, "Ein Tetradrachmon des Arsakiden Mithradates III," *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XXXIII (1922), 156-77. The coins assigned by Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 56-60, to an "unknown king" are now generally given to Mithradates III, and those assigned to Mithradates III, pp. 61-67, to Orodes II. See also McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 213 and n. 29.

³⁴ Dio Cass. xl. 12; Crassus heard that Orodes was but lately established on the throne.

³⁵ Plut. *Crassus* 17.

³⁶ The following is a partial bibliography on the campaign of Crassus. Primary sources: Ampelius 31; Appian *Bell. civ.* ii. 18; Caesar *Bell. civ.* iii. 31; Cicero *De div.* ii. 22; Dio Cass. xl. 12-27; Eutrop. *Brev.* vi. 18; Florus i. 46; Hegesippus *Historia* i. 21; Josephus *Bell.* i. 179-80 and *Ant.*

the senatorial decree proposed by Pompey, Crassus was made governor of Syria; everyone knew a Parthi-

xiv. 105 and 119; Justin xlii. 4; Livy *Epit.* cvi; Moses Chor. ii. 17; Nic. Dam. *Hist.* cxiv in Athen. *Deip.* vi. 252 d (J, II A, p. 378, fr. 79); Obsequens 64 (124); Orosius vi. 13; Petronius *Satyricon* 120; Plut. *Crassus* 16-33, *Cicero* 36, *Caesar* 28; Polyaeus *Strat.* vii. 41; Ruf. *Fest.* 17; Seneca *Epist.* iv. 7; Servius *Comm. in Verg. Aen.* vii. 606; Strabo xvi. 1. 23; Vell. Pat. ii. 46. 2; Zonaras v. 7; Zosimus iii. 32. Secondary sources: J. Foy-Vaillant, *Arsacidarum imperium* (Paris, 1725), pp. 108-23; L. du Four de Longuerue, *Annales Arsacidarum* (Argentorati, 1732), pp. 23 f. (not available); G. E. J. Guilhem de Sainte-Croix, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement des Parthes," *Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, Mém. de litt.*, L (1808), 48-78; Carl Ritter, *Die Erdkunde von Asien*, VII 1 (Berlin, 1843), pp. 1117-25; E. W. Fischer, *Römische Zeittafeln* (Altona, 1846), pp. 250 and 253; F. R. Chesney, *The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris* (London, 1850), II, 407-12; J. Saint-Martin, *Fragments d'une histoire des Arsacides* (Paris, 1850), II, 110-16; Charles Merivale, *History of the Romans under the Empire*, I (4th ed.; New York, 1896), 407-30; F. von Spiegel, *Erânische Alterthumskunde* (Leipzig, 1871-78), III, 110 f.; J. H. Schneiderwirth, *Die Parther oder das neupersische Reich unter den Arsaciden nach griechisch-römischen Quellen* (Heiligenstadt, 1874), pp. 51-67; T. Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, III (10th ed.; Berlin, 1909), 341-53; Wilhelm Ihne, *Römische Geschichte*, VI (Leipzig, 1886), 429-40; Gius. Stocchi, *La prima guerra dei Romani nella Mesopotamia* (Firenze, 1887; not available); L. von Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, II 2 (5th ed.; Leipzig, 1898), pp. 252-56; A. von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans* (Tübingen, 1888), pp. 87-92; F. Justi in Geiger and Kuhn, *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie* (Strassburg, 1895-1904), II, 498 f.; P. Manfrin, *La cavalleria dei Parthi* (Roma, 1893), pp. 37-99; A. Steinmann, *De Parthis ab Horatio memoratis* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 6-8; W. Drumann, *Geschichte Roms*, IV (2d ed.; Leipzig, 1908), 105-22; B. Niese, *Grundriss der römischen Geschichte nebst Quellenkunde* (4th ed.; München, 1910), p. 236; K. Regling, *De belli Parthici Crassiani fontibus* (Berlin, 1899), reviewed by von Höck, *Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie*, 1899, cols. 1147 f., and L. Holzapfel, *Berl. philol. Wochenschr.*, 1901, cols. 850-55; Regling, "Zur historischen Geographie des mesopotamischen Parallelogramms," *Klio*, I (1902), 443-76, and "Crassus' Partherkrieg," *Klio*, VII (1907), 357-94; P. Groebe, "Der Schlachttag von Carrhae," *Hermes*, XLII (1907), 315-22; H. Delbrück, "Antike Kavallerie," *Klio*, X (1910), 335-40; Francis Smith, "Die Schlacht bei Carrhä," *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXV (1916),

an war was intended.³⁷ Opposition to the war arose at once, but Crassus was urged on by Caesar, who was then in Gaul, and his position was defended by Cicero.³⁸ Italy was scoured for troops, and in spite of the legitimate cry of an unjust war Crassus left Rome on the ides of November, 55 B.C. The curses of the tribune Ateius, leader of the antiwar party, followed him as he departed for Brundisium, where he set sail for Dyrrachium. Thence he marched overland, arriving in Syria during April or May, 54 B.C., and took over the command and troops of Gabinius. With the Syrian garrisons he now had an army of seven legions. His quaestor was C. Cassius Longinus; his legates were his son Publius Crassus, Varguntius, and Octavius. He might expect Abgarus of Osroene, Alchaudonius, an Arab prince, and Artavasdes, then king of Armenia, as allies, to furnish light cavalry, though their help was always a doubtful quantity; but Abgarus was definitely playing both sides, and Alchaudonius soon openly declared himself pro-Parthian.

237-62; K. Hartmann, "Ueber das Verhältniß des Cassius Dio zur Parthergeschichte des Flavius Arrianus," *Philologus*, LXXIV (1917), 73-91; Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, I (3d ed.; Berlin, 1920), 475-78; A. Günther, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern* (Berlin, 1922), pp. 14-38; M. Gelzer in PW, art. "Licinius (Crassus)," No. 68; F. Lammert, *Die römische Taktik zu Beginn der Kaiserzeit und die Geschichtsschreibung* (*Philologus*, Supp., XXIII 2 [Leipzig, 1931]); W. W. Tarn in *CAH*, IX, pp. 605-12.

³⁷ Plut. *Pompey* 52; Vell. Pat. ii. 46. 2; Livy *Epit.* cv; cf. Plut. *Crassus* 16.

³⁸ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* i. 9. 20 and v. 8; *Ep. ad Att.* iv. 13. 2.

The first year was spent in minor operations, the purpose of which is not clear; perhaps it was to train the troops, or possibly Crassus wished to establish a base of supplies in Mesopotamia.³⁹ Roman troops crossed the Euphrates and advanced into the Land of the Two Rivers. The small force of Silaces, the Parthian satrap, was easily scattered and its leader wounded. The Greek cities, including Nicephorium, were easily won over; but after the inhabitants of Zenodotium had massacred some legionaries that town was stormed—an exploit for which Crassus was hailed as “imperator” by his troops.⁴⁰ Silaces retired to report to Orodes the news of the Roman invasion, for sufficient Parthian troops were not available to attempt further resistance.

Crassus failed to follow up his advantage, but left two cohorts from each legion, a total of seven thousand men, and one thousand cavalry to garrison the captured towns; he then returned to Syria for the winter. Orodes sent two generals to harry the garrisons of the newly taken villages, and spent the winter thus allowed him in preparation for the coming struggle.

During the winter Crassus stripped the temple at Jerusalem of such money and gold as Pompey had left,⁴¹ plundered the temple of Atargatis at Hierapolis-

³⁹ Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 606.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Crassus* 17; Dio Cass. xl. 13.

⁴¹ Josephus *Bell.* i. 179 and *Ant.* xiv. 105; cf. Orosius vi. 13. 1.

Bambyce (Membidj),⁴² and enrolled a few additional soldiers. About the same time, or perhaps in the spring, Orodes sent ambassadors to Crassus to demand the reason for this unprovoked invasion. If the war was being waged without the consent of the Roman people, as the Parthians had been informed, then they would show mercy and take pity on the old age of Crassus; but if the attack were official, then it was to be a war without truce or treaty. If the message is correctly reported, this is one of the numerous examples proving the superiority of the Parthian intelligence service over the Roman, which seems to have been notoriously bad in the East.⁴³ Such a reply was not calculated to pacify the Roman; on the contrary it provoked him to fury, as perhaps Orodes intended. Crassus replied that he would answer their demands in Seleucia. The eldest of the Parthians then stretched out the palm of his hand and responded: "Hair will grow here before you see Seleucia."⁴⁴ The gesture and retort are still in use among present-day Arabs.

Because he had garrisoned the captured towns Crassus had no choice but to follow the same road on his next campaign, for, as he said, he had left many good men there. This decision cost him the support of a large body of foot and horse tendered by Arta-

⁴² Plut. *Crassus* 17.

⁴³ Cf. Trajan's difficulties (pp. 234 f.).

⁴⁴ Dio Cass. xl. 16; Plut. *Crassus* 17-18.

vasdes the Armenian,⁴⁵ who advised Crassus to advance by way of Armenia and thus keep in the hills, where the Parthian cavalry would be least useful. His advice and support were refused, and he rode away.

Crassus crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma⁴⁶ with a force which numbered about forty-two thousand, including four thousand cavalry and a like number of light-armed men.⁴⁷ Opposed to these troops were ten thousand cavalymen (ten dragons⁴⁸), munitioned by a thousand camels which carried additional supplies of arrows. These forces were in command of Suren,⁴⁹ the Parthian commander in chief, assisted by the satrap Silaces; for Orodes, taking with him the bulk of the infantry, had gone to Armenia to hold in check Artavasdes the king and to await the Roman attack, which he had every reason to expect would fall in that direction. But even Orodes was unable to

⁴⁵ Said by Plut. *Crassus* 19 to have numbered thirty thousand foot and sixteen thousand mailed horse.

⁴⁶ On the location of this Zeugma and the earlier one to the north see F. Cumont, *Études syriennes* (Paris, 1917), pp. 119-42; J. Dobiáš, "Séleucie sur l'Euphrate," *Syria*, VI (1925), 253-68.

⁴⁷ Plut. *Crassus* 20 gives the force at seven legions with four thousand horse and as many light-armed men. Florus i. 46. 2 speaks of eleven legions; Appian *Bell. civ.* ii. 18 makes the total force a hundred thousand! The legions are estimated at thirty-five thousand by Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, pp. 155 f.; thirty-four thousand by Sykes, *Hist. of Persia*, I, 347 f.; and twenty-eight thousand by Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 608.

⁴⁸ The Parthian military unit was a "dragon," consisting of one thousand men, according to Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 29.

⁴⁹ This is a family name; see Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 70 ff.

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foresee the foolhardiness of Crassus; hence the brunt of the campaign was borne by the cavalry left to defend Mesopotamia, where they were eminently suited to the level country.

Cassius, the quaestor, suggested a halt to rest the men in one of the garrisoned villages and the dispatch of scouts to gather information on the enemy forces. He argued that, if the advance had to be made at once, the best route lay along the Euphrates to Seleucia, which was the objective. But when Abgarus of Osroene rode into camp with news that the Parthians were retreating and taking their goods with them, and that they had left only two subordinates to cover their flight, Crassus permitted his enthusiasm to win the upper hand, and immediate advance across Mesopotamia was decided upon. Abgarus was later accused of acting as agent of the Parthians, but it is difficult to substantiate the charge.⁵⁰

Suren was undoubtedly a man of great ability and courage, although not yet thirty years of age. He traveled with a large number of personal attendants, a bodyguard of a thousand mail-clad horsemen, and a sufficient number of concubines to require two hundred wagons. Apparently his force was composed entirely of cavalry,⁵¹ the logical arm for the open country and for the distances to be traversed.

⁵⁰ Dio Cass. xl. 20. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, pp. 162 f., expressed doubts as to the accuracy of the original source; Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 608, believes Abgarus innocent.

⁵¹ Plut. *Crassus* 23 ff.; cf. Vell. Pat. ii. 46.

Crassus hastened across Mesopotamia through territory which the Roman authorities who seek an excuse for the subsequent defeat claim was trackless desert waste. Actually the country was rolling, and there were some villages and water holes throughout the region. Since the legions, among the most rapid marchers in the world, set out in the spring, they probably arrived before the lush grass of the last rains had burned away. On May 6 the troops reached the river Balicha (Balikh) at a point below the city of Carrhae (Harran).

At Carrhae the Roman commander was informed by his scouts that Suren was near by. The officers urged a rest and a reconnoitering expedition; but Crassus, carried away by the ardor of his son, advanced almost immediately, allowing his men barely sufficient time to eat and drink while standing in ranks. As Cassius had advised, Crassus moved forward with a wide front and little depth to his line, the wings supported by cavalry. To his son Publius he gave the command of one wing, to Cassius that of the other, while he himself took the center. The hurried advance tired still more the already weary Romans. On the approach of the Parthians, the bulk of the troops were formed into a square. The strength of the enemy remained an unknown quantity, for their numbers were masked by an advance guard and the heavy armor of the cataphracts was concealed under skins. At a given signal the Parthians

discarded the coverings and with the roar of a multitude of kettledrums charged the Roman line. This move resulted in a general withdrawal of the scouts and light-armed to positions within the square; and before the astonished Crassus was aware of the maneuver, he was surrounded.

To understand the disaster which followed, some discussion of the character of the forces involved is demanded. The chief strength of the Parthian army was in its cavalry, which was divided into two branches, the light- and the heavy-armed. The light-armed wore no armor at all, though each man probably bore a small oval shield and carried a powerful bow and a quiver of arrows. This compound bow outranged the Roman weapons and had sufficient force to penetrate the armor of the legionaries. Camels stationed behind the fighting lines carried an extra supply of arrows from which the light-armed replenished their quivers.

The heavy cavalry, the cataphracts, wore scale armor which covered horse and rider⁵² from head to foot. Their weapon was a long, heavy lance, with which they charged the enemy, relying on weight to carry them through the opposing forces. Scale armor

⁵² Examples were found at Dura-Europus, *Illust. London News*, September 2, 1933, p. 362. The horses apparently were not as heavy as Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 601, has supposed, since the Dura armor fitted light Arab horses. However, the Dura armor is later in date than the time of Crassus. See also the figures clad in scale armor on Trajan's column (p. 217).

was first developed in Iran and spread rapidly eastward into China and more slowly westward through Parthia to the later Roman army.⁵³ In direct contrast to the Parthians were the Romans, armored foot soldiers, equipped for close fighting, each man protected by a shield and by a javelin (*pilum*) which he hurled before closing in with his short sword. In cavalry the army was weak, for the Romans as yet depended on their allies to supply this branch of the service; the lesson taught at Carrhae eventually caused the expansion of the Roman mounted forces.

The Roman infantry were surrounded by the Parthian bowmen, who poured into them a deadly hail of arrows from every side. A charge by the Roman light-armed proved ineffectual. When the legions attempted the hand-to-hand fighting by which they hitherto had always conquered, the Parthians retired before them and continued to wield their bows with telling effect until they drove the legionaries back to the main body. Crassus realized the necessity of decisive action at once; the order was given for his son to charge the Parthians. With thirteen hundred horsemen, five hundred archers, and eight cohorts (about four thousand men), the young Publius drove the enemy before him with ease until, caught far from all support, the Parthians turned upon him. Many of

⁵³ B. Laufer, *Chinese Clay Figures. I. Prolegomena on the History of Defensive Armor* (Field Museum Anthropological Series, XIII 2; Chicago, 1914), pp. 217 ff.

those engaged in the attack on Crassus left and joined the assault on Publius. The bowmen rode Indian fashion around the bewildered Romans, shooting as they passed. Only the light-armed Gauls were effective against the Parthians, for they slipped from their mounts and stabbed the unprotected bellies of the Parthian horses or seized the lances and dragged the heavily armored riders to earth. But they were too few. Publius was wounded and attempted to fall back on the legions. His soldiers retired to a little hill, perhaps a tell, locked their shields, and fought on until they were killed or forced to surrender; not more than five hundred were taken alive. Publius⁵⁴ and the majority of his officers ordered their shield-bearers to kill them or committed suicide. The Parthians cut off the head of Publius, fixed it on a lance, and returned to the main attack.

In the meantime Crassus, relieved somewhat by the departure of those who had joined the assault on Publius, took courage and drew up his troops on sloping ground. Warned by a messenger of the danger to which his son was exposed, Crassus prepared to move to his aid; but scarcely had he set his forces in motion when the returning Parthians appeared with the head of Publius. Attacked by bowmen on the flanks and crowded by the heavy cavalry in front, the situation of the Romans was extremely serious until nightfall, when the Parthians withdrew.

⁵⁴ Cicero *Pro Scauro* iii. 1.

Crassus had sunk so far into the depths of despair that his officers were unable to rouse him, and on their own authority they ordered a general retreat to Carrhae. The cries of the wounded who were left behind informed the Parthians that the Romans were retreating; but they did not attack, as their bowmen and horses would have been at a great disadvantage in the darkness. About midnight a band of three hundred horsemen arrived at Carrhae and sent a message to tell Coponius, the commandant, of the disaster. He ordered his men to arms at once, and when positive news of the defeat was received he marched out to meet Crassus.

The following day the Parthians tarried to dispatch some four thousand Roman wounded and the numerous stragglers who were fleeing in all directions; four cohorts under Varguntius were also destroyed. Since the slaughter did not begin until dawn, it doubtless occupied most of the day. Their task finished, the Parthians took up the pursuit and surrounded the town of Carrhae where Crassus and the remnant of his army had taken refuge. There was no prospect of relief, since the whole Near East had been denuded of troops for the expedition; hence Crassus determined to abandon the shelter of the friendly but dangerous walls and to seek protection in the hills of Armenia. For obvious reasons the time of departure was kept secret; but the Parthians managed to place a citizen of Carrhae, one Andromachus,

who was in their service, in the position of guide to the Roman forces. Crassus set out at night toward the hill town of Sinnaca,⁵⁵ but Andromachus wasted time until day broke. For this service he was rewarded with the tyranny of Carrhae, which he held until his cruelty led the citizens to kill him and his family.⁵⁶ Octavius, more successful in his choice of guides, reached the hill country safely with about five thousand men. Meanwhile Cassius, disgusted with the meanderings of Andromachus, had returned to Carrhae, whence he fled with five hundred horsemen to Syria. Unnerved by this bitter experience, he ever after kept a man ready to kill him should he so direct.⁵⁷

At dawn Crassus was still a mile and a half from Octavius and the safety of the rough country when the appearance of the Parthians forced him to take refuge on a knoll. Surrounded by an enemy numerically far superior, his situation was extremely dangerous; Octavius perceived his peril and courageously left a safe position on high ground to relieve Crassus.

Suren realized that he must act immediately, for if the Romans reached the near-by hills it would be impossible to use the Parthian cavalry. His next move, though possibly motivated by a desire to secure the person of Crassus, who was believed to be the in-

⁵⁵ Strabo xvi. 1. 23; Tarn in *CAH*, IX, 610, n. 1.

⁵⁶ Nic. Dam. cxiv (J, II A, p. 378, fr. 79); Plut. *Crassus* 29.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Brutus* 43.

stigator of the war, may also have been caused by a genuine desire to make peace, perhaps for purposes of self-aggrandizement. He released some Roman prisoners who had been allowed to overhear a conversation in the course of which assurances of kind treatment for Crassus and a desire for peace were expressed. The Parthians were ordered to cease fighting, and Suren with his staff advanced to the base of the rise on which the Romans had made their stand and offered safe passage and a treaty of peace. Crassus, fearing treachery, was disinclined to accept; but his men threatened him, and he was forced to comply.⁵⁸ The meeting took place in the open space between the two armies, and each commander was accompanied by an equal number of men, presumably unarmed. The Parthians were on horseback, the Romans on foot. After a short conversation Crassus was offered a horse and the party started in the direction of the Euphrates, the boundary where most of the preceding treaties had been signed. But the Romans, weary with fighting and expecting treachery, perhaps failed to understand the purpose of this act, seeing in it an abduction of their commander. Octavius seized the bridle of Crassus' horse, and a general scuffle ensued, during which Octavius drew a sword and slew one of the Parthian grooms. This precipitated a *mêlée* in which Crassus, Octavius, and

⁵⁸ Plut. *Crassus* 30; but cf. Dio Cass. xl. 26, who says that Crassus trusted Suren without hesitation.

other Romans were slain. Whether or not the Parthians intended treachery we cannot be sure, but one of the supposedly unarmed Romans struck the first blow, and the whole affair may have been a tragic misunderstanding.⁵⁹ Later the headless bodies of the Romans were dragged around the walls of Sinnaca.⁶⁰

The Roman troops either surrendered or scattered during the night, only to be hunted down when daylight broke. Of the forty-two thousand who had set out with Crassus, scarcely one-fourth escaped, for twenty thousand were slain and ten thousand were made prisoners. The captives were settled at Margiana⁶¹ (Merv), where they intermarried with native women.⁶² Some were pressed into the Parthian armies and later betrayed their captors.⁶³ Suren proceeded to Seleucia, where he held a mock triumph to impress the citizens. Not long afterward, realizing the danger from so able a man, Orodes put Suren to death.

While the campaign against Crassus was in progress, Orodes had come to terms with Artavasdes, who was no longer under Roman influence. The Parthian had arranged a marriage between his son Pacorus and

⁵⁹ G. E. J. Guilhem de Sainte-Croix, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement des Parthes," *Acad. des inscr. et belles-lettres, Mém. de lit.*, L (1808), 62, was the first to point out this very possible interpretation of the story.

⁶⁰ Lucan *De bell. civ.* viii. 436 f.; Strabo xvi. 1. 23.

⁶¹ Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 47.

⁶² Horace *Od.* iii. 5. 5.

⁶³ Vell. Pat. ii. 82; Florus ii. 20. 4.

the sister of the Armenian monarch. While the festivities were in progress and the entire company was watching a performance of the *Bacchae* of Euripides, messengers arrived with the head and hand of Crassus, gruesome trophies of Carrhae. In announcing the victory the head was thrown upon the stage, an action scarcely in keeping with Greek tradition, though both of the kings and their attendants were familiar with the Greek language and literature, and Artavasdes had written orations and histories and composed tragedies in that language.⁶⁴

The result of Crassus' fiasco was to place Parthia on an equal if not superior plane with Rome in the minds of men from the Mediterranean to the Indus.⁶⁵ The lands east of the Euphrates became definitely Parthian, and the Euphrates remained the boundary between Rome and Parthia until A.D. 63, when the defeat of Paetus took place. The Parthians failed to follow up their victory, although Cassius, now in command of the Roman troops in Syria, was short of men and unlikely to receive reinforcements while civil war was threatening in Rome.

Among the groups most strongly affected by this increase in Parthian prestige were the Jews. For

⁶⁴ Plut. *Crassus* 33. Just how much reliance can be placed on this much overworked story is doubtful. In any case, the evidence concerns only the immediate court circle, and the extent to which Hellenism penetrated the life of the common people yet remains to be determined.

⁶⁵ Strabo xi. 9. 2; Dio Cass. xl. 14; Pliny *Hist. nat.* v. 88 (25); Justin xli. 1. 1; Herodian iv. 10; Plut. *Antony* 34.

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years they had looked to this newly risen power in the East as a possible source of support, and the strong Jewish colonies in Babylonia must have kept their more westerly brethren informed of the Parthian successes. As the Greeks of Mesopotamia directed their appeals for aid to the rulers of Seleucid Syria, so the Palestinian Jews turned their eyes toward Parthia for deliverance from oppression.

Perhaps in the time of Antiochus Sidetes (139/38–129 B.C.) an agreement for co-ordinated action had been reached between the Jews and the Parthians.⁶⁶ Certainly either during the ill-fated Parthian expedition or immediately afterward John Hyrcanus had made attacks on Syrian cities.⁶⁷ A passage of about that date in the Talmud seems to mention an attack by the Jews on Antioch.⁶⁸ In the time of Alexander Jannaeus (103–78 B.C.) a Parthian embassy of good will is mentioned as having been feasted at Jerusalem. During the celebration they inquired for the old man Simeon, then in exile, who had entertained them previously.⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that during the reign of Alexander no mention is made of Jewish embassies to Rome such as had commonly been sent by his

⁶⁶ A late writer, Josippon, chap. 28, says that John Hyrcanus received an embassy which proposed such an agreement.

⁶⁷ Josephus *Ant.* xiii. 254 and *Bell.* I. 62.

⁶⁸ Soṭah 33a. "Antioch" is by many emended to "Antiochus"; see J. Klausner, *Israelitic History* [in Hebrew], II (Jerusalem, 1924), 74.

⁶⁹ Yerushalmi, Berakoth 7. 2 (Krotoschin ed., reproduced by L. Lamm [Berlin, 1920], I, 11b) and Nazir 5. 5 (*ibid.*, II, 54b).

predecessors.⁷⁰ The disaster which the Roman arms had suffered at Carrhae made certain the supremacy, at least for the time being, of pro-Parthian over pro-Roman sentiment among the Jews.

In 52 B.C. raids were made on Syria; but the Parthians were driven out by Cassius, who then hastily marched southward into Judea, where he assaulted and captured the city of Taricheae. Large numbers of Jews who had revolted, perhaps inspired by the Parthian success, were sold into slavery.⁷¹ The Jews discovered in plots against members of the pro-Roman party naturally turned toward Parthia as a certain refuge.⁷²

The next, more determined, attempt by Parthia opened the way for expansion to its farthest western limits. This advance forms the subject of the following chapter.

⁷⁰ Eleazar Isar Szadzunski, *The Talmudical Writings as a Source for Parthian and Sassanid History* (unpublished M.A. diss., University of Chicago, 1932), pp. 30-34, and abstract of a paper in *JAOs*, LII (1932), 305.

⁷¹ Dio Cass. xl. 28; Josephus *Bell.* i. 180.

⁷² Cf. the example in Josephus *Bell.* i. 485 f.

CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE IN SYRIA

CRASSUS and Publius were dead, and the eagles of their legions decorated Parthian temples.¹ But Roman armies had been destroyed before, and Rome still survived. The lesson may have made no immediate impression in popular thought and literature, but military men were cognizant of the danger.

M. Tullius Cicero was appointed proconsular governor of Cilicia and was assigned twelve thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. Included in his instructions was a special charge to keep Cappadocia friendly,² for the new king, Ariobarzanes III, was a doubtful quantity. From Brundisium Cicero wrote to Appius Claudius Pulcher, the governor of Cilicia whom he was to succeed, that the Senate had proposed raising troops in Italy for Cicero and Bibulus, the new governor of Syria, but that the consul Sulpicus had vetoed the measure. In a dispatch to the Senate Pulcher reported that he had dismissed many of his troops; but his legate privately contradicted the statement, and Cicero begged him not to reduce

¹ Horace *Epist.* i. 18. 56-57 and *Od.* iv. 15. 6-8.

² Plut. *Cicero* 36. 1. On Cicero's governorship see also G. d'Hugues, *Une province romaine sous la république* (Paris, 1876).

an already too small force.³ From Actium on June 14,⁴ 51 B.C., he wrote to Atticus that he hoped the Parthians would remain quiet.⁵ At Athens Cicero still had no news of their movements,⁶ but at Tralleis he heard that they were inactive.⁷ On July 31 the new governor reached Laodicea within his own territory. His earlier ideas with regard to the peacefulness of the "Persians" (Parthians) were soon to undergo rapid changes.⁸ He had scarcely begun his work when on August 9 reports reached him that some Roman cavalry had been cut up by the Parthians.⁹ His two legions were scattered and practically mutinous when he arrived at camp in Iconium.¹⁰ The troops were reunited, and Cicero was proceeding to whip them into shape, when on August 30¹¹ he received a dispatch from Antiochus I, king of Comma-

³ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* iii. 3.

⁴ Translations of dates of this period from the old Roman calendar are of dubious accuracy, as the calendar is known to have been seriously incorrect at this time.

⁵ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 9. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.* v. 11. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.* v. 14. 1.

⁸ Cicero *De domo sua* 60. Cf. the much later writer Boethius, who remarks (*De consolatione philosophiae* ii. 7. 30-34) that in the time of Cicero the Parthians feared Rome.

⁹ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 16. 4.

¹⁰ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 4. 2.

¹¹ Cf. *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 3. 1, written to Cato on August 30, 51 B.C., with xv. 4. 3, also to Cato but written four months afterward.

gene, informing him that Pacorus (I),¹² son of King Orodes of Parthia, had reached the Euphrates. Pacorus, at this time young and inexperienced, was supported in the command by Osaces, a more seasoned warrior.¹³ The troops under Pacorus consisted of a large detachment of Parthian cavalry and a considerable force of allies, some of whom may have been Arabs.¹⁴ Artavasdes, king of Armenia and brother-in-law of Pacorus, was reported to be contemplating an attack on Cappadocia.¹⁵ But Cicero, who did not quite trust Antiochus, the source of this information, decided to await further news before acting.¹⁶

Since a Parthian thrust from Syria at Cilicia was expected to pass through Cappadocia, Cicero decided to advance with his legions to a point where he could be prepared to act no matter whence the attack came. On September 19,¹⁷ while on the march to Cilicia, Tarcondimotus,¹⁸ the chief Roman ally in the region beyond the Taurus, reported that Pacorus had crossed the Euphrates and camped at Tyba.¹⁹ A serious up-

¹² Pacorus apparently struck coins in his own name, although there is no numismatic evidence for a joint rule with his father; see p. 104, n. 43.

¹³ Dio Cass. xl. 28; Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20. 3.

¹⁴ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 4. 7. ¹⁵ *Ibid.* xv. 3. 1. ¹⁶ *Ibid.* xv. 1. 1-2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* xv. 1. 2. The date is mistranslated by W. G. Williams in the Loeb edition.

¹⁸ See PW *s.v.*

¹⁹ Possibly 'Ain Dēbā, PW, art. "Syria," col. 1624.

rising had been started in Syria, probably by the pro-Parthian party. From Jamblichus, the son of the famous Sampsiceramus of Emesa (Homs), leader of the Arab allies, came the same news. Cicero went into camp at a point near Cybistra (Ereğli) at the foot of the Taurus. Thence he sent frantic appeals to the Senate for more troops, since the Roman forces in the province were scarcely sufficient to maintain order.²⁰ The majority of the legions were held in Spain and Gaul near the persons of Pompey and Caesar, who were preparing for the coming struggle and were loath to part with their troops. Jamblichus, Tarcondimotus, and Deiotarus remained faithful to Rome, but only the forces of the last named could be depended upon with certainty.²¹ To make matters worse, the native population, suffering from the greed and oppression of former governors, was only too ready to welcome the Parthians.²²

Cicero remained in camp near Cybistra for five days, since from that point, which commanded the Cilician Gates, he could both block a Parthian thrust through Cappadocia and act as a threat to the vacillating Artavasdes of Armenia.²³ By September 20

²⁰ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 1. 3-5 and Caelius *ibid.* viii. 5. 1.

²¹ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 1. 2 and 6 and *Ep. ad Att.* v. 18. 1-2. At a later date Deiotarus received the praise of the Senate; see Lucan *De bell. civ.* v. 54 f., and cf. Cicero *Pro rege Deiotaro* 1. 2.

²² Dio Cass. xl. 28; Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 1 and 2. 3.

²³ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 2. 1-2.

Cicero had information that the Parthians had passed through Commagene and were in Cyrrhestica. Cassius with all of his troops was in Antioch,²⁴ where he was shortly afterward surrounded by the Parthians.²⁵ At this time there was no news as to the whereabouts of M. Calpurnius Bibulus, governor of Syria, then on his way from Rome. Parthian patrols soon penetrated beyond the frontiers of Cilicia, and a considerable body of their cavalry was annihilated by some squadrons of Roman horse and a praetorian cohort stationed on garrison duty at Epiphanea.²⁶ When it became apparent that the Parthian raid was directed not toward Cappadocia but into Cilicia, Cicero proceeded by forced marches through the Taurus by the Cilician Gates and arrived at Tarsus on October 5.²⁷

Both the Roman commanders and the Roman and Greek historians failed to understand the tactics employed by the Parthians. This expedition was a cavalry raid by a comparatively small force of swiftly moving horsemen whose object was not conquest, for which their numbers and equipment were inadequate, but booty and destruction of enemy property. This was the reason why they struck not at Cappadocia but at the rich area around Antioch. It was a comparatively easy matter to cross the Euphrates, avoid

²⁴ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 18. 1. On the passage through Commagene see Caelius in Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* viii. 10. 1.

²⁵ Dio Cass. xl. 29; Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20. 3.

²⁶ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 4. 7; PW, art. "Epiphanea," No. 2.

²⁷ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20. 2.

THE STRUGGLE IN SYRIA

contact with the small garrisons in the cities, and descend upon the rich villas and suburbs of Antioch. Cassius shut himself up in the heavily walled portion of the city, where he remained until the Parthians had departed. Probably their withdrawal was occasioned by the completion of their plundering of the city lands rather than by any action of the Roman troops, as Cicero himself is free to say.²⁸

The Parthian troops next moved onward to Antigonea (unidentified),²⁹ where they attempted unsuccessfully to cut down the forests, which hampered their cavalry. Meanwhile Cassius had ventured forth to worry the wings and had undoubtedly reduced both the numbers and the morale of the enemy forces. He employed Parthian tactics when he set an ambush along the road which they were traveling from Antigonea, feigned a retreat with a small body of men, and then turned to surround the disorganized pursuers with his entire force. In the struggle which followed Osaces was mortally wounded; he died a few days later.³⁰ This victory Cassius reported to the Senate in a dispatch dated October 7, 51 B.C.³¹ Short-

²⁸ *Ibid.* v. 21. 2.

²⁹ Malalas viii, p. 201; Strabo xvi. 2. 4; PW, art. "Antigoneia," No. 1. Not Tell Shaikh Hasan; see R. J. Braidwood, *Mounds in the Plain of Antioch* . . . (*OIP XLVIII* [Chicago, 1937]) 38, n. 2.

³⁰ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20. 3-4. Cf. Dio Cass. xl. 29, who states that he was killed in the fighting. On this victory see also Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 5. 35.

³¹ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 21. 2.

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ly thereafter Bibulus, recently arrived in Syria, entered Antioch.³²

Cicero, in camp on October 8 near Mopsuestia in Cilicia, apparently felt much reassured. He wrote Appius Claudius Pulcher, who had been asking about the Parthians, that he really did not think there were any, just Arabs partially equipped as Parthians, and that he thought they had all gone home. He, Cicero, understood that there was not a single enemy in Syria.³³ Evidently news of the Parthian defeat by his military rival Cassius had already arrived, and possibly Cicero wished to minimize the importance of the victory. Perhaps this also accounts for his onslaught on the towns of the Amanus, which began almost immediately afterward, on October 13.³⁴

The raiders under Pacorus at once withdrew and went into winter quarters in Cyrrestica.³⁵ Cicero left his brother Quintus in charge of Cilicia and of the winter camp established there and returned to Laodicea. Everyone realized that the situation was fraught with danger for the coming year.³⁶ Suggestions were made that Caesar should go with his own army to face the Parthians in the next summer, or that Pom-

³² Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xv. 4. 7 and *Ep. ad Att.* v. 21. 2; Dio Cass. xl. 30.

³³ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* iii. 8. 10.

³⁴ *Ibid.* xv. 4. 8; cf. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20. 5.

³⁵ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* v. 21. 2.

³⁶ *Ibid.* v. 21. 2 and vi. 2. 6; Caelius in Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* viii. 7. 1.

pey should be sent to take command.³⁷ When the latter course was decided upon, Caesar turned over to Pompey legions I and XV for the contemplated expedition.³⁸ In February, 50 B.C., Deiotarus decided to join Cicero's forces with thirty cohorts of four hundred men each and two thousand cavalry. In his letter to Cicero he indicated that he would take over the campaign, and Cicero believed that Deiotarus could hold out until Pompey arrived. King Orodes himself was expected to command the Parthians. At Laodicea early in May Cicero was planning to leave on the 15th for Cilicia and was hoping that the trip would be peaceful, though he realized that a serious war was impending. At Tarsus on June 5 he heard talk of bad "robberies" in Cilicia and of Syria blazing with war. Cicero's rival, Bibulus, dared not venture out of Antioch.³⁹

Bibulus, governor of Syria, turned to diplomacy rather than arms in an attempt to stave off the invasion. After he had won the regard of Ornodapates, a satrap who was unfriendly to Orodes, Bibulus persuaded him to adopt a plan to place Pacorus upon the throne. The troops which had been used against the Romans were then to be employed against

³⁷ Caelius in Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* viii. 10. 2; Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* vi. 1. 3.

³⁸ Caesar *Bell. Gall.* viii. 54 f.; Plut. *Pompey* 56. 3 and *Antony* 35. 4; Lucan *De bell. civ.* ii. 474 f.

³⁹ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* vi. 1. 14; vi. 4 f.; vi. 8. Caesar *Bell. civ.* iii. 31 says of the Parthians: "Bibulum in obsidione habuerant." Cf. also Livy *Epit.* cviii, which may refer to events as late as 50 B.C.

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Orodes;⁴⁰ but before the scheme could be carried out the latter apparently heard of the affair and recalled Pacorus.⁴¹ The threatened invasion of the summer of 50 B.C. therefore failed to materialize, and by the middle of July Cicero felt that danger from the Parthians was over and that he could safely leave for Rome. The garrisons placed in Apamea and elsewhere were withdrawn, an action which caused some criticism.⁴² Pacorus was allowed to live and was later even restored to the high command, where he proved himself one of the most capable generals Parthia ever possessed. For the next decade Parthia failed to make good her threat of serious invasion. The fact that no tetradrachms were struck from about 52 to 40/39 B.C. may indicate a transference of activity to the eastern part of the empire.⁴³

Naturally it was to the advantage of Orodes to further the civil war among the Romans. Pompey sent

⁴⁰ Dio Cass. xl. 30. There is nothing in this account which directly implicates Pacorus. Cicero's failure to mention the incident is not strange, since his account closes at about this point. Cf. Tarn, "Tiridates II and the Young Phraates," *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris, 1932), II, 834 f.

⁴¹ Justin xlii. 4. 5.

⁴² Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* ii. 17. 3. His later references to the Parthians are few: *Ep. ad Att.* vi. 6; vii. 2 and 26; viii. 11.

⁴³ On the possibility of numismatic evidence for joint rule with Orodes see Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 88, No. 173 and n. 1, and p. 97, Nos. 1 f. and n. 1; cf. Gardner, *Parthian Coinage*, pp. 41 f. Tarn, *loc. cit.*, would assign these coins to the young Phraates instead and date them about 26 B.C. On the absence of tetradrachms see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 184 and 221.

L. Hirrus⁴⁴ and probably others as ambassadors to Orodes. The Parthian king offered an alliance, provided he should receive the province of Syria in return. This Pompey refused, perhaps because he thought the price too high, or because Hirrus, though of senatorial rank, had been imprisoned,⁴⁵ or because of his relationship with Crassus and Publius, for Cornelia, Pompey's wife, had formerly been the wife of Publius. Notwithstanding this, after the Battle of Pharsalia Pompey entertained the notion of throwing himself into the hands of the Parthian ruler, in the hope of returning to the contest with a force furnished by him. He was persuaded by his friends to abandon the idea, partly because they considered Ptolemy a safer refuge and partly out of consideration for Cornelia.⁴⁶

Q. Cornificius, a later governor of Cilicia, wrote Cicero in 46 B.C. that Caesar had given him charge of Syria for the coming year and that he was fearful of a Parthian attack.⁴⁷ Cornificius, however, never held the Syrian command; it was taken over in 45 B.C. by

⁴⁴ Caesar *Bell. civ.* iii. 82; Dio Cass. xli. 55; cf. also Lucan *De bell. civ.* ii. 633 and 637 f.

⁴⁵ Dio Cass. xlii. 2.

⁴⁶ Plut. *Pompey* 76. 4; Quintilian iii. 8. 33; Appian *Bell. civ.* ii. 83; Dio Cass. xlii. 2. 5; Vell. Pat. ii. 53. 1; Florus ii. 13. 51; cf. also Lucan *De bell. civ.* vii. 427 ff. and viii. 396 ff. On the proposed mission (probably imaginary) of Deiotarus to rouse the east for Pompey see Lucan *De bell. civ.* viii. 209 ff. and 331 ff.

⁴⁷ Cicero *Ep. ad fam.* xii. 19. 1 f.; PW, art. "Cornificius," No. 8.

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C. Antistius Vetus. The autumn of that year found one of the Pompeians, Q. Caecilius Bassus, supported by certain legions, shut up in Apamea by Vetus. Bassus appealed to the Parthians for aid, and Pacorus at the head of his squadrons forced the abandonment of the siege;⁴⁸ but, because of the lateness of the season, the main body of Parthians did not remain long.⁴⁹

Since temporizing measures would obviously never solve the Parthian problem, Caesar began plans for a great campaign against them. Elaborate preparations were made for handling the home government while the dictator was to be away and for the organization of the army.⁵⁰ Octavius, Caesar's nephew, was sent to Apollonia, ostensibly to study philosophy, but in reality to learn military tactics in preparation for the coming campaign.⁵¹ Sixteen legions and ten thousand cavalry were made available for service.⁵² Six legions, together with many light-armed troops and cavalry, under the command of M. Acilius Caninus⁵³ went to winter in Apollonia,⁵⁴ while one legion was

⁴⁸ Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* xiv. 9. For further details see Adcock in *CAH*, IX, 714.

⁴⁹ Dio Cass. xlvii. 27; Appian *Bell. civ.* iv. 58 f.

⁵⁰ Dio Cass. xliii. 51.

⁵¹ Suet. *Augustus* 8; Appian *Bell. civ.* iii. 9; Cicero *Ep. ad Att.* xiii. 27 and 31; Dio Cass. xlv. 3; Florus ii. 13. 94; Plut. *Brutus* 22. 2, *Cicero* 43, and *Antony* 16; Vell. Pat. ii. 59; Livy *Epit.* cxvii.

⁵² Appian *Bell. civ.* ii. 110.

⁵³ Nic. Dam. *De Caes.* 16; Clayton M. Hall, *Nicolaus of Damascus' Life of Augustus*, p. 81, § 16, n. 3.

⁵⁴ Appian *Bell. civ.* iii. 24; Dio Cass. xlv. 9.

sent to Syria.⁵⁵ Gold for payment of expenses was forwarded to Asia Minor,⁵⁶ and large quantities of arms were prepared and gathered at Demetrias in Thessaly.⁵⁷ The expedition was to proceed to Parthia by way of Lesser Armenia.⁵⁸ These extensive preparations reflect far better than mere words the respect in which the Parthians were held by the Romans.⁵⁹ The assassination of Caesar in March put an end to his plans and saved the Parthians from what would have been undoubtedly a very serious war with the Romans.

In the civil wars which followed, the Parthians played a small part. A certain number of mounted Parthian bowmen had come into the possession of Cassius after the defeat and surrender in 44 B.C. of Caecilius Bassus and his legions. When Cassius learned that Antony and Octavian were crossing the Adriatic, a move which forced him to abandon his plans for an Egyptian expedition, he sent back his Parthian troops with ambassadors who asked for a larger force of auxiliaries. Apparently these were supplied, and in 42 B.C. they fought a losing battle on

⁵⁵ Appian *Bell. civ.* iv. 58.

⁵⁶ Nic. Dam. *De Caes.* 18.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Brutus* 25. ⁵⁸ Suet. *Julius* 44; cf. Plut. *Caesar* 58.

⁵⁹ See Dio Cass. xlv. 15; Appian *Bell. civ.* ii. 110; Plut. *Caesar* 60; Cicero *De div.* ii. 110; Suet. *Julius* 79. 3; all of whom cite the report that the Sibyl said the Parthians could be defeated only by a king. This was propaganda, of course, but it showed the Roman feeling toward the Parthians.

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the side of the republicans at Philippi in Macedonia against Octavian.⁶⁰

Antony, heir not only to the papers but also to the dreams of Caesar, considered an attack on Parthia as he passed through Asia Minor after the battle.⁶¹ In the late summer of 41 B.C. he was in Tarsus in Cilicia, where he had ordered Cleopatra to appear before him. From Tarsus Antony proceeded overland to Syria, where he appointed L. Decidius Saxa governor of that province.⁶² A body of Roman cavalry sought to raid Palmyra; but the people of that wealthy trading center were forewarned and fled to Parthian territory, where their influence was one cause for the Parthian invasion of Syria which was soon to take place.⁶³ To these refugees were added the pro-Parthian tyrants who had gradually established themselves in Syrian cities during the period after the defeat of Crassus when Roman control was at an ebb. Such tyrants, removed by Antony, sought haven at the Parthian court.

From Syria Antony went southward to Alexandria. In 40 B.C., while he was still in Egypt with Cleopatra, the Parthians again took the field against the Romans, and this time they had the good fortune to have with them Quintus Labienus, one of the ambassadors whom Brutus and Cassius had sent to Parthia to

⁶⁰ Appian *Bell. civ.* iv. 63, 88, 99; cf. Justin xlii. 4. 7.

⁶¹ Plut. *Antony* 25. 1.

⁶² Dio Cass. xlviii. 24. 3.

⁶³ Appian *Bell. civ.* v. 9 f.

secure reinforcements.⁶⁴ When Labienus learned of the proscriptions which had followed the Battle of Philippi, he cast his lot with the Parthians. Under the joint command of Labienus and Pacorus⁶⁵ the Parthian army crossed the Euphrates in the spring of 40 B.C. and invaded Syria. An attack on Apamea failed; but the small garrisons in the country round about were easily won over to their side, since they had served with Brutus and Cassius. Saxa, the governor, was defeated in a pitched battle through the superior numbers and ability of the Parthian cavalry, and his brother, his quaestor, lost most of his men through desertion to Labienus. This was brought about by means of pamphlets wrapped around arrows and shot into the Roman camp. At last Saxa fled in the dead of night to Antioch, but he lost most of his men as a result. Labienus took Apamea without resistance.

To cope with this new situation Labienus and Pacorus divided their forces, the Roman turning northward after Saxa, the Parthian southward into Syria and Palestine. Saxa was forced to abandon Antioch and fled into Cilicia, where he was seized and put to death. Labienus then continued into Asia Minor in a most successful campaign, during which he took almost all the cities of the mainland. Zeno of Laodicea

⁶⁴ Florus ii. 19; Dio Cass. xlviii. 24. 4; Vell. Pat. ii. 78; Livy *Epit.* cxxvii; Ruf. Fest. 18.

⁶⁵ Justin xlii. 4. 7; Dio Cass. xlviii. 25; Plut. *Antony* 28.

and Hybreas of Mylasa both wished to oppose him, but others, who were without arms and inclined toward peace, yielded. Hybreas especially provoked Labienus, for when the latter struck coins with the legend IMPERATOR PARTHICUS⁶⁶ Hybreas said: "Then I shall call myself 'Carian general.'" When Mylasa was taken the home of Hybreas was especially singled out for plunder, but the orator himself had sought safety in Rhodes.⁶⁷ Alabanda also surrendered only after sharp fighting; Stratonicea of Caria, though it was besieged a long time, was never taken.⁶⁸ A later rescript of Augustus praised Stratonicea for its resistance to the Parthian attack.⁶⁹ L. Munatius Plancus, governor of Asia, fled to the islands for refuge. The forces of Labienus may even have penetrated as far as Lydia and Ionia.⁷⁰ Naturally he did not neglect the opportunity thus created to collect funds from the captured territory.⁷¹

Pacorus, proceeding along the coast, and Barzapharnes, one of his commanders, marching farther inland, met with equal success in the south. All Syria

⁶⁶ G. F. Hill, *Historical Roman Coins* (London, 1909), pp. 128-31 and Pl. XIII 80. These coins bore on the obverse the head of Labienus and on the reverse a saddled and bridled horse. The assumption of such a title should mean a victory over the Parthians, but the Parthians were the allies of Labienus! It was evidently as difficult for contemporaries to understand this action as for us.

⁶⁷ Strabo xiv. 2. 24.

⁶⁸ Dio Cass. xlvi. 25-26.

⁶⁹ Tac. *Ann.* iii. 62. ⁷⁰ Plut. *Antony* 30. ⁷¹ Strabo xii. 8. 9.

fell before them except Tyre, against which Pacorus was powerless without a fleet.⁷² In some places, such as Sidon and Ptolemais (Acre), he was favorably received.

At this time in Judea the political power of the Hasmoneans was gone. Hyrcanus (I), the high priest, was but nominal ruler; and Antigonus, his nephew, had already failed in the attempt to wrest Jewish leadership from his uncle. The real power lay in the hands of Phasaël and Herod, sons of Antipater the Idumean. To the advancing Parthians Antigonus⁷³ offered one thousand talents and five hundred Jewish women, and because he was the head of a pro-Parthian group Pacorus decided to aid him. A special squadron of horsemen under the command of the cupbearer Pacorus, a man who bore the same name as the prince, was detailed to advance into Judea for this purpose. While these troops were raiding Carmel, a large number of Jews volunteered their services to Antigonus. Jews and Parthians together advanced to a grove of oak trees⁷⁴ not far away, where they defeated the opposing forces, and then hastened on to Jerusalem.

⁷² Dio Cass. *xlvi*. 26; Josephus *Ant.* *xiv.* 330 ff., *xx.* 245, and *Bell.* *i.* 248 ff.

⁷³ Dio Cass. *xlvi*. 26 confuses Antigonus with Aristobulus, as *xlvi*. 41 and *xlix.* 22 of his own work, as well as the accounts of Josephus, prove.

⁷⁴ Cf. Strabo *xvi.* 2. 28; PW, art. "Drymos," No. 4. This may be a place name.

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Within the city the writer of Enoch was moved by the coming of the Parthian hosts to express the pious hope that the city of righteousness would be a hindrance to their horses.⁷⁵ In possible internal dissensions among the invaders he saw deliverance for the elect—a most reasonable hope in view of the past history of Parthia, but one not fulfilled in this case.

The combined Jewish and Parthian forces managed to enter the palace; but the struggle, eventually little more than an armed contest between two political factions, went on for some time within the walls. Finally the cupbearer Pacorus was admitted to the city with five hundred Parthian horsemen, ostensibly to act as mediator. Hyrcanus and the tetrarch Phasael were persuaded to go as ambassadors to the Parthian commander Barzapharnes. To allay suspicion Pacorus left with Herod two hundred horsemen and ten "Freemen," and the remainder of the cavalry acted as escort to the embassy. They were well received by Barzapharnes, and it was not until the Parthian commander had departed to rejoin Prince Pacorus and the ambassadors had reached Ecdippa (ez-Zib) on the coast that they learned they were virtual prisoners.

In the meantime Pacorus the cupbearer was attempting to lure Herod outside the walls of Jerusalem in order to seize him. But Herod was suspicious, for

⁷⁵ I Enoch 56: 5-8; cf. also chap. 57. See Olmstead, "Intertestamental Studies," *JAOIS*, LVI (1936), 255 f., for the dating.

he had heard of his brother's arrest; under cover of darkness he fled with most of his family, pursued by the Parthians. Herod and his supporters managed to hold both the Parthians and the hostile Jewish group at bay and eventually reached the stronghold of Masada (es-Sebbah) to the west of the Dead Sea. The Parthians pillaged Jerusalem and the surrounding country and laid waste the city of Mareshah or Marissa (Tell Sandaḥannah). Antigonus himself bit off the ears of Hyrcanus, so that his mutilated condition might prevent his ever again holding office.⁷⁶ Phasaël killed himself; Antigonus was made king in Jerusalem; and Hyrcanus was carried away to Parthia.⁷⁷ By Parthian intervention a Jewish king again sat on the throne in the Holy City; the dream of re-establishing the kingdom had become a reality. The wide extent of Parthian influence, no doubt originally through trade relations and now through military strength, is demonstrated by the rapidity with which Malchus, king of the Nabataean Arabs, obeyed Parthian orders to expel Herod from his territory.⁷⁸ This act later cost him a large sum of money.⁷⁹ Practically all of the Asiatic possessions of Rome were now either

⁷⁶ Cf. Lev. 21:16-23.

⁷⁷ Josephus *Bell.* i. 273 and 284 and *Ant.* xiv. 379 and 384 f.; Euseb. *Hist.* i. 6. 7; *CSCO Syr.*, 3. ser., t. IV, Versio (1903-5), p. 83, lines 17-19. Cf. Edwyn Robert Bevan, *Jerusalem under the High Priests* (London, 1924), pp. 145 f.; James Darmesteter, "Les Parthes à Jérusalem," *JA*, 9. sér., IV (1894), 43-54.

⁷⁸ Josephus *Bell.* i. 276.

⁷⁹ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41.

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in the hands of Parthia or were seriously threatened by her. Antony, though aware of the situation, took no decisive action during his voyage up the Syrian coast on his way to Greece,⁸⁰ for war was on in Italy and his presence there was imperative.

In 39 B.C. Antony was sufficiently in control of the situation at home to begin a new campaign against the Parthians.⁸¹ He had sent Publius Ventidius Basus in advance into Asia in 40 B.C.,⁸² and this officer surprised Labienus with only a small body of local troops, for his Parthian allies were not present at that time. Labienus, unable to offer battle, was forced into Syria, where he was evidently cornered. Both the Romans and the troops of Labienus awaited reinforcements; for the former these were heavy-armed men, for the latter the Parthians. Both received the expected aid on the same day, but Ventidius wisely re-

⁸⁰ Dio Cass. xlvi. 27; Plut. *Antony* 30.

⁸¹ Appian *Bell. civ.* v. 65, 75, 132 f.; Gellius *Noct. Att.* xv. 4; Victor *De vir. ill.* 85; Dio Cass. xlvi. 39-41 and xlix. 19-22; Eutrop. *Brev.* vii. 5; Florus ii. 19 f.; Frontinus *Strat.* i. 1. 6 and ii. 5. 36 f.; Tac. *Germ.* 37; Josephus *Ant.* xiv. 392-95 and 420 and *Bell.* i. 284-92; Justin xlii. 4. 7-11; Juvenal *Sat.* vii. 199; Livy *Epit.* cxxvii; Orosius vi. 18. 23; Pliny *Hist. nat.* vii. 135 (44); Plut. *Antony* 33 f.; Ruf. *Fest.* 18; Strabo xii. 2. 11, xiv. 2. 24, xvi. 2. 8; Val. Max. vi. 9. 9; Vell. Pat. ii. 78; Zonaras x. 18 and 22 f. Plutarch drew his information on Antony's movements from the accounts of Quintus Dellius, one of his officers; see Plut. *Antony* 59. Cf. also *ibid.* 25; Strabo xi. 13. 3; Horace *Od.* ii. 3; and the discussion in J, II D, pp. 623-25. It is doubtful whether Dellius covered the campaign of Ventidius; see O. Hirschfeld, "Dellius ou Sallustius," *Mélanges Boissier* (Paris, 1903), pp. 293-95.

⁸² Appian *Bell. civ.* v. 65.

mained encamped on high ground where the Parthian horsemen could not operate effectively. Overconfident because of their previous success, the Parthians advanced without seeking to effect a junction with Labienus, and charged up the slope of the hill on which the Romans awaited them. The legions met them in a downrush that swept all before it. The Parthian survivors fled to Cilicia without attempting to join Labienus, who tried to escape at nightfall. His plans were betrayed by deserters; many of his troops were killed in ambush, and the remainder went over to the Romans. Again Labienus escaped, but soon afterward he was taken prisoner and put to death; thus ended the career of the man who chose to style himself "Imperator Parthicus."⁸³

Ventidius recovered Cilicia and then sent Pompaedius⁸⁴ Silo with a troop of cavalry to secure the Amanus Gates, through which passed the road to Syria.⁸⁵ This officer was unable to force the pass and

⁸³ Dio Cass. xlviii. 26 and 39-40; Strabo xiv. 2. 24. Rhosus (Arsus) seems to have begun a new era on its coinage with these victories of Ventidius in 39 B.C.; see George Macdonald, "A New Syrian Era," *Journal international d'archéologie et numismatique*, VI (1903), 47 f.

⁸⁴ Or Poppaedius; see notes in Boissvain's ed. of Dio Cass. at xlviii. 41.

⁸⁵ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Earnest Cary, *ad loc.*, n. 1, states that the *Cilician* Gates are meant. That is obviously an error, since the Cilician Gates are located in the Taurus Mountains, whereas Dio clearly refers to a pass in the Amanus on the border between Cilicia and Syria. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 190 and n. 2, suggests the *Syrian* Gates, on the basis of Strabo xvi. 2. 8; the reference in n. 2 is incorrect, for Strabo xv. 2. 8 refers to the *Caspian* Gates, hundreds of miles to the east. The *Amanus* Gates, just north of Epiphanea in Cilicia, are the most probable.

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was nearly destroyed by Pharnapates,⁸⁶ the Parthian commander who was defending it. At the critical moment Ventidius came up with reinforcements and turned the tide in favor of the Romans. Pharnapates and most of his detachment were slain.⁸⁷ Pacorus evidently then withdrew from Syria late in 39 B.C., and the country was occupied by Ventidius. Fighting continued sporadically in many quarters; Aradus offered prolonged resistance, and Ventidius encamped near Jerusalem for some time, though he did not attack the city.⁸⁸ When he departed he left a detachment under Silo in the vicinity and turned northward to reduce those cities which still remained pro-Parthian.⁸⁹

Early in the spring of 38 B.C. Pacorus gathered his army together and again invaded Syria while the legions of Ventidius were yet in winter quarters⁹⁰ beyond the Taurus in Cappadocia.⁹¹ The situation was none too free from danger of general uprising, for many of the Roman governors had mistreated the sub-

⁸⁶ Cf. Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 5. 37, who was probably drawing from Livy. Frontinus' account does not correspond with the others and may not refer to the same engagement or commander, whose name he gives as Pharnastanes; Dio Cass. xlviii. 41, Phranapates; Strabo xvi. 2. 8, Phranicates; Plut. *Antony* 33, Phar- or Phranapates.

⁸⁷ Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Plut. *Antony* 33. The "tablelike hill" in Strabo xvi. 2. 8 may have been a tell.

⁸⁸ Josephus *Bell.* i. 288 f.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* i. 291.

⁹⁰ Dio Cass. xlix. 19.

⁹¹ Frontinus *Strat.* i. 1. 6.

ject peoples,⁹² while the Parthian administration under Pacorus was evidently popular.⁹³ Confronted with such a situation, Ventidius had to act with caution. Knowing that Pharnaëus⁹⁴ of Cyrrhestica, one of his allies, was secretly in league with the Parthians, he determined to use him to advantage. Ventidius treated him as though he had his entire confidence, but pretended to fear those very things which he most desired to bring about. In this way he caused Pharnaëus to give Pacorus an entirely false idea of the situation. Pacorus was told that the Romans hoped he would advance via Zeugma, along the ordinary and shortest route, for then they could avoid the Parthian archers in the hills; should the Parthians cross the Euphrates farther down, Ventidius was fearful of disaster. Pacorus, acting on this false information, led his troops by the long route through Cyrrhestica⁹⁵ and spent forty days gathering material and building a bridge over the river, which at the chosen point was quite wide.

In the time thus gained Ventidius collected his troops and was ready for action three days⁹⁶ before

⁹² Dio Cass. *xlvi*. 24.

⁹³ *Ibid.* *xlix*. 20; cf. also the tenacity with which Aradians supported the Parthians.

⁹⁴ Frontinus *Strat.* *i*. 1. 6; Dio Cass. *xlix*. 19 gives *Χαυναῖον*. Frontinus is equally reliable and at least a full century closer to the events recorded. The form Pharnaëus is more probable, since it contains the Iranian element *Phar*.

⁹⁵ Strabo *xvi*. 2. 8.

⁹⁶ Frontinus *Strat.* *i*. 1. 6.

the arrival of the Parthians. Since he had not opposed the passage of the Euphrates, the Parthians supposed his forces to be inadequate and attempted an attack on his camp, which was located on high ground near Gindarus (Tell Jindaris), a little west of the Afrin River. The attacking force, composed of cavalry, was driven down the hill in confusion and slaughtered at the bottom by the heavy-armed men and slingers. In the midst of the mêlée Pacorus was slain, and with his death the Parthian forces melted away.⁹⁷ A slightly different version is given by Justin, according to whom a part of the legions of Ventidius charged the Parthians, defeated, and pursued them. Pacorus, when he saw the Roman camp apparently defenseless, threw himself with the remainder of his troops upon it. The Roman reserves then advanced and cut to pieces the last of the Parthians, and Pacorus perished in this last struggle.⁹⁸ Of the remaining Parthians, some were cut off and killed in an attempt to recross the bridge over the Euphrates, and some fled for refuge to Antiochus of Commagene, father-in-law of Orodes,⁹⁹ who was now openly pro-Parthian. The head of Pacorus was displayed in the revolting

⁹⁷ Dio Cass. xlix. 20, followed by Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, pp. 191 f., who did not know of the details in Frontinus; Josephus *Bell.* i. 317 and *Ant.* xiv. 434; Tac. *Hist.* v. 9. Florus ii. 19. 6 mentions a Parthian force of 20,000, possibly this one. See also Vell. Pat. ii. 78. 1 and Moses Chor. ii. 19.

⁹⁸ Justin xlii. 4. 7-10.

⁹⁹ Dio Cass. xlix. 23.

cities of Syria, which are reported to have been thus induced to surrender.¹⁰⁰

Pacorus was evidently a man of great energy and unusual military genius, for his death was regarded by the Romans as a severe blow to Parthia and one which went far to redeem the disgrace of Carrhae.¹⁰¹ Under this prince Ctesiphon is said to have been enlarged by the immigration of many new citizens, fortified with walls, and given a Greek name.¹⁰²

Ventidius completed the subjugation of Syria, and the last chance of Parthian success for the time being at least was gone. Once rid of active opposition, Ventidius turned to punish those who had aided the Parthians. Antiochus of Commagene was besieged in Samosata until he offered to do the bidding of the Romans and to pay one thousand talents. But Antony, who by midsummer of 38 B.C. had nearly reached the scene of action, was filled with a desire to reap some of the glory for himself, refused the offer, and relieved Ventidius of the command. The faithful Herod hastened from Judea with reinforcements of infantry and cavalry; some of these were delayed by the Parthians, who controlled the road, but they fought their way through and arrived just be-

¹⁰⁰ Dio Cass. xlix. 20; Florus ii. 19; Plut. *Antony* 34; Strabo xvi. 2. 8. Cf. Eutrop. *Brev.* vii. 5, who says the battle was fought on the same day as Carrhae, that is about May 6.

¹⁰¹ Tac. *Germ.* 37; cf. also Horace *Od.* iii. 6. 9 ff.

¹⁰² Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 23.

fore the close of the siege. Unfortunately Antony was even less successful than his able lieutenant before the walls of Samosata, and he was at last constrained to accept three hundred talents in lieu of the original offer of a thousand.¹⁰³

Ventidius returned to Rome. Gaius Sosius was to take charge of Syria, and Publius Canidius Crassus was expected to subdue Armenia and then proceed northward to the Caucasus. In November, 38 B.C., Ventidius celebrated his triumph in Rome.¹⁰⁴ Antony also was granted one, but did not live to enjoy it. Jerusalem fell in 37 B.C.; Antigonus was put to death, and Herod became king of the Jews.

The loss of his son Pacorus proved a great shock to the aged King Orodes and may have unbalanced his mind to some extent. With thirty sons to choose from, Orodes found it difficult to make up his mind. His selection of Phraates, the eldest of his eligible children,¹⁰⁵ was most unfortunate, as the events which followed proved.

¹⁰³ Plut. *Antony* 34; Josephus *Ant.* xiv. 439-47 and *Bell.* i. 321 f.; Dio Cass. xlix. 20 f. Can this be the treaty mentioned in Florus ii. 20. 1?

¹⁰⁴ The speech in which he proclaimed his victories was borrowed from C. Sallustius, according to Fronto *Epist.* ii. 1. 5 (Loeb, II, p. 137). On Ventidius see Suetonius in Gellius *Noct. Att.* xv. 4. On the triumph see *Fasti triumphales populi Romani*, ed. E. Pais (Rome, 1920), F. Tr. 715/39; *CIL*, I 1, p. 461, A.V.C. 716; Vell. Pat. ii. 65.

¹⁰⁵ Justin xlii. 4. 11-16; Dio Cass. xlix. 23.

CHAPTER VI

ANTONY AND ARMENIA

PHRAATES IV came into power shortly before 37 B.C.¹ Not long thereafter he attempted to hasten the death of his aged father by a dose of aconite.² When this failed he resorted to the more certain method of strangulation. To make his position more secure, he shortly murdered his brothers³ and was thus apparently without opposition. But soon he found himself compelled to remove numbers of prominent Parthians, while the remainder fled to refuge among various peoples and in distant cities.

¹ No coins are known to have been struck in 38/37 B.C. either by Orodes II or by Phraates IV; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 184. Phraates' first known issue, A. Ritter von Petrowicz, *Arsaciden-Münzen* (Wien, 1904), p. 77, No. 1, is dated June, 37 B.C. Horace *Ep.* 7. 9 should be placed about this time.

² Plut. *Crassus* 33. In dropsy the excess blood which the heart cannot handle backs up into the extremities, causing them to swell. When given in small doses, aconite strengthens and steadies the heart action and might thus effect a temporary cure, though larger quantities would be fatal. The drug is made from common monkshood and would be in an impure state as prepared in antiquity—a fact which may account for the cure rather than the death of Orodes. The whole incident may be a later Greek or Roman addition.

³ There is almost no agreement of sources with regard to the time of these murders: no clue in Justin xlii. 5. 1; Plut. *Antony* 37, Phraates put Orodes to death; Dio Cass. xlix. 23, Orodes dies of grief and old age before the murder of the sons. Cf. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 196 and note 1.

Some even sought the protection of the Romans. Among the latter was a noble, Monaeses, a man of great prominence and wealth who had gained a reputation as a commander during the war just completed.⁴ He promised Antony to lead the Roman army and believed that he could easily win over almost all of Parthia. Induced by this favorable presentation of the situation, Antony prepared for war against the Parthians. Late in 37 or early in 36 B.C. Publius Canidius Crassus forced Armenia to become a Roman ally and then turned northward to defeat the Iberians and Albanians, thus removing the threat of an attack from the rear on the proposed expedition.⁵

Hyrchanus, the Jewish high priest carried off to Parthia in 39 B.C., though unable to serve again in his former capacity because of his mutilated condition, wished to return home. Not long after his accession to the throne in 37 B.C. Herod sent an ambassador to request the release of Hyrchanus. Despite the protests of the local Jews, leave to depart was granted by the Parthian king. Financed by his friends, Hyrchanus journeyed to Jerusalem, where he lived in honor until 30 B.C., when he was put to death on the suspicion that he was plotting against Herod.⁶ Later Pheroras,

⁴ Horace *Od.* iii. 6. 9; Plut. *Antony* 37. Adolf Günther, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kriege zwischen Römern und Parthern* (Berlin, 1922), p. 58, n. 1, suggests that his reputation was won in the attack on Statianus.

⁵ Dio Cass. xlix. 24; T. R. Holmes, *The Architect of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 122 f. and notes; Günther, *op. cit.*, p. 51 and n. 1.

⁶ Josephus *Bell.* i. 433 and *Ant.* xv. 11-22 and 164-82.

brother of Herod, was accused of planning to flee to the Parthians.⁷

On the eastern frontier the precarious state of affairs in Parthia attracted the attention of the Hun Chih-chih, whose capital lay on the Talus River in western Turkestan; but his plans to invade Bactria and Parthia never materialized.⁸

Until the war with Parthia should terminate, Antony lent Monaeses three cities, Larissa (Sizara), Arethusa (Restan), and Hierapolis (Membidj),⁹ and promised him the Parthian throne. Phraates opened negotiations with Monaeses and eventually persuaded him to return to Parthia, a move which Antony did not prevent, since to destroy Monaeses would merely result in alienating the pro-Roman Parthians. Envoys were sent with him to request the return of the standards captured from Crassus in 53 B.C. and of such of his men as still survived.¹⁰

While these negotiations were under way, Antony continued his preparations for war, the most important part of which was to secure allies to supply cavalry. Of these Artavasdes, king of Armenia, was the

⁷ Josephus *Bell.* i. 486.

⁸ J. de Groot, *Chinesische Urkunden zur Geschichte Asiens*, I, 230 f. ("Tsit-ki" = Chih-chih).

⁹ PW, arts. "Larisa," No. 12; "Arethusa," No. 10; and "Hierapolis" (in Suppl. IV).

¹⁰ Dio Cass. xlix. 24; Plut. *Antony* 37.

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most powerful.¹¹ When late in April or early in May¹² Antony advanced to the Euphrates, contrary to expectations he found the whole region carefully guarded; but, since he was following the plan of invasion laid out by Caesar¹³ rather than that of Crassus, this made little difference. Since in any case he needed the cavalry to be furnished by his northern allies, he turned up the Euphrates, passed through Zeugma (near modern Biredjik, Turkish Birecik, which is the ancient Apamea; see p. 83, n. 46), and at some point, perhaps Carana (Erzurum), met the auxiliaries and held a review of the troops.¹⁴

The total forces under Antony's command numbered about a hundred thousand men, divided as follows: sixty thousand legionaries (sixteen legions), ten thousand Iberian and Celtic cavalry, and thirty thousand allies, both horsemen and light-armed, including seven thousand foot and six thousand horse

¹¹ Dio Cass. xlix. 25; Plut. *Antony* 37; cf. Strabo xi. 13. 4 and xvi. 1. 28.

¹² J. Kromayer, "Kleine Forschungen zur Geschichte des zweiten Triumvirats," *Hermes*, XXXI (1896), 92 ff.; Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 225 f. Günther, *Beiträge*, p. 55, makes it the middle of April; cf. also J. Kromayer and G. Veith, *Schlachten-Atlas zur antiken Kriegsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1922-29), Röm. Abt., Blatt 24:7. Florus ii. 20. 2 states that Antony made no declaration of war.

¹³ Suet. *Julius* 44.

¹⁴ On the route followed see Kromayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-86; Holmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 124 f. and 223-25 (with bibliographical notes). Cf. Theodor Mommsen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire* (tr. by W. P. Dickson; New York, 1906), II, 30-34, and Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, I, 478-81.

furnished by Artavasdes.¹⁵ These horsemen, fully equipped and armored, the Armenian king was proud to display before Antony.¹⁶ His advice was to attack Media Atropatene, since the ruler of that country, also named Artavasdes, and all of his troops were with the Parthians on the Euphrates. The guide who led the Romans northward from Zeugma to the borders of Atropatene, and later even Artavasdes himself, were accused of being Parthian agents;¹⁷ but the charge may have been based on a desire to shift the blame for the defeat that ensued. In order to speed up his advance Antony left behind his slow-moving baggage, his siege engines (carried in three hundred wagons), and all beasts of burden. About two legions, under Oppius Statianus, were assigned the task of bringing forward this material as rapidly as possible.¹⁸ Because there was no heavy timber in the country to be traversed, siege engines could not be constructed there; if they were to be available, they had to be brought with the army. Antony himself took the cavalry and the pick of the infantry and hurried to the capital of Media Atropatene, Praaspa (Takht-i-

¹⁵ Plut. *Antony* 37. Justin xlii. 5. 3 and Florus ii. 20 state that he had with him sixteen legions; Victor *De vir. ill.* 85. 4 reports the number as fifteen; Livy *Epit.* cxxx gives 18; and Vell. Pat. ii. 82 says thirteen. Kromayer, *op. cit.*, *Hermes*, XXXIII (1898), 27, estimates the average strength of these legions at 3750. See also Günther, *Beiträge*, p. 50 and n. 2; Tarn, "Antony's Legions," *Classical Quarterly*, XXVI (1932), 75-81.

¹⁶ Strabo xi. 14. 9.

¹⁷ Strabo xi. 13. 4 and xvi. 1. 28.

¹⁸ Dio Cass. xlix. 25; Plut. *Antony* 38 says ten thousand men.

Sulaimān),¹⁹ which he was forced to besiege.²⁰ Lack of siege equipment was a great handicap, for Antony had to build huge mounds in lieu of the usual towers. Phraates, when he saw that the task of reducing the well garrisoned and strongly defended city was likely to occupy Antony for some time, turned his attention to the baggage train. Statianus, caught off his guard, was surrounded by cavalry, and in the battle which ensued the Roman commander and all his men were lost.²¹ The valuable siege engines and the baggage were destroyed by the Parthians. Among the numerous captives taken was Polemon, king of Pontus, who was afterward released for a ransom. Artavasdes the Armenian deserted either just before the battle, which may account for the completeness of the Roman defeat,²² or shortly afterward when he despaired of the Roman cause.²³ He took with him, besides his own troops, some of the allied forces, a total of sixteen thousand men. Antony, hastening with reinforcements in response to messengers from Statianus, found only corpses.

The Roman commander was now in a peculiarly

¹⁹ Praaspa is the classical Vera, Strabo xi. 13. 3. See Sykes, *Hist. of Persia*, I, 360 and n. 1; H. C. Rawlinson, "Memoir on the Site of Atropatenian Ecbatana," *Journ. Royal Geog. Soc.*, X (1841), 113-15.

²⁰ Dio Cass. xlix. 25.

²¹ Plut. *Antony* 38 mentions the loss of ten thousand men; Livy *Epit.* cxxx and Vell. Pat. ii. 82, two legions.

²² Dio Cass. xlix. 25.

²³ Plut. *Antony* 39.

difficult position. To obtain food he had to send out foraging parties, which, if they were small, were wiped out or, if large enough to defend themselves, so reduced the strength of the besiegers that the people of Praaspa could make successful sorties and destroy the siege works. The legionaries, though protected by slingers, suffered much from the Parthian archers and their run-and-fight cavalry tactics. As Delliuss, probably an eyewitness, remarked in his account of a skirmish engaged in by a large foraging party in which the Parthian dead totaled eighty, the Romans thought it a terrible thing that, when they were victorious, they killed so few of the enemy and, when they were vanquished, they were robbed of as many men as they had lost with the baggage wagons.²⁴ Shortly after this particular party returned, the people of the city made a sally and put to flight the Romans on the mound. To punish the cowardice of these men Antony was reduced to decimation; that is, he put to death every tenth man. To the remainder he gave barley instead of the usual wheat.²⁵ Since neither side wished to prolong the campaign into the approaching winter, Antony made a last, unsuccessful attempt to

²⁴ Plut. *Antony* 39.

²⁵ *Ibid.*; Frontinus *Strat.* iv. 1. 37. Though Dio Cass. xlix. 27 says that all the army was given barley, the substitution of barley for wheat is ordinarily part of the punishment; cf. Octavian in the Dalmatian War, Suet. *Augustus* 24; Dio Cass. xlix. 38. 4; H. M. D. Parker, *The Roman Legions* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 232-34 (a work almost valueless for the eastern campaigns).

secure the lost standards and captives before raising the siege. After all negotiations proved abortive, Antony departed, leaving behind his improvised siege implements.

Phraates expected the Romans to return by the route they had come, but Antony was advised by a friendly Mardian²⁶ to follow the hills and thus avoid the archers to some extent rather than cross the open, treeless plains. The hill route was also said to be shorter, to be better provisioned, and to have the additional advantage of passing through many villages. With the Mardian as guide, Antony took the route suggested, and for two days all went well. On the third, when he had relaxed his guard and was marching in open order, he came to a point where the road was flooded by a recently breached dike. Warned by his guide that this was the work of the Parthians, Antony ordered his men into battle array, a task scarcely accomplished when the Romans were enveloped by enemy cavalry. Charges by light-armed troops simply caused the Parthians to withdraw momentarily, but attacks by the Celtic horsemen were effective.

Antony then adopted a formation consisting of a hollow square the flanks of which were covered by slingers and javelin-throwers, while horsemen broke up the Parthian attacks with charges. Thus the col-

²⁶ Plut. *Antony* 41. The later writers Vell. Pat. ii. 82 and Florus ii. 20. 4 represent him as a survivor of Crassus' expedition, settled in Margiana.

umn was able to proceed, though but slowly.²⁷ On the fifth day Flavius Gallus asked for some of the light-armed troops from the rear. When the usual attack came, he pressed forward against the enemy instead of drawing them back toward the legionaries as was the custom. In a few moments he was surrounded and forced to ask for aid, but the small detachments sent were quickly cut to pieces. Disaster appeared imminent until Antony arrived from the van and with him Legion III, which pushed its way through the fugitives and effected a rescue. Some three thousand were killed and five thousand wounded, among them Gallus, who died shortly afterward.²⁸ On the next day the Parthians, said to number about forty thousand, hoped to complete the destruction of the Roman forces, but the legions rallied and met the attack by forming a *testudo*.²⁹ The Parthians, deceived by the sea of shields, supposed that the Romans were giving up the struggle and so dismounted and charged on foot. When they were within a short distance, the legionaries rose and met them with their short swords, killing those in the front ranks and putting the remainder to flight. The weary retreat then continued.

Famine fought with the Parthians, for the small amount of grain available was difficult to grind after the mills had been abandoned with the transport

²⁷ On the retreat see also Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 13. 7.

²⁸ Plut. *Antony* 42 f.; cf. Tac. *Hist.* iii. 24.

²⁹ Plut. *Antony* 45; Dio Cass. xlix. 29 f.; Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 3. 15.

animals. Wild plants which the soldiers ate produced sickness and even death.

When the vigor of the Parthian attacks had declined for a time, Antony considered leaving the hills for level ground, especially as the rough hill country ahead was reported to be waterless. A cousin of the Monaeses who had been with Antony came to camp and warned him through an interpreter that the same fate which had befallen Crassus awaited him should he ever leave the hills. The Mardian was of the same opinion, and he added that but one day without water awaited them on the safe route. Accordingly they continued on as originally planned. Camp was broken at night, the troops carrying water in such vessels as they had or even in their helmets. But the Parthians, contrary to their usual custom, took up the pursuit even in the darkness and followed close behind the legions. About sunrise they overtook the rear guard, then worn out by a thirty-mile march. The parched soldiers suffered from drinking water laden with salts, for it was impossible to restrain them from anything liquid. Antony began to pitch camp, but abandoned the idea and resumed the march on the advice of a Parthian deserter who assured him that a river of good water was not far off, and that beyond it the Parthians were not likely to pursue them. As a reward for this information, the deserter was given as many gold vessels as he could conceal in his garments. The disorganization of the Roman army was by this

time almost complete, for Roman stole from Roman, Antony's own baggage-carriers were attacked, and the commander himself made arrangements for a freedman in his bodyguard to kill him should he so command. To reorganize his troops Antony called a halt, and he had partially brought order out of chaos when the Parthians resumed the attack. A testudo was formed, and the front ranks moved gradually along until they came to the river, across which the wounded were sent first, while the retreat was covered by the cavalry. Beyond this the Parthians did not pursue, even as the deserter had predicted. Six days later the Romans reached the Araxes (Aras) River, the border between Media and Armenia, twenty-seven days after leaving Praaspa.³⁰

The expedition cost the lives of approximately thirty-five thousand men. In eighteen defensive engagements the Romans had managed to preserve their forces from annihilation. A few more such Pyrrhic victories, and no one would have returned to tell the tale.³¹ Phraates celebrated his victory by re-

³⁰ Plut. *Antony* 47 ff.; Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 3. 15 and ii. 13. 7. On the retreat see H. C. Rawlinson, "Memoir on the Site of the Atropatenian Ecbatana," *Journ. Royal Geog. Soc.*, X (1841), 113-17.

³¹ Plut. *Antony* 50 puts the loss at twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, but apparently (see Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 205 and n. 2) does not include the ten thousand men lost under Statianus. Vell. Pat. ii. 82 states that losses amounted to not less than one-fourth of all the soldiers, one-third of the camp followers, and all of the baggage. Florus ii. 20. 10 says one-third of the legions remained; cf. Plut. *Demetrius et Antonius* 1!

striking with his own types the tetradrachms of Antony and Cleopatra captured as a part of the spoils.³²

Antony, though keenly aware that the desertion of Artavasdes the Armenian had cost him dearly, was forced to treat him with respect and friendliness in order to secure much needed supplies. From Armenia Antony proceeded in haste to a place called Leukē Kōmē ("White Village") between Beirut and Sidon on the Syrian coast, though he was constantly hampered by inclement weather in the rainy season and lost eight thousand men on the march. There he stayed until joined by Cleopatra, who brought with her clothing and money for the troops. When these proved insufficient, Antony made up the difference from his own pocket and the pockets of his allies.³³ After a short rest together on the Syrian coast, Antony and Cleopatra proceeded to Alexandria, where they spent the winter. In the meantime a quarrel had arisen between Phraates and his Median ally over the booty taken from the Romans. The Median, fearful for the safety of his throne, sent Polemon³⁴ to Antony with an offer of alliance. This Antony accepted, and

³² Allotte de la Fuÿe, "Monnaies arsacides surfrappées," *Rev. num.*, 1904, pp. 174-87; the example discussed is now in the collection of E. T. Newell, New York City. See also Allotte de la Fuÿe in *Mém. Miss. archéol. de Perse*, XXV (1934), 34.

³³ Dio Cass. xlix. 31. Cf. Plut. *Antony* 51, according to whom one account relates that Cleopatra brought only the clothing and Antony furnished the money from his private funds.

³⁴ Dio Cass. xlix. 33.

he later gave the kingdom of Lesser Armenia as a reward to the ambassador.

During this winter in Alexandria Sextus Pompeius, perhaps inspired by the successes of the late Labienus, sent messengers to the Parthians to offer them his services. The envoys were captured by Antony's men and sent back to Egypt.³⁵

Meantime Antony planned to advance through Media Atropatene in the spring, join the king at the Araxes River, and invade Parthia. He had actually left Egypt when he learned that his other wife, Octavia, was on the way from Rome; he thereupon returned to Alexandria.³⁶ After the failure of an attempt to entice Artavasdes into Egypt, Antony sent Quintus Dellius to seek one of the daughters of the Armenian monarch as a wife for his son by Cleopatra. Evidently this also failed, since in the early spring of 34 B.C. Antony marched northward through Palestine. Herod escorted him for some distance, and Cleopatra accompanied him as far as the Euphrates.³⁷ Antony advanced to the borders of Armenia, whence he conducted further negotiations for the marriage alliance. At length, when the king did not appear in person, Antony hastened toward Artaxata, the Armenian capital. Artavasdes was finally induced to enter camp, where he was at once seized and put in

³⁵ Appian *Bell. civ.* v. 133 and 136; Dio Cass. xlix. 18; Livy *Epit.* cxxxii.

³⁶ Plut. *Antony* 52; Dio Cass. xlix. 33.

³⁷ Josephus *Ant.* xv. 80 and 96 and *Bell.* i. 362.

chains. The fact that Octavian had attempted to enlist the aid of Artavasdes^{37a} may have provoked Antony's action. The Armenians, who knew nothing of this intrigue, found in the seizure of their king a permanent grievance against Rome.^{37b}

Antony thereupon subdued the country with comparative ease and drove the king's eldest son, Artaxes, about whom the Armenians had rallied, out of the country to refuge with Phraates. After the region had been garrisoned, Antony went back to Egypt. The Armenian king and his wife and children and much booty were given as presents to Cleopatra. The king eventually graced a triumph and later was put to death.³⁸ Antony's son Alexander was made king of Armenia, Media, and Parthia—that is, from the Euphrates to India!^{38a}

In 33 B.C. Antony again penetrated as far as the Araxes River, where he made a treaty with the Median king, an alliance against Octavian and the Parthians. Troops were exchanged, the Median king received a part of Armenia, and Antony secured Iotape, daughter of the ruler, for his son. The standards taken at the defeat of Statianus were also returned.

Not long afterward the Parthians together with

^{37a} Dio Cass. xlix. 41. 5, possibly also Vergil *Georg.* iv. 560.

^{37b} Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3.

³⁸ Plut. *Antony* 50 and *Demetrius et Antonius* 5; Josephus *Bell.* i. 363 and *Ant.* xv. 104 f.; Strabo xi. 14. 15.

^{38a} Plut. *Antony* 54. 4; Dio Cass. xlix. 41.

Artaxes of Armenia, whom they had aided to recover his kingdom, were defeated by the Median Artavasdes with the help of his Roman allies.³⁹ Later, when Antony recalled his troops, Artavasdes was in turn overcome and forced to seek refuge with the Romans. Armenia and Media were thus lost to Rome, the first to Artaxes, the second to Phraates. Such Romans as were left behind were killed.⁴⁰

As a result of Phraates' victory over Antony, the brewing internal strife in Parthia broke forth, and even before 31 B.C. a certain Tiridates (II) was in open revolt against the king.⁴¹ Both parties sought aid from Octavian, who was too deeply engaged in his war with Antony to take up the matter. Cleopatra and Antony were defeated in the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C., and both chose to take their own lives rather than appear in the triumph of Octavian. Tiridates was victorious, and the deposed Phraates sought aid from the "Scythians." Among the Greek inscriptions from Susa is a much mutilated metric one which Cumont has dated to Phraates IV.⁴² As he suggests, this rebel Tiridates might be the general men-

³⁹ Horace *Od.* iii. 8. 19 suggests internal strife among the Parthians; cf. also Plut. *Antony* 53. 6.

⁴⁰ Dio Cass. li. 16. 2. Note the Zeus Nikephoros types struck by Phraates in 32/31; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 184 f.

⁴¹ Justin xlii. 5. 4; Dio Cass. li. 18; cf. also Horace *Epist.* i. 12. 27-28 and *Od.* i. 26. 5, and Vergil *Georg.* i. 509. See also PW, art. "Tiridates," No. 4.

⁴² "Nouvelles inscriptions grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1930, pp. 211-20.

tioned in these verses, perhaps a commander who won fame in the victory over Antony.

From Egypt Octavian passed through Syria to the province of Asia, where he spent the winter of 30/29 B.C. About the same time Phraates and his "Scythian" allies drove Tiridates from Parthia, and he fled to Syria, where Octavian permitted him to live in peace.⁴³ Because of the laxity of the royal guards Tiridates had been able to steal Phraates' young son, whom he took with him to Syria. Phraates, then sole ruler of Parthia, on learning of this, sent envoys to Octavian in Asia Minor requesting the return of his son and the surrender of Tiridates. When Octavian left for Rome the son of the Parthian king and the pretender Tiridates went with him. They were brought before the Senate, which turned the matter over to Octavian for settlement. The son of Phraates was then returned to his father⁴⁴ upon the condition

⁴³ Dio Cass. li. 18. There are no known dated tetradrachms of Phraates for 30/29 B.C.; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 185. Horace *Od.* ii. 2. 17 mentions Phraates' restoration. On the problem of Tiridates and Phraates see H. Ten Cate Fennema, *Quaestiones Parthicae* (Neomagi, 1882), pp. 44 f.

⁴⁴ Dio Cass. li. 18. 3 is just after Actium. Dio liii. 33. 1 clearly suggests he is recalling earlier events; hence the next section probably refers to the same time as the passage previously cited. Dio states that the matter was referred to the Senate, which turned it over to Octavian for settlement. This would require some time, which the interval between Octavian's stay in Asia Minor and the reappearance of Tiridates in Parthia in May, 26 B.C., provides. We cannot accept all of Justin xlii. 5. 6 f., where he says that Tiridates with the son of Phraates and later the envoys, dispatched after the news reached Phraates, were received by Octavian in Spain. The ten months allowed by the numismatic evidence

that the standards be restored, but it was a number of years before the Romans actually received them.

Coins of Attambelus II of Characene overstruck by Phraates about this time show that the former had suffered some defeat at the hands of his overlord.⁴⁴

In the spring of 26 B.C.⁴⁵ Tiridates evidently advanced down the Euphrates with unexpected speed, for Phraates was forced to kill his harem on a little island a short distance south of Belesi Biblada (Kalat Bulak).⁴⁶ Perhaps at this time Tiridates struck the coins with the unique legend $\Phi\text{I}\Lambda\text{I}\Omega\text{M}\text{A}\text{I}\Omega$.⁴⁷ Tiridates must have reigned but a very short time, for his only

would be barely sufficient for Tiridates alone, to say nothing of the envoys, to reach Spain and return. Since Tiridates' coins stop in March, 25, the above interpretation of Dio liii. 33. 1 solves the problem usually created by dating the passage to 23 B.C. All of Justin xlii. 5. 6 may be erroneous, or he may have misplaced the incident of the kidnaping of the son. This type of error is even more common in Justin than one of fact. If the foregoing argument is accepted, we must date the return of Phraates' son between 29 and 26 B.C.

⁴⁴ G. F. Hill, "Greek Coins Acquired by the British Museum in 1926," *Num. Chron.*, 5th ser., VII (1927), 207.

⁴⁵ The following table, drawn from McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 185, lists the known tetradrachms from Mesopotamia bearing dates from 26-25 B.C. assigned to Phraates IV and Tiridates II:

Phraates IV	April, 26 B.C.
Tiridates II	May, 26 B.C.
Phraates IV	Aug., Sept., and Nov., 26 B.C.
Tiridates II	March, 25 B.C.
Phraates IV	May, 25 B.C.

⁴⁶ Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 1.

⁴⁷ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 135. The reference in Horace *Sat.* ii. 5. 62 should be dated about this time.

coins of this period are dated in May, 26 B.C. Soon thereafter, if we may accept Justin,⁴⁸ he again fled with many of his adherents to Octavian, who was then in Spain. An inscription found in Spolato seems to refer to a son of Tiridates who eventually became a Roman citizen under the name Caius Julius Tiridates and who fell while in command of some Parthian auxiliaries serving in the Roman army.⁴⁹

But Tiridates was not thus easily disposed of; in March, 25 B.C., he was again striking coins in the mint city of Seleucia. By May of the same year, however, Phraates had resumed control sufficiently to coin money at the same place, and Tiridates had vanished from our knowledge, this time permanently.

Meanwhile Roman losses at the hands of the Parthians had not been forgotten. War in the East was

⁴⁸ Cf. p. 136, n. 44. See the discussion of this period in David Magie, "The Mission of Agrippa to the Orient in 23 B.C.," *Class. Philol.*, III (1908), 145 ff. Trogus sheds no light on the question. Tiridates had a maximum of ten months to make the trip, but perhaps like Herod he did not fear to travel in winter. Tiridates is mentioned by Horace *Od.* i. 26. 5 and in *Mon. Ancyr.* vi (32). I cannot agree with the suggestion of Tarn, "Tiridates II and the Young Phraates," *Mélanges Glotz*, II, 834, that "Phraates, son of Phraates," mentioned by Augustus was set up as a joint king by Tiridates in his second attempt on the throne. Tarn feels that Dio Cass. li. 18. 3 is impossible and Justin xlii. 5. 6 untrue, but it seems equally impossible that the Romans ever supported dual candidates for the throne. The junior Phraates in question is perhaps Phraataces, son of Phraates IV.

⁴⁹ *CIL*, III, No. 8746; V. E. Gardthausen, "Die Parther in griechisch-römischen Inschriften," *Orientalische Studien Theodor Nöldeke zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet* (Gieszen, 1906), pp. 847 f.

definitely among Octavian's plans.⁵⁰ The campaign was to be directed at Parthia, and at least a part of the troops would follow the route used by Antony. Even dreams of Bactria and India are mentioned; and ambassadors or agents, one of whom is called "Lycotas," apparently penetrated more than once to those regions.⁵¹ Lycotas' lady love must learn where the Araxes flows and how many miles a Parthian charger can go without water, and she must consult a painted map (the world map of Agrippa?) to discover where the Dahae live.⁵²

If a parchment written in Greek and found with two others at Avroman in Kurdistan is dated in the

⁵⁰ Propertius iii. 1. 16; 4. 1-19; 5. 48; 9. 25 and 53 f.; 12. 1-15. The *ante quem* date for these plans would seem to be the recognition of Octavian as a god, Propertius iii. 4. 1-19, and the *post quem* date the recovery of the standards in 20 B.C. Since his patron was C. Maecenas, friend and military adviser to Octavian, Propertius would be in a position to secure information. There are indications of such plans as early as 30 B.C. in Tibullus iii. 7 and Horace *Od.* i. 2. 21 f. and 51 (on the dating of this ode see J. Elmore, "Horace and Octavian [*Car.* i. 2]," *Class. Philol.*, XXVI [1931], 258-63); 11. 2; 12. 53 ff.; 19. 11 f.; 21. 15. On Iccius' preparing chains for the Mede see *ibid.* i. 29. 4 f.; on new levies, i. 35. 30-32. See also *ibid.* ii. 9. 18 ff.; 13. 17 f.; 16. 6; iii. 2. 3; 3. 44; 5. 4; 29. 27; Vergil *Aeneid* vii. 605 f.

⁵¹ Propertius iv. 3.

⁵² Magie, "Mission of Agrippa," *Class. Philol.*, III (1908), 145 ff., suggests that while Agrippa was at Mytilene in 23 B.C. his officers may have been negotiating for the return of the standards. Horace *Od.* i. 12. 53, and perhaps also i. 19. 12, should be placed about this time. The date of *Od.* i. 21. 15 is uncertain; see A. Steinmann, *De Parthis ab Horatio memoratis* (Berlin, 1898), p. 22.

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Seleucid era, Phraates had at least four queens: Olenneire, Cleopatra, Baseirta, and Bistheibanaps.⁵³

On May 12,⁵⁴ 20 B.C., when Augustus was in Syria, the prisoners and standards were surrendered to Tiberius, who was commissioned to receive them.⁵⁵ One can hardly appreciate how large this event loomed in the eyes of contemporaries, even in view of the numerous literary references, until one turns to numismatics. The restoration of the standards was recorded on coins struck in the Asiatic, Spanish, imperial, and senatorial mints.⁵⁶ Indeed, most of the legends which relate to contemporary events are concerned with Parthian affairs. Augustus thought the return of the standards important enough to boast of it in his record a copy of which is preserved as the *Monumentum Ancyranum*.⁵⁷ The event was celebrated in

⁵³ Avroman II; see E. H. Minns, "Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan," *JHS*, XXXV (1915), 22-65. The document bears the date 291, i.e., 21/20 B.C. if the era is Seleucid, A.D. 44/45 if it is Arsacid. For further bibliography on the parchment see p. 47, n. 70; see also p. 170, n. 87.

⁵⁴ Ovid *Fasti* v. 545 ff.; *CIL*, I (2d ed.), pp. 229 and 318.

⁵⁵ Suet. *Augustus* 21. 3 and *Tiberius* 9. 1; Justin xlii. 5. 11 f.; Livy *Epit.* cxli; Vell. Pat. ii. 91. 1; Florus ii. 34. 63; Eutrop. *Brev.* vii. 9; Orosius vi. 21. 29; Horace *Od.* iv. 15. 6-8 and *Epist.* i. 12. 27 f. and 18. 56 f.; Ovid *Tristia* ii. 227 f. and *Fasti* v. 579 f. and vi. 465-68; Strabo vi. 4. 2 and xvi. 1. 28; Vergil *Aeneid* vii. 605 f.; Propertius iv. 6. 79-82; *Orac. Sibyl.* v. 47 ff. See also the later statue of Augustus in *CAH*, Plates, IV, 148 a and 150.

⁵⁶ Harold Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, I (London, 1923), 46; 63, Nos. 46 ff.; 70, Nos. 98 ff.; 84, No. 256; 86, Nos. 302 ff.

⁵⁷ *Mon. Ancy.* v (29).

Rome by the erection of a triumphal arch,⁵⁸ and the standards were ultimately placed in the temple of Mars Ultor.⁵⁹

As we have previously seen,⁶⁰ after Artaxes had cleared Armenia of the Roman garrisons left by Antony, he remained ruler of the country. About 20 B.C. the Armenians became so dissatisfied with him that they requested that Tigranes, brother of Artaxes, be sent to rule over them. Augustus sent not only Tigranes but in addition an army under the command of Tiberius to drive out Artaxes and place Tigranes on the throne. Archelaus of Cappadocia was given Lesser Armenia as well as certain lands in Cilicia. Ariobarzanes, son of the former king of Media Atropatene, was appointed to rule over his father's lands.⁶¹ Before Tiberius arrived, Artaxes had been slain by the Armenians; hence there remained little for the Roman forces to do. Tigranes reigned for some years, and at a later date may have fallen under Parthian in-

⁵⁸ Mattingly and Sydenham, *op. cit.*, I, 46; 61, No. 17; and 63, No. 37; Dio Cass. liv. 8.

⁵⁹ *Mon. Ancy.* v (29); Dio Cass. liv. 8. This temple in the forum of Augustus was not finished until 2 B.C., and the representations on the coins (for which see Mattingly and Sydenham, *op. cit.*, I, 46; 61, No. 16; 85, Nos. 281 ff.) do not correspond to the known plan of the building. G. F. Hill, *Historical Roman Coins* (London, 1909), p. 143, and other writers have suggested that the building on the coins is a temporary shrine erected on the Capitol.

⁶⁰ See p. 135.

⁶¹ Strabo xii. 1. 4 and 3. 29; Dio Cass. liv. 9. 2; Suet. *Tiberius* 9. 1.

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fluence,⁶² although at the time the general feeling was that Armenia had been restored to the ostensible, if not actual, control of Rome.⁶³

The years which followed the Parthian victories in Syria and Armenia and the subsequent disorder within their empire saw the scene of their contest with Rome shifted to the Euphrates, which by the beginning of the Christian era had for nearly a hundred years been the boundary between the two great powers.

⁶² Tigranes' coins bear Parthian titles; see Newell, *Coins of Eastern Dynasts* ("Numismatic Notes and Monographs," No. 30), pp. 13-15.

⁶³ *Mon. Ancy.* v (27); Strabo xvii. 1. 54; Dio Cass. liv. 9; Josephus *Ant.* xv. 105; Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3; Vell. Pat. ii. 94. 4 and 122. 1; Suet. *Augustus* 21. 3 and *Tiberius* 9. 1. Cf. also Crinagoras in *Anthologia Planudea* xvi. 61 (Loeb, V). On the coinage see Mattingly and Sydenham, *op. cit.*, I, 47 and 69, Nos. 97 ff., issued in 18 B.C., especially No. 101, which bears the legend CAESAR DIVI F ARME CAPTA and the figure of an Armenian kneeling to the right.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONTEST FOR THE EUPHRATES

THE standards and captives taken from the armies of Crassus and Antony had been returned to Rome; faced with discord within her own domains, Parthia yielded them without a struggle. Shortly after their surrender in 20 B.C., Augustus sent as a present to Phraates, the Parthian king, an Italian slave girl named Musa.¹ Whether she was placed in a strategic position as a source of information or with the hope that she might influence the king, we have no means of knowing. By Musa Phraates had a son, also named Phraates² (V), better known by the diminutive Phraataces. After the birth of this male heir to the throne, the status of Musa was raised from that of concubine to queen.

When about 10 B.C. Phraataces attained sufficient age to become a candidate for the succession to the throne, Musa persuaded her husband to send his older children to Rome and thus to leave the field clear for her own son. Phraates invited M. Titius,³

¹ The son of Musa was old enough to rule Parthia in 2 B.C.; cf. p. 147.

² He is probably the Aphrahat the son of Aphrahat who ruled over Seleucia and Ctesiphon of Beth Aramaya according to Mar Mari in *Acta martyrum et sanctorum*, ed. Paul Bedjan (Paris, 1890-97), I, 68, § 7.

³ PW, art. "Syria," col. 1629. Titius was governor from 10 to 9 B.C.

then governor of Syria, to a conference and turned over to him his sons⁴ Seraspadanes, Phraates, Rhodaspes, and Vonones, as well as two of their wives and four of their sons. Throughout their residence at Rome these princes were treated with all respect due their rank,⁵ and one of them, Phraates, built a temple at Nemi, dedicated perhaps to the goddess Isis.⁶

"Who fears the Parthian . . . while Augustus lives?" boldly sang Horace⁷ about this time, but others of his poems both earlier and later betray a lively interest in the East not unmixed with that emotion.⁸ In Parthia itself the surrender of the standards aroused further animosity against Phraates and provided additional fuel for the discontent already present. Josephus mentions a Parthian king named Mithradates who was in power sometime between 12 and 9 B.C. and who must represent some opposition of which all other record is lost.⁹

⁴ *Mon. Ancy.* vi (32). Seraspadanes and Rhodaspes are mentioned in an inscription found in Rome, *CIL*, VI, No. 1799 = Dessau 842. See also Strabo vi. 4. 2 and xvi. 1. 28; Tac. *Ann.* ii. 1 f.; Vell. Pat. ii. 94.4; Justin xlii. 5. 12; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 42; Suet. *Augustus* 21.3 and 43.4; Eutrop. *Brev.* vii. 9; Orosius vi. 21. 29.

⁵ They are generally spoken of as hostages (see the references in the preceding note); but this word, like "tribute," was regularly abused by ancient writers.

⁶ *CIL*, XIV, No. 2216; Gardthausen, "Die Parther," p. 844.

⁷ *Od.* iv. 5. 25.

⁸ Horace *Carmen saec.* 53 ff.; *Epist.* ii. 1. 112 and 256; *Od.* iv. 14. 42 and 15. 23.

⁹ Josephus *Ant.* xvi. 253; Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xxxviii; Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 116.

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Strong central government in Parthia was a thing of the past, and for some years to come the empire remained in a state of turmoil. Under such conditions party, racial, and religious strife found ample opportunity to develop. The Parthians had long enjoyed friendly relations with the Jews both within and without their political domain. The return of Hircanus from Parthia to Jerusalem in 37 B.C. is but the last demonstration of this *entente cordiale*. The breakdown of royal power brought a change in the situation. Sometime not long before 6 B.C. a Babylonian Jew, Zamaris, fled with one hundred of his relatives and five hundred of his armed cavalry to Antioch, where he sought refuge with C. Sentius Saturninus, then governor of Syria.¹⁰ Such a man was no city merchant but a rich and powerful landowner, one of the feudal nobility who lived on vast estates outside of the city areas. Indeed, many other Babylonian Jews, like Zamaris, were agriculturists, not merchants, even as they were in the time when Babylon flourished.¹¹ Only some desperate situation could force a man who could raise five hundred armed retainers to flee from his homeland; perhaps Zamaris had espoused the cause of the Mithradates mentioned by Josephus. Saturninus gave him land at Ulatha near Daphne; but Herod offered a tract in Batanaea

¹⁰ Josephus *Ant.* xvii. 23-27; PW, art. "Sentius (Saturninus)," No. 9, cols. 1518 f.

¹¹ Szadzunski, *Talmudical Writings*, *passim*.

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with special privileges, including freedom from taxation.

About the end of the century events occurred in Armenia which led again to Roman intervention. As we have seen (p. 141), the expedition led by Tiberius in 20 B.C. arrived too late to be of great service, for the death of Artaxes permitted the installation of his brother Tigranes II without difficulty. When not long before 6 B.C. Tigranes died, the nationalist party placed on the throne Tigranes (III) and Erato, his sister-wife, the children of the dead king.¹² To insure the investiture of a candidate satisfactory to Rome, Tiberius was commissioned to leave for Armenia.¹³ But Tiberius lingered at Rhodes. Eventually Augustus ordered that a certain Artavasdes II, perhaps a brother of Tigranes II,¹⁴ be installed as ruler of Armenia.¹⁵ Tigranes and Erato must have been deposed, and Artavasdes reigned a short time.

¹² Cf. Dio Cass. iv. 10a. On the coins of Tigranes and Erato see Barclay V. Head, *Historia numorum* (Oxford, 1887), p. 636 (the Armenian material was omitted from the 2d ed., 1911). For further numismatic bibliography see PW, art. "Erato," No. 9. This period in general is dealt with in PW, art. "Julius (Augustus)," No. 132, cols. 350 ff.; *CAH*, X, 254-64 and 273-79; F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 81 ff. and 211 ff. See also PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 4.

¹³ Dio Cass. iv. 9; Zonaras x. 35; (Ovid) *Consol. ad Liviam* 389 ff. may refer to the commission of Tiberius.

¹⁴ Cf. Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3.

¹⁵ Artavasdes struck coins with portraits of Augustus and himself; see Percy Gardner, "On an Unpublished Coin of Artavasdes II., King of Armenia," *Num. Chron.*, N.S., XII (1872), 9-15. Besides the fact that the portrait of Augustus is reasonably youthful, the Artavasdes from Media would probably not have followed such a model.

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In 2 B.C. Musa took the final step to secure for her son Phraataces the throne of Parthia; Phraates, now an old man, was poisoned.¹⁶ Artavasdes, established by Roman aid on the Armenian throne, was looked upon with disfavor by many of his subjects and certainly by the Parthians. A coalition of these two groups drove him from the throne about 1 B.C., and Tigranes and his sister-wife again secured control.¹⁷ If Rome was to maintain her sphere of influence in Armenia and her prestige in the Near East, immediate action was imperative. At the moment Augustus had few whom he could trust to cope with this new development. His grandson Gaius was put in command of the forces sent to restore Roman authority. Someone, perhaps Isidore of Charax, was commissioned to secure information about the East—a definite indication that the government was awakening to the inadequacy of the Roman military intelligence service.¹⁸

When the news of the advance of Gaius reached Parthia, Phraataces sent an embassy to Augustus

¹⁶ The earliest coins of Phraataces are dated early in 310 S.E.; see Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xl and 136.

¹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* ii. 4; Dio Cass. lv. 10. 18; Vell. Pat. ii. 100. 1; cf. *Mon. Ancyr.* v (27).

¹⁸ Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 141; E. Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI*, IV (1932), 4-8. Cf. Rostovtzeff in *CAH*, XI, 126, who dates Isidore in the time of Pliny (d. A.D. 79). His argument is based on the mention of an Artabazus, king of Characene, in Lucian *Long.* 16. But no coins of this king are known, and information given by Isidore does not otherwise extend beyond Augustus' time. See PW, art. "Mesene," cols. 1091 f.

to explain matters and to request the return of his brothers. The Roman reply was addressed baldly to "Phraataces" and directed that he lay aside the title of king and withdraw from Armenia.¹⁹ The Parthian answered with equal rudeness. Alarmed by the turn affairs had taken, Tigranes of Armenia attempted to make peace with Augustus and was sent to Gaius with a promise of favorable action. Not long after this Tigranes died fighting some barbarians, perhaps on the northern frontier, and Erato abdicated.

When Gaius reached the Euphrates, Phraataces, now thoroughly aroused by active intervention on the part of Rome, held an interview with him on an island, while the armies were drawn up on opposite banks. Later the two dined, first on the Roman side and then on the Parthian, pledging their good faith thus in typical eastern fashion. One of the officers, Velleius Paterculus, a youthful tribune with Gaius, aptly describes Phraataces as an excellent youth.²⁰ The terms arranged appear to have favored the Romans, for it was agreed that the Parthians should drop all claim to Armenia and that the four Parthian princes should stay in Rome.²¹

In A.D. 2 Phraataces and Musa his mother were

¹⁹ Dio Cass. lv. 10. 20.

²⁰ Vell. Pat. ii. 101. 1.

²¹ Cf. the passage from Antipater of Thessalonica urging Gaius on to the Euphrates, *Anthol. Palat.* ix. 297, and the mentions of Armenia and the Araxes in Crinagoras *ibid.* 430. See also Suet. *Nero* 5. 1 and *Tiberius* 12. 2; Plut. *Reg. imp. apophtheg.* 207. 10.

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married.²² This act, which horrified the Greeks and Romans,²³ suggests a possible connection with the changes which Zoroastrianism was then undergoing. Customs long confined solely to the Magi were being adopted at this time by the people as a whole; thus burial in rock tombs was abandoned for exposure and the collection of the bones in small rock cuttings.²⁴ Next-of-kin marriages had been common among the Magi.

After his interview with Phraataces Gaius advanced northward into Armenia, where he placed Ariobarzanes, son of Artabazus, king of the Medes, on the throne. Revolt against this new Roman appointee was soon in full swing, and Gaius began military operations to suppress it. In due course he attacked the stronghold of Artagira,²⁵ which was defended by Addon,²⁶ perhaps the satrap set over the

²² The date is fixed by the appearance of the head of Musa for the first time on the coins along with that of Phraataces; see Gardner, *Parthian Coinage*, pp. 45 f. The only other appearance of the heads of king and queen together on the Parthian coinage is in the reign of Gotarzes II; see Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 172.

²³ Cf. Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 42 f.; Lucan *De bell. civ.* viii. 401-10; M. Felix *Octavius* xxxi. 3; *Orac. Sibyl.* vii. 38-50.

²⁴ Justin xli. 3. 5. Silius Italicus xiii. 473 f. mentions that it was proper to bring dogs to the royal corpses in Hyrcania. Lucian *De luctu* 21 notes that the Persians bury their dead. See also Herzfeld, *Archaeological History of Iran* (London, 1935), pp. 38 f.

²⁵ PW s.v., No. 1. The spelling and date are fixed by *CIL*, IX, No. 5290.

²⁶ PW, art. "Donnes." The spelling is uncertain; perhaps Dones or Addus is better.

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territory by the Parthian king. On September 9, A.D. 3, in the course of a parley in which Addon was to reveal the whereabouts of a treasure hoard of the Parthian ruler, he wounded the young Roman commander, and, although the city was taken by the Romans, Gaius died from the effects of his wound the next year.²⁷ Augustus could boast that all Armenia had been subdued,²⁸ and poets commemorated the return of Gaius.²⁹ There are some indications that this Armenian campaign was but the preliminary to an attack on the Parthians. Gaius is said to have died in the midst of preparations for a Parthian war,³⁰ and Augustus is reported to have contemplated expanding the boundary of the Empire beyond the Euphrates.³¹

Ariobarzanes, installed as king of Armenia by Gaius, soon died, and his place was taken by his son, Artavasdes III.³² Phraataces did not remain long

²⁷ Strabo xi. 14. 6; Dio Cass. lv. 10a. 6-9; Vell. Pat. ii. 102; Florus ii. 32; Ruf. Fest. 19; Tac. *Ann.* i. 3; *CIL*, IX, No. 5290.

²⁸ *Mon. Ancyr.* v (27).

²⁹ Antipater of Thessalonica in *Anthol. Palat.* ix. 59.

³⁰ Seneca *De cons. ad Polyb.* xv. 4; Ovid *Ars amat.* i. 177 ff., 199 ff., 223 ff.; *Remedia amoris* 155 ff. and 224. The verse last cited possibly expresses disappointment over the failure of the expedition.

³¹ Seneca *De brev. vit.* iv. 5.

³² *Mon. Ancyr.* v (27). There is a Greek inscription from Susa of about this date which mentions Zamaspes, stratiarch of Susa, who was commended by Phraates for watering the gardens of the guards. Note the continued use of Macedonian titles at this late date. The inscription should be dated either 9/8 B.C., under Phraates IV, or A.D. 2/3, under

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in power after his marriage to his mother, an act which his subjects did not approve.³³ In A.D. 4³⁴ he was either killed or driven into Syria, where he died shortly afterward.³⁵ The nobles called in a prince of the Arsacid family named Orodes (III), whose violent temper and great cruelty made him intolerable. Another insurrection followed, and Orodes was murdered at a festival or while hunting³⁶ about A.D. 6.³⁷

Ambassadors were then dispatched to Rome, whence they were sent to Tiberius, who was probably in Germany.³⁸ They requested the return of one of the sons of Phraates IV; and Vonones, the eldest, was sent.³⁹ The Parthians were not long satisfied, for they were irked by the western manners and friends their new sovereign had acquired at Rome.

Phraataces; see F. Cumont, "Inscriptions grecques de Suse," *CR*, 1931, pp. 238-50.

³³ Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 42 f.

³⁴ Gardner, *Parthian Coinage*, p. 46; the last coins of Musa and Phraataces are dated Hyperberetaeus, 315 S.E.

³⁵ Cf. Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 42 f. and *Mon. Ancyr.* vi (32).

³⁶ Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 44 f.

³⁷ The only known coin of Orodes, if indeed it is properly assigned, is dated 317 S.E., i.e., A.D. 6/7; see Gardner, *Parthian Coinage*, p. 46 and Pl. V 1. No coins were struck in the two years which followed.

³⁸ Suet. *Tiberius* 16.

³⁹ *Mon. Ancyr.* vi (33); Tac. *Ann.* ii. 1-2; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 46. This is probably the Vonones mentioned in a poem quoted by Ausonius *Epist.* xxiii. 6. The poem, sent him by Pontius Paulinus, was based on Suetonius *Lives of the Kings*, a work now lost.

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His dislike of the hunt and of traditional feasts, his free and open manners, his failure to show interest in horses—all these things caused the nationalists to call in another Arsacid, Artabanus III. He was king of Atropatene, but had connections on one side of his family with the Dahae.⁴⁰ On his first attempt to secure the throne, in A.D. 9/10, Artabanus was badly defeated and forced to retreat to the mountain fastnesses of his own kingdom. Vonones hastened to re-strike the old tetradrachms of Musa and Phraataces with a design symbolic of his success, a winged Victory bearing a palm branch, and then to strike drachms in a similar style with the legend ΒΑCΙΑΕΥC ONOWNHC NEIKHCAC APTABANON.⁴¹ But his triumph was short-lived, for Artabanus collected a second army and returned to the attack. This time Vonones was defeated and forced to flee to Seleucia on the Tigris. Artabanus followed, and many of his opponents were slain. The victor entered Ctesiphon and was proclaimed king about A.D. 12.⁴² Vonones escaped from Seleucia to Armenia, which was then without a king, for Artavasdes III had been murdered

⁴⁰ Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3 and vi. 36 and 42; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 48. See also PW, art. "Hyrkania," cols. 507 f., and Werner Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero (Klio, Beiheft XV [1923])*, pp. 70 ff. Vonones' existing coins are dated A.D. 9/10, 11/12, and 12/13; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 187.

⁴¹ Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xliii and 143 f.

⁴² Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 48-50; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 187. This Artabanus is probably the same one mentioned by Mar Mari in *Acta martyrum et sanctorum*, I, 79, § 8.

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and Tigranes (IV), a grandson of King Herod the Great, sent by Augustus to succeed him, had been deposed after a brief reign.⁴³ Vonones secured the Armenian throne, but owing to pressure from the Parthian king Artabanus he was forced to abdicate in A.D. 15 or 16.⁴⁴ He threw himself on the mercy of the governor of Syria, Creticus Silanus,⁴⁵ who allowed him to live in Antioch and to retain the pomp and name of king.

Shortly before the abdication of Vonones from the throne of Armenia, in A.D. 14 the aged Augustus died and his adopted son Tiberius succeeded him. When Artabanus of Parthia sent his son Orodes to fill the vacant place, Tiberius felt it incumbent upon himself to take action. In A.D. 18 he sent his adopted son Germanicus with full authority to act as a free agent⁴⁶ and with what was felt to be an impressive retinue. Germanicus proceeded to Artaxata, the Armenian capital, where he found that the people were ready to accept Zeno, son of Polemon, king of Pontus, who had grown up among them and adopted their customs and manners. As Zeno was also friendly to the Romans, Germanicus crowned him in the midst of a

⁴³ *Mon. Ancy.* v (27); *Tac. Ann.* ii. 3 f. and vi. 40; *Josephus Ant.* xviii 140 and *Bell.* ii. 222. See also PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 5.

⁴⁴ *Tac. Ann.* ii. 4. Cf. *Josephus Ant.* xviii. 50-52; W. E. Gwatkin, *Cappadocia as a Roman Procuratorial Province* ("University of Missouri Studies," V 4 [Columbia, Mo., 1930]), p. 13; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 223.

⁴⁵ PW, art. "Caecilius," No. 90.

⁴⁶ *Tac. Ann.* ii. 43.

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multitude of people who hailed him as king of Armenia under the name Artaxias.⁴⁷

Germanicus then returned to Syria, where an embassy from the Parthian king reached him. The proposal was made that the friendly alliance in effect between their predecessors should be renewed, and Artabanus sent word that he would be willing to come as far as the Euphrates, the traditional meeting-place for Roman and Parthian and the boundary between the two great empires. He requested, however, that Vonones be removed from the neighborhood of the frontier, whence he was fomenting discontent among the Parthians. Germanicus replied with politeness but made no mention of the proposed conference, which apparently never took place. He did transfer Vonones to the coastal city of Pompeiopolis (ancient Soli, near modern Mezitli) in Cilicia.⁴⁸ At the same time Germanicus sent Alexander, perhaps a Palmyrene merchant, on a mission to Mesene and to a certain Orabazes. The nature of his message we can only conjecture; but it could hardly involve any direct threat against the Parthians, with relations as amicable as they then were. The embassy suggests

⁴⁷ Tac. *Ann.* ii. 56; cf. also Suet. *Gaius* i. 2 and Strabo xii. 3. 29. Coins were struck in Caesarea of Cappadocia with the legend GERMANICUS ARTAXIAS and with the coronation scene; see Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, I, 104, No. 8. Mattingly suggests that these were perhaps struck by Caligula.

⁴⁸ Tac. *Ann.* ii. 58; the contemporary Strabo xvi. i. 28 confirms the fact that the Euphrates was still the boundary.

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that the Parthian vassal state of Mesene was by this time more or less independent, which is not surprising in view of the weak central government.⁴⁹

Vonones bribed his guards the next year, A.D. 19, and in the course of a hunt attempted to escape. Halted at the banks of the Pyramus River (Jeihan, Turkish Ceyhan Nehri) by the destruction of a bridge which had been torn up to prevent his escape, he was arrested by Vibius Fronto, prefect of the cavalry. Shortly afterward Vonones was assassinated by Remmius, under whose charge he had been placed in Pompeiopolis. Probably Remmius had been implicated in the escape and feared the revelations which might be made after its failure.⁵⁰

In the same year that Vonones was murdered, Germanicus died, and for the next decade the East remained at peace. Thus between the years 19 and 32 only one governor was sent out to Syria, and even he probably served but a short term. Tiberius was later reproached for thus inviting trouble on the Armenian frontier by leaving that office vacant.⁵¹

Artabanus at once set about consolidating his position. Josephus⁵² tells us at length a story of two Jewish brothers, Anilaeus and Asinaeus, who lived in

⁴⁹ J. Cantineau, "Textes palmyréniens provenant de la fouille du temple de Bêl," *Syria*, XII (1931), 139-41; H. Seyrig, "Antiquités syriennes," *Syria*, XIII (1932), 266-69.

⁵⁰ Tac. *Ann.* ii. 68; Suet. *Tiberius* 49. 2. On Remmius see PW *s.v.*, No. 3.

⁵¹ Suet. *Tiberius* 41.

⁵² *Ant.* xviii. 310-79.

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Neharda.⁵³ They set up a robber kingdom in northern Babylonia, defeated the Parthian satrap, and thus brought themselves to the attention of the Great King. Artabanus handled the situation in a manner much used by present-day mandataries: he sent for the brothers and placed them in formal control of the region which they had ruled as robber barons. This arrangement served admirably for fifteen years, until the death of the brothers just before the revolt of Seleucia.⁵⁴ As a consequence of this military inactivity we have little information for the period;⁵⁵ one exception is a letter which Artabanus wrote in December, A.D. 21, to the magistrates and the city of Susa, the only royal document of the Arsacid period which has come down to us. The purport of the letter, which was later graven on the stone base of a statue, was to validate a contested city election.⁵⁶

⁵³ Arrian *Parthica* xi, *Νάαρδα*; see also PW, art. "Νάαρδα." This city lay on the Euphrates not far from Sippar and near the mouth of the Nahr Malka.

⁵⁴ This chronology is not exact, but it seems to fit the evidence. If the six-year period mentioned by Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 373 represents, as it seems to do, the duration of the revolt of Seleucia, which began in A.D. 35 (see p. 164), then subtraction of the fifteen peaceful years (Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 339) gives A.D. 20 for the beginning of the brothers' activities.

⁵⁵ Artabanus ceased coining money long before the end of his reign. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 188, reports his last known coin as dated A.D. 27/28 but adds with a query coins from 29/30 and 30/31.

⁵⁶ F. Cumont, "Une lettre du roi Artaban III," *CR*, 1932, pp. 238-60; M. Rostovtzeff, "L'Hellénisme en Mésopotamie," *Scientia*, LIII (1933), 120 f.; C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven, 1934), pp. 299-306. As to Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 302, note that

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On the death of Artaxias III (Zeno) of Armenia, Artabanus seized the opportunity thus occasioned to place his eldest son, known to us only as Arsaces, upon the throne.⁵⁷ To the aged Tiberius he wrote, claiming the treasure left by Vonones in Syria and Cilicia and threatening to add to his domain all the lands of the Achaemenidae and Seleucidae.⁵⁸

Perhaps it was Artabanus III who brought the Mandaeans from "Madai" to the country of the Two Rivers.⁵⁹ The long reign of Artabanus suggests that he was both able and powerful and that he must have restored central authority over the nobles. His diplomatic success in Armenia perhaps caused him to attempt to bring them further under his control, until at last they took action. Two of the most prominent among them, Sinnaces and Abdus, the latter a eunuch, went secretly to Rome, where they reported that if a Parthian prince should appear on the frontier the country would rise to his support. Tiberius chose Phraates, last and youngest son of Phraates IV, now a man of years and a resident of Rome for nearly half a century. But Phraates died suddenly

while Dura-Europus would follow the Syrian Seleucid era beginning October, 312 B.C., Susa would use the Babylonian one beginning April, 311 B.C. The Parthian era dates from April, 247 (not 248) B.C.

⁵⁷ Tac. *Ann.* vi. 31. Cf. also Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* ii. 2.

⁵⁸ Tac. *loc. cit.*; Dio Cass. lviii. 26; Suet. *Tiberius* 66.

⁵⁹ E. S. Drower, *The Mandaeans of Iraq and Iran* (Oxford, 1937), pp. 6 ff., suggests that Madai may have been a city in Media, the homeland of Artabanus, or may have been located farther east.

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after his arrival in Syria, perhaps from age and the fatigue of travel, or possibly overtaken by the fate which hovers over those who pretend to thrones occupied by such as Artabanus. Artabanus discovered the mission of the two ambassadors to Tiberius, removed Abdus by poison, and kept Sinnaces occupied by various missions and pretenses.

Not discouraged by his first attempt, in 35 Tiberius dispatched another Arsacid prince, this time Tiridates (III), a grandson of Phraates IV, and appointed L. Vitellius as governor of Syria. To make the task of Vitellius easier he planned to set up a rival king in Armenia, and to this end he reconciled Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, and his brother Mithradates. Financial encouragement was offered to Pharasmanes to place his brother on the Armenian throne. Since to this was added the incentive of removing so dangerous an opponent to a safe distance, Pharasmanes undertook the task.⁶⁰ Arsaces, the son of Artabanus, was murdered by his attendants, who had been bribed, and Pharasmanes took Artaxata without resistance. When this news reached the Parthian court, Artabanus at once sent his son Orodes to recover the lost dependency.

Unfortunately Orodes was unable to secure sufficient mercenary troops, since the passes through which they must come were controlled by the Ibe-

⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* vi. 33; Dio Cass. lviii. 26; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 97; Pliny *Hist. nat.* xv. 83.

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rians. The Parthian forces consisted almost wholly of cavalry, while the Iberians had a force of infantry. Orodes was unwilling to risk a battle against superior odds and prudently evaded the issue until forced by his men to give battle. When the Parthian prince was defeated in personal combat by Pharasmanes, the troops of the defeated leader, supposing him to be dead, fled from the field.⁶¹

Artabanus in 36 gathered the remaining forces of his empire and advanced against the Iberians. The Alani, possibly incited by agents of Vitellius, had moved through the passes of the Caucasus and, unopposed by the Iberians, had swarmed into Parthian territory.⁶² Before Artabanus could force a decisive engagement, Vitellius took the field at the head of his legions and spread the rumor that he was about to invade Mesopotamia. Because he felt it impossible to maintain the struggle in Armenia and at the same time engage in a war with Rome, Artabanus withdrew from Armenia to defend his homeland. When he had thus attained his objective, Vitellius modified his policy and by means of bribes encouraged disaffection within the Parthian kingdom. He was so successful that Artabanus was compelled to retire to his eastern frontier with only a band of foreign mer-

⁶¹ Tac. *Ann.* vi. 35; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 97 ff. From Tiberius to Severus Alexander the *Orac. Sibyl.* xii. 47-288 furnishes a fairly extensive sketch of Roman history.

⁶² Josephus *loc. cit.*; Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922), p. 116. Cf. Seneca *Thyestes* 630 f.

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cenaries. There he hoped to find support among those long-time friends of Parthia, the tribes to the east of the lower Caspian Sea, for he felt sure that the Parthians would soon tire of a ruler set up by Rome.⁶³

Meanwhile Vitellius urged Tiridates to seize his kingdom while opportunity offered, and to this end conducted him with legions and allies to the banks of the Euphrates. After sacrifices were made and the omens found favorable, a bridge of boats was thrown across the river and the army passed over it to Parthian territory. There they were met by Ornospades, a Parthian who had served under Tiberius and had thus won Roman citizenship.⁶⁴ Shortly afterward Sinnaces arrived with more troops, and Abdagases brought the royal treasure and ornaments.

The Greek cities of Mesopotamia, such as Nicephorium and Anthemusia, and the Parthian cities, such as Halus and Artemita,⁶⁵ all welcomed Tiridates, who was apparently acceptable to the Greeks, the nobility, and the pro-Romans. Seleucia received him

⁶³ Tac. *Ann.* vi. 36; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 100.

⁶⁴ Tac. *Ann.* vi. 37; cf. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 234. Ornospades was not yet satrap of Mesopotamia, an honor which he received after he rejoined his king.

⁶⁵ This distinction between Greek and Parthian cities is made by a number of ancient authors. Besides cities given above from Tac. *Ann.* vi. 41, Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* 1-3 mentions Ichnae, Nicephorium, Artemita, and Chala as Greek cities. Note that Artemita is called both Greek and Parthian; on its location see T. Jacobsen in *Four Ancient Towns in the Diyala Region*, a forthcoming Oriental Institute Publication.

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with acclaim, and his supporters⁶⁶ were rewarded with control of the city government, displacing the more aristocratic group which had upheld Artabanus. Coronation ceremonies were delayed pending the arrival of Phraates and Hiero, two powerful nobles. This Phraates was perhaps satrap of Susiana, then an important Parthian province.⁶⁷ These two nobles were probably engaged in negotiations with Artabanus, with whom they shortly allied themselves, for they failed to appear at the coronation, and Tiridates was crowned by a member of the Suren family according to the custom. Restrained by lack of funds from an attack on Artabanus, now installed in the far eastern part of the empire, Tiridates laid siege to a fort in which the former ruler had left his treasure and his concubines. The possession of the royal harem was vital to recognition by the country at large, and we have seen how Phraates IV slew his women rather than allow them to fall into the possession of the pretender Tiridates.

Parthia was never long sympathetic with kings who held their crowns by virtue of Roman support,

⁶⁶ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 225, suggests that his supporters in Seleucia were the native elements, consistently pro-Roman. This idea cannot be reconciled with information from Tacitus, which clearly indicates that the three groups behind Tiridates were the Greeks, the nobility, and the pro-Romans, unless we assume the last to be the native elements.

⁶⁷ Suggested by Cumont, "Une lettre du roi Artaban III," *CR*, 1932, pp. 249 f.

and the disaffected party probably had strong support from the two nobles who had failed to attend the coronation. Artabanus was discovered in Hyrcania clothed in dirty rags and living by his bow. Naturally he was suspicious of a trap when first approached, but eventually he became convinced of the reality of Parthian dislike for Tiridates if not of the people's love for himself. Artabanus hesitated only long enough to gather some Dahae and Sacae contingents before he hastened forward, still in his rags, which he continued to wear to arouse sympathy.⁶⁸ He was in the vicinity of Seleucia before his opponent made a move. Some of the adherents of Tiridates advised bringing the struggle to an immediate issue before the troops of Artabanus could be reorganized and rested. Another faction, headed by the king's chief adviser, Abdagases, suggested a retreat across the Tigris into Mesopotamia proper, for this would delay action until the arrival of Roman troops and of Armenian and Elymaean forces. Tiridates, who was not of a warlike disposition, agreed to the withdrawal. The strategic retreat soon took on the aspect of a flight, for his troops deserted rapidly. Among the first to leave were the nomadic tribes; and they were soon followed by others, some of whom went over to Artabanus. Tiridates fled to Syria, where he arrived with scarcely more than a handful of men.

Artabanus evidently had little trouble in reoc-

⁶⁸ Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 100; Tac. *Ann.* vi. 44.

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cupying the country. Tiberius desired to have the struggle formally ended and instructed Vitellius to that effect late in A.D. 36. Artabanus expressed his willingness and met the Roman commander on a bridge of boats across the Euphrates. Each was escorted by a guard. We do not know the terms agreed upon, but not long afterward Artabanus' son Darius was sent to Rome to live.⁶⁹ Negotiations completed, Herod Antipas, the Jewish tetrarch and a Roman ally, invited both leaders to a rich feast in a tent erected on the bridge. Among other objects, Josephus says that the Parthians presented the Romans with a Jewish giant some seven cubits in height! After the banquet Vitellius went to Antioch and Artabanus to "Babylon."⁷⁰

Struggle after struggle between contenders for the throne for over half a century had reduced Parthia to a state of anarchy, and the good effects of the strong rule of Artabanus had been largely negated by his contest with Tiridates. This situation is clearly reflected in the coinage, for from the beginning of the Christian era until about A.D. 40 there are frequent intervals for which no royal coins are known. The kings were either not in possession of the mint cities

⁶⁹ Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 101-3. Cf. Dio Cass. lix. 17. 5 and 27. 2 f.; Suet. *Vitellius* 2. 4 and *Gaius* 19; all of these either place this incident in the reign of Gaius or leave the question unsettled. See Eugen Täubler, *Die Parthernachrichten bei Josephus* (Berlin, 1904), pp. 33-39.

⁷⁰ Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 103 f. This is probably an early case of confusion between Babylon and Seleucia.

or were too poverty-stricken to be able to coin money. If life and commerce continued, it was because of the strength of local authorities or the power and prestige of ancient cities. The story of Anilaeus and Asinaeus (pp. 155 f.) well illustrates the situation in Parthia about this time. Artabanus was forced to recognize the virtual independence of large areas in the north, and Parthian troops and officials were everywhere helpless. Within Seleucia there was continual strife between opposing elements. The native or Babylonian group and the Jews at first combined against the Greeks with success; but the Greeks managed to alienate the natives from their former allies, and together they massacred thousands of Jews.

One specific example is known to us of the way in which the great commercial centers met this breakdown of authority. About two years before the death of Tiberius, which took place in March, A.D. 37, the great mint city of Seleucia, center of the royal power, revolted.⁷¹ For five years no royal coinage had been struck in the city. Then the strong commercial elements, wearied of the bickerings of petty contenders for the throne, declared their independence. Life within and without the city probably continued much as usual, except in time of actual siege. During the

⁷¹ Numismatic evidence given in McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 225 and 188 ff., and Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xlvi, when combined with Tacitus' statement (*Ann.* xi. 9. 6) that the revolt lasted seven years, enables us to date its beginning. On the coins struck by the city during the revolt see McDowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 141 f., No. 141.

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seven years of the revolt Seleucia maintained an independent position.

Not long after the meeting between Vitellius and Artabanus discontent was again manifest among the nobles. The situation appeared so hopeless to the king that he thought it prudent to leave the country and place himself under the protection of his neighbor and vassal, Izates II of Adiabene. The story of the Parthian vassal kings of Adiabene is an interesting one. The first king known to us, Izates (I), had two children, Helena and Monobazus (I). Following the custom then prevalent, these two were married. Monobazus succeeded to the throne about A.D. 30. Izates II, their son, was sent to Adinerglus,⁷² king of Charax, for safety from the threat of death which hangs over all youthful oriental princes who are surrounded by half-brothers with zealous mothers. While there he was converted to Judaism by a commercial Jew. When Izates was old enough, his father recalled him and gave him land in Gorduene. Through the efforts of another Jew, Helena adopted the new faith. On the death of Monobazus I, about A.D. 36, Izates II came to the throne of Adiabene.⁷³

Upon the abdication of Artabanus a certain Cinna-

⁷² Josephus *Ant.* xx. 22, Abennerigus. The Ad(or b)inerglus named on coins of A.D. 10(?) may be identical with the Adinn(e)rglus of A.D. 22; see G. F. Hill, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia* (London, 1922), pp. cxcix-cci.

⁷³ Josephus *Ant.* xx. 17-37 and 54. "Gorduene" depends on an emendation; the text reads *Καρρῶν*, which is impossible (cf. PW s.v.).

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mus, who had been brought up by Artabanus, was selected to rule. Artabanus arrived at the court of Izates with a thousand relatives and retainers, and his faithful vassal was easily persuaded to act as mediator. In response to a letter from Izates suggesting that Artabanus resume his throne, the Parthians replied that, since Cinnamus had already been installed, they feared another change would bring civil war. Cinnamus, either because of genuine friendship for Artabanus or because he felt his own position very insecure, offered to abdicate in favor of the former ruler and even placed the crown on the head of the exile himself. Izates was rewarded by the gift of the city of Nisibis and its surrounding lands, which were detached from the Armenian kingdom.⁷⁴

Artabanus lived but a short time after his restoration, for the evidence suggests that he died about A.D. 38.⁷⁵ He was followed by Gotarzes II,⁷⁶ who was

⁷⁴ Josephus *Ant.* xx. 54-69.

⁷⁵ Vardanes, the second successor of Artabanus, was in the third year and second month of his restoration when Apollonius of Tyana visited him (see n. 81). Seleucia, which surrendered in the spring of 42 (see p. 169), was then still in revolt.

⁷⁶ Tac. *Ann.* xi. 8. Cf. Josephus *Ant.* xx. 69, whose condensed account apparently makes Vardanes the first to mount the throne. For somewhat uncertain numismatic evidence which upholds Tacitus see Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. xlv f.; J. de Bartholomaei, "Recherches sur la numismatique des rois Arsacides," *Mém. Soc. d'arch. et de num. de St. Pétersbourg*, II (1848), 59; Herzfeld, *Am Tor*, pp. 45 and 47 f.

Many of the exploits of Gotarzes appear in various forms in the *Shahnamah*; see J. C. Coyajee, "The House of Gotarzes: a Chapter of Parthian History in the Shahnameh," Asiatic Society of Bengal, *Journ. and Proc.*, N.S., XXVIII (for 1932), 207-24.

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probably not an Arsacid but may have been of Hircanian origin, the son of a man named Gew.⁷⁷ Gotarzes had two brothers, Artabanus and Vardanes, whom he evidently feared, for he murdered the first together with his wife and son, and the second fled far away. Gotarzes had been on the throne about a year when in A.D. 39 the nobles called in Vardanes, who is reported by Tacitus to have covered three thousand stadia in two days.⁷⁸ Such a feat, if not impossible, is very extraordinary. As a result of this hasty trip Vardanes surprised and put to flight Gotarzes. The deposed ruler escaped to the country of the Dahae, where he occupied himself with plots against his brother.

If the rule of Vardanes was to be firmly established, control of the mint city of Seleucia was essential. He began a siege of the city, which was strongly fortified by walls and by its natural defenses, the river and the canals, and was well provisioned. Perhaps Vardanes made use of Ctesiphon as his base of operations, for at a later date he was believed to have been its founder.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Herzfeld, *Am Tor*, pp. 40 ff. and Pls. XXI-XXIII; Herzfeld, "Kushano-Sasanian Coins," *Mem. Archaeol. Survey of India*, No. 38 (1930), p. 5; *CIG*, III, No. 4674. Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* i. 21 calls Gotarzes' brother, Vardanes, a Mede.

⁷⁸ *Ann.* xi. 8. 4. Tiberius traveled 184 miles in a night and a day over well constructed Roman roads with an elaborate system of relays. Possibly the royal post roads of Persia had survived in better shape than we have suspected, but approximately 350 miles in two days is still remarkable.

⁷⁹ *Amm. Marcel.* xxiii. 23.

In the meantime Gotarzes had enlisted the aid of the Dahae and the Hyrcanians and soon advanced to recover his kingdom. Vardanes abandoned the siege of Seleucia in 39 and moved his forces to the great Bactrian plain, far to the east; but preparations for the battle were suddenly interrupted when Gotarzes discovered that the nobles were planning to take the throne away from both his brother and himself. Drawn together by this common danger, the brothers agreed that Vardanes was to occupy the throne of Parthia and Gotarzes was to withdraw to Hyrcania. "Victory" coins were struck by the aristocratic party in Seleucia in the years 40/41—43/44 in celebration of their triumph over the popular party and the restoration of Vardanes to the throne.⁸⁰

In the spring of 42 the sage Apollonius of Tyana passed through Babylonia on his way to India.⁸¹ Vardanes had but two years and two months before recovered his throne;⁸² Seleucia still apparently remained in revolt,⁸³ and Vardanes was established in Babylon. The account of Philostratus suggests that Vardanes' territory was limited in extent, for Apollonius passed into Parthia after leaving Nineveh,

⁸⁰ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 225 f.

⁸¹ Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* i. 19-40; cf. A. von Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften*, III (Leipzig, 1892), 58 f.

⁸² Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* i. 28; cf. also i. 21.

⁸³ *Ibid.* i. 21. Ctesiphon alone is mentioned. The reference to Babylon cannot in this case be assigned to Seleucia, although such details cannot be pressed too far in this source.

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which evidently belonged to Adiabene and hence to the kingdom of Gotarzes. By June, A.D. 42, Vardanes had again advanced to the neighborhood of Seleucia and under guidance of the aristocratic party, then apparently favorable to his candidacy for the throne, the city had voluntarily surrendered.⁸⁴ The revolt, which had lasted for seven years, was thus ended.

Philostratus reports that the governor of Syria sent an embassy to Vardanes regarding two villages (in Roman territory near a Zeugma) which the Parthians had recently seized. Because of their lack of importance they were apparently surrendered without a struggle. He states further that Megabates, a brother of the king, saw Apollonius in Antioch.^{84a}

The Iberian Mithradates, Roman appointee to the throne of Armenia, having proved unsatisfactory to the patron nation, was brought back, imprisoned, and then banished by Caligula.⁸⁵ Shortly after the latter's death in 41, his successor Claudius released Mithradates and sent him eastward to regain his kingdom, the throne of which had apparently been vacant for some time and then had been seized by the Parthians. Supported by Roman troops and by Iberians supplied by his brother Pharasmanes, Mithradates defeated the Armenians under Demonax with

⁸⁴ He at once began the issue of royal coinage; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 189.

^{84a} Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* i 31 and 37.

⁸⁵ Dio Cass. lx. 8; Seneca *De tranquillitate animi* 11. 12; Tac. *Ann.* xi. 8. 1.

ease. Lesser Armenia under Cotys continued resistance for some time, but it too was at last subdued. The new king, perhaps because he felt insecure, ruled with great cruelty, which soon caused appeals for aid to the Parthian Vardanes. The Parthian king attempted to secure the help of one of his principal vassals, Izates II of Adiabene, but was unable to convince him that a campaign against Mithradates had much chance of success. The fact that his five sons were in Rome undoubtedly influenced Izates. Angered by the latter's refusal, Vardanes began a campaign against his vassal. Possibly for the purpose of distracting Vardanes, Vibius Marsus, governor of Syria from 42 to 45, made a feint at the Euphrates frontier.⁸⁶

The position of Vardanes was perhaps becoming too strong for the nobles; at any rate they encouraged Gotarzes to secure the throne. About 43⁸⁷ Gotarzes collected an army and advanced to the river Erindes (probably the ancient Charindas)⁸⁸ in Hyrcania. The passage of this stream was hotly contested, and Vardanes at last managed to prevent his brother from

⁸⁶ Tac. *Ann.* xi. 10; Josephus *Ant.* xx. 72.

⁸⁷ Gotarzes' first coins, Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 161, were struck early in 355 S.E., i.e., A.D. 44/45; cf. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 226 f. and table, p. 189. If Avroman II (see p. 140, end of n. 53) is dated in the Arsacid era, it should be placed in A.D. 44. It seems better, however, as indicated in chap. ii, to consider that the Seleucid era was used and that the date is 21/20 B.C.; cf. p. 47, n. 70. The occurrence of the name Cleopatra among the queens is a further argument for the earlier dating, for after Actium Cleopatra was not a popular name; see PW, arts. "Kleopatra."

⁸⁸ PW, art. "Hyrcania," cols. 468 and 506 f.

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crossing. This victory Vardanes followed up with other successes until he was master of all the territory to the river Sindes, which separated the Dahae from the people of Aria.⁸⁹ There the troops refused to advance farther, and a monument was erected.

About the end of 45 the conflict between the brothers broke out again, and from 46/47 to 47/48 they were engaged in a struggle which terminated with the death of Vardanes. He was assassinated by the nobles, probably at the instigation of Gotarzes, while engaged in the national sport of the chase.⁹⁰ With the death of Vardanes, a thoroughly native king, the only hope of Gotarzes' opponents lay in appeal to Rome.

From this period onward the dates given in this volume are calculated on the basis of a readjustment in the calendar which took place between the years A.D. 16/17 and 46/47, almost certainly in the latter year. The 19-year cycle of intercalation introduced in 747 B.C. had been employed without change since 367 B.C. The calendar year was again brought into conformity with the solar year by the insertion of a full month so that henceforth the Macedonian month Xandicus instead of Artemisius corresponds to the Babylonian Nisan, the beginning of the year.^{90a}

⁸⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xi. 10. 3.

⁹⁰ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 190. Vardanes' coins stop in the fourth month of 45/46, but this proves only that Vardanes no longer held Seleucia. Furthermore, coins of 46/47 and 47/48 bear the personal name of Gotarzes and thus prove that he had a rival, who was most probably Vardanes.

^{90a} McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 151-53; cf. J. Johnson, *Dura Studies* (Roma, 1931), pp. 1-15.

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There was a division of opinion as to who should succeed to the Parthian throne; many favored Gotarzes, while others preferred Meherdates, son of Vonones I and grandson of Phraates IV, who had been sent to Rome. Because of the general dislike of Romanized Parthians and perhaps because of the proximity of Gotarzes, he was accepted as king again. But further reports of cruelties and excesses soon appeared,⁹¹ and in 47 an appeal was made to Rome for Meherdates.⁹² Claudius responded favorably and ordered C. Cassius Longinus, governor of Syria, to conduct the new pretender to the Euphrates.⁹³ In 49 the expedition set out; at Zeugma a halt was made to await the Parthian supporters of Meherdates. Cassius urged an immediate advance before the ardor of the adherents of Meherdates could cool, and the head of the great house of Karen sent messengers with the same advice. Through the influence of Abgarus V of Edessa Meherdates was persuaded to make his advance through Armenia, where he was delayed for some time in the capital of this Arab ruler. After much hardship in the snow and mountains of Armenia, Meherdates reached the level ground, where

⁹¹ Tac. *Ann.* xi. 10. Tacitus' information would of necessity be based largely on the reports brought to Rome by delegates of the dissatisfied parties.

⁹² Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 127 and n. 2; Wroth, *Parthia*, p. xlvii.

⁹³ Cf. the reference to some Parthian victory of Claudius, Seneca *Apocolocyntosis* 12.

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he was joined by forces under the command of the head of the Karen family. Crossing the Tigris they proceeded through Adiabene to Nineveh and Arbela. Faced with such an army, Izates of Adiabene could do nothing less than exhibit friendliness, however transitory. When they turned southward they found Gotarzes in a strong defensive position behind the river Corma (‘Adhaim?’).⁹⁴ Since, however, his troops were insufficient to force the issue, Gotarzes sought to delay a decisive battle while he attempted to win over the troops of his opponents. Izates and Abgarus were thus lost by Meherdates, who, fearing a general exodus, determined to strike before all his army melted away. The battle remained undecided until the Karen, who had defeated the forces opposed to him and carried his pursuit too far, was met on his return by the reserves of Gotarzes and was slain. His army defeated and its morale broken, Meherdates threw himself on the mercy of a certain Parraces, one of his father’s vassals. This man betrayed him and gave him in chains to Gotarzes, who cropped his ears, that he might never again reign, but spared his life.⁹⁵

Probably in commemoration of this victory Gotarzes about A.D. 50 cut a great relief on the rock at

⁹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 13 f.; PW, art. “Corma.” Sanbulus (see PW *s.v.*), the mountain where Gotarzes offered sacrifices to Hercules, is probably the Sunbula Kuh. Both the ‘Adhaim and the Diyala are so small in summer that the troops would scarcely notice them; hence their omission in Tacitus’ account is understandable.

⁹⁵ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 13 f.

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Behistun. It shows him charging the foe with leveled spear, while overhead hovers a winged Victory crowning the king with a wreath. The accompanying inscription reads ΓΩΤΑΡΞΗC ΓΕΟΠΟΘΡΟC, "Gotarzes, son of Gew."⁹⁶

In 51 Gotarzes either died of some disease⁹⁷ or fell the victim of a plot.⁹⁸ He was succeeded by a certain Vonones (II), who was king of Media.⁹⁹ Vonones must have reigned but a few months; the empire then passed to his son or brother Vologases I.¹⁰⁰

About A.D. 52¹⁰¹ Pharasmanes of Iberia sent his

⁹⁶ Herzfeld, *Am Tor*, pp. 40 ff. and Pls. XXI-XXIII. Probably, as C. Hopkins in M. I. Rostovtzeff and P. V. C. Bauer, *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Second Season, 1928-29* (New Haven, 1931), p. 93, suggests, the dedicatory inscription to Zeus Soter dated A.D. 50/51, found at Dura, should be referred to this civil war.

⁹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 14. 7.

⁹⁸ Cf. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 191, who finds a coin of Gotarzes dated three months after the first of those struck by Vologases. This find strongly supports Josephus *Ant.* xx. 74, who says that Gotarzes was the victim of a plot.

⁹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 14. 7. Josephus does not mention Vonones; but Tacitus cannot be discredited on the basis of the abbreviated account of the Jewish historian, who may well have deliberately omitted the name of Vonones because of his unimportance. No coins can be assigned to him.

¹⁰⁰ Son, Tac. *loc. cit.*; brother, Josephus *loc. cit.* The date A.D. 54 for the close of the reign of Vonones, proposed by Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 128 and n. 2, is too late.

¹⁰¹ The whole chronological question from 51 to 63 is very complex; see the editions of Tacitus by L. Nipperday and H. Furneaux; E. Egli, "Feldzüge in Armenien von 41-63 n. Chr.," in Max Büdinger, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaisergeschichte* (Leipzig, 1868), pp. 267-362; H. Schiller, *Geschichte des römischen Kaiserreichs unter der Regierung des Nero* (Berlin, 1872), pp. 91-205; Mommsen, *Prov. Rom. Emp.*, II, 50 ff.;

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son Rhadamistus to invade Armenia, which was at that time in the hands of the pro-Roman Mithradates, brother of the Iberian ruler. Mithradates was soon besieged in Gorneae (Garni), not far from Artaxata, the capital. The Roman garrison in the beleaguered town was under the command of the prefect Caelius Pollio and the centurion Casperius. Rhadamistus attempted to bribe Pollio to surrender Gorneae; the prefect was sorely tempted to accept, but Casperius refused to be a party to such an affair. He secured a temporary truce and set out to persuade Pharasmanes to abandon the war or, if he should be unsuccessful there, to carry the news to Ummidius Quadratus, legate of Syria. Casperius reached Pharasmanes, but his negotiations with him were unsuccessful, for the Iberian king wrote secretly urging Rhadamistus to press the siege in every possible manner. The bribe offered to Pollio was increased, and, with the restraining influence of the centurion absent, a deal was soon struck. The Roman soldiers forced Mithradates to surrender by threatening to

B. W. Henderson, "The Chronology of the Wars in Armenia, A.D. 51-63," *Class. Rev.*, XV (1901), 159-65, 204-13, and 266-74; D. T. Schoonover, *A Study of Cn. Domitius Corbulo as Found in the "Annals" of Tacitus* (Chicago, 1906); Werner Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero* (*Klio*, Beiheft XV [1923]), pp. 7-38, and "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Kriege Corbulos," *Klio*, XIX (1925), 75-96, and "Zur Neronischen Orientpolitik," *Klio*, XX (1926), 215-22; Arnaldo Momigliano, "Corbulone e la politica romana verso i Parti," *Atti del II° congresso nazionale di studi romani*, I (Roma, 1931), 368-75; Mason Hammond, "Corbulo and Nero's Eastern Policy," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLV (Cambridge, 1934), 81-104.

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refuse to fight. Mithradates, his wife, and all his children were murdered at the command of Rhadamistus, who thus came into possession of Armenia.¹⁰²

Quadratus heard of these events, perhaps through the centurion Casperius, and ordered a council of war. Pharasmanes was commanded to recall Rhadamistus and withdraw from Armenia, but no other action was taken. Julius Paelignus,¹⁰³ procurator of Cappadocia, gathered together some provincial auxiliaries, ostensibly to recover Armenia but actually to despoil his friends. Deserted by his troops, he was forced to flee to Rhadamistus, whom he urged to assume the crown and in whose coronation he participated. When Quadratus heard of these proceedings, he dispatched Helvidius Priscus with a legion to set matters right. Priscus had already crossed the Taurus and restored order in some measure when he was recalled. This sudden change on the part of the Romans was caused by the fact that the newly crowned Vologases I of Parthia was contemplating an advance into Armenia and the presence of Roman legions on soil which was considered Parthian was certain to cause trouble.

Vologases, who was the son of a Greek concubine, had two brothers, Pacorus and Tiridates.¹⁰⁴ Vologases

¹⁰² Tac. *Ann.* xii. 44-47.

¹⁰³ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 49. 1. Perhaps the same man as the Laelianus of Dio Cass. lxi. 6. 6; see PW, art. "Julius (Paelignus)," No. 374.

¹⁰⁴ Dio Cass. lxii (lxiii. 5); Josephus *Ant.* xx. 74; Tac. *Ann.* xii. 44. This Greek woman may well have been a long-time resident of Parthia.

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was probably the eldest, since his brothers yielded to him their claims to the throne. To Pacorus, the elder of his two brothers, Vologases had given Media Atropatene;¹⁰⁵ it was now imperative that a suitable position be found for the younger, Tiridates. Since Armenia, which was felt to be properly Parthian territory, was unsettled, Vologases saw therein an opportunity to strengthen his own position and at the same time provide a satrapy for Tiridates.

Vologases about A.D. 52¹⁰⁶ began an advance into Armenia, where he encountered little resistance. In his rapid advance he took the important city of Tigranocerta and then the capital, Artaxata. Because of the severity of the winter, which had then closed in, and the attendant lack of provisions, Vologases was forced to abandon his conquest. Rhadamistus, who had fled on his approach, at once returned and began to rule with great cruelty, at least according to the reports which reached Rome.

In the meantime the nobles of Adiabene had become dissatisfied with the rule of Izates II and proposed Parthian intervention to Vologases. The Parthian ruler demanded that Izates give up the special privileges granted to him by Artabanus III and resume

¹⁰⁵ Josephus *Ant.* xx. 74.

¹⁰⁶ If McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 191, is right in assigning to Gotarzes II a coin as late as December, 51, then Vologases' invasion of Armenia is not likely to have taken place before 52. Cf. also *CAH*, X, 757 and n. 2, following Henderson, "Chron. of the Wars in Armenia," *Class. Rev.*, XV (1901), 164 f.

his status as vassal of the empire. Izates, fully aware of the temerity of his defiance, sent his wives and children to a citadel, gathered all the grain into the fortified places, and burned all the forage in the open country. When these preparations were complete Izates took up a position with some six thousand cavalry on the Upper Zab River, which separated Adiabene from Media. Vologases arrived by forced marches and camped near by, whence he sent messages to Izates boasting of the greatness of the Parthian empire, which extended from the Euphrates to the boundaries of Bactria. Interchange of words was still taking place when the threat of an invasion of eastern Parthia by tribes east of the Caspian Sea forced Vologases to withdraw.¹⁰⁷

Not long after the return of Rhadamistus to Armenia the people again arose and drove him from the country. His wife Zenobia, who accompanied him in his flight, was at length so weary that she could go no farther, and to prevent her falling into the hands of his enemies Rhadamistus stabbed her and cast her into the Araxes River. Some shepherds found her still alive and took her to Artaxata, whence she was sent to Tiridates. The Parthian king treated her kindly, not necessarily for humanitarian reasons, but because through her he had a legitimate claim on Armenia. Tiridates returned to Armenia about the year 54.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Josephus *Ant.* xx. 81-91.

¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Ann.* xii. 51 and xiii. 6.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAMPAIGN OF CORBULO

THE emperor Claudius was poisoned in October, 54, and the youthful Nero ascended the throne. News of events in Armenia reached Rome by December, and preparations were immediately begun for war.¹ The oriental legions were recruited to war strength and then moved in the direction of Armenia. Antiochus IV of Commagene and Agrippa II of Chalcis (Andjar) were to collect troops and hold them in readiness for an invasion of Parthia, and bridges were to be constructed across the Euphrates. Lesser Armenia was given to Aristobulus, a son of the former king Herod of Chalcis and first cousin of Agrippa II; Sophene was turned over to a Sohaemus, perhaps of the same family as the one who had just succeeded to the throne of Emesa.² To take command of the forces gathered to "retain" Armenia, Cn. Corbulo was recalled from Germany. Corbulo was a seasoned veteran and a career man, and his appointment was undoubtedly a wise move. The X

¹ Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 6; Nero was seventeen years old on the sixteenth of December, 54.

² Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 7; Josephus *Ant.* xx. 158 and *Bell.* ii. 252; Dessau 8958. Emesa and Sophene are too far apart to make the identity of these two men likely; see PW, art. "Sohaemus," No. 4.

Fretensis and the XII Fulminata and some oriental auxiliaries were to remain in Syria with Ummidius Quadratus, governor of that province. An equal number of allies, the III Gallica, and the VI Ferrata³ were assigned to Corbulo, who was also to have the cohorts that were wintering in Cappadocia. The allied rulers had orders to obey these generals as the exigencies of war demanded. Corbulo hastened to Cilicia, where he met Quadratus, who was greatly afraid that his more personally attractive colleague would reap all the glory. The Roman commanders sent envoys to Vologases, who in order to avoid war surrendered some important members of his family as hostages. Undoubtedly Vologases was pleased to secure terms, for a little earlier his son, Vardanes, had revolted.⁴ Whether he ever succeeded in displacing his father or in making himself king is doubtful, for the revolt was apparently put down.⁵

Corbulo was greatly hampered by the miserable

³ On the legions see PW, art. "Legio," both the general section and those on the individual units, also "Domitius (Corbulo)" in Suppl. III. Frontinus *Strat.* iv. 2.3 apparently refers to the beginning of the campaign. Cf. also the mention of Arrius Varus, who was successful in Armenia, by Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 9 and *Hist.* iii. 6 (perhaps different men of that name are meant).

⁴ See *CAH*, X, 879, for a discussion and bibliography on this pretender to the throne. The relationship here accepted depends on an emendation of Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 7. 2.

⁵ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lii, n. 2, points out that the appearance of "Vol." on some of the drachms of Vologases is suggestive of the fact that he was confronted with a rival. For a similar instance in the cuneiform literature see pp. 50-52.

condition of the eastern legions. Tacitus says that many of the veterans scarcely knew arms when they saw them, and in some instances troops were not even supplied with armor. Those who were too old or incapacitated were sent home, and the strength of the legions was increased by levies from Galatia and Cappadocia. To these was added the X Freten-sis, which was relieved in Syria by the IV Scythica, brought from Moesia.⁶ Late in 57 Corbulo felt conditions sufficiently improved so that he could move forward into Armenia, where the winter of 57/58 was spent under canvas in the bitter cold. Many of the men suffered from frozen hands and feet; but Corbulo, whose tall and commanding figure was always conspicuous, strode among them bareheaded and kept up morale with words of encouragement. Under such conditions many deserted, but desertion was effectively discouraged by the infliction of the death penalty for the first offense instead of the third as was customary. Paccius Orfitus was given command of the auxiliaries, who were distributed in garrison posts at strategic points. In spite of strict orders to the contrary, Orfitus engaged the enemy and was badly defeated.

In the spring of 58, when weather conditions improved, the campaign was resumed. Tiridates, supported by his brother Vologases of Parthia, began to

⁶ On the statement of Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 35 that it came "ex Germania," see PW, art. "Legio (III Scythica)," cols. 1558 f.

despoil the Roman adherents. His horsemen managed to evade the troops sent against them and continued their successful raids. Corbulo sought in vain to catch Tiridates and at last was forced to adopt the tactics of his opponent and divide his men into bands to pillage the country. At the same time he advised Antiochus of Commagene to advance across the Armenian frontier. Pharasmanes of Iberia also allied himself with the Roman cause, and the "Insochi," possibly the Moschi or the Heniochi,⁷ were actively harassing the Armenians. Vologases and most of his troops were occupied with a revolt in Hyrcania⁸ which ultimately resulted in the permanent loss of that territory to Parthia. The Hyrcanians sent an embassy to Rome for aid, which apparently was not forthcoming.

Corbulo was aware of this diversion of Parthian forces. Hence when Tiridates made tentative overtures and requested to know the cause of the invasion, the Roman commander did not hesitate to reply that Tiridates should address himself as a suppliant to Nero, from whom he might receive his kingdom again in a peaceful manner, rather than attempt to hold it through bloodshed. Extended negotiations followed, but attempted treachery and a feeling of uncertainty on both sides caused their eventual abandonment.

⁷ See discussion and bibliography in *CAH*, X, 880, n. 5.

⁸ Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 37. 6, xiv. 25. 2, xv. 1. 1; Wroth, *Parthia*, p. liii. Hyrcania may have supported the revolt of Vologases' son.

Fighting now broke out in earnest. Corbulo retained command of one division of the Roman forces while Cornelius Flaccus, a legate, took charge of the second, and Insteius Capito, camp prefect, of the third. Volandum, the strongest of the forts, fell by assault on the first day. All the male citizens were put to the sword and the noncombatants sold to the victorious forces. Punitive expeditions which the Roman commander sent out had little trouble in reducing other strongholds. Such easy success induced him to set out to Artaxata with the intention of laying siege to it also. Tiridates had insufficient forces to withstand an attack for any length of time and therefore attempted to induce the Romans to break their formations and thus lay themselves open to attack by his cavalry. Because of their discipline and training under Corbulo the ranks stood firm and the ruse failed. Tiridates, determined not to risk an open battle, fled in the night, probably to take refuge with Vologases. Artaxata surrendered without a struggle.⁹ The lives of the inhabitants were spared, but the walls were pulled down and the city burned.¹⁰ Rome celebrated the victory by erecting statues and triumphal arches and creating new holidays.

⁹ Dio Cass. lxii. 19-20; Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 39-41.

¹⁰ Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 41. 3. This was probably the end of the campaign season, and, as suggested by Furneaux in his ed. of the *Annals*, II, 114, n. 2, the city may not have been destroyed until after the army had wintered there. Such compression of chronology would be typical of Tacitus' account of eastern affairs.

In the spring of 59 Corbulo turned southward and, passing by the borders of the country of the Mardi and through that of the Tauraunites, drew near Tigranocerta.¹¹ In the course of this march the army suffered more from hardships than from attacks by the Armenians, but two strongholds which resisted were reduced, one by storm, the other by siege. Ambassadors from Tigranocerta approached to present a gold crown to Corbulo and inform him that the city was prepared to surrender. But when the army arrived before the city the gates seem to have been closed. To discourage a lengthy defense Corbulo executed an Armenian noble whom he had captured and shot his head into the city. It fell into the midst of a council of war—a fact which hastened the surrender of the city without further resistance.¹²

At a fort named Legerda¹³ Corbulo met with strong resistance, and it had to be taken by storm.¹⁴ Corbulo evidently wintered at Tigranocerta.

About this time the Hyrcanian ambassadors who

¹¹ PW, art. "Tigranokerta." On the eclipse of 59 see Pliny *Hist. nat.* ii. 180.

¹² Frontinus *Strat.* ii. 9. 5; cf. Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 24. 6. For army discipline during this campaign see Frontinus *Strat.* iv. 1. 21 and 28. The coins (McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 228 f.) strongly suggest that Seleucia was in revolt from 59/60–61/62.

¹³ This is the Elugia of Tiglathpileser III, as Lehmann-Haupt points out in *Zeitschr. für Ethnologie*, XXXII (1900), 438, n. 4; see also Olmstead, "Shalmaneser III and the Establishment of the Assyrian Power," *JAS*, XLI (1921), 359 f., n. 31.

¹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 24–25.

had been in Rome were returning to their own country. They crossed the Euphrates, probably near Melitene, and had an interview with Corbulo. Apparently the ambassadors proceeded eastward to their own country.¹⁵

The next year, 60, Tiridates made an attempt to recover his kingdom by an invasion from the direction of Media Atropatene. Corbulo sent Severus Verulanus, a legate, with auxiliaries, and followed as rapidly as possible himself. Tiridates was easily repulsed and forced to flee. Fire and sword soon reduced the country to submission.

Armenia was then entirely in the possession of the Romans, and Nero appointed Tigranes V, great-grandson of Archelaus, the last king of Cappadocia, as ruler. Parts of Armenia were intrusted to Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemon of Pontus, Aristobulus of Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of Commagene, in order to make the control of the newly subdued territory easier, for some people still favored the Parthians. Leaving a thousand legionaries with three or four thousand cavalry and infantry auxiliaries to support the new ruler, Corbulo returned to Syria, where he succeeded Quadratus, who had died.¹⁶

Tigranes, as soon as he was established, proceeded in 61 to invade and ravage Adiabene. Either events

¹⁵ The text of Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 25, "maris rubri," must be corrupt. The emendation "maris sui," which has been suggested, seems reasonable.

¹⁶ Tac. *Ann.* xiv. 26; Josephus *Ant.* xviii. 140 and *Bell.* ii. 222; PW, art. "Tigranes," No. 6.

in Hyrcania had now reached such a stage as to be utterly hopeless or Vologases considered that this invasion of Adiabene was of sufficient importance to warrant his departure from the Hyrcanian front. Murmurs in Parthia from discontented nobles were encouraged by Tiridates, deposed king of Armenia, who felt that his brother, Vologases of Parthia, had not assisted him sufficiently. Monobazus, ruler of invaded Adiabene, contemplated surrender to the Romans rather than capture by Tigranes. Vologases called a council of the nobles and reaffirmed his brother's rights to Armenia. His own cavalry he turned over to Monaeses, a Parthian noble, with orders to co-operate with Monobazus and the forces of Adiabene in driving Tigranes from Armenia, while he planned to abandon the contest with Hyrcania and to threaten Syria with the main Parthian force.¹⁷ Corbulo dispatched to Armenia under Severus Verulanus and Vettius Bolanus two legions,¹⁸ perhaps the IV Scythica and the XII Fulminata, and placed on the Euphrates the III Gallica, the VI Ferrata, and the X Fretensis, all of which he augmented by levies. All the crossings were defended, and water supplies carefully guarded. In view of the serious situation, Corbulo requested of Nero that an additional commander be sent to take charge of Armenia.

Tigranes anticipated trouble with the Parthians

¹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 2; Dio Cass. lxii. 20.

¹⁸ Statius *Silvae* v. 2. 32 ff. mentions the activities of Bolanus.

and therefore withdrew into Tigranocerta. Monaeses and his Parthian forces cut off convoys carrying food to the city and shortly thereafter appeared before its walls. An attempt to storm it proved unsuccessful, and siege was begun. When Corbulo heard of these events, he threatened Vologases with an invasion of Mesopotamia unless the siege was raised. Corbulo's messenger reached the Parthian king at Nisibis. Vologases was inclined to seek peace, since the Romans were so well prepared and the besieged city so strong, and since forage for the Parthian cavalry had been destroyed by a plague of locusts. For these reasons an agreement was reached, and it was announced that Vologases was sending ambassadors to Rome to request control of Armenia. Monaeses was ordered to abandon the siege of Tigranocerta, and the Parthian monarch returned to his own country. The Roman concessions were not immediately disclosed: Tigranes and the Roman legions which supported him were likewise to withdraw from Armenia. The soldiers spent the winter of 61/62 in temporary quarters on the Cappadocian frontier.¹⁹

In response to the request of Corbulo, L. Caesennius Paetus was appointed governor of Cappadocia. A division of troops was made; the IV Scythica, the XII Fulminata, the V Macedonica (which had recently been withdrawn from Moesia), and certain auxiliaries from Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia

¹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 5 f.; cf. Dio Cass. lxii. 20.

were placed at the command of Paetus, while the III Gallica, the VI Ferrata, and the X Fretensis were allotted to Corbulo.²⁰ The troops were apparently paid in silver which had been specially struck at Caesarea in Cappadocia.²¹ Corbulo took up a position on the Euphrates, where he effectively discouraged any Parthian advance in that direction.

The ambassadors whom Vologases had dispatched to Rome returned, unsuccessful, and the Parthians prepared to resume hostilities.²² Paetus at once assumed the offensive. Planning to take Tigranocerta, he crossed the Euphrates, probably near Melitene (Malatya), with his two legions, the IV Scythica under Funisulanus Vettonianus and the XII Fulminata under Calavius Sabinus. The V Macedonica was left in Pontus for the winter.²³ After he had reduced some of the nearer fortresses, Paetus was forced by the approach of cold weather into winter quarters at Rhandeia on the Arsantias River, a tributary of the Euphrates.²⁴ Now that the Romans had made the first move in the contest, Vologases took the field in ear-

²⁰ Tac. *Hist.* iii. 24 and *Ann.* xiii. 8 and xv. 6. 5; see also Victor Chapot. *La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe* (Paris, 1907), p. 79. See also *CIL*, XIV, No. 3608 = Dessau 986.

²¹ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, I, 15, n. 4, and p. 147, coins Nos. 37 ff. The reverse (*ibid.*, Pl. X, No. 159) bears the legend ARMENIAC and a Victory holding a palm and a wreath.

²² Tac. *Ann.* xv. 7; Dio Cass. lxii. 20. ²³ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 9.

²⁴ Dio Cass. lxii. 21; B. W. Henderson, "Rhandeia and the River Arsantias," *Journ. of Philology*, XXVIII (1903), 271 ff.

nest. Paetus had greatly weakened his legions by granting leaves to all who applied for them. In addition his troops were not those who had been whipped into shape by Corbulo, and some of the best men were with the V Macedonica in Pontus. One cohort was dispatched to guard the wife and small son of Paetus, who were placed for safety in a fortress at Arsamosata.

Corbulo in the meantime had succeeded in bridging the Euphrates, perhaps at Zeugma, under heavy fire. He brought up ships of considerable size furnished with towers on which were placed ballistae and catapults which cleared the hills on the opposite side of the river. The bridge was thus completed and a camp established to protect the bridgehead. This success caused the Parthians to abandon their thoughts of a Syrian invasion and to turn all of their forces against the Romans in Armenia.

As soon as Paetus heard of the advance of Vologases, he at once proceeded against the Parthian. Vologases easily forced him to retire to his camp, but he failed to press home the advantage thus gained. To make matters worse, Paetus divided his forces and sent three thousand men to guard the near-by passes of the Taurus while he kept the remainder in the winter camp near Rhandeia. As an additional precaution he informed Corbulo of the seriousness of his position. Upon the receipt of this news a thousand men from each legion, eight hundred cavalry, and an

equal number of auxiliaries were ordered to be prepared to march on short notice. Meanwhile the position of Paetus was becoming increasingly dangerous. The advance posts and isolated Roman detachments were quickly overcome by the enemy, and a regular siege of the camp was begun. Again messengers went to Corbulo, this time with a plea for immediate aid.

Then Corbulo began his march.²⁵ Leaving a part of his forces to maintain the forts along the Euphrates, he moved by the shortest and best provisioned route through Commagene, Cappadocia, and then Armenia. To avoid such difficulties as Paetus had encountered in securing provisions, Corbulo carried wheat on camels which followed the army. Shortly he began to meet fugitives from the besieged Roman camp, and thenceforward he proceeded by forced marches with great rapidity. But Paetus was unable to await his arrival and entered into negotiations with the Parthians. Doubtless the latter were aware of the proximity of the relieving column and were glad to arrange a peace. The Roman commission was forced to negotiate with Vasaces, the Parthian cavalry commander. An agreement was reached on the second day, when Corbulo was but three days' march away. Monobazus of Adiabene acted as witness to the treaty thus concluded, the terms of which were naturally highly favorable to the Parthians.

²⁵ Whether or not Tacitus attempts to cover up deliberate negligence on the part of Corbulo in not hastening to the relief need not be discussed here.

The siege of the camp was to be abandoned, and all Roman soldiers were to be withdrawn from the confines of Armenia. All forts, supplies, and provisions were to be turned over to the Parthians. When these conditions had been fulfilled, Vologases was to be free to send ambassadors to Nero to negotiate the Armenian question.²⁶ In addition the Romans were forced to bridge the Arsanius River (Murat Su), which ran before their camp, as a visible symbol of their defeat. These stipulations were carried out faithfully, but not without further difficulties for the vanquished; for even before the Roman troops left the intrenchments, the Armenians entered and seized the arms and clothing of the legionaries, who dared not protest lest a general massacre ensue.

Paetus hastened to the Euphrates, abandoning his wounded along the way. There he met Corbulo, whom he attempted to persuade to return with him and resume the attack. This Corbulo sensibly refused to do. He returned directly to Syria, while Paetus spent the winter in Cappadocia.

Monaeses was sent by Vologases to Corbulo with a request that the forts on the east side of the Euphrates be abandoned by the Romans. Negotiations were conducted on the bridge which Corbulo had built over the river, but only after the central portion had been destroyed. The Roman commander agreed to evacuate the forts if the Parthians would

²⁶ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 14; Dio Cass. lxxii. 21; cf. also Suet. *Nero* 39. 1.

withdraw from Armenia, a condition to which they agreed.

The ambassadors sent by Vologases arrived in Rome in the spring of 63. They proposed that Tiridates should receive the crown of Armenia at Roman headquarters, explaining that only his duties as a Magus prevented him from coming to Rome for the investiture. Though the request was denied, the ambassadors were sent back with presents—an action from which they might infer that if Tiridates appeared in person at Rome the appeal would be granted.

Preparations were then made to continue the war. The administration of Syria was given to C. Cestius Gallus, and the military forces, augmented by the XV Apollinaris from Pannonia under Marius Celsus, were intrusted to Corbulo. Paetus having returned to Rome, the authority of Corbulo was now increased until it was such that Tacitus compared it with that of Pompey under the Manilian Law.²⁷ The IV Scythica and the XII Fulminata, which had lost the best of their men and were low in morale, were sent to Syria. Picked troops were then gathered at Melitene, ready to cross the Euphrates. They consisted of the III Gallica and the VI Ferrata²⁸ from Syria, the V Macedonica, which had remained in Pontus, and the recently arrived XV Apollinaris. Crack units

²⁷ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 25; *CIL*, III, Nos. 6741-42a = Dessau 232; J. G. C. Anderson in *Class. Rev.*, XLV (1931), 190.

²⁸ An inscription from Bithynia honors Sulpicius Sceptia Asper of the VI Ferrata and refers to the legion's wintering in Cappadocia; see F. W.

from Illyria and Egypt, the latter probably part of the XXII Deiotariana, and auxiliaries from allied kings were also assembled there.

Corbulo as he advanced into Armenia over the route followed by Lucullus and Paetus destroyed citadels and spread terror throughout the countryside. Proposals of peace arrived from Tiridates and Vologases, and the Parthian ambassadors were accompanied on their return by some Roman centurions who carried messages of a conciliatory nature. Vologases craftily proposed that a meeting be arranged at Rhandeia, where Paetus had been forced to surrender. Tiberius Alexander and Annius Vinicianus, son-in-law of Corbulo, went to the camp of Tiridates as pledges against ambush. The leaders, each accompanied by twenty horsemen, met and agreed that Tiridates was to receive Armenia, but only from the hands of Nero. In a formal ceremony some days later the Armenian monarch removed the crown from his head before the assembled Roman and Parthian troops and laid it at the feet of a statue of Nero erected for that purpose.

This agreement was reached late in 63, but it was not until 66 that it was consummated.²⁹ A part of

Hasluck, "Inscriptions from the Cyzicus District, 1906," *JHS*, XXVII (1907), p. 64, No. 5; A. von Domaszewski, "Kleine Beiträge zur Kaisergeschichte," *Philologus*, LXVII (1908), 5-8. This is the Asper of Tac. *Ann.* xv. 49 ff.

²⁹ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 24-31; cf. Josephus *Bell.* ii. 379, speech of Agrippa in 66; Mommsen, *Prov. Rom. Emp.*, II, 64; *CAH*, X, 770-73.

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this period was no doubt occupied by a long trip which Tiridates took to visit his mother and his brothers Pacorus, king of Atropatene, and Vologases, the Parthian monarch, who was at Ecbatana. In the interim the daughter of Tiridates and also his kingdom remained as hostages in Roman hands. The troops on the eastern frontier were kept ready for action, and there is evidence that the crossing near Melitene was used by troops which were pushed forward into Armenian territory.³⁰

While the war was in progress Nero had erected a triumphal arch in Rome;³¹ now that the struggle was concluded, he issued a series of coins to commemorate the closing of the Temple of Janus.³²

On the long journey to Rome Tiridates took care to observe the Zoroastrian regulations which were laid on him by his priestly office.³³ The entire trip was made by land to avoid defiling the sea,³⁴ and the large sums of money required to support the three thou-

³⁰ The III Gallica under Titus Aurelius Fulvus was stationed at Ziata (Harput), where it apparently built a fortress at the command of Corbulo; see *CIL*, III, Nos. 6741-42a = Dessau 232.

³¹ Tac. *Ann.* xv. 18. 1. The arch is probably represented on coins; see Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, I, 155, n. 1, and coins Nos. 147 ff.

³² Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, I, 156, n. 1, and coins Nos. 159 ff.

³³ Pliny *Hist. nat.* xxx. 16 f.; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 24.

³⁴ Pliny *loc. cit.*; *The Zend-Avesta*. I. *The Vendîdâd*, tr. by James Darmesteter ("The Sacred Books of the East," ed. F. Max Müller, IV [2d ed.; Oxford, 1895]), pp. lxxv-lxxvii.

sand horsemen who accompanied the Armenian king were drawn from the Roman state treasury. Besides his own sons, Tiridates took with him those of his two brothers and of Monobazus. The queen also was a member of the party and rode beside her lord, wearing a helmet in lieu of the usual veil. The whole trip took some nine months. In Italy Tiridates traveled in a two-horse carriage sent by Nero which conveyed him by way of Pisenum to Neapolis, where he was met by the Emperor. Here Tiridates did obeisance and paid homage to Nero; but, like the warrior that he was, he refused to remove his dagger, preferring to fasten it to its sheath with nails.

A gladiatorial exhibition was given at the near-by city of Puteoli, after which the party proceeded to Rome. The Imperial City was decorated for the occasion, and great crowds gathered to watch the ceremony. Tiridates again humbled himself before Nero, who then declared him king of Armenia and placed the diadem upon his head.³⁵ After a stay of some duration in Rome Tiridates returned home partly by land and partly by sea, for he crossed from Brundisium to Dyrrachium and then passed through Asia Minor. He brought back with him many costly gifts and numbers of artisans in order to rebuild the capital city of Artaxata.³⁶

³⁵ Dio Cass. lxxii (lxxiii. 1. 2—6. 1); Suet. *Nero* 13.

³⁶ For an interpretation of this trip of Tiridates see F. Cumont, "L'iniziazione di Nerone da parte di Tiridate d'Armenia," *Rivista di filologia*, LXI (1933), 145-54.

This trip of Tiridates affords us glimpses of Zoroastrianism which unite with other scraps of evidence to show that in the second half of the first century after Christ a wave of oriental reaction was taking place. On the coins of the contemporary Parthian king Vologases I the altar appears for the first time in the history of Arsacid numismatics,³⁷ and the figure of a man making an offering before a similar object is frequent.³⁸ Under this same ruler all of the scattered remains of the manuscript or oral traditions of the Avesta were ordered collected.³⁹ For the first time Pahlavi appears on the coins in addition to the traditional Greek, which has by now become hopelessly corrupt.⁴⁰

The period of peace which followed the temporary settlement of the Armenian question is responsible for a dearth of information on Parthia. There is even considerable doubt as to the length of the reign of Vologases I; it probably extended to 79/80.⁴¹ Military preparations on a large scale were made by Rome in the years 66 and 67: a new legion, the I Italica, was created;⁴² and one of the crack legions, the XIV Gemina (Marta Victrix), was started on the journey to the eastern front.⁴³ At the time of his

³⁷ Wroth, *Parthia*, Pl. XXIX 11 f. ³⁸ *Ibid.*, Pl. XXIX 8-10.

³⁹ *Zend-Avesta*. I. *Vendidâd*, tr. by Darmesteter, pp. xxxviii-xli.

⁴⁰ Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 182 f.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. xlix f.; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 192.

⁴² Suet. *Nero* 19; Dio Cass. lv. 24. 2.

⁴³ Tac. *Hist.* ii. 11, 27, 66; W. Schur, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero* (*Klio*, Beiheft XV [1923]), pp. 107 ff.

death in 68 Nero was engaged in plans for a great expedition which had as its objective the Iron Gates of the Caucasus.⁴⁴ Possibly its ultimate aim was the Alani, as has been suggested,⁴⁵ or it might have been a feint to keep the Parthians occupied and thus prevent their sending aid to the Jews; but in any case hostilities with the Parthians could hardly have been avoided. The troublous times which followed Nero's death put a stop to all such preparations.

In 69 Vespasian declared himself emperor. Vologases, informed of the event, sent ambassadors to Alexandria the next year to offer him the use of forty thousand Parthian horse.⁴⁶ The letter which they bore was addressed: "The King of Kings, Arsaces, to Flavius Vespasianus, greetings."⁴⁷ Possibly this salutation had something to do with the polite refusal which followed, but more likely Vespasian felt he had the situation in hand. Sohaemus of Emesa and Antiochus of Commagene joined forces with Vespasian, and embassies were sent to the Parthians and Armenians so that peaceful relations might be established with them.⁴⁸ In 71 Vologases sent his congratulations to Titus at Zeugma on the Roman victories over the Jews and presented him with a gold crown.

⁴⁴ Tac. *Hist.* i. 6; Suet. *Nero* 19; Dio Cass. lxii (lxiii. 8. 1); Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 40; *CAH*, X, 773-78. See also E. M. Sanford, "Nero and the East," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1937), 75-103.

⁴⁵ Mommsen, *Prov. Rom. Emp.*, II, 65 f. and n. 3.

⁴⁶ Suet. *Vespasian* 6; Tac. *Hist.* iv. 51. On a revolt in Seleucia in 69/70 see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 228 f.

⁴⁷ Dio Cass. lxxv (lxxvi. 11. 3).

⁴⁸ Tac. *Hist.* ii. 81 f.; v. 1.

The gift was accepted, and the messengers who brought it were feasted before their return.⁴⁹

An incident occurred in 72 which threatened to break the established peace.⁵⁰ L. Caesennius Paetus, formerly with Corbulo and now governor of Syria, informed Vespasian of a projected alliance of Antiochus of Commagene and his son Epiphanes with Vologases against Rome. The union would have been dangerous, for Samosata, the capital of Commagene, lay on the Euphrates at one of the best crossings. The Parthians would thus have an excellent base for operations in Syria and Cilicia. Paetus was given authority to proceed against Antiochus, which he did with all possible speed. Moving forward with the X Fretensis and some auxiliaries furnished by Aristobulus of Chalcis and Sohaemus of Emesa, Paetus took Antiochus of Commagene by surprise. That king gathered his wife and children and retired before the Roman advance, which swept into Samosata without a struggle. Though Antiochus himself was not disposed to contest the matter by force of arms, his two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, with such troops as they could muster, barred the passage. An all-day battle resulted in a draw at nightfall, when the king

⁴⁹ Josephus *Bell.* vii. 105 f.

⁵⁰ C. E. S. Gsell, *Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Domitien* (Paris, 1893), pp. 232-34. H. C. Newton, *The Epigraphical Evidence for the Reigns of Vespasian and Titus* ("Cornell Studies in Classical Philology," XVI [New York, 1901]), pp. 19 f. and No. 254, does not date the consulship of Paetus; but cf. PW, art. "Syria," col. 1629.

left and continued his flight. This so disheartened the troops that they deserted to the Romans and the princes fled for refuge to Vologases with a guard of only ten men.⁵¹ Among the Parthians they were well treated, but they were later surrendered to Velius Rufus, who had been sent by Vespasian to secure them. Antiochus was placed under arrest by the Romans, but was allowed to live in Sparta, where he was furnished with sufficient money to maintain an estate such as befitted a king.⁵² Lesser Armenia and Commagene were then made into provinces and garrisoned accordingly.⁵³ The absorption of these frontier kingdoms was in accord with the policy begun under Tiberius and now continued under Vespasian, who had become thoroughly acquainted with the eastern situation during his campaign in Judea.

The number of standing legions in the Near East was raised, as well as the number of high commands. Syria and Commagene, which was added to it, had the III Gallica, the IV Scythica, and the VI Ferrata; Judea retained the X Fretensis; and the V Macedonica, which had been utilized in the Jewish War, was sent back to Moesia via Alexandria early in 71.

⁵¹ *CIL*, III, No. 14387 *i* = Dessau 9198; also Dessau 9200.

⁵² Josephus *Bell.* vii. 219-43.

⁵³ Franz Cumont, "L'Annexion du Pont Polémoniaque et de la Petite Arménie," *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Mitchell Ramsay* (Manchester, 1923), p. 114 and notes; Théodore Reinach, "Le mari de Salomé et les monnaies de Nicopolis d'Arménie," *Revue des études anciennes*, XVI (1914), 133-58.

Cappadocia, Lesser Armenia, and Galatia were placed under one governor with military headquarters at Melitene. Apparently there were no legions in Cappadocia at the beginning of Vespasian's reign, and he was the first to station legions there.⁵⁴ The legions for this district were the XII Fulminata and at least one other, probably the XVI Flavia.

The invasion of Parthian territory by the Alani, a nomadic tribe of the north, occurred about A.D. 72.⁵⁵ They advanced from their territory near Lake Maeotis (the Sea of Azov),⁵⁶ secured an alliance with the king of the now independent Hyrcania,⁵⁷ and passed

⁵⁴ Suet. *Vespasian* 8. 4; Tac. *Hist.* ii. 81; S. E. Stout, "L. Antistius Rusticus," *Class. Philol.*, XXI (1926), 49. PW, art. "Legio" (pub. 1924-25), contains nearly all of the evidence available on the subject.

⁵⁵ Josephus *Bell.* vii. 244-51 and *Ant.* xviii. 97; Suet. *Domitian* 2. 2; Dio Cass. l.v (l.xvi. 15. 3); perhaps Lucan *De bell. civ.* viii. 223. Suggested dates for the invasion run from 72 to 74; see B. Niese, "Zur Chronologie des Josephus," *Hermes*, XXVIII (1893), 209-11, A.D. 73; Emil Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi*, I (Leipzig, 1901), 639, n. 139, A.D. 72; E. Täubler, "Zur Geschichte der Alanen," *Klio*, IX (1909), 18, A.D. 72 or 73; Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in S. Russia*, p. 118, A.D. 73-74; R. P. Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 23, and Josef Markwart, "Iberer und Hyrkanier," *Caucasica*, VIII (1931), 80, A.D. 72.

⁵⁶ There have been numerous attempts to emend the text of Josephus, especially on the basis of early translations of the Chinese sources; see Täubler, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff. More recent work on these same sources makes it probable that Josephus was correct, as Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 133, recognized; see Hirth, "Story of Chang K'ien," *JASOS*, XXXVII (1917), 96. J. Saint-Martin, "Discours sur l'origine et l'histoire des Arsacides," *J.A.*, I (1822), 65-77, believed the original Parthian invasion was similar in character to that of such peoples as the Alani.

⁵⁷ Josephus *Bell.* vii. 245.

to the south through the Iron Gates of the Caucasus⁵⁸ and thence into Media Atropatene. Pacorus, brother of Vologases I, installed in that country at the accession of Vologases to the Parthian throne, was driven into some remote spot. His harem fell into the hands of the Alani, but he succeeded in ransoming his wife and concubines. The hordes continued their march westward and defeated Tiridates, king of Armenia, within the confines of his own country, where they nearly captured him with a lasso. Satiated with booty, they returned eastward.

In 75 Vologases appealed to Rome for aid against the Alani, but Vespasian did not send either Titus or Domitian as the Parthian monarch had requested.⁵⁹ There was a Roman force in at least one of the passes of the Caucasus,⁶⁰ and Vespasian aided Mithradates of Iberia to fortify his capital, Metskheta. While these precautions were ostensibly for the purpose of curbing the Alani, they might also have been directed

⁵⁸ There were Roman troops stationed here at one time, but possibly this was later, in 75; see Statius *Silvae* iv. 4. 61 ff.

⁵⁹ Suet. *Domitian* 2. 2; Dio Cass. lxx (lxxvi. 15. 3).

⁶⁰ *CIL*, III, No. 6052, plus a minor correction by A. Aminraschwili quoted in *Philol. Wochenschr.*, XLVIII (1928), col. 838. See also *J.A.*, 6. sér., XIII (1869), 93-103; C. de la Berge, *Essai sur le règne de Trajan* ("Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études," XXXII [Paris, 1877]), p. 163; Newton, *Vesp. and Tit.*, pp. 19 f. The fact that almost every Roman campaign in Mesopotamia began with an expedition into Armenia disproves the belief of D. Magie, "Roman Policy in Armenia and Transcaucasia and Its Significance," *Amer. Hist. Assoc., Annual Report for 1919*, I (Washington, D.C., 1923), 300-303, that Roman interest in these regions was not military but commercial.

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against the Parthians. In 76 M. Ulpius Trajan, father of the future emperor, received triumphal insignia for some diplomatic victory over the Parthians.⁶¹ The work of Valerius Flaccus, a part of which must have been composed about this time, clearly mirrors Roman interest in the Alani and in the Caucasus region.⁶²

⁶¹ W. H. Waddington, *Fastes des provinces asiatiques* (Paris, 1872), No. 100; Pliny *Panegyricus* 14. That no serious fighting took place is shown by Tac. *Hist.* i. 2; Victor *Epit.* 9. 12 and *De Caes.* 9. 10.

⁶² Valerius Flaccus iii. 493 f.; v. 558-60 and 600 f.; vi. 65 f., 106 f., 114-35, 203 f., 507 f., 690-92.

To about this same time may belong the Pahlavi document Avroman III. It is dated 321 (A.E.?), i.e., A.D. 74, or, if it is dated in the Seleucid era, A.D. 10. See A. Cowley, "The Pahlavi Document from Avroman," *JRAS*, 1919, pp. 147-54; A. H. Sayce, "Two Notes on Hellenic Asia. I. The Aramaic Parchment from Avroman," *JHS*, XXXIX (1919), 202-4; J. M. Unvala, "On the Three Parchments from Avroman in Kurdistan," *Bull. School of Or. Studies*, I 4 (1920), 125-44; H. S. Nyberg, "The Pahlavi Documents from Avromān," *Le monde oriental*, XVII (1923), 182-230.

CHAPTER IX

PARTHIA IN COMMERCE AND LITERATURE

IN THE period covered by the past four chapters important changes were taking place in the world of commerce, changes which were eventually to influence profoundly the course of Parthian history. With increasing wealth and luxury in Syria and Rome came a demand for the products of the Far East. One or more of the great silk routes from China passed through Parthia, and others crossed territory which Parthian arms controlled.¹ The revenue from taxes swelled Parthian treasuries until Tacitus compared them with those of Rome.² Incentive for the development of new routes to avoid Parthia probably arose not from a desire to avoid payment of these duties but from the breakdown of Parthian control along the route. Customs exacted by an organized government, though high, amount to less than the numerous tributes required by petty chieftains every

¹ M. P. Charlesworth, *Trade-Routes and Commerce of the Roman Empire* (2d ed.; Cambridge, 1926), pp. 98 ff. There are several errors in that chapter; e.g., Seleucia was directly opposite Ctesiphon, not "a few miles distant" (as stated on his p. 101). Again, Charlesworth, *loc. cit.*, says: "Seleucia on the Tigris . . . usually was able to hold itself independent(!) of Parthia."

² Tac. *Ann.* ii. 60.5.

few miles when strong centralized rule is gone. The water route to India with its harbor dues and pirates must have been the lesser of two evils.³

At a later date we have records of customhouses established on the Tigris-Euphrates frontier where taxes were collected by Roman publicans.⁴ Widespread occupation during the Parthian period, including extensive reoccupation of abandoned sites, proves that Parthian rule brought prosperity to Mesopotamia. The huge Nahrwan canal (east of the Tigris) with many of its branches may be of Parthian construction.

During the reign of Vologases I (A.D. 51/52-79/80) a new city, Vologasia or Vologesocerta, was founded in the vicinity of Babylon.⁵ The king's intention may have been to establish a new commercial center to displace the older Seleucia, where party strife frequently disturbed the flow of trade and where opposition to the royal will often arose.⁶ Vologesocerta is frequent-

³ Cf. W. H. Schoff, *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (New York, 1912), p. 5; on the date of the *Periplus*, see p. 69, n. 41. J. W. Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1928), pp. 23 f., feels that the northern routes also were developed to circumvent Parthia.

⁴ Fronto *Princ. hist.* 16; Philostratus *Vita Apoll.* i. 20; E. S. Bouchier, *Syria as a Roman Province* (Oxford, 1916), p. 170.

⁵ The date of this foundation or refoundation was probably between 55 and 65, since it is mentioned in Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 122. The tenth book of Pliny's work was published in 77. On the city see also Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 23 and the Peutinger Table.

⁶ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 229 and 236.

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ly mentioned in inscriptions from Palmyra as the destination of the Palmyrene caravans. With the diversion of trade to this new center, the increasing importance of the more purely Parthian Ctesiphon across the river, and the destruction wrought by successive Roman invasions, the decline of the old royal city of Seleucia grew progressively more rapid in the second century after Christ.

The most important of the early trade routes was the great road which led to the Land of the Two Rivers across the Iranian plateau from the borders of China. Chinese traders met the westerners⁷ at a place called the "Stone Tower," tentatively identified as Tashkurgan on the upper Yarkand River.⁸ When the road reached Bactria, the presence of the Kushans forced a wide detour southward through Arachosia and Aria. From Rhages (Rayy) the road led westward to Ecbatana (Hamadan).⁹ From Ecbatana, however, goods continued to pass to Syria via the Fertile Crescent or across the desert via Dura-Euro-

⁷ The Seres of Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 54 ff., Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 14, and classical literature in general are not the Chinese but these intermediaries. B. Laufer, *Sino-Iranica* (Chicago: Field Museum, 1919), p. 538, emphatically denies a connection between the Greek *sēr* (pl., *sēres*), the Mongolian *širgek*, and the Manchu *širge*, originally proposed by J. Klaproth, "Conjecture sur l'origine du nom de la soie chez les anciens," *JĀ*, II (1823), 243-45, and J. P. Abel-Rémusat, *ibid.*, 245-47, and accepted by many including Schoff, *Periplus*, p. 266. But cf. now PW, art. "Seres."

⁸ Charlesworth, *Trade-Routes and Com. of Rom. Emp.*, p. 103.

⁹ Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth. passim*. Cf. Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 46 ff. An interesting novel on the silk trade of this period is S. Merwin's *Silk* (New York, 1923).

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pus or Palmyra. For Mesopotamian trade they might take a more southern route to the distributing center of Seleucia-Ctesiphon, where bales received overland from China and India mingled with those which came up the Persian Gulf and the Tigris River.

At the same time that shifts in the routes of commerce were taking place, interest at Rome in the Orient became both intense and widespread, an interest clearly reflected in the poets. Many historical references have already been pointed out, for some of these writers were in position to secure first-hand information, and most of them were contemporary with the events they mention. But more important than the actual information which they furnish is the fact that the poets mirror the passing thought and interests of contemporary Rome. In their writings, then, we should expect to find evidence of the rise of Roman interest in the East, and, since many of the poems are datable by internal evidence, we should be able to trace its development quite closely.

Sulla's contact with Parthia was of an ephemeral character; he had no realization of the future of those "barbarians" or even of their strength in his own day.¹⁰ A most peaceful people, the "Persians" (Parthians), says Cicero before his governorship of Cilicia.¹¹ Crassus had already begun to talk of Bac-

¹⁰ This is clearly brought out by J. Dobiáš, "Les premiers rapports des Romains avec les Parthes et l'occupation de la Syrie," *Archiv or.*, III (1931), 215-56.

¹¹ Cicero *De domo sua* 60.

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tria, India, and the Outer Sea¹² before he set out on his conquests in the East; but he had little information with regard to the enemy. Faith in the invincible Roman legion was unshaken; the effect of mounted archers and heavy-armored cavalry against foot troops remained to be demonstrated by the Parthians. Doubtless many excuses were found for the disaster at Carrhae, but in any case it did not suffice to awaken the public immediately to the presence of a new power on the eastern horizon. Few apparently realized the truth.

Cicero, governor of Cilicia, at the edge of the threatened territory, was aware to some extent of the danger from beyond the Euphrates. With Parthian cavalry at the very door of Syria, his frantic appeal for additional troops aroused no great concern at Rome. The raids passed, and no action was taken; but the seriousness with which Pompey, after Pharsalia, considered leading Parthia against the Roman world, proved that military men at least were somewhat cognizant of the situation. The elaborate preparations made by Caesar, including sixteen legions and six thousand cavalry, show clearly that he realized the magnitude of the task which lay before him. Still, it is very doubtful whether, to the man in the streets at Rome, Parthia was much more than a name. The awakening was sudden and rude.

In 40 B.C. Parthian forces under the joint command

¹² Plut. *Crassus* 16. 2.

of the Parthian prince Pacorus and the Roman Labienus struck directly into the heart of the Roman East. The provinces of Asia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Syria were all taken by the Parthians; even as far south as Petra, Parthia's word was law. For two years this vast area, so vital to Roman commerce and pleasure, was under military occupation by the Parthians. Possession of the Carian and perhaps the Ionian coast by foreigners struck close to home, for in the coastal towns of those districts Roman officials were accustomed to land when they passed to their eastern commands. There were many in Rome itself who were native to that part of the world or who had been there on business. The victories of Ventidius had no sooner pushed the invaders beyond the Euphrates than another Roman army, under Antony, barely escaped annihilation at Parthian hands. The effect was electrical. Catchwords and phrases concerning the East became common property and were on every tongue. Occasional references are to be found as early as Lucretius¹³ and the first poems of Vergil.¹⁴ After the Parthian invasion of Syria a flood of such material begins. The *Eclogues* of Vergil¹⁵ and

¹³ *De rerum natura* iii. 750. In the references which follow, mentions of specific historical events have generally been omitted; they will be found in their proper places in the narrative. The lists are not to be considered as complete.

¹⁴ *Ciris* 299, 308, 440, 512; *Culex* 62 and 67.

¹⁵ *Ecl.* i. 62; iv. 25; x. 59.

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later his *Georgics*¹⁶ and his *Aeneid*¹⁷ abound in references to Parthia, Media, Bactria, and distant India. The Parthian bow, the feigned retreat, the parting shot from behind, the Armenian tiger, the Hyrcanian dog, Assyrian dye and spice, Indian or Assyrian ivory, the inhospitable Caucasus, the tepid Tigris, the broad Euphrates, the beautiful Ganges, the Indian Hydaspes, the wool of the Seres—all these and many more become stock phrases which persist in literature long after the events which caused them to spring into being have become ancient history. Epics and plays were written with Parthian settings.¹⁸ Horace was greatly interested in the East,¹⁹ especially in the proposed expedition of Tiberius and the recovery of the standards.²⁰ Hints of an expedition to the East at the direction of Augustus are plentiful in Propertius.²¹

¹⁶ *Georg.* i. 509; ii. 121-23, 126, 134-39, 171 f., 440, 465; iii. 26 ff.; iv. 210 f., 290, 313 f., 425 f., 560 f.

¹⁷ *Aeneid* iv. 367; vi. 794; viii. 685-88, 705 ff., 726, 728; ix. 31 f.; xii. 67 and 857 f.

¹⁸ Horace (*Sat.* ii. 1. 15) declares he cannot write an epic (as others were apparently doing) depicting the Parthians falling from their horses. Persius (*Sat.* v. 1-4), roughly a hundred years later, perhaps modeling his phrase on the passage in Horace, speaks of the poets' theme of a wounded Parthian.

¹⁹ Horace *Ep.* i. 12; vii. 9; xiii. 8; *Od.* i. 2. 21 f. and 51; 11. 2; 12. 53 ff.; 19. 10-12; 21. 15; 22. 6-8; 26. 5; 29. 1-5; 31. 6; 35. 9 and 40; 38. 1; ii. 2. 17; 7. 8; 9. 17 ff.; 11. 16; 13. 17 f.; 16. 6; iii. 1. 44; 2. 3; 3. 44; 5. 4; 8. 19; 24. 1 f.; 29. 27 f.; iv. 5. 25; 14. 42; 15. 23; *Carmen saec.* 53 ff.; *Epist.* i. 1. 45; 6. 6 and 39; 7. 36; ii. 1. 112 and 256.

²⁰ See pp. 139 f., nn. 50 and 55.

²¹ See p. 139, n. 50.

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Ovid, besides carrying on the literary tradition set up at an earlier date,²² was greatly interested in the expedition of Gaius to Armenia.²³ Frequent references to Hyrcanian dogs in the work of Grattius on those animals show that they do not belong to the realm of legend but were in actual use.²⁴ Seneca²⁵ and Lucan²⁶ still employ the standard phrases; in the case of Silius Italicus²⁷ there seems to be little beyond the mere repetition of stock phrases. Statius, on the other hand, was a close friend of Abascantius, secretary to Domitian, and his writings abound in references

²² *Amores* i. 2. 47; ii. 5. 40; 14. 35; 16. 39; *Heroides* xv. 76; *Metamorph.* i. 61 f. and 777 f.; ii. 248 f.; iv. 21, 44-46, 212, 605 f.; v. 47 ff. and 60; vi. 636; viii. 121; xi. 166 f.; xv. 86 and 413; *Remedia amoris* 155 ff. and 224; *De medicamine faciei* 10 and 21; *Ars amat.* i. 199, 201 f., 223 ff.; ii. 175; iii. 195 f., 248, 786; *Tristia* v. 3. 23 f.; *Epistulae ex Ponto* i. 5. 79 f.; ii. 4. 27; iv. 8. 61; *Fasti* i. 76, 341, 385 f.; iii. 465, 719 f., 729; iv. 569.

²³ See p. 150, n. 30.

²⁴ Grattius 155-62, 196, 314 f., 508.

²⁵ *De const. sap.* xiii. 3; *De brev. vit.* iv. 5; *De cons. ad Polyb.* xv. 4; *De cons. ad Helviam* x. 3; *Hercules furens* 909 ff. and 1323 f.; *Troades* 11; *Medea* 373 f., 483 f., 723 ff., 865; *Hippolytus* 67, 70, 344 f., 389, 753, 816; *Oedipus* 114, 117-19, 427 f., 458; *Thyestes* 370 ff., 462, 601-6, 630 f., 707, 732; *Herc. Oet.* 40 f., 157-61, 241 f., 336, 414, 515, 628, 630, 659 f., 667; *Phoenissae* 428; *Octavia* 627 f.; *Epist.* iv. 7; xii. 8; xvii. 11; xxxiii. 2; xxxvi. 7; lviii. 12; lxxi. 37; civ. 15.

²⁶ *De bell. civ.* i. 10 ff., 230, 328; ii. 49 f., 296, 496, 552 f., 594, 633, 637-39; iii. 236, 245, 256 ff., 266 ff.; iv. 64 and 680 f.; v. 54 f.; vi. 49-51; vii. 188, 281, 427 ff., 442 f., 514-17, 539-43; ix. 219 ff. and 266 f.; x. 46-52, 120, 139, 142, 252, 292.

²⁷ iii. 612 f.; v. 281; vi. 4; vii. 646 f.; viii. 408 and 467; xi. 41 f. and 402; xii. 460; xiii. 473 f.; xiv. 658 and 663-65; xv. 23, 79-81, 570; xvii. 595 f. and 647.

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which show an intimate knowledge of eastern affairs.²⁸ Martial also has numerous historical references to the East,²⁹ and in the poems of Juvenal there is clear evidence of a shift in attitude toward the oriental provincial after the accession of Hadrian.³⁰ "By's mark your horse you'll own, by's tiara a Parthian's known," said some writer of Anacreontics about this time.³¹

In the centuries which followed, the references to the East became more and more stereotyped. Tertullian,³² Philostratus the son of Nervianus,³³ M. Minucius Felix(?),³⁴ Oppian,³⁵ all of whom probably lived within the Parthian period, carry on the tradition. Still later writers continue in the same strain³⁶ or occasionally quote from works now lost.³⁷ Even

²⁸ *Silvae* i. 2. 122 f.; 3. 105; 4. 77-81 and 103 f.; ii. 2. 121 f.; 4. 34 f.; 6. 18 f. and 86 f.; 7. 93 ff.; iii. 2. 91; 3. 33 f., 92 ff., 212; 4. 62 f.; iv. 1. 40-43; 2. 38 and 49; 3. 137 and 153 ff.; 4. 30 f.; 5. 30-32; v. 1. 60 f.; 2. 140 f.; 3. 185-90; *Thebaid* i. 686 and 717-20; ii. 91; iv. 387 ff. and 678; v. 203 f.; vi. 59, 209, 597 f.; vii. 69, 181, 524 f., 566, 687; viii. 237 ff., 286 ff., 572; ix. 15 f.; x. 288 f.; xii. 170 and 788.

²⁹ *De spect.* i and xviii; *Epig.* ii. 43. 9; 53. 9 f.; v. 58. 4; vi. 85; vii. 30; viii. 26; 28. 17 f.; 77. 3; ix. 35. 3; 75. 2 f.; x. 72. 5 ff.; 76. 2 f.; xii. 8; xiv. 150.

³⁰ See p. 240. Other references by Juvenal to the East are *Sat.* ii. 163 ff.; vi. 337, 466, 548 ff.; viii. 167-70; xv. 163.

³¹ *Anacreontia* (ed. J. M. Edmonds in "Loeb Classical Library") 27.

³² *Apologeticus* xxxvii. 4. ³³ *Imagines* i. 28 f.; ii. 5, 28, 31.

³⁴ *Octavius* vii. 4; xviii. 3; xxv. 12.

³⁵ *Cynegetica* i. 171 f., 196 f., 276-79, 302, 371; ii. 98 f., 100, 135 ff.; iii. 21 ff., 259, 501; iv. 112 ff., 164 f., 354 f.; *Haliutica* ii. 483 and 679; iv. 204.

³⁶ Achilles Tatius iii. 7. 5; Callistratus 4.

³⁷ Ausonius xii (*Technopaegnon*). 10. 24; *Epistulae* xxiii. 6 (from a lost work of Suetonius); xxv. 1; xxvii. 53; liii.

such Christian writers as Jerome still remember the Parthians.³⁸

When Rome found herself confronted with new and more vigorous opponents, the Sasanidae, the Parthians were sometimes, though by no means always, confused with them. Examples of both confusion and correct identification may be found in Claudian, where again the Araxes, the Hyrcanian tiger, the Medes, the Indians, and other traditional terms appear.³⁹ Even as late as Boethius⁴⁰ and the *Anthologia Latina*⁴¹ the tradition was still alive; indeed, through the medium of classical literature it was carried over into English classics.⁴²

³⁸ Jerome *Epist.* xiv. 3; lxxvii. 10; cvii. 10; cxxv. 3; cxxvii. 3.

³⁹ Claudian *Paneg. dictus Probino et Olybrio* 78-81, 160-63, 170, 179 f.; *In Rufinum* i. 227, 293, 310-12, 374-76; ii. 242-44; *De bello Gildonico* 31-33; *In Eutropium* i. 321, 342-45, 354, 414-16; ii. 102, 475 f., 569-71; *Fescennina de nuptiis Honorii Augusti* i. 1 f.; *Epithalamium* 168, 210-12, 217, 222-25; *Paneg. tertio cons. Hon.* 4, 19 f., 27 f., 35 f., 70-72, 201-4, 210 f.; *Paneg. quarto cons. Hon.* 43 f., 145 f., 214-16, 257 f., 306-8, 387 f., 530 f., 542, 585 f., 601, 607-10, 653, 656; *Paneg. dictus Manlio Theodoro* 236; *De consulatu Stilichonis* i. 52 ff., 155-57, 266; iii. 62-64; *Paneg. sexto cons. Hon.* 18, 69 f., 85 f., 414-16, 562 f.; (IX) *De hystrice* 21 f.; (XXV) *Epithalamium dictum Palladio et Celerinae* 61, 74, 88 f.; (XXX) *Laus Serenae* 52; (XXXI) *Epist. ad Serenam* 7, 14-16; *De raptu Proserpinae* i. 17 f.; ii. 82, 94, 200; iii. 105, 263-65, 320, 325. The tradition that the victories of Trajan made Mesopotamia a Roman province appears in Claudian *Paneg. quarto cons. Hon.* 315-17 and is frequently alluded to elsewhere.

⁴⁰ *Philosophiae consolatio* ii. 2. 34-38; iii. 5. 5 and 10. 9; iv. 3. 15; v. 1. 1-3.

⁴¹ Octavianus in *Poetae Latini minores*, IV, ed. A. Baehrens (Lipsiae, 1882), p. 249, lines 104 f., and p. 256, *Verba amatoris ad pictorem* 3 f.

⁴² Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, Scene 1; Act IV, Scene 12, line 70; *Cymbeline*, Act I, Scene 6, line 20; Milton, *Paradise Regained* iii. 280 ff.

CHAPTER X
TRAJAN IN ARMENIA AND
MESOPOTAMIA

THE campaign of Corbulo had achieved a temporary though costly settlement of the Armenian succession which left that country well within the sphere of Roman influence. The inroads of the Alani broke upon Parthia about A.D. 72 and drew her attention again to her eastern frontier, where, from the middle of the first century, she had been gradually losing ground. At the time Josephus was writing, in the latter part of the first century, the Euphrates was still the western boundary.¹ With Roman interests occupied elsewhere and Parthian arms engaged in the east, ancient historians of the western world found little of note to record.

In April, 78, a king by the name of Pacorus (II) began striking coins at the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint; but Vologases I was able to continue his issues from the same place, and even during the same month.² This evidence for the struggle between pretender and ruler continues until the end of the next year, when

¹ Josephus *Bell.* iii. 107.

² McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 192.

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Vologases disappears from history.³ Pacorus II⁴ is seldom mentioned in our scanty literary sources, nor is there any hint as to what relation he bore to his predecessor, save that his succession was not a friendly one.

In 79 there appeared in the East a pseudo-Nero, in reality a Roman citizen from Asia Minor named Terentius Maximus. He progressed as far as the Euphrates, but was at last forced to take refuge with one of the pretenders to the Parthian throne, Artabanus (IV), who struck coins at the Seleucia mint in the years 80-81.⁵ The pseudo-Nero won a welcome from the Parthians on the ground that he had returned Armenia to Parthian control. Preparations were being made to restore him when his imposture was discovered and he died.⁶

By 82/83 Pacorus II had apparently driven his rivals from the field; in any case they no longer had

³ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 119 f., rightly assigns to Vologases I the issues of 78-80 formerly given to Vologases II. This clears up the difficulty of a two-year reign of Vologases II in 78-80 and his reappearance thirty years later, in 111/112, when his real period of power commenced. Cf. Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lvi.

⁴ Not the ruler of Media (see p. 194), for his earliest coins (see Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lvi) show a youthful and beardless head.

⁵ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 203; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 193 and 230.

⁶ Dio Cass. lxxvi. 19. 3b; Joan. Antioch. (*FHG*, IV, fr. 104); Zonaras xi. 18. C. Another pseudo-Nero appeared ten years later; to one of the two must refer the *Orac. Sibyl.* iv. 125. 138 f.

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sufficient power to strike coins.⁷ The surrender of another pseudo-Nero was demanded by the emperor Domitian in 89, and Pacorus was at last constrained to give him up.⁸

Toward the conclusion of his reign Domitian apparently planned to seek military honors in the East. Abascantius, his secretary, was ordered to learn what news came from the wandering Euphrates.⁹ The Euphrates was to be crossed at Zeugma, whence the army would turn north, pass over the Araxes, and perhaps conquer regal Bactra or even India. Other forces would invade Mesopotamia; the wealth of Babylon would be theirs. M. Maecius Celer was sent in advance to take charge of the Syrian legions, and his earlier experience in fighting in the East was expected to be of great value.¹⁰

Although Domitian did not live to carry out this plan, it was not long before Trajan was engaged in a campaign which followed closely along the same lines. Trajan came to the throne in 98. Perhaps it was early in his reign that certain difficulties arose between

⁷ The early issues of Pacorus after his victory depict the king on horseback receiving a diadem from a Tyche and an untied diadem(?) from a male figure in the rear. This may well be the conquered Artabanus, as E. T. Newell suggests in the forthcoming *Survey of Persian Art*.

⁸ Suet. *Nero* 57. 2; Tac. *Hist.* i. 2.

⁹ Statius *Silvae* v. 1. 89. Abascantius was a friend of Statius, whose poems are filled with thoughts of the proposed expedition.

¹⁰ Statius *Silvae* i. 4. 77-81; ii. 6. 18 f.; preface to iii; iii. 2. 101 ff. and 135 f.; iv. 1. 40 ff.; 2. 49; 3. 137 and 154; 4. 30 f.; v. 1. 60 f.; 2. 140 f.; 3. 185 ff.

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him and Pacorus over some frontier question, for the Parthian claimed that neither had executed a certain agreement within thirty days and that the Romans had fortified enemy territory contrary to the oracle.¹¹

The last years of Pacorus appear to have been troubled. His coinage at the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint contains lengthy gaps, including one of five years (88-93) and one of eight years (97-105). As early as 105/6 a rival king, perhaps Vologases II, made his appearance; and in 109/10 Osroes, the brother or brother-in-law of Pacorus, began to coin money.¹² The struggle soon became one between Osroes and Vologases II, for with one exception the dated coinage of Pacorus ceases in 96/97.¹³

In 97, during the reign of the emperor Ho, the protector-general Pan Ch'ao sent Kan Ying on a mission to Ta Ch'in (Syria). He reached Mesene, where sailors discouraged his crossing by telling him that the round trip took three months. Here is another indication of the growing importance of this region and of the southern route to Syria. Four years later, in 101, a king of Parthia named Man-ch'iu

¹¹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 32. On the placing of this fragment cf. Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 12 f.

¹² McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 193.

¹³ Wroth, *Parthia*, p. lvi. The issues of 107/8 usually assigned to Osroes are probably not his; possibly they belong to Vologases II, as McDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 231, suggests.

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(identified as Pacorus) sent gifts of lions and ostriches from Mesene,¹⁴ the latter perhaps brought there by traders from Arabia.

We have further evidence that Pacorus was not dead, however; for Decebalus, the famous Dacian opponent of Trajan, presented the Parthian with a slave named Callidromus, presumably a Greek, taken from the Romans by one of the Dacian leaders. The Greek remained for a number of years with Pacorus, and eventually came to possess a beautiful gem engraved with the figure of the Parthian ruler.¹⁵ Possibly some of the heavy Parthian cavalry had aided the Dacians, for the armored warriors on Trajan's column that are usually called Sarmatians might also be Parthians.¹⁶ Perhaps it was to this Pacorus that Martial referred in one of his poems as deliberating in Arsacia (Rhages).¹⁷ In 110¹⁸ Pacorus sold the kingdom of Osroene to Abgarus VII, son of Izates, but the territory may have remained subject to Parthia in some manner. About the same time a ruler named Tiridates was deposed from the Armenian throne by Osroes, and Axidares, one of the two sons

¹⁴ Édouard Chavannes, "Les pays d'Occident d'après le Heou Han chou," *T'oung pao*, 2. sér., VIII (1907), 178 and n.

¹⁵ Pliny *Epist.* x. 74.

¹⁶ M. Dieulafoy, "L'Art antique de la Perse, V (Paris, n.d.), p. 54; Karl Lehmann-Hartleben, *Die Trajanssäule* (Leipzig, 1926), Pl. 17, No. 31, and Pl. 20, No. 37.

¹⁷ Martial *Epig.* ix. 35. 3. ¹⁸ Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 140.

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of Pacorus,¹⁹ was put in his place. This action, taken without consulting the Roman government, may have served as an excuse for the Armenian and Parthian campaigns which followed.²⁰

Only after the completion of the Dacian Wars did Trajan find time to devote his attention to the East, where the Armenian situation or the possibilities of further conquest made easy by the state of anarchy in Parthia may have attracted him. In the autumn of 113, perhaps on October 27,²¹ the Emperor set sail from Rome.²² On his arrival at Athens he was met by an embassy from Osroes, who desired peace and requested that Axidares, whom he had by now de-

¹⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 17 and 19. The spelling Axidares comes from Arrian *Parthica* frs. 37 f. and 40; Dio Cass. *loc. cit.* gives Exedares. The other son was Parthamasiris.

²⁰ So Dio Cass. lxxviii. 17. 1. ²¹ Arrian *Parthica*(?) fr. 34 f.

²² Some of the principal works dealing with this campaign are as follows: J. Dierauer, "Beiträge zu einer kritischen Geschichte Trajans," in M. Büdinger, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaisergeschichte* (Leipzig, 1868), pp. 152-86; C. de la Berge, *Essai sur le règne de Trajan* ("Bibliothèque de l'École des hautes études," XXXII [Paris, 1877]), pp. 155 ff.; W. D. Gray, *A Study of the Life of Hadrian prior to His Accession*, "Smith College Studies in History," IV 3 (Northampton, Mass., 1919), esp. pp. 183-94; A. von Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans* (Tübingen, 1888), pp. 141 ff.; H. H. Sills, *Trajan's Armenian and Parthian Wars* (Cambridge, 1897), pp. 77 ff. (not available); Roberto Paribeni, *Optimus princeps* (Messina, 1926-27), II, 278-303; B. W. Henderson, *Five Roman Emperors* (Cambridge, 1927), pp. 318 ff.; R. P. Longden, "Notes on the Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 1-35; P. L. Strack, *Untersuchungen zur römischen Reichsprägung des zweiten Jahrhunderts. I. Die Reichsprägung zur Zeit des Traian* (Stuttgart, 1931), 34 ff. and 213 ff.; A. Shalit, "The Oriental Policy of Rome from Nero to Trajan" (in Hebrew), *Tarbiz*, VII (1936), 159-80; Longden in *CAH*, XI, 236-52.

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posed from the Armenian throne, be replaced by the latter's brother Parthamasiris. The demand was not granted; it was not even answered, nor were the presents which accompanied it accepted.²³

Trajan then proceeded eastward, perhaps by sea, to Ephesus²⁴ and thence through Lycia and adjoining provinces to Seleucia (in Cilicia?). From there he probably went by sea²⁵ to Antioch,²⁶ where he arrived early in 114. At Antioch he received messages of friendship and gifts from Abgarus, prince of Osroene, who was attempting to preserve neutrality with both Parthians and Romans. Trajan consecrated a portion of the spoils of the Dacian Wars in the temple of Jupiter Casius, and Hadrian composed verses to accompany the offering.²⁷ A trip was made to Heliopolis (Baalbek) to consult the oracle on the issue of the war.²⁸

Trajan drew his troops for the coming struggle

²³ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 17.

²⁴ C. de la Berge, *Essai*, p. 161, n. 3; cf. the route taken by Pliny (*Epist.* x. 17A).

²⁵ Helen McClees, "A Military Diploma of Trajan," *AJA*, XXX (1926), 418-21; see also the excellent article of Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 2 and n. 1.

²⁶ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 18. 1.

²⁷ *Anthol. Palat.* vi. 332; Arrian *Parthica* fr. 36.

²⁸ Macrobius *Saturnalia* i. 23. 14 ff. Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 227, 230, and n. 977, places this in the spring of 116 on the basis of Macrobius and *CIL*, X, No. 1634 = Dessau 300. Juvenal *Sat.* vi. 405 ff. may refer to Trajan's campaign.

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from three main sources: from Pannonia (veterans of the Dacian Wars); from the garrisons and regular legions of Egypt; from the legions ordinarily stationed in Palestine and Syria.²⁹ Though undoubtedly our information on the forces of Trajan is still far from complete, we know that four of the eastern legions were used, with at least a part of a fifth. These were the IV Scythica³⁰ and the VI Ferrata³¹ from Syria, the X Fretensis³² and at least a part of the III Cyrenaica³³ from Judea, and the XVI Flavia Firma from Com-magene.³⁴ Other legions which may possibly have served are the I Adiutrix, II Traiana Fortis, VII Claudia,³⁵ XI Claudia, XV Apollinaris, and XXX Ulpia.³⁶

Numerous auxiliaries were sent from Egypt under

²⁹ Fronto's comparison (*Princ. hist.* [Loeb, II, pp. 207-11]) of the troops of Verus and of Trajan suggests that the condition of the latter's forces was at least fair. Veget. *Epit. rei mil.* i. 8 perhaps refers to the time of Verus rather than that of Trajan.

³⁰ *CIL*, III, No. 10336 = Dessau 1062.

³¹ *CIL*, X, No. 5829 = Dessau 2726.

³² *CIL*, VI, No. 1838 = Dessau 2727.

³³ *CIL*, X, No. 3733 = Dessau 2083; Yale University, *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Sixth Season* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 480-82.

³⁴ The location of the garrison post of this legion is very uncertain; see Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 8 and n. 4, and cf. PW, art. "Legio (XVI Flavia)."

³⁵ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 80 may refer to this legion.

³⁶ PW, art. "Legio"; Paribeni, *Optimus princeps*, II, 285 f.

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the command of Valerius Lollianus, prefect of the *Cohors I Apamenorum sagittariorum equitata*.³⁷

Early in 114 Trajan advanced to Melitene, which he fortified and enlarged.³⁸ Parthamasiris wrote Trajan a letter couched in a lofty style, but without result. Another, in more humble terms, requested that Marcus Junius, governor of Cappadocia, be sent to him. Trajan did not halt in his advance but sent the son of Junius, then proceeded on to Arsamosata, which he took without a struggle.³⁹ When he arrived at Satala he was visited by a number of rulers from the Caucasus and the region about the Caspian Sea.

³⁷ *CIL*, III, No. 600 = Dessau 2724. This inscription is applied by some writers to the expedition of Verus. The auxiliaries included the following troops: *Ala I Praetoria civium Romanorum*; *Ala Augusta(?) Syriaca*; *Ala Agrippiana*, possibly the *Ala II Flavia Agrippiana*; *Ala Herculiiana*, perhaps the *Ala I Thracum Herculiiana*.

Other alae engaged in the war, but not necessarily under Valerius, were the *Singularium*, probably the *I Ulpia Singularium* (*CIL*, III, No. 11995, and X, No. 6426), and the *I Flavia Augusta Britannica milliaria bis torquata ob virtutem* from Pannonia (*Dipl. XXXIX* of 114 [pub. in *CIL*, III, p. 1975] and *CIL*, III, No. 6748).

The cohorts under Valerius were the *I* and *IV Lucensium*, *II Ulpia equitata civium Romanorum*, *I Flavia civium Romanorum*, *I Thracum*, *II* and *III Ulpia Paphlagonum*, *II equitum(?)*, *I Ascalonitanorum Felix*, *V Chalcidenorum*, *I* and *V Ulpia Petraeorum*, *I Ulpia sagittariorum*, *III Dacorum*, and *I Sygambrorum* (*CIL*, III, No. 600 = Dessau 2724). Another, apparently not under Valerius, was the *I Pannoniorum et Dalmatarum* (*CIL*, X, No. 5829 = Dessau 2726).

³⁸ Procopius *De aedificiis* iii. 4. 15 ff.; cf. Tac. *Ann.* xv. 26 and Ruf. *Fest.* 15.

³⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 19. 2: μέχρι σαμωσατου; emendation suggested by von Gutschmid. Cf. Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 214 f., n. 923, who does not believe a change is necessary.

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Presents were given to Anchialus, king of the Heniochi and the Machelones.⁴⁰ Trajan also invested a king of the Albani and received kings of the Iberians, the Sarmatians, and the Colchians.⁴¹ These events were probably represented on coins bearing the legend REGNA ADSIGNATA.⁴² Amazaspus, brother of King Mithradates of Iberia, must have joined forces with Trajan at Satala. But he was destined never to engage in the fighting, for he died and was buried near Nisibis.⁴³ It was probably at Satala that Trajan met reinforcements from the Danube region.⁴⁴

At Elegia (Ilidja, Turkish Ilıca), west of modern Erzurum, Parthamasiris at last secured the interview he had so long sought. Trajan received the Armenian monarch before all the army. Parthamasiris approached the Emperor, took off his diadem, and laid it at the feet of Trajan, expecting to have it replaced even as Nero had replaced the diadem on the head of Tiridates. The scene is represented on a gold coin which bears the inscription REX PARTHVS.⁴⁵ The

⁴⁰ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 19.

⁴¹ Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3; see also the references given by Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 9, n. 8.

⁴² Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 291, No. 666; Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 222 f.

⁴³ *Frag. choliambica*, ed. A. D. Knox, fr. 1 (in "Loeb Classical Library," *The Characters of Theophrastus*, ed. J. M. Edmonds, p. 279); *IG*, XIV, No. 1374.

⁴⁴ *IGRR*, III, No. 173; Longden, *op. cit.*, p. 9 and n. 7.

⁴⁵ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 262, No. 263a, and 266, Nos. 310-12; Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 218-20 and Pl. III 220.

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army received the act as one of surrender and raised the shout of "Imperator!"⁴⁶ Trajan made no move to replace the diadem. When Parthamasiris saw that he was surrounded on all sides, he requested a private conversation, which was granted. This proved no more satisfactory, and the Armenian ruler eventually became angry and left camp, only to be brought back by the legionaries. Trajan then bade him speak out so that all might hear. Parthamasiris explained that he had not been defeated in battle but had come to be invested with the crown of Armenia, just as Tiridates had been. Trajan then declared that he would surrender Armenia to no one and that henceforth it was to be a Roman province.⁴⁷ For promised security Parthamasiris thanked the Emperor, but he complained of his suffering and reproached him for the treatment accorded him.⁴⁸ Trajan permitted the Armenian ruler to leave camp, escorted by his Parthian companions and a detachment of Roman cavalry. The Armenians with him, now Roman subjects, were not allowed to depart. As the cavalcade left the encampment, the leader of the Roman cavalry swung his horse against that of Parthamasiris, ordered him to rein in his mount,⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Strack, *op. cit.*, I, 220 f., believes that the coins inscribed IMPERATOR VII do not represent this acclamation, which he feels must have been unnumbered.

⁴⁷ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 19-20.

⁴⁸ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 38.

⁴⁹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 39.

and then killed him.⁵⁰ Trajan declared later that he himself, not Axidares, had taken the decision. There could be no dispute that Axidares had the best right to rule Armenia; it was Parthamasiris who had first broken the agreement,⁵¹ and he had suffered merited punishment.⁵²

Meantime Lucius Quietus had been sent with a column against the Mardi, who are supposed to have lived east of Lake Van.⁵³ They are described as a poor but warlike people, without horses, inhabiting a rough country. Attacked front and rear, they were entirely destroyed, or at least so Arrian reports.⁵⁴ Perhaps at this time a Roman guard was left at the boundaries of the Lazi and the Saginae,⁵⁵ not far from the "Caspian Gates" (the Iron Gates?).⁵⁶

The conquest of Armenia was still to be accomplished. Trajan took part in this task, administering rebukes and punishments where necessary, sifting false rumors brought in by scouts or even starting them himself so that the army might be ever on the

⁵⁰ Fronto *Princ. hist.* (Loeb, II, pp. 212-14). Cf. Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3; Victor *Epit.* 48. 10. The rather general attempt by classical scholars to clear Trajan of blame for this murder is quite unnecessary; this is not the first instance of treachery on either side.

⁵¹ The agreement referred to is unknown.

⁵² Arrian *Parthica* frs. 37-40.

⁵³ Themistius *Orationes* xvi (ed. Dindorf, p. 250).

⁵⁴ Arrian *Parthica* frs. 86-87.

⁵⁵ Procopius *De bellis* viii. 2. 16. ⁵⁶ Arrian *Parthica* viii. fr. 6.

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alert, and issuing commands so that the troops might advance in good order.⁵⁷

Armenia was made into a province⁵⁸ and a procuratorial governor appointed. Three of the early officials are known: L. Catilius Severus,⁵⁹ C. Atilius Claudius,⁶⁰ and T. Haterius Nepos.⁶¹ In distant Crete a coin was struck with the legend APMENIA.⁶² Trajan was particularly proud of the title "Optimus" which he added to his formal titulary about this time.⁶³

From Armenia Trajan turned south toward Mardin and Nisibis, perhaps then a part of Adiabene.⁶⁴ A

⁵⁷ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 41; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 23.

⁵⁸ Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3.2. A coin bearing the legend KOINON AP-MENIAC ETOYC MΓ was struck by Trajan at about this time; see B. Pick, "Une monnaie du κοινὸν Ἀρμενίας," *Revue des études anciennes*, XVI (1914), 283-89.

⁵⁹ Consul in 115 according to *Rev. archéol.*, 4. sér., XVIII (1911), 486 No. 95, from *Bolletino dell'Associazione archeologica romana*, I (1911), 137 f.; in Armenia in 116 according to Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxv. 9. 6). *CIG*, II, No. 3509; PW, art. "Catilius," No. 4; Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 10; cf. Paribeni, *Optimus princeps*, II, 293.

⁶⁰ *CIL*, X, No. 8291 = Dessau 1041. Rohden in PW, art. "Atilius," No. 40, says he is not identical with the Cuspius Rufinus mentioned by Paribeni, *loc. cit.*, as the first governor; cf. also Longden, *loc. cit.*

⁶¹ *CIL*, XI, No. 5212 = Dessau 1058; *CIL*, XI, No. 5213 = Dessau 1338; PW, art. "Haterius," No. 8.

⁶² J. Svoronos, *Numismatique de la Crète ancienne*, p. 347, No. 81, and Pl. XXXIV 19 (not available); W. Wroth, *Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Galatia, Cappadocia, and Syria* (London, 1899), p. 102 and Pl. XIV 5.

⁶³ See Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 235, on this title. Cf. Dio Cass. lxxviii. 23 and Pliny *Paneg.* 2.

⁶⁴ Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 11.

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centurion named Sentius, dispatched earlier in the campaign as an envoy to Mebarsapes, ruler of Adiabene, was imprisoned in the fortress of Adenystrae (Dunaisir?).⁶⁵ When the Roman advance swept through the country this centurion raised a revolt among the captives there, killed the commander of the garrison, and opened the gates to the Romans. Mebarsapes was probably forced to withdraw across the Tigris to Adiabene proper.⁶⁶ Singara (Sindjar),⁶⁷ Libana,⁶⁸ and possibly also Thebeta⁶⁹ were taken without fighting by Lucius Quietus, that invaluable Moorish veteran of the Dacian Wars. Mannus, said to have ruled a part of "Arabia" near Edessa, furnished Mebarsapes with troops, all of which were lost in action against the Romans.⁷⁰ Some unknown ruler, who had sworn oaths and been pardoned by Trajan, later fled to Mannus.⁷¹

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 22. 3. The fragment is probably out of place. Adenystrae was identified by G. Hoffmann in *ZDMG*, XXXII (1878), 741, as Dunaisir (a site now occupied by Tell Ermen and Koçhisar) southwest of Mardin; cf. Ritter, *Erdkunde*, XI, 366 and 374.

⁶⁶ As Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 11, infers from Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22.

⁶⁷ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 50; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22.

⁶⁸ Arrian *Parthica* ix. fr. 7. Cf. Libba in Polyb. v. 51. 2, also PW, art. "Labdana."

⁶⁹ Thebetha or Thebida in Arrian *Parthica* xi. fr. 11, Thebata in Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 120, Thebeta in Peutinger Table between Nisibis and Singara; see also Amm. Marcel. xxv. 9. 3.

⁷⁰ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22. 1.

⁷¹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 49.

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The army moved westward and occupied Edessa. As Trajan approached this city Abgarus VII, its ruler, mindful of his previous failure to appear, sent his handsome young son, Arbandes, to meet the Emperor. Trajan chided the young man for his tardy arrival to share the labors of the campaign, to which Arbandes replied that he would have come before but for the Parthians, whom he feared. With the way thus paved by this agreeable emissary, Abgarus appeared before his city with a gift of two hundred and fifty horses and mailed horsemen, coats of mail, horses, and sixty thousand arrows. He also informed the Emperor that he would surrender claim to his land, even though he had purchased it at great price from Pacorus (cf. p. 217). Trajan took three coats of mail and returned the remainder. Abgarus was confirmed in his position as phylarch, though apparently there was a faction in Edessa which objected.⁷²

Manisarus, perhaps a rebel Parthian vassal, against whom Osroes was conducting a campaign,⁷³ sent an embassy to seek peace from Trajan. Manisarus was ready to withdraw from those parts of Mesopotamia and Armenia which he had taken, but Trajan refused to treat with him until he came in person to make his promises good.⁷⁴ Sporaces, phylarch of Anthemusia, the district between Carrhae and Apamea on the

⁷² Arrian *Parthica* frs. 42-48.

⁷³ Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 143, makes him ruler of Gorduene.

⁷⁴ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22. 1.

Euphrates, had not come with the others to pay his respects to Trajan. The expedition started to move against him; but as soon as he heard that troops were advancing, Sporaces fled, and his chief city, Batnae, was taken.⁷⁵

With the exception of the campaign of Osroes against Manisarus, mentioned above, there is no record of Parthian military movements. What opposition they offered to the Roman advance was apparently made through such faithful vassals as Mebarsapes. Where were the Parthians, and why did they remain inactive? Numismatic evidence provides an answer. The coins struck at the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint from 105/6 onward show that a constant struggle was in progress between Vologases II and Osroes, with first one and then the other in possession of the mint (cf. p. 216). Pacorus may have been still alive and have been a third factor in the contest.⁷⁶ With

⁷⁵ Arrian *Parthica* frs. 54–56; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 23. 2; Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3; Ruf. *Fest.* 20.

⁷⁶ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 230 f., largely on a numismatic basis, places the centers of control of the various contenders as follows: Pacorus, northern Mesopotamia; Osroes, Elymais; and Vologases II, northern Iran. But Osroes is mentioned in Adiabene by Mšihā Zkha, p. 5 (tr. into French on p. 80), and in northern Mesopotamia by Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22. 1; the supposed mention of Osroes in Susa is without foundation (see p. 233, n. 98). References to this king in the "Scriptores," in Mšihā Zkha, in Pausanias, and in Dio Cassius certainly imply that the Romans recognized him as the chief contender for the Parthian throne. On Pacorus cf. below, n. 97.

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this picture in view, it is not difficult to understand why the Roman forces met with little opposition.⁷⁷

After his visit to Edessa, Trajan passed westward to Antioch, where he spent the winter of 114/15. For his exploits, particularly the taking of Nisibis and Batnae, Trajan was awarded the title of "Parthicus," but this was not confirmed until after the capture of the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon.⁷⁸ Coins with the legend ARMENIA ET MESOPOTAMIA IN POTESTATEM P. R. REDACTAE commemorate the formation of the two provinces.⁷⁹ At Antioch, early in 115,⁸⁰ the emperor had a narrow escape during the terrible earthquake which destroyed a large part of the city. While the shocks rocked the city and towering Mount

⁷⁷ The numismatic evidence confirms the conclusion reached on the basis of other sources by Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 12, that Parthia was in a chaotic state.

⁷⁸ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 28; Longden, *op. cit.*, pp. 5 f.; cf. Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 36-42. A. von Domaszewski, "Die politische Bedeutung des Traiansbogens in Benevent," *Jahreshefte des Österreichischen archäologischen Institutes in Wien*, II (1899), 185 ff., thinks the conquest of Mesopotamia shows on the Beneventum arch; but E. Groag, "Die Adoption Hadrians," *Mitt. des Kaiserlich Deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Römische Abteilung*, XIV (1899), 273 f., objects, since he believes the arch was not finished until the time of Hadrian.

⁷⁹ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 289, No. 642; cf. also *ibid.*, p. 270, No. 375; Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 223; Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3; Malalas xi (ed. Dindorf, p. 274).

⁸⁰ Upon this very uncertain date hangs the chronology of the succeeding years; nearly all the works mentioned take up this question. The system here followed is that of Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 2-7, which seems to agree consistently with the new material from Dura-Europus and Seleucia.

Casius, he was forced to take refuge in the open air of the hippodrome.

In the course of the winter those troops left about Nisibis⁸¹ occupied themselves with the construction of boats.⁸² In the spring, with the arrival of the Emperor, these vessels were transported to the Tigris. The crossing took place opposite the Gordyaeon mountains⁸³ under fire from the other bank. While a bridge of boats was being built, other boats loaded with heavy-armed troops and archers served as a screen and still others dashed hither and thither as though carrying landing parties. The opposing forces awaited the actual crossing, then withdrew without hostilities.⁸⁴ No further mention is made of this fleet, and it may have been constructed solely for this crossing. All of Adiabene was taken, and a province designated as Assyria was formed⁸⁵ out of this terri-

⁸¹ Cf. Arrian *Parthica* fr. 51.

⁸² Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.

⁸³ See PW, arts. "Γορδυαία ὄρη" and "Καρδοῦχοι." Longden, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 5, suggests Za^cfaran (Gertrude Bell, *Amurath to Amurath* [London, 1924], p. 286); Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 143, proposes Jazīrat ibn ʿUmar.

⁸⁴ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26; Arrian *Parthica* frs. 57-58.

⁸⁵ Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 3. Assyria probably included Nineveh, Arbela, and Gaugamela, mentioned by Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26, as well as the Kirkuk district (Arrian *Parthica* xiii. fr. 13), Dobra (*ibid.* fr. 12), and Olbia in the district of Chazane on the "Euphrates" (*ibid.* fr. 14). Strabo xvi. 1.1 correctly places Chazane on the Tigris; see A. G. Roos, ed., *Arrianus*, II, 230. Cf. von Gutschmid, "Aus Arrians parthische Geschichte," *Kleine Schriften*, III, 129, on the places listed by Arrian, who may refer to events other than the Adiabene campaign.

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tory, which seems to have been under the control of Osroes during the Adiabene campaign.⁸⁶

Trajan's whole campaign followed the pattern set by Caesar, and comparison with later and better known expeditions makes fairly clear the route followed. That there was an army on the Euphrates is proved by numerous references to it⁸⁷ and by a triumphal arch at Dura-Europus;⁸⁸ there is no evidence for another on the Tigris. The erection of the arch and the presence of Trajan at Ozogardana,⁸⁹ just below modern Hit, suggest that the Emperor accompanied the Euphrates force. Present evidence leads us to believe, then, that Trajan and his army descended the Euphrates River along with the fleet, which kept pace with the land forces. Only the steersmen and the lookouts were trained sailors; the other members of the crews were recruited from the villages along the

⁸⁶ Mšihā Zkha, p. 5 (tr. p. 80), whose sources recalled the visit of Trajan. Another mention of Osroes as being in the north occurs in connection with his campaign against Manisarus (see p. 227). See also Pausanias v. 12. 6.

⁸⁷ E.g., in Arrian, Dio Cassius, and Ammianus Marcellinus.

⁸⁸ S. Gould in Baur, Rostovtzeff, and Bellinger, *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fourth Season*, pp. 56-65.

⁸⁹ See p. 232 and nn. 94 f. This place is above the point where he would have crossed over from the Tigris. If we are correct in assigning the places mentioned in Arrian *Parthica* xiii to the Adiabene campaign, the army must have gone as far south as Kirkuk. It might seem questionable that they should return north and cross to the Euphrates instead of continuing down the Tigris, but quite possibly we are misled by casual mentions of these places into believing that the campaign covered more territory and took longer than was actually the case.

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banks. The horses placed on board suffered greatly from cramped quarters. Only occasionally were the fleet and the army separated by cliffs and bends, as they would be in passing Dura-Europus. Eddies in the currents of the winding river caused much difficulty.⁹⁰

A great wall, said to have been built by "Semiramis," was passed,⁹¹ the towns of Phaliga⁹² and Dura-Europus were visited, and the triumphal arch already mentioned was erected at the latter place. The army moved on past Anatha, then known by its later name of Tyre,⁹³ to Ozogardana, where Trajan reviewed his troops⁹⁴ and where his tribunal was still shown in the days of Ammianus Marcellinus.⁹⁵ At some point below modern Baghdad, where the rivers came closest together, Trajan undertook to transport his fleet across to the Tigris. A canal was considered; but the Emperor was informed that the Euphrates was much higher than the Tigris, and his informants seem to have discouraged the plan. Perhaps the operation was

⁹⁰ Arrian *Parthica* frs. 59-63.

⁹¹ Could this be the spoil banks of the canal of "Semiramis" mentioned in Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 1?

⁹² Arrian *Parthica* x. fr. 8, Phalga; Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* 1, Phaliga; Dura-Europus Parchment X, ed. Rostovtzeff and Welles in Baur and Rostovtzeff, *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Second Season*, p. 203, line 6, Paliga.

⁹³ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 64.

⁹⁴ Zosimus iii. 15.3, Zaragardia. Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 267, Nos. 322-23, and 290, No. 655, probably refer to this review. See also *ibid.*, p. 265, No. 309 and n.**.

⁹⁵ Amm. Marcel. xxiv. 2. 3.

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impossible because of low water, for Trajan arrived in the late fall.⁹⁶ Eventually machines were constructed and the boats were hauled to the other river. Ctesiphon fell without resistance. There is no mention of Seleucia, which perhaps was in the possession of Pacorus, for coins of his for 115/16 have been reported there.⁹⁷ If Pacorus had sought Roman support to regain his power, there would have been no occasion for the Romans to storm Seleucia. The daughter of Osroes and his famous golden throne were among the spoils taken at Ctesiphon, but the great king himself had fled when Trajan entered the city.⁹⁸ Here he was hailed "Imperator," and on February 20, 116, the Senate confirmed his title of "Parthicus."⁹⁹ A tribute was imposed on the newly conquered territory.¹⁰⁰ Coins issued about this time bear the legend PARTHIA CAPTA.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ The summer would have been spent in the Adiabene campaign, and the late fall and winter left for the attack on lower Mesopotamia, since the latter country is nearly impossible for summer campaigning. The fresh oysters sent to Trajan when he was many days from the sea (Athen. *Deip.* i. 7. d) probably went to Mesopotamia.

⁹⁷ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 193 and 232. Newell in *AJA*, XLI (1937), 515 f., questions the attribution of these coins to Pacorus.

⁹⁸ Spart. *Hadrian* 13. 8; Capit. *Antoninus Pius* 9. 7. I am unable to locate the source for the statement found in Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 312, n. 2, and McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 230, n. 63, and 232 f., that Osroes fled to Susa and was captured there by the Romans.

⁹⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 28. For the date see G. Calza in R. Accademia dei Lincei, *Notizie degli scavi di antichità*, X (1934), 254-56.

¹⁰⁰ Spart. *Hadrian* 21. 12.

¹⁰¹ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 267, Nos. 324 f., and Pl. IX 149; Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 224.

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After the capture of Ctesiphon the Emperor set sail down the Tigris with a fleet of fifty ships, among them the large, clumsy imperial galley, elaborately decorated, upon which he expected to hold conferences en route.¹⁰² Various cities of Mesene were occupied, including Akra or Agra beyond the Tigris,¹⁰³ Oratha,¹⁰⁴ and an Apamea¹⁰⁵ where the Tigris divided, the branch to the left being the true Tigris and the other the Selas.¹⁰⁶ Attambelus V of Characene remained faithful to Trajan, even though ordered to pay tribute.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps a statue was erected to the Emperor on the shore of the Persian Gulf.¹⁰⁸

On the return trip Trajan passed Borsippa (Birs Nimrud) and then stopped at Babylon, where he sacrificed in the room in which Alexander was reputed to have died.¹⁰⁹ This trip to the Gulf must have occupied the winter of 115/16. While at Babylon in the early spring of 116 Trajan learned that most of the conquered territory had revolted and massacred or expelled the garrisons left there. The Romans were apparently caught without warning, probably because of inadequate intelligence service. Jerome's remark, written about two hundred and fifty years

¹⁰² Arrian *Parthica* frs. 67-68.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* xvi. fr. 15.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. PW s.v.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* xvi. fr. 16.

¹⁰⁷ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 28. 4.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.* fr. 69.

¹⁰⁸ Jordanes *Romana* 268.

¹⁰⁹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 75; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26. 4² and 27. 1a and 1, also 30. 1.

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later, that Britain knew in the summer what Egypt and the Parthians had learned in the spring is illustrative of Parthian success along this line.¹¹⁰

A brother of Osroes named Meherdotes (a later form of Mithradates) recovered for Parthia some of the region about the middle Euphrates. He died when thrown from his horse and was succeeded by his son Sanatruces. Sanatruces, at one time king of Armenia also, inflicted much damage upon the Romans.¹¹¹ Two generals were at once ordered to put down the revolt in the north: Lucius Quietus and Maximus (perhaps Appius Maximus Santra). The former, in addition to other victories, besieged and captured Nisibis and sacked and burned Edessa. Abgarus VII, its ruler, fled to refuge in eastern Parthia.¹¹² The

¹¹⁰ Jerome *Epist.* lxxvii. 10.

¹¹¹ Arrian *Parthica* fr. 77; Malalas, pp. 269 f. On the use of Malalas as a source for events of this period see Alexander Schenk, Graf von Stauffenberg, *Die römische Kaisergeschichte bei Malalas* (Stuttgart, 1931), pp. 260-94. For the present the objections raised by Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 29-35, seem sufficient to prevent a wider use of Malalas. A "Sanatruk the king" is mentioned in an inscription at Hatra; see W. Andrae, *Hatra nach Aufnahmen von Mitgliedern der Assur-Expedition* (*WVDOG*, XXI [Leipzig, 1912]), p. 162, Fig. 279, and Pls. XIII and XXII. For transcription and translation see W. Andrae and P. Jensen, "Aramäische Inschriften aus Assur und Hatra aus der Partherzeit," *MDOG*, No. 60 (1920), pp. 49 f. On the possibility that this Sanatruces is the Parthian king see Herzfeld, "Hatra," *ZDMG*, LXVIII (1914), 659-61.

¹¹² This is on the assumption that the Abgarus who returned from Bactria in 155 is the same man. The chief objection to this proposal is his age at his restoration, for he would have come to the throne in 109 and have been restored in 155.

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Jews joined with the Parthians in this revolt, and Quietus was ordered to put them down.¹¹³ This was but one phase of a general Jewish revolt throughout the eastern part of the Roman Empire. Maximus was defeated and slain, possibly at a place named Balcia in the Taurus, by a certain Arbaces (Arsaces?).¹¹⁴ On the other hand, Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander captured and burned Seleucia on the Tigris, which now for the first time came into Roman hands.¹¹⁵

To counteract the success of Quietus on the middle Euphrates, Osroes sent a large Parthian army to the aid of Sanatruces under the command of his son Parthamaspates. But the disputes which soon arose between the two cousins reached the ears of Trajan, who saw therein an opportunity to fan into open flame one of those quarrels which so often proved the undoing of Parthian military strategy. The Emperor

¹¹³ Euseb. *Hist.* iv. 2. 1 ff. and *Chron.*, ed. Karst, p. 219, also numerous other writers drawing on Eusebius.

¹¹⁴ Fronto *Princ. hist.* 16 (Loeb, II, p. 214) and *De bell. Parth.* 2 (Loeb, II, p. 22); Dio Cass. lxxviii. 30. 1. See the discussion in Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 16 f.

¹¹⁵ Professor Leroy Waterman, of the University of Michigan, excavating at Seleucia found evidence for the burning of the building in block B (the area most thoroughly cleared) between the years 115 and 120; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 233, n. 71. No Parthian issues from the Seleucia-Ctesiphon mint for 116/17 are known, and at that time coins of Trajan were circulating there; see McDowell, *op. cit.*, p. 194. This is strong confirmation of the dating system adopted by Longden, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-7.

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invited Parthaspates to a secret conference at night, and as a result Sanatruces was defeated by his cousin, pursued, captured, and killed.¹¹⁶ To complete this diplomatic victory Trajan called together at Ctesiphon the Parthians (of the pro-Roman party?) and the Romans in the locality, appointed Parthaspates as king, and placed a diadem on his head.¹¹⁷ The event is represented on coins inscribed REX PARTHIS DATUS.¹¹⁸

The death of Sanatruces did not end opposition to the Romans in Armenia, for a son of Sanatruces named Vologases (II?) was able to force L. Catilius Severus, governor of that province, into such a position that just before the crucial battle Vologases demanded and received an armistice. Trajan sent envoys to him and granted him a portion of Armenia in return for peace. The situation in which Severus found himself was thus cleared up, and the danger which threatened to make Trajan's withdrawal from Mesopotamia impossible was removed.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Malalas, pp. 269 f. and 273 f.

¹¹⁷ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 30. 3; cf. Spart. *Hadrian* 5. 4, where "Parthamasis" is obviously due to confusion with the earlier person of that name (see pp. 218 ff.), and 21. 10.

¹¹⁸ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 291, Nos. 667 f. and 669(?), and Pl. XI 194. If No. 669 is of this series, then the description is incorrect and inconsistent with the text of p. 239. See also Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, I, 224 f.

¹¹⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxv. 9. 6); Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 17.

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In the late spring of 117 Trajan retreated¹²⁰ northward along the Tigris, which he followed to the vicinity of Hatra. A siege of this desert city, which was perhaps the headquarters of the Parthian opposition,¹²¹ was undertaken, but after several days the Emperor was forced to abandon the attempt. The surrounding country offered nothing in the way of food for man or beast, and water was both scarce and bad. As Dio says, the Sun-god made a siege impossible, and the Romans were troubled by clouds of flies, which settled with maddening tenacity on food and drink. Trajan himself mixed in the fighting and had a narrow escape from death when his cavalry was driven back in disorder. A part of the wall was broken down, but the Roman troops failed to occupy the breach thus created, and the whole affair had to be abandoned.¹²² A general withdrawal of the Roman forces then took place, not only from the Tigris and the lower Euphrates, but even from towns as far north as Dura-Europus.¹²³

¹²⁰ The flies and heat mentioned by Dio Cass. lxxviii. 31. 4 would be found in Hatra either in late spring or in early fall. "Retreat" is the word used by Fronto (Loeb, II, p. 202, § 7), who mentions Trajan in the same breath with Crassus and Antony; but his prejudice against Trajan must be taken into consideration.

¹²¹ This would seem the only satisfactory explanation of an attack on a place otherwise so unimportant, unless Hatra blocked the road to the Khabur River, which the Romans planned to follow.

¹²² Dio Cass. lxxviii. 31; Arrian *Parthica* xvii. fr. 17.

¹²³ Dura was evacuated before the autumn of 117; see Rostovtzeff, "Dura and the Problem of Parthian Art," *Yale Classical Studies*, V (1935), 201 and n. 52.

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In the spring of 117 Trajan prepared for another expedition to Mesopotamia to make Roman control over the new provinces an actuality. The Parthians had rejected Parthaspates, and there is some indication that Osroes had resumed control.¹²⁴ The health of the Emperor had begun to fail shortly after the siege of Hatra, and illness now forced the abandonment of his new plans and his return to Italy. Death overtook him early in August, 117.¹²⁵

Although for the first time the western capital of Parthia had fallen into Roman hands, this campaign of Trajan can scarcely be called an unqualified success.¹²⁶ The very fact that the Emperor had to return the next year indicates its failure. On this first occasion the Roman forces had not encountered united Parthian resistance. Perhaps the approach or the preparation of such forces lay behind the general revolt which had cost the life of the Roman commander Maximus and the loss of his legions. Much remains to be done before an accurate and coherent account of this campaign can be written, and further archaeological evidence would be of great assistance.

¹²⁴ Dio Cass. lxxviii. 33. 2; McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 194.

¹²⁵ Probably at Selinus in Cilicia; see C. de la Berge, *Essai*, p. 189, n. 1, and PW, art. "Selinus," No. 11 (cols. 1308 f.).

¹²⁶ Fronto *Princ. hist.* 7 (Loeb, II, p. 202) certainly did not consider it successful; cf. the much later tradition in Claudian *Paneg. quarto cons. Hon.* 315-17.

CHAPTER XI

THE DOWNFALL OF THE PARTHIAN
EMPIRE

AT THE accession of the new emperor, Hadrian, in 117, Roman foreign policy underwent a definite change. Claims to the new provinces which Trajan had attempted to add were dropped, and the frontier was once more to be limited to the old Euphrates boundary.¹ Along with these changes went an increased respect for the ability of the provincial,² who began to take more and more part in the government, not only in the provinces but also in Rome itself.

To honor the activities of Trajan in the Orient, Hadrian established the Parthian Games, which were celebrated for many years.³ Parthia herself was ap-

¹ Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 6. 2; Spart. *Hadrian* 5. 3 and 9. 1. These provinces were only partially held, and even so under military control, for from one to three years at the most. Thus they should not be included on maps illustrating the greatest extent of the Roman Empire. A comparable situation would be the inclusion of Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine on a similar map of the Parthian empire.

² Cf. the changed attitude in Juvenal *Sat.* viii. 47 ff. from the scorn of i. 103 ff. and iii. 60 ff. The last is the famous passage on the Syrian Orontes flowing into the Tiber. The accession of Hadrian had taken place about the time book vii was written.

³ Dio Cass. lxi. 2. 3; *CIL*, I, pp. 377 f., and II, No. 4110 = Dessau 2931. Coins which might indicate military operations by Hadrian against

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parently facing further territorial losses, for a report that the kings of Bactria sent envoys to Hadrian to seek friendship⁴ seems evidence that Bactria was then among the independent districts. In the west the excavations at Dura-Europus furnish us with a glimpse of that part of the Parthian empire. A contract of 121/22 drawn up in Phaliga mentions a Manesus, strategus of Mesopotamia and of Parapotamia and commander of the Arabs, who was also a collector of imposts.⁵

Parthamaspatēs, rejected by the Parthians soon after the departure of the Roman troops, was given Osroene by Hadrian.⁶ About 123 Hadrian went per-

the Parthians are now thought most doubtful. ADVENTIVI AUG. PARTHIAE S.C. and EXERCITUS PARTHICUS legends have been reported, but are now either lost or considered possible forgeries. On the first legend see Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, II, 456, PARTHIA, note. On the second see *ibid.*, p. 462, note, and Strack, *Untersuch. zur röm. Reichsprägung*, II, 148, n. 328, and 233 f., n. 22. EXERCITUS SYRIACUS, Mattingly and Sydenham, *op. cit.*, II, 428, No. 690, does not relate to any Parthian war.

⁴ Spart. *Hadrian* 21. 14.

⁵ Manesus bore also the title βασις, evidently a Parthian title, probably coming from the Pahlavi *pātikshāi* and eventually from Old Persian; see H. S. Nyberg, *Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi* (Uppsala, 1928-31), II, 179 f. M. I. Rostovtzeff and C. B. Welles have dealt with this contract in three papers: "Un contrat de prêt de l'an 121 ap. J.-C. trouvé à Doura," *CR*, 1930, pp. 158-81; "A Parchment Contract of Loan from Dura-Europus on the Euphrates," *Yale Classical Studies*, II (1931), 3-78; "Parchment No. X. A Contract of Loan of 121 A.D.," in Rostovtzeff and P. V. C. Bauer, *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Second Season, 1928-29* (New Haven, 1931), pp. 201-16.

⁶ Spart. *Hadrian* 5. 4, erroneously Parthamasiris; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 33. 2; Julius Dürre, *Die Reisen des Kaisers Hadrian* ("Abh. des archäolo-

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sonally to the eastern frontier, where he managed to settle difficulties which threatened to break out into actual hostilities.⁷ Perhaps these were connected with the struggle for power between Osroes and Vologases II, which was almost continuous from the time of the Roman withdrawal under Trajan. Vologases gradually was able to overcome his opponent, who struck no more coins after 128/29.⁸ During that year Hadrian returned to Osroes his daughter, who had been captured when Trajan took Ctesiphon, and in addition promised to restore the golden throne.⁹ In the years 131-32 another revolt of the Jews was simmering, and there is just a suggestion that the Parthians may have been expected to lend them assistance.¹⁰

Vologases, who as we have seen had received a part of Armenia at the time of Trajan's invasion and whose headquarters were probably in northwestern Iran, came into conflict with the Alani about 136.¹¹

gisch-epigraphischen Seminares der Universität Wien," II [Wien, 1881]), p. 48; Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 146 and n. 1. Rawlinson, *Sixth Mon.*, p. 316 and n. 2, is in error when he suggests that Armenia was given to Parthamaspates.

⁷ Spart. *Hadrian* 12. 8. ⁸ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 195.

⁹ Spart. *Hadrian* 13. 8; Dürr, *Die Reisen des Kaisers Hadrian*, pp. 61 f.; Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 146.

¹⁰ Dio Cass. lxxix. 13. 1 f.

¹¹ Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 146. Note that there was no coinage struck in the Seleucia mint during 134-36; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 195.

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In that year, at the insistence of Pharasmanes of Iberia, this tribe from the northeast invaded Albania, Media Atropatene, and finally Armenia and Cappadocia. Probably it was this invasion which is mentioned by Mšīḥa Zkha.¹² A hostile force, according to his account, was reported to have invaded Gorduene. Rakhbakht, governor of Adiabene, and the general "Arshak" (not the king) took command of the twenty thousand foot troops raised in Ctesiphon by Vologases and set out to the threatened area. There a chief named Kizo managed to trap the Parthians in a valley; they were saved only by the heroic efforts of Rakhbakht, who lost his life in the fighting. The Parthians were forced to withdraw, and the way into Mesopotamia was open to the invaders. But fortune favored the Parthians, for at this critical juncture the homeland of the enemy was threatened by another people and they hastened eastward to repel the attack. Either the invaders of Gorduene or their own new foe or perhaps both of these groups must have been Alani. According to another account Vologases resorted to bribery in a vain attempt to stop their advance; but Flavius Arrianus, the historian, who

¹² Pp. 6-10 (tr. pp. 81-86). On Mšīḥa Zkha, in addition to the Syriac text and French translation of Mingana, *Sources Syriacques* (Mosul, 1907), see also E. Sachau, *Die Chronik von Arbela* (*APAW*, 1915, No. 6) and F. Zorell, *Chronica ecclesiae arbelensis . . .* ("Orientalia christiana," VIII [Roma, 1927]); P. Peeters, "Le 'Passionnaire d'Adiabène,'" *Analecta Bollandiana*, XLIII (Bruxelles, 1925), 261-304; G. Messina, "La cronaca di Arbela," *La civiltà cattolica*, anno 83° (1932), III, 362-76.

was then governor of Cappadocia, finally forced them to halt. Vologases complained to Hadrian against Pharasmanes.¹³ But when Pharasmanes was "invited" to Rome, he refused, and insults were exchanged between him and Hadrian.¹⁴

From the death of Osroes to the end of the reign of Vologases II, A.D. 128/29–147, to judge from comparative numismatic evidence, there was in Iran a king by the name of Mithradates (IV), as his Pahlavi coin legend informs us.¹⁵ His bronze issues display a number of animal types—eagle, reclining humped bull, sheep, heads of horses and bulls. Apparently, however, there are no literary references to his activities.

In 138 Hadrian died and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius, but there were no difficulties on the Parthian frontier which the western historians deemed worthy of mention. In May, 148, appear coins of Vologases III, who must have succeeded to the throne without a struggle and who ruled until about March, 192.¹⁶

¹³ Dio Cass. lxi. 15; Arrian *Parthica* viii. fr. 6; Arrian *Tactica*; Karl Hartmann, *Flavius Arrianus und Kaiser Hadrian* (Augsburg, 1907 [diss.]).

¹⁴ Spart. *Hadrian* 13. 8 f.; 17. 12; 21. 13.

¹⁵ Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. lx and 219 f., Nos. 25–28. The fact that Mithradates struck no tetradrachms shows that he was solely in Iran. This is the first appearance of an extended Pahlavi inscription on Parthian coinage. It is unlikely that this Mithradates is the Meherdotes of Malalas, p. 270; cf. Schenk, *Malalas*, pp. 266 ff., and comments by Longden, "Parthian Campaigns of Trajan," *JRS*, XXI (1931), 31 f. On the coin inscriptions see Herzfeld, *Paikuli* (Berlin, 1924), p. 67.

¹⁶ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, pp. 195–98. Mšīha Zkha, p. 11 (tr. p. 88), notes that Vologases III followed Vologases II; we may thus be reasonably sure that we have not omitted any kings who bore this name.

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Vologases planned against the Armenians an expedition which some ancient writers claim was forestalled by correspondence from Antoninus.¹⁷ In any event Roman troops were sent to Syria for a Parthian war.¹⁸ Five years later the aged Abgarus VII of Osroene was returned to his kingdom from the east,¹⁹ possibly from independent Bactria or Hyrcania, whither he may have fled at the time of the Parthian counterstroke against Trajan. At the same time the Hyrcanians and Bactrians sent an embassy to Antoninus,²⁰ further evidence of internal weakness in Parthia and of the continued independence of these provinces (cf. pp. 240 f.). Parthian weakness is likewise indicated by the Emperor's refusal to return the throne of Osroes, which had been captured by Trajan.^{20a}

As to the Far East, Chinese records mention that a Parthian prince who came to China in 148 was among those responsible for the establishment of Buddhism there.²¹

In 161 Antoninus Pius was succeeded by Marcus

¹⁷ Capit. *Antoninus Pius* 9. 6; cf. Aristides *Or. sac.* i (Dindorf, pp. 453 f.). Cf. also the reference to the preparations for the struggle, Capit. *Marcus Antoninus* 8. 6.

¹⁸ *CIL*, IX, No. 2457 = Dessau 1076.

¹⁹ Capit. *Antoninus Pius* 9. 6; cf. PW, art. "Abgar," No. 7, and my p. 235, n. 112.

²⁰ Victor *Epit.* 15. 4.

^{20a} Capit. *Antoninus Pius* 9. 7.

²¹ Lewis Hodous, "The Introduction of Buddhism into China," *The Macdonald Presentation Volume* (Princeton, 1933), p. 231.

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Aurelius,²² who joined with himself Lucius Verus,²³ the adopted son of the late emperor. Soon after the accession of the new rulers, Vologases launched his long-threatened campaign. C. Sedatius Severianus,²⁴ Gallic legate of Cappadocia, took the field against him. Severianus was probably following Trajan's route northward into Armenia when he was caught by the Parthian forces under a commander named Osroes and forced into Elegia. There Severianus was besieged, and he and his troops died almost to the last man.²⁵ Edessa was taken by the Parthians, and a certain Waël, son of Sahru, was placed on the throne.²⁶ The Parthians then moved southward and crossed the Euphrates into Syria, where they spread terror everywhere.²⁷ Since the days of Cicero the Syrians had been friendly with the Parthians, and danger of a general revolt became imminent.²⁸ Attidius Cornelianus, governor of Syria, was driven back when he attempted to oppose the invaders, and thus the state of affairs became critical.²⁹ It was decided

²² PW, art. "Annius," No. 94.

²³ PW, art. "Ceionius," No. 8. ²⁴ PW, art. "Sedatius," No. 1.

²⁵ Lucian *Alex.* 27. On the manner of his death cf. Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 21 and 25. See also Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 1; Fronto *Princ. hist.* (Loeb, II, p. 214).

²⁶ Hill, *Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia*, pp. xcvi f., and Gutschmid, *Geschichte Irans*, pp. 148 f.

²⁷ Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 1; Orosius vii. 15. 2.

²⁸ Capit. *Verus* 6. 9.

²⁹ Capit. *Marcus Antoninus* 8. 6.

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to send Lucius Verus, the co-emperor, to take command of operations, and to supply him with the best generals Rome could produce: Avidius Cassius, Statius Priscus, and Martius Verus.

Accompanied by Marcus Aurelius as far as Capua,³⁰ Verus set out for Syria, where he arrived in 162. Not only were troops gathered from the oriental provinces, but three legions were brought from the Rhine and the Danube.³¹ These were the I Minervia under M. Claudius Fronto,³² the II Adiutrix, later under Q. Antistius Adventus,³³ and the V Macedonica under P. Martius Verus.³⁴ Parts or all of the following legions

³⁰ Capit. *Verus* 6. 7 and *Marcus Antoninus* 8. 10.

³¹ On the campaign see E. Napp, *De rebus imperatore M. Aurelio Antonino in Oriente gestis* (Bonnae, 1879 [diss.]); C. Harold Dodd, "Chronology of the Eastern Campaigns of the Emperor Lucius Verus," *Num. Chron.*, 4th ser., XI (1911), 209-67; A. von Premerstein, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Marcus," *Klio*, XIII (1913), 87-92; and the bibliography cited by Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, II D, pp. 628 f.

³² *CIL*, VI, No. 1377 = Dessau 1098. Cf. also *CIL*, III, No. 1457 = Dessau 1097; *CIL*, XIII, No. 8213 (see *Klio*, XI [1911], 357 f.). Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 21 probably also refers to this Fronto.

³³ *CIL*, VIII, No. 18893, and Dessau 8977 show the transfer of Adventus to the Adiutrix in A.D. 164. In 162 he was legate of the VI Ferrata.

³⁴ *CIL*, III, No. 6189; *CIL*, III, No. 7505 = Dessau 2311. The legion served under M. Statius Priscus also. Of the oriental legions, the III Cyrenaica appears on an undated graffito from Dura-Europus which might belong to this time; see C. B. Welles in Bauer, Rostovtzeff, and Bellinger, *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fourth Season*, pp. 150 f., No. 294.

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may have served: III Gallica,³⁵ III Augusta,³⁶ I Adiutrix,³⁷ X Gemina,³⁸ and possibly II Traiana.³⁹

The Syrian troops were in miserable shape, most of them ill equipped and some not even familiar with their weapons.⁴⁰ Verus was greatly worried over the desperate situation in which he found affairs.⁴¹ He made an attempt to treat for terms, but the suggestion was refused by Vologases.⁴² Verus established his military headquarters in Antioch, where he could enjoy the cool shade and swift waters of near-by Daphne. His winters were spent in Laodicea.⁴³ There is no record of his taking an active part in the campaign with the exception of a rapid trip to the

³⁵ *Année épig.*, 1913, No. 48 = Dessau 9492. Probably Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 31 refers to this legion. Possibly the imaginative account he cites uses the names of troops actually under Cassius in Mesopotamia. A Celtic and a small Moorish contingent are also mentioned by Lucian *loc. cit.* See also Hopkins and Rowell in *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fifth Season*, pp. 229 f.

³⁶ *CIL*, VIII, No. 2975 = Dessau 2306. This should perhaps be referred to the time of Severus.

³⁷ *CIL*, III, No. 6755.

³⁸ *CIL*, VIII, No. 7050.

³⁹ On this and on all the other legions see PW, art. "Legio."

⁴⁰ Fronto *Princ. hist.* (Loeb, II, pp. 206 ff.); Vul. Gall. *Avidius Cassius* 5. 5-7.

⁴¹ Fronto *Epist.* ii. 2 (Loeb, II, pp. 116-18).

⁴² Fronto *Princ. hist.* 14 (Loeb, II, p. 212); Nazarius *Paneg.* xxiv. 6. The true estimate of the character of Verus must lie somewhere between the eulogy of Fronto and the vilification of Dio and the Scriptores.

⁴³ Dio Cass. lxxi. 1-2; Capit. *Verus* 7. 3 and *Marcus Antoninus* 8. 12.

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Euphrates, said to have been made at the insistence of his staff.⁴⁴

That stern disciplinarian Avidius Cassius,⁴⁵ a native Syrian, was given command of the army and the task of whipping the legions into fighting shape. Early in 163 Statius Priscus took the offensive and advanced into Armenia. He seized the capital, Artaxata,⁴⁶ and, although he did not destroy it,⁴⁷ he founded a "new city" (Caenepolis, later Valarshapat; Armenian, Nor Khalakh) not far away. The ruler of Armenia who was thus deposed appears to have been Aurelius Pacorus,⁴⁸ whose name proves that he had been given Roman citizenship by M. Aurelius. The new Roman appointee was one Sohaemus,⁴⁹ whose enthronement was signalized by a new inscription on the coins of Verus, REX ARMEN. DAT.⁵⁰

At least one year elapsed between Priscus' advance into Armenia and the time when Cassius began a

⁴⁴ Capit. *Verus* 7. 6.

⁴⁵ PW, art. "Avidius," No. 1.

⁴⁶ Capit. *Marcus Antoninus* 9. 1 and *Verus* 7. 1; Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 20.

⁴⁷ As the evidence presented by F. Cumont, *Fouilles de Doura-Europos* (Paris, 1926), p. 334 and notes, shows.

⁴⁸ *CIG*, III, No. 6559; *Asin. Quad. fr.* 9 (J, II A, p. 449); *Fronto Epist.* ii. 1 (Loeb, II, p. 144).

⁴⁹ Some Roman candidate would certainly be placed upon the throne shortly after the capture of Artaxata, and the reference in *Fronto Epist.* ii. 1 (Loeb, II, p. 144), written at the end of the Armenian campaign, clearly belongs about this time. Cf. PW, art. "Sohaemus," No. 5.

⁵⁰ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, III, 255, Nos. 511-13.

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campaign in Mesopotamia.⁵¹ The latter fought an engagement at Sura (Sūriyyah)⁵² above Circesium and then threw a pontoon bridge across the Euphrates in much the same manner as would a modern military engineer. pontoons were collected back of the lines and brought forward above the point to be bridged. They were then floated downstream one by one and anchored at the desired point. The planks which the boats carried were used to join them to the bank or to similar pontoons farther out in the stream. Protection was given to the engineers by archers from a tower mounted on the pontoon nearest the opposite bank.⁵³ Once across the river Cassius turned southward along the stream, took Dausara and Nicephorium (Rakka),⁵⁴ and then won a bloody engagement near Dura-Europus,⁵⁵ which thenceforward

⁵¹ The events of these campaigns are known only from scattered references, largely geographical in character. That Priscus was in charge of the Armenian war and Cassius of the Mesopotamian conquest we can be certain.

⁵² Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 29; PW, art. "Sura"; A. Poidebard, *La trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie; le limes de Trajan à la conquête arabe* (Paris, 1934), pp. 83 f.

⁵³ Dio Cass. lxxi. 3.

⁵⁴ Fronto *Epist.* ii. 1 (Loeb, II, p. 132); PW, art. "Dausara." There is also a Dausara near Edessa; see Steph. Byz. (Dindorf, p. 148). Victories in "Arabia" are mentioned by Vul. Gall. *Avidius Cassius* 6. 5.

⁵⁵ Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 20 and 28. On the identification of this Europus with Dura see F. Cumont, *Fouilles de Doura-Europus*, p. lii and notes. A dedicatory inscription to Verus was found at Dura; see Cumont, *op. cit.*, p. 173 and p. 410, No. 53.

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remained in Roman hands.⁵⁶ The victory went to the Romans only after a hard struggle and a pursuit which forced the Parthians into an armistice. Thence the army moved southward to Seleucia, where it was received in a friendly fashion. Shortly afterward, however, upon the violation of some agreement, the metropolis was stormed by the legions, among them the III Gallica,⁵⁷ and much of the city was destroyed by fire. Evidence from the excavations at Seleucia suggests that the assault on the city took place about December, 165, and that there was less damage than we have heretofore suspected.⁵⁸ Some place the blame for this violation of faith on Cassius; but many others, including the later historian of the Parthian wars, Asinius Quadratus, say that the people of Seleucia were the first to break the agreement.⁵⁹ Possibly the pro-Parthian party had gained the ascendancy over the pro-Roman one. Ctesiphon also was taken, and the palace of Vologases was destroyed.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Rostovtzeff, "Dura and the Problem of Parthian Art," *Yale Classical Studies*, V, 201.

⁵⁷ Cf. p. 248.

⁵⁸ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 234. Coins were again struck about November, 166, and destruction in the main area excavated was relatively slight.

⁵⁹ Capit. *Verus* 8. 4. On the capture of the city see Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 3; Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 10. 2.

⁶⁰ Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 3; Lucian *Bis accusatus* 2.

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But the campaign was not fated to be a complete success, for while the troops were engaged in looting Seleucia one of the periodical epidemics, probably of smallpox,⁶¹ swept over the armies. The situation became so acute that the Romans were forced to retreat and leave behind large quantities of booty.⁶² Many soldiers died of disease and famine on the homeward road,⁶³ and the remainder carried the scourge into the Roman world, whence it spread rapidly westward until it reached the Rhine and Gaul.⁶⁴

Our scanty sources on this campaign might be supplemented if we could place the numerous but scattered references in Lucian. We find, for example: "Arsaces was in the act of slaying his mistress, while the eunuch Arbaces drew his sword upon him; the guards were dragging Spatinus the Mede out from the banquet by the foot, with the lump on his brow from the golden cup."⁶⁵

The Roman withdrawal must have been followed by a rapid Parthian advance over the invaded territory. Sohaemus was evidently driven from the Ar-

⁶¹ Heinrich Haeser, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin und der epidemischen Krankheiten* (3d ed.; Jena, 1875-82), III, 24-33. This plague is mentioned in Chinese records; see Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient*, p. 175. See also Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 24; Capit. *Verus* 8. 2.

⁶² Mšihā Zkha, p. 12 (tr. p. 88). ⁶³ Dio Cass. lxxi. 2. 4.

⁶⁴ Amm. Marcel. xxiii. 6. 23; Capit. *Verus* 8.

⁶⁵ Lucian *Icaromenippus* 15 (translation of H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler). Cf. also Lucian *Menippus* 10 and *Tyrannus* 6. Eusebius *Chron.* (ed. Karst, p. 222) mentions Vologases' attack and the triumph of Verus.

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menian throne and forced to flee to Syria. Such encroachment could scarcely be tolerated by the Romans, and about 166 another expedition began a march across Mesopotamia. Edessa was besieged, captured, and returned to its former ruler, Ma^cnu VIII,⁶⁶ and the Parthian appointee, Waël, disappears. Next Nisibis, which had refused to ally itself with the Romans, was beset both by them and by the plague.⁶⁷ One of the Parthian commanders, Osroes, probably the same as the victor over Severianus, saved his life only by swimming the Tigris.⁶⁸ Perhaps it was this same expedition which pushed on far enough to the east to enable Verus to strike coins with the legend L. VERUS AUG. ARM. PARTH. MAX. MEDIC.⁶⁹

In 168, or perhaps a few years later, when Martius Verus⁷⁰ was governor of Cappadocia, he sent his gen-

⁶⁶ A. von Gutschmid, "Untersuchungen über die Geschichte des Königreichs Osroëne, *Mém. de l'Académie impériale des sciences de St.-Petersbourg*, 7. sér., XXXV (1887), 29 and 49; Hill, *Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia*, p. xcvi; Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 22. Procopius *De bello Persico* ii. 12. 29 says the inhabitants revolted, murdered the Parthian garrison, and delivered the city to the Romans.

⁶⁷ Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 15. The reference to the plague dates the siege to about 166, if we place the fall of Seleucia in December, 165. Cf. *CAH*, XI, 347 f.

⁶⁸ Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 19.

⁶⁹ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, III, 328, No. 1455, struck between summer and December, 166; *CIL*, VIII, No. 965 = Dessau 365; Lucian *Quomodo hist.* 30; *Capit. Verus* 7. 2.

⁷⁰ *CIL*, III, p. 1991; *CIL*, XI, No. 1924 = Dessau 5503; PW, art. "Martius," No. 6; Lucius Verus to Fronto ii. 3 (Loeb, II, p. 194).

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eral Thucydides⁷¹ to restore Sohaemus to the Armenian throne; but the exigencies of the situation evidently forced Verus himself to enter Armenia.⁷² The garrison which Priscus had left at Caenepolis was found in a mutinous state, and the Parthian "satrap" Tiridates had stirred up trouble and slain the king of the Heniochi. Tiridates even dared to thrust his sword in Verus' face when the latter rebuked him for his action. Nevertheless Tiridates was not slain but was deported to far-off Britain.⁷³

The conclusion of this war marks a further step in the decline of Parthia. The territory west of the Khabur River remained permanently a portion of the Roman Empire; Carrhae and Edessa henceforth came more and more under the sway of Roman influence.⁷⁴

In 175 Avidius Cassius, the conqueror of Seleucia and Ctesiphon, declared himself emperor while Marcus Aurelius was far away on the Danube. In view of the prospect of civil war among the Romans, Vologases apparently threatened to resume the struggle.⁷⁵ Doubtless he was dissuaded by the sudden collapse of the revolt and the appearance of the Emperor on the scene.

⁷¹ PW, art. "Thukydidēs," No. 5.

⁷² Dio Cass. lxxi. 3. Iamblichus in Photius 94 (ed. Bekker, p. 75).

⁷³ Dio Cass. lxxii (lxxi. 14. 2).

⁷⁴ Hill, *Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia*, pp. xc and xcvi.

⁷⁵ Capit. *Marcus Antoninus* 22. 1. This incident may have occurred earlier, about 173.

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In September, 191, the aged Vologases was faced with a revolt, for another ruler of the same name, Vologases (IV), began to coin money in the Seleucia mint. Vologases III struck coins again in March, 192, but thereafter disappears.⁷⁶ In 193, the year of the three emperors, conditions became very unsettled in the Near East. Among the claimants to the Roman throne was Pescennius Niger in Syria, to whom the eastern vassals of Rome and the western dependents of Parthia offered congratulations and troops. Perhaps even Vologases himself was among those who tendered support. At first, when the outlook was bright, these proposals were declined with thanks; later, especially after Septimius Severus, who had been acknowledged emperor at Rome, started eastward, Niger was constrained to seek aid. He sent legates to rulers east of the Euphrates, especially those of Hatra, Armenia, and Parthia. Many of the Roman vassals estimated the situation correctly and made no move. But Barsemius of Hatra, Abgarus of Edessa, and the ruler of Adiabene actually sent troops, and Vologases promised to order the satraps to collect forces.⁷⁷ After being defeated by Severus,

⁷⁶ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 198; Mšihā Zkha, p. 22 (tr. p. 98). Mingana, editor of the latter, on pp. 97 f., n. 1, has attempted on somewhat uncertain grounds to calculate the year in which Vologases IV ascended the throne; he was correct at least in wishing to make it later than the then accepted date 191.

⁷⁷ Herodian iii. 1. 2 f. and 9. 1 f. Moses Chor. ii. 75 states that Osroes of Armenia announced himself neutral.

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Niger attempted to escape to the Parthians but failed. Some of his followers, more successful, gave military advice to Parthia.⁷⁸

While the attention of the Romans was occupied by the struggle between Severus and Niger, Vologases fomented a revolt in Osroene and Adiabene, and troops from these districts besieged Nisibis.⁷⁹ After the death of Niger they sent ambassadors to Severus to lay claims before the Emperor by virtue of the aid which they had given him in attacking a city which had sheltered his opponent's sympathizers! They also promised to restore what spoils remained as well as the Roman prisoners. But they refused to surrender the cities which they had captured or to receive garrisons, and they demanded that the Romans completely evacuate that territory.⁸⁰

Late in the spring of 195 Severus crossed the Euphrates and advanced into enemy territory. At Edessa Abgarus IX, ruler of the surrounding area, joined Severus, gave his sons as hostages, and assumed the name Septimius.⁸¹ The next advance was to Nisibis, where Severus established his headquarters. The legionaries suffered greatly on this long march. Per-

⁷⁸ Dio Cass. lxxv. 8. 3; Herodian iii. 4. 7 f.

⁷⁹ Dio Cass. lxxv. 1. 1 f. (Loeb, IX, p. 194). For Vologases' part in the revolt see Mšihā Zkha, p. 21 (tr. p. 98).

⁸⁰ Dio Cass. lxxv. 1 f. (Loeb, IX, pp. 194-96).

⁸¹ Herodian iii. 9. 2. These events should probably be placed in the first campaign (contrary to Herodian). See also Spart. *Severus* 9. 9 and 18. 1; Victor *De Caes.* 20. 14-17.

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haps it was at Nisibis that the "Arabians" (of Hatra?) sent envoys with more reasonable offers than they had made before. The offers were refused, since the rulers had not come themselves. Severus remained at Nisibis, but divided his army into various commands under T. Sextius Lateranus,⁸² Tib. Claudius Candidus,⁸³ P. Cornelius Anullinus,⁸⁴ Probus,⁸⁵ and Laetus,⁸⁶ who proceeded to devastate the country round about. Three divisions, those under Anullinus, Probus, and Laetus, were sent to one of the districts of Mesopotamia, Ἀρχή (unidentified).⁸⁷ Severus received three imperial salutations and took the titles "Parthicus Arabicus" and "Parthicus Adiabenicus,"⁸⁸ since he had conquered the middle Euphrates and Adiabene. "Parthicus (Maximus)" he declined,^{88a} preferring no doubt to assume that honor after the

⁸² PW, art. "Sextius," No. 27.

⁸³ PW, art. "Claudius," No. 96; *CIL*, II, No. 4114 = Dessau 1140.

⁸⁴ PW, art. "Cornelius," No. 58.

⁸⁵ Possibly the son-in-law of Severus; see Spart. *Severus* 8. 1.

⁸⁶ PW, art. "Laetus," No. 1. He is not yet identified.

⁸⁷ Dio Cass. lxxv. 3. 2 (Loeb, IX, p. 198). Hatra, Adiabene, Arbelitis, Asicha near Zaitha, and the Archene of Pliny *Hist. nat.* vi. 128 have been suggested as emendations.

⁸⁸ *CIL*, VIII, No. 306, and VI, No. 954 = Dessau 417 f.; Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, IV, 97 f., Nos. 55 and 62 f., probably issued in 195. The abbreviated titles "Arabicus" and "Adiabenicus" appear frequently; see *ibid.*, pp. 96 ff., Nos. 41, 58, 63A, 64, and 76, issued 195-97.

^{88a} Spart. *Severus* 9. 10; cf. below, p. 260.

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capture of the Parthian capital, in the manner of Trajan.

Early in 196, before a direct attack could be made on Parthia, Severus was forced to leave the eastern front by the revolt in Gaul of Clodius Albinus, who was eventually defeated and killed in 197. With the Emperor absent and the Roman power weakened by civil war, Vologases swept rapidly northward through Mesopotamia. Nisibis was saved only by the desperate defense of Laetus, who was besieged within the city, and even Armenia may have been retaken.⁸⁹

The Roman successes had apparently crystallized revolutionary sentiment in Iran, and definite action was probably begun by the Medes and the people of Persis⁹⁰ before the withdrawal of Severus. Vologases with a large army advanced against the enemy, whom he met in Khorasan. After crossing a small river his forces found themselves surrounded on all sides. Taken by surprise they were forced to abandon their horses and retreat, but the rebels cornered them in the mountains and killed a great number. At last the loyal Parthian troops managed to reorganize, fall upon their pursuers with great fury, and drive them as far as the sea (the Caspian?). Homeward bound after this victory, the army of Vologases met a rebel contingent which had become separated from the

⁸⁹ Herodian iii. 9. 1 f.

⁹⁰ The phrase "Medes and Persians" used by Mšīḥa Zkha, pp. 21 f. (tr. pp. 98 f.), may mean merely "Iranians."

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main body. After two days of hard fighting, the forces opposing the king melted away into darkness during the night, and his troops returned in triumph.⁹¹

Narses, king of Adiabene, had not only refused to join with Vologases in his eastern campaign but may have shown signs of becoming friendly to the Romans. For these reasons, after his successful conquest, the Parthian monarch invaded Adiabene, destroyed and pillaged several cities, and went home only after drowning Narses in the Greater Zab.⁹²

In 197 Severus began preparations for an attack on Parthia itself. Three new legions—the I, II, and III Parthica⁹³—were created for the coming campaign, and at least a part of the III Augusta must have served.⁹⁴ His officers probably included Statilius Barbarus,⁹⁵ L. Fabius Cilo,⁹⁶ Q. Lollianus Gentianus,⁹⁷ and C. Fulvius Plautianus.⁹⁸ In the latter part of 197

⁹¹ Mšīḥa Zkha, *loc. cit.*

⁹² Mšīḥa Zkha, p. 23 (tr. pp. 101 f.).

⁹³ Dio Cass. iv. 24. 4. On the numerous problems which surround these legions see PW, arts. "Legio (Severus)" and "Legio (II Parthica)." Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, IV, 102, No. 91, PRO-FECTIO AUG., may celebrate the Emperor's departure.

⁹⁴ *CIL*, VIII, No. 2975 = Dessau 2306.

⁹⁵ PW, art. "Statilius (Barbarus)," No. 13.

⁹⁶ PW, art. "Fabius," No. 65. ⁹⁷ PW, art. "Lollianus," No. 5.

⁹⁸ PW, art. "Fulvius," No. 101. In the cases of some of these men there is uncertainty as to whether their service was in the first campaign instead.

Severus and his army left Brundisium and sailed directly to Syria. In the spring he advanced to relieve Nisibis; but the Parthians withdrew before him without a struggle,^{98a} and Severus, accompanied by the brother of the Parthian king, returned to the Euphrates. There he prepared boats, and partly by this means and partly by marching along the banks the army descended the river. By the fall of 198⁹⁹ the capital city was reached, and both Seleucia and Babylon were occupied after they had been abandoned by the Parthians. Ctesiphon, which apparently put up considerable resistance, was captured and sacked.¹⁰⁰ The Emperor then assumed the title "Parthicus Maximus"¹⁰¹ after the example of his predecessor Trajan.

Food for man and beast soon became scarce, and no extensive stay was made in the vicinity of Ctesiphon. Again partly by boat and partly by land the army moved up the Tigris. Like Trajan, Severus made an

^{98a} *CIL*, VIII, No. 4583, dated in the spring of 198, celebrates a victory over the Parthians.

⁹⁹ A hoard of coins dated 198/99, probably buried upon the approach of the Romans, strongly confirms this dating; see McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 91, No. 122, and p. 235.

¹⁰⁰ Dio Cass. lxxvi (lxxv. 9); Spart. *Severus* 16. On date see Maurice Platnauer, *The Life and Reign of the Emperor Lucius Septimius Severus* (Oxford, 1918), p. 117, n. 1; cf. also Johannes Hasebroek, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Septimius Severus* (Heidelberg, 1921), pp. 113 f.

¹⁰¹ *CIL*, III, Nos. 205 f.; Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, IV, 105, Nos. 122(a) ff.

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attempt to capture Hatra and, like him, was unsuccessful. This first attack in 199 accomplished nothing; not only were many soldiers lost, but the siege engines also were destroyed. Severus therefore retired, perhaps to Nisibis, only to renew the attack again the next year with better food stores and additional engines. The second expedition was scarcely more successful than the first. Foraging parties were cut off; all the new engines, except those designed by a fellow countryman of Dio Cassius the historian, were destroyed; and even the Emperor himself on his lofty tribunal was endangered. The defenders' machines for shooting two arrows at once were so effective and had such range that some of the imperial guards were shot down.¹⁰² Burning naphtha and jars of insects were thrown upon the heads of the attackers. At last a breach in the outer circuit was made. The final rush was checked by Severus, who felt that the legionaries had had their share of booty at the sack of Ctesiphon and wished to retain the rich spoil from the temple of the Sun-god and the numerous slaves for himself. But instead of surrendering, as he expected, the people of Hatra rebuilt the wall in the night. The European soldiers, angered by the events of the day before, refused to advance; and the Syrian troops, when driven to the attack, were slaughtered miserably. At the end of twenty fruitless days Severus

¹⁰² Numbers of heavy arrows which must have been shot from engines have been found at Dura-Europus.

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left for Syria.¹⁰³ During this siege Laetus, who had so successfully defended Nisibis, was killed by the soldiers, perhaps at the Emperor's command.¹⁰⁴ Laetus was extremely popular with the men and was suspected of too high political aspirations.

The Parthian campaign of Severus can scarcely have given satisfaction from either the political or the personal point of view. No territory beyond that already within the Roman sphere of influence was added, the loss of men was heavy, and the expedition closed with the failure at Hatra. On the other hand Parthia suffered greatly. Her western capitals and territory had once more been raided by Roman arms, and the destruction caused must have furthered the rapid decay which was already under way.

Between the departure of Severus from Hatra and the death of Vologases in 207/8¹⁰⁵ our sources for Parthia fail us. At any rate Vologases IV was followed by his son, the fifth of the same name.¹⁰⁶ In 211 Caracalla became head of the Roman state. Not long after this Abgarus IX of Osroene began to expand the limits of his control over neighboring groups. Caracalla induced the king to pay him a friendly visit and

¹⁰³ Dio Cass. lxxvi (lxxv. 11-13). The campaign was commemorated in 197-98 by issues bearing the legend VICT. PARTHICAE (see Mattingly and Sydenham, *op. cit.*, IV, 105, No. 121, and 108, No. 142(a)) and then and later by numerous other coins celebrating the return of peace.

¹⁰⁴ Dio Cass. lxxvi (lxxv. 10); Spart. *Severus* 15. 6.

¹⁰⁵ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 199.

¹⁰⁶ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 12. 2a).

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then seized him. Without its leader Osroene rapidly submitted to Roman authority, and it was henceforth controlled without a king. The king of Armenia was engaged in a quarrel with his sons; and, when they too had been summoned before Caracalla on the pretense of peacemaking, they were treated in the same fashion as Abgarus. But the Armenians, instead of yielding, had recourse to arms.¹⁰⁷

About 213, contemporary with the Roman difficulties with Osroene and Armenia, arose a dispute between Vologases and his brother Artabanus (V).¹⁰⁸ Apparently Artabanus, who controlled Media and struck his coins at Ecbatana, was making a bid for Mesopotamia also. Caracalla claimed to have engendered these disputes in the hope that they would weaken the Parthian power.¹⁰⁹

In his winter quarters at Nicomedia (İzmit) Caracalla assembled troops and built two large engines so constructed that they could be taken apart and stowed away in ships for transport to Syria.¹¹⁰ The following legions, either as a whole or in part, probably fought in the ensuing campaign: the I and II

¹⁰⁷ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 12. 1²).

¹⁰⁸ The latter struck only drachms; see Wroth, *Parthia*, pp. 247-50, and McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 235.

¹⁰⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 12. 2a-3 and 13. 3). Coins of Vologases issued in 214/15 and 215/16 bear a Tyche with palm, possibly a claim of victory; see McDowell, *op. cit.*, pp. 94 and 199 f.

¹¹⁰ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 18. 1). On the winter quarters in Nicomedia see *CIL*, VI, No. 2103b.

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Adiutrix,¹¹¹ the II Parthica¹¹² under Aelius Decius Triccius, the III Augusta,¹¹³ the III Italica,¹¹⁴ the III Cyrenaica, the IV Scythica,¹¹⁵ and some German troops.¹¹⁶ Caracalla found a pretext for war in the fact that the Parthians had not surrendered to him a certain Cilician cynic named Antiochus and a Tiridates, perhaps an Armenian prince. The cynic Antiochus had found favor with Severus and Caracalla by rolling in the snow to encourage the troops when they were suffering from the cold. Later he became a friend of Tiridates, and together they deserted to the Parthians.¹¹⁷ When the latter felt it advisable to surrender Antiochus and Tiridates, the Emperor gave up the idea of an immediate advance against the Parthians. Instead he sent Theocritus¹¹⁸ with an army against the Armenians, while he himself proceeded to Antioch, where he spent the winter of 215/16. Theocritus was severely defeated.¹¹⁹

¹¹¹ *IGRR*, III, No. 1412 = Dessau 8879. On the question of whether or not the legions of this inscription are the I and II Parthica see PW, art. "Legio (Caracalla)" and the articles on those legions.

¹¹² Spart. *Caracalla* 6. 7.

¹¹³ *CIL*, VIII, No. 2564.

¹¹⁴ *CIL*, III, No. 14207⁶.

¹¹⁵ Hopkins and Rowell in *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Fifth Season*, pp. 218 ff.

¹¹⁶ Dio Cass. lxxx. 4.

¹¹⁷ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 19. 1 f.); Herodian iv. 10 f.

¹¹⁸ PW, art. "Theokritos," No. 4. ¹¹⁹ Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 21).

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By 216 Artabanus V had apparently extended his sway over Mesopotamia, but Vologases continued to strike coins at the Seleucia mint for some years to come.¹²⁰ While Caracalla was resident in Antioch he sent a request to Artabanus for the hand of his daughter. Perhaps this was an attempt to unite the two great powers of the world,¹²¹ but more probably it was simply an attempt to secure a *casus belli*.¹²² If we follow the contemporary but most untrustworthy Herodian, Artabanus at last consented to the marriage. The Emperor proceeded to the Parthian court in great state and amid much festivity. During the celebration the Romans fell upon the unsuspecting Parthians and slaughtered great numbers of them, though Artabanus managed to escape. Whether or not this somewhat improbable tale is true, Caracalla ravaged a large part of Media, sacked many of the fortresses, took the city of Arbela, and dug open the Parthian royal tombs, scattering the bones.¹²³

Artabanus retired into the mountains to gather additional forces, and Caracalla announced his victory to the Senate.¹²⁴ Coins with the legend VIC(TORIA)

¹²⁰ See McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 200.

¹²¹ Herodian iv. 11.

¹²² Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 1).

¹²³ A hoard of coins found at Ashur suggests that the Romans occupied the city in 216; see *MDOG*, No. 28 (1905), pp. 34 f., and E. Herzfeld, "Untersuchungen über die historische Topographie der Landschaft am Tigris, kleinen Zâb und Gebel Hamrîn," *Memnon*, I (1907), 115 f.

¹²⁴ Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 1 ff.); Spart. *Caracalla* 6. 4 f.

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PART(HICA)¹²⁵ were issued to commemorate the victory. In the spring of 217 Artabanus invaded Roman territory and burned several cities of Beth Aramaya (Mesopotamia).¹²⁶ About this time, early in April, Caracalla was assassinated while en route from Edessa to Carrhae, and Macrinus succeeded to the throne.¹²⁷

Since the new emperor felt that the time was not auspicious to continue the war, he returned the captives (of the previous struggle?), laid the blame on Caracalla, and requested peace. Artabanus at once rejected this offer and demanded that the towns and fortresses which had been destroyed be restored, that Mesopotamia once more be returned to Parthia, and that reparation be made for the injury to the royal tombs. Artabanus advanced toward Nisibis, near which city Macrinus met him. The battle was precipitated by a skirmish over a water hole. The cavalry and camel corps of the Parthians were particularly effective, but the Romans had the advantage in close fighting. Caltraps, scattered by the Romans, hindered the movements of the Parthian mounted forces. The struggle lasted for three days, at the end of which

¹²⁵ Mattingly and Sydenham, *Rom. Imp. Coin.*, IV, 257, Nos. 297(a)–299(e). In connection with this campaign, note the dedicatory inscription to Julia Domna found at Dura-Europus; see H. Rowell, "Inscriptions grecques de Doura-Europos, 1929–30," *CR*, 1930, pp. 265–69.

¹²⁶ Mšihā Zkha, p. 28 (tr. p. 104), clearly means by this name northern Mesopotamia, not the area about Seleucia-Ctesiphon as is usually the case. For the common interpretation see Eduard Sachau, *Zur Ausbreitung des Christentums in Asien (APAW)*, 1919, No. 1), p. 26.

¹²⁷ Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 5. 4 f.); Herodian iv. 13. 3 ff.

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the Parthians held the advantage.¹²⁸ Perhaps this was because the numerical superiority of the Parthians enabled them to extend their line in a flanking movement until the inferior Roman forces were greatly weakened. Macrinus after the defeat was able to purchase peace at the cost of two hundred million sesterces expended in gifts to Artabanus and influential Parthians.¹²⁹ To the Senate the whole affair was represented as a Roman victory, and Macrinus was offered the title of "Parthicus," a title which he felt constrained to refuse. Coins were struck in 218 with the legend VICT(OR)IA PART(HICA).¹³⁰

In June, 218, Macrinus was defeated near Antioch. He sent his son Diadumenianus to seek refuge with Artabanus; but the young man was captured at Zeugma and killed,¹³¹ and the father suffered a like fate near Antioch.

¹²⁸ Herodian iv. 15. 4 makes the battle a draw, and this is also the implication of Mšīḥa Zkha, p. 28 (tr. p. 104). Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 26. 7 f.) definitely gives the Parthians the advantage. The price of the peace seems to settle the point in their favor. The campaign is mentioned in Capit. *Macrinus* 2. 2.

¹²⁹ Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 27. 1). For mentions of Greeks who served and died in the campaigns of this period against the Parthians see Paul Wolters, "Ein Denkmal der Partherkriege," *Mitteilungen des K. Deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung*, XXVIII (1903), 291-300; *CIG*, I, Nos. 1253 and 1495; *Klio*, XI, 358-66. Cf. Dio Cass. lxxviii (lxxvii. 7); Herodian iv. 8. 3.

¹³⁰ K. Regling, "Römische aurei aus dem Funde von Karnak," in *Festschrift zu Otto Hirschfelds 60. Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1903), p. 297, No. 60.

¹³¹ Dio Cass. lxxix (lxxviii. 39 f.); Capit. *Opellius Macrinus* 10.

The final downfall of the Parthian empire and the rise of the Sasanian power are alike shrouded in that uncertainty which prevails when events in the East do not directly concern the Roman world. The Arabic sources are much better informed on the Sasanid period than on the Arsacid, and unfortunately few Sasanian sources have survived. Archaeological evidence is as yet scanty. About A.D. 212 the revolt which was to end the empire began as a series of petty wars among the kings and princes of the districts about Persis, which was then doubtless independent. Ardashir, son of Papak, son of Sasan, having expanded his territory at the expense of neighboring kingdoms, persuaded his father to revolt against his immediate overlord. Papak then assumed the titles "god" and "king" and requested permission of the Parthian "great king" Artabanus to place his son Shapur on the throne of the slain overlord. The demand was refused. Papak soon died, and his place was taken by Shapur, who not long thereafter was killed by a falling wall. Ardashir hastened to Istakhr and was recognized as king.¹³²

About 220 began a revolt against the authority of Parthia which soon spread both widely and rapidly. Allied to Ardashir were certain of the Medes together with Shahrat of Adiabene and King Domitian of

¹³² Theodor Nöldeke, *Geschichte der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden, aus der arabischen Chronik des Tabari übersetzt und mit ausführlichen Erläuterungen und Ergänzungen versehen* (Leiden, 1879), pp. 1-8; Eduard Meyer in *Encyc. Brit.*, XVII, art. "Persia," pp. 580-82.

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Kerkh Slukh (Kirkuk). The final struggle began in the springtime. In a single year the allies invaded Mesopotamia (Seleucia-Ctesiphon district) and Beth Aramaya (to the north), made an unsuccessful attack on Hatra, then overran Beth Zabdai (Zabdicene), and finally invaded Arzun (Arzanene).¹³³ Vologases V was evidently killed in the fighting, for his last coins are dated 222/23.¹³⁴ Artabanus V was defeated and killed about 227, and all his territory, including Media, fell into the hands of Ardashir. The remaining Parthian forces fled to the mountains, where Artabanus' son Artavasdes continued the struggle for some years. Eventually captured, he was executed in Ctesiphon.¹³⁵

Thus ended the Parthian empire, which in truth at this late date was no longer a living organism but was a senile wreck whose ruler had no more power than tradition or his individual prowess could command. The arrival of the Sasanidae brought fresh blood and new inspiration to a world which was sorely in need of such stimulants.

¹³³ Mšīḥa Zkha, pp. 28 f. (tr. p. 105); Dio Cass. lxxx. 3 f. (Loeb, IX, p. 482) agrees very closely with this Syriac source.

¹³⁴ McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 200. For new evidence on early Sasanian chronology see R. Ghirshman, "Inscription du monument de Châpour I^{er} à Châpour," *Revue des arts asiatiques*, X (1936), 123-29.

¹³⁵ See his coinage, Wroth, *Parthia*, p. 251, and the statement by Mšīḥa Zkha, p. 29 (tr. p. 105), that the young son of Artabanus was killed by the Persians in Ctesiphon. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia*, p. 200, assigns tentatively to Artavasdes a coin bearing the late date of 228/29 which he believes was struck at Seleucia.

It is planned to treat the rise of the Sasanidae more fully in a future work on their empire.

LISTS OF RULERS

PARTHIAN KINGS

	B.C.		A.D.
Arsaces	<i>ca.</i> 250-248	Orodes III	4- <i>ca.</i> 6/7
Tiridates I	<i>ca.</i> 248-211	Vonones I	7/8-12
Artabanus I	<i>ca.</i> 211-191	Artabanus III	12- <i>ca.</i> 38
Priapatius	<i>ca.</i> 191-176	Tiridates III	<i>ca.</i> 36
Phraates I	<i>ca.</i> 176-171	Cinnamus	<i>ca.</i> 37
Mithradates I	<i>ca.</i> 171-138/37	Gotarzes II	<i>ca.</i> 38-51
Phraates II	138/37- <i>ca.</i> 128	Vardanes	<i>ca.</i> 39-47/48
Artabanus II	<i>ca.</i> 128-124/23	Vonones II	<i>ca.</i> 51
Mithradates II	<i>ca.</i> 123-88/87	Vologases I	51/52-79/80
Gotarzes I	91-81/80	Pacorus II	78-115/16?
Orodes I	80-76/75	Artabanus IV	80-81
Sinatruces	76/75-70 or 69	Osroes	<i>ca.</i> 109/10-128/29
Phraates III	70 or 69-58/57	Parthamaspates	<i>ca.</i> 117
Mithradates III	58/57-55	Vologases II	105/6?-147
Orodes II	<i>ca.</i> 57-37/36	Mithradates IV	128/29?-147?
Pacorus I	died in 38	Vologases III	148-192
Phraates IV	<i>ca.</i> 38-2	Vologases IV	191-207/8
Tiridates II	<i>ca.</i> 30-25	Vologases V	207/8-222/23
Phraataces (Phraates V)		Artabanus V	<i>ca.</i> 213-227
	2 B.C.-A.D. 4	Artavasdes	<i>ca.</i> 227-228/29?

SELEUCID KINGS¹

	B.C.		B.C.
Seleucus I Nicator	311-280	Antiochus III (the Great)	223-187
Antiochus I Soter	280-262/61	Seleucus IV Philopator	187-175
Antiochus II Theos	261-247	Antiochus IV Epiphanes	175-163
Seleucus II Callinicus	247-226		
Seleucus III Soter	226-223		

¹ Adapted from *CAH*, IX, 1023.

LISTS OF RULERS


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	B.C.		B.C.
Antiochus V Eupator	163-162	Antiochus IX Cyzicenus	
Demetrius I Soter	162-150		115-95
Alexander I Balas	150-145	Seleucus VI Epiphanes	Nicator
Demetrius II Nicator			96-95
	{ 145-139/38	Antiochus X Eusebes	
	{ 129-125	Philopator	95-83
Antiochus VI Epiphanes		Demetrius III Eucærus	
	145-142/41	Philopator Soter	95-88
Antiochus VII Sidetes		Antiochus XI Philadelphus	92
	139/38-129	Philippus I Philadelphus	92-83
[Alexander II Zabinas 128-123]		Antiochus XII Dionysus	87-84
Antiochus VIII Grypus and		[Tigranes of Armenia	83-69]
Cleopatra Thea	125-121	Antiochus XIII Asiaticus	
Seleucus V	125		69-64
Antiochus VIII Grypus	121-96	Philippus II	65-64

ROMAN EMPERORS

			A.D.
Augustus	27 B.C.-A.D. 14	Hadrian	117-138
	A.D.	Antoninus Pius	138-161
Tiberius	14-37	Marcus Aurelius	161-180
Caligula	37-41	Lucius Verus	161-169
Claudius	41-54	Commodus	180-192
Nero	54-68	Julianus and Pertinax	193
Galba, Otho, Vitellius	68-69	Septimius Severus	193-211
Vespasian	69-79	Caracalla	211-217
Titus	79-81	Geta	211-212
Domitian	81-96	Macrinus	217-218
Nerva	96-98	Heliogabalus	218-222
Trajan	98-117	Severus Alexander	222-235

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THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST
IN
PARTHIAN TIMES

* APPROXIMATE SITE
0 100 200 300 MILES
0 100 200 300 400 KILOMETERS