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The oligarchy of Four Hundred at Athens, installed in the senate-house about February or March 411 B.C., and deposed about July of the same year, after four or five months of danger and distraction such as to bring her almost within the grasp of her enemies, has now been terminated by the restoration of her democracy; with what attendant circumstances, has been amply detailed. I now revert to the military and naval operations on the Asiatic coast, partly contemporaneous with the political distensions at Athens, above described.

It has already beer stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of ninety-four triremes, having remained not less than eighty days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Miletus towards the end of March; with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichides had been for some time besieging, and which was now in the greatest distress. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions, of Tissaphernes, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phoenician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for cooperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighboring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Miletus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus; an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighboring town of Lampsacus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichides, the commander of the Athenian besieging armament. Though the Chians—driven to despair by increasing famine as well as by want of relief from Astyochus, and having recently increased their fleet to thirty-six triremes against the Athenian thirty-two, by the arrival of twelve ships under Leon, obtained from Miletus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes—had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage, yet Strombichides felt compelled immediately to carry away twenty-four triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Miletus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy as already recounted, and when the Athenian generals were divided in opinion, Charminus siding with this party, Leon and Diomedon against it. Apprized of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favorable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbor of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbor. He accordingly returned to Miletus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation, real or pretended, of the arrival of the Phoenician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. They not only murmured at the inaction of the armament during this precious moment of disunion in the Athenian camp, but also detected the insidious policy of Tissaphernes in thus frittering away their strength without result; a policy still more keenly brought home to their feelings by his irregularity in supplying them with pay and provision, which caused serious distress. To appease their clamors, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favor of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Miletus with his whole fleet of one hundred and twelve triremes round to the promontory of Mykale immediately opposite Samos, ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only eighty-two sail, in the absence of Strombichides, was then moored near Glauke on the mainland of Mykale; but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried; the reaction from which attempt brought about, with little delay, the great democratical manifestation, and solemn collective oath, of the Athenian armament, coupled with the nomination of new, cordial, and unanimous generals. They were now in high enthusiasm, anxious for battle with the enemy, and Strombichides had been sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Miletus. That officer had recovered Lampsacus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos. Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to one hundred and eight sail. He arrived in the night, when the Peloponnesian fleet was preparing to renew its attack from Mycale the next morning. It consisted of one hundred and twelve ships, and was therefore still superior in number to the Athenians. But having now learned both the arrival of Strombichides, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Miletus, to the mouth of which harbor the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.

Such confession of inferiority was well calculated to embitter still farther the discontents of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus. Tissaphernes had become more and more parsimonious in furnishing pay and supplies; while the recall of Alcibiades to Samos, which happened just now, combined with the uninterrupted apparent intimacy between him and the satrap, confirmed their belief that the latter was intentionally cheating and starving them in the interest of Athens. At the same time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the cooperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta, for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly, Clearchus was sent with forty triremes from Miletus to the Hellespont, yet with instructions to evade the Athenians at Samos, by first stretching out westward into the Aegean. Encountering severe storms, he was forced with the greater part of lm squadron to seek shelter at Delos, and even suffered so much damage as to return to Miletus, from whence he himself marched to the Hellespont by land. Ten of his triremes, however, under the Megarian Helixus, weathered the storm and pursued their voyage to the Hellespont, which was at this moment unguarded, since Strombichides seems to have brought back all his squadron. Helixus passed on unopposed to Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, and which he now induced to revolt from Athens. This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Clearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Miletus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium, and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile, the discontents of the fleet at Miletus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernes. Unpaid, and only half-fed, the seamen came together in crowds to talk over their grievances; denouncing Astyochus as having betrayed them for his own profit to the satrap, who was treacherously ruining the armament under the inspirations of Alcibiades. Even some of the officers, whose silence had been hitherto purchased, began to hold the same language; perceiving that the mischief was becoming irreparable, and that the men were actually on the point of desertion. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokrates of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus while advocating their cause. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles: he took refuge, however, on a neighboring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians, also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernes had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely, and intimated to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king’s territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernes within all reasonable limits, and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. It appears that in other matters also, Lichas had enforced instead of mitigating the authority of the satrap over them; so that the Milesians now came to hate him vehemently, and when he shortly afterwards died of sickness, they refused permission to bury him in the spot—probably some place of honor—which his surviving countrymen had fixed upon. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians, instead of acquiring autonomy, according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament, however, was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus, who was summoned home and took his departure. Both Hermokrates and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernes; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy named Gaulites, a Karian, brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages, both to defend himself against the often-repeated charges of Hermokrates, that he had been treacherously withholding the pay under concert with Alcibiades and the Athenians, and to denounce the Milesians on his own side, as having wrongfully demolished his fort. At the same time he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretext, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta, soothing the impatience of the armament, and conciliating the new admiral Mindarus. He announced that the Phoenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to cooperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Miletus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.

Mindarus, a new commander, without any experience of the mendacity of Tissaphernes, was imposed upon by this plausible assurance, and even captivated by the near prospect of so power­ful a reinforcement. He despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes round the Triopiari Cape to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Here again was a fresh delay of no inconsiderable length, while Tissaphernes was absent at Aspendus, on this ostensible purpose. Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phoenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of hope that it was really coming onward. But the satrap soon showed that his purpose now, as heretofore, was nothing better than delay and delusion. The Phoenician ships were one hundred and forty-seven in number; a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernes affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King; who had commanded a fleet of three hundred sail to be fitted out for the service. He waited for some, time in pretended expectation that more ships were on their way, disregarding all the remonstrances of the Lacedaemonian officers.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alcibiades, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of this approaching Phoenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernes at Aspendus, and to determine him, if possible, to send the fleet to the assistance of Athens, but at the very least not to send it to the aid of Sparta. The latter alternative of the promise was sufficiently safe, for he knew well that Tissaphernes had no intention of applying the fleet to any really efficient purpose. But he was thereby enabled to take credit with his countrymen for having been the means of diverting this formidable reinforcement from the enemy.

Partly the apparent confidence between Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, partly the impudent shifts of the former, grounded on the incredible pretext that the fleet was insufficient in number, at length satisfied Philippus that the present was only a new manifestation of deceit. After a long and vexatious interval, he apprized Mindarus— not without, indignant abuse of the satrap—that nothing was to be hoped from the fleet at Aspendus. Yet the proceeding of Tissaphernes, indeed, in bringing up the Phoenicians to that place, and still withholding the order for farther advance and action, was in every one’s eyes mysterious and unaccountable. Some fancied that he did it with a view of levying larger bribes from the Phoenicians themselves, as a premium for being sent home without fighting, as it appears that they actually were. But Thucydides supposes that he had no other motive than that which had determined his behavior during the last year, to protract the war and impoverish both Athens and Sparta, by setting up a fresh deception, which would last for some weeks, and thus procure so much delay. The historian is doubtless right: but without his assurance, it would have been difficult to believe, that the maintenance of a fraudulent pretext, for so inconsiderable a time, should have been held as an adequate motive for bringing this large fleet from Phoenicia to Aspendus, and then sending it away unemployed.

Having at length lost all hope of the Phoenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernes; the more so, as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever, and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into cooperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet—seventy-three triremes strong, after deducting thirteen which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes—having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. After having been delayed some days at Ikarus by bad weather, Mindarus reached Chios in safety. But here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with fifty-five triremes, to the northward of Chios, and was thus between the Lacedaemonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy’s fleet. Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt by a body of three hundred assailants from Kyme under the Theban Anaxander, partly Methymnaean exiles, with some political sympathizers, partly mercenary foreigners, who succeeded in carrying Eresus after failing in an attack on Methymna. Thrasyllus found before Eresus a small Athenian squadron of five triremes under Thrasybulus, who had been despatched, from Samos to try and forestall the revolt, but had arrived too late. He was farther joined by two triremes from the Hellespont, and by others from Methymna, so that his entire fleet reached the number of sixty-seven triremes, with which he proceeded to lay siege to Eresus; trusting to his scouts for timely warning, in case the enemy’s fleet should move northward.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the northeastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland : after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont, though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet, if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus did neither; thus eluding their watch, and reaching the Hellespont without the knowledge of the Athenians. Having passed two days in provisioning his ships, receiving besides from the Chians three tesserakosts, a Chian coin of unknown value, for each man among his seamen, he departed on the third day from Chios, but took a southerly route and rounded the island in all haste on its western or seaside. Having reached and passed the northern latitude of Chios, he took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left hand, direct to the mainland; which he touched at a harbor called Karterii, in the Phocaean territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the gulf of Kyme to the little islets called Arginusae, close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylene, where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatus, on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna, by the next day’s morning meal: then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and passed Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight; where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhoeteium, and other neighboring places.

By this well-laid course and accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet completely eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprized of its departure from Chios. When it arrived at Harmatus, however, opposite to and almost within sight of the Athenian station at Methymna, its progress could no longer remain a secret. As it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news circulated everywhere, and was promulgated through numerous fire-signals and beacons on the hill, by friend as well as by foe.

These signals were perfectly visible, and perfectly intelligible, to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont: eighteen Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, sixteen Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former it was destruction, to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Ekaeus at the southern extremity of that peninsular, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, or perhaps even before he left Miletus, that, if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a vigilant and special lookout for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus. When the signals first announced the arrival of Mindarus, the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos could not know in what position he was, nor whether the main Athenian fleet might not be near upon him. Accordingly they acted on these previous orders, holding themselves in reserve in their station at Abydos, until daylight should arrive, and they should be better informed. They thus neglected the Athenian Hellespontine squadron in its escape from Sestos to Elaeus.

On arriving about daylight near the southern print of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Mindarus, which had come the night before to the opposite stations of Sigeium and Rhoeteium. The latter immediately gave chase: but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros, not without the loss, however, of four triremes, one even captured with all the crew on board, near the temple of Protesilaus at Ekeus: the crews of the other three escaped ashore. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force, eighty-six triremes strong, was employed for one day in trying to storm Elaeus. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Before all could arrive there, Thrasyllus with his fleet arrived in haste from Eresus, much disappointed that his scouts had been eluded and all his calculations baffled. Two Peloponnesian triremes, which had been more adventurous than the rest in pursuing the Athenians, fell into his hands. He waited at Elaeus the return of the fugi­tive Athenian squadron from Imbros, and then began to prepare his triremes, seventy-six in number, for a general action.

After five days of such preparation, his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestos up the Hellespont, by single ships ahead, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. The left or most advanced squadron, under Thrasyllus, stretched even beyond the headland called Kynossema, or the Dog’s Tomb, ennobled by the legend and the chapel of the Trojan queen Hecuba; it was thus nearly opposite Abydos, while the right squadron under Thrasybulus was not very far from the southern mouth of the strait, nearly opposite Dardanus. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes, ten more than Thrasyllus in total number, extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore; the Syracusans under Hermokrates being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibatae or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manoeuvring: nevertheless, the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manoeuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormion at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; nor would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossema. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. Its ships were driven up against the land, and the assailants even disembarked to push their victory against the men ashore. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and found shelter first in the river Meidius, next in Abydos. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless, eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian, and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellene, and Leukas, one each, fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals; who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships. They erected u trophy on the headland of Kynossema, near the tomb or chapel of Hecuba; not omitting the usual duties of burying their own dead, and giving up those of the enemy under the customary request for truce.

A victory so incomplete and indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis, with the revolt of Euboea, their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossema, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight and triumph. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favor, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened, to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending Hippokrates and Epikles to bring the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Euboea. This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still further enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of this fleet, which, in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only, under Hippokrates, survived to join Mindarus.

But though Athens was thus exempted from all fear of aggression on the side of Euboea, the consequences of this departure of the fleet were such as to demonstrate how irreparably the island itself had passed out of her supremacy. The inhabitants of Chalcis and the other cities, now left without foreign detente against her, employed themselves jointly with the Boeotians, whose interest in the case was even stronger than their own, in divesting Euboea of its insular character, by constructing a mole or bridge across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Euboean strait, where Chalcis was divided from Boeotia. From each coast a mole was thrown out, each mole guarded at the extremity by a tower, and leaving only an intermediate opening, broad enough for a single vessel to pass through, covered by a wooden bridge. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenes, with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of this, undertaking. The Euboeans and Boeotians both prosecuted it in such numbers, and with so much zeal, that it was speedily brought to completion. Euboea, so lately the most important island attached to Athens, is from henceforward a portion of the mainland, altogether independent of her, even though it should please fortune to reestablish her maritime power.

The battle of Kynossema produced no very, important consequences except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Cyzicus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after it, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution : moreover, in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But, on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Ekeus, and there recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossema, which the Athenians had there deposited, except some of them which were so much damaged that the inhabitants of Elaeus set them on fire.

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Tissaphernes, while furnishing neither aid nor pay to the Peloponnesians, had by his treacherous promises and bribes enervated all their proceedings for the last year, with the deliberate view of wasting both the belligerent parties. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to strengthen them strenuously, by men as well as by money, and who labored hard to put down the Athenian power; as we shall find him laboring equally hard, eighteen years afterwards, to bring about its partial renovation. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war; and in the main—first, through the hands of Pharnabazus, next, through those of the younger Cyrus—the determining reality. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well paid, out of the Persian treasury, the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success. Twenty-six years after this, at a time when Sparta had lost her Persian allies, the Lacedaemonian Teleutias tried to appease the mutiny of his unpaid seamen, by telling them how much nobler it was to extort pay from the enemy by means of their own swords, than to obtain it by truckling to the foreigner; and probably the Athenian generals, during these previous years of struggle, tried similar appeals to the generosity of their soldiers. But it is not the less certain, that the new constant paymaster now introduced, gave fearful odds to the Spartan cause.

The good pay and hearty cooperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernes. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsaces with the Persian garrison. Arsaces had recently committed an act of murderous perfidy, under the influence of some unexplained pique, against the Delians established at Adramyttium : he had summoned their principal citizens to take part as allies in an expedition, and had caused them all to be surrounded, shot down, and massacred during the morning meal. Such an act was more than sufficient to excite hatred and alarm among the neighboring Antandrians, who invited a body of Peloponnesian hoplites from Abydos, across the mountain range of Ida, by whose aid Antandrus was liberated from the Persians.

In Miletus, as well as in Cnidus, Tissaphernes had already experienced the like humiliation; Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions, nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. Under these circumstances, he began to fear that he had incurred a weight of enmity which might prove seriously mischievous, nor was he without jealousy of the popularity and possible success of Pharnabazus. The delusion respecting the Phoenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Miletus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly, he dismissed the Phoenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phoenician towns were endangered by sadden attacks from Arabia and Egypt; while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont, for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians. He wished, while trying again to excuse his own treachery about the Phoenician fleet, at the same time to protest against their recent proceedings at Antandrus; or, at the least, to obtain some assurance against any repetition of such hostility. His visit to Ionia, however, seems to have occupied some time, and he tried to conciliate the Ionic Greeks by a splendid sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus. Having quitted Aspendus, as far as we can make out, about the beginning of August (411 B.C.), he did not reach the Hellespont until the month of November.

As soon as the Phoenician fleet had disappeared, Alcibiades returned with his thirteen triremes from Phaselis to Samos. He too, like Tissaphernes, made the proceeding subservient to deceit of his own: he took credit with his countrymen for having enlisted the good-will of the satrap more strongly than ever in 1hc cause of Athens, and for having induced him to abandon his intention of bringing up the Phoenician fleet. At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus, before his departure from Miletus, in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halicarnassus; for we now find Alcibiades going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. He erected fortifications at the town of Kos, and planted in it an Athenian officer and garrison : from Halicarnassus he levied large contributions; upon what pretext, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.,

At the Hellespont, Mindarus had been reinforced after the battle of Kynossema by the squadron from Euboea, at least by that portion of it which had escaped the storm off Mount Athos. The departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Euboea enabled the Athenians also to send a few more ships to their fleet at Sestos. Thus ranged on the opposite sides of the strait, the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus at the Hellespont. He had hoped probably to get up the strait to Abydos during the night, but he was caught by daylight a little way from the entrance, near Rhoeteium; and the Athenian scouts instantly gave signal of his approach. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessel ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. The Athenian squadron here attacked him, but were repulsed and forced to sail back to Madytus. Mindarus was himself a spectator of this scene, from a distance; being engaged in sacrificing to Athena, on the venerated hill of Ilium. He immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of eighty-four triremes, Pharnabazus cooperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue; at length, towards the evening, twenty fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alcibiades sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the rejunction of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counter-balancing reinforcement. As soon as his purple flag or signal was ascertained, the Athenian fleet became animated with redoubled spirit. The new-comers aided them in pressing the action so vigorously, that the Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavored to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat; even pushing into the water in person, as far as his horse could stand. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved; yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements; in the meantime, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons, for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenes; who first endeavored without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Euboea and Boeotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenes deposed and fined the men who had exercised it, establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna; blocking up the town by sea while the Macedonians besieged it by land. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenes was summoned away before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace: Archelaus, however, took Pydna not long afterwards, and transported the town with its residents from the sea-board to a distance more than two miles inland. We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to injustice, extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Corcyra, less stained, however, with savage enormities than that recounted in the seventh year of the war. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedaemonians. The democratical leaders, apprized of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came, with a detachment of six hundred Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The extent of their alarm is attested by the fact, that they liberated the slaves and conferred the right of citizenship upon the foreigners. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles. We know nothing about the particulars of this compromise, but it seems to have been wisely drawn up and faithfully observed; for we hear nothing about Corcyra until about thirty-five years after this period, and the island is then presented to us as in the highest perfection of cultivation and prosperity. Doubtless the emancipation of slaves and the admission of so many new foreigners to the citizenship, contributed to this result.

Meanwhile Tissaphernes, having completed his measures in Ionia, arrived at the Hellespont not long after the battle of Abydos, seemingly about November, 411 B.C. He was anxious to regain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alcibiades, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory, bringing the customary presents; but the satrap seized his person and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King’s express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians. Here was an end of all the delusions of Alcibiades, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels. Yet these delusions had already served his purpose by procuring for him a renewed position in the Athenian camp, which his own military energy enabled him to sustain and justify.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great,—partly, as it would appear, through reinforcements obtained by the former, partly through the dispersion of the latter into flying squadrons from want of pay,—that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed, round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia, on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alcibiades; who had found means to escape from Sardis, along with Mantitheus, another Athenian prisoner, first to Klazomenae, and next to Lesbos, where he collected a small squadron of five triremes. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenes came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Cyzicus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise. Having passed first from Kardia to Elaeus at the south of the Chersonese, they sailed up the Hellespont to Prokonnesos by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guardships at Abydos.

Resting at Proconnesus one night, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alcibiades warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. “We have no money (said he), while our enemies have plenty from the Great King”. Neither zeal in the men nor contrivance in the commanders was wanting. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Cyzicus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Cyzicus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbor; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighboring mainland. After a gallant and hard-fought battle, partly on shipboard, partly ashore,—at one time unpromising to the Athenians, in spite of their superiority of number, but not very intelligible in its details, and differently conceived by our two authorities,—both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crew ; while Cyzicus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The booty taken by the victors was abundant and valuable. The numbers of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at sixty, the highest at eighty.

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alcibiades and his two colleagues, about April 410 B.C., changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Miletus; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokrates, secretary of the late admiral Mindarus, to the ephors at Sparta: “All honor and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving : we are in straits what to do”. The ephors doubtless heard the same deplorable tale from more than one witness; for this particular despatch never reached them, having been intercepted and carried to Athens. So discouraging was the view which they entertained of the future, that a Lacedaemonian embassy, with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius—ancient friend and guest of Alcibiades, who had already been at Athens as envoy before—was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner, which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy : and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event,—which is stated by Diodorus, perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself,—nevertheless, leads me to doubt whether the ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms: That each party should stand just as they were; that the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn; that prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedaemonian against one Athenian. Endius insisted in his speech on the mutual mischief which each was doing to the other by prolonging the war, but he contended that Athens was by far the greater sufferer of the two, and had the deepest interest in accelerating peace. She had no money, while Sparta had the Great King as a paymaster: she was robbed of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Dekeleia, while Peloponnesus was undisturbed : all her power and influence depended upon superiority at sea, which Sparta could dispense with, and yet retain her preeminence.

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Cleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the splendor of the recent victory, and upon the new chances of success now opening to them: insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius.

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Aegospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people, misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition, even assuming it to have been formal and authorized, as well as the time at which it was made, we shall hesitate before we pronounce Cleophon to have been foolish, much less corrupt, for recommending its rejection. In reference to the charge of corrupt interest in the continuance of war, I have already made some remarks about Kleon, tending to show that no such interest can fairly be ascribed to demagogues of that character. They were essentially unwarlike men, and had quite as much chance personally of losing, as of gaining, by a state of war. Especially this is true respecting Cleophon, during the last years of the war, since the financial posture of Athens was then so unprosperous, that all her available means were exhausted to provide for ships and men, leaving little or no surplus for political peculators. The admirals, who paid the seamen by raising contributions abroad, might possibly enrich themselves, if so inclined; but the politicians at home had much less chance of such gains than they would have had in time of peace. Besides even if Cleophon were ever so much to gain by the continuance of war, yet, assuming Athens to be ultimately crushed in the war, he was certain beforehand to be deprived, not only of all his gains and his position, but of his life also.

So much for the charge against him of corrupt interest. The question whether his advice was judicious, is not so easy to dispose of. Looking to the time when the proposition was made, we must recollect that the Peloponnesian fleet in Asia had been just annihilated, and that the brief epistle itself, from Hippokrates to the ephors, divulging in so emphatic a manner the distress of his troops, was at this moment before the Athenian assembly. On the other hand, the despatches of the Athenian generals, announcing their victory, had excited a sentiment of universal triumph, manifested by public thanksgiving, at Athens; nor can we doubt that Alcibiades and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes, is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position; to withdraw garrisons; to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylos, she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia; such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war, doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Perikles would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory of Cyzicus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice, calculated to paralyze Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenseless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet. Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates; indeed, past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have obtained relief from the entire burden of war; but would merely have blunted the ardor and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly,—and by the generals, Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus, the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace. It would have balked them of conquests ardently, and at that time not unreasonably, anticipated; conquests tending to restore Athens to that eminence from which she had been so recently deposed. And it would have inflicted this mortification, not merely without compensating gain to her in any other shape, but with a fair probability of imposing upon all her citizens the necessity of redoubled efforts at no very distant future, when the moment favorable to her enemies should have arrived.

If, therefore, passing from the vague accusation that it was the demagogue Cleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject, we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made; yet a statesman like Perikles would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker, like Cleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future.

Meanwhile the Athenian fleet reigned alone in the Propontis and its two adjacent straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont; although the ardor and generosity of Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus; near to which, at a place called Aspaneus, the Idaean wood was chiefly exported.

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalcedon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory, had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens; the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present, by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alcibiades then conducted them to Chalcedon, opposite to Byzantium on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens; first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn ships from the Euxine, for her own consumption; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through, not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound, even down to the present time. For the opposite reasons, of course, the importance of the position was equally great to the enemies of Athens. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April, 411 B. C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalcedon in the Bosphorus (about June, 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this preeminence ; and her supplies chained during the last few; months could only have come through during those intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy. Accordingly, it is highly probable that her supplies of corn from the Euxine during the autumn of 411 B.C., had been comparatively restricted.

Though Chalcedon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alcibiades now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing-port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine. The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue : it was now reestablished under the auspices of Alcibiades. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenes, were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedaemonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasus, especially, the citizens, headed by Ekphantus, expelled the Lacedaemonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. It will be recollected that this was one of the cities in which Peisander and the Four Hundred conspirators (early in 411 B.C.) had put down the democracy and established an oligarchical government, under pretext that the allied cities would be faithful to Athens as soon as she was relieved from her democratical institutions. All the calculations of these oligarchs had been disappointed, as Phrynichus had predicted from the first: the Thasians, as soon as their own oligarchical party had been placed in possession of the government, recalled their disaffected exiles, under whose auspices a Laconian garrison and harmost had since been introduced. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedaemonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernes; an accusation which seems improbable, but which the Lacedaemonians believed, and accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.

The tone at Athens since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. But that which most mortified the Lacedaemonian king, was to discern from his lofty station at Dekeleia, the abundant influx into the Peiraeus of corn-ships from the Euxine, again renewed in the autumn of 410 B.C. since the occupation of the Bosphorus and Hellespont by Alcibiades. For the safe reception of these vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis exclaimed that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly, he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalcedon. That Spartan was a public guest of the Byzantines, and had already been singled out to command auxiliaries intended for that city. He seems to have begun his voyage during the ensuing winter (410-409), and reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes who guarded the Hellespont.

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded fifty triremes, one thousand of the regular hoplites, one hundred horsemen, and five thousand seamen, with the means of arming these latter as peltasts; also transports for his troops besides the triremes. Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he made a descent at Pygela, and next succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon, with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernes had summoned, under proclamation “to go and succor the goddess Artemis”; as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinusian triremes recently arrived. From these enemies, Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost three hundred men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium; from whence, after burying his dead, he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont. On their way thither, while halting for a while at Methymna in the north of Lesbos, Thrasyllus saw the twenty-five Syracusan triremes passing by on their voyage from Ephesus to Abydos. He immediately attacked them, captured four along with the entire crews, and chased the remainder back to their station at Ephesus. All the prisoners taken were sent to Athens, where they were deposited for custody in the stone-quarries of Piraeus, doubtless in retaliation for the treatment of the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse; they contrived, however, during the ensuing winter, to break a way out and escape to Dekeleia. Among the prisoners taken, was found Alcibiades, the Athenian, cousin and fellow-exile of the Athenian general of the same name, whom Thrasyllus caused to be set at liberty, while the others were sent to Athens.

After the delay caused by this pursuit, he brought back his armament to the Hellespont and joined the force of Alcibiades at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their head­quarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions, throughout the neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus. It is curious to learn, however, that when Alcibiades was proceeding to marshal them all together,—the hoplites, according to Athenian custom, taking rank according to their tribes,—his own soldiers, never yet beaten, refused to fraternize with those of Thrasyllus, who had been so recently Worsted at Ephesus. Nor was this alienation removed until after a joint expedition against Abydos; Pharnabazus presenting himself with a considerable force, especially cavalry, to relieve that place, was encountered and defeated in a battle wherein all the Athenians present took part. The honor of the hoplites of Thrasyllus was now held to be reestablished, so that the fusion of ranks was admitted without farther difficulty. Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home, were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylos, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenes, in B.C. 425. The place was vigorously attacked, both by sea and by land, and soon became much pressed. Not unmindful of its distress, the Athenians sent to its relief thirty triremes under Anytus, who, however, came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavorable winds from doubling Cape Malea. Pylos was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation. But Anytus, on his return, encountered great displeasure from his countrymen, and was put on his trial for having betrayed, or for not having done his utmost to fulfil, the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption. Whether he could really have reached Pylos, and whether the obstacles which baffled him were such as an energetic officer would have overcome, we have no means of determining; still less, whether it be true that he actually escaped by bribery. The story seems to prove, however, that the general Athenian public thought him deserving of condemnation, and were so much surprised by his acquittal, as to account for it by supposing, truly or falsely, the use of means never before attempted.

It was about the same time, also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisaea, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to recover it, but failed; though they defeated the Megarians in an action.

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409, and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alcibiades during the autumn of the same year, seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force; indeed, it must have been at some period during this year that the Lacedaemonian Clearchus, with his fifteen Megarian ships, penetrated up the Hellespont to Byzantium, finding it guarded only by nine Athenian triremes. But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alcibiades and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalcedon and Byzantium. The Chalcedonians, having notice of the project, deposited their movable property for safety in the hand of their neighbors the Bithynian Thracians; a remarkable evidence of the good feeling and confidence between the two, contrasting strongly with the perpetual hostility which subsisted on the other side of the Bosphorus between Byzantium and the Thracian tribes adjoining. But the precaution was frustrated by Alcibiades, who entered the territory of the Bithynians and compelled them by threats to deliver up the effects confided to them. He then proceeded to block up Chalcedon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosphorus to the Propontis; though the continuity of this wall was interrupted by a river, and seemingly by some rough ground on the immediate brink of the river. The blockading wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, and advanced as far as the Herakleion, or temple of Heracles, belonging to the Chalcedonians. Profiting by his approach, Hippokrates, the Lacedaemonian harmost in the town, made a vigorous sally: but the Athenians repelled all the efforts of Pharnabazus to force a passage through their lines and join him; so that, after an obstinate contest, the sallying force was driven back within the walls of the town, and Hippokrates himself killed.

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alcibiades departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenes and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalcedon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to pay to the Athenians twenty talents on behalf of the town, and also to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Oaths to this effect were mutually exchanged, after the return of Alcibiades from his expedition. For Pharnabazus positively refused to complete the ratification with the other generals, until Alcibiades should be there to ratify in person also; a proof at once of the great individual importance of the latter, and of his known facility in finding excuses to evade an agreement. Two envoys were accordingly sent by Pharnabazus to Chrysopolis, to receive the oaths of Alcibiades, while two relatives of Alcibiades came to Chalcedon as witnesses to those of Pharnabazus. Over and above the common oath shared with his colleagues, Alcibiades took a special covenant of personal friendship and hospitality with the satrap, and received from him the like.

Alcibiades had employed his period of absence in capturing Selybria, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalcedon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. These, however, the Lacedaemonian garrison, under the harmost Clearchus, aided by some Megarians under Helixus, and Boeotians under Koeratadas, was perfectly competent to repel. But the ravages of famine were not so easily dealt with. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Clearchus, strict and harsh, even under ordinary circumstances, became inexorable and oppressive, from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers; and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus; and to get together, if possible, a fleet for some aggressive operation that might divert the attention of the besiegers. He left the defence to Koeratadas and Helixus, in full confidence that the Byzantines were too much compromised by their revolt from Athens to venture to desert Sparta, whatever might be their suffering. But the favorable terms recently granted to Chalcedon, coupled with the severe and increasing famine, induced Kydon and a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alcibiades with the Athenians into the wide interior square called the Thrakion. Helixus and Koeratadas, apprized of this attack only when the enemy had actually got possession of the town on all sides, vainly attempted resistance, and were compelled to surrender at discretion: they were sent as prisoners to Athens, where Koeratadas contrived to escape during the confusion of the landing at Piraeus. Favorable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalcedon.

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalcedon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year; the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter. Both of them, however, were acquisitions of capital importance to Athens, making her again undisputed mistress of the Bosphorus, and insuring to her two valuable tributary allies. Nor was this all the improvement which the summer had operated in her position. The accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The mere withdrawal of his hearty support from Sparta, even if nothing else followed from it, was of immense moment to Athens; and thus much was really achieved. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians,—all, probably, sent for from Athens, which accounts for some delay,—were directed, after the siege of Chalcedon, to meet Pharnabazus at Cyzicus. Some Lacedaemonian envoys; and even the Syracusan Hermokrates, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their track into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of king Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Manor. Some Lacedaemonian envoys, Boeotius and others, were travelling down along with him, after having fulfilled their mission at the Persian court.