The pueblo communities were now to rid themselves for a time of their Spanish masters, whom they regarded as tyrants. Fast efforts to shake off their fetters had only shown how tightly they were riveted. They were required to render implicit obedience, and to pay heavy tribute of pueblo products and personal service. Their complaints, however, in this direction are not definitely known. The Spaniards in their later gathering of testimony ignored this element of secular oppression, if, as can hardly be doubted, it existed, and represented the revolt to be founded exclusively, as it was indeed largely, on religious grounds. The New Mexicans seem to have been more strongly attached than most American tribes to their aboriginal faith, and they had secretly continued so far as possible the practice of the old forms of worship. The friars had worked zealously to stamp out every vestige of the native rites; and the authorities had enforced the strictest compliance with Christian regulations, not hesitating to punish the slightest neglect, unbelief, relapse into paganism, so-called witchcraft, or chafing under missionary rule, with flogging, imprisonment, slavery, or even death. During the past thirty years large numbers of natives had been hanged for alleged sorcery, or communion with the devil, though generally accused also of projected rebellion or plotting with the Apaches. The influence of the native old men, or priests—sorcerers, the Spaniards called them—was still potent; the very superiority of the pueblo organization gave the patriotic conspirators an advantage; past failures had taught caution; and so skilfully was the movement managed that the premature outbreak a few days before the time agreed upon was hardly less successful and deadly than would have been the revolt as planned.

Pope, connected with a former disturbance and accused of many crimes, was the moving spirit now. He was a San Juan Indian, but made Taos the centre of his efforts. Appealing to the popular superstition as well as patriotism, he claimed to have formed an alliance with the Great Spirit, or El Demonio of the Spaniards; and personally or through his agents and associates—chief among whom were Catiti of Santo Domingo, Tupatú of Picurí, and Jaca of Taos—Pope brought into his scheme all the pueblos except those of the Piros in the south, who for tome unexplained reason were not invited. The Tanos and the Queres of Ciénega are doubtfully said to have shown some reluctance. A knotted cord was the mysterious calendar sent by swift runners to all the pueblos to make known the date of rising, which seems to have been fixed for the 13th of August, 1680.

Despite the utmost precautions, however—no woman being intrusted with the secret, and Pope killing his own son-in-law on suspicion of treachery—the influence of the friars over certain converts was so strong that the plot was revealed, perhaps as early as the 9th, from several different sources.

 

New Mexico in the Seventeenth Century

 

The Tanos of San Lázaro and San Cristóbal revealed Pope’s plot to Padre Bernal, the custodio. Padre Velasco of Pecos received a like confession from one of his neophytes. The alcalde of Taos sent a warning which caused the governor to arrest two Tesuque Indians who had been sent by the Tehuas to consult with the Tanos and Queres. Otermin sent messengers in all haste to warn padres and settlers south of San Felipe to flee to Isleta, while those of the north were to start for the capital or Santa Cruz de la Cañada. Pope saw that his only hope of success was in immediate action, and by his orders the Taos, Picuríes, and Tehuas attacked the missions and farms of the northern pueblos before dawn on the 10th, “llevandolo todo a sangre y fuego”. Apparently, hostilities had been committed at Santa Clara a day or two earlier, and some of the more distant pueblos rose a day or two later, as soon as they heard of the premature outbreak. I follow Escalante’s version for what is not found in Otermin’s journal; but little reliance can be put in the accuracy of details. All agree that the outbreak was on the 10th, day of San Lorenzo, and that it was premature. On that day Alférez Lucero and a soldier arrived at Santa Fé with news of the rising of the Tehuas, reporting that the alcalde mayor had collected the people at La Cañada, and that the rebels were in force at Santa Clara. Captain Francisco Gomez was sent out to reconnoitre, and returned on the 12th with confirmation and a few details of the disaster. The governor on the 13th ordered the alcalde and sargento mayor, Luis Quintana, to bring in the people from La Cañada to Santa Fé, which was probably accomplished. He sent out native scouts, despatched an order to Lieutenant-general Alonso García to send aid from Isleta, and prepared to defend the capital.

It was the plan of the New Mexicans to utterly exterminate the Spaniards; and in the massacre none was spared—neither soldier, priest, or settler, personal friend or foe, young or old, man or woman—except that a few beautiful women and girls were kept as captives. From San Felipe south all were warned in time to make their escape. Many settlers of the valley farther north took refuge at La Cañada and were saved; but in all the missions of the north and east and west only the friar at Cochití, those at Santa Fé, and one in the Zuñi province—who was perhaps absent—escaped death. The number of victims was slightly over 400, including 21 missionaries and 73 men capable of bearing arms; those who escaped were about 1,950, including 11 missionaries and 155 capable of bearing arms. It will be noticed that the friars with few exceptions were newcomers, and that the whole number in the province was less than might have been expected from preceding annals.

On August 14th the scouts returned and reported that 500 Indians from Pecos and the eastern pueblos were approaching; and next morning the foe appeared at San Miguel in the suburbs of the villa. One of the number was induced to enter the town and hold a conference; but he said that nothing could change the determination of his countrymen, who had brought two crosses, one red, as a token of war, the other white, indicating peace; but if the Spaniards should choose the white flag they must immediately quit the country. They said they had killed God and Santa María, and the king must yield. The governor sent out a force to attack the enemy before reinforcements could arrive, and soon went out in person. The battle lasted nearly all day, but when the Spaniards seemed on the point of victory, the northern army of Taos, Picuríes, and Tehuas appeared on the field, and Otermin was obliged to retire with his men to protect the palacio, where women and children had taken refuge. The siege of Santa Fé lasted five days. The natives were about 3,000 strong. They soon took and de­stroyed the suburbs, and indeed all but the plaza and casas reales. The church and convent were burned, and the water supply was cut off. Out of a population of 1,000, Otermin had less than 150 men, many of them servants utterly unfit for military service; but the situation was critical, and finally on the 20th with 100 men he made a desperate sortie. Invoking “the sweet name of María,” this forlorn hope threw itself against the besiegers and drove them back, killing 300 and bringing 47 captives into the villa, who, after their testimony had been taken, were shot in the plaza. During the whole siege and battles only five Spaniards were killed, though the governor and many others were wounded.

It was decided on the 21st to abandon Santa Fé, or, as the original record puts it, to march to the relief of Isleta; clothing to the value of $8,000 was distributed; and the governor, garrison, women and children, and three friars—Cárdena, Duran, and Farfán—about 1,000 persons in all, began their march on foot, each carrying his own luggage, as the horses were barely sufficient for the sick and wounded. The natives, though watching the fugitives from the hills and sometimes being seen at a distance, made no attack. Perhaps they had not yet the courage to face the desperate valor of Otermin’s little band, or they waited for the hardships of the march to render their deadly task less difficult; but it is more likely that they were content to avoid further bloodshed, now that their chief object had been effected in the invaders’ retreat.

The route was by Santo Domingo, where were found the bodies of three padres and five other Spaniards who had been murdered, and thence to San Felipe and Sandía, whose Spanish inhabitants had escaped, though all these pueblos had been sacked and partially ruined, all vestiges of Christianity having been destroyed. Several haciendas on the way were found in ruins, with evidence that the occupants had been killed. Isleta was reached on the 27th; but the refugees under Captain García had left this pueblo thirteen days before and gone south to Fra Cristóbal. At Alamillo, in the region of Socorro, the governor met García, who had been overtaken by his messengers and returned. Legal proceedings were begun against him for having left Isleta without orders; but he claimed to have acted from necessity, having neither force nor supplies, and believing that all in the north were dead. Here also, on September 6th, was met Pedro de Leiva with thirty men, part of the escort of Padre Ayeta’s supply train, sent up from El Paso by the procurador to aid the fugitives. All went south to Fra Cristóbal, where on the 16th a council determined that under the circumstances it was impracticable to return to Santa Fé; and before the end of September the whole force was encamped in the region of El Paso del Norte, where for twenty years or more the Franciscans had had a mission of Guadalupe.

Father Ayeta’s wagon-train of supplies, the departure of which from Mexico has been noted in the preceding chapter, was a veritable godsend to the refugees, without which many must have perished, and no stand could have been made at El Paso. As it was, with all the padre procurador’s energy and liberality, distributing from his store—most of which had been sent for the friars—ten head of cattle and ten fanegas of corn daily, and with some aid from the Nueva Vizcayan authorities at Parral and Casas Grandes, there was much suffering among the exiles. Many abandoned the company and were scattered in the Chihuahua settlements. At the end of the year Ayeta went to Mexico with a full report of misfortunes and a petition for relief, and his mission was successful; for the viceroy not only took steps to relieve present necessities, but ordered preparations to be made for the reconquest of the lost province. Ayeta came back early in 1681, still in charge of the royal interests, bringing cheering news, supplies, and reenforcements. Then—or possibly not till 1682—El Paso was founded, at or near the temporary camp of San Lorenzo, as a kind of presidio and supply station for the reconquest and protection of New Mexico.

The New Mexicans were again masters in their own country, free to use or abuse the liberty they had won. Unfortunately, they had a leader who, like the governor he had deposed, claimed supreme authority. Willing to restore the old faith, or estufa-sorcery, Pope had no idea of surrendering his newly acquired power or of granting independent government to the pueblos. Therefore, or because of other remnants of Spanish influence, perhaps from the wrath of native deities or retribution sent by the Christian god, aboriginal prosperity was at an end. Civil war, drought, famine, and pestilence devastated the province for a decade. Naturally, we know but little of what happened during this period save the final result; and to the reconquest itself must be attributed a large share of the devastation. Moreover, the Spaniards, who tell the story, are disposed to exaggerate the ruin that followed apostasy from the faith.

Pope’s first task was to obliterate Christianity with all its tokens. He ordered the destruction of all crosses and church implements; forbade the naming of Jesus or Maria; decreed that men should put away their wives and take others to their liking; that all be cleansed of baptism by water and soap-weed, baptismal names being dropped; that churches be destroyed and estufas reopened; that the Spanish language be abandoned for native dialects; and that none but native crops be raised. The new sovereign travelled from pueblo to pueblo to superintend the execution of his decrees. Assuming supernatural powers, he proclaimed that the Christian god was dead, having been made of rotten wood, and powerless, while the native gods were still potent to make the New Mexicans a pros­perous people. The Castillos were not to be feared, for he had built walls up to the skies to keep them away. On his tour Pope dressed in full Indian costume, and wore a bull’s horn on his forehead. Everywhere he was received with honors similar to those formerly exacted by the governor and custodio, scattering corn-meal upon the people as a token of his blessing. The destruction of Christian relics was attended by noisy demonstrations, processions, dances, offerings to heathen deities, and every conceivable profanation of all that the missionaries had held most sacred.

All this was good fun during the insane excitement of victory and freedom from restraint; but Pope’s rule became oppressive. He not only threatened vengeance of the gods on all who refused to obey his orders, but proceeded to execute that vengeance, often inflicting the death penalty. The most beautiful women were taken for himself and his captains. Excessive tribute was imposed for the support of the central government. Civil discords and wars followed, supplemented by drought, which was less adequately provided against than of old. The pagan deities seem to have abandoned their worshippers, and caused some very strange phenomena. The Apaches and Yutas took advantage of the situation to renew their raids for plunder. Many pueblos were abandoned, sites of others were changed, and tribes were scattered. Barbarism darker than that of aboriginal times settled down upon this northern land.

It was not until the autumn of 1681 that Governor Otermin was ready; or, if not ready, was required by the viceroy’s orders to attempt the recovery of the lost province. While the record is meagre, it is clear enough that there was much opposition to this attempt, there being two parties among the soldiers, officers, colonists, and even the friars. Many believed that the opportunities for missionary work and colonization were better in the south than in the north; they had lost their property and their families or friends, and had not yet recovered from the terror of the massacre; they were in favor of utilizing the funds and forces lately received to strengthen their position at El Paso, and of putting off the conquest to a more convenient season. Otermin himself may have been lukewarm in the cause, but if so the viceroy’s instructions left him no choice. Captain Juan Dominguez de Mendoza, who had served in New Mexico from his boyhood, had retreated from Isleta with García, and had succeeded the latter as lieutenant-general, was leader of the opposition, and legal proceedings had on that account been begun against him and others. Most if not all the friars favored an experimental entrada at least, hoping that the natives, prompted to revolt and apostasy by the devil and a few sorcerers, had now seen the error of their ways, and would be eager for peace and pardon.

Otermin’s arm consisted of 146 soldiers, with 112 Indian allies, 975 horses, and a supply train of ox­carts and pack-mules. Juan Dominguez de Mendoza was lieutenant-general and maestro de campo; Francisco Javier was civil and military secretary; and Padre Ayeta, the procurador general, accompanied the expedition with Padre Antonio Guerra, and perhaps one or two other friars.

The start from Paso del Norte was on the 5th of November, and the march up the river past Estero Largo, Robledo, Perrillo, Cruz de Anaya, Fray Cristóbal, and Contadero, presents nothing of interest except these names. From November 26th to the 4th of December, Otermin visited the southern group of pueblos, Senecú, San Pascual, Socorro, Alamillo, and Sevilleta. All these towns had been abandoned by the native Piros, and all ranchos along the route had been pillaged. Everywhere there were clear traces of revolt against Christianity in burned churches and broken images, of a revival of pagan rites in rebuilt estufas, and of later devastation, perhaps by northern rebels but probably by Apache raiders. The Spaniards completely destroyed all that was left.

Isleta, in the Tiguas province, was the first pueblo whose inhabitants had remained, and it was taken by assault on the 6th of December, after a slight resistance. Next day, the 1,511 inhabitants formally renewed their allegiance, received pardon with much advice, and offered many children for baptism. Here the walls of the burned church served as a corral for cattle; but the people had plenty of excuses to offer, attributing all that was unchristian to the northern apostates, who had come to attack their town and force these faithful subjects of the Spanish king to feign a relapse to idolatry. Indeed, they regarded Otermin’s arrival as a most fortunate event, for they had plenty of corn, and were expecting an attack from the famine-stricken rebels of the north. A few Indians had escaped before the town was taken, and had gone north with news of the Spaniards’ arrival; and now others were sent out by the governor to notify the rebels of his friendly intentions if they would return to their allegiance.

From Isleta on the 8th, Dominguez was despatched with seventy men to make a reconnaissance of the northern pueblos; and a few days later the governor and his army followed up the river, in a snow-storm, encamping from the 16th to the 23d at a point in sight of Alameda, Puaray, and Sandía. These pueblos, whose inhabitants had fled, were found in the same condition as those below Isleta, except that they contained large stores of maize, all of which, with the towns themselves, was burned by the governor’s orders. Dominguez rejoined Otermin on the 18th, having visited San Felipe, Santo Domingo, and Cochití, which he had found abandoned, like the rest with stores of maize, but which he had not burned. At Cochití he met a large force of Indians, who approached in hostile array, but finally consented to parley. Catiti, their chief, professed deep penitence for his sins, shedding tears, and promising in a day and a half to bring in all the rebels of the three towns to accept pardon and renew their allegiance. He failed to keep his agreement; the hostages held were strangely allowed to depart; and much evidence was obtained to show that Catiti’s penitence was but a ruse, to gain time for the Moquis and other distant tribes to join the rebel force at Cieneguilla for a combined attack on the Spaniards. Accordingly, Domínguez returned south to rejoin the governor, who severely criticised his management of the expedition, blaming him for not having burned the pueblos, for not having sent reports, and for various other short­comings.

Otermin spent the week of his stay near Sandía, chiefly in examining witnesses on the details of Domínguez’ expedition, and on the causes of the original revolt, the acts of the Indians during the past year, and their present disposition. Among the witnesses were two half-breeds, who claimed to have been forced into the rebellion, and who gave themselves up voluntarily. The record is very voluminous, and many pages might be filled with details that would have more interest than real importance. On the 23d a junta de guerra was held, and radical differences of opinion were expressed; but the decision was that in view of the natives’ bitter hostility, the inadequacy of the force for a military conquest, the bad condition of the men, and especially of the horses, the snow and intense cold of midwinter, and finally the news that the hostile natives under Tupatú were threatening the faithful Tiguas—it was best to retire to a point opposite Isleta, which was done on the 24th or 25th. Here other witnesses were examined, and evidence accumulated to the effect that the rebels were preparing to run off the horses and massacre the enfeebled Spaniards. Matters were still further complicated by the defection of a large part of the Isletas, who fled to join the rebel army. Though some were nominally in favor of remaining, it is clear that none, not even Otermin or Ayeta, was zealous in the cause; and that the chief anxiety was to fill the autos with evidence that should justify a retreat. Yet it must be admitted that this evidence, if somewhat highly colored, had much real force.

The final junta began on the last day of the year, and on January 1, 1682, it was decided to march southward. There were 385 Indians at Isleta who still remained faithful, and who could not fairly be left to the vengeance of the apostates; therefore they accompanied the army. The pueblo having been burned, with all the grain and other property that could not be carried, the retreat down the valley began on the 2d; and on the 11th of February Otermin reached Estero Largo, only a few leagues from El Paso. From this point the governor sent a general report to the viceroy, accompanied by the autos, to which he referred for details. In this document he made known his plans for settlement and missionary work in the El Paso region, asked for more stringent regulations to keep the colony together and bring back fugitives of the past few years, and also for leave of absence to visit Parral for medical treatment. On the 25th of June the fiscal of the audiencia in Mexico made a report, in which, after a careful resume of the entrada from the autos, he commented in severe terms on the acts of Dominguez de Mendoza, recommending criminal prosecution of that officer; and he also blamed Otermin for not having made a stand at Sandía or some other convenient point, since the large stores of maize destroyed in the southern pueblos and left undestroyed in the north would have sufficed to restore the horses and support the army until help or new orders could be received. The fiscal favored, however, the proposed settlement and presidio at El Paso, though the New Mexican soldiers should not be permitted to enlist in the southern presidial company; and he also approved strict measures to collect and keep together all fugitives of the colony, whether Spaniards or Indians. The governor’s leave of absence was not granted.

With the termination of Otermin’s journal in the spring of 1682, the record again becomes fragmentary and meagre. We have, however, some items of mission work in the El Paso region, the succession of governors, and a few attempts to regain lost ground in the north. With the 385 natives that had come with Otermin from Isleta, a few who had accompanied the original refugees of 1680, and some who came later, the padres proceeded to found three new mission pueblos in the south. These were Senecti, Socorro, and Isleta. Not much is known of what was accomplished in the following years, and that little belongs mainly to the annals of Chihuahua and Texas; but there were many troubles with converts and gentiles, and most of those who came from New Mexico gradually disappeared from their new homes. During most of the decade Padre Nicolás Lopez, perhaps the same as Hurtado, held the office of custodio and procurador general. In 1687 there was a royal order that twenty new missionaries should be sent to the Rio del Norte.

The rule of Governor Otermin ended in 1683, and he was succeeded the same year by Domingo Jironza Petriz Cruzat, though Bartolomé de Estrada Ramirez is named as an intermediate ruler. Cruzat, or Cruzate as the name is also written, held the office four years, though involved in controversies with the governor of Nueva Vizcaya, and perhaps temporarily suspended in 1684-5. Captain Mange, the explorer and writer, nephew and eulogist of Don Domingo, tells us that he ruled con aplauso, chastised the apostates, routed a combination of ten nations, reduced some of them to pueblo life, made fifteen campaigns, ruled more as a father than as a governor, and in his final residencia was pronounced a “bueno, recto, y limpio juez,” and thanked in the king’s name; and indeed, much of this praise seems to have been well deserved.

In September 1683 the king approved all that had been done by the viceroy, including the establishment of a presidio of 50 men at El Paso; and he ordered that every effort should be made, with the slightest possible expense, to regain the lost province. In August 1684 a force of 50 Spaniards and 100 Indians was sent against a ranchería of apostate and gentile Apaches to kill the men and capture the women and children. In September 1685 the governor issued strict orders for the arrest and return of all fugitives. It was perhaps in connection with this order that the troubles with Governor José de Neiva of Nueva Vizcaya occurred; and it is to be noted that in the same month the maestro de campo, Juan Dominguez de Mendoza—before involved, as will be remembered, in serious charges—ran away from El Paso with the intention of going to Mexico, accompanied by several other officers. Alonso García succeeded Dominguez as maestro de campo and lieutenant-governor.

In 1686, under circumstances that are not explained, but on which the despatches carried by Dominguez and his companions to Mexico would probably throw much light, Cruzat was succeeded by Don Pedro Reneros de Posada, who ruled till 1689. Of his rule nothing appears except that he seems to have made an entrada to the towns of the Queres, and that according to Mange there were complaints of his inefficiency, resulting in the reappointment of Jironza de Cruzat. The latter in 1688 or 1689 renewed the entrada and fought the Queres, with other tribes fortified at Cia, killing 600 of the apostates and capturing over 70, who, except a few old men who were shot in the plaza, were with the king’s license sold into slavery for 10 years, many of the natives having been burned to death in their dwellings rather than submit to capture. Next year, or in 1690, the governor had his preparations made for another effort in the north; but a revolt of the Sumas demanded his attention.

In 1689 Toribio de Huerta, claiming to have been one of the original conquerors of New Mexico, applied to the king for authority to undertake the reconquest, with the title of marques, and other emoluments as usually demanded for such service. Of course, his chief aim was the saving of apostate souls; but he also reminded the monarch that between Zuñi and Moqui was the Sierra Azul, a region immensely rich in silver, and made all the more desirable by the well-known existence of a quicksilver mine near at hand. This picture seems to have struck the fancy of the king and his counsellors, for he instructed the viceroy to give the subject particular attention, investigating the feasibility of the scheme, and Don Toribio’s means for accomplishing it. As we hear no more of the matter, we may suspect that the empresario could not support all his allegations about northern wealth.

Before the king heard of Cruzat’s zeal and success, he had appointed as his successor Diego de Vargas Zapata Lujan Ponce de Leon. In later orders of July 1691, he instructed the viceroy that if Vargas had not taken possession of the office, or if he was not ruling successfully, he was to be given another good place and Cruzat retained as governor; but Vargas had begun to rule early in 1691, and Cruzat was a few years later made governor of Sonora. In the orders to which I have alluded, the king consented to raise the pay of the presidio soldiers from 315 to 450 pesos per year, declined to sanction the abandonment of the El Paso garrison, and suggested that Cia might be a better site than Santa Fé for the proposed restoration of the Spanish villa.