

THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME

VOL. V.

THE REPUBLIC OF AUGUSTUS

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PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION

THE publication of the fifth volume, which completes my study of the *Greatness and Decline of Rome*, gives to the author an opportunity for a word of greeting to his American readers. This volume continues the history to the close of the reign of Augustus Cæsar, A.D. 14. The years covered by the narrative present the most important epoch in the history of Rome, because it was during this period that Rome became conscious of her mission and responsibilities for the rule of the West. Her attention had hitherto been directed almost exclusively towards the East, but during these years, it was, under the pressure of events, directed towards Gaul and the West.

Historians have generally recognised that the conquest of Gaul was the capital event of the last century of the republic, but not a few have made the mistake of attributing to Julius Cæsar all the credit and responsibility for that conquest and for its formidable consequences.

Three generations were in fact required to produce from this event all the consequences that were involved in it or that were to be connected with it. From Cæsar to Augustus, there is, however, an unbroken progression and development of events which took place independently of human prevision, and which finally produced that great accomplishment, Roman Gaul, mother of the France of to-day.

It seems clear from the effect produced in Europe by my history that the people of to-day are beginning to take into account, in their study of the old world, the action of certain

forces which move slowly and which had not previously been analysed by historians. The explanation suggested by myself of the Romanisation of Gaul, while it has aroused European criticism has also found a full measure of adherents and support. I may hope to secure for the history a similar discriminating interest on the part of readers in America. The American nation is developing itself or transforming itself so rapidly that its citizens are in a position, from their own personal experience, to appreciate, more readily than can be done in Europe, the immense rôle which is played in life by hidden forces. The action of such forces it is difficult for the historian to trace; but unless they are studied and determined, he must fail in his chief aim and purpose.

GUGLIELMO FERRERO.

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CHAPTER I

THE EAST

Greece before the Roman conquest—Greece and the Roman conquest—Greece in the second century of the republic—The inability of Rome to remedy the sufferings of Greece—Policy of Augustus in Greece—The theatrical crisis at Rome—The Syrian pantomimes—Pylades of Cilicia—The temple of Rome and Augustus at Pergamum—Asia Minor—The manufacturing towns in the Greek republics of the coast—The agricultural monarchies of the highlands—The cults of Mithras and Cybele—The unity of Asia Minor—Asiatic Hellenism and Asiatic religions—The Greek republics in the Asiatic monarchy—Asia Minor after a century of Roman rule—Weakness, crisis and universal disorder—The critical position of Hellenism and the Jews—Jewish expansion in the east—The worship of Rome and Augustus in Asia Minor—The Greek renaissance.

WHEN Greece was declared a Roman province in 146 B.C. the decadence of the whole country had already begun. Her territorial and maritime empire had gradually fallen away, her commercial supremacy had disappeared, her capital had been exhausted and her industries ruined, art and study were decaying, and the sources of her former wealth had run dry. The forges of Laconia, which had been maintained by a prosperous trade in swords, lances, helmets, trephines, files and hammers, were now silent; * the bronze foundries of Argos, once busy and famous, had been closed; † and closed also were the celebrated workshops of the artists of Sicyon. ‡ Ægina had gradually lost her maritime trade and had closed her

Greece after
the Roman
conquest.

* Xenophon (Hell. III. iii. 7) speaks of this industry, which is never heard of under the empire.

† Pindarus in *Athen.* i. 50 (28), i. 49 (27 D.); Pollio, i. 149; Ælius, v.l. iii. 25. Nothing is heard of this industry afterwards.

‡ Pliny, XXXVI. iv. 1; Strabo, VIII. vi. 23.

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well-known bronze foundries, while the smaller hardware articles for which she was especially famous were no longer produced; * the marvellous prosperity of Athens was now buried beneath the ruins of her maritime empire. Her commerce died when she lost the empire of the sea and was no longer able to support it with privileges of every kind; expenditure upon her fleet, her army and her public works became impossible when the tribute of the allies had been cut off; with the Athenian empire had crumbled the system of cleruchies and territorial possessions which brought agricultural products, wood and metals into Greece from every quarter. The consequence had been universal ruin; the shipyards of the Piræus had decayed like the armourers' shops; the Attic vases in red and black which had once been sent to the houses of the rich throughout the Mediterranean were no longer in fashion. The silver-mines of Laurium, the chief source of Athenian wealth, were exhausted; every trade and every art which had formerly supplied the needs and the luxury of Athens had sunk to vanishing-point. The wealthy city, the metropolis of a vast empire and a great commercial centre, had become the deserted capital of a little country some forty miles square, exporting merely a little oil, a little honey, a little marble and some famous perfumes, the last remnants of the wide commercial connections by means of which she had ruled in former years.† Corinth alone remained a flourishing commercial and manufacturing centre amid the universal decadence.

Economic depression.

The decay of the great industrial and commercial towns also brought poverty upon the whole of Greece; agricultural work proved unprofitable, and the artisans could find no employment in the secondary towns; yet at the same time, as in great and small republics, the peasants flocked to the towns from the most distant parts of the country and abandoned the country as the nation grew poorer. The vices attendant upon wealth, luxury, the thirst for pleasure, avarice, the gambling spirit,

* Blümner, *L'Attività Industriale dei Popoli dell' Antichità Classica*, in the *Biblioteca di Storia Economica* (Milan, Società Editrice Libreria, vol. ii. part 1, p. 592).

† See Blümner, *op. cit.* p. 562 ff.

municipal pride and intrigue, far from disappearing, continued to develop with increasing force. Thus Greece had been ravaged by terrible domestic evils until the time of the Roman conquest. To preserve some outward show in the towns, to pay the artists and workmen, to keep up the schools of athletes, the great games and the intellectual traditions, to satisfy the ambitions and the animosities of the many political oligarchies in the great and small towns, Greece had squandered the wealth accumulated by her ancestors and had compromised her prospects in every direction. Parties and towns, as if in parody of their ancient power, had embarked upon war, revolution, plunder and violence; every district had been impoverished by these disturbances and by the unbridled luxury of public and private life. Celibacy and debt, the two great scourges of the ancient world, which constantly suffered from want of capital and diminished population even in the most prosperous epochs, had brought desolation even to the countryside. By degrees, large estates worked by slaves or lands entirely deserted had replaced districts formerly populous, while in the towns art languished and morals deteriorated, in spite of the most desperate efforts. Want and corruption, walking, as usual, hand in hand, entered the palace of the noble, the house of the merchant and the humble dwelling of the peasant.

Midway upon this ruinous career Greece was annexed by Rome, but the progress of her destruction was rather accelerated than restrained. To understand the true nature of the Roman empire we must abandon one of the most general and most widespread misconceptions, which teaches that Rome administered her provinces in a broad-minded spirit, consulting the general interest and adopting wide and beneficent principles of government for the good of the subjects. Subject countries have never been so governed, either by Rome or by any other empire; domination has never been advantageous to subject races except by accident; the dominant race has invariably attempted to secure the largest possible profit for itself with the least possible amount of risk and trouble. As in all countries subjugated by her, Rome had allowed affairs

*The effects of
the Roman
conquest.*

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in Greece to follow their natural course for good or for evil until they became dangerous or disastrous to her own interests. By the destruction of Corinth, the last great industrial and commercial town in Greece, Rome had forced the country to live upon the feeble resources of her territory and the infamous means of subsistence to which a decadent people resorts; Greece was reduced to exhibiting her antiquities and her monuments to strangers and to advertising the miraculous cures of Epidaurus. Moreover, Rome had divided the country into an infinite number of little states, the majority of which included merely the territory of one town. Sparta, Athens, and a few other towns had preserved their independence and some of their adjacent territory; Sparta held part of Laconia and Athens the whole of Attica and some of the islands. These towns in alliance with Rome continued to live under their old institutions and laws without paying tribute or admitting a foreign governor. The rest of the country had been incorporated with Macedonia and divided into a large number of towns, paying tribute and self-governing, with their own laws and their own institutions, but under the supremacy of a Roman governor and the Roman Senate. Thus the little wars and revolutions which had formerly harassed the country had been suppressed in favour of peace. Unfortunately, when peace is not produced by the natural balance of domestic forces, but is imposed from without, it is comparable merely with the lethargy produced by narcotics, which stifle pain for a moment but rather aggravate the disease. The *pax Romana* had neither regenerated Greece nor brought any particular advantage to the country, for the little wealth that peace had brought had been seized by Rome. The great war with Mithridates, the civil wars of the last thirty years, the imposts, taxes and other depredations of the political factions, added to the ordinary taxation and to the extortions of the *publicani*, had reduced Greece to utter exhaustion, overwhelmed with debt property already involved, discouraged the small landholders, diminished the population, weakened the tottering governments and scattered the last remnants of capital. Even the treasury in the temple of Delphi was empty at the time

when Augustus visited Greece. The fair mother of Hellenism, once so rich and powerful, was now a beggar among the nations, enslaved to Rome, with all the rags and sores of infamous poverty. 21 B.C.

If the dreams of those who wished to embellish the world at their pleasure had been possible of realisation, if the domination of man over man could have become the self-sacrifice of the conqueror for the benefit of the conquered, Augustus might have been able to attempt the most marvellous enterprise in Roman history, the regeneration of Greece. Great as was his admiration for the poetry of Virgil, it was not from thence that he drew his political wisdom. He was but too well aware that the power of Rome was very limited compared with her prestige, and that the empire largely rested upon the illusions of its subjects, who were disunited, ignorant and despondent, and greatly exaggerated the Roman power. He remembered that Rome could not maintain troops in the majority of the provinces, that the most she could do was to send a governor and a few incompetent officials to each province year by year; that in no case could she introduce her laws, her religion, any new institutions or any moral principle likely to bind her subjects to herself, and that, in short, she must be content in the majority of cases to govern the subject peoples through their own national institutions. He thus realised that he could do little or nothing for Greece, and that Greece was the one country where it would be most difficult to apply Virgil's great precept, *Pacis . . . imponere morem*. On the economic side the great scourge of Greece was her poverty, for which there were many causes: debt, diminishing population, the want of capital and the decay of manufacture. Rome had done her utmost to alleviate these evils by her efforts to restore Corinth, and if Greece wished to revive her prosperity she must rely principally upon herself. Moreover, it was not strictly true to say that all her resources were exhausted. Both her past history and the territory she held could provide opportunities. Corinth, for instance, speedily revived not only through help from Rome, but also because the colonists had discovered in the ruins overthrown by Mummius a mine of

Rome's
inability to
alleviate the
distress.

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antiquities which could be sold at a high price, especially at Rome. Thus a new town might be rebuilt from the spoils and ashes of the old.* Similarly, the landholders of Elis were beginning to cultivate fibre-bearing plants, hemp, flax and cotton; numbers of women were established at Patras and worked at weaving these materials, especially the byssus, an excellent fibre in which an export trade was beginning.† Moreover, the tree of Pallas, the olive, grew in many parts of Greece, and was a tree of golden fruit in antiquity, as the oil was used for the most varied purposes, for cooking, lighting, medicine, and as soap and unguents, especially in the gymnasiums, baths and athletic schools. Unfortunately the poverty of Greece was not merely the result of circumstance; it was due to many moral vices, public and private: luxury, frivolity, moral degradation, the corruption of justice, a mixture of civic arrogance and civic indifference, the spirit of chicanery, the domination of a little minority of rich men and the servility of the numerous poor. Against such vices Greece and Rome were equally powerless. From time to time Rome might be able to check some of the worst abuses; but she was unable to correct vices inherent in national institutions which the Roman governors were bound to use, in traditions which they were bound to respect, in interests which they could not outrage, and in minds which it was dangerous to wound.

The policy of Augustus in Greece.

However, Augustus' stay in Greece merely marked one stage of a journey far greater in length and very different in intention. Preparations were in progress, probably in Macedonia, to organise the army which he was to lead into Asia during the summer or autumn; he proposed to invade Armenia in the following spring simultaneously with another army

* Strabo, VIII. vi. 23.

† Pausanias, V. v. 2, VII. xxi. 14. In my opinion it is reasonable to suppose that the cultivation of these plants was now begun in Greece, and this for two reasons. In the first place, at this time, as we shall see, many other similar attempts were made in different parts of the empire; secondly, Augustus established a colony at Patras in 14 B.C., so that this town must then have shown some prospect of prosperity, and therefore the textile industry which afterwards brought prosperity must have been begun. Hence we may conclude that textile plants were now cultivated in Elis.

under Archelaus, king of Cappadocia. Thus Augustus, with his diminutive suite and his modest ceremonial, was not visiting this exhausted province for the purpose of extorting its few remaining possessions; at the same time he had no intention of attempting to regenerate it upon the lines of poetical policy preached by Cicero and Virgil. His inclination was rather to readjust to the necessities of the time the old Greek policy of Titus Quintius Flamininus and the aristocratic party, which consisted in concealing the impotence of Rome beneath a show of profound respect for Greek liberty and in leaving Greece to the disintegrating influence of her own vices, so that she would be forced to blame rather herself than Rome for her own misfortunes. During his stay Augustus carried out several reforms, and projected others which were executed later; these were intended to alleviate the disintegrating policy of the previous century and to restore to Greece some vestiges or some show of her old liberty.* He separated Greece from Macedonia and made one province of it, including Thessalia, Epirus, the Ionian Islands, Eubœa and some of the Ægean Islands; the name of the new province was Achaia, and the governor was to reside at Corinth.† He reorganised the old Amphictyonic council, which met every year at Delphi, though its sessions had lost much of their former solemnity; he attempted to establish a diet to which every town in the new province of Achaia should send a representative, and which was to meet every year; ‡ he gave freedom to several towns, including the league of Laconian cities which

* Here may be quoted the judicious observation of Hertzburg, *Histoire de la Grèce sous la Domination romaine* (French translation, by Bouché Leclercq, Paris, 1887, vol. I. p. 465): "Augustus introduced a series of measures to regulate the situation of a certain number of Greek cities; this was done more particularly between the years 22 and 19 B.C., during which the emperor traversed a large part of the eastern provinces and gave its final form to his provincial government. . . . Unfortunately we do not know the provisions or the date of any but a few of them." As the date of these measures cannot be determined, they have been assigned by conjecture to this journey.

† See Hertzburg, *op. cit.* p. 464 ff. The statement that the division was made at this moment is conjectural.

‡ Hertzburg, *op. cit.* p. 474 ff.; Mommsen, *Les Provinces Romains*, Rome, 1887, vol. I. p. 244.

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occupied the southern part of Laconia.* He also remodelled the territory of Athens and Sparta, and forbade Athens to continue her practice of selling the title of citizen, a base expedient which had been carried to excess by the unhappy town.† There is no evidence that Augustus increased the tribute; the poverty of the provinces forbade any such proceeding. On the contrary, he apparently attempted to derive profit from the property which the republic possessed in Greece; to a great Laconian family, that of the Eurycles who had fought with him at Actium, he gave the island of Cythera, which had become State property, naturally under condition of the payment of a *vectigal*; ‡ then, during the autumn of the year 21, while the army was crossing the Bosphorus on its way to Bithynia, he went to Samos, where he proposed to pass the winter in preparing for the Armenian expedition and in supervising the affairs of Asia Minor.

Dispute at Rome concerning the theatre.

Meanwhile Agrippa had married Julia, and after the recent disturbances Rome had recovered its usual tranquillity; § but no sooner had the disturbances in the streets been suppressed than another war broke out in the metropolis between the actors and authors, with the Roman theatres as the battle-field. The upstart aristocracy around Augustus had attempted to hide its lack of descent by professing loud admiration for the past history of Rome and attempting to revive the theatre of Ennius, Nævius, Accius, Pacuvius, Cæcilius, Plautus and Terence—in other words, the Greek theatre which the Roman writers had imitated. It became one of the duties of a citizen to miss no performance of the classical works, to applaud loudly, to exclaim on every possible occasion that nothing so fine could ever be written, and that the revival of a national theatre was required to spread moral and patriotic ideas among the people. All good citizens were to work at this noble enterprise. Horace himself was advised to put on the cothurnus; but the patriotism of Horace was by no means intense. At Philippi he had thrown away his shield, and he now felt no desire to risk the hisses of the Roman public upon the

* Pausanias, III. xxii. 6.

† Dion, liv. 7.

‡ Dion, liv. 6.

§ See Horace, *Epist.* II. l. 49 ff.

stage.* What was more unfortunate was the fact that he even ventured to criticise these old and admired writers; he declared that their verses were clumsy and their language coarse and impure.† Happily there were many citizens more zealous than Horace, who were ready to do anything to help the republic, even to write tragedies. Asinius composed a large number; Augustus himself had composed or drafted at least one, under the title of Ajax,‡ though he preferred in general to encourage others by gifts of money. He had given, for instance, a very considerable sum to Lucius Varus Rufus for his *Thyestes*, which was generally regarded as a masterpiece.§ Literary men of the middle classes who were attempting to win the favour of the great by their pens, also composed numerous pieces, as, for instance, Gaius Fundanius, whose comedies somewhat amused Horace; || doubtless there were many like him whose names have been lost. However, while the Romans were attempting to represent the grandeur of Ajax, Achilles and Thyestes in noble iambic lines, two rivals from the east appeared; these were Pylades of Cilicia and Bathyllus of Alexandria, who put upon the stage a form of entertainment hitherto unknown to the Romans, the pantomime.¶ Invisible voices accompanied by gentle music sang a story; the actor or mime, wearing a handsome mask and dressed in a beautiful silk costume, performed in gesture, following the music, the scene related by the invisible voices. At the conclusion of the scene the actor disappeared, and during a musical interlude changed his costume, the man becoming a woman, the young man an old one, or the man a god; he then returned to act a further instalment of the story. Usually the mimes chose their subjects from the innumerable adventures of the Greek

* Horace, *Epist.* II. l. 177-193.

† Horace, *Epist.* II. l. 156-176.

‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 85.

§ See Teuffel Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, Leipzig, 1890, vol. i. p. 480, § 2.

|| Horace, *Sat.* I. x. 40, and the *Comm. Porph.*: *Solum illis temporibus Fundanium dicit comœdiam bene scribere at Pollionem tragediam, quæ trimetris versibus fere texitur, epicum autem carmen validissime Varium, molle vero ait et elegans Vergilium. Sed apparet, cum hoc Horatius scriberet, sola adhuc Bucolica et Georgica in notitia fuisse.*

¶ Saint Jerome, *ad Chron. Eus.*, an. 732/22.

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gods, from the Homeric and Cyclic poems, or from the ancient Greek myths preserved in tragedy, with a preference for sensual episodes and terrible catastrophes such as the madness of Ajax. Sometimes their lines were written by competent poets, but their chief object, to which end the poetry and music were subordinated, was to tickle or to shock the nerves of the spectators by a great number of different scenes, tragical or comical, chaste or sensual, sentimental or terrible, bound together by a slender thread of plot. Thus to understand or to enjoy the entertainment required little intellectual effort; the spectator needed only to listen and look and to watch the fugitive details, which might be forgotten immediately. Assuming that a work of art is perfect in proportion as it resembles a living form, from which no one member can be cut off, or in proportion as it expresses eternal truths by the action of human characters, these pantomimes would certainly be considered very degenerate works in comparison with real tragedy. However, they proved so successful at Rome that Pylades soon became a popular favourite. The great classical works necessitated some mental effort if real intellectual enjoyment was to be derived from them; the public preferred the easier enjoyment of the pantomime, and its preference testified to the frivolity of a corrupt society. At the same time people may have had some reason to prefer the quick and lively acting of the mimes to the wearisome tragedies of the day, which were painful imitations of the great models, preserving their gravity without their poetry, and therefore heavy and wearisome in the extreme.

Augustus at
Pergamum.

However, the authors of these wearisome tragedies, the national actors, and all persons of reputation raised their hands in horror and protested in their loudest tones. How could such men as Pylades and Bathyllus be allowed to drive Accius and Pacuvius from the theatres of Rome? This petty theatre war is by no means the trifling affair that it is often thought to be. It showed how facts were running counter to the intentions of men in the theatres as well as in the sphere of morals and administration. Men wished to revive the old Roman traditions, and straightway oriental novelties were

forthcoming. The dispute grew fiercer. However, even if Augustus thought that the chief of the State was bound to devote his attention to public entertainments, he had no time at the moment to spend upon the actors of Rome and their quarrels, for he was proposing to give the peoples of Asia Minor, on a larger stage, a very different spectacle from that provided by the mimes of Pylades and Bathyllus ; he was about to go up to heaven in living form, like an actor raised in the air by an ingenious machine at the close of some great spectacle. The admiration of Asia obliged him to mount this old and crazy apparatus, which had already borne the kings of Egypt to the clouds, and to undertake an aerial voyage of considerable danger. Apparently on November 25 he had disembarked at Samos,* at the doors of the old monarchies of Pergamum and Bithynia, in the two provinces of Asia and Bithynia, which had asked permission after Actium to raise two temples to him, as to their ancient kings, in the two old metropolitan towns of Pergamum and Nicomedia. The construction of the temples had not been completed, but none the less Augustus found that his worship was rapidly spreading throughout Greek Asia.† Pergamum was not only working to finish the temple and to organise the worship of Augustus on the model of the cult of Zeus, but had associated in this task the whole of Asia, the *κοινὸν Ἀσίας*, the diet of Asiatic towns which had begun to meet in the age of Antony ; Pergamum wished the temple to express not only its own devotion, but that of Asia as a whole.‡ In fact, the whole of Asia was fervently devoted to the new cult and the new god ; many towns discussed the advisability of instituting solemn games in honour of Rome and of Augustus ; other

* See Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1891, vol. II. p. 466, n. 3.

† A coin (Cohen, I.² p. 75, n. 86) proves that the temple of Pergamum was inaugurated in the second half of 19 or the first half of 18.

‡ The fact that the temple originally proposed by Pergamum was constructed by the *κοινὸν Ἀσίας* is proved by the important inscription found at Mytilene (I. G. I. II. 58 : [ἐν τῇ ναῷ κατα] κερασμένῳ ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας), and by the coins quoted in Cohen, I.² p. 75, n. 86. It was a temple with six columns, and on the architrave were the words *Rom. et Aug.* and about it *Com[mune] Asiae*. The fact is important, for it shows that the worship of Augustus sprang from the force of public feeling.

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towns, such as Mylasa,* Nisa † and Mytilene, ‡ were raising altars and temples to the *princeps* of the Roman republic; at Alabanda his cult was associated with that of one of the town divinities. Mytilene stated in an inscription that "what is low by fate and by nature can in no way be compared with beings possessing the divine lustre and the superiority of the gods"; the town seems to have thought that the mere attribution of divinity was not enough, and solemnly undertook to neglect no means of increasing the divine powers of Augustus if opportunity should occur. § Another inscription, unfortunately mutilated, contains the decree which regulated the worship of Augustus in some towns unknown to us, and decides that tablets on which the decree was to be engraved should be placed not only in the temple of Pergamum, but in many of the imperial towns. The names of several towns have been deciphered, and include Actium, Brundisium, Tarragona, Marseilles, and Antioch in Syria. || The Asiatic towns were not content to adore the president of the Latin republic; they wished to advertise their devotion in every direction, as though to urge other nations to sanctify their subjugation by making their subservience a religious duty.

Emperer-
worship and
the condition of
Asia Minor.

Thus the sceptical politician of a decadent republic, the grandson of a money-lender, was adored as the equal of Zeus, of Ares, and of Hera, and this in Asia Minor, that dangerous Eldorado where Rome had found treasures and met with disasters alike of incomparable grandeur, where she had secured her domination without striking a blow and had preserved it only at the cost of fearful bloodshed. Probably Augustus was chiefly occupied during that winter with the Parthian difficulty and the expedition to Armenia, which was to be concluded in the spring; but he must have found time to consider what gifts the eastern peoples required in exchange for this worship and these temples. It was a worship of very novel character. Even under the monarchy, the adoration of kings during their lifetime seems to have been confined to Egypt, while Asia Minor waited for the death of her sovereigns

* C. I. G. 2696.

† I. G. I. ii. 58, B.

‡ *Ibid.*

† C. I. G. 2943.

|| I. G. I. ii. 58, A.

before adding them to the number of her gods. Why had this Egyptian cult, which had never taken root in Asiatic soil, now grown and flourished with such rapidity? Why, when Italy was attempting to revive republican institutions, did this worship of living sovereigns, representing the utmost exaggeration of dynastic feeling, increase with such rapidity among the Greeks of Asia Minor and cling so tenaciously to the person of the first magistrate of the new republic? When Augustus disembarked in Asia Minor he set foot in one of the three greatest industrial regions of that ancient world composed of Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt. The shores of Asia Minor formed a series of bays and promontories, with a climate and vegetation resembling those of Greece, on the other side of the Ægean; in the fertile valleys of the rivers which run down from the plateau, in the regions corresponding to the ancient realms of Pergamum and Bithynia, the territory populated by Phrygians, Carians, Lycians and Mysians had been divided among a large number of Greek towns after the Macedonian conquest. These towns continued to administer their respective territories under the constitutions of the Greek republic, but had become manufacturing centres; the *ecclesia*, or assembly of all the citizens, the *boule*, or state council elected by the people, the *strategi*, the archons, the *prytanes*, and all the other magistrates elected by the people to deal with public business still held office as of yore. Under such a constitution, Sardis, the metropolis of Lydia, exported to all parts of the world beautiful coverings of embroidered wool* and purple fabrics, which, though less famous than those of Tyre, were none the less well known; † Thyatira was a famous purple centre; ‡ Pergamum was celebrated for its curtains and gold-shot fabrics,§ and for the manufacture of *pergamene*, a product which rivalled papyrus.|| Miletus was also a purple-dying

* Athenæus, vi. 67 (255).

† Pliny, N. H. VII. lvi. 196.

‡ *Act. Apost.* xvi. 16; C. I. G. iii. 3496 (*Βαφέις*). Other inscriptions alluding to the textile industries of Thyatira may be found in C. I. G. 3480 and 3504.

§ Valerius Maximus, II. i. 5; Pliny, N. H. XXXIII. iii. 63, XXVI. xv. 115, XXXVII. i. 12.

|| Pliny, N. H. XIII. xl. 70.

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centre, and wove cloths and woollen coverings for beds and hangings for doors.* Tralles † and Cnidus ‡ manufactured and exported pottery; the crystal ware of Alabanda was famous everywhere; § Laodicea wove and sold various woollen fabrics, which were known by the name of that town; || Hierapolis was also famous for its dyes. ¶ Rhodes sent out many cargoes of its famous wine every year,** and also manufactured a large quantity of weapons and iron instruments; †† Cos exported wine, and was perhaps the only town of antiquity to spin, weave and dye silk. ‡‡ Samos sold oil, §§ and Chios its famous wine ||| and its unguents. Thus these towns sent out wine, fabrics and other merchandise into every part of the ancient world, and their vessels returned to the Ægean Sea with large quantities of gold and silver, in coin or in ingots. This gold and silver was gradually distributed along the coast to the merchants and workmen, to the country people, the country seats of the landholders, or the huts of the peasants, and reached the highland regions by way of the valleys. After the age of Alexander the Great, Hellenic civilisation flourished in the Greek towns of Asia by means of the wealth accumulated by the cloth weavers and dyers. This wealth had given the towns their public and private luxury, had encouraged art and letters, increased the pomp of religious ceremonial and sup-

* Servius, *ad Virg. Georg.* iii. 306; Athenæus, xi. 72 (486), xv. 42 (691); Pliny, N. H. VIII. xlviii. 190.

† Pliny, N. H. XXXV. xii. 161.

‡ Lucian, *Lesiph.* 7; see C. I. G. 3, pp. xiv-xvi, tab. ii.

§ Pliny, N. H. XXXVI. viii. 62.

|| Ramsay, *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Oxford, 1895, vol. I. p. 40.

¶ Strabo, XIII. iv. 14; C. I. G. 3924 (*ἱργασία τῶν βαφείων*).

** See C. I. G. 3, pp. v-xiii, tab. i.

†† Strabo, XIV. ii. 5.

‡‡ Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* v. 19; Pliny, N. H. II. xxii. 76-77. The passage in Pliny proves that the silkworm of Cos was not the *Bombyx mori*, which feeds on the mulberry, but another caterpillar, fed on the leaves of the cypress, the terebinth, the ash and the oak. The *Bombyx mori*, the only silkworm of modern Europe, was introduced much later, in the fifth century of our era. We shall see hereafter, from frequent allusions in the poets to the fact, that *cos vestes* were very popular in Rome at this time.

§§ Athenæus, ii. 71 (66).

||| Pliny, N. H. XXXVI. vii. 59.

ported in ease numbers of workmen, while continuing the institutions of the Greek *πολις*, which were also modified to meet the needs of the towns, and of a population chiefly composed of artisans and merchants. Rhodes, the Venice of the *Ægean Sea*, had shown that an aristocracy of merchants and armourers could administer with the Greek institutions a state where the population was chiefly composed of the working classes and was consequently exposed to social disturbances; successful administration depended upon the distribution of gifts to the people, the provision of festivals and amusements, and of pecuniary help whenever one of the temporary famines set in, which were frequent in populous towns.*

21 B.C.

Culture, pride, the adventurous spirit, mercantile greed, ambition, an insatiable thirst for power, for pleasure and for knowledge were the leading characteristics of these Greek towns and their populations; Hellenic culture possessed a power of expansion as brilliant as it was dangerous. Actuated by this natural tendency and supported by their wealth, these republics had long attempted to dominate the native races in the highland interior, to make them a source of profit, and even to absorb them. From certain points of view the enterprise was easy, but from others it was no less difficult, and Hellenic culture changed considerably for the worse in the course of the attempt. When Greek civilisation left the prosperous seaboard and reached the vast and monotonous plateau which marks the frontier of Central Asia, it reached a strange and hostile country, wholly out of touch with the world of its origin and growth. Rich manufacturing towns there were none; as in the more deserted districts of modern Russia, the country was covered by vast forests, wide fields of flax or corn, and by pasture-lands, with from time to time a few poor villages and distant flocks. The wild and sinister silence of this desert was rarely broken by the step of man; the little republics, with their fiery spirit, their agitations and their seditions, ever in a state of change, gave place to vast and lethargic monarchies, ancient and venerable, professing to trace their origin from the Achæmenides or the Persian empire.

The contrast between the coast and the highlands.

* Strabo, XIV. §. 5.

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These formed the strongest possible contrast with the alert and inquiring populations of the coast, restive under every domination, whether human or divine, greedy of power, wealth, knowledge and danger. An exception may be made of the monarchy founded in the south of Pontus, in the heart of Asia Minor, by the hordes of Gallic immigrants who had arrived in the third century; this district was populated by a mixture of Phrygians and Celts, who had retained the bold and restless spirit of the invaders. Elsewhere were none but barbarous and hardy races, made to endure the domination of men and gods in every form, incapable of independent action, ready for slavery, for military service, for obedience to their sovereigns, their priests and their gods. The mental habits of these races excluded all possibility of political understanding or intellectual culture, and chiefly consisted in a rude and violent mysticism, stimulated by two vast religions, monotonous as the plateau which their votaries inhabited—two of those mystical and vague cosmopolitan religions which crush the minds of men beneath the weight of infinity and have contributed at every age to form mixed races and prepare them for slavery. The younger of these worships was the cult of Mithras, which the Persian power had introduced and spread over the plateau of Asia Minor. It was an austere worship, formed by a fusion of primitive Mazdeism with the Semitic doctrines of Babylon, in which Mithras was worshipped as Justice and as the Sun, the sublime and almost inaccessible source of life and virtue. It was a worship which professed to lead feeble humanity to this inaccessible source by a host of ritual ceremonies and obscure symbols. The kings were regarded as human incarnations of this principle, and the monarchy as the poor but venerable image of the divine.*

The worship
of Cybele.

On the other hand, the cult of the Goddess Mother, known in certain regions as Dindymene and in others as Cybele, was an ancient religion of savage nature based upon the mystery of generation, and had been founded by clever priests whose chief anxiety was to secure wealth and power for themselves

* Franz Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithras*, Brussels, 1902, chaps. I and I; see specially pp. 78 and 80.

Before the conquest of Alexander the Great, these priests had accumulated vast property by mortmain and had secured command of the barbarous races of the highlands by means of a doctrine which taught that the divinity was to be sought beyond the limits of conventional morality or the artificial ties of family and society, within the two extreme and opposed forces which dominate the forces of reproduction. The Goddess Mother, or, in other words, Nature, did not visit the towns to which the Greeks thronged for their strife and their commerce; she inhabited the deserted mountains, the lonely shores and the lakes, far from man, and followed by a troop of animals, lions and stags in their natural wildness. Man must therefore follow the goddess, and seek her far from towns, in the wild retreats of lonely nature, where the free accomplishment takes place of that great divine mystery of reproduction by which the eternal unity is harmonised with the transitory diversity; there he must seek that mysterious grace which makes the universal whole imperishable, though particular beings appear to pass away when their momentary existence is concluded. Man can be merged in the divine when he gives free liberty to this instinct, the one divine spark within him, and frees it from the bonds and fetters of an artificial civilisation. It was an obscure theology, though marked by a certain profundity of thought which enabled the priests to derive profit from the two mysterious and contrary forces latent in the obscure depths of love, sexual attraction and repulsion. Brothels were opened in their temples under the protection of the Goddess Mother, and the priests persuaded female worshippers that the prostitution of themselves was a meritorious act, and that the money thereby gained was to be devoted to the goddess—in other words, to her ministers. Ascetic tendencies were also turned to advantage, and chastity, or even castration, were represented as no less meritorious than prostitution. A company of eunuch priests had also been organised who invited to festivals of blood all who were willing to honour the goddess by the sacrifice of their virility.*

* Concerning this cult see Ramsay, *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, I. 87, 93 (Oxford, 1895).

. 21 B.C
The unity of
Asia Minor.

This vast diversity of climate, race, language, government and religion had none the less been long stirred throughout Asia Minor by an obscure movement, latent, but none the less intense, towards unification. The apparent inconsistency may be explained by a consideration of the social configuration of the country. The routes by which the monarchies of the interior communicated with the Mediterranean world passed through Greek territory, while the routes of Greek communication with Persia passed through the territories of the monarchies. While the natives of the highlands were agriculturists and shepherds, the Greeks were artisans and merchants. To the highlanders they sold many objects manufactured in their towns, and received in exchange skins, wool, flax, timber, minerals, and, above all, slaves. When the natural shrinkage of a town population left vacancies in the Greek cities, or when new workers were required, they were provided by Phrygia, Lydia, and the vast realms of Pontus and Cappadocia. The peasants of these regions saw neither shame nor cruelty in the practice of bringing up children for sale to the slave merchants, who took them to the manufacturing towns where men were needed. Though Hellenic civilisation had by no means overrun the highlands, it had at least touched the summits of them; at the royal courts Greek civilisation was in fashion, Greek artists were employed, and a few towns were built and maintained at great expense, to become preserves of Greek culture. On the other hand, Asiatic Hellenism lost much of its political force in contact with the native races, but was imbued with much of their religious spirit. The working class particularly, composed of Carians, Phrygians and Lydians, brought their native religious spirit to the towns, and gradually became more attached to the temples than to the towns. The upper classes, in which the proportion of rich merchants was constantly increasing, found themselves surrounded by strange religions which agreeably impressed the imagination and excited the senses; to the gods they readily devoted that part of their time which the Greek conception of life would have reserved for the State. By degrees the Greek gods opened their temples to native divinities, and attempts

at identification were made, as in the case of Artemis of Ephesus; the native temples were thrown open to the Greek gods, and the deities of these two metaphysical religions became Greek in form and aspect. In the group of Mithras Tauroctonus produced by the school of Pergamum, a fair Greek ephēbus, wearing the Phrygian cap, symbolised that vague divine splendour conceived by the Persian spirit.* Thus civic patriotism diminished, while religion, with its innumerable priests, its rich and sumptuous temples, the multiplicity of its cults, its frequent and interminable feasts and festivals, became no less paramount than industry and commerce in the public and private life of the Asiatic Greeks.† Contact with the native races produced a further result. These races had been formed by centuries of monarchical government, and industrial interests, added to the influence of Asiatic religion, induced the Greek towns to attempt a reconciliation of monarchy and republic; monarchism had been overcome by European adventurers, overlaid with Greek culture, and was ready to protect the Greek spirit, to use and support the republics and to abandon its former antagonism. In almost every case the commercial interests of the Greek towns in Asia extended far beyond their own territories; they required peace, tranquillity and order in regions where their feeble political power was devoid of influence. On the other hand, the slow invasion of the highland monarchical spirit had gradually weakened civic and republican patriotism. The towns had readily recognised monarchy as the greatest force capable of co-ordinating their own interests. The Diadochi in the course of their intestine warfare had kept a general purpose in view; they had respected the republican institutions of the towns, and had attempted to use them as a means of grafting Greek civilisation upon the native races; they had also founded several republics upon Greek models in the interior of the country; the Greeks, again, had worshipped this co-ordination of their interests

* Franz Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1902, p. 18.

† For the importance of religion in the Hellenism of Asia Minor see the fine study of V. Chapot, *La Province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie*, Paris, 1904, p. 395 ff.

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as personified in the kings. Thus the atmosphere was charged with mysticism and monarchical inclinations had assumed a religious colouring; on the one hand was the example of distant Egypt, on the other the native doctrines of Mithras worship, and the Asiatic Greeks had eventually realised that the best means for securing general respect for these kings among all the peoples of Asia Minor was to make them gods or demi-gods. Thus the divine attributes of monarchy and the apotheosis of dead kings, as practised in Asia Minor, was something more than monstrous flattery offered by degenerate Greeks; it was one of the numerous methods by which Hellenic civilisation attempted to pursue its great aim of economic and intellectual supremacy over the native races of Asia and Africa. These little republics of merchants, artisans and literary men were in no lack of money, but their military power and their diplomacy were weak; they therefore used the new Hellenic monarchies as a bulwark against the distant power of Persia, against the semi-Persian chieftains of the highlands, lying between the old empire of the Achæmenides and the coasts. These monarchies were utilised and adored as the unifying principle in town and republican life, and as the beneficent force which protected their commerce on the continent and on the sea.

The provinces
of Asia Minor

Now, a century after the fall of the kingdom of Pergamum, it was not dead kings but a living republican magistrate that the Asiatics adored; they bowed before Rome in worship, though they had more reason to hate than to venerate her name. When Rome succeeded the kings of Pergamum, though she continued their traditional policy, she abandoned their historic mission. Many towns had been declared free—that is, exempt from tribute, independent of the Senate and the proconsul, and allied to Rome on a footing of equality; such towns were Cnidus, Mylasa, Chios, Mytilene, Ilion, Lampsacus, Cyzicus and Rhodes, and such was their status when Augustus reached Asia; * the remaining towns were under the authority of a proconsul and subject to payment of tribute, though the populations were allowed to meet, to pass laws, to elect their councils and their magistrates, and to be governed by their

* Chapot, *La Province consulaire d'Asie*, Paris, 1904, p. 114 ff.

own laws, subject to the intervention of the Senate and the proconsul, though this was not frequently exerted. The proconsul was merely an overseer and a treasurer, whose business was to collect the annual tribute and send it to the metropolis. Rome, however, was by no means concerned, like the Asiatic monarchies, to defend the vital interests of Hellenic civilisation, to foster its diffusion and maintain its supremacy over the native races, to protect its commerce and to co-ordinate the efforts of the different towns. Rome was far away. For two centuries she had been represented in these territories by a proconsul who was changed every year, and by a Senate overburdened with business, legislating, like all assemblies, without attempt at a continuous policy, and ignorant of the country and its population. Hitherto the chief care of Rome had been to rob the Greek towns of the gold and silver which they accumulated in exchange for their merchandise, and to see that none of the highland monarchies, Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Galatia, or Commagene, descended upon the coast to seize the inheritance of the Attalids with even less scruple than Rome had shown. Thus by degrees she had allowed events in Asia Minor to drift, and though she had not entirely destroyed, she had none the less weakened the vital elements of this heterogeneous society, both the Hellenic spirit and the native traditions. She had half ruined the Greek republics and almost crushed their intellectual activity; at the same time her continual reorganisations had weakened all the highland monarchies, with the possible exception of Galatia. In the latter country, at the time of Augustus, was to be found an aristocracy of rich landholders and a king richer than any of them,* governing a strong population of Phrygians and Celts composed of peasants and soldiers, who cultivated the soil, reared vast flocks, and exported wool, † santonine ‡ and certain medicinal gums extracted from the acacia.§ They had been allies of Rome for centuries, and had accumulated much wealth by military service under Rome during the last fifty years, especially against Pontus. After

* Strabo, XII. vi. 1.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Pliny, N. H. XXI. xxi. 160.

§ Pliny, N. H. XXIV. xii. 109.

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the battle of Actium Augustus had been so struck by the vigour of this people and by the capacity of their king, Amyntas, that he had united to Galatia Lycaonia, Pamphylia, Pisidia and modern Cilicia; these were the wildest parts of Asia Minor, and concealed the nests of the brigands and pirates who plundered the east; Amyntas had been commissioned to destroy these malefactors. In the course of this enterprise Amyntas had died, and as Rome could find no one willing to take his place Galatia had been made a province. The remaining sovereigns of the highlands were feeble, timorous and often in great pecuniary need; they were preserved by Rome for the sake of the last remnants of authority over the natives which they still possessed. A literary Greek of Laodicea, by name Polemo, the son of Zeno, the celebrated orator, was now king of Pontus, the famous realm of Mithridates; Pontus, remote, isolated and forgotten, seemed to be expiating the great dream of an Asiatic empire by her complete devotion to the obscure labours of peace. The numerous and varied races of the country were solely occupied with agriculture, mining* and cattle-breeding, the rearing of their children and the veneration of the gods. The few colonies on the Black Sea, the only towns of importance in the country, Sinope, Amisus and Trebizond, had no ambition or inclination for war; they were fully occupied with the local industries, the tunny fishery, the exportation of timber, wool and iron,† and certain rare and costly herbs, such as liquorice ‡ and hellebore.§ Cappadocia, the kingdom of Archelaus, was even more poverty-stricken, and its vast territories were inhabited by an unintelligent race, also subsisting upon agriculture, cattle-breeding and mining,|| which spoke a language of its own, and which had but two towns, Mazaca and Comana.¶

* Concerning the mines of Pontus see Strabo, XII. iii. 19, XII. iii. 30, XII. iii. 40.

† On the subject of Pontus see Blümner, *L'Attività Industriale dei Popoli dell' Antichità Classica*, vol. ii. part i. of the *Biblioteca di Storia Economica*, published at Milan by the Società Editrice Libreria, p. 539.

‡ Pliny, N. H. XXII. ix. 24.

§ Pliny, N. H. XXV. v. 49.

|| Strabo, XII. ii. 10.

¶ Strabo, XII. ii. 6.

21 B.C.
The condition
of the country.

The native races of the highlands, with the exception of the Galatians, had been decimated, reduced to poverty and humiliated by the Roman policy; they had lost their best blood in the terrible wars which Rome had spread throughout Asia Minor; at the same time, their former conquerors, the Greeks of the towns, had endured no less suffering and loss. For a century they had been condemned to the toil of Sisyphus; they were obliged to send out their merchandise to Italy, and thus to recover the precious metals of which Rome had deprived them by taxation and usury; as soon as they had amassed sufficient wealth, the process of pillage once more began, until the Greek towns of Asia Minor had been utterly exhausted. The invasion of Mithridates had been followed by the reconquest of Sulla, the devastations of the pirates, the influx of the Roman *publicani*, the confiscations of Pompey's generals, the pillage of Brutus and Cassius and the exactions of Antony, with the result that the condition of the country was positively appalling. The wealthy classes had been ruined or reduced to poverty by a succession of financial catastrophes, had lost their only means of support as Roman authority declined, and for the last thirty years had been unable to maintain in their former splendour the costly liturgies, and therefore the prestige of Hellenism, which depended upon them. Thus the institutions of the *polis* had been utterly disordered, art and science had decayed, and in every town cliques of corrupt and needy politicians were attempting to profit by the vices and ignorance of the people. The finances were in a miserable state, the public monuments in ruin and the schools neglected; justice was bought and sold, the populations were capricious and violent, and all honest men were disgusted by the prevailing corruption, which was both intolerable and incurable. In Asia Minor, as throughout the east, this fearful social disruption to which Roman policy had subjected Greek civilisation had favoured the slow and tenacious growth of two forces which rose like weeds among the ruins, the brigands and the Jews.

The brigand people of Cilicia had killed Amyntas a short time before and had proved a most serious embarrassment to Rome. Herod the Great.

21 B.C.

When Augustus ruled Asia he was confronted with a strange situation which no intelligent man would have thought conceivable a century earlier. He perceived that as Amyntas was dead the only eastern sovereign who could command respect, if not, perhaps, admiration, was Herod, the king of the Jews. Herod was a barbarian by birth, an Idumean, whose family had been converted to Judaism a short time previously. During the confusion of the last civil wars a series of intrigues and aggressions had enabled him to usurp the sovereign dignity of the old Asmonean family of Judea. Thus he had become the king of an obscure and uncivilised people which for centuries had lived amid the desolating eastern wars, with no apparent destiny but to swell the plunder of the conquerors. Yet Herod now aspired to become the foremost of the Roman vassals in the east; he neglected no opportunity of attracting attention to himself and to his Judean kingdom. He had provided a contingent of soldiers for the expedition of Ælius Gallus to the Yemen. He had given Samaria the name of Sebaste, the Greek translation of Augustus; * he had begun the construction of a town which he proposed to call Cæsarea; † he wished to establish in Judea among his barbarian subjects a magnificent and luxurious monarchy in the Greek style, and for this purpose was beginning great public works in every part of his realm; at Jerusalem he had established games in honour of Augustus to be held every five years; he was building a great theatre and amphitheatre, ‡ introducing Greek artists and striking coinage with Greek inscriptions. Herod aspired not only to become the first vassal of Rome in the east, but also a patron of Greek civilisation, though he was but an Idumean Arab and king of the half-civilised Jews.

National
characteristics
of the Jews.

At the same time his aspirations were by no means foolish, for the condition of the Jews had undergone a great change throughout the east during the last century. They already possessed some of the qualities which make them a force to-day; they were hard-working and thrifty; amid numberless sensual religions, they lived beneath an austere God, who was a stern

* Josephus, A. J. XV. viii. 5.

† *Ibid.* ix. 10.

‡ *Ibid.* viii. 1.

moral guardian and not an obliging procurer of vice; finally, they were extremely prolific, a most valuable quality in an age when civilisation had exhausted many another race. For a long time they had been obliged to emigrate in large numbers, and had found admirable opportunities for expanding and making their fortunes as Hellenic civilisation broke up. They had formed considerable colonies, had acquired wealth and prosperity in all eastern towns—in the towns of Egypt and in Alexandria * especially, in the towns of Asia Minor,† and in those of Persia and Babylonia,‡ beyond the frontier. In every case they were a necessary part of the city population, as artisans, merchants or bankers.§ The majority lived very quietly; a certain number acquired a competence, while a few became enormously rich—the Rothschilds of the day; all formed colonies, with their own customs, laws and ideas, utterly different from those of the Greeks; nor would they abandon these at any price. They had a particular repugnance for the religious eclecticism so common in the ancient world; they declined to adore any God but their own, attempted to make converts, and professed a scrupulous observance of their religion wherever they were, even at the risk of wounding native sentiments. If the laws of a town contradicted the precepts of their religion they declined to submit to the laws or left the town; they had but little connection with the population which received them, and lived apart, forming a people within a people, a state within a state.|| Numerous, united and hard-working, hated for their eccentricities and feared for their wealth, their inclinations and their yearnings were ever turned towards Jerusalem and its temple. They never forgot the Holy Land where Jehovah had his sanctuary; they often returned to their own country or sent immense sums of money

* Josephus, *Contr. Apion.* li. 6.

† Philemon, *Legat. ad Caium*, 33; Josephus, A. J. XVI. ii. 3; Chapot, *la Province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie*, Paris, 1904, p. 183.

‡ Philemon, *Legat. ad Caium*.

§ See Chapot, *La Province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie*, Paris, 1904, p. 185.

|| See the interesting fragment of Nicolas of Damascus in Müller, *Frag. Histor. Græc.* iii. 420.

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to the support of the national existence. Thus the Jews, with their colonies, their commerce, and their wealth, had acquired great power over the decaying Hellenism throughout the east. Herod's policy was merely the inevitable consequence of this spontaneous Jewish expansion, and Herod realised that the Jewish state could no longer be confined to the frontiers of Palestine, as the nationality spread over the world; his duty was to follow his people, to make himself known, loved or feared beyond his own frontiers, in order to support Jewish emigration, or to overcome the hatreds and difficulties which surrounded their colonies. His policy was based upon two principles: he was to be the client and vassal of Rome, in full honesty and loyalty, and to secure the protection of the great republic for his Jewish colonies wherever they might be; he was also attempting a reconciliation as far as possible between Judaism, which, in spite of its strength, was unable to dominate the east by its own power, and Hellenism, which, if weakened, was not dead, but was eager for wealth and power and capable of revival.

The vitality of
Hellenism.

The temple of Pergamum, the worship of Augustus and of Rome, was a fresh proof that Hellenism was not ready to die. Peace had been established for ten years in the east; confusion had settled into some kind of order and confidence was reviving. Throughout Asia Minor the textile factories recommenced their labours, the dyers mixed their colours and the merchant vessels spread their sails. Meanwhile, on the distant horizon, unbroken for a century save by the vague figure of the Senate, Asiatic Hellenism had observed the slow rise of a figure in which, by a natural delusion, it recognised the form of the familiar monarch. It was in no mere spirit of cowardice and servility that Asia found room in its Olympus crowded with heterogeneous gods for the recent, unexpected incarnation which Italy had produced. This god must be a force no less beneficent than the sunlight adored in Mithras or the Nature personified in Cybele. He must be a force co-ordinating the private interests of the Greek towns, their bulwark against Persia, the protector of their commerce, as had been the old empire of the Diadochi. For a century Asiatic Hellenism had yearned

and prayed for the appearance of this force, but in vain ; futile attempts had been made to worship Rome or the proconsuls during their temporary stay in the country. However, a century of disillusionment had not discouraged the Asiatic Greeks. The expected incarnation seemed now to have arrived ; peace had been restored ; Hellenism began to hope that it might rise from its decadence, and this hope was symbolised by the worship of Augustus. By raising to him and to Rome the temple of Pergamum and by making this temple the centre of a cult Asiatic Hellenism invited Augustus to take the great position which the Hellenic monarchs of Asia had enjoyed and which Rome had scorned.

CHAPTER II

“ARMENIA CAPTA, SIGNIS RECEPTIS”

Augustus and the Græco-Asiatic monarchy—The agreement with the Parthians and the Asiatic policy—The Roman protectorate in the east—The reforms of Augustus in Asia—Peace with the Parthian empire—The historical importance of this peace—Syria—The Syrian empire of pleasure—Domestic difficulties in the kingdom of Judea—Augustus and Herod—The publication of the odes of Horace—Egnatius Rufus as a candidate for the consulship—Further intrigues of the nobility—Augustus returns to Rome.

Augustus and
the Asiatic
provinces.

MAGNIFICENT was the mission which the east offered to Augustus, but would he accept it? Was it possible for one man to represent in Italy the old Latin republic and in Asia Minor the great monarchical principle? If Augustus had temples in Asia Minor, he did not possess the vast wealth upon which the kings of Pergamum had based their power, their wide forests and lands, their countless specimens of tapestry, gold brocade, and pergamene, their multitude of βασιλικοί, or royal slaves.* These huge resources had been dispersed by the annexation of the kingdom; the royal slaves had been liberated, the great factories had been divided into an infinite number of little private workshops, which were probably more productive than the great factories of former times; the lands had become the property of the Roman republic, and had been divided upon methods already detailed. Some remnant of these resources there may have been, but in any case these belonged to Rome, and not to Augustus.† His wealth was considerable,

* Foucart, *La Formation de la Province romaine d'Asie, dans les Mémoires de l'Institut national de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, xxxvii. part i., Paris, 1904, p. 305 ff.

† The emperors held vast estates in Asia Minor (see Chapot, *La*

and he had a large number of slaves, but nothing that could compare with the possessions of the old kings of Pergamum. Augustus was a rich man for his age, yet his wealth was but a modest competence in comparison with the infinite resources of the old Asiatic sovereigns, and most of what he possessed he was obliged to spend in Italy. Thus he found himself in Asia in the position of a poverty-stricken and helpless god; the honours showered upon him rather expressed the hopes of him cherished by the Asiatics than any real feeling of respect or fear of his presence. If Augustus had any illusion upon this point his eyes were speedily opened by two facts. Shortly after his arrival at Samos the inhabitants of Cyzicus, under the very eyes of the new god, had seized the opportunity of a certain disturbance to begin one of those small massacres of Roman citizens which had become periodical in Asiatic towns since the great massacres of the age of Mithridates.* A short time before, Augustus, on the advice of his master Athenodorus of Tarsus, had attempted to put a stop to certain thefts from the gymnasium of Tarsus, committed by a political clique which had been formed in Antony's time in that town; he had sent Athenodorus in person to expel the thieves. Notwithstanding his venerable age, the support of all respectable people, and the prestige and protection of Augustus, Athenodorus was exposed in his own town to the mockery and the threats of the persecuted party, who actually sent people during the night to commit nuisances at the door of his house. The philosopher had been obliged to pass the matter off with a jest; he made a public speech telling the people that the

Province romaine proconsulaire d'Asie, Paris, 1904, p. 373 ff.). But apart from the allusion to the *arca Liviana*, the inscriptions and the information which have come down to us are of much later date. Moreover, it is by no means certain that the *arca Liviana* refers to the property held by the wife of Augustus. In any case, the property of the kings of Pergamum came into the possession of the republic, and must have been held by the republic in the age of Augustus, though the estates had been divided among members of the aristocracy under payment of a small vectigal, instead of being leased to the publicani. We have nothing to show that Augustus appropriated them, and in default of evidence we cannot venture upon a conjecture so unlikely, in view of the constitutional character of his reform.

* Dion, liv. 7.

21 B.C. dependency of the town clearly pointed to a state of illness.*

The Armenian
revolution.

Whether Augustus was man or god, his authority in Asia was derived from Rome, as the moon depends upon the sun for light. It was, however, imperative, especially for reasons of Asiatic policy, to secure some agreement with the Parthians, the influence of which would startle Asia and increase the prestige of Rome. Once again fortune came to his aid. Events in Armenia were precipitated more rapidly than he expected in the one direction which he desired. During the winter of 21 and 20, while the Roman forces and the contingent from Cappadocia were gathering upon the frontiers of Armenia for the invasion in the spring, a revolution broke out in that kingdom, the king was overthrown, and the country declared its readiness to accept Roman supremacy.† In Asia there were but two great states, Rome and the Parthian empire; the petty monarchies of Pontus, Cappadocia, Commagene and Armenia were rather shadows than realities; and Rome or Persia could do with them as they pleased, when they did not impede one another's action. Augustus, however, did not annex Armenia to the empire; he deserted his father's policy for the old policy of the aristocratic party upon this occasion.‡ Roman proconsuls or proprætors found no difficulty in making Ephesus the centre of government for the old kingdom of Pergamum, the Greek province of Asia, the manufacturing and republican state; from Ephesus they could control all the Greek towns between which the territory was divided. The ordinary government of this province, whether efficient or not, could be continued by the maintenance of the town

* Strabo, XIV. x. 14; the date, however, is not certain. Strabo says that the event occurred after Athenodorus "returned to his country in his old age."

† Dion, liv. 9, and Velleius, ii. 94, which passage is, however, very inaccurate.

‡ Mon. Anc. v. 21-28: *Armeniam majorem . . . cum possem facere provinciam, malui majorum nostrorum exemplo regnum id . . . , Tigrani tradere.* Augustus thus distinguishes the recent policy of Cæsar and Lucullus from the traditional policy—that is, from the aristocratic policy of the fifty years which followed the second Punic war—and admits that he followed this latter.

institutions. On the Asiatic tableland, however, when the monarchies were overthrown, the proconsul would be obliged to deal with a population scattered throughout vast regions, unsupported by any military organisation or native institutions, with no officials acquainted with the country, and with no other help than the respect and terror inspired by the name of Rome, which force diminished proportionately to the distance of the subject-tribes from the coast. As these countries had been accustomed from time immemorial to obey none but priests and dynastic sovereigns, it was wiser to seize these sovereigns and to use them as the instruments of a governmental system, the strings of which were pulled by Rome. Augustus therefore resolved to set up a new king in Armenia, and chose Tigranes, the brother of the dead king; he had captured Tigranes at Alexandria after Actium, and had brought him up at Rome. He was unable to appear in Armenia in person, and the coronation was therefore carried out by his son-in-law, Tiberius, with full ceremonial in the Roman camp.*

A protectorate, as compared with an annexation, brought a further advantage. It was less likely to disquiet the Parthians, and if they recognised the change of kings in Armenia their action would imply a considerable increase in the power and prestige of Rome. Many, however, doubted whether the Parthians would consent to accept this diplomatic defeat, and feared the outbreak of a struggle between Rome and Persia. Throughout Asia great uneasiness prevailed, and commerce was paralysed in such maritime towns as Byzantium, where the price of corn rose.† Augustus, however, apparently had good reasons for thinking that Phraates would yield, for in spite of this agitation he quietly devoted his attention to the affairs of Asia Minor. Though he did not openly act as a successor to the rule of the Diadochi, he attempted to reconcile the interests of the Asiatic towns upon certain points. The most difficult question was that of debt. Though the textile industries and the export trade were reviving, the want

Augustus' Asiatic reforms.

* *Mon. Anc.* v. 24-28; Suetonius, *Tib.* 9; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 94.

† The passage in Valerius Maximus VII. vi. 6 seems to refer to this time.

20 B.C.

of money was great: private persons, merchants, landowners and towns were overwhelmed with debt; even Rhodes, notwithstanding its wealth, had suffered severely in the civil wars,* while the condition of other towns was still more unfortunate. We have already noticed that after the earthquake many towns applied to Rome for help; Chios allowed her marvellous portico to decay,† while abandoned and ruined houses could be seen in every town. No doubt these disasters might have been repaired automatically, but the process would have been very slow. Augustus seems to have realised the necessity for radical measures, and to have authorised the towns to annul their debts; ‡ many towns availed themselves of this permission, though some, including Rhodes, refused. Augustus then rearranged the amount of tribute in proportion to the resources of the towns, diminishing the payments of the poor and increasing those of the rich.§ He introduced certain constitutional reforms in some towns, probably at their own request; || he punished Cyzicus for the massacre of the Roman citizens by depriving that town of its free privileges; ¶ finally, he reorganised the highland districts of the interior. On the eastern side, which includes the chain of the Amanus, he restored the old kingdom of that Tarcondimetes who had died while serving under Antony at Actium; Augustus restored to the throne and property of the father the son who bore his name.** Artavasdes, king of Armenia Minor, had died a short time before, and this country had been given to Archelaus, king of Cappadocia.†† On the northern frontier of Syria was the little kingdom of Commagene, a kind of outpost defence against Persia; the throne had been abandoned by Persia and by Rome, and had been vacant for ten years. Augustus

* See Josephus, A. J. XIV. xiv. 3.

† See Josephus, A. J. XVI. ii. 2.

‡ Dion Chrysostom, *Orat.* 31, par. 66 (ed. Arnim., Berlin, 1893). See Suetonius, *Aug.* 47: . . . *alias [urbes] aere alieno levavit*; see Dion, liv. 7.

§ Dion, liv. 7.

|| There is no doubt that upon this voyage were promulgated the edicts of which mention is made by Pliny, *Epist. ad Trajan.* 79 and 84 (Keil).

¶ Dion, liv. 7.

** Dion, liv. 9.

†† *Ibid.*

seized the opportunity of restoring the national dynasty in the person of a child who bore the name of Mithridates.* 20 B.C.
Then, apparently on May 12, the Roman camp beheld † the arrival of the prisoners and the standards restored by Phraates, together with ambassadors ordered to conclude the final treaty of peace with Rome.

Asia was astounded by this great triumph of Roman diplomacy. No one had expected that the Parthian empire would thus give way after three victorious struggles with the Romans. Augustus was regarded as endowed with divine powers, and his arrival as the influence which had changed the situation. Persia herself had yielded, and Rome had made a great step forward, as she had now acquired indisputable supremacy throughout Asia Minor. Italian admiration was also great, though it failed to realise that the protectorate of Armenia was a small achievement in comparison with the promised conquest of Persia, which the public had expected. Augustus, foreseeing that many people would blame him for not annexing Armenia in continuance of his father's policy, wrote to the Senate asking approval for his measures, and prudently adding a dissertation upon foreign policy, in which he revived the old doctrines of Scipio and of the aristocracy to prove that Rome ought not to annex further provinces to the empire.‡ The precaution, however, was superfluous. His friends had hastened to give to the course of events the warm colouring of their own imagination, representing Armenia as conquered, and the Parthian king as kneeling before Rome to ask pardon for his former offences, to restore the standards and to implore peace. While the Senate regarded the letter of Augustus as a prodigy of

* Dion, liv. 9.

† Gardthausen, *Augustus*, ii. 476, n. 23.

‡ Dion (liv. 9) tells us that Augustus justified his Asiatic policy in a letter to the Senate dealing with Roman foreign policy in general, and declared his opposition to further conquest. This proves, in the first place, that Augustus feared criticism and objections to this policy, and that, in the second place, he wished to secure ratification of that policy from the Senate. Dion's information authorises us to suppose, though he does not state the fact, that Augustus requested the Senate to approve acts which he had performed in virtue of his extraordinary powers, following the precedent of Pompey after his great proconsulship in Asia.

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wisdom, the people admired him as if he had conquered Armenia and Persia, in precise contradiction of the policy which he had enounced as advisable in his letters.

. . . Jus Imperiumque Phraates
 Cæsaris accepit genibus minor . . .

wrote Horace * in that year, somewhat abusing the privilege of exaggeration allowed to poets. Coins were struck with the inscription *Armenia Capta*,† in which a kneeling Parthian proffered the standards;‡ the same scene was depicted in paintings, one of which seems to have been discovered on the Palatine;§ these rejoicings, however unjustifiable or unsupported by facts, were more rational than Italy could realise; this treaty restored peace to the east for a century by means of a reasonable compromise between the two great rival empires. The Parthians undertook to abandon all interference in Mediterranean policy, to leave Asia Minor and Syria to Roman influence, and to remain behind the high plateau and avoid the beautiful east coast so ardently coveted by the policy of the Achæmenidæ. Rome, on the other hand, abandoned the programme of Alexander the Great, and undertook to penetrate no further into Central Asia. We can understand the reasons which actuated the Roman policy, but we do not know why the Parthians abandoned the old policy of the Persian empire in the hour of Rome's weakness. Whatever their reasons, the event is of great historical importance, for in the conclusion of this peace was born the Europe of our own day. The treaty gave Rome full liberty of action in Europe, and she might now begin in Gaul that political work which was to end in European civilisation. If Rome had been constantly hampered by continual struggles with the Parthians on the borders of the Euphrates the wild and unknown districts upon the Rhine frontier would have waited in vain for Roman legions and Roman law.

* *Epist.* I. xii. 27.

† Cohen, i. Nos. 8-9, 11-12, 56.

‡ Cohen, i. Nos. 54 and 358.

§ Bernouilli, *Römische Ikonographie*, I. 241

After receiving the standards and the prisoners Augustus ^{20 B.C.} went to Syria,* the country which had produced the pantomimes now so popular at Rome. He wished to reorganise ^{Augustus in Syria.} the details of the Syrian tribute,† and to settle certain difficulties which Herod’s policy had caused in Judea. The Macedonian conquest had brought the institutions of the Greek *polis* and the Hellenic spirit even to Syria; this Semitic nation, however, with its sensuality and mysticism, showed no capacity for policy, war, philosophy, or high art, and was attracted only by wealth and pleasure. Both before and after the Roman and Macedonian conquests the efforts of the nation were directed solely to the task of maintaining what might be styled the Syrian empire of pleasure, and in every branch of commerce and manufacture connected with this object Syria remained paramount. A class of highly intelligent landholders, employing serf labour, cultivated in their gardens the most exquisite fruits and the most succulent vegetables; ‡ the lands of Laodicea produced a wine which was exported even to India; § their famous figs,|| their dried prunes ¶ and their pistachio nuts were sent to all parts of the world.** The artisans were no less skilful than the labourers. Tyre and Sidon, notwithstanding the wars which had convulsed the political world, preserved their ancient fame for their fabrics, their dyes, and their glassware. No purple was more appreciated than theirs.†† Tyre, notwithstanding the appalling degradation of its crowded slums, composed principally of dye-shops, remained the richest and the most pestilential of all the purple-selling towns. In each workshop several workmen (sometimes only

* After the spring equinox: Josephus, B. I., I. xx. 4; A. J. XV. x. 3; see Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, II. 469, n. 25.

† Josephus, B. I., I. xx. 4, A. J. XV. x. 3, says that Augustus had placed all his procurators under the control of Herod; thus it is clear that he was not satisfied with the manner in which these officials fulfilled their duties, and considered some reorganisation advisable. Hence the conjecture that this reorganisation was one of the objects of his journey.

‡ Pliny, N. H. XX. v. 33: *Syria in hortis operosissima.*

§ *Peripl. maris Erythrai*, 49.

|| Pliny, xv. 83.

¶ *Ibid.* xv. 91.

** Hehn, *Pflanzen Cultivate e Animalis Domestici*, Florence, 1892, p. 373.

†† Strabo, XVI. II. 23.

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one) dyed fabrics with the world-famous purple, which were then sold by Syrian merchants at great profit in every quarter. Merchants of greater skill and energy could hardly be found in the ancient world; not content with exporting the produce of their own country, they had diverted to Syria part of the trade which China and India maintained with the Mediterranean regions. There were also convenient warehouses and offices throughout the Mediterranean countries; * in almost every maritime town little Semitic colonies of Syrian merchants were to be found at this age; these were as widely distributed as the old Phœnician establishments had formerly been.† At the same time these merchants sent out dancers, servants, ropewalkers, musicians and mimes to every rich town; the majority of the male and female musicians scattered throughout the empire were Syrian; Syrian, also, were a large number of the courtesans established at Rome, where the graceful *ambubaia* were in high favour with the young men, and not merely for their skill in flute-playing.‡ Thus, by a thousand dexterities, the Syrian, subtle, ingenious and cunning, gathered gold and silver from every part of the empire in exchange for the commodities of pleasure and luxury; the wealth he thus acquired was once more absorbed by the pursuit of pleasure in his own country, a perpetual and exhausting search for that amusement which can be made a source of profit. Constant contact with voluptuousness had infected this mercantile aristocracy with a spirit of moral degeneration. It was a country of merchants and shipowners, incapable of realising any great philosophical or political idea, or any of the great aspirations of Hellenic literature and art which might have led them to a

* Mommsen, *Le Provincie romane da Cesare a Dioclesiano*, Rome, 1890, vol. ii. p. 460.

† For instance, at Puteoli: C. I. G. 5853 (of later date); C. I. L. x. 1576-1579, 1601; 1634; at Ostia: C. I. G. 5892; C. I. L. 14, p. 5; at Ravenna: C. I. L. xi. 198, a; at Aquileia: C. I. L. v. 1142; at Trieste: C. I. L. v. 1633, 1679. Some were in the Danube valley—at Sarmizegetusa: C. I. L. 3 (suppl.), 7954; at Apulum: C. I. L. 3 (suppl.), 7761; at Sirmium: C. I. L. iii. 6443; at Celeia: C. I. L. 3 (suppl.), 11,701.

‡ Mommsen, *Le Provincie romane da Cesare a Dioclesiano*, Rome, 1890, vol. ii. p. 456.

higher destiny. The Syrian literature consisted of third-rate Greek romances dealing with stories of brigands, magic and love, and might be compared with the poorest of our novelettes; Syria utterly neglected such great intellectual arts as sculpture and architecture, for the reason that these required not only ingenuity and skill, but also breadth and vigour of mind; * worship was practically confined to those erotic cults the spread of which we have already noticed in Asia Minor, and here again all power of realising the great problems of life and mind was choked by coarse superstition and by luxurious festivals and orgies.† The life of the nation had neither depth nor conscious purpose. The noise of the crotalum and the sistrum had lulled to rest the energy and vigour on which were based the republican institutions of the Greek *polis*. Party faction or party conflict was unknown in the Syrian towns; order was maintained by prosperity, amusements and voluptuous worship, by ease of intercourse with the richer classes rather than by the menaces of the law; even the peasants were resigned to their serfdom, which was by no means onerous. At times the turbulent Syrian spirit might produce riots, especially in the industrial towns, but these disturbances subsided easily and automatically. Accustomed to easy profit, the country paid its tribute, which provided the larger part of the expenditure upon the Roman army, with docile indifference and without a murmur. No complaints concerning the imposts were made, and yet the nation did not realise that it was the army upon its frontiers which guaranteed peace, and thereby enabled the Syrians to invade the empire, with their merchants, their servants, their amusements, and their courtesans.

Augustus could do little for the welfare of Syria during his stay in that country. He merely deprived Tyre and Sidon of their liberty as a punishment for certain tumults which had

Domestic troubles in Judea.

* Mommsen, *Le Provinces romanes de Cesare a Diocleriano*; Rome, 1890, vol. ii. p. 453 ff.

† See Luc., *De Dea Syria*, which provides a picture of religious manners in Syria in the second century which is applicable to the age of Augustus.

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broken out in these towns * a short time before. Judea, however, proved a great source of trouble. Herod's policy, notwithstanding its wisdom, had proved highly unpopular with this strange Jewish people, who were as difficult to manage as the Syrians were easy. Fanatically tenacious of tradition, inspired by a national pride utterly disproportionate to their power, they were invariably turbulent and discontented, and ever ready to oppose the governmental policy; thus they had conceived a profound hatred of Herod. Herod was an Idumean who had been recently converted, and the son of a minister who had usurped his master's throne; his Roman policy was regarded as treason and his Hellenic inclinations as impiety. In vain did Herod invent the most ingenious devices to overcome his unpopularity; the national hatred of him was continually fomented by the partisans of the dispossessed dynasty, the survivors of that family whom he had brought to his palace on his marriage with Mariamme, the niece of the two last Asmonæans; this alliance was made in the vain hope of legitimising his usurpation. Detested as a usurper, unpopular by reason of the very utility and necessity of his policy, unable to trust even his intimate friends, this violent, sensuous and suspicious Arab had established a reign of terror based upon espionage, and had put Mariamme to death upon mere suspicion. The consequence had been a further outburst of popular animosity. Towns and individuals were continually denouncing to Augustus the cruelty of Herod, and at the present moment the town of Gadara came with a request to be included in the province of Syria.† Augustus was bound to consider whether his continual support of Herod might not provoke some serious resentment in Judea with which Rome would have to deal.‡ It was a difficult position; Rome could rely upon Herod, but his unpopularity seemed to be so great that the very support of this faithful but dangerous vassal seemed to involve great risk.

Augustus and Herod.

Augustus had an interview with Herod, gave an audience to the inhabitants of Gadara, considered the position from every point of view, and remained convinced that Herod,

* Dion, liv. 7. † Josephus, A. J. XV. x. 3. ‡ *Ibid.*

notwithstanding his mistakes, was honestly working for the welfare of Rome, of the eastern provinces and of the Jews. The difficulties which confronted Augustus and his vast empire were represented in miniature in the little realm of Herod, and only by means of the most dangerous methods could he secure the execution of his most statesmanlike ideas. Augustus therefore rejected the demand of the inhabitants of Gadara; he continued to show favour to Herod, regarding him as an intelligent, active and reliable character; he further made him procurator-general of Syria, with orders to supervise the various procurators scattered throughout this rich province. The petty king of Abila, in Anti-Lebanon, by name Zenodorus, had recently died, and Augustus transferred his state to Herod.* Upon the approach of winter Augustus returned to his favourite Samos,† while Tiberius went to spend the winter at Rhodes.‡

Meanwhile confusion had increased at Rome. The convention with the Parthians had by no means checked the bitterness of the puritanism with which the middle class, the literary classes and the more earnest members of the aristocracy continued to protest against the incompleteness of the aristocratic restoration of the year 27. The general public, in great exasperation, vented its ill-temper upon every one alike: upon the aristocracy, the corruption of which aroused disgust, upon the last remnants of the democratic party, which vainly strove to recover popularity, and upon Horace, who had at last published his Odes. After many laborious years of solitude spent in the effort to transplant and acclimatise in Italy the form and content of Greek lyric poetry, with all its grace and beauty, he had at length come forward in entire satisfaction with his work, to publish it and wait for praise. He had been received coldly, and almost with hostility, by the critics and the public. The Odes had given great pleasure to the few who could understand them, especially to Augustus, who spoke of them as an “immortal work.”§ But the men of letters,

Horace and
the puritan
party.

* Josephus, A. J. XV. x. 3. † Dion, liv. 9. ‡ Suetonius, Tib. 11.

§ Suetonius, *Vita Hor.*: *Scripta . . . ejus . . . mansura perpetuo optatus est, ut non modo saculare carmen componendum injunxerit,*

20 B.C.

the professional critics and the public had heaped reproaches upon the little volume. Horace had become so famous a writer that his work could not be ignored, but Rome was unable to appreciate its profound literary importance, and preferred to make its eternal beauty an object of attack in the vague discontent of the moment.* The Puritan party were frightened by his erotic poems, and accused him of immorality; † the critics avenged themselves for the disdain of the petty literary cliques which his solitary life implied; the apathetic public was ready to depreciate any modern production upon comparison with the classics. It had been accustomed for centuries to the solemn monotony of the hexameter or to the simple cadence of the distich, and could not appreciate the metrical variety of the poet, the refinement of his language, or his wonderful descriptive power. His work was criticised as wanting in originality, simply because it was too original. His poems were said to be graceful and readable, but mere imitations of Archilochus, Alcæus and Sappho.‡ Italy feared to recognise herself in these irreconcilable inconsistencies, and preferred to imagine that they were mere imitations of Greek work. At the same time profound and serious disturbance had broken out at Rome once more upon the candidature for the consulship of Egnatius Rufus, the ædile and famous fireman, the pet aversion of the aristocracy.

The candidature of Egnatius Rufus.

The aristocracy had been accustomed for several years to *sed et Vindelicam victoriam Tiberii Drusique*. The remark upon the immortality of his work seems to refer particularly to the Odes.

* Horace, *Epist.* I. xix. 35.

† The first epistle of the first book seems to prove the fact of this reproach. Horace says that he will no longer write traditional poems, but will deal with moral poetry; v. 10-11:

“Nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono;
Quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.”

These verses show that he had not been satisfied with the reception of his Odes, and as we are at a time when the famous social laws of the year 18 were in preparation I am inclined to think that Horace was led to the study of moral philosophy by public opinion, which was unable to appreciate either the matter or form of the Odes. People were apparently saying that Rome did not require frivolous poets, but rather writers capable of teaching morality.

‡ Horace, *Epist.* I. xix. 19.

regard the consulships as its monopoly, as in the old-time republic; at no price would it admit the election of an obscure individual who even boasted of his independence as compared with the nobility. Egnatius was perhaps the only candidate who could now hope to be successful at Rome, even without the aid of the dominant oligarchy, and notwithstanding the great aversion to upstarts. The consequence was a desperate struggle. Against Egnatius were brought forward two powerful candidates, Caius Sentius Saturninus, a noble of old family, and Augustus himself, notwithstanding his absence and his repeated refusals. Egnatius was forced to retire, and Augustus and Sentius were elected; Augustus refused office, and the by-election was postponed so long that at the outset of the year 19 Sentius became sole consul.* Inspired by the traditional and puritan spirit of the time, he attempted to pose as a supporter of the old republican austerity. He proceeded to mete out severe justice to the hungry horde which preyed upon the public finances and no longer possessed the high connections, the influence or the wealth required to avert so sudden and startling an outburst of rage. The little tax-farmers who had been accustomed to mild treatment now found their contracts rigorously enforced; accounts were audited to the last sesterce, and debts which the State had not claimed were called in with merciless severity.† Thus Sentius harassed a large number of struggling people to save the State a few millions of sesterces, and secured the admiration of every blockhead and every aristocratic parasite as the saviour of morality and the State, and as the undaunted representative of republican honesty. Sentius conceived a vast idea of himself in consequence, and when the election of a colleague became necessary he thought himself strong enough to deal with Egnatius Rufus as with the small *publicani* of Rome, and declared that if Egnatius Rufus came forward as a candidate he would refuse to receive his name. Rufus, however, was bold, popular and ambitious, and therefore appeared in

* Dion, liv. 10; Velleius Paterculus, II. 92: [*Saturninus*] *forte solus et absente Casare consul*. . . .

† Velleius Paterculus, II. xcii.

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opposition to Lucretius Vespillo, a noble who had been proscribed in 42 and had fought at Philippi; when Sentius struck his name off the list of candidates he proceeded to canvass for votes in defiance of the consul and of his supporters.* The conservatives and the popular party once again called up their forces in support of Rufus or in opposition to him; Sentius furiously declared that even if Rufus were elected he would not proclaim him,† and either side, when bribery proved ineffectual, began to use force. Riots broke out and blood was shed;‡ the aristocratic clique, notwithstanding its age, recovered all the vigour of youth, proposed to give a lesson to its adversaries, and asked Sentius to proclaim a levy and begin a massacre. At this point, however, the courage of the formidable consul failed, and he declined to follow the precedents of Opimius and Nasica. The two parties were reduced to methods of mutual obstruction as ridiculous as they were violent, which filled Rome with disturbances, and continued so long that the second consul had not been elected in the month of June.§ Finally the aristocratic clique understood that it could not defeat the indomitable fireman by its own power, and once more applied to Augustus for help.

Augustus
abandons
Egnatius
Rufus.

In the midst of this disturbance was inaugurated the aqueduct of Aqua Virgo constructed by Agrippa.|| This was a remarkable contribution to that improvement of public departments for which all were crying. No one manifested any regret for the old-time republic on this question. When the Senate and its members requested Augustus to return to Rome he waited for a time at Athens,¶ where he met Virgil. Virgil had undertaken a long journey in the east to visit the scenes of his poem before giving his final touches to the work, and had

* Velleius Paterculus, II. xcil. 4.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Dion, liv. 10. It is likely that the tumults of which Dion speaks broke out towards the close of this struggle, which must have been the most violent period of it.

§ Dion, liv. 10.

|| C. I. L. xi. 861. The inscription proves that Sentius was still sole consul in June; C. I. L. 2255; about the middle of the month of August the nomination of his colleague was not known in Spain.

¶ Frontin, *De Aqueduct.* 10.

met his illustrious friend in the Attic metropolis. Augustus temporised, probably for the same reasons which had induced the aristocracy to request his return. Possibly he considered that his presence in Rome might be as dangerous to himself as the aristocracy thought it would be advantageous to their cause. He therefore waited, hoping that the discord would die away, and that he might return to Rome when peace had been restored. Affairs, however, in Rome went from bad to worse, and he was therefore forced to decide upon return. He started for Italy in the month of August, taking Virgil with him; the poet's health had broken down, and he was obliged to abandon the journey which he had hardly begun. At Brundisium, feeling his malady increase, the poet said farewell for ever to his great friend and patron, for whom he was to have composed his work. Augustus continued his journey to Campania, where a deputation of the leading men in Rome came to meet him. They were accompanied by a party of prætors and tribunes, and had with them Quintus Lucretius Vespillo, the candidate who was fruitlessly opposing Egnatius.* Their pretext was to pay their respects to Augustus in the name of the city, and to inform him of the miserable state of affairs in Rome, while their real object was to secure his support. The *principes viri* asked the president to stop the candidature of Egnatius, and their arguments and diplomacy persuaded him that the only possible remedy was the use of his discretionary power; he should elect the consul himself, and override the decision of the *comitia*. Augustus yielded, and bestowed one more favour upon the conservative party by electing Lucretius, the former victim of proscription.† The aristocratic party prepared to receive Augustus with great pomp in Rome, ostensibly in honour of his victory over the Parthians, his successful oriental diplomacy and his pacification of the east, but in reality to testify to their gratitude for his abandonment of Egnatius. The affront shown to the over-zealous fireman was regarded by them as of more importance than the eastern successes. Augustus, with habitual prudence, would never

* Dion, liv. 11; Mon. Anc. ii. 34.

† Dion, liv. 10.

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19 B.C.

exasperate those whom he was obliged to wound, and declined this triumphal reception ; he entered Rome quietly, as a private individual, on the night of October 11 and 12.* In the morning the party which was preparing to insult its defeated enemies by its festivities in honour of Augustus heard that he was already in his Palatine residence, and that its magnificent preparations were useless.

* Dion, liv. 10.

CHAPTER III

THE GREAT SOCIAL LAWS OF THE YEAR 18 B.C.

The death of Virgil—Horace writes his Epistles—Resolution to confer further honours upon Augustus—The outcry for moral reform—Horace and the puritan movement—Morality and law—Augustus and the puritan movement—The close of the first ten years of presidency—Difficulties in the way of moral legislation—Agrippa and Augustus as presidents of the republic—The purification of the Senate—Augustus and his work upon moral legislation—The *lex de maritandis ordinibus*—Marriages between citizens and freedwomen—Encouragement to marriage—Penalties upon bachelors—The law is approved—Further agitation by the puritan party—Julia—Vacillation of Augustus—The *lex Julia de adulteriis*—Adultery as *judicium publicum*—*Adulterium* ; *lenocinium* ; *stuprum*—The nature and object of these laws—The timocratic reform of the constitution.

A SHORT time previously, on September 21,* Virgil had died at Brundisium, where he had disembarked, after making a will leaving half of his property to his brother-in-law. His fortune derived from his friends amounted to ten million sesterces; a quarter was bequeathed to Augustus, a twelfth to Mæcenas, and the rest to two men of letters among his friends, Lucius Varius and Plotius Tucca.† Thus at the age of fifty-two the kindly writer of the Georgics and Eclogues was laid to rest with his work unfinished, leaving behind him a collection of admirable but somewhat disconnected fragments. He had not found time to weld into one whole the different material which he had used in the composition of his poem, the dramatic and symbolical elements, the borrowings from Latin archæo-

The death of Virgil; the "Æneid."

* Donatus, *Vita*, 62 ff. R; Saint Jerome, *Ad en.* 2000. There is an error in Servius, *Vita*, p. 2, L.

† Donatus, *Vita*, p. 63, R; Probus, p. 1, K; Servius, *Proem*, *Æn.* p. 2.

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logy and Greek mythology, the philosophy and the legend, the history and the poetry. The subordinate characters in the poems, such as Dido and Turnus, are living human figures, but the pious Æneas is a mere puppet worked by the fingers of the gods, who are no longer the human characters of Homer's Olympus, while they have not become the abstract symbols of a metaphysical religion. The description of the burning of Troy is a marvellous piece of movement and colour; but the poem, as a whole, lacks the true poetic inspiration, because the conclusion of it is foreordained; the pious Æneas must emerge triumphant, though his chief exploits are the delivery of wearisome speeches, and Turnus, notwithstanding his courage and his modesty, must be conquered because his defeat is necessary to the destiny of Italy. There is more human reality in the love-story of Dido and Æneas, but their history is suddenly cut short by the necessities of the poem, which drive Æneas away as they had brought him, and as they had made him enamoured of the queen to justify the future struggle between Rome and Carthage. The descriptions of primitive Latium display an almost musical freshness and harmony, but they, again, are out of place in the close form of a warlike poem, while the imitations of the *Iliad* are too obvious and the summary descriptions of the battles are wanting in actuality. We feel that Virgil has never seen what he describes, that he is reproducing from others, borrowing picturesque details here and there, of which he cannot make a living whole. The ground plan of the poem is of vast size, far greater than that of the *Iliad*, as, indeed, the political work and civilisation of Rome were far greater than those of Greece. The *Æneid* is not the simple human drama provided by the quarrel of Agamemnon and Achilles; Virgil proposed to expound in dramatic form the philosophy underlying the history of a great people, to give a dim future vision of the Eternal City, mistress of the world; inspired by the breath of epic grandeur, his work was to gather all the traditions of the dying religion within the limits of a living narrative. Had his power of execution equalled his breadth of conception, Virgil would have composed the masterpiece of all literature; he would have

excelled Homer, and possibly Dante. Unfortunately, like all the works of Rome, this magnificent plan remained unfinished. Virgil was the first to recognise the fact, and requested Varius and Tucca to burn his manuscript while he was on his death-bed. He could not foresee the value of his work to human imagination in the coming centuries, nor could he realise that the Christian world would find some power of prophetic vision in his shadowy ideals of Rome as the Holy City, which he had gathered from the contemplation of its past. The ten millions of sesterces presented to the poet by the political aristocracy of Rome were lost ; Italy would not have the great national poem which she had long impatiently expected ; Varius and Tucca were to burn the precious manuscript in obedience to the orders of the dying man.

None the less Virgil was an enviable figure, dying as he did in full enjoyment of popular favour, amid the general sorrow of the Italian public, which had waited for the masterpiece long and confidently, and could not fail to find sublime beauties in the poem which he left behind, whatever its defects. Such defects as were observed were attributed to the fate which had not left the artist time to give the last touches to his work. Horace, on the other hand, discontented and discouraged by the cold reception given to the Odes, and disturbed by the criticisms of the puritan party, had begun the study of moral philosophy and attempted to secure a place in the party which strove to reform the morals of the age. He had returned to the writing of satire with riper and more balanced judgment, with more delicate and bitter irony ; he now began the composition of the Epistles, in which he made some recent event a text from which to expound the vices, the deceits and the contradictions of his time. His progress, however, was for the most part purposeless, and was dictated by the caprice of his impressions, his imagination and his reading ; nor did he ever confine himself to the course prescribed by any definite doctrine.

The Epistles
of Horace.

Ac ne forte roges, quo me duce, quo Lare tuter :
Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri
Quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes.*

* Horace, *Epist.* l. i. 13 ff.

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Although these moral epistles were probably written for the purpose of regaining the favour of the Roman public, Horace at the moment proved stronger than his intentions, and his philosophical satire, like his literary efforts of earlier years, ran counter to public feeling. In so strange an age it was impossible to foresee the results of any effort. Augustus had planned to leave Rome and conclude an agreement with the Parthians as a possible issue from domestic difficulties, and he found that the agreement plunged him into deeper trouble than before. The Senate was in no way discouraged by his stealthy return to Rome, and it expressed with yet greater significance the impatience with which he was awaited in Italy; October 12, the date of his return, was declared a holiday, and the new solemnities of the *Augustalia* were arranged for that day; it was resolved to erect an altar to Fortuna Redux, at the Porta Capena, near the temple of Honour and Valour, while the Pontiffs and Vestal Virgins were ordered to offer sacrifices upon this altar upon October 12 annually.* By these honours the Senate merely gave expression to public feeling, which had long been anxious to testify to its admiration for the exploits of Augustus in the east, and to entrust him with a more difficult commission, the reform of morality. The recent scandals had horrified both the puritan and the traditionalist party, and both, though from very different motives, demanded a social reform which would be thorough and permanent. Exasperated by the long struggle arising from the candidature of Egnatius Rufus, emboldened by the support of public opinion and by their final triumph, the nobility at length ventured to demand openly what they had secretly desired for many years—the purification of the Senate by the expulsion of the revolution intruders and the return to a constitution which, if not wholly aristocratic, was to be at least timocratic, or based upon property qualification; magistracies would then be closed to all who did not possess a certain minimum amount of wealth. The middle classes, the better of the knights, and the intellectual classes, who grew more and more

* Mon. Anc. II. 27-33 (lat.), VI. 7-14; C. I. L. I. 2 p. 332; Dion liv. 10; Cohen, pp. 78-79, 138; Aug. cii. 107-108.

anxious for impossible perfection, also demanded this purification, for reasons of their own; careless of the fact that their only road to the Senate would be blocked, they urged that a small Senate was required composed of able men, instead of the vast body of that time, which included eight or nine hundred members. They also raised a more urgent outcry for laws which would oblige the rich to lead that modest and virtuous life to which their own poverty restricted them and would suppress the most obvious scandals of private life. Italy cried aloud for a wise and strong statesman, anxious to serve the public weal, who would bring back to Rome that modesty which a series of horrors had driven out. Surely none but Augustus could perform this task!

Thus, as soon as Augustus returned he was besieged by an anxious crowd of admirers who wished to force him by any and every means to become the saviour of Rome, of Italy, of the empire and of the world. Before the end of the year proposals had been advanced to appoint him *præfectus morum* with the powers of a censor;* deputations were continually arriving, telling him that Rome and Italy were exhausted by licence, begging him to correct these abuses as he alone could, to propose any laws that he thought advisable and begin the cleansing of this Augean stable.† The extent to which public feeling was occupied by this question may be realised from the fact that Livy, who had brought his history down to the year 195 and the abolition of the Oppian Law against female luxury, thought himself bound to give a full report of the discussions which then took place; he gives Cato's speech and the reply of his opponents, and probably introduced a considerable number of arguments which were then advanced for or against such sumptuary legislation.‡ Popular feeling was now so strong that no one could venture to oppose it. Horace, condemned henceforward to differ on every point from his fellow citizens, alone offered objections in his Epistles, together with truly ironical refutations of the puritan movements which professed to regenerate the world by paper laws—a hopeless

The demand for social reform.

* Mon. Anc. iii. 11-12. See the note on p. 52.

† Dion, liv. 10.

‡ Livy, xxxiv. 2-8.

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task, since vice and virtue are matters of character, thought and feeling. If men do not learn the difference between good and evil in childhood, and are not then taught to restrain their vicious passions, virtue will never be more than mere Utopianism; men are carried away by excessive desire for honour, pleasure, wealth, and listen only to the words of *Janus summus ab imo*—the *Stock Exchange Gazette*, as we should say at the present day.

O cives, cives, quærenda pecunia primumst;
Virtus post nummos.*

Social standing was estimated by the possession or the want of monetary qualification for office. "Will you know," he says, "why I can agree with my fellow citizens on no point? With whom can I agree? Some think only of amassing wealth, others of fine clothes, and of indulging every whim for villas, festivities or travel." † The essential principle of morality is the stern education of heart and mind, and the constant self-examination of thought and feeling. ‡ The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* seemed to Horace a marvellous handbook of practical morals, as the upper classes, who profess to correct the thoughts of others, may there find the constant exposure of their own failings. In one marvellous line Horace condenses the whole of his political philosophy: *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi* §—"When kings act foolishly the people suffer for it." To the universal tendency towards luxury and pleasure Horace liked to oppose his simple life, his love of the country, and his independence; to all his opponents and to the criticisms of the puritan party he could reply that his actions were better than their words. "I prefer to eat dry bread and to be free rather than to take my fill of honey-cakes in the service of the priests." || "Let the man who would live according to nature build his house in the country, and not in the town." ¶ "Is the water which rushes from the aqueducts purer than that which murmurs in the streams upon the hillside?" ** We

* *Epist.* I. l. 53 ff.

† *Ibid.* II. 32 ff.

‡ *Ibid.* x. 10.

** *Ibid.* x. 20.

† *Ibid.* I. 70 ff.

§ *Ibid.* II. 14.

¶ *Ibid.* x. 12, 15.

find him quarrelling with his farm bailiff, who wishes to take service in Rome, whither he is attracted by the open taverns and the haunts of ill-repute.* What hope is there of bringing back free citizens to the country when slaves can be kept there with such difficulty? Thus it is obvious that Horace cared little for the artificial puritanism then in fashion, and that he was anxious to demonstrate to his contemporaries that they themselves exhibited the symptoms of every disease arising from corrupt civilisation, though they were blind to their failings; the keen and universal pursuit of wealth,† unbridled pride,‡ the love of pleasure and luxury, the purposeless activity produced in every civilisation by excessive ease and wealth and that nervous strain which Horace calls *strenua inertia*.§ Why are the rich never content? Why are they ever desiring this or that? And why does the keen desire for an object invariably change to repulsion the moment it has been acquired? More serious still, the poor are attacked by the same malady as the rich.

Quid pauper? Ride: mutat cenacula, lectos,
Balnea, tonsores, conducto navigio æque
Nauseat ac locuples, quem ducit priva triremis.¶

The conclusion of his philosophy is simple enough: happiness and sorrow flow from the one source, the mind, and not from without the man. Men who know nothing of Fortune display their foolishness in their attempts to capture her by following in ships with all sails spread, or in chariots drawn by galloping horses.¶ Finally, Horace is bold enough to answer the incessant clamour which demanded respect for the law with the reply that the virtue which only consists in respecting senatorial decrees, laws and civil rights is a very feeble quality. Many a bad action, he says, may be committed without infringement of law. The public will regard as honourable the man who sacrifices the pig or ox due to the gods if he should secretly pray to Laverna, the goddess of theft, for the power to commit fraud and robbery while retaining his good reputation. Thus

* *Epist.* I. xlv. 21.
† *Ibid.* vi. 49.
‡ *Ibid.* i. 91.

↑ *Ibid.* i. 43 ff. ; vi. 29 ff.
‡ *Ibid.* i. 82.
¶ *Ibid.* xi. 28.

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bluntly does Horace state his belief that the puritanism of the age was nothing more than a refinement of fraud.

Augustus and
the puritan
movement.

Horace, however, was a lonely poet, with an income sufficient for his wants, while Augustus was the master of the world. Horace could think and write as he pleased; Augustus was the servant of the multitude. The critical poet in his study might combat the inconsistencies of his time, and win the barren triumph of his criticism; the head of the empire was forced to reckon with these inconsistencies as influences far superior to his own. Whether real or unreal, puritan feeling had become so intense and universal that it could not be neglected. Augustus had done much for the Roman plebs; to the Roman aristocracy and to the middle classes who demanded these laws he had given nothing but the empty satisfaction of an agreement with the Parthians, and the slow improvement of the Italian roads. Nor, again, was it possible for Augustus to criticise these aspirations with the scepticism of Horace; they were undoubtedly reinforced by longstanding enmities and self-conceit, but they also sprang from a healthy view of life and were in harmony with venerable traditions. Numerous laws identical with those now demanded had been proposed and enforced in the course of earlier centuries. This fact, at least, was a proof that several generations had regarded legislation as an efficient means of checking the progress of corruption. Would such legislation be less effective in the present instance? The example of ancient Rome must have encouraged so fervent a supporter of tradition as Augustus. Augustus, in fact, had not refused to accept the powers of the censorship* and the *cura morum*, but he did not employ them with the rapidity and the

* Modern historians are unwilling to rely upon Dion, liv. 10, and Suetonius, *Aug.* 27, who give different details, it is true, but state that Augustus held the *cura morum*, and consequently accepted the office. Modern historians prefer the contrary statement given in *Mon. Anc.* (Gr.), iii. 11-21. Yet Augustus was unable to use the tribunician power for the *lectio senatus* in the following year, as he says in the *Mon. Anc.*, where he obviously alludes to the proposal of the *leges Juliae*. This *lectio* must have been performed in virtue of those powers of censorship which had been conferred upon him together with the *cura morum*. It should be added that Dion (liv. 16) reports another measure executed by Augustus in virtue of his power as censor, and

vigour expected by an impatient public; none the less he resolved to devote his attention to the history of legislative reform, and ordered a commission of senators * to prepare a law against celibacy as a beginning. In so important a matter he was anxious to have no precipitation; these preparations at most were merely intended to satisfy the public and to pave the way, so that when reform became inevitable its difficulties and dangers might be diminished. A favourable opportunity was soon to appear. On December 15 the altar to Fortuna Redux was inaugurated; the year 19 ran to its close. With the year 18 began the last of Augustus' principate; the powers of the *princeps* were to expire at the end of this year.

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No one, however, would contemplate for a moment the possibility of Augustus' retirement. So great a work as the

The close of the first decade of the principate.

we shall notice other instances hereafter which can only be explained as due to the powers conferred by the *cura morum*. These considerations incline me to believe that Dion and Suetonius are by no means incorrect and that the Mon. Anc. is not wholly accurate. Augustus made very sparing use of his power as censor and of the other powers conferred by the *cura morum*, and it was not by means of these powers that he worked to reform morality, but by proposing laws in the *comitia* as a tribune. It is, however, incorrect to say that he never had recourse to these powers, and that therefore he did not accept them. In the Mon. Anc. Augustus towards the end of his life may have made a general statement affirming that he did not use powers which he had in reality employed very sparingly and only in special cases. In that case Dion and Suetonius are not entirely wrong. Dion, however, (liv. 10) is inaccurate when he says that the *cura morum* was given to Augustus for five years, in the year 19. Augustus in the Mon. Anc. (Gr. iii. 11-12) tells us that the *cura morum* was offered to him in the years 19 and 18. Why was it offered twice at an interval of one year? The most probable explanation is that in the year 19 it was given to him until the end of the year 18—that is, until the end of his ten years' presidency—and that in 18 it was given to him for the five years from 17 to 12—that is to say, for the next five years during which his powers were prolonged. Dion may thus have confused the first and second grant. It would have been strange if he had been given the *cura morum* for five years in 19, before it was known whether he would accept the prolongation of his other powers. Thus we have an explanation of the statement of Augustus to the effect that in the year 11 he was offered the *cura morum* once more. We shall thus see the meaning of the *regimen perpetuum* of which Suetonius speaks.

* This was the usual procedure of Augustus, according to Dion (liv. 21), for any law of any importance, and thus he must have undertaken the study of the severe and important social laws which attacked so many interests. Dion himself (liv. 16) indicates that these laws were preceded by long discussions with the Senate and the most influential parties.

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reformation of morals could never be carried out in one year ; there was a universal wish to retain Augustus at the head of the State to carry out these laws, as he had been retained ten years before for the re-establishment of peace. Augustus was ready to accept the prolongation of his power, either through readiness to act or because he could not help himself, or for both reasons. He was unwilling, however, to undertake unaided the heavy burden which was increased every year by the demands of the public ; he therefore contemplated a reorganisation of the supreme authority, the third measure of the kind within ten years. He wished to have a colleague, Agrippa, and to share his honour and responsibility with him. Agrippa was therefore asked to return from Gaul, where he had been performing certain important measures of which we shall speak later. While Augustus was waiting at Rome and discussing the proposed legislation with the senators, he was able to save Virgil's poem from destruction and thus to preserve a work in which every aspiration of Italian nationalism had been expressed in melodious verse. Under his representations, Varius and Tucca, Virgil's executors, ventured to disobey the poet's dying wish, and instead of burning the *Æneid* they worked to complete the manuscript. By the irony of events, at a moment when the whole of Italy demanded further respect for the sacred authority of law, Augustus, to the general delight, reversed the dying wishes of Virgil, though to the old Romans a man's dying wish had the force of inviolable law. A literary masterpiece outweighed sacrilege in the eyes of this generation. It was a noble act of audacity for a refined and civilised state, but a poor beginning for a country which wished to restore the discipline of a military government. Livy, however, had said, *Nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus.*

Difficulties in the way of legislation against celibacy.

As the commission worked out the details of the law upon celibacy it became clear that any reform of the kind would end in insoluble contradictions. The law implied the necessity of decreeing more or less clearly that every citizen should be married, as had been proposed a century before, when the mischief was growing obvious, by Quintus Metellus Mace-

donicus in his famous speech *De Prole Augenda*. It was obvious, therefore, that to restore the obligation of marriage implied the restoration to the father of the family of the rights attaching to this duty, his rights over his wife, his children and his property; the liberty which had greatly overthrown the old despotism of the *pater familias* must now be restricted, and the emancipation of the women which approached complete freedom must be abolished. Every one was agreed that such freedom was the cause of the dissolution of the old family life. Augustus was a strong opponent of women's rights, to use a modern phrase, but at the same time he did not wish to make the path of reform too difficult, or to attack the licence which had destroyed the old family organisation. This licence had been enjoyed and abused too long by the upper classes, and now involved a large number of interests and established customs. Hence a further inconsistency arose; the State had been shaken by the destruction of the family, and it was therefore the business of the State to work for its reorganisation. Augustus preferred to see whether an artificial system of rewards and punishments would not induce selfish citizens to get married, and avoid the necessity of restricting the freedom of family life. The task was by no means easy, and months went by before any conclusion had been secured. Fortunately Agrippa at length returned to Rome, and his energy inspired the government with some activity.

The new organisation was now carried out in full detail. All the powers of Augustus, including the *cura morum*, were to be prolonged for five years; Agrippa was to be his colleague, with power equal to his own; he would thus hold the tribuneship, the supervision of the provinces, the right of issuing edicts, and perhaps also the *cura morum*. Modern historians, under the obsession of the idea that Augustus wished to found a monarchy, have failed to understand the importance and significance of this act; Augustus had been sole head of the government for ten years, and now introduced one of the most ancient and universal principles of republican magistracies, the *collegium*, though the supremacy of his position was yet uncertain, and though his measure might endanger the unity of the

The reorganisation of the supreme power.

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State which had been restored by the authority of the *princeps*. This fact is enough to show that he had no thoughts of founding a monarchy or a dynasty. For centuries the republic had been governed by two annual consuls, and instead of this, would now be governed by two *princeps* for five years.* Then, after the Senate and the people had approved this new organisation of the supreme power, and had given Augustus the *cura morum* for five additional years, he resolved to begin the purification of the Senate, with the support of Agrippa. He acted, however, with the utmost prudence. He considered that this purification would necessitate the reduction of the Senate to three hundred members at most.† To avoid raising discontent he decided to admit at least six hundred members to the new Senate. After making this concession to the vested rights of the senators, he did not wish to incur the odium even of the necessary exclusions, and devised a new method of choosing the senators; the two or three hundred who were to be excluded would find themselves outside the doors of the Senate one morning almost without noticing the fact, and without incurring any stigma. After taking a solemn oath that he was actuated solely by desire for the public benefit, Augustus intended to choose as senators the thirty citizens whom he thought most worthy; they would take the same oath, and each would hand in a list of five citizens chosen on the same principle; from each of these lists one name would be drawn by lot. The thirty citizens thus nominated by their colleagues and by lot would join the thirty nominees of Augustus, and they once again would each produce a list of five citizens, from which one would be chosen by lot as before. This process would be

* Dion, liv. 12. The vague phrase in which he refers to this prolongation, αὐτὸς . . . προσέθετο, cannot induce us to believe that Augustus resolved upon this prolongation himself, which in any case required the approval of the Senate, and perhaps of the people. Dion often makes mistakes of this kind. But the passage in which he says, τῷ Ἀγρίππῳ ἄλλα τε ἐξ ἴσου πη ἐαυτῷ καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς δημαρχικῆν . . . ἴδωκε, seems to show that Agrippa held the same powers as Augustus, and therefore also the *cura morum*; the fact is further proved by Agrippa's action towards the end of his *quinquennium*, when he shared in a *lectio senatus*, as we shall see.

† Dion, liv. 14.

repeated twenty times, until the number of six hundred had been made up. In this way no one would be excluded by name, and those who were shut out could vent their displeasure upon the chance of the lot. Of the many ingenious ideas of this clever politician this was perhaps the most dexterous. As a matter of fact it was too ingenious, and, as often happens in such cases, proved a failure. All who had any reason to think that they would not be nominated raised objections. As soon as Augustus announced the mode of choice the leading men were besieged by the prayers and supplications of their humbler colleagues; wearied by this importunity, many of them followed the method which Augustus adopted in times of difficulty and absented themselves from Rome. Consequently the task of making the first selection was impeded by the fact that a certain number of the senators were not at Rome, and could not draw up their lists. This difficulty was overcome by drawing senators from those already chosen to replace the absentees; and thus the operation was able to continue, though more slowly than had been thought, as it was necessary to secure the appointment of the most illustrious men, who could not be excluded. When, however, the crowd of nonentities was reached, from whom choice was both necessary and difficult, the process became troublesome and extremely slow. Countless intrigues were hatched by the obscure soldiers of the revolution, who feared deprivation of a long-coveted honour for which they had risked their lives; by intrigues and falsifications even the fortune of the lot was tampered with. Augustus, in irritation and disgust, resolved for a moment to restrict the number of senators to the three hundred who had been first appointed, and who were certainly the best. Then, fearing that the measure was too radical, he made up the number to six hundred himself, by choosing those who seemed the most worthy or the least incompetent.*

Augustus' expectation that the purification of the Senate would be the cause of infinite trouble to himself was fully realised. Almost every one who had been excluded came to him with protestations, claims and supplications; each

Result of the attempt to purify the Senate.

* Dion, liv. 13; Suetonius, *Aug.* 35 (. . . *vir virum legit*).

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individual asked that his own case might be examined, naturally alleging that it contained special features of interest, while every claimant had an influential friend who supported his cause. In theory every one supported the measure, but when theory became practice each was anxious to secure the retention of his own friends; numberless arguments were forthcoming to prove that many who had been admitted were inferior to those who had been excluded. Augustus thus found himself between Scylla and Charybdis. If he refused to lend an ear to complaints he would cause great dissatisfaction; if he granted every request he would exasperate the aristocratic party, who desired quietly and by degrees to reinstate the body of senators who had been openly expelled. Augustus first remedied the most obvious cases of injustice, and attempted to console the senators who were excluded by exhortations to patience.* All would come right in the course of time. The results, however, of this initial effort provided no great encouragement for the pursuit of further reforms. He soon received information of a series of plots against his life, and this gave rise to prosecutions.† Whether serious or imaginary, these conspiracies obliged Augustus to observe caution; ‡ some assassin might easily be forthcoming who would reward his efforts by sending him to join his adopted father.

However, when the purification of the Senate had been completed Augustus attempted to provide a greater satisfaction for the puritan party, and for all who professed to support the traditional movement. As tribune of the people, he laid before the *comitia* the elaborate details of the law against celibacy, the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*.§ This law was an ingenious but highly artificial compromise between historical tradition and immediate necessity, between a lost

* Dion, liv. 14.

† *Ibid.* liv. 15.‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 35.

§ This is the title given by Suetonius, *Aug.* 34, and the Digest. The order in which these laws were presented is very doubtful; all that can be said with certainty is, as we shall afterwards see, that the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* certainly preceded the *lex de adulteriis*, and perhaps also the *lex sumptuaria*. According to Dion (liv. 16), the first law was the *lex de ambitu*. This question has been dealt with in connection with another law.

The law
against
celibacy.

ideal of family life and the vices and selfishness of the present generation. Thus it was involved in a constant series of inconsistencies; it destroyed with one hand what it raised with the other, and continually attempted to restore tradition by methods which necessitated its inevitable ruin. The law laid down marriage as obligatory upon all citizens,* below the age of sixty in the case of men, and below fifty in the case of women; † it then dealt in complete and revolutionary fashion with the serious question of union between free men and freedwomen. Concubinage of this kind was frequent at Rome and in Italy, especially in the middle classes, for reasons already given, and also because at Rome the free class contained more men than women; it was thus impossible for every man to marry a free wife, granted that he wished to do so.‡ Augustus was anxious to see the number of marriages increased, and was therefore inclined to recognise and encourage these unions, which were regarded by many citizens as more convenient than the *justæ nuptiæ*, when they produced children. They were, however, an object of repugnance to the puritans and the traditional party; they outraged aristocratic pride. Men with marriageable daughters regretted to see plebeians, knights, and even senators living in concubinage with freedwomen, while many a full citizen was unable to marry his daughters because he could not provide the large dowry requisite for the purpose. Augustus therefore arranged this compromise between tradition and necessity. Marriage with freedwomen—that is, the legitimacy of children by such marriages—was forbidden only to senators, and to their children for two generations in the male line; § such unions were, however, recognised for the rest of the citizens.|| The man who was to personify the

* Tertullian, *Apolog.* 4.

† Ulpian, xvi. 3.

‡ Dion, liv. 16. The fact that Augustus decided to legitimise these unions proves that they must have been very numerous. See Bouché Leclercq, "Les Lois démographiques d'Auguste," in the *Revue historique*, lvii. 258.

§ Dion, liv. 16; Digest, XXIII. ii. 44; Ulpian, *Frag.* xiii. 1.

|| Digest, XXV. vii. 4: *Concubinam ex sola animi destinatione æstimari oportet.* There is no doubt that a freedwoman might become either a concubine or a wife; the fact is sufficiently proved by the passages from Ulpian in the Digest, XXV. vii. 1, prologue and par. 3. Did the

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power of Rome in the Senate, to wield that power in the provinces, and to command legions must not be born of a pretty Syrian dancer or a Jewish slave; he must be the son of a Roman matron of free and pure Latin blood, to preserve the continuity of tradition in its full power and integrity. In other cases these mixed unions were tolerated, and the result was the disappearance of the old Roman blood in the course of centuries. Thus legislation brought two classes of women into existence with different marriage rights: the *ingenue honestæ*, the aristocracy of marriage, who could only become legal wives with full moral dignity; the *libertæ*, the middle class of marriage, who might become either concubines or legitimate wives. The lofty conception of the old Roman custom was thus asserted, which regarded the legitimacy of a marriage as depending, not upon certain legal formulæ, more or less symbolical, but upon a certain moral dignity in the woman and upon the free consent of the married pair. To these two classes Augustus proposed to add a third; the women composing it were to be the plebeians of marriage; devoid of moral dignity, they could not be legitimate wives, but merely concubines, and would be composed of prostitutes, procurers or their freedwomen, wives convicted of adultery, and actresses.*

The enforcement of marriage.

The female sex having been thus divided into three classes, the law proceeded to attack a greater difficulty, the means of enforcing marriage. We have already said that Augustus did not propose to restrict the liberty and independence of the family. He devised an ingenious system of rewards and penal-

same right apply to a woman *ingenue et honesta*? The passage of Marcan (Digest, XXV. vii. 3, prologue) supports the idea: *in concubinato potest esse et aliena liberta et ingenue: et maxime ea qua obscuro loco nata est, vel quantum corpore facit*. It would thus seem that a free woman of Roman birth might be regarded as a concubine if she were of humble birth and a plebeian. It is obvious that this was a much-disputed point, because in the same passage (Digest, XXV. vii. 1) Ulpian says that he agrees with Attilicinus: *puto solas eas in concubinato haberi posse sine metu criminis, in quas stuprum non committitur*, which excludes the *ingenue honesta*. At the outset the Roman principle doubtless excluded from the state of concubinage the *ingenue honesta*, but in course of time, as morality grew lax, the principle fell into disuse, thanks to the lawyers and their discussions.

* Ulpian, *Frag.* xiii. 2; see Digest, XXIII. ii. 43.

ties to overcome the selfishness of bachelors ; there were to be rewards for the responsibilities and cares inseparable from marriage, and penalties to outweigh the obvious conveniences of celibacy. The tortuous methods of this legislation and its numerous inconsistencies were indeed extraordinary. The objects and the means of this policy were in hopeless antagonism ; it was an attempt to impose upon the Romans the civic ideal of a military aristocracy in artificial combination with the selfishness of an age which had been irresistibly drawn towards democratic equality and mercantile utilitarianism. Augustus, however, found that these inconsistencies were inevitable. He therefore did not hesitate to disregard old and venerable traditions, such as that which considered a second marriage a disgrace and a kind of posthumous adultery. Widows and divorced women were obliged by the new law to marry again without consideration for their feelings ; widows might wait a year and divorced women six months.* It appears that Augustus even proposed to remove some of the obstacles to marriage which arose from relationship ; he merely prohibited marriages between remarried persons and children of the first bed, between a father-in-law and his daughter-in-law, and a mother-in-law and her son-in-law—that is to say, in cases where relationship might seem to infringe paternal dignity.†

With great boldness Augustus dealt with testamentary dispositions as affecting family life, and thus introduced his legislation to a field which had hitherto been respected with the most scrupulous regard ; he proposed that every heir or legatee should be released from the obligation of celibacy or widowhood, if such obligation were a condition imposed by will.‡ Thus, if a father or a guardian refused their consent to a marriage or withdrew a dowry, the son or daughter or ward might

* Ulpian, *Frag.* 14.

† See Heineccch, *Ad Legem Juliam et Papiam Poppæam*, Geneva, 1747, p. 308 ff.

‡ Digest, XXXV. l. 72, § 4 ; 79, § 9. As we see in the Digest (XXXVII. xiv. 6, § 4) that similar conditions imposed upon the liberation of the slave were nullified by the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*, I am inclined to think that this measure was to be found in the *lex Julia*, and not in the *lex Papiæ Poppææ*.

Legislation upon details of family life.

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appear before the prætor, who would examine the reasons for refusal, and in case of injustice force the father or guardian to consent.* The advantages offered to those who married brought equal confusion into the old principles of private and public right. These advantages were numerous, and naturally differed for each sex and social class. Senators with wives and children enjoyed certain privileges, of which three are known to us; of the two consuls, the one with a large number of children, or the one who was married when the other was a bachelor or without children, had the first right to the *fascæ*; † married citizens with children had certain advantages, not precisely known, in replacing magistrates who died in office ‡ and in the division of provinces; § any citizen could become a candidate for office at an age as many years below the legal limit as he had children.|| This arrangement would thus both encourage marriage and bring young men into the State service. As regards civil rights, the *lex Julia* decorated the mother of three children by allowing her to wear the *stola*; she was given civil rights and relieved of the last disabilities of wardship.¶ This was an excellent reform, which secured the complete emancipation of the women, and, though it might make women more anxious to be mothers, it made paternity more formidable to the husband, whose legal right over his wife would vanish as soon as she had presented him with three

* See Digest, XXIII. ii. 19; Gaius, l. 178; Ulpian, xi. 20. The magistrate in charge of this business at Rome could only be a prætor.

† Aulus Gellius, ii. 15.

‡ See the vague allusion to this fact in Tacitus, *Annals*, ii. 51.

§ See Dion, liii. 13. He is doubtless wrong in attributing to the year 28 B.C. the arrangements contained in the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*, as Aulus Gellius indicates in the passage to which reference is made above. This passage proves that the privileges of public right were to be found in the *lex Julia*.

|| Digest, IV. iv. 2. I am inclined to think that this arrangement was contained in the *lex Julia* or in the *lex Papia Poppæa*, for the reason that, as we shall see, the *jus trium liberorum* helps us to explain the career of Tiberius and Drusus.

¶ See Gaius, l. 145. The *jus trium liberorum* must certainly have been established either by the *lex Julia* or by the *lex Papia Poppæa*; if by this latter, we cannot explain why the Senate of 745 should have granted it to Livia (Dion, lv. 2); it must therefore have appeared in the *lex Julia*. See Jörs, *Über das Verhältniss der Lex Julia de Maritandis Ordinibus zur Lex Papia Poppæa*, Bonn, 1882, p. 25.

children. Finally, as regards freedmen, the law sanctioned privileges which singularly weakened the authority of the patron, though Augustus by his own example was attempting to re-establish that authority. The law authorised marriage* to freed persons of both sexes who had received freedom upon condition of not marrying (patrons often inserted this condition that they might bequeath their rights over freedmen to heirs); freedmen with two or more children were exempted from the obligations of the *operæ*, *dona*, and *munera*; † those who had two children while dependent upon a patron, or who had only one child five years of age, were relieved of the obligation of *operæ*, and thus the most important economic rights of the patron were annulled. Gladiators or actors were, however, excluded from this privilege.‡ A freedwoman was exempt from the obligation of *operæ* if she married with her patron's consent.§ Finally, the law deprived a freedman's wife of her power of divorce without her husband's consent.|| While the law was thus advantageous to those who accomplished their duty to their race, it proceeded to harass the bachelors with numerous pains and penalties, of which two are definitely known to us. In the first place, bachelors were excluded from festivals and public shows—a serious disability at a time when shows and spectacles were a State department.¶ As they selfishly avoided the trouble necessary to the prosperity of the land, the State declined to provide them with amusement. The law also deprived bachelors of any right to inherit except through persons related to them at least in the sixteenth degree,** while the other provisions of the will remained valid.

* Digest, XXXVII. xiv. 14, 6, § 4.

† Digest, XXXVIII. i. 37. We can see from the statement in Cod. Just. VI. iii. 6, § 1, that this measure formed part of the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*, and not of the *lex Papia Poppæa*.

‡ Digest, XXXVIII. i. 37.

§ *Ibid.* i. 14.

|| *Ibid.* ii. leg. un. § 1.

¶ This measure is revealed to us by the *Acta ludorum secularium*, discovered some years ago (*Ephem. Epigr.* VIII. p. 229; v. 54 ff.), and is confirmed by Dion, liv. 30.

** Sozom, *Hist. Eccl.* i. 9; Gaius, ii. 111, 144, 286. The passage in Gaius (ii. 286 a) states so clearly that the *lex Julia* imposed the disability to inherit upon the *caelibes*, and the *lex Papia Poppæa* upon the

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This was a serious measure, as it overthrew one of the fundamental principles of the old legal system. For reasons of public necessity, the law no longer respected the wishes of the dead. By depriving bachelors of possible legacies from friends, the law debarred the wealthy classes from a constant means of increasing their property and repairing their shattered fortunes.

Criticism of
the law.

The many violations of traditional right implied by this law naturally became the object of severe criticism from lawyers most faithful to the traditional system. The Roman Senate had not yet become the court of slaves, and Antistius Labeo, the most illustrious representative of the old legal system, severely reprehended the revolutionary spirit of legislation which, under pretext of restoring tradition, ruthlessly intervened between patron and freedman, testator and heir, father and son.* This purely legal argument may have produced little effect upon the public which desired the laws, but the puritan party offered more serious objections; they asserted

orbis (a married man without children), that in the absence of any contrary evidence we must accept the fact. It is, moreover, a likely measure in itself. The article dealing with the *calibes* was already sufficiently stringent, and it is not surprising that Augustus should have gone no further.

* Proof of this statement seems to be provided by the very important arguments of Ateius Capito preserved to us by Aulus Gellius (XIII. xii. 1): *Agitabat hominem (Antistium Labeonem) libertas quadam nimis atque vecors, tanquam eorum (sc. legum atque morum p.r.), Augusto jam principe et temp. obtinens, ratum tamen pensumque nihil haberet, nisi quod justum sanctumque esse in Romanis antiquitatibus legisset.* To this we may add the statement of Porphyry, *Ad. Hor. S. I. iii. 82*, and Tacitus, *Annals*, iii. 75, regarding the aversion of Antistius for Augustus and the condescension of Ateius; it will then seem probable that the revolutionary legislation of Augustus was one of the reasons for disagreement between these two jurists. To what else could Ateius Capito have alluded when he said that Antistius would regard nothing as just and holy that could not be found in antique tradition? He certainly did not allude to any undue narrow-mindedness and conservatism in the interpretation and application of principles. Pomponius (Digest, I. ii. 47) tells us that Labeo *plurima innovare instituit*, and that, on the other hand, Ateius Capito was more conservative in this respect than Labeo. Discord was bound to arise, not upon questions of interpretation, but upon points of principle; and therefore specially upon the legislation of Augustus, which overthrew so many of these principles. Thus the contradictory statements of Capito and Pomponius can be reconciled, and we have an explanation of the accusation of political subserviency uttered against Capito by the aristocrats.

that the law, instead of going to the root of the evil, employed dangerous remedies which were likely to aggravate it; and instanced the measures which gave complete emancipation to women. Men excused their celibacy by referring to the growing independence of woman, which made her character more imperious, her desires more extravagant and her selfishness more capricious. Yet the law, instead of restraining this liberty, was increasing it. Augustus, however, had no difficulty in securing approval of the law, first by the Senate, as in the times of aristocratic prosperity, and afterwards by the people.* Men's minds were so fascinated by the law and were so persuaded of its marvellous efficacy that no real opposition was permitted. Moreover, though the law threatened considerable inconvenience in the future years, it promised immediate advantages to a large number of people; it legitimised connections with freedwomen, it improved the position of many freed slaves, while it gave privileges and hopes to all who had children already, and was therefore supported by

* There has been much discussion upon this point, which has been recently examined in a very learned study by M. Bouché Leclercq in the above-quoted article from the *Revue historique*. But it seems to me impossible to deny that the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* was approved in the year 18. In the *Acta ludorum sacularium* (*Eph. Epigr.* viii. 229) mention is made of people *qui tenentur lege de maritandis ordinibus*. On the other hand, as the Senate gave Livia in 745 the *ius trium liberorum* (*Dion.* iv. 2), the *lex Julia* must have been already approved. We cannot refer to this law and to the year 18 the statement of Suetonius (*Aug.* 34), *præ tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit*. Suetonius expressly says that he is speaking of additions and corrections in the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*, and not of the law itself, which must have been already passed, as improvements were being made. In the speech which Dion puts in the mouth of Augustus (*lvi.* 7) we hear of two laws concerning marriage which preceded the *lex Papia Poppæa*; possibly the second of these contained the additions and corrections of which Suetonius speaks. In that case the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* was first approved in the year 18 by the *comitia*, and afterwards (we will attempt to determine the date later) Augustus presented modifications and additions which roused keen opposition. Against this view we cannot advance the lines of the *Carmen Saculare*; *decreta super jugandis feminis*, for Horace immediately goes on to add, *prolisque novæ feraci lege maritæ*. These lines have another meaning; Horace quotes the *decreta patrum* and the *lex* to show that both the Senate and the people had their share in the new legislation, the Senate by giving the first approval, and the people by finally passing the law.

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every married man with a family. The moment was favourable, as the married were in much stronger force than the bachelors. Thus there was no serious opposition; indeed, every one considered that the law did not go far enough; additional legislation of greater stringency was required which would go to the root of the evil. Encouraged by the ease with which the law was passed, the traditional party immediately began an agitation to secure a law against irregularities of family life. They argued that the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* might create families, but was useless if these were to become so many centres of adultery, debauchery, discord and infamy. No right-minded person would be willing to found a family unless he could secure the obedience of his children and check the wild extravagance, the capricious luxury and the immorality of a woman who felt herself bound to disobey her husband in order to avoid the accusation of vulgarity. The laxity of the marriage tie, bad education, friendships, literature and the dowry now inclined women to every form of vice.*

Further
puritan
demands.

As the authority of the *pater familias* had thus been weakened, the support of the law became necessary; there was a cry for legislation to restrain luxury, to check the profligacy of young men and to make adultery a punishable crime. The question was discussed in the Senate, and after vigorous debates was referred directly to Augustus, with various proposals which had been formulated.† Augustus, however, was by no means inclined to yield to this new demand,‡ for several reasons,

* Chapter xvi. in Dion, book liv., short as it is, is most important; it shows that the *lex de adulteriis*, and probably also the *lex sumptuaria*, followed the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, probably in consequence of party or public opinion. In the text I have shown how these two laws resulted from the first; marriage could not be enforced upon men unless they were provided with domestic authority. The attitude of Augustus shows that he was opposed to this supplementary legislation. I think that the *lex sumptuaria* was approved under these conditions and for these reasons, because in the discussions to which Dion refers Augustus dealt with the dress and *κόσμος* of women. On the other hand, Suetonius (*Aug.* 34) quotes the *lex sumptuaria* among the other laws approved during that year; thus we are obliged to place it at the same date.

† Dion, liv. 16.

‡ If we read the passage in Dion (liv. 16) dispassionately, it seems perfectly clear that Augustus attempted to temporise, a fact which shows his disinclination to support these laws. Dion gives the words

among which personal motives doubtless had their place. As supreme magistrate of the republic he would have been forced to set an example and observe these laws or to risk that public criticism which falls with special severity upon the great. Augustus himself had nothing to fear from the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*; he was married and had one daughter, already married to her second husband; by Agrippa in the year 20 she had had a son, Caius, who was then three years of age, and was now expecting her second child, Lucius. Tiberius had already married Agrippina, the daughter of Agrippa by his first wife, who had been a daughter of Atticus; * Augustus was about to arrange a marriage for Drusus, the second son of Livia, who was then aged twenty. On the other hand, the new law against luxury might cause him some inconvenience. His personal life was entirely simple, and conducted in the traditional style; vast wealth flowed annually into his great residence, and was then scattered throughout Rome, Italy and the empire, but he himself preserved the manners of the Italian middle class from which he sprang. His *togæ* were woven at home by his slaves under the supervision of Livia; † he would go to the purple-sellers' shops and bargain for the cloth to make his state robes.‡ If his palace was vast, it was by no means luxurious, and the archaic simplicity of his own room was afterwards to become proverbial.§ His entertainments were marked by that high-born courtesy which invariably accompanies simplicity of life; the table was arranged for three, and only for six upon solemn occasions. Tiberius also displayed a strong love of tradition on this point. Julia, however, had very different tastes. She was beautiful, intelligent, well educated, attractive and young, being now about twenty-two years of age, and seemed born rather to the state of an Asiatic princess than to the simplicity of a Roman matron. She liked

of Augustus as follows: "It is your business to order and to advise your wives as you please, even as I do mine." This was tantamount to saying, "You must rely upon your own authority, and not upon that of the laws for which you ask."

* Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 7. The date of the marriage is not entirely certain.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 73.

‡ *Ibid.* *Aug.* 72 and 73.

§ *Ibid.* *Aug.* 74.

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literature, art, refinement and luxury, large villas, splendid palaces, silk dresses, social gatherings and festivities; * every year she grew less amenable to the influence of her father and of her husband. It was too much to hope that she would readily obey a new sumptuary law.

Yet more dangerous appeared the task of proposing a law to deal with immorality and adultery. Augustus could scatter vast sums of money, toil from morning to evening upon State business, have a smile for every one, and play different parts, but his past forbade him to assume responsibility for the nation's morals. The difficulty must have been obvious to himself. Not only the past, but also the present, may well have caused him some dismay. The fair front of modesty and honour which his family presented to the public was in some degree deceptive. Roman gossip, whether true or false, asserted that Augustus was too intimate with Terentia, the beautiful wife of Mæcenas.† Agrippa was often absent upon State business, and at such times Julia's relations with the handsome young aristocrats were somewhat too free, and Augustus was obliged to remonstrate with her upon this subject on several occasions; ‡ she was perhaps already beginning an imprudent intimacy with a young man of good family, Sempronius Gracchus, a descendant of the famous tribunes.§

* Macrobius, Sat. II. v. 1: *Sed indulgentia tam fortuna quam patris abutebatur: cum alioqui literarum amor multaque eruditio, quod in illa domu facile erat, præterea mitis humanitas minimeque sævus animus ingentem fæmina gratiam conciliarent: mirantibus qui vitia noscebant tantam pariter diversitatem.* This clearly states that Julia possessed certain admirable qualities which cannot easily be harmonised with the vices with which she is credited. This fact should arouse our suspicions of those historians who attribute monstrous vices to her; and there is every presumption that their accounts are exaggerated. We shall see that such, indeed, is the fact as we follow Julia's history. On the other hand, there is no doubt that she was as fond of luxury as she was of art and literature. Macrobius (Sat. II. v. 1) speaks of *profusos cultos perspicuosque comitatus*, for which Augustus reproached her, and quotes other facts of the kind in the same chapter.

† Dion, liv. 19.

‡ Suetonius, Aug. 64. The anecdote concerning Vinicius may be referred to this date.

§ Tacitus, An. i. 53: . . . *Sempronium Gracchum qui familia nobili, solers ingenio et prave facundus, eandem Juliam in matrimonio tenuerat.* . . . This is the only serious accusation against Julia during

GREAT SOCIAL LAWS OF THE YEAR 18 B.C. 69

Tiberius and Agrippina were by exception a model couple, 18 B.C. living quietly, beyond the reach of slander or gossip.*

At first Augustus objected; he delivered speeches in the Senate to protect the great Roman tradition against the strange revolutionary puritanism of his time, and to show that husbands and fathers should govern their families as before by their authority and wisdom. One day he went so far as to quote himself as an example. The puritan party then attempted to embarrass him by pointing to the irregularity of his own family life, and requested him to explain his methods of family government to the Senate. He accepted the invitation, and delivered a long speech, explaining his old-fashioned ideas of family life, and giving an imaginary description of his household which naturally was accepted as the truth. Other methods for his intimidation were then employed; as censor he received denunciations of the conduct of a young man during the civil wars, who married a woman whose lover he first had been, thereby repeating the conduct of Augustus with Livia; this action was regarded as a threat to rake up the details of his terrible past if he refused to satisfy the strict puritan party.† By thus working upon public and senatorial opinion and by these vain threats against Augustus the members of the puritan party carried their point. Augustus ordered the preparation, no doubt by commissions of the ardent

The lex Julia de adulteriis.

this portion of her life. The indecent story related by Macrobius (Sat. II. v. 6) to show that Julia at this moment *tam vulgo potestatem corporis sui faceret* is obviously one of the numerous inventions by which her name was slandered after her fall. This story, however, admits that there was an extraordinary resemblance between the sons of Julia and their father, which is so much proof that they were his children. The explanation put into Julia's mouth by Macrobius can be nothing but a monstrous calumny, and was invented to accuse Julia of a daring infamy at a time when she had a tangible proof of her chastity in the likeness of her children. Moreover, is it likely that any one would have ventured to ask Julia, the daughter of Augustus, and the first woman in Rome after Livia, such a question as that which Macrobius says she answered? Tacitus, notwithstanding his severity towards this family, regards the story as a fable, and during this period reproaches Julia only for her adultery with Sempronius Gracchus. It must also be observed that Tacitus does not support the statement of Suetonius (*Tiberius*, 7) that Agrippa's wife attempted to seduce Tiberius.

* Dion, liv. 16.

† *Ibid.*

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puritans, of two new laws, the sumptuary law * and the famous *lex Julia de pudicitia et de coercendis adulteriis*.† The tendency of the first law can easily be imagined, though but few of its provisions are known to us. We know that it attempted to check the building extravagance which Horace constantly deploras in his Odes ; ‡ we may conjecture that in dealing with female dress this law restricted the use of silk, that lascivious fabric which, according to the puritans, left women naked instead of clothing them ; § finally, we know that this law restricted the expenditure upon banquets. For a banquet given on ordinary days expenditure was limited to two hundred sesterces (£2) ; for banquets on the Calends, the Ides, the Nones, and other festival days not more than three hundred sesterces (£3) might be expended ; the expenditure upon marriage feasts was limited to one thousand sesterces (£10).|| This law was no doubt generally popular ; it immediately abolished the magnificent banquets given by the millionaires of the metropolis, which outshone the modest dinners of the poorer senators, knights and plebeians ; it stripped the rich matrons of the costumes and jewels which aroused the jealousy of their poorer sisters ; while it attempted to reduce the vast luxury of the palaces built by the architects and artists of Alexandria to the humble proportions of the poorer dwellings inhabited by the multitude. The simple-minded hoped that the money thus saved by this law would be expended upon the education of the children.

The *lex de adulteriis* ¶ was intended not merely to punish

* See note * on p. 66.

† We do not know whether this was the title of the law, or even if it is not a composite title. This point, like many others concerning the famous laws of Augustus, is most obscure.

‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 89, tells us that Augustus republished the *Orationes Q. Metelli de prole augenda, et Rutilii de modo adificiorum ; quo magis persuaderet utramque rem non a se primo animadversam, sed antiquis jam tunc cura fuisse*. Hence it appears that Augustus attempted to check this building extravagance. I am therefore inclined to think that these provisions were contained in the *lex sumptuaria* of which Suetonius speaks, *Aug.* 34.

§ Compare the words of Pliny on silk fabrics, *N. H.* II. xxii. 76.

|| Aulus Gellius, II. xxiv. § 14-15.

¶ Digest, XLVIII. v. 1 : *Hac lex lata est a divo Augusto*.

adultery, but to cleanse the family of all the vices which had stained it for the last two centuries. By this law the State once more infringed to a large extent the absolute authority of the *pater familias*. The *pater familias* was allowed to retain, as a last vestige of his old authority, the right of killing an adulterous daughter and her accomplice as soon as they were discovered.* The husband was allowed to kill his wife's lover if he caught him in his own house, and if he was a comedian, a singer or dancer, under sentence of condemnation, or a freedman of the family; † he could not, however, kill his wife unless he caught her sinning in his house. Upon the discovery of adultery the husband, or the father, if the husband would not act, was granted sixty days, if they were Roman citizens, to bring the adulterous wife before the prætor and the *quæstio* ‡ or jury, which was probably instituted at the same time as the law. If the husband or father did not appear as accusers within four months after these sixty days anybody might enter an accusation, as adultery was made a criminal charge, like parricide or forgery.§ The penalties were extremely severe. The adulterer was banished for life and lost half his property; the adulteress was banished for life, lost half her dowry, a third of her fortune, and was forbidden to remarry, so that she could only live with a man in a state of concubinage.¶ To connive at adultery by lending a house to lovers for their

* Digest, XLVII. v. 20; 22, § 2; 23, § 4. As regards the condition of two lovers who had sinned in the house of the *pater familias*, I think we may infer from the Digest (XLVII. v. 23) that though this condition was not explicitly contained in the *lex de adulteriis*, it was a consequence gradually deduced by the interpretation of the lawyers. If the law had been clear upon this point it is difficult to understand why Ulpian should have quoted the opinion of different lawyers, including Labeo and Pomponius, in support of his theory.

† Digest, XLVIII. v. 24; see Cod. Just. IX. lx. 4.

‡ Digest, XLVIII. v. 2, § 8; 3; 4. Adulteresses were usually judged by a *quæstio*, analogous to that which decided the majority of criminal trials, as is proved by the story of a trial for adultery in Dion, liv. 30; the prætor of whom Dion speaks must be the president of the *quæstio*. The procedure of the *quæstiones* was the same as that of the *judicia publica*, and the *lex Julia* made adultery a *judicium publicum* (Inst. IV. xviii. 4).

§ Inst. IV. xviii. 4; Digest, XLVIII. v. 4; Cod. Theod. IX. ii. 2.

¶ Pauli, Sent. II. xxvi. 14.

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meetings, or for a husband to profit by the unchastity of his wife or to condone her adultery, were offences constituting the crime of *lenocinium*, and were punished as the adultery itself.* Finally, the law prohibited and punished with the same penalties as adultery and *lenocinium* all offences known as *stupra*; under this head were included relations which could not be legitimated by *maritalis affectio*, and were regarded as illicit from the manner of their occurrence, whether they took place with a free-woman, with one of honourable family and respectable reputation, with a widow or with a woman of marriageable age.† A wife, on the other hand, could not accuse her husband of adultery,‡ and he might have relations with other women unpunished, provided they were not married or *ingenuæ honestæ*; if he had relations with the latter he might be condemned, not for infidelity to his wife, but for *stuprum*, or for adultery with the wife of another.

Effects of this
legislation.

Thus a reign of terror was established in the realm of Aphrodite. This law let loose the spirit of slander and calumny, the jealousy of wealth, the cruel ambition of lawyers, the thirst for vengeance, and these base passions rushed like a band of terrible harpies into the voluptuous gardens of Cythera. It was in reality a piece of class legislation most dangerous to the upper classes. Binding only upon Roman citizens, the *lex de adulteriis* was chiefly aimed at senators and knights, whose wealth and renown might tempt accusers, who themselves ran no risks; § thus it was a very doubtful privilege for the

* Digest, XLVIII. v. 2, § 2-48, 5, 8 and 9; Cod. Just. IX. ix. 2.

† Digest, L. xvi. 101, XLVIII. v. 34.

‡ Cod. Just. IX. ix. 1.

§ This may be clearly seen from the lines of Ovid, *Ars Amandi*, I. 31-34. From the public to whom he appeals he excludes maidens and matrons, and he adds (l. 33) that he sings *Venerem tutam concessaque furta*; this is an allusion to the *lex de adulteriis*, to which he refers several times in the *Tristia* and the *ex Pontio*, as an argument that his book did not incite to actions forbidden by the *lex de adulteriis*. As the book is not intended for married women or marriageable girls, to whom does it apply? Was it intended for courtesans? This is the first and obvious idea. Those, however, who have read the book are well aware that in different passages the reader is informed of the best means of seducing a married woman and for deceiving the vigilance of a jealous husband. Moreover, it would be strange that Ovid should regard a connection with courtesans as *furta*. The words *concessaque*

Roman aristocracy. Freedmen or strangers in Rome, whatever their wealth, men and women alike, could practise any adultery they pleased, whether for love or for gain; Roman citizens, and especially senators and knights, if they transgressed the proscribed limits of love, were exposed to the terrible severities of the *lex de adulteriis*; hence we must regard the *lex de adulteriis*, the *lex sumptuaria* and the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* as the first great and serious attempt at an aristocratic restoration. Those who imagine that Augustus was working with prudence and cunning to found a monarchy, have failed to grasp the spirit of these laws, on which his work was partly based. These laws were not merely intended to increase the birth-rate, which was probably not falling in several parts of Italy; Augustus' chief anxiety was the economic and moral reorganisation of the aristocratic family, the old source of republican strength which had now become sterile, the old school of generals and diplomatists who had conquered the empire. If Augustus had wished to found a monarchy, he should have encouraged luxury, immorality and celibacy amongst the aristocracy, instead of seeking to check these evils; for monarchy could only rise upon the ruins of an aristocracy reduced to the servility of a band of courtiers by pleasure and pecuniary want, as in the age of Louis XIV. Augustus, however, required helpers for the task of government; these could only be drawn from the aristocratic families, and he therefore required a vigorous aristocracy; hence his intention was to restore the vitality of the Roman aristocracy, and he attempted to enforce upon it by legislation certain important and special duties without which aristocratic privileges would have been sheer injustice. The effort proved fruitless, at any rate in part, for the deterioration of the aristocracy continued, but it

furti indicate that there were adulteries not punished by the *lex de adulteriis*. Such cases were adultery with foreign women or freedwomen, who had married foreigners or freedmen. Adultery, like *stuprum*, concerned only the *ingenua* and *honesta*, a woman free-born and of respectable family; to the foreigner or freedwoman it did not apply. It is probable that the freedwoman who had married a Roman citizen according to the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* might be accused of adultery, but I have no texts which provide a satisfactory decision of the point.

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would be presumption to say that the attempt was not seriously meant.

Further
legislation.

Other laws passed by Augustus at the same time throw much light upon the character and the intention of this social legislation. To consolidate the economic basis of the family among the upper classes,* he inserted a measure in the *lex de adulteriis* dealing with the dowry. Hitherto the dowry had been wholly in the power of the husband; he was now forbidden to sell or pledge his rights to it. Moreover, after enforcing these special obligations upon the aristocracy, he provided an actual privilege by way of compensation, in a law which confined the right of candidature to citizens with a property qualification of at least 400,000 sesterces. Thus the political career which had been open to the poorer citizens for a century was now closed; the old timocratic and aristocratic constitution was restored; political posts which had formerly been open to such men as Ventidius, the muleteer, were now declared to be the privilege of the moneyed classes; government became the monopoly of an aristocracy which, though degenerate, idle and disunited, was none the less legally defined. It was a decision which concluded a century of terrible struggle, and which might inaugurate a new order of things; none the less, it was received with such universal indifference that our knowledge of it depends upon a few lines written at a later date by a historian who attached no great importance to the event.† The democratic party, the great party of Caius Gracchus and Caius Cæsar, had long been dead; the legislation of Augustus did not slay the slain, but laid the corpse within the grave. After long struggles Rome had reverted to her aristocratic constitution; through the instrumentality of Augustus she had again defined the duties and privileges of the nobility, with which she hoped to govern in future centuries the empire of her conquest. But would she be sufficient for these things? This was the great problem that the future was to solve. It is

* Digest, XXIII. v. 4; Pauli, *Sent.* IX. xxi. B. 2.

† Dion, liv. 17. The only allusion, curiously enough, that I have found to this reform is in the *Amores* of Ovid (III. viii. 35): *Curtis pauperibus clausa est. Dat census honores.*

GREAT SOCIAL LAWS OF THE YEAR 18 B.C. 75

probable that, together with this law, Augustus proposed another, the *lex de ambitu*, upon electoral corruption, providing that any one who purchased votes should be disenfranchised for five years.* And, finally, the prætors were allowed to expend, when they wished, three times the amount allocated to them from the treasury upon the public games.† The sumptuary law forbade the rich to display their wealth in their own houses, but the public had every right to amusement in the streets and in the theatre. Here we see the new democratic spirit which became obvious at Rome after the restoration of the moneyed aristocracy, a spirit which Augustus was well able to satisfy. 18 B.C.

* Dion, liv. 16. He places this law, however, before the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus*. We may assume that this law was connected with the timocratic reform.

† Dion, liv. 17.

CHAPTER IV

THE "LUDI SÆCULARES"

The eternal city—The nobility and the plebs—The great families and the learned class—The revival of confidence—The *ludi sæculares* in the preceding ages—The *ludi sæculares* of Augustus—Varied significance of the games—The order of ceremonies—The *suffimenta* and the *fruges*—Final preparations for the festivities—The prayer to the *Mœræ*—Ceremonies of June 1 and 2—The *Carmen Sæculare*—New dangers of the eastern provinces—Licinus and Gaul—The Gallic policy of Agrippa—Agrippa and the roads of Gaul—Augustus adopts the two sons of Agrippa—First results of the social laws. The Germanic invasion in Gaul—Agrippa in the east and Augustus in Gaul.

Cosmopolitan
Rome

THE passing of this social legislation dispersed the clouds which had obscured the Italian horizon, and a spirit of rejoicing pervaded Rome. The successes of recent years, the agreement with the Parthians, the purification of the Senate, the division of supreme authority between Augustus and Agrippa, and the legislation which seemed to denote a restoration of traditional morality had apparently produced profound and general satisfaction. This contentment was, moreover, well justified, for the prosperity of the time was extraordinary in comparison with the gloomy days of the revolution. No one had ever dreamed that Rome could thus rise from her ruins and recover her old glory and power. The public might have been deceived upon the agreement with the Parthians, but it was none the less true that the vast empire, under the influence of universal peace, now began to exert its inherent power of attraction upon those smaller States, whether allied, under protection or independent, which surrounded it like the satellites of a planet. Rome became the vast metropolis of the Mediterranean

world. Visitors arrived from the forests of cold Germania, and from the Parthian court; east and west made Rome a point of amalgamation, and the city now presented a confusion of every language, race and nationality which had been united beneath her sway. The sovereigns of the little allied or vassal states followed the example of Herod and sent their sons or successors to be educated at Rome; Augustus had extended his hospitality to them, and was willing to watch over their education, regardless of expense. In his residence a task was undertaken of which the republic had never dreamed; his palace became a kind of luxurious college for the future sovereign vassals of Rome, and consequently a powerful means of spreading Roman influence among the allies.* The younger members of the Gallic nobility also came in numbers to Rome to complete their education, and to study the workings of that formidable power which had overcome their ancestors and now exerted a strange attraction upon themselves; young men were also seen in Rome from the great families of Germania, such as the Marcoman, Marbod, who was also attracted by that curiosity concerning Roman institutions which began to stir the Germanic barbarians in their marshes and forests and to rouse them from their lethargy.† Even Parthian nobles were to be found in Rome; they had been driven from the country by civil war, and had probably come to rejoin Tiridates,‡ who had been well pensioned by the republic through the influence of Augustus.§ This cosmopolitan aristocracy gathered about the household of Augustus and his richest friends, and was to the Romans an outward and visible sign of the prestige which

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 48: *plurimorum (regum sociorum) liberos et educavit simul cum suis et instituit.*

† Dion (lvi. 23) tells us that at the time of the battle when Varus perished there were numerous Γαλάται καὶ Κέλαι at Rome—Gauls and Germans—of whom many were ἐπιδημοῦντες, staying in Rome for pleasure. These must have been chiefly Gauls and Germans of the upper classes, who were making a long stay at Rome. If they were thus numerous in the year 9, it is probable that this immigration had already begun at the present time. Of German nobles who came to Rome at this time for their education we have the case of Marbod; Strabo, vii. 1, 3.

‡ Compare the case of Ornospades, which was certainly not exceptional, in Tacitus, *Annals*, vi. 37. § Justin, xlii. 5, 9.

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18 B.C.

Rome had recovered. Europe, Asia and Africa once more bent the knee before the great republic; the neighbouring nationalities upon the borders of the empire were also anxious to know and to admire the marvellous city. Never had the sun shone upon an empire so vast, so powerful or so firm; every year solemn embassies, small victories and reassuring messages from the provinces spread satisfaction throughout Italy.

The aristocracy and the plebeians.

Each class, moreover, had special reasons for contentment. The nobility would have been foolish to complain of their lot; for ten years they had done nothing, and yet had recovered their wealth and prestige, and were once more respected and flattered by the middle classes of Rome, simply because every family had condescended to admit a certain number of plebeians and literary men to share the fortunes which had been restored at the expense of the empire. The poor plebeians, who had formerly attached themselves to the demagogues, and had been the most important element in the *collegia* of Clodius, were now begging from the great that support which they had formerly derived from their party leaders; they attempted to secure a position as clients of the great households, where they were offered sometimes meals, sometimes money, or other presents. Every morning they called upon their patrons, accompanied them to the forum and upon their visits, were ready with applause when the patron spoke in the courts, and appeared with joyful or downcast faces according to the state of his affairs. Thus was formed the network of artificial ties which for several centuries were to connect the wealthy classes of Rome with an interminable string of beggars, an arrangement irksome to both patrons and clients.* The new custom was both expensive and troublesome, but it brought certain advantages. It enabled the nobles to walk through the streets

* Such, in brief outline, is the well-known picture of Roman clientship in the age of Martial, after its political reasons had disappeared, when it became nothing more than a bounty given by the rich classes to the idle proletariat of Rome. This band of clients, however, was not formed in a day or in a year, and I therefore suppose that its origin can be traced to this period, when the rich aristocracy was reformed at Rome, while its political power was to disappear during the slow transformation of republican institutions.

of Rome with a long train of followers, and gained for them universal veneration ; they were no longer disturbed by the possible result of elections, or of discussions or debates in the Senate, and they were able to preserve the public peace far more efficiently than any threats of punishment could do. They were regarded with no less respect by the middle classes, the younger members of which, after completing their studies, devoted their attention to securing some powerful patron among the aristocracy. The old-time objection to literary clients and their admission to the household rapidly disappeared, as is proved by the Epistles of Horace, in which the poet discusses the matter at length. In the seventeenth epistle of the first book he admits that a happy life in obscurity and poverty is possible ; he adds, however, that any one who would help his friends and live in some comfort must seek the friendship of the great ; he treats with impatient sarcasm those imitators of Diogenes who pretended to despise wealth upon principle. He declares plainly that those who flatter wealth are less base than those who live in sordid poverty at the bottom of the social scale ; if the rough blouse brings no disgrace, no more does the purple of Miletus. He resolutely asserts that

Principibus placuisse virtus non ultima laus est.

At the same time dignity and discretion are to be observed. The client must not loudly and incessantly complain, like the beggar who chants, " My sister has no dowry, my mother is hungry, and the little field of my ancestors brings nothing." While Augustus was preparing the convention with the Parthians, Horace had composed another epistle, the eighteenth of the first book. This was addressed to a friend who had been welcomed to a rich man's house as a client of standing, and felt ill at ease, fearing to be regarded as a parasite. Horace soothes his uneasy conscience, assuring him that the " difference between friend and parasite is as great as that between wife and courtesan." Horace was fond of his liberty and jealous of his independence, and therefore refused such hospitality ; at the same time, with a certain indulgent irony, he advises his friends and colleagues to accept it.

18 B.C.
General
revival of
confidence.

Upon the whole, if the recent legislation caused some inconvenience to the great under the government of Augustus, the nobility had recovered their domination of Rome and of the empire, and were able to exert their power with greater ease at this time than at any other ; the risks and responsibilities of supremacy were avoided, while its privileges had been secured. Nor, again, had the middle classes any reason for excessive discontent. Prosperity was increasing under the patronage of the great, with the revival of agriculture, of art and of commerce. This class had now secured the long-desired benefit of the great social laws, and was willing to regard them as marking the outset of a new age and of a purer period. Imperial administration had vastly improved ; the terrible and systematic spoliation of Cæsar's time was past ; provincial governorships were given to wealthy men whose energy and intelligence may not have been great, but who were not obliged to plunder their subjects to satisfy their political adherents at Rome. The organisation of the supreme power for the next five years must also have caused great public satisfaction. Italy was to enjoy the advantages of a monarchical government, the continuity and permanence of its power, without losing the privileges of republicanism, the legal equality of all citizens, simplicity of ceremonial, freedom of speech before the nobles, and a State personified in no one man. A double presidency for five years in place of a sole presidency for ten years brought two advantages : there was the prospect of more energetic administration, as two presidents working in harmony would be more influential than one ; there was, further, no great divergence from republican tradition, as the tenure of office had been shortened and the collegiate principle observed. All were ready to admire the new system, which provided them with a fresh argument for the theory that the republican constitution had only been remodelled in certain unimportant details. The innumerable evils which poverty had brought upon the nation during the civil wars had been but slowly overcome, notwithstanding the peace, but every one, as in the year 27 B.C., was hopeful of the future. The mysticism which looked forward to a universal regeneration again revived,

with simple expectations of a new era which would mark the outset of a happier and purer life ; for twenty-five years these ideas had received fervent or doubtful credence according to the march of events, but had never entirely vanished from men's minds. In view of the pessimism which had attacked the State, this wave of confidence, notwithstanding its mystical nature, was wholly beneficial ; it will explain why Augustus or some of his friends, towards the end of the year 18, considered that this happy frame of mind should be encouraged by some great ceremonial, which would solemnly externalise the vague popular idea of a new era and a new life, and would connect these ideas in the minds of the people with the great moral and social principles formulated by recent legislation. Obviously, a ceremony of ancient nature and great solemnity was required ; it must reunite in picturesque harmony the belief in the regeneration of the world, the social ideas of the oligarchy which governed the empire, the Etruscan doctrine of the ten centuries, the Italic legend of the four ages of the world, the oracles of the Sibyl which announced the approaching reign of Apollo, the recollections of Virgil's Eclogue which had predicted the Golden Age, the Pythagorean doctrine of the return of souls to the earth, which taught that every 440 years body and soul live again in their former state, and society therefore returns to its former condition. In short, this ceremony must emphasise the necessity for a return to tradition, for the immediate re-establishment of religion and family life, of the customs and military organisation of the old Roman State. What ceremony, however, was capable of expressing so much ? The invention of some new ceremony was repugnant to a generation which had expended great trouble in retracing the half-forgotten traditions of the past, and was now clinging to them in fear of further aberration. The promoters of the idea, however, went to the past, and found the records of a most ancient ceremony. Instituted in the year of the foundation of the republic, 509 B.C., in honour of the deities of the lower world, Dis and Proserpine, to implore the cessation of a terrible plague,* the *ludi sæculares* had been repeated century

* Censorinus, *d. die natali*, xvii. 10.

18 B.C. by century as a solemn guarantee for the public safety. There had been three such repetitions at intervals slightly varying in length, one in 346,* one in 249,† and another in 149, or 146,‡ according to other authorities. Hence the fifth celebration should have taken place in the year 49, when the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey broke out. At that date, however, the chief preoccupation had been to avoid any premature acquaintance with the realms of Dis and Proserpine by the fortune of war and consequently the fifth celebration had been overlooked.

Augustus and
the *ludi*
seculares.

Augustus probably resolved to re-establish these games for two chief reasons. The ceremony was so unique that no living person had seen it, nor would any one see it more than once in a lifetime, and it was therefore an admirable means of stirring public feeling. Further, the ceremony was based upon the idea of the century, the *sæculum*, and if this implied the division of time into periods of 100 years, it might easily be made to cover the popular notion of the mystical century as no one remembered the original meaning of the ceremony. The celebration of the *ludi seculares* was intended not only to repair the omission of the civil wars, and to secure the public health by supplications addressed to the divinities of Hell; it was also an attempt to introduce a new ceremony under an ancient name, and to do what Virgil had already done for tradition and Latin legend in his *Æneid*. We might almost think that the *ludi seculares* were merely a fragment of the *Æneid* in outward show, so wholly Virgilian was their conception, as also was the attempt to combine Latin tradition with rites and myths of a character cosmopolitan, but chiefly Etruscan and Greek, and to use foreign, especially Greek, forms, as the means of expressing an idea which was absolutely Roman, with the object of symbolising that amalgamation between the Latin and Greek worlds which all expected.

Preparations
or the games.

For this purpose, Augustus called in the help of a young lawyer, Caius Ateius Capito, who was learned both in religious

* Censorinus, xvii. 10.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Zosimus, ii. 4.

and civil law. In order to show that the *ludi sæculares* signified the mystical commencement of a new era, Augustus first introduced the Etruscan idea of a century considered as the longest term of human life, and therefore reckoned as 110 years; this innovation was justified by reference to certain Greek sibylline oracles; * the method had been before successfully employed to overpower the objection of Rome to foreign innovations. The college of *quindecimviri*, of which Augustus was a member, was in charge of the Sibylline oracles; it took up the question with interest and soon found an oracle said to have been delivered by the Sibyl at the time of the agitation of the Gracchi, when the agrarian movement began to stir the country about 126 B.C. This oracle gave a minute description of the *ludi sæculares*, and ordered their celebration every 110 years. Ateius Capito and the college of the *quindecimviri* accepted this oracle as the rule for the *ludi sæculares*; they asserted that records in the college had been found showing that the games had already been celebrated four times at intervals of 110 years down to the year 126, with, however, some small discrepancies; † consequently another century of 110 years was about to terminate and the games might therefore be celebrated during the first year of the joint presidency. ‡ The fifth celebration

* See Ephem. Epigr. viii. 280; *Acta ludorum sæcul. Septimor.* v. 20.

† The oracle has been preserved to us by Zosimus (ii. 6). Mommsen, *Ephem. Epigr.* viii. 235, has shown that this oracle refers to the agitation of the Gracchi, and consequently proves that the games were celebrated about 126. Censorinus (*d. die natali*, xvii. 10), after giving the date of the *ludi sæculares* according to tradition, tells us, on the other hand, that the records of the *quindecimviri* showed that the first celebration had taken place in 456 B.C. and the second in 344. He does not mention the third celebration. Now if the first took place in 456, the second, according to the 110 years system, should have occurred in 346, the third in 236, the fourth in 126, and the fifth in 16. We can therefore understand why the *quindecimviri* relied upon the oracle which stated that the games had been held in 126, and thus affirmed that three celebrations had been held at intervals of 110 years, except in the second case, where a slight difference of two years was admitted, perhaps to justify the difference of a year which they were about to accept.

‡ The hypothesis of Boissier (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1892, March, p. 80) that the games were held a year in advance to celebrate the conclusion of the first ten years of the government's existence seems reasonable, though I am inclined to think that there was also a desire to celebrate the passing of the social laws.

18 B. . would then conclude the period of 440 years, and those who believed in Varro's doctrine of the restoration of soul and body might then hope that the *ludi sæculares* would mark the physical regeneration of ancient Rome, and that the warriors of the old republic would return to earth, as their sojourn in the Elysian fields was now concluded. This must have been a great encouragement to obey the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*. On the other hand, the ceremony would provide special satisfaction for those who were attracted by the symbolism of the ritual, or who believed in the Sibylline oracles which had been widely disseminated during the preceding ten years.

The significance and the details of the ceremony.

Ateius and the *quindecimviri*, in strict accordance with the oracle, resolved that the religious celebrations should consist of sacrifices to be offered during three successive nights, the first to the Mæræ (the Greek name for the Fates), the second to the Ilithyæ, the goddesses of procreation, and the third to Mother Earth. Thus appeal would be made to the divinities which governed the physical existence, the life and death of the individual, the fecundity of the race, a matter most important to the State, and the fertility of the earth, which is the original source of material wealth. It was impossible to ask the gods more clearly for an age purified from destructive vice, fruitful in men, and happy in well-merited prosperity. The sacrifices were to be offered to the gods of the upper world in the following order: on the first day to Jupiter, on the second to Juno, on the third to Diana and Apollo; the festival was to conclude with solemn honours to the fair Greek god whose worship Augustus was attempting to spread, the god who was to watch over the new century, according to the Sibylline oracle and Virgil's Eclogue, the god who represented the sun, light, warmth and intelligence, the source of physical life and of intellectual grandeur. The hymn to Apollo and Diana, which was to conclude and commemorate the festival, would be composed by Horace, the greatest living poet. All freedmen, citizens or not, were invited to the celebration; the representatives of the upper classes in Rome, men and women, were to take part in the celebrations, under the supervision of the two presidents, Augustus and Agrippa.

On February 17,* the Senate decreed the celebration of the *ludi sæculares* for that year; the name of the mover is unknown. The expenditure required for the work necessitated by the games and the festivities was voted. The Senate commissioned Augustus, who was one of the *magistri* or presidents of the college of *quindecimviri*, to supervise the ceremony.† Augustus submitted the programme drawn up by Ateius Capito to the college of the *quindecimviri*; he secured the approval of this programme and induced the college to publish certain edicts or decrees containing the necessary arrangements for the celebration; thus the organisation and arrangement of the celebration were apparently the work of the college and not of Augustus. It was resolved that the celebration should begin during the night of May 31 by a sacrifice to the *Marsæ*, and should proceed in the order we have stated until June 3; the religious ceremonies were to be connected by a continuous round of public amusements. Heralds were sent through every part of Italy, even to the remotest villages, to announce the approaching celebration which no one had yet seen or would see again.‡ The most distinguished members of the upper classes were asked to take part; processions and shows were organised and choirs were trained. During these preparations the college of *quindecimviri* was ordered to consider whether the custom of

* The fragmentary inscription dealing with the *ludi sæculares* of Claudius or Domitian mentions a *senatus consultum* of February 17 concerning the expenses of the games (C. I. L. vi. 877a). I assume that during this session the nature of the games was discussed, and preliminary arrangements were made. It is possible, however, that some general decision concerning the games had already been arrived at in a previous session. In any case, it is certain, as Mommsen says, that a meeting of the Senate was necessary, and that Augustus and the *quindecimviri* could only act in virtue of powers conferred upon them by the Senate.

† This rests upon the supposition of Mommsen (*Ephem. Epigr.* viii. 247) that the first twenty-four lines of the *Acta* contain the fragment of a letter from Augustus to the *quindecimviri*. The theory is at least reasonable though uncertain. At the same time it should be observed that the procedure followed in the organisation of the games is by no means clear from the inscription, which is badly mutilated. We can only gather that there were a certain number of *edicta* and *decreta* issued by the college of *quindecimviri*, and that even if Augustus was commissioned by the Senate to supervise the festivities, he attempted to keep in the background as usual.

‡ Zosimus, ii. 5.

18 B.C.
The organisation of the ceremony.

18 B.C.

former celebrations should be followed, by which the people first made the *suffimenta*, or purification of burning sulphur or bitumen. The college was also to appeal for offerings of food (wheat, barley, and beans) for distribution amongst those who attended the celebrations.* It must be remembered that the *ludi sæculares* were originally an Etruscan ceremony, in which prayers were offered to the gods for the conclusion of the plague; consequently, the first celebration must have taken place during a period of plague. Hence it is likely that the Etruscans, realising that the possibility of contagion was increased by the collection of crowds at such a time, had thought well to purify the spectators by methods still recognised as efficacious in some degree. The offering of the *fruges* was probably brought into some religious connection with the *suffimenta*. The college decided that their members should receive these offerings of the *fruges* on May 28,† before the temples of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and of Jupiter Tonans on the Capitol, in the spacious porticoes of Apollo's temple on the Palatine and of Diana's temple on the Aventine; in these centres, with the exception of the temple of Diana, they would distribute to the people the sulphur and bitumen for the purification of themselves and their families before they came to the festival.‡

The final
preparations.

The celebration became the question of the moment throughout Italy, and all other cares were forgotten; from Augustus, Agrippa, and the consuls who were occupied with the preparations for its success, to the small farmers of the little towns who contemplated a journey to the capital for this one occasion, the unique solemnity was the one subject of conversation.

* Acta, 29-35; *Ephem. Epigr.* viii. 228.

† This date is conjectural: see Mommsen, *Ephem. Epigr.* viii. p. 250.

‡ According to Zosimus (li. 5) the *suffimenta* were distributed *ἐν τῷ καπερῶλει* (this expression certainly refers to the two temples of Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Jupiter Tonans on the Capitol of which mention is made in line 30 of the Acta, *καὶ ἐν τῷ νεῶρῳ κατὰ τὸν Παλάτιον*—this is certainly the *Ædes Apollinis* mentioned in line 31 of the Acta). According to Zosimus, the *fruges* were accepted in Diana's temple on the Aventine, but the *suffimenta* were not distributed. The reason for this difference is very obscure, and possibly Zosimus was mistaken. The inscription on the Acta does not help us, as it is incomplete, and cannot here be restored from the text of Zosimus.

The Roman aristocracy were to be represented by their leading members, their fairest and purest women, their most promising youths, and even Horace, who declined, with his usual cynicism and discontent, to believe in the sincerity of the celebration or of its organisers could not renounce the opportunity of composing a fine poem which the hostile public would be forced to welcome for once at least. It was, however, impossible to say how far the masses could understand or appreciate the leading idea of the celebration, the necessity for regeneration, an aim to be secured, not by idle longing for the fabulous Golden Age, but by practising the austerity enforced by the legislation of the preceding era, by living the simple and fruitful family life. The first of June approached, and vast congregations thronged Rome. A difficulty then arose from the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, which excluded bachelors from public shows. This exclusion would have extended to a large number of people, including Horace himself, the author of the official hymn for the occasion. On May 23, after much discussion, the Senate suspended the operation of the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* for this occasion, and ordered that one *commentarium* of the games should be inscribed upon a column of brass, and another upon a marble column.* Two days later the *quindecemviri*, in view of the numbers who had come to Rome, decided that the distribution of the *suffimenta* should take place upon May 26, 27, and 28, instead of upon one day.†

After the purification of the free citizens, the ceremonies began on the last night of May. In the Campus Martius on the banks of the Tiber, at the spot defined by the oracle, where the Tiber is narrowest and deepest,‡ and where the

The opening ceremonies.

* Acta. v. 50-53.

† *Ibid.* v. 64-70. We have two coins of Augustus referring to the *suffimenta*.

‡ There has been much discussion upon this point, but I think no other translation is possible of the words of the sibyl (Zosimus ii. 6): ἐν κεδίῳ παρὰ Θύμβριδος ἀπλετον ἕδωρ δπηκη στενωτάτων . . . Does στενωτάτων refer to ἕδωρ or to κεδίον? It seems to me that this word can only refer to ἕδωρ, and that it completes the sense expressed by the word ἀπλετον, meaning the spot where the river is deepest and narrowest. Zosimus could hardly have meant the spot where the Campus Martius was narrowest and the water of the Tiber most abundant as this would have been a very confusing description. Our

18 a.c bridge of Victor Emmanuel stands to-day, three altars had been built. A stage had also been raised, but there was no seating accommodation for the spectators; it was intended that they should remain standing, and that the ceremony should be marked by the old traditional austerity of the age when comfortable seats and a great *velum* to provide shade were unknown.* Thus about two o'clock in the night the people thronged to the Tarentum. The darkness was relieved only by the stars and by the altars upon the banks of the Tiber. In this obscurity Augustus came forward, followed by the whole college of *quindecimviri*,† and sacrificed nine lambs and nine kids upon the three altars,‡ *Achivo ritu*, in the Greek fashion.§ In the silence of the night, in the name of all citizens and free men, absent or present, Augustus addressed a prayer to the goddesses who turn and snap with their fingers the slender threads of life; the prayer was conceived in a style as formal and as dry as a legal contract, and no translation can render its archaic and commercial brevity. I give it here as it has been restored by scholars from the fragments which have come down to us.

“*Mœræ, uti vobis in illeis libreis scriptum est, quarum rerum ergo, quodque melius siet P. R. Quiritibus, vobis VIII agnis feminis et IX capris feminis sacrum fiat; vos quæso præcorque uti imperium maiestamque P.R. . . Quiritium duelli domique auxitis utique semper nomen Latinum tuæmini . . . incolumitatem sempiternam victoriam valetudinem populo Romano Quiritibus tribuatis faveatisque populo Romano Quiritium legionibusque populi R. Quiritium remque* interpretation on the other hand, clearly points to the spot between San Giovanni del Fiorentini and the Janiculum Bridge, near which spot were discovered the *Acta sacularia* and the altar of Dis and Proserpine.

* *Acta*, v. 100, in *scena quoi theatrum adjectum non fuit, nullis positus sedilibus*. See Zosimus ii. 5, and Valerius Maximus II. iv. 2.

† Zosimus, ii. 5.

‡ Zosimus (ii. 5) says that there were three altars and that Augustus sacrificed three lambs. But the prayer to the *Mœræ* found in the *Acta* clearly states that nine kids and nine lambs were sacrificed. Zosimus is therefore mistaken. We might assume that two other *magistri* of the college sacrificed upon the other two altars simultaneously with Augustus, but line 115 which gives an account of the sacrifice to the *Ilithyæ* clearly says that Augustus performed the sacrifice alone.

§ *Achivo ritu*: *Acta*, v. 20.

p. populi Romani Quiritium salvam servetis . . . uti sitis volentes propitiæ p. R. Quiritibus quindecimvirum collegio mihi domo familiæ et uti hujus . . . sacrificii acceptrices sitis VIII agnarum feminarum et VIII caprarum feminarum propriarum immolandarum; harum rerum ergo macte hac agna femina immolanda estote fitote volentes propitiæ p. R. Quiritibus quindecimvirorum collegio mihi domo familiæ." *

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The word *mibi* does not mean "to me, Augustus, to my family and house," but, "to me who am present as a citizen and a freeman," Augustus himself being merely the mouthpiece of the prayer which was then on the lips of all present and of every member of Italy, and which directly proposed the following contract to the divinity; nine lambs and nine kids were offered to the goddesses who were to return prosperity to the State and to individuals by way of exchange. No prayer could be more archaic in style and form. The *populus Romanus* and the *Quirites* alone were mentioned, though the ceremony was one to which all freemen were invited. When the sacrifice was accomplished, torches and great fires were lighted to illuminate the stage where various scenes were represented; † the public remained standing while the matrons to the number of one hundred and ten, to represent the years of the century, offered a *sellisternium*, or sacred banquet to Diana and Juno.‡

The next day the ceremony in the Capitol took place; Agrippa and Augustus with two colleagues each sacrificed an ox to Jupiter Optimus Maximus, repeating the monotonous prayer which Augustus had addressed to the *Mærae* during the night.§ The Latin games were then represented in a wooden theatre built upon the Campus Martius near the Tiber and provided with seats, while in the Tarentum the games begun during the night were continued upon the stage.|| A second *sellisternium* was offered by the mothers during that day; ¶ the *quindecimviri* dispensed women in mourning from their retirement; ** in the night a further sacrifice was offered in the darkness of the Tarentum, on the banks of the Tiber to

The ceremonies of June 1 and 2.

* Acta, v. 91, 99.

† *Ibid.* 100; Zosimus, II. 5.

‡ Acta v. 101.

§ *Ibid.* 103, 106.|| *Ibid.* 108.¶ *Ibid.* 109.** *Ibid.* 110-114.

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the *Ilithyæ*, the goddesses of fertility; this was a bloodless sacrifice, consisting of twenty-seven cakes of three different kinds, thrice offered, and accompanied by the same formal prayer, in which the names of the goddesses were changed.* June 2 began with a great sacrifice to Juno on the Capitol; the chief part was taken by the matrons, in token of the religious value of woman to the State and to the family, who might not take part in politics, but could unite her prayers with the supplications of the men for divine protection. One hundred and ten mothers, representing the years of the century and chosen by the *quindecimviri* from the noblest families in Rome, were ordered to appear on the Capitol for the sacrifice. Agrippa and Augustus respectively sacrificed a cow,† and Augustus repeated to Juno the prayer offered to the Fates, to Jupiter and to the *Ilithyæ*; the matrons then fell upon their knees and recited a long prayer slightly different from the preceding formula, asking Juno *genibus nixæ*, to protect the republic and the family, and to give strength and victory to the Romans for ever. Further games were then celebrated in every quarter of Rome.‡ That night in the Tarentum were offered the three sacrifices to *Terra Mater*; the usual prayer was repeated for the fifth time and followed by a *sellisternium*.§ On June 3 was held the last and most important solemnity, the sacrifice of the twenty-seven cakes already offered to the *Ilithyæ*, in honour of Apollo in his temple on the Palatine.|| When the sacrifice was offered and Augustus had recited the monotonous prayer for the sixth time, the conclusion of the three days' ceremonies was reached, and then the Ode of Horace was sung by twenty-seven young men and twenty-seven girls. The vigorous stanzas soared above the vast city of Rome, the seven hills of which had never heard from human lips prayers of such tender and harmonious sweetness rising to the gods. Vast was the difference between the legal prayers recited by Augustus, and the one hundred and ten matrons, with their clumsy relative pronouns and their heavy gerundives

* Acta v. 115-118.

† *Ibid.* 133.‡ *Ibid.* 139-146.† *Ibid.* 119.§ *Ibid.* 134-138.

and these light and graceful stanzas which rose and fell like flying birds. 17 B.C.

The poem summarises the significance of the long ceremony ; ^{The *carmen* *sæculare*.} it contains the mythology of the astronomical and moral symbolism, refers to the recent social laws, glorifies the great traditions of Rome and expresses the desire for peace, prosperity, power, and virtue, under which alone the longings of mankind can be fulfilled. In a prelude of two stanzas the boys and girls invoke Apollo and Diana.

Phœbe, silvarumque potens Diana,
Lucidum cœli decus, o colendi
Semper et culti, date quæ precamur
Tempore sacro.

Quo Sibyllini monuere versus
Virgines lectas puerosque castos
Dis, quibus septem placuere colles,
Dicere carmen.

Then the boys turn to Apollo, the god of light, the sun, and sing a stanza which no young Roman can read without emotion even twenty centuries later :

Alme sol, curru nitido diem qui
Promis et celas, aliusque et idem
Nasceris, possis nihil urbe Roma
Visere majus !

The girls take up the song, associating Diana with the Ilithyæ and Lucina, the goddesses of generation :

Rite maturos aperire partus
Lenis, Ilithyia, tuere matres,
Sives tu Lucina probas vocari,
Seu Genitalis.

The young men then resume the invocation of the favour of the goddesses for the legislation of the preceding year :

Diva, producas subolem patrumque
Prosperes decreta super jugandis
Feminis prolisque novæ feraci
Lege marita.

It will then be possible, say the girls, to celebrate the *ludi sæculares* for three days and nights every 110 years.

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Certus undenos declens per annos
 Orbis ut cantus referatque ludos
 Ter die claro totiensque grata
 Nocte frequentes.

With alternate song boys and girls then invoke the Fates, the Goddesses of Destiny, the Earth, the mother of fertility and prosperity, the new Apollo, the god of health, who lays aside his arrows in benignant mildness, and Diana, on this occasion in the form of a crescent moon :

Vosque veraces cecinisse, Parcæ,
 Quod semel dictum est stabilisque rerum
 Terminus servet, bona jam peractis
 Jungite fata,

Fertilis frugum pecoriaque Tellus
 Spicea donet Cererem corona ;
 Nutriant fetus et aquæ salubres
 Et Jovis auræ.

Condito mitis placidusque telo
 Supplices audi pueros, Apollo ;
 Siderum regina bicornis, audi,
 Luna, puellas.

After thus severally invoking the sun, and the powers of fertility, destiny and prosperity, and the moon, the boys and girls, probably in alternate stanzas, address the gods of Olympus collectively, and send up to them in magnificent lines the universal desires of Rome and Italy, the prayer which expresses all the regrets, the aspirations, the hopes and the ideals which rise in the national heart at the moment of their recovery from vast catastrophe :

Roma si vestrum est opus Iliaque
 Litus Etruscum tenuere turmæ,
 Jussa pars mutare Lares et urbem
 Sospite cursu,

Cui per ardentem sine fraude Troiam
 Castus Æneas patriæ superstes
 Liberum munivit iter, daturus
 Plura relictis :

Di, probos mores docili juventæ,
 Di, senectuti placidæ quietem,
 Romulæ genti date remque prolemque
 Et decus omne !

Quæque vos bobus veneratur albis
 Claris Anchisæ Venerisque sanguis
 Impetret, bellante prior, jacentem
 Lenis in hostem.

Jam mari terraque manus potentes
 Medus Albanasque timet secures,
 Jam Scythæ responsa petunt superbi
 Nuper et Indi.

Jam Fides et Pax et Honos Pudorque
 Priscus et neglecta redire Virtus
 Audet apparetque beata pleno
 Copia cornu ;

Angur et fulgente decorus arcu
 Phoebus acceptusque novem Camenis,
 Qui salutari levat arte fessos
 Corporis artus,

Si Palatinas videt æquus arces,
 Remque Romanam Latiumque felix
 Alterum in lustrum meliusque semper
 Prorogat ævum.

The song closes with a final invocation from the retiring singers, whose prayers have filled their hearts with piety :

Quæque Aventinum tenet Algidumque,
 Quindecim Diana preces virorum
 Curat et votis puerorum amicas
 Applicat aures.

Hæc Jovem sentire deosque cunctos
 Spem bonam certamque domum reporto,
 Doctos et Phoebi chorus et Dianæ
 Dicere laudes.

This magnificent poem forms a hymn to life in its every manifestation, addressing the sun, the powers of fertility, abundance, virtue, and power, and all is marvellously rendered in the Greek mythological style. The composition was, indeed, almost too beautiful. A comparison of this magnificent prayer with the dry formulæ recited by Augustus will illustrate the uneasiness, the discontent, and the inconsistencies of the age. On the one hand, we have the old political religion, petrified by barbarous symbolism and traditional ritual ; on the other hand, we see an attempt to vitalise that religion by an appeal to the art, the mythology, and the philosophy of the Greeks,

The true force
 of the *carmen
 sæculare*.

17 B.C.

by an appeal, that is, to purely intellectual sympathies which were not based upon any religious revival. The *carmen seculare* was a fine work and was worthy to rank with the temple of Apollo built by Augustus under the columns of which the poem was recited; it was, however, a lyrical outburst of human song, and not an outpouring of religious fervour; it might have been composed by a great artist who regarded these divinities as so many intellectual symbols intended for the artistic personification of certain patriotic ideas. The uneducated peasant and the ignorant plebeian might well believe that they would obtain their wishes from the Fates and from Apollo by repeating the formula which Apollo himself had delivered. But if the aristocracy would no longer use religion as a means of public discipline, it was impossible that the old religion could become the instrument of imperial government. The beautiful lines of Horace could not revive a sense of duty in the corrupt and frivolous aristocracy if they were repeated merely for their harmony. The *ludi seculares* are proof of the fact that attempts to revive the old Roman religion with an infusion of the Greek spirit ended rather in confusion than in regeneration. In vain did the chorus of girls and boys proceed to the Capitol to sing the poem once more; * in vain did the people enjoy the spectacle of the four-horsed chariot race in addition to the ordinary games; † in vain did the *quindecimviri* attempt to please this world of holiday makers by adding seven days of *ludi honorarii* to the three days of *ludi solemnes*, ordaining one day alone of rest, June 3; ‡ the sure and certain hope which the singers of Horace's poem professed to carry away with them was no more than a fine piece of poetical hypocrisy.

* Acta, v. 148. Mommsen (*Epik. Epigr.* viii. 256) supposes on the other hand, that the poem was sung *a choris solemnibus pompa ex Palatio ad Capitolinum pergentibus et inde redeuntibus ad aedem Apollinis Palatinam*, but the text of the Acta which is very precise, seems to me entirely against this hypothesis, which might otherwise seem probable. With regard to the inconsistency of singing on the Capitol in honour of Apollo and Diana, a poem which barely mentions Jupiter and Juno, we may reply that the composition was not merely a hymn to Apollo and Diana, but was primarily the *carmen seculare*, the hymn which summarised the ceremony as a whole.

† Acta, v. 154.

‡ *Ibid.* 156-159.

While Italy was delighting itself at Rome with these rites, ceremonies and songs, the European provinces of the empire were preparing a great revolt, by way of comment upon the *ludi sœculares*, the games and the *carmen*. The long confusion of the last century had so inverted the natural sequence of cause and effect, that peace itself lighted the fire of war in the Alps and the European provinces. Peace had been of inestimable benefit to Italy and to the rich eastern provinces, but no great benefit to the uncivilised nations ruled by Rome in the Alps, in transalpine Gaul, in Spain and Pannonia. Peace had brought more frequent and severer levies of auxiliary troops, stricter consuls and proprætors, and a fresh taxation imposed by Augustus and vigorously collected by his procurators, to reorganise the finances of the vast empire. These regions had been accustomed for years to regard the Roman supremacy as purely nominal, and were now stirred by the breath of insurrection. Even in Gaul the census ordered by Augustus, and the fresh tribute which he had imposed, destroyed within ten years the work of pacification, and the discords and agitations of former times were breaking out once more.* Licinus, the famous freedman of Augustus, had been ordered to superintend the collection of the tribute, and personified in the eyes of the Gauls this unexpected and disagreeable change of Roman policy. In the execution of his task, Licinus went about the country and made the acquaintance of landowners, merchants and workmen, in order to estimate the wealth of every class; he, perhaps, was the first Roman to observe amid the cold and fogs of uncultured Gaul the signs of that marvellous wealth which was soon to become a source of revenue. He had been the first to realise the future prosperity

17 B.C.
Disturbances
in the pro-
vinces.

* Suetonius, Tib. 9; *Post hæc Comatam Galliam anno fere resit (Tiberius) et barbarorum incursionibus et principum discordia inquietam.* This brief allusion proves that the Gallic aristocracy were again beset by discord about this time, and that their designs were connected with the Germanic invasion of which we shall speak later. This implies that in the Gallic nobility a Roman and a Germanic party had been formed and that the Roman domination had aroused keen discontent. Dion (liv. 21) precisely confirms the phrase of Suetonius and says that the chief cause of the discontent was the exactions of Licinus.

17 B.C. and greatness of Gaul,* but he had used his knowledge merely to show Augustus that he was a past master in the art of extracting money from subject races. No provincial governor, quaestor, legate or procurator had shown such zeal as Licinus in Gaul in the task of restoring the finances of the republic, and no one had gone to work more unscrupulously. He had followed throughout Gaul the officials in charge of the census, had interpreted the instructions of Augustus from his own point of view and asserted his position to a greater degree than a freedman of the *princeps* had any right to do. In Gaul he was nothing more than the private assistant of the *legatus*, but he had overruled the scruples of that official and had filled his own purse while procuring money for the State. He was aware that in the prevailing financial distress his measures would not be scrutinised too closely at Rome, if he could but produce a brilliant result.

The situation
in Gaul.

In Gaul, therefore, the anti-Roman party was rising once more among the nobility, and to this great peril was added a second possibility of disaster, the Germanic danger which now reappeared. Cæsar's victory over Ariovistus had driven the Germans out of Gaul, and the doors of the new Roman provinces had been shut upon them. Forty years had now elapsed since the defeat of the king of the Suevi; while the prestige of Rome had sunk during the civil wars, a new generation had grown up beyond the Rhine which had forgotten

* Dion, liv. 21. This is the real meaning of Dion's account of the quarrels between Augustus, Gaul and Licinus, and the speech which the Greek historian puts in the mouth of Licinus on the subject of the Gallic wealth. Notwithstanding its exaggerations, this speech obviously contains the serious reflections of Licinus, who would never have maintained his position in Gaul so long if he had been nothing more than a vulgar extortioner, capable of deceiving Augustus by clever lies. Licinus, unscrupulous as he was, was an intelligent and active man, and did excellent service to the Roman government; further, even from the fiercely selfish point of view of the Romans, he must be credited with more serious intentions than a mere desire to enrich himself by plundering the Gauls. These intentions can be observed from a consideration of this episode. When Licinus was accused by the Gauls of laying crushing taxation upon them, he attempted to prove to Augustus that the Gauls and their country were much richer than Rome believed, and were likely to become much richer in the future. On this point his views were correct.

Cæsar and his army, and began to covet the fertile lands of Gaul with their opportunities for emigration, for conquest, and for plunder, opportunities which the Germans had always been able to grasp before the Roman invasion, while at the present moment, there were but five legions in the country. Agrippa seems to have been the first to realise that Rome must keep upon her guard lest the Gallic nobility should make advances to the Germans and induce the latter to resume their efforts for the conquest of Gaul ; during his last visit to the province he had devised two great political expedients to counterbalance the military weakness of Rome in Gaul ; he proposed to calm the anger of the Gauls concerning the increased taxation, and also to prevent an invasion by a diplomatic concession. He allowed the great multitude of the Ubii, who were stationed upon the Germanic side of the Rhine, to cross the river and occupy the uncultivated territory beyond it ; * he thus hoped to secure the friendship of the neighbouring population beyond the river, and to transform into hard-working subjects those whom he would otherwise be forced to destroy. Agrippa, with his great administrative genius, also realised that Rome was now too weak to impose heavy taxation upon Gaul, unless such taxation were justified in the eyes of the people by concessions in return ; he wished to do for Gaul what Augustus had begun to do for Asia, and attempted to reconcile the long opposition of interests which had separated the different parts of the nation. The local aristocracies which had been divided by bitter enmity during the earlier centuries of war, were united in peace by a common desire to imitate Græco-Roman civilisation and to profit by the new order of things. The towns were becoming important, and commerce was developing, not only with Germany and Italy, but also in the interior of the country ; the artisan and mercantile classes

* Strabo, IV. iii. 4 : . . . μετήγαγεν Ἀγρίππας ἐκόντας εἰς τὴν ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἑήνου. Although Strabo gives no date it is certain that Agrippa must have made this concession during his last stay in Gaul ; no war was in progress, and he would have had time to deal with questions of civil administration. Obviously the intention of this concession was, as we have stated, to secure the friendship of the frontier populations which were chiefly disturbed.

16 B.C. were growing more numerous and more important in every tribe, and demanded peace, order, and security as in Asia, not only among themselves, but also beyond the frontiers of the little states to which they belonged. Rome alone was able to provide peace in Gaul as in Asia. Agrippa had realised that roads through the country must first be made, and at that time he had surveyed and begun the construction of the great Gallic *quadrivium*, the four roads from Lyons; one of these went northwards to the sea and probably ended in the village which was the port of embarkation for Britain; another went south to Marseilles; a third eastward to the Rhine; and the fourth westward through Aquitaine as far as Saintonge.* He had made use of the existing Gallic roads, enlarging and improving them. Thus the money extorted by Licinus from Gaul was partially expended for the benefit of the country and its inhabitants.

Unrest in the
northern
provinces.

Agrippa, however, had been obliged to interrupt this great task and to return to Rome, to work with Augustus at the social laws and the *ludi sæculares*; at the outset of the year 16, the storm which had been gathering upon the northern frontier broke. About the same time the Bessi in Thrace revolted against their king, Rhœmetalces, who had been imposed upon them by the Romans; Macedonia was invaded by the Dentheletæ, the Scordisci, and probably also by the Sarmatæ; the Pannonians revolted in conjunction with the kingdom of Noricum, which was merely a Roman protectorate, and invaded Istria. In the Alps the Venonetes and the Camunni took up arms; † the former tribe probably inhabited the Valtellina, and also possibly part of the valley of the Adige and the valley of the Inn; ‡ the second tribe inhabited the valley which has retained their name. These reports of war reached Rome from every side at the beginning of the year 16, when Augustus was greatly occupied with the first effects of his social legislation. The tree so carefully planted was bringing forth strange fruit.

* Strabo, IV. xvi. 11.

† Dion, liv. 20.

‡ Oberziner, *Le Guerre di Augusto contro i Popoli Alpini*, p. 52, Rome, 1900.

It was now obvious that the purification of the Senate, claimed by the nobility as a measure of safety, had merely served to empty the senatorial benches, and to advertise the selfishness of that aristocracy which claimed a monopoly of governmental privileges.* Those who had been excluded from the Senate plucked up courage, and attempted to influence Augustus and to shake his severity as censor. They continually advanced the irrefutable argument, why inflict the affront of expulsion upon so many decent senators, seeing that the senators in possession, the members of the nobility, were no better than themselves? Thus by degrees the excluded senators recovered their seats one after another.†

The laws upon marriage and adultery gave rise to even greater embarrassments. Augustus had been careful to adopt the two sons of Agrippa and Julia, by name Caius and Lucius (the former was aged three years and the latter but a few months), in order to set a good example of obedience to the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, and to be able to say that as a law-abiding citizen, he had brought up three children for the republic, Julia and these adopted sons.‡ Agrippa had one daughter by Pomponia and had given her in marriage to Tiberius; he was also young enough to hope for other children by Julia. By adopting two young children, Augustus could not be accused of attempting to avoid the law or to avoid the trouble and responsibility of child-rearing. Though his habitual dexterity was able to surmount the difficulty arising from the sterility of Livia, it was not so easy for every one else to obey the new regulations. Moreover, the first public trials

The consequences of the social laws.

* Only thus can we explain why Augustus, as Dion reports, obliged the Senate to fine members who were absent from a proportion of the sessions without reasonable excuse. (Dion, liv. 18.)

† Dion (liv. 14) says, in speaking of the *lectio senatus* of the year 18, *καὶ αὐτῶν* (those who had been excluded) *οἱ μὲν πλείους ἐπανήλθον χρόνῳ εἰς τὸ συνέδριον.*

‡ Dion, liv. 18. This was the true motive of the adoption, and not the wish to choose his successors. If the choice of a successor had been in question, Augustus might have selected, not children, but Tiberius or Drusus, who were old enough to bear responsibility and were then giving proof of their capacity. Moreover, Augustus was always particularly careful to give no ground whatever for the idea that he was preparing a successor.

16 B.C.

for adultery had shown that attempts to purify the household by the work of spies and informers brought to light a vast amount of private impurity which was likely to contaminate others. The public flocked to these trials as to a scandalous show for the pleasure of seeing the parties to the suit exchanging coarse insults, shameful accusations, and disgusting revelations.* The public took such pleasure in prying into other people's affairs that they began to cast curious glances upon Augustus himself and Terentia; every one was anxious to know whether the author of the law would set the example of its observance.† Finally, whether these laws were likely to regenerate Rome or not, it was at least certain that they would increase the amount of litigation. This was in itself a danger, as the old *lex Cincia* was no longer observed and as many senators, knights, and plebeians regarded legal business as a means of livelihood. Lawsuits multiply and are protracted to interminable length when lawyers can make money from them. For these reasons Augustus had determined to revive the provisions of the *lex Cincia*, which forbade any arrangement concerning payment for legal services; for this purpose he had the law reconfirmed by the Senate after a special debate. The Senate also decided that a fine should be inflicted upon those members who absented themselves from its sessions without valid reasons.‡

A Germanic
invasion of
Gaul.

For some time, however, Augustus had determined to avail himself of his usual expedient in moments of difficulty, and to disappear from Rome, where it was no less dangerous for him to enforce his laws than to leave their operation without supervision, seeing that those who did not observe them remained unpunished.§ The numerous revolts which had broken out

* Dion, liv. 30. The anecdote is of later date (in the year 742), but if Augustus could thus resolve to intervene with such vigour in opposition to his usual caution, the abuse must have been of long standing and serious. It is very probable that it can be traced to the first prosecutions under the law.

† See Dion, liv. 19.

‡ Dion, liv. 18.

§ Dion (liv. 19) tells us that Augustus resolved to leave Rome that he might not witness the continual violation of his laws. He then says that he started after sending Agrippa to Syria and took with

would have provided sufficient pretext for his absence, but the arrival of yet more serious news immediately decided his action ; the Germans were attempting to force their way into Gaul. After the departure of Agrippa, the administration of Gaul had been left in the hands of Marcus Lollius, a man who enjoyed the entire confidence of Augustus, and indeed deserved it for his capacity in certain directions. On the annexation of Galatia, Lollius had been the first governor of that province, and had been consul in the year 21. He was an intelligent and energetic man, but avaricious in the extreme ; he used his friendship with Augustus to accumulate, by cautious and clever methods, a gigantic fortune, and at the present time, in conjunction with Licinus, he was extorting money from the Gauls to fill both his own purse and the State treasury. His unpopularity among the Gauls was thus considerable. For this reason, added to the suddenness of the attack, and possibly to his own mistakes, Lollius was unable to drive the invaders beyond the Rhine. He had been beaten in various engagements, had lost an eagle belonging to the Fifth Legion, and finally in a panic sent to Augustus for help. Cæsar's son was thus obliged to hasten to Gaul to avert the Germanic peril, and to master the turbulent Gauls.*

This news must have distracted the public attention in Rome and Italy from questions of domestic strife and scandal, at any rate, for the moment. It seemed that a new Vercingetorix was about to arise in Gaul, and this at a time when half the European provinces were threatened with war. On the other hand, Augustus, though still rejoicing in his successful agreement with the Parthians, must have asked himself what would

him Tiberius, although the latter was prætor. This seems to indicate that he started upon the news that revolts had broken out, and when he heard of the Germanic invasion of Gaul, where Tiberius had been appointed *legatus*. Otherwise, we cannot explain why he took Tiberius from Rome, where he ought to have remained as prætor. The two stories are easily reconciled ; Augustus was already anxious to start, and he therefore took advantage of the revolts and the Germanic war which would justify his absence in the eyes of the public.

* Dion, liv. 20, Velleius Paterculus, ii. 97 ; the passage of Velleius Paterculus certainly refers to this invasion, and confirms the version of Dion, though it is not in strict chronological order.

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be the effect of this European crisis on the east, where the maintenance of peace seemed very precarious; what would happen if Phraates seized the opportunity to retake Armenia, while he himself was occupied elsewhere? Ironical, indeed, was the answer which the gods seemed to have granted to the invocations of the *Carmen sæculare*. Fortunately, Augustus could rely upon the help of Agrippa, and the two *principes* soon made the necessary arrangements. It was recognised that at a time of such danger, Cæsar's son must appear in Gaul. His name alone would produce a great impression, and was worth as much as several legions. Meanwhile, Agrippa would go to the east, and maintain order by his presence, or if necessary, by force, while Augustus re-established peace in Europe. Rome and Italy were to be entrusted to Statilius Taurus, who was appointed *præfectus urbi* by the Senate in the old fashion; * Publius Silius, the governor of Illyria, was already marching against the Pannonians and the tribes of Noricum to drive them back from Istria; when this province had been secured, he would fall back to the Valley of the Po to suppress the revolts among the Alpine tribes.†

This arrangement received the full approval of the Senate. Agrippa started for the east, taking Julia with him,‡ notwithstanding the old prohibition which Augustus had renewed. It did not seem prudent after the passing of the *lex de adulteriis*, to leave her at Rome, far from her husband and father, and exposed to the insipid flatteries and courtesies of the futile and fashionable Sempronius Gracchus. Possibly, too, Agrippa was anxious to fill the gaps in his family caused by the adoptions of Augustus. On his side, Augustus, after inaugurating the temple of *Quirinus*,§ took with him Tiberius, who was prætor in that year (through the Senate he had authorised Drusus,

* Dion, liv. 19.

† *Ibid.* liv. 20: as regards Publius Silius and his proconsulship of Illyria, see C. I. L. iii. 2973.

‡ We know that Julia went to the east with Agrippa, not only by inscriptions in her honour, but by her identification with local deities, of which we shall speak later, and also by an anecdote to be found in F. H. G. iii. 350 (Müller).

§ Dion, liv. 19.

the brother of Tiberius, to fulfil his duties), in order that he might be supported by an intelligent and prudent young man upon whom he could rely.* But when Augustus reached Gaul, the name of Cæsar had already driven the Germans beyond the Rhine; he found Gaul free from the fear of invasion, and struggling only with Licinus, a more formidable power than any invader.†

* Dion, liv. 19.

† *Ibid.* liv. 20.

CHAPTER V

THE EGYPT OF THE WEST

The revolt in the Alpine provinces—The plan of campaign against the Rhætians and the Vindelicians—Tiberius—Drusus—Tiberius and Drusus as the *legati* of Augustus—Conference of Licinus and the Gallic chiefs—The Egypt of the west—The war against the Rhætians and Vindelicians—Popularity of Drusus and Tiberius at Rome—The eulogy of Horace upon the conquerors—Drusus and Tiberius as representatives of the aristocratic renaissance—The glory of the Claudii.

The revolt in the Alps.

IN the plains of Gaul the revolt had quickly died away, but in the Alpine districts the movement spread and increased in intensity. Publius Silius drove the Pannonians and the Norici from Istria, went down the valley of the Po, and made his way to the Valtellina and the Val Camonica to oppose the Venonetes and the Camunni.* The appearance of his army, however, in no way deterred the insurgents. The Venonetes were regarded as one of the most warlike populations of the Alps,† and other tribes had been misled by their example; the Trumplini of the Val Trompia and the numerous tribes of the Lepontii,‡ who inhabited the Swiss and the Italian valleys opening into Lakes Maggiore and Orta, were now in revolt; a similar movement was in progress among the Rhætians and the Vindelicians, whose warlike tribes occupied the vast regions of the Grisons and Tyrol and extended to the Danube§

* Dion, liv. 20.

† Strabo, IV. vi. 8.

‡ Did the Trumplini rise simultaneously with the Venonetes and the Camunni? Dion does not state the fact, but Oberziner shows much reason for assuming it, as in the inscription of La Turbie these tribes appear in the list of Alpine peoples conquered by Augustus at this time. See Oberziner, *La Guerre de Augusto contro i Popoli Alpini*, Rome, 1900, p. 59 ff.

§ Dion, liv. 22.

through the plain of Bavaria. Thus the centre of the Alps was in a ferment ; although at the west the movement had been checked upon the edge of the great gap which the Roman sword had made through the valley of the Salassi, it none the less extended from the centre of the vast mountain range to the Cottian Alps, where Donnus, the faithful friend of Rome, had died, leaving his inheritance to his son, Cottius, who was an unreliable ally at so disturbed a time. Even the rude and hardy Ligurian populations of the Maritime Alps were drawn into the movement.* The Alpine villages had become so many refuges for the last remnants of those races which had inhabited the plains—Ligurians, Iberians, Celts, Etruscans, Eugeanæans ; these different populations there lived in a state of internecine warfare, but would unite for defence against invaders from the plains and against Rome, though the latter power had hitherto appeared only at rare and uncertain intervals in the majority of the valleys. Thus these peoples had lived hitherto almost without restraint in their mountain gorges, forming tribes under the government of rich land-owners, cultivating the soil, breeding cattle, working the mines and cutting wood in the magnificent forests, plundering travellers and making occasional raids upon the plains for free-booting purposes. Several of these tribes had even gained more wealth in the anarchy of the last thirty years and by their periodical raids upon the plains than they had found in the sands of their mountain torrents. Peace was therefore much less desirable to them than to the other inhabitants of the western provinces, and revolt accordingly broke out upon every side.

Thus in the very heart of her European provinces Rome was suddenly plunged into a most serious war, which would have

The plan of campaign.

* Oberziner is right in attaching great importance to the passage of Ammianus Marcellinus (XV. x. 2). This passage shows that Donnus died at this time and that Cottius succeeded him, that Cottius and some of his people took part in the revolt of the Maritime Alps which broke out in 14 B.C., as may be seen from Dion (liv. 24). It is obvious that these later revolts were aroused by the example of the earlier movements, and were a consequence of them.

16 B.C.

tested the genius of a second Cæsar. It was necessary to cross the Alps by forced marches to crush the Pannonians and the Norici who had invaded Istria and the Germans who had attacked Gaul. Such a punitive expedition demanded rapid movement and unexpected onslaughts. Order must then be re-established in Thrace, where the disturbance was considerable, by the same methods. Such at least was the strategical plan which the conqueror of Gaul would have adopted against the barbarian inhabitants of these mountains and plains; but times and men had changed. Augustus was anxious not to mobilise the legions of Syria, Egypt and Africa, and could only dispose of thirteen legions for these campaigns, five of which were stationed in Gaul and eight in Illyrian Macedonia, we do not know precisely where.* Now these thirteen legions, notwithstanding their constant training, were neither sufficiently hardy nor energetic to become an invincible weapon wielded by the mobile genius of a second Cæsar. Moreover, Augustus was by no means a second Cæsar. He was unwilling to lead the army in person, and preferred to direct operations at a distance through his legates. He therefore resolved to divide the necessary work into several parts, which were to be undertaken successively with prudence and caution. For the moment he proposed to abandon Pannonia, Noricum and Thrace, and to hurl upon the Alps all the forces at his disposal. When he had conquered the Venonetes and the Camunni he intended to send Publius Silius against the Trumplini and the Lepontii, in that year if possible, and, if not, in the following year; † he was then prepared to shatter the coalition of the Rhætii and Vindelici, which was the most formidable obstacle in his path. One army was to start from the valley of the Po, to enter the valley of Adige at Verona and to deploy upon the valley of the Eisach by way of Trent; driving the enemy before it, this army would pursue the rebels into the side valleys to right and left, capturing and massacring the Rhætian population as far

* Pfitzner, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserlegionen von Augustus bis Hadrianus*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 16.

† Oberziner, *op. cit.* pp. 59-60.

as possible. The army would then turn towards the Brenner pass and descend like a devastating torrent upon the Inn and the plains of the Vindelici. Meanwhile another army would start from Gaul, probably from Besançon, would follow the course of the Rhine and reach Lake Constance by crossing the country of the Lepontii, which Silius would have already invaded. This force would then seize Lake Constance, which was in the possession of the Vindelician tribes, would effect a junction with the Italian army and advance to the Danube, subjugating the whole of Vindelicia.*

All these expeditions, however, in the Alps, in Pannonia, in ^{Tiberias.} Noricum and in Thrace, required young generals of vigour and intelligence, possessing the necessary health, energy and endurance for mountain warfare against barbarians; it was a kind of warfare with little opportunity for great battles, but demanding the constant pursuit of a very mobile enemy in an interminable series of skirmishes. Augustus had therefore been justifiably anxious to bring new blood into the public service by appointing men between thirty and forty years of age to the highest offices. Unfortunately he had been obliged on this point also to consider the prejudices, the ambitions, the interests and the jealousies of the old nobility, and he had not been greatly aided by the circumstances and the spirit of his age, which rather enervated the old nobility than renewed its strength. Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of Augustus, men of high intelligence and capacity were by no means numerous among the members of the old Pompeian aristocracy who had held prætorships and consulships. At any rate, Augustus did the best he could. It was no doubt upon his advice that Lucius Calpurnius Piso appeared that year as a candidate for the consulship of the year 15. He is supposed to have been the son of the consul of 58, and therefore the brother of Cæsar's last wife, Calpurnia, and the uncle of Augustus, though he was

* Oberziner (*La Guerre di Augusto contro i Popoli Alpini*, Rome, 1900, pp. 99-101) seems to me to have proved that this was probably the plan of campaign, but documentary evidence for the whole of this campaign is so scanty that we must confine ourselves to mere conjecture.

15 B.C. much younger than Augustus, being only thirty-two years of age.* Augustus wished to make Piso his *legatus* in Thrace. Then he chose Tiberius to command the army which was to start from Gaul and to invade Vindelicia. Tiberius was then twenty-six years of age. He was a member of one of the most ancient and illustrious families of the Roman aristocracy, and had already given numerous proofs of intelligence and energy. He was admired as a type of the nobility at the best period of republican prosperity. In that year he held the prætorship.† Augustus could therefore make Tiberius his *legatus* and entrust him with an army without any violation of law and custom, without any imprudence or risk of accusation that he was showing favouritism to an unworthy object. He showed, in fact, that he was ready to trust youth not merely

* Tacitus, *Ann.* vi. 10: *patrem et consorium*. This hint from Tacitus would incline us to think that Piso was really the son of the consul of 58 who was censor in 50, and was therefore the brother of Calpurnia. However, a comparison of his age with that of his father and his sister raises objections. Piso died at the age of eighty in A.D. 32, and was therefore born in 48 B.C., ten or eleven years after his sister had married Cæsar. There would thus be a difference of twenty-five or twenty-six years between himself and his sister. It would be rash to say that the case is impossible, as the consul of 58 might have married again at the age of fifty, but it is in any event extraordinary.

† There is no doubt that Tiberius showed the highest capacity both in youth and middle age; the point cannot be contested, as historians are unanimous. Tacitus himself, notwithstanding his dislike, admits (*Ann.* vi. 51): *egregium vita famaue, quoad privatus, vel in imperiis sub Augusto fuit*. Suetonius (*Tib.* 39) and Dion (*lvii.* 13) say that he deteriorated after the death of Germanicus. Moreover, as we shall see, his history between the ages of twenty and twenty-five is that of an eminent man. The events of his life which we shall hereafter display show that Tiberius, at any rate at this time, represented pure aristocratic tradition with an obstinacy unparalleled except in the case of a Claudius. We have therefore to begin with this important fact, that even the historians who disliked him most do not hesitate upon this point, and all agree that his youth was adorned with many virtues and was free from vice. This point of view must be adopted if we wish to understand the figure of Tiberius or to solve what a German historian has called the "Tiberian enigma." Tiberius has never been understood, because no detailed study has been given to the part of his life preceding his accession to the empire, which is far the most important. The key to his history is to be found in the years during which Tiberius was merely the son-in-law of Augustus and one of the great personages of Rome.

with unimportant posts, but also with important responsibilities. 15 B.C.

So much can hardly be said of another nomination made at ^{Drusus.} the same time, which was justified neither constitutionally by previous political training, or personally by services already rendered, and therefore seems to be a first infringement, slight but none the less dangerous, of that strict respect for the constitution which Augustus wished to restore. A *legatus* was required to command the army which was to start from Italy and attack the Rhætians in their valleys, and for this purpose Augustus chose the younger brother of Tiberius, Drusus, the second son of Livia. Drusus was a young man of twenty-two, and, like Tiberius, had been authorised by the Senate to hold magistracies five years before the legal age; under this privilege he had been elected *quæstor* for the year 15.* Roman armies had indeed been commanded by *quæstors*, but invariably under circumstances of extreme gravity, when no magistrate of higher rank was available. This was by no means the case in the present instance. Many former *prætors* and *consuls* were to be found, and if Augustus entrusted an army to this young *quæstor*, who had as yet given no proof of his capacity, this could be nothing but an act of favouritism irreconcilable with the form and the essence of the republican constitution. But Drusus was a favourite with the gods; all privileges seemed reserved for him. Like Tiberius, he possessed the noble and aristocratic beauty of the Claudii; † but he did not possess the proud and taciturn reserve of Tiberius and his ancestors; ‡ on the contrary, he was affable and agreeable,

* Dion Cassius gives us no information concerning the *cursus honorum* of Drusus, but we can deduce the dates of his *prætorship* and *quæstorship* from Suetonius (*Claudius*, 1): *Drusus in quæstura præturaque honore, dux Rætici, deinde Germanici belli.*

† Suetonius (*Tib.* 68) says of Tiberius that he was *facie honesta*, as, indeed, his busts show him. Velleius Paterculus, II. xcvi. 3, says of Drusus: *pulchritudo corporis proxima fraterna fuit.*

‡ Many writers refer to Tiberius' stiffness of manner, which is a feature of aristocratic character in ages of little refinement, and may therefore be regarded in the case of Tiberius as a tradition of the great aristocratic age and as a proof that even in character he was a true representative of the traditional Roman nobility. Two centuries earlier this repellent manner was habitual among the nobility and

15 B.C.

and could inspire even the sceptical and the vicious with admiration for the old Roman virtues, which appeared so crabbed in his brother, even in the eyes of the moral. He was the first example of a member of the Roman aristocracy who showed the old virtues under pleasing and agreeable form.* Among his many virtues Drusus had not even his brother's failing of excessive fondness for wine. Thus when Augustus in that year betrothed him to Antonia, the younger daughter of Antony and Octavia, the universal sympathies of Rome were aroused by admiration for this couple, whose youth, beauty and virtue seemed almost of divine origin. Antonia was chaste, loyal, simple, devout, an excellent housekeeper, with all the good qualities of the old Roman matron; she also possessed the accomplishments of her age, the beauty, the wit and the culture which earlier generations had not known. Handsome, young, affable, a strong republican and an enthusiastic admirer of the old Roman tradition,† Drusus had every honourable ambition which an aristocrat should entertain, and such purity that he was said to have entered marriage in complete innocence and to have remained invariably faithful.‡ Popular both with the nobles and the people, the happy pair

commanded respect; but in the time of Augustus it was considered out of date and made a disagreeable impression upon many people. Pliny (XXVIII. ii. 23): *tristissimum . . . hominem*; Pliny (XXXV. iv. 28): *minime comis*; Suetonius (*Tib.* 68): *incedebat cervice rigida et obstipa: adducto fere vultu, plerumque tacitus: nullo aut rarissimo etiam cum proximis sermone, eoque tardissimo. . . . Quæ omnia ingrata, atque arrogantia plena et animadvertit Augustus in eo et excusare tentavit . . . professus, natura vitia esse, non animi.*

* Velleius, II. xcvi. 2-3: *Cujus ingenium utrum bellicis magis operibus an civilibus suffecerit artibus, in incerto est: morum certe dulcedo ac suavitas et adversus amicos æqua ac par sui æstimatio inimitabilis fuisse dicitur.*

† This is the only conclusion which can be drawn from the obscure passage of Suetonius (*Tib.* 50), which says that Tiberius *prodita eius* (of Drusus) *epistula, qua secum de cogendo ad restituendam libertatem Augusto agebat.* Tiberius always loved his brother, and if Suetonius denies it in this chapter, the facts are against his denial. If the anecdote is not a garbled version of some simple occurrence, it can merely show the keen enthusiasm of the young Drusus for the aristocratic and republican ideas which were traditional in his family, and probably came to him from his mother. Experience of war and the honours he gained doubtless moderated this enthusiasm at a later date.

‡ Valerius Maximus, IV. iii. 3.

seemed to realise that union of Roman strength and virtue with Greek culture and grace which literature, politics, religion, morals and philosophy were vainly endeavouring to achieve. 15 B.C.

It is difficult to say for what reason Augustus resolved to appoint Drusus his *legatus*. It is, however, certain that this act introduced the first profound change within the spirit of the old republican constitution. Augustus was very fond of Drusus, and no doubt his decision was largely dictated by his sentiments. Possibly he gave way to the advice of Livia, while the capacity and the virtues of the young man may have overcome his last hesitation. Drusus gave promise of becoming a great general, and young men were required to conduct a war. Was it not, therefore, wise to turn his unusual capacities to immediate account? It is very certain that Augustus would not have chosen Drusus as his *legatus* if he had not been assured that his choice would meet with universal approval. The public was capricious: at one time it demanded the most scrupulous respect for the constitution; at another time, when its favourites were concerned, it would approve or even demand the most extraordinary privileges. No public character enjoyed greater popularity than the chaste husband of the fair and virtuous Antonia. In any case, the nomination of Drusus was an important precedent, as it imperceptibly introduced the dynastic principle within the republican constitution.

While Tiberius and Drusus were preparing their armies, Augustus was spending the winter in Gaul upon the consideration of a most serious question. From every part of the country the chiefs and leading personages in the *civitates* or Gallic tribes came to denounce the abuses and the violence of Licinus; he was even accused of increasing the number of months in the year to fourteen, in order that he might levy tribute upon two additional occasions. Whether these accusations were true or false, the avaricious procurator became the scapegoat of the new fiscal policy, of which he was merely the instrument, and which really proceeded from Augustus and the Senate; the recall of this agent was demanded, that the

Tiberius and
Drusus as
legati.

Discussion
between
Licinus and
the Gallic
chiefs.

15 B.C.

detested taxation might come to an end.* These protestations, added to further menaces from Germania, so shook the resolution of Augustus that he resolved to open an inquiry, after attempting to minimise the mistakes of his freedman. Licinus, however, offered a clever defence. He attempted to prove to Augustus that the complaints of the Gauls were false and their poverty imaginary, stating that they would soon be much richer than the Romans; he attempted to shelter himself behind great political interests, asserting that the fair country of Gaul would one day bring Italy as much wealth as Egypt,† and that Rome should seize this unexpected opportunity.

The Egypt of
the west.

This intelligent freedman was, indeed, able to display to his master a second Egypt slowly emerging between the Alps and the Rhine from the sea of conflict which had ravaged Central

* Dion, liv. 21. This chapter, though incomplete and ill-arranged, is most important, for it marks the time when Augustus and his friends began to realise that Gaul was wealthy. Though Dion seems to be telling a strange anecdote, it is easy to discover the substratum of truth at the bottom of this story. On the one hand we see the Gallic chiefs complaining of the increased taxation noted in the passage of St. Jerome (vol. iv. p. 214), while on the other hand is Licinus attempting to prove to Augustus that Gaul is a wealthy country. The room full of golden money which the freedman is said to have shown his master can only be a proof of the wealth of the province, and his warning that the Gauls in possession of this wealth would eventually revolt marks an effort to persuade Augustus, who was still sceptical, that wealth was really to be had in Gaul. The chapter shows that Licinus was the first to perceive the rapid increase of Gallic wealth, and that he attempted to make Augustus share his view, to defend himself from the accusations aimed at him by the Gallic chiefs.

† Velleius Paterculus, II. xxxix. 2: *Divus Augustus proter Hispanias aliasque gentes, quarum titulis forum eius prænitet, pæne idem facia Egypto stipendiaria, quantum pater eius Galliis, in ævarium reditus contulit.* This is also a passage of primary importance for the political history of Augustus' reign. Instead of correcting the passage to bring it into harmony with Suetonius (*Cæsar*, 25) concerning the Gallic tribute, it should be taken in connection with the passage in St. Jerome and the numerous facts which will presently be adduced concerning the rapid growth of Gallic wealth. It is very unlikely that at the moment of the Roman annexation Gaul brought in as much as Egypt. If we keep to the text of Suetonius (*Cæsar*, 25), we must admit that the revenue from Egypt was only forty millions of sesterces—an improbable amount, as this sum was too small for the richest province of the empire. We do not know what the tribute of Egypt was, and Friedländer has made a vain attempt to estimate it (*Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*, Leipzig, 1890, vol. iii. p. 158) by comparing two passages from the historian Josephus: B. J. II. xvii. 11

Europe for ages. He could show him a Gaul which seemed wholly Gallic; a peaceful Gaul, which, though not quite obedient to the foreign yoke, no longer dreamed of war and conquest; a Gaul devoted to art, agriculture and commerce, and apparently ready to imitate the kingdom of the Ptolemies in the far east in many respects. The *civitates* or Gallic tribes preserved almost intact the old organisation with which Cæsar had hardly interfered, but their energy, their sentiments and their inward life were subjected to a process of rapid change. The constant internecine wars had ceased, and though the tribes formerly dominant had preserved their supremacy, both they and their subjects forgot their old quarrels and joined in the work of furthering their economic development. Rivers were no longer the subject of armed conflict, nor were they barred by customs

A. J. XVII. xi. 4. The first passage tells us that the Egyptian tribute was twelve times greater than that of Palestine; the second passage, however, instead of telling us what tribute Palestine paid to Rome, merely gives the amount of taxation paid by the Jews to their government, a very different thing. We can, however, compare the case of Syria and Pontus, which paid thirty-five millions of drachmæ at the moment of annexation (Plutarch, *Pompey*, 45). How could Egypt, with a fertile country, with a dense and industrious population, have paid less? Attempts have therefore been made to correct the text of Suetonius by increasing the Gallic tribute imposed by Cæsar, but another improbability results. Is it likely that Cæsar would have imposed upon the poor and little-cultivated country of Gaul a tribute which could be paid by so rich a country as Egypt, with its agriculture, its commerce and its manufacture? All these difficulties disappear if we admit that Velleius Paterculus, with his habitual and somewhat obscure brevity, meant to say that in his age (that is, under Tiberius) Egypt and Gaul paid almost the same tribute. The passage in St. Jerome concerning the increase of the Gallic tribute, and Dion, liv. 21, concerning the complaints of the Gauls against Licinus, enable us to harmonise the text of Suetonius (*Cæsar*, 25) with that of Velleius Paterculus (ii. 39). The two texts speak of the Gallic tribute at two different ages. During the first fifty years, after the end of the civil wars, the forty million sesterces imposed upon Gaul by Cæsar so increased that the Gallic tribute eventually became almost equal to that of Egypt. This increase can be explained if we admit that about this time Rome perceived that the wealth of Gaul was growing, for reasons which we shall soon explain. On the other hand, if we admit that Augustus realised the possibility of making Gaul the Egypt of the west, the whole of his Gallo-Germanic policy becomes entirely comprehensible, as we shall see. Arnold (*Studies of Roman Imperialism*, Manchester, 1906, p. 92) seems to interpret the passage of Velleius Paterculus as I do myself: "Her share of taxes [Gaul's] was equal to that contributed by Egypt itself."

15 B.C. houses; upon these numerous and spacious waterways, which now became a means of intercommunication, merchandise could be imported and exported to and from every quarter of Gaul, even from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, so close was the natural connection of the river system. This was an inestimable advantage for a vast continental region at a time when transport by land was expensive; * families were large, and as the ravages of war had ceased the population was increasing. Thus Gaul, like Egypt, was becoming a country with a comparatively close population, and displayed another characteristic favourable to rapid economic development, a condition rare at that age, but known to the ancients as *πολυανθρωπία*, or abundance of men.† Under these favourable conditions, and stimulated by the political change and by the spirit of the age, the new generation energetically devoted its powers to fresh branches of agriculture and manufacture. Gold and silver were once more extracted from the rivers and from old and new mining centres, and Gaul, like Egypt, was becoming rich in the precious metals.‡

Two branches of agriculture in which Egypt outstripped every European and Asiatic province, the growing of corn and flax, now began to flourish throughout Gaul, favoured by the climate, the abundance of capital, the population and the soil. Its well-watered plains and its climate, sheltered from extremes of temperature, made Gaul then, as at the present day, an excellent country for the growing of cereals; as the population was increasing concurrently with the supply of gold and silver, the price of corn necessarily rose, and it became a profitable agricultural investment.§ On the other hand, the progress of navigation throughout the Mediterranean stimu-

* Strabo, IV. i. 2.

† *Ibid.*: *πολυανθρωπία . . . καὶ γὰρ τοκάδες αἱ γυναῖκες καὶ τρέφειν ἀγαθαί.*

‡ The story of Dion (liv. 21) is a proof that the precious metals were remarkably abundant in Gaul at that time, as Licinus shows Augustus a room full of gold and silver. Another proof of more importance is the fact that a mint was soon to be established at Lyons (Strabo mentions its existence, IV. iii. 2), which would be neither possible nor explicable if the precious metals had not been abundant in Gaul.

§ Strabo, IV. i. 2: *σίτον φέρει πολύν. . . .*

lated the cultivation of flax, which was required in every harbour for the manufacture of sails, as sails, though expensive, were not so dear as galley slaves.* It was, indeed, at this moment that the Cadurci, at least, began the cultivation and export of this valuable plant.†

15 B.C.

The campaign
against the
Rhetians
and the
Vindelicians.

Thus it is possible that every complaint of the Gauls was met by representations from the freedman, who strove to convince Augustus that this rich and populous province, with a large amount of precious metal in circulation, could provide a heavy tribute in gold and silver, and, like Egypt, might some day become a second granary for Rome. Italy was then suffering from a scarcity of ready money, and was invariably confronted by the menace of famine; hence these considerations could not fail to have great weight. They were, however, counterbalanced by the complaints of the Gallic chiefs, by the mutterings of popular discontent and by the Germanic peril. Thus Augustus was, as usual, reduced to hesitation. If an ancient historian is to be believed, Licinus concluded his argument by introducing the leader of the republic to a large room full of gold and silver extorted from Gaul, and the sight of this treasure is said to have induced Augustus to give way. In any case it is certain that Licinus retained his position in Gaul, and that the Gallic chiefs were forced to content themselves with a vague promise that the most serious abuses should cease.‡ Military operations were then resumed in the spring of 15. Silius seems to have subjugated the Lepontii and a great part

* Pliny, 19, *Proem.* 1. 7-9, shows us that the progress of flax cultivation and the great profits arising from it depended in his age and earlier chiefly upon the advance of navigation, for which sails were required. I am inclined to think that the cultivation of flax, like that of corn, was begun in Gaul at an early date, though Strabo says nothing upon the subject. We have, however, one sufficient reason for thinking that the Gallic agriculture and manufactures of which Pliny speaks began at an early date, and this reason is provided by the history of the ceramic art. As we shall see hereafter, M. Déchelette has shown in his great work that pottery-making had progressed greatly in Gaul during the second half of the first century A.D. Pliny does not mention this, doubtless because he did not know the fact; hence the manufactures of which he speaks must be of yet more ancient date.

† Strabo, indeed (IV. ii. 2), mentions this industry of the Cadurci.

‡ Dion, liv. 21.

15 B.C.

of modern Switzerland, while Drusus and Tiberius were executing the joint attack upon the Rhæti and Vindelici arranged during the previous year. Drusus entered the valley of the Adige; meeting the enemy at Trent, he won a victory, and went up the valley of the Eisach as far as the Brenner Pass, according to some, continually fighting his way, while others assert that he encountered no obstacle; he then descended to the valley of the Inn. Meanwhile Tiberius had reached the shores of Lake Constance with an army and fought a naval battle upon the lake with the Vindelici who had taken refuge in the islands. We do not know precisely when or where the brothers met; we can only assert that they crossed Vindelicia together while marching towards the Danube, and that on August 1 they defeated the Vindelici in a battle which was directed by Tiberius, thus conquering southern Bavaria and carrying the frontiers of the empire to the Danube; * they then entered Noricum with their army, and met with no resistance.†

The popularity
of Drusus and
Tiberius.

The standing popularity of Drusus at Rome had been increased by the great enthusiasm evoked by the news of the victory of Trent, and the Senate immediately granted him the authority of a prætor, though he had not yet been elected to this magistracy; the young general's position was thus brought into harmony with the laws of the constitution.‡ When the news of the conquest of Vindelicia was received the popularity of the two young generals knew no bounds; the hopes, the pride and the regret which were attached to the memory of the great traditions of the past immediately revived in public feeling. Amid the dead and withered forest an ancient stock

* Oberziner, *Le Guerre di Augusto contro i Popoli Alpini*, Rome, 1900, pp. 100-102.

† Strabo, IV. vi. 9. This must be the summer in which Tiberius and Drusus thus conquered Noricum.

‡ Thus, I think, can be interpreted the obscure and curt sentence of Dion (liv. 22): *δοσε και τιμας στρατηγικας επι τουτω* [the victory over the inhabitants of Trent] *λαβειν*. It is probable that Drusus was honoured by a measure analogous to that which was taken in the case of Octavianus in 43 B.C., at the time of the war of Modena, and for a similar reason, namely, to give him full legal military authority. Dion's text may be explained by a comparison of the words of Cicero (*Phil.* V. xvi. 45): *demus igitur imperium Casari, sine quo res militaris administrari, teneri exercitus, bellum geri non potest; sit pro prætore eo jure, quo quis optimo.*

was once more putting forth leaves and flowers and bringing fruit to perfection! Amid the universal decadence of the nobility one of the most ancient aristocratic families at Rome, that of the Claudii, had provided the republic with two men who could take their places with the heroes of the past, and who, before reaching the age of thirty, had shown an energy, a capacity, and a purity of life which might be sought in vain throughout the great palaces and illustrious names of Rome. The public immediately regarded Drusus and Tiberius as instances of that revival of the old nobility which was earnestly desired for the sake of the republic; delight, admiration and enthusiasm were so great that Augustus requested Horace to celebrate this happy event in poetry. Though Horace had refused to immortalise the exploits of Agrippa and Augustus, he consented upon this occasion. Possibly he was flattered by this request from Augustus, who thus seemed to point to him, now that Virgil was dead, as the national poet and as the proper object of that public admiration which had hitherto shown no great preference for the half Greek poet of Venusia. Possibly, again, he was tempted by the hope, which every poet secretly entertains, that he might become as popular as Virgil if he found a subject of national importance. The fact remains that he composed a hundred and twenty-eight of his finest lines in two odes, one to Drusus and the other to Tiberius. In the first ode, the fourth of the fourth book, he depicts Drusus swooping down upon the Rhæti and Vindelici.

Horace's
eulogy of
the victors.

Qualem ministrum fulminis alitem,
Cui rex deorum regnum in aves vagas
Permisit expertus fidelem
Juppiter in Ganymede flavo,
Olim juvenas et patrius vigor
Nido laborum propulit inscium
Vernique jam nimbs remotis
Insolitos docuere nisus
Venti paventem, mox in ovilia
Demisit hostem vividus impetus,
Nunc in reluctantes dracones
Egit amor dapis atque pugnae. . . .

Though Horace is said to have been the court poet under the new monarchy, he sees nothing in the triumph of the

15 B.C. two brothers to increase the new prestige of a dynasty, but rather sees the flower of virtue springing from the old stock of aristocratic tradition which the blast of revolution had shattered; he sees personified in Augustus tangible evidence of the aristocratic theory, the old-time Roman family which handed on virtues from father to son by heredity and education.

. . . sed diu
Lateque victrices catervæ
Consiliis juvenis revictæ

Sensere, quid mens rite, quid indoles
Nutrita faustis sub penetralibus
Posset, quid Augusti paternus
In pueros animus Neronæ.

Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis;
Est in juvenis, est in equis patrum
Virtus, neque imbellem feroces
Progenerant aquilæ columbam.

Horace, like many a modern writer, justifies the existence of the aristocracy by biological arguments drawn from the effects of heredity and descent, though doubtless clumsier than those which the pupils of Darwin follow to-day. Heredity alone, however, will not suffice to explain the effects even to Horace; if the aristocratic spirit is a natural growth, it is also to some extent the deliberate outcome of education and of tradition as expressed by the family.

Doctrina sed visa promovet insitam,
Rectique cultus pectora roborant;
Ut cumque defecere mores,
Dedecorant bene nata culpa.

Quid debeas, o Roma! Neronibus,
Testis Metaurum flumen et Hasdrubal
Devictus et pulcher fugatis
Ille dies Latio tenebris,

Qui primus alma risit adores,
Dirus per urbes Afer ut Italas
Ceu flamma per tædas vel Eurus
Per Siculas equitavit undas.

Post hoc secundis usque laboribus
Romana pubes crevit, et impio
Vastata Poenorum tumultu
Fana deos habuere rectos,

Dixitque tandem perfidus Hannibal.
 " Cervi, luporum præda rapacium,
 Sectamur ultro, quos opimus
 Fallere et effugere est triumphus.

" Gens, quæ cremato fortis ab Ilio
 Jactata Tuscis æquoribus sacra
 Natosque maturosque patres
 Pertulit Ausonias ad urbes,

" Duris ut illex tonsa bipennibus
 Nigræ feraci frondis in Algido,
 Per damna, per cædes, ab ipso
 Ducit opes animumque ferro.

" Non hydra secto corpore firmior
 Vinci dolentem crevit in Herculem
 Monstrumve submittere Colchi
 Majus Echlonæve Thebæ.

" Merses profundo, pulchrior evenit ;
 Luctere, multa proruit integrum
 Cum laude victorem geretque
 Prælia conjugibus loquenda.

" Carthagini jam non ego nuntios
 Mittam superbos ; occidit, occidit
 Spes omnis et fortuna nostri
 Nominis Hasdrubale interempto.

Nil Claudiæ non perficiunt manua,
 Quas et benigno numine Juppiter
 Defendit et curæ sagaces
 Expediunt per acuta belli.

Thus the most illustrious poet of the age, yielding to the wishes of Augustus, immortalised the triumphs gained in Vindelicia and the new glory of one of the oldest aristocratic Roman families, which was not of the house of the Julii, but of the Claudii.

The ode in honour of Tiberius was less philosophical and more descriptive. Horace associates the services of Tiberius with the glory of Augustus. To the latter he first addresses himself.

The ode in
honour of
Tiberius.

Quæ cura patrum quæve Quiritium *
 Plenis honorum muneribus tuas,
 Auguste, virtutes in ævum
 Per titulos memoresque fastus
 Æternæ . . . ?

* *Odes*, iv. 14.

15 B.C. Then, after a brief reference to the wars of Drusus, follows a long description, highly coloured if not greatly rhetorical, of Tiberius fighting like a Homeric warrior :

Spectandus in certamine Martio
Devota morti pectora liberae
Quantis fatigaret ruinis ;
Indomitas prope qualis undas

Exercet Auster, Pleiadum choro
Scindente nubes, impiger hostium
Vexare turmas et frementem
Mittere equum medios per ignea.

He then compares him to the Aufidus in time of flood, and recalls the fact that August 1, the date of Tiberius' triumph over the Vindelici, was also the anniversary of the day on which Augustus entered the abandoned palace of Cleopatra. By way of conclusion he then returned to the figure of the young hero's father-in-law, and eulogised the greatness and power of Rome, as personified in Augustus :

Te Cantaber non ante domabilis
Medusque et Indus, te profugus Scythes
Miratur, o tutela praesens
Italiae dominaeque Romae !

Te, fontium qui celat origines,
Nilusque et Ister, te rapidus Tigris
Te belucosus qui remotis
Obstrepat Oceanus Britannis,

Te non paventis funera Galliae
Duraeque tellus audit Hiberiae,
Te caede gaudentes Sygambri
Compositis venerantur armis.

CHAPTER VI

THE GREAT CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN PROVINCES

The Ligurian revolt—The pacification of the east—The worship of Julia in the east—The provinces of Europe and their tributes—The export commerce of Italy to Gaul—Causes of the crisis in the European provinces—Gaul and the Germanic tribes—The new Germanic peril—The restored republic incompetent to conduct diplomatic negotiations—Augustus and foreign policy—The administration of the Alpine provinces reorganised—The new strategical roads across the Alps—Military reforms—Agrippa and Herod in Asia Minor—The new prosperity of the east—Slow progress of Greece.

THE two odes enjoyed a great success. Even those critics who objected most strongly to the metrical and lyrical theories of Horace admitted themselves defeated.* For the first time the lonely writer had given voice to the sentiments of universal Italy in these two poems. Unfortunately, for the first time again, his usual fine taste had deserted him and he had committed several extravagances. Augustus must have smiled when he read the last stanzas of the ode to Tiberius, which stated that Gaul did not fear death and that the proud Sigambri laid down their arms in order to adore himself. Notwithstanding the beauty of these two odes, they showed that Horace understood nothing of events beyond the Alps, and that the

The Ligurian revolt.

* Horace, *Odes*, IV. iii. 13 ff.: *Roma principis urbium*. . . . These lines show that the public was beginning to display less aversion for the style of Horace. I am inclined to think that the *Carmen Sæculare* and the patriotic odes contained in Book IV., and composed at the request of Augustus, were the chief cause of this change in public opinion in favour of Horace, who was anxious to become the national poet in Virgil's place.

15 B.C. public was even more ignorant than he. No sooner had the Rhæti and Vindelici been subdued, than, at the very moment when Horace represented all nations as bowing down before Augustus and the majesty of Rome, the Ligurian and Maritime Alps revolted * and involved part of the subjects of Cottius in their movement.† A new war thus broke out, which, though not dangerous, was difficult and costly on account of the absence of roads. To attack the insurgents in their deep valleys the troops were obliged to follow the old road which crossed the mountains between Tortona and Vado by way of Aquæ Statiellæ, followed the sea-coast after Vado, and thus reached Gallia Narbonensis. In the year 43 Antony had climbed this difficult path with the remnants of the army routed beneath the walls of Modena; but the soldiers of the present age had degenerated. It was impossible to send the legions, with their cumbersome baggage, over such bad roads.‡ Thus this vast empire with its infinite power, as lauded by Horace, was hampered by want of roads in the task of repressing a revolt of barbarian tribes which had broken out upon the very frontiers of Italy. Augustus was forced to ask the Senate for the necessary funds to reconstruct the road, and to devote his attention to this task.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, the insolence of the Ligurians would not greatly have disturbed the equanimity of Augustus, if all the peoples and rivers mentioned by Horace had actually done homage before him. But in spite of the poet's fine lines Augustus saw that the position of the empire was very different from that in which he had found it twenty

The pacifica-
tion of the
east.

* Dion, liv. 24. See Oberziner, *La Guerre de Augusto contre les Popoli Alpini*, Rome, 1900, p. 131.

† This is a hypothesis of Oberziner which seems to me to be a reasonable deduction from the unduly neglected passage in Amm. Marcell. XV. x. 12.

‡ C. I. L. v. 8085, 8088, 8094, 8098, 8100, 8101, 8105; these are the *cippi* of Augustus, dated 740-741, which have been found between Oneglia and La Turbie, on the road known as the *Via Julia Augusta*, as is shown by the inscription 8102. Thus it is clear that in 740 Augustus made considerable repairs upon this road, which was enlarged and built in Roman style. This work was evidently begun in consequence of the Ligurian revolt, which showed the Roman government the necessity of improving communications with Liguria.

years before. At that time the chief point of danger seemed to lie eastward. It was in the east that the towns made periodical revolts and constantly massacred Roman citizens. In the east the great and small states under Roman protection were constantly revolting, while the mountain populations preserved a sturdy independence and menaced the Roman power in the plains. In the east the court of Alexandria hatched its cunning intrigues, and there, again, the frontiers were menaced by the most formidable of all enemies, the Parthians. During the last twenty years these difficulties had disappeared. When Agrippa went to Asia with Julia about the end of 16, he found the Parthians in a state of entire tranquillity, with no idea of profiting by the wars which had broken out in the western provinces and of using that opportunity to recover Armenia. There was, indeed, a Parthian party anxious to win the friendship, or even the alliance of Rome. There was at the court a concubine of the king, formerly an Italian slave, who had been given to Phraates by Cæsar; she is known to Josephus as Tesmussa, though her real name is Thea Mousa. This concubine had acquired great influence over the king, and was now anxious to secure the succession for her own son in preference to the legitimate heir to the throne. She wished to gain the support of Rome for her son, and had therefore assumed the leadership of a party which attempted to promote an alliance between Rome and the Parthian empire.* Rome was thus relieved of all anxiety throughout Asia Minor as far as Armenia and throughout Syria to the banks of the Euphrates. Hence there was no reason for special anxiety on account of the disturbances which had broken out in the kingdom of the Bosphorus (the Crimea and the districts near the north of the Don). In that region the king, Asander, had died, and an adventurer named Scribonius had asserted that he was a nephew of Mithridates, had married the widow queen, Dynamis, and was about to proclaim himself king of the Bosphorus, asserting that Augustus was ready to give his consent. Agrippa would not allow this

* Josephus, A. J. XVIII. ii. 4; Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 694: *Θεῆς Μούσας Μούσης Βασιλείσσης.*

15 B.C. impostor to seize the throne, and was anxious to marry Dynamis to Polemo, the king of Pontus, and thus to unite these kingdoms. He considered, however, that the will of Rome might be imposed upon this discontented country by means of a naval demonstration off the coast, for which he and Polemo were making leisurely preparations.* Thus the chief task in the east at that moment was to receive innumerable deputations in company with Julia, to be present at festivals, to accept laudatory inscriptions and permit the erection of his statues in marble and bronze.† He even allowed the Asiatic peoples to find a place in their Olympus for Julia by the side of Augustus, and thus to symbolise the ardent admiration of the Græco-Asiatics for the great and venerable constitution which alone seemed able to co-ordinate the special interests of the towns and to defend Hellenic civilisation against the Parthians. Julia was the first Latin woman to play the part of a goddess in the confused melodrama of her age. At Paphos ‡ she received the title of divine, at Mytilene § she appeared as the new Aphrodite, at Eresus || as Aphrodite Genetrix, while in other towns she was conjoined with Hestia.¶ Then, while Drusus and Tiberius were fighting in Vindelicia and in Rhætia, Agrippa and Julia paid a visit to the court of Herod in the spring of 15. Herod was anxious to show courtesy to the daughter and to the son-in-law of Augustus, and had come to Asia on purpose to invite them.

The European provinces and their tributaries.

Compared with the disturbances of twenty years earlier, the east seemed entirely peaceful; but at that moment the barbarian Celts, Germans, Illyrians and Thracians, who had

* Dion, liv. 24.

† The two fragmentary inscriptions found at Megara seem to refer to Agrippa and Julia (*Corp. Inscr. Græc., Græcia Septentrionalis*, I. 64-65). See *Bull. de Corresp. hell.* 1880, p. 517. In honour of Agrippa: at Corcyra, C. I. Gr. 1878; at Ilium, *ibid.* 3609. See also C. I. A. iii. 575-576.

‡ *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, ix. 1888, p. 243 (quoted by Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, iii. (part ii.), Leipzig, 1904, p. 715.

§ *Inscript. Græcæ Insul. Maris Ægæi*, ii. 482.

|| Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, I. 54.

¶ G. Inscr. Att. iii. 316 (it is not quite certain whether 'Ιουλία here represents the daughter of Augustus or Livia).

hitherto remained quiet, began a most ominous agitation beyond the Alps and in the valleys of the Danube and the Rhine. The chief cause of this ferment was the reform of the year 25, which had imposed tribute upon the European provinces. The ancient historians constantly assert that Gaul was discontented with the tribute and that the Dalmatians and Pannonians revolted on account of its excessive severity. We may ask for what reasons these tributes became so heavy a burden. Why should the western provinces be constantly complaining, while the eastern states paid their tribute without difficulty and without offering objections? As we have no precise details, we are forced to conjecture the course of events in these provinces, and to compare such recent historical conditions as show some analogy to the situation of those days. There is no doubt that Rome drew the majority of her tribute from every province in the form of precious metal. It must be remembered that with the increase of art, manufacture and commerce, and with the spread of oriental habits in Italy, a greater demand arose for those luxuries which the east could provide—wines, perfumes, fruits, medicinal plants, textile fabrics, jewels and works of art. Thus the east really paid the greater part of its tribute in the form of this merchandise, and took from Italy in exchange the gold and silver which had poured into the chests of the proconsuls or proprætors. Doubtless the eastern provinces were obliged to give up part of their agricultural and industrial output to the Roman metropolis; but with peace this output became more abundant, while after the battle of Actium the Roman power was less oppressive, and in exchange for tribute secured that peace under which alone manufacture and commerce can flourish; thus the eastern provinces were gradually resigned to the payment of tribute, because they were able to pay. On the other hand, the tribute must have been a heavy burden to most of the barbarian provinces in Europe, for the reason that they neither manufactured luxuries nor possessed such fruits of the earth as could be exported to Italy. Hence they were obliged to pay their tribute for the most part in gold and silver. All that Rome drew from these provinces was the gold and silver which she expended

15 B.C.

in Italy or other provinces, upon the payment of her armies, upon public works and other State departments. Thus we can understand why Gaul at the close of the civil wars should have shown such energy in prospecting for gold and silver and in working the mines, and why Licinus should have shown Augustus a room full of precious metal. Gaul was a populous and energetic country, with much mineral wealth which could be worked with comparative facility, but this was by no means the case in other provinces, in poverty-stricken Dalmatia or wild Pannonia.* The Roman domination and the imposition of tribute upon these provinces had opened a breach through which the gold and silver laboriously collected flowed into other parts of the empire, with effects almost similar to those visible in the poorest provinces and in the country districts of France during the last years of the reign of Louis XIV., which were marked by excessive taxation and the attraction of money to the towns. The purchasing power of money increased and the value of crops and lands went down; incomes thus diminished, while the taxation which was levied in money remained at its former height, or was even increased. Thus the country districts were a prey to debt, depopulation and discontent. In this way it seems possible to explain the exasperation which soon drove many a tribe to revolt against Rome and her tax-collectors.

The progress
of exportation
from Italy to
Gaul.

The crisis was to become the more serious as these provinces had been invaded not merely by the treasury officers, but also by eastern and Italian merchants who came to seek new customers, not among the people, but among the wealthy classes, which were less faithful to national tradition and invariably more ready to imitate the manners of the dominant nation. It is unfortunately impossible to retrace the history of this commercial invasion, but certain facts are established and authorise further conjecture. We know, for example, that about this time northern Italy began to send large consignments of wine to the Danube provinces by way of Aquileia and

* We shall see that Tiberius attempted at a later date to encourage gold-mining in Dalmatia, and that he even had recourse to coercive measures. See *Florus*, IV. xii. 10-12 (2, 25).

Nauportus.* We know that in those years Gaul began to buy the famous red pottery ware, plain or ornamented, from the well-known factories of Arretium, and the ware of Puteoli, which differed but little from that of Arretium; † the grey and yellow ornamented ware, probably manufactured in the valley of the Po by Acus ‡ was also exported, as was the famous ware of Cnæus Ateius, which seems to have been made in Italy. § The Gallic manufacturers continued to make and to sell in the markets of the *oppida* the traditional Gallic ware, painted vases, decorated with geometrical patterns in colour and ornamented with interlaced knots chiselled upon the surface or worked by the wheel. At the same time Italian merchants found an increasing market among the rich Gauls for the plates, vessels and lamps of Italian workshops; these were of better quality than the Gallic productions, while the military and political prestige of Rome made them seem even better than they really were. The rich Gauls considered that the use of Italian ware brought them nearer to the dominant race and bridged the gap between conquered and conquerors. These fragments of information represent but parts of a general movement, and show us the approach of merchants from Italy and the most civilised districts of the east, teaching the barbarian tribes the lofty virtues of civilisation, the taste for fine fabrics, rich furniture, exquisite wines, the fair slaves of the east, great and useless public monuments, and thereby persuading them to spend their money so that much of it gravitated to the pockets of artists, literary workers and manufacturers of luxuries. It was a kind of peaceful conquest of the European provinces, accomplished by the ordinary methods which civilisation brings to bear upon subject territories, to pervert and corrupt

* This may be inferred from the comparison of two passages in Strabo, V. ii. 8 and IV. vi. 10. The wine which the Illyrians took up at Aquileia after the first transport must have been exported by the route described in the second passage. It was probably wine from the valley of the Po: cp. Strabo, V. i. 12, in which passage he praises the rich vintages of Cisalpine Gaul.

† J. Déchelette, *Les Vases céramiques ornés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1904, vol. i. p. 15.

‡ J. Déchelette, *op. cit.* i. 31.

§ J. Déchelette, *op. cit.* i. 16.

15 B C. agricultural barbarians who have been overpowered by force of arms and force of wealth. Many ran into debt, the nobles showed less generosity to the poor, the old manufactures and the traditional commerce of the country were threatened with decadence and death, while unsatisfied desires produced a general state of discontent and accentuated the contrast between the new civilisation and the old, between native and foreign ideas. The hatred of the Roman domination, stimulated by so many reasons, might be stirred to conflict by any chance incident. If Gaul, which was naturally a rich country, was thus exasperated, we can imagine the condition of the poorer and less civilised provinces.

Causes of the
crisis.

Thus the revolt which had broken out in the Alps, and which Augustus had not been able entirely to crush, was a trifling affair in comparison with the conflagration which threatened to devastate the valleys of the Rhine and of the Danube. Of all the European provinces one alone was at peace, far-distant and isolated Spain, which had been finally subdued by the last expeditions of Agrippa. In every other province the *pax Romana* was tottering to its fall. The whole of Gaul was in a ferment; if Vindelicia made no movement, it was merely because the country was still stupefied by the blow of the preceding year; Noricum had thrown down its arms upon the approach of Tiberius' force because it had been enfeebled by earlier invasions of the Dacians and Getæ; Pannonia, on the other hand, was in full revolt, and great agitation prevailed throughout Dalmatia, the little principalities of Mœsia under Roman protection, and in Thrace, to the south of the Balkans, where the dynasty of the Odrysæ occupied the throne, also under Roman protection. In Thrace the anti-Roman party was numerous and powerful, while the dynasty was unpopular because it tolerated Roman protection and was inclined to adopt Hellenic culture. The Thracian peasants and shepherds were very reluctant to serve in the Roman auxiliary force, or to provide gifts for the Greek poets entertained at court.* The anxiety of Augustus must have been the

* See Ovid *Pont.* ii. 9. In this letter to the king of Thrace, Cotys, interesting details may be found concerning one of these half-barbarian

keener, as at this moment Cæsar's great exploit, the conquest of Gaul, had brought forth serious and unexpected consequences in another quarter. Cæsar and his legions had attacked the tottering Celtic republics, and with a few vigorous strokes had overthrown the traditional constitution; the result had been not merely to produce a profound revolution in Gaul, but also to disturb the former equilibrium of the European continent and to arouse among peoples and states a ferment which grew, from almost invisible beginnings, to very considerable proportions. The Roman conquest had pacified and almost disarmed the old Celtic republics; those warlike states, which for centuries had formed a bulwark protecting Italy against Germanic barbarism, now became mere administrative areas in a rich nation which had entered upon the path of economic prosperity but no longer possessed any national military organisation. Gaul was now open to the Germans, who could have made their way through these pacific populations and have marched upon Italy without encountering any obstacle upon their road except five legions.

Agrippa had long ago realised that the Germanic danger was becoming an important question upon the Rhine frontier, but the same difficulty now appeared upon the Danube, and in more formidable proportions than he had ever supposed. The concessions of Gallic territory which had been granted to the Germans along the Rhine had done nothing to dispel this danger, and other barriers must now be raised to check this seething line of barbarous tribes, which extended from the Vistula to the Rhine and from the Baltic to the upper Danube. The Germans were poor, especially in precious metals. They had no towns or even villages of importance; they lived scattered about the country, in lonely dwellings, though they were by no means strongly attached to the soil; their manners and customs were uncivilised, their manufactures few and rudimentary, their religion poor, their agriculture superficial, their flocks numerous and their habits almost nomadic. Even the largest tribes constantly burnt their dwellings, and

Gaul and
Germania.

courts, which was attempting to become civilised under Roman and Hellenic influence.

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I

15 B.C.

emigrated to new lands, which they then divided among themselves, rebuilding their houses, pasturing their flocks and sowing their crops. They were not overburdened with baggage, and took with them nothing more than their flocks, a supply of corn, their weapons and household utensils, with a few slaves. At the end of a year, when the first harvest could be reaped, the tribe was as comfortable upon its new domains as it had been upon its old settlements. The severity of the climate, the vast forests, the country rich only in pasture-land and far less productive of corn than Gaul, their remoteness from civilisation, their ignorance and warlike temper, not merely prevented the Germanic tribes from securing wealth and refinement and founding permanent states, but made them incapable of attachment to the soil. These numerous tribes, which were stirred to movement by the least event or the smallest anxiety, were constantly fighting with one another for the possession of particular lands, when they were not raiding one another's flocks or prosecuting ancient feuds. In each tribe every freedman and landowner, from childhood to old age, devoted his attention solely to war, and left all other tasks to the slaves and women; the religion, the customs of the Germans and their system of family life tended to stimulate the taste for danger and the scorn of death. In short, every tribe, great or small, was a band of robust and hardy warriors of extraordinary courage and impetuosity.

The Germanic
danger.

Fortunately for Rome there was no unifying or guiding intelligence connecting these disorganised forces. Each tribe was governed by the freedmen, the landowners and warriors, who met in assemblies, decided questions of peace or war, made laws and administered justice; these assemblies were composed of hasty and impulsive members, whose violence was but little checked by the priests and by the most distinguished families, who owed their influence to their wealth and to their military glory. In any case the influence of the assemblies and of the nobility itself was weak, for neither the passage of time nor contact with more civilised peoples nor continual warfare had softened the fierce independence of the German warrior and landowner. For this reason Gaul had been able

to check the Germanic invasions for a long time, and Augustus need not have entertained such apprehension of their power except for the fact that Gaul had now lost her military energy, while the poor and barbarous Germans cast covetous glances upon her wealth. To the Germans war was not only an amusement, but a trade; the aristocracy required plunder from which to make presents to the poorer warriors and to maintain their retinues, which formed the only germ of political order in this anarchical world. It was easy to see that the Germanic populations were not likely to continue their pillage of one another, their raids upon scanty flocks and little treasures, when a united effort would enable them to seize the wealth of Gaul. Hitherto the prestige of Rome had checked their advance beyond the Rhine; but a day would come when they would realise that this prestige was supported by a very modest force. Beyond the Alps countless states, great and small, had risen and fallen during the last centuries, leaving their ruins on every side, but the Roman power itself seemed now to be tottering upon this uncertain basis. Hence the moment was approaching when it would be necessary for Rome to undertake the serious step of deciding what her policy should be with regard to the European provinces. Italy had begun to realise that one of these provinces at least—namely, Gaul—was rich. Augustus regarded Gaul as the Egypt of the west, a great source of future wealth and an important outlet for Italian agriculture and manufactures. Thus it was obvious that the empire could not afford to lose these recent conquests among the European provinces; it was equally obvious that the equivocal or anarchical condition of these provinces must be changed. The Rhine defences must be strengthened and the frontier of the empire extended to the Danube. So lengthy a frontier could not possibly be defended with so few legions, if it were not naturally strong. The Danube was a natural line of defence behind which a few legions, if well led, could easily guard vast tracts of country. Hence it was necessary to reach the Danube at all costs, even at the risk of leaving turbulent and unreliable tribes upon the rear.

132 GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF ROME

15 B.C.

The diplomatic
incompetence
of the restored
republic.

Such was the task with which Rome was now confronted. It was the most burdensome part of Cæsar's inheritance, the most serious consequence of the great adventure which he made into the unknown when he conquered Gaul. It was, moreover, extremely difficult, and will probably suffice to explain why Livy about this time in his great history of Rome asked himself a question which must seem ridiculous to-day: Had Cæsar done more good than harm? Would it have been a benefit or misfortune to the world if that life, so pregnant in consequences, had never been lived? * To check these countless barbarian tribes upon either side, and so to extend the frontier, was a task demanding all the diplomatic skill and all the military energy which the Roman nobility had displayed during the conquest of the empire. These qualities, however, were rapidly vanishing, notwithstanding the desperate efforts of the conservative party, and were hardly to be found in the new aristocracy, which was now composed of the remnant of the historical nobility, the conservative leaders of the revolution, rich knights and the cultured members of the middle classes. This idle class, superficial in the extreme and spoilt by the purposeless and frivolous pursuit of intellectual pleasure, considered that the whole art of provincial government consisted in such rhetorical jingoism as the magnificent stanzas of Horace displayed in polished form, a few vague notions of geography and politics, and a boundless confidence in Augustus. The Senate voted, without offering objection or demanding explanation, all the sums required by Augustus for the war. The opposition seen in the time of Cæsar and Pompey had ceased to exist; all were glad to see that Augustus was willing to decide questions of peace and war without reference to the Senate, as, indeed, he had been empowered to do.† The upper classes had no political principles or traditions which would enable them to follow a definite course in dealing with questions of foreign policy; times and places were vague to them by reason of

* Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.* V. xviii. 4.

† C. I. L. VI. 930, v. 1: *facturus cum quibus volet facere liceat . . . ita uti licuit Divo Augusto.* This phrase in the *lex regia Vespasiana* shows that Augustus had the power to make peace and war, but it is impossible to say when this power was conferred.

distance, and in their easy pride they were anxious only for the conclusion of a process which seemed to them inevitable, the consolidation and extension of the Roman empire. The means to be employed, the difficulties to be overcome, the dangers to be avoided, and other trifling considerations of this nature were the business of Augustus alone. For centuries it has been asserted that Augustus with great dexterity despoiled the Senate of its power of conducting foreign policy; the truth is, that the decadence of the nobility and the apathy of the Senate obliged Augustus to deal alone with the enemy upon the Rhine and Danube. There seems to be no doubt that Augustus was very far from satisfied with this uncontrolled responsibility in matters involving great uncertainty and peril; but whatever his personal opinion may have been, he was obliged to accept the situation. As no one else would act, he, his relatives and his friends, were forced to guide the foreign policy of the State and to act on behalf of the incapable Senate and the careless public, whose impossible desires and chimerical ideas continually hampered military operations and diplomatic efforts. It is indeed difficult to direct the foreign policy of a country when poets make it their business to explain that policy to the masses.

Augustus, however, proceeded to conduct this vast enterprise with all the energy of which he was capable. It was the happiest moment of his life; the *Julium sidus*, the star of his fortune, was now shining with its greatest brilliance. He was now forty-nine years of age—that is to say, in the prime of life; the strict regularity of his life and the comparative safety and calm which he had been able to enjoy after the conclusion of the civil wars seem to have given new strength to his sickly constitution about this time. It is certain that for the last ten years he had been free from any dangerous illness, and his political experience and capacity had now reached maturity. He might now trust himself to think that his power rested upon a firm basis, for even those who neither felt nor expressed admiration for him were ready to submit to his rule as being the least evil of a corrupt age. He was surrounded by a fair and united family, which he could place as an example before

The foreign policy of Augustus.

15 B.C.

all those who demanded a return to the traditions of the past. No more perfect example of the old Roman nobility than Livia could be found in Rome. It is more than probable that her influence will largely account for the conservatism of Augustus, for the support which he gave to the aspirations of the old nobility and for his persevering attempts to restore the aristocratic republic. The grandson of the usurer of Velletri, the middle-class citizen who had gained nobility by success and merit, had fallen under the influence of this woman, who belonged to one of the oldest families, invariably regarded in Italy as half divine. Livia, however, was careful to keep in the background and to prevent her conservative influence from becoming too obvious. Though a most capable adviser in all difficult circumstances, she was naturally retiring and disliked publicity. Agrippa was a most faithful friend; Julia was beautiful, clever, and apparently able to live in full harmony with her husband in the distant east. Augustus' two sons-in-law were capable, energetic and courageous men, generals of tried worth and good husbands; not only did they help him to govern the State, but they set a fine example to the frivolous youth of their time. What more could any man desire, except the continuance of that happy moment? The period of Augustus' long life which now begins is perhaps both the fairest and the least unhappy.

The reorganisation of the Alpine districts.

As Augustus saw the danger increase, he displayed remarkable activity in every direction. The Ligurian road was quickly repaired and the revolt in the Maritime Alps and in the valleys which had broken out against Cottius was energetically suppressed. It was probably at this moment that Augustus proceeded to reorganise the conquered or reconquered districts by the methods of brutality which were considered necessary at that time. Most of the able-bodied members of the revolted Alpine tribes were sold into slavery, and thus scattered, or were reduced to serfdom and bound to the soil. Only the inhabitants necessary to cultivate the ground were left in the valleys, and these were probably women for the most part.*

* Dion, liv. 22. Dion does not state that the deported population was sold into slavery, but the inference is easy when we remember

The territory was then divided ; all the valleys leading down to Lake Maggiore as far as the Saint Gothard, a considerable part of the territory conquered from the Lepontii, seem to have been united to the territory of Milan and to have been subject to the authority of the little Senate of Milanese decurions and of its communal magistrates.* The district known to us as the valley of Bregaglia, formerly inhabited by the Bergalei, was attached to Como ; † the valleys of the Camunni and of the Trumplini were united to the territory of Brescia.‡ In all these valleys the lands taken from the tribes and rich families were partly given to these three towns as municipal domains,§ and partly divided between Augustus, his family and his friends ; this booty included magnificent forests, rich mines, excellent pasturage and fertile lands.|| The same treatment was meted out to the valleys of the Rhætian Alps ; these were almost entirely assigned to the new province of Rhætia which was now formed by Augustus and included Vindelicia and all the territory from the backbone of the Alps to the Danube and from the Lake of Geneva to the frontiers of Noricum.¶ In Noricum Augustus resolved to introduce the Roman system of administration and to suppress the national dynasty, but he did not wish to reduce the country to a province ; he therefore established a *præfectus* upon the system which he had already tried

the usual procedure in ancient warfare. The phrase of Pliny (lil. 134). . . . *Trumplini, venalis cum agris suis populus*, seems to allude to a kind of serfdom. Pliny obviously means to say that in the territory of the Trumplini the fields were sold together with their inhabitants ; in other words, that the men were bound to the soil.

* Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, vol. ii. Berlin, 1902, pp. 184-185.

† *Ibid.* p. 188.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 197.

§ Nissen (*op. cit.* p. 196) has observed that the conquest of the Alpine valleys increased the territory and the prosperity of many towns in the valley of the Po. It is therefore natural to assume that part of the lands conquered in the Alps was given to the towns. This was in part compensation for domains bought by Augustus for his veterans after Actium.

|| C. I. L., V. 5050, v. 14. This inscription shows us that the Emperor Claudius had *agri* and *saltus* in valleys conquered during these years. Any one who knows the habits of Rome will understand that these *agri* and *saltus* may have come from the plunder of this war, in which Drusus, the father of Claudius, participated.

¶ Oberziner, *Le Guerre di Augusto contro i Popoli Alpini*, Rome, 1900, p. 102.

15 B.C.

in Egypt. A knight chosen by himself was to govern the former kingdom, with the title of viceroy, in place of the national dynasty. Thus upon this side also the Danube was to mark the frontier of the empire. Cottius was left upon his throne, but in the position of *praefectus* and without the name or authority of king; he was thus to be directly responsible to Rome.

Military
reforms.

The annexation of Rhætia and Noricum involved a further step. This country must be defended against Germanic and Dacian invaders. The formation of new legions for this purpose would have been too great an expense, while it would also have been difficult to find a supply of soldiers and officers among the upper, middle and lower classes of Italy. Augustus had resolved not to exceed the number of twenty-three legions and to preserve the national and Italian character of the army; he therefore proposed to base the defence of his increased empire upon the following principle: the frontiers could never be attacked simultaneously at several points, and consequently the same legions could defend very different points, if rapid transport were provided. Instead of increasing the number of his legions Augustus preferred to improve their mobility by making fresh roads, which were less expensive and would also be useful to private individuals and for purposes of trade. He therefore resolved to open a high-road between the new provinces and the valley of the Po across the Alps; this road would enable the legions concentrated in the valley of the Po to hasten to the defence of the Danube frontier when occasion required. Drusus was commissioned to lay out this road, which started from Altino on the Po, and probably passed through Treviso, Feltre, the Valsugana, Trent and the valley of the Adige, thus reaching the Danube.* Augustus also wished to build another strategical road through the valley of the Salassi, through his colony of *Augusta Salassorum* and over the Little and Great Saint Bernard; this road would

* From an inscription, C. I. L. v. 8002, we know that the road was constructed at this time from Altino to the Danube: *viam Claudiam Augustam quam Drusus pater Alpibus bello patefactis devexerat, munivit ab Altino usque ad fluvium Danuvium*. Upon the probable direction of the road see C. I. L. v. p. 938.

facilitate the passage from Italy to Gaul and enable the legions of Illyria and Pannonia to concentrate upon the Rhine in the course of a few weeks.* In the same year Augustus began to found colonies of veterans, a further sign of the threatening storm. After Actium and the end of the civil wars he had somewhat neglected the soldiers and the veterans, turning a deaf ear to their continual claims for less service, more pay, more privileges and more definite terms of enlistment; † though he discharged every year a certain number of soldiers who had served at least twenty years, he made no effort to provide them with land, which would have been an expensive and difficult undertaking. Moreover, though the soldiers had been constantly rewarded with land during the civil wars, they had no right whatever to this kind of pension; there were, indeed, many disbanded soldiers in poverty who vainly attempted to beg from the great soldiers under whom they had fought a small piece of land upon which to spend their old age, but in that year Augustus had been unexpectedly moved by pity for his poor veterans and attempted to provide them with good and fertile lands, though beyond the frontiers of Italy; he founded a colony for them at Patras, giving them part of the domains bought from the town; ‡ he induced Agrippa to found another colony in Syria, upon the ruins of the town of Berytus, which had been partially destroyed and depopulated during the civil wars.§ Probably at this time also he projected the construction of Augusta Vindelicorum, Turin and Benevagienna. Augusta Vindelicorum was situated at the end of the road opened by Drusus; Turin, at the confluence of the Po and the Dora, commanded

* We have no information concerning the date when this road was built, but it can hardly have been made before the time when Gallic policy became important, and the defence of the Rhine correspondingly necessary. I have therefore brought this road into connection with the other, as being separate parts of the same policy.

† We shall see that in the following year Augustus proposed a military law granting great privileges to the soldiers, who must have complained for a long time of their position, as Augustus resolved to satisfy their desires.

‡ Strabo, VIII. vii. 5. The vague chronological indication given by Strabo is defined by St. Jerome, *ad annum Abraham*, 2003.

§ Strabo, XVI. ii. 19; St. Jerome, *ad annum Abraham*, 2003.

15 B.C. the new strategical high-road through the valley of the Salassi at the spot where the Po becomes navigable; Benevagienna, in the heart of Liguria, was founded upon the land captured from the insurgents.* Turin and Benevagienna were to be fortified for the purpose of intimidating the Ligurians.

Agrippa and
Herod in Asia
Minor.

The Senate approved these proposals with the utmost readiness, and voted the necessary expenditure with its usual docility and carelessness and without asking how the money would be found. Thus for Augustus the year 14 was full of anxiety and hard work. Agrippa's task in the east was extremely easy in comparison. His naval demonstration off the coast of Tauris had been carried through without difficulty, and he had settled the affairs of the kingdom of the Bosphorus as he wished.† He had then returned overland, crossing Asia Minor in the company of Herod, who had joined him during the expedition.‡ Herod was anxious to secure his favour, that he might carry out upon a wider field and before the whole of the east the great idea which gave some tinge of nobility to his perfidious and arbitrary policy, the amalgamation of Hellenism and Judaism. During his journey he had distributed great bounty to the Greek towns and had begun the reconstruction of the famous portico of Chios at his own expense; § he had also posed before Agrippa as the champion of the Greek towns and of the Jews. The whole of Asia Minor soon realised that concessions could only be obtained from Agrippa through the king of Judea, and many towns had turned this knowledge to advantage. Ilion had secured the remission of a fine; Chios had perhaps recovered its freedom, and thus obtained a diminution of the taxation laid upon it; other favours were given to

* Dion (liv. 23), among the events of the year 15, says that Augustus *πόλεις ἐν τε τῇ Γαλατίας καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰβηρίᾳ συγγὰς ἀπέφικσε*. Must we understand by *Γαλατία* Cisalpine Gaul? In that case Benevagienna and Turin must be the two colonies in question. The supposition is not unlikely. We know, in fact, that the colonies of Gallia Narbonensis were founded at an earlier date. These years suit two colonies—Benevagienna, which presupposes the submission of the Ligurians, and Turin, which must have been connected with the construction of the great high-road through the valley of the Salassi.

† Dion, liv. 24; Orosius, VI. xxi. 28; St. Jerome, *ad Ann.* 2003 (edit. Schon. ii. 143).

‡ Josephus, A. J. XVI. ii. 2.

§ *Ibid.*

other towns.* Herod also induced Agrippa to issue a solemn edict confirming and increasing the privileges of the Jewish colonies in Asia Minor, though these were hateful to the natives.† Thus this Idumæan Arab became in the east the great champion of the Jews scattered throughout the empire and of the colonies separated from the mother country; he was able to appear as the mediator between Judaism and Hellenism, and even dared to extend his patronage to the latter civilisation. Oriental Hellenism, exclusive, proud and arbitrary as it had been, now tolerated for its own advantage this presumption, which would have seemed ridiculous and scandalous at any other time.‡ But Hellenism was now in its decadence, and Herod, king of the Jews, was becoming the first power in the Hellenic and Semitic east. The *pax Romana*, the new policy inaugurated by Augustus, which attempted as far as possible to reconcile divergent provincial interests, instead of collecting booty and sowing discord with reckless carelessness upon every side, had created in the east a situation wholly without parallel and utterly different from that prevailing in the west. Agriculture, trade and commerce were reviving upon every side; the noise of the loom was heard in every town, the cauldrons of the dyers were heated and the furnaces of the glass-blowers were in full work. Workmen could always find occupation in the manufacturing towns; landowners had an easy market for their excellent wine, their exquisite dried fruits, their simples and aromatic herbs. Their customers were to be found not merely in the east, along the shore and upon the highlands, but also in Italy, which required an annually increasing quantity of these luxuries from the east. New markets were opened in the barbarian provinces of Europe, from Gaul to Thrace.

Thus when Augustus organised the defence of the Rhine and of the Danube he not only preserved the integrity of the empire, but also secured wide markets for the manufactures of the east. There was a growing demand throughout the

The growing prosperity of the east. Progress in Greece.

* Josephus, A. J. XVI. ii. 2.

† Josephus, A. J. XVI. ii. 3-4.

‡ Certain Greek towns, including Athens, seem to have raised statues to Herod in different temples. See C. I. A. iii. 550; C. I. G. 2630

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Mediterranean world for the products of India, silk, rice and pearls.* The east naturally became the middle market and realised great profits from this trade; especially was this true of Egypt, which then entered into triumphant rivalry with the Arabs of the Yemen. In the age of the Ptolemies but few ships set out for India every year from Myos Hormos, the Egyptian harbour on the Red Sea; there was now almost a fleet of ships engaged in commerce with the far east, and their number increased every year, as merchants gained wealth by this traffic.† Industry, commerce and agriculture of every kind flourished in Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor, and even within Greece a revival was manifest in certain directions. Patras was the centre of a flourishing trade in byssus, and the foundation of a Roman colony naturally brought wealth to the town, as Augustus had assigned to the colonists territories and certain small towns which were to pay tribute.‡ The marble quarries of Attica, Taygetus, Thasos, Croceæ and of Tænarium began to export large quantities of marble to Italy; § Laconia, Thessaly and Elis exported horses for the circus games; || the towns situated at the mouth of the Danube were beginning to purchase Greek wines and fabrics.¶ Such towns as Ypata, in the valley of the upper Sperchius, and Tithorea, in the valley of the upper Cephissus, expressed from the olives of their surrounding territory an excellent oil, and the future seemed to smile with promise, even in the midst of the universal desolation of Greece.** Thus the eastern world had apparently secured that permanent pacification and that security of traffic by land and by sea which is essential to the welfare of industrial and commercial countries; in this peace and security wealth rapidly increased and the precious metals flowed in from all sides.

* See *Peripl. Mar. Erythr.* 49, although this document is of later date.

† Strabo, II. v. 12.

‡ Pausanias, V. v. 2, VI. xxi. 6, VII. xvii. 5, VII. xxi. 4, VII. xxii. 1.

§ Hertzberg, *Histoire de la Grèce sous la Domination romaine*, ii. 207.

|| Hertzberg, *op. cit.* ii. 208.

¶ Dion Chrysostom, *Or.* xxxvi. 444, xii. 198 a. Dion Chrysostom is speaking of a later age, but it is obvious that this interchange of commerce must have begun at this time, when there was a general rise of prosperity.

** Hertzberg, *op. cit.* ii. 208.

The numberless evils of the eastern world were not entirely cured, and racial discord, political decay, religious confusion and moral decadence continued, but the east had acquired a greater power of resisting these disintegrating forces. Prosperity had thus returned unexpectedly at a time when it was thought to have fled the world for ever, and in their general haste to gather the outflow from its horn of plenty, classes and races forgot to some extent the jealousies and the animosities which the long struggle had fostered. An Arab, the king of Judea, was allowed to express upon behalf of all the great necessities of the east and to lay her needs at the feet of Rome; she yearned for a union of peoples, languages and religions for the common purpose of introducing commerce, art, letters, vices and religious myths to that barbarous west which Augustus was preparing to throw open to the east by the power of the sword.

The lion which had raged with unbounded fury in the age of Mithridates now licked the hands of Agrippa, docile as a lamb. In his hand-to-hand struggle with the lion whelps of Europe Augustus might well ask himself whether Antony was not justified in his proposal to transfer the empire to the east. How much more peaceful and settled would the empire have been if it were separated from these turbulent European provinces! But there was now no possibility of retreat. While Agrippa and Herod made their way through the peaceful east Augustus in Gaul was meditating plans of even vaster scope than those which he had executed in this year; he projected the reorganisation of Gallic administration and the conquest of Germania.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST OF GERMANIA

Reasons for the conquest of Germania—The reorganisation of the administration in Gaul—The three Gauls—The difficulty of the conquest of Germania—Increasing popularity of Augustus—The *numen* and the altars of Augustus—The worship of Augustus and its significance—The return of Augustus to Rome—The new and the old generations—The reaction against traditionalism and puritanism—Ovid—The *Amores*—Ovid and the nobility—The conquest of Germania and the new generation—New senatorial reform—Plan for the conquest of Germania—The invasion of Germania by way of the rivers.

Reasons for
the conquest
of Germania.

From the outset of his presidency Augustus had never openly declared himself opposed to a policy of expansion ; at the same time he had persistently avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire, and had found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and the ambition of the people. Accordingly he had concluded peace with Persia at a time when Italy was anxious for war. Fifteen years of this policy had produced the desired effect ; Italy was involuntarily growing resigned to the systematic supineness of his foreign policy and was content with the modest trophies gained by the legions fighting in the north of Spain or in the valleys of the Alps. The revival of prosperity, the growing prestige of the State and forgetfulness of Actium, together with the obvious decadence of the Senate, turned the course of public opinion in a new direction. It was impossible to cherish great plans of conquest at a time when the Senate was too impotent and apathetic to direct any such policy. Yet precisely at the moment when public opinion had ceased to contemplate the

idea of expansion by conquest, Augustus, almost entirely upon his own initiative, and as a result of calm judgment and reflection, resolved to begin a vast enterprise of the utmost importance.

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So unexpected was this singular change of policy that ancient and modern historians alike have traced it to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will. The real reasons, however, were far more profound and intricate. If Augustus had not persuaded himself about this time that the conquest of Germany was an imperative and urgent necessity, we cannot understand why he should have begun so formidable an enterprise with a feeble Senate and a shattered aristocracy, apart from the fact that he had invariably avoided responsibility of such grave import. What, then, were the reasons which determined him to attempt the conquest of Germany? As we have no documentary evidence, we must have recourse to conjecture, and the most simple and reasonable hypothesis can be based, in my opinion, upon the condition of affairs in Gaul. It is not likely that Germany in itself seemed worth the great trouble and expense of conquest. The urgency of the enterprise depended upon the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Hence the first conception of this design may be connected with the great debate which took place between the Gallic chiefs and the freedmen in the presence of Augustus. This debate marks a decisive epoch in the history of Rome; then it was that the penetrating insight of Licinus enabled the governing oligarchy to realise the infinite value of Cæsar's conquests. For fifteen years Augustus had scoured the empire from the mountains of Spain to the highlands of Asia Minor, from the towns of Syria to the villages of the Alps, in search of money; he must have thought his good fortune marvellous indeed when it seemed possible to extract abundant wealth from a province beyond the Alps, in central Europe and adjoining Italy, from a province, also, which was likely to become as rich as any in the empire and likely to afford a vast market for Italian agriculture and manufactures. To

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these economic advantages, which were obvious to every one, great political advantages were also added. Italy had forced Augustus to conquer and to annex Egypt in order to inflict an everlasting humiliation upon the presumption of the eastern world, which had become overweening during the civil wars; though she had ruthlessly taken vengeance upon the whole of the east for the excessive ambition of Cleopatra, her position relative to the empire as a whole had not changed. The western provinces, even when led by Italy, remained inferior to the eastern in population, in wealth and in importance. Roman nationalism professed to scorn the orientals, but Italy and the republic were chiefly supported by the revenues of the eastern provinces. Augustus, Agrippa and the Roman proconsuls were obliged to show every consideration to their oriental subjects and to those towns, monarchies and states, however insignificant, which lay under the protectorate of Rome. Herod, an Idumæan and a barbaric chieftain, had received favours and kindnesses which the Senate had refused two centuries before to the famous successors of Alexander, the highest representatives of true Hellenism. The superiority of the east, and in particular the influence of Egypt, rapidly increased as the passage of peaceful years effaced the recollections of the last civil war; eastern influence thus spread a more refined and more intellectual civilisation throughout the empire and through Italy. It is therefore not improbable that Augustus, under the advice of Licinus, may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul as likely to become not only an important source of revenue for the imperial treasury, but a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the teeming populations of the eastern provinces. If Italy succeeded in spreading beyond the Alps and securing her footing in a rich and populous province, where commerce and manufacture were vigorously pursued, she would be less inclined to rely upon the east, could adopt an attitude of stronger domination, and more easily preserve that imperial supremacy which eastern influences threatened to undermine.

The reorganization of Gaul

Augustus had thus given full credence to Licinus, and while he adopted the views of his clever freedman he extended them

to form the basis of a new policy entirely Gallic in nature. Licinus had merely proposed to extort all the money possible from Gaul by any and every means. It was obvious, however, that Gaul could never become the Egypt of the west if the Germans were able to threaten her frontiers, if the neighbouring provinces were in revolt, and if the country itself was in a state of suppressed revolution. Unlike Egypt and Syria, Gaul was not an ancient nation accustomed to centuries of obedience and taxation. The triumph of Licinus had exasperated the country, and when the registration was concluded under which the whole of Gaul was to be subjected to fresh financial arrangements, the opposition party seemed likely to stir the general discontent to a rising, which would be supported by a Germanic invasion.* If Gaul was to be the chief support of the empire in the west, its foundations must be strengthened at all costs; such seems to have been the idea which guided Augustus henceforward in his Gallic policy. Of the various methods before him he preferred two, a careful administrative reorganisation of Gaul and the conquest of Germania. The territorial division which Cæsar had found in Gaul upon his arrival still remained intact. Cæsar had left it in existence, and years of peace had strengthened it. The strongest tribes, such as the Ædui and the Arverni, as allies of Rome, still preserved their supremacy over the little *civitates* which they governed; by the side of these tribes many other *civitates*, great and small, were directly under the government or supervision of Rome, according as they were subject, free or allied. Internal wars had ceased and Gaul had now become an industrial and commercial nation; it was therefore obvious that such hegemonies as those of the Arverni and the Ædui existed merely to preserve their old privileges and to claim a superiority now entirely

* The passages of Livy, *Per. 137, Civitates Germaniæ cis Rhenum posita oppugnantur a Druso; et tumultus qui ob censum exortus in Gallia erat, compositus . . .*, and of Dion, *liv. 32, . . . διὰ τὸ τοῦ Γαλάτας μὴ ἰθελοδουλεῖν . . .*, clearly show that the expedition of Drusus to Germania was connected with the threatened rising in Gaul, and justified the invasion of Germania. What we know of the history of Gaul and of Germania shows us that Gaul was greatly agitated at that time, and that in every attempt at revolt the country relied upon German aid.

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fictitious. On the other hand, they might become a danger to Rome in the event of a general revolt, as possible nuclei of fresh national coalitions. Augustus therefore resolved to put an end to these great hegemonies by removing from the supremacy of the Arverni the Vellavi, the Cadurci and the Gabali; from the Ædui the Segusiavi, the Ambarri, the Aulerci, and the Brannovices; these *civitates* were to be directly subject to the authority of Rome.* The various *civitates* were then reduced to greater uniformity upon the basis of the census; those which were too small were amalgamated, while the larger were divided, with the result that sixty *civitates* were formed, almost equal in size and importance, all independent of one another and in immediate relations with Rome.†

The admini-
stration of Gaul.

This organisation increased, however, both the duties and

* Strabo (IV. ii. 2) says that the Vellavi were under the strict domination of the Arverni. Hirschfeld ("Die Æduer und Arverner unter Röm. Herrschaft," *Sitzungsb. Berl. K. nig. Akad.* 1897, ii. 1100) seems to me to have shown that this change was probably made by Augustus, and that a similar change affected the other subjects of the Arverni and of the Ædul. In my opinion there are numerous considerations to show that the change took place at this time, as also the division of Gaul into three parts. In my Italian edition (vol. iv. p. 68, n. 1) I had placed the division of Gaul in the year 27, but more careful study induces me to think that the division probably took place in this year. In the first place, Augustus was but a very short time in Gaul in the year 27; he went almost immediately to Spain, and such a reform required a long stay and a full examination of local conditions. Moreover, it does not seem likely that the reorganisation would have taken place before the conclusion of the survey and census of Gaul. Now it is not certain that the survey was concluded in 27, while the census was only ordered in that year. Finally, the anxiety which the condition of Gaul caused Augustus at that moment is enough to explain why he should thus have organised the country in the years 14 and 13, while there is no sufficient reason for such a measure in the year 27. Gaul was then more peaceful, and Augustus was occupied with more urgent questions.

† Strabo (IV. ii. 2) says that the names of sixty *civitates* were inscribed upon the altar of Lyons. Under Tiberius (Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 44) the *civitates* were sixty-four in number. The difference may be explained, as is pointed out by Arnold (*Studies of Roman Imperialism*, Manchester, 1906), if we remember that four Germanic tribes—the Nemetes, the Vangiones, the Triboci and the Raurici—were then transported beyond the Rhine and were united to Gaul. See Ptolemaeus, II. ix. 9. As Strabo is nearer to Augustus in point of date, I consider that he should rather be followed for the facts of the epoch which we are studying.

the responsibilities of the Roman governor. To secure a proper administration of Gaul under the new arrangements and to reinforce the Roman supremacy Augustus decided to divide these sixty states into three divisions, though he did not propose to follow the natural ethnological division into three parts. On the west, in Aquitaine, between the Pyrenees and the Garonne, the population was Iberian, like that of Spain; in the centre, between the Rhone and the ocean, from the Garonne to the Seine, the inhabitants were pure Celts; on the east, between the Seine and the Rhine, was a mixed population of Celts and Germans. The effects of language and race thus pointed to a natural tripartition of the country. However, the division of Gaul which Augustus introduced into the districts of Aquitaine, Lyons and Belgium tended to confuse the ethnological and historical differences and affinities of the Gallic peoples. Under the new system seventeen *civitates* were united in Aquitaine, of which five were Iberian and twelve Celtic; * among these were the Arverni. To the district of Lyons he assigned twenty-five or twenty-six Celtic *civitates*, including the Ædui, who were thus separated from the Arverni.† The Belgian district was formed of seventeen *civitates*, among

* Strabo says fourteen (IV. i. 1), but further on (IV. ii. 2) he only enumerates twelve, eleven of which may be found in Ptolemæus (II. vii. 5-13). Ptolemæus assigns seventeen *civitates* to Aquitaine. Thus the *civitates* of Iberian origin, which numbered twenty according to Strabo, but were obscure and insignificant (IV. ii. 1), must have been amalgamated to form five or three *civitates* of larger size, assuming that the number fourteen or twelve is inexactly stated by Strabo when he enumerates the Celtic *civitates* of Aquitaine. This fusion of little Iberian *civitates* in the larger unities may explain Ptolemæus' statement that there were seventeen *civitates*, whereas Pliny (IV. xix. 108) enumerates more than forty. Pliny must have counted all the original petty *civitates*, which were amalgamated into three or five larger divisions; in other words, he has given the geographical division of the region, while Ptolemæus has followed the administrative division. Hence Ptolemæus will be the authority to be followed, even for the age of Augustus; in no other way can we understand the number of these *civitates* as sixty, which, according to Strabo, built the altar of Lyons, and must necessarily have been administrative unities.

† Pliny, IV. xviii. 106; Ptolemæus, II. viii. 5-12. The two lists differ only in the case of a few names, and the difference may be explained from changes which must have taken place in the administrative areas.

14 B.C. which some pure Celtic populations were included, such as the Sequani, the Lingones and the Helvetii.* The central and purely Celtic group, which was the most compact, the most energetic, the largest, and therefore the most dangerous, was thus cut down upon the east and west to increase the Iberian and the Celto-Germanic groups. The government of Gaul was thus based upon the administrative equilibrium of three almost equal groups.

Preparations
for the conquest
of Germania.

It will easily be understood that in making this artificial division, which was in contradiction with the racial history, the languages and the past of Gaul, Augustus intended to extinguish the sense of nationalism, to weaken the spirit of tradition, to break all tribal connections maintained by language or race, and to direct the energies of this reconstituted and denationalised Gaul to agriculture, commerce, manufacture, study and pleasure. This reorganisation, however, did not seem of itself sufficient to support the Roman supremacy, for the hope that the Germans would come to their help continued to agitate the minds of the Gauls. Hence the conquest of Germania was necessary to secure the safety of Gaul and of the Danube provinces. In this case there was no possibility of choice, as in the question of the conquest of Persia; the necessity was imperative. If Italy and the Senate could not realise it, Augustus could not avoid it, as the responsibilities of power were his and as it was his business to remove the great dangers which threatened the future. At the same time his German campaign was almost as difficult as the Persian. So much Augustus could have discovered without leaving Rome by a perusal of chapters xxxix. and xl. of *Cæsar's Commentaries*, in which the conqueror of Gaul clearly states the dangers and difficulties of war in Germania and dwells upon the bravery of the enemy, the want of roads, the difficulty of transport and commissariat, the vast forests and the ease with which a force could be ambushed. These difficulties had in no way diminished since Cæsar's day; the soldiers of Augustus were less

* Ptolemæus, II. ix. 4-10. In Pliny (IV. xvii. 100) there are many other names, probably for the same reason as that which explains the variations in his list of the *civitates* of Aquitaine.

hardy than those of Cæsar, needed more baggage, more abundant supplies, more reliable guides and easier roads. Augustus was not inclined to plunge rashly into the unknown, like Lucullus and Cæsar; he was able, however, to resolve upon a serious step when he had realised its necessity after careful consideration. At the outset of the year 13 he invited Agrippa to return to Italy from the east, in order that he might have a consultation with the most experienced warrior of that day.* The year 13 would see the end of their five years' presidency. Augustus and Agrippa would thus be obliged to meet at Rome to procure the prolongation of their power; they might use the opportunity to consider a plan of campaign. Moreover, the moment for beginning the conquest seemed singularly opportune. The enterprise was no less difficult than that which Cæsar had concluded in Gaul or which Antony had attempted in Persia; but Augustus could now look back upon fifteen years of successful government, and his influence would suffice to persuade the State to this adventure. Upon the whole, these fifteen years had been of greater benefit than harm to Italy; peace had not been disturbed, prosperity had increased, many animosities had died away and many desires had been satisfied. Though these benefits may not have been entirely due to him, his contemporaries gave him full credit for them. He it was who for fifteen years had worked to reform abuses, to pass and to enforce laws, to reorganise the provinces,

* It seems to me probable that Agrippa came back for the German expedition, and it is very likely that the command of the enterprise was to be entrusted to him. It is true that at the beginning of the year 12 he started for Pannonia, and not for Germany; but an unforeseen event such as the Pannonian revolt may well have obliged Augustus and Agrippa to change their first plans. In fact, as soon as Agrippa knew that the Pannonian revolt had been quelled by the mere terror of his name he returned to Rome, probably to continue preparations for the German expedition. These were interrupted by his death, and Augustus then resolved to divide responsibility for these wars between Drusus and Tiberius. It is difficult to believe that Augustus wished to entrust so serious an enterprise to his two sons, who, whatever their capacity, were still quite young, when he had at hand so experienced a soldier as Agrippa. We shall also see that his first idea was to invade Germania by water, and this suggestion was probably due to Agrippa, who was more of an admiral than a general; he had won the two great naval victories of Naulochus and Actium.

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to conclude treaties, to save money, to crush revolts and to increase the empire. His popularity was not the transitory breath of public favour that Cæsar had enjoyed; it was the quiet confidence with which the first magistrate in the republic was invariably regarded.

Divis orte bonis, optime Romulæ
Custos gentis, abes jam nimium diu :
Maturum reditum pollicitus patrum
Sancto concilio redi.

Lucem redde tuæ, dux bone, patriæ ;
Instar veris enim voltus ubi tuus
Adfulsit populo, gratior it dies
Et soles melius nitent.

Thus it was that Horace * saluted Augustus when he was preparing to return to Rome, and depicted Italy waiting his arrival like that of a son from a distant country. It was due to him that

Tutus bos etenim rura perambulat,
Nutrit rura Ceres almaque Faustitas,
Pacatum volitant per mare navitæ,
Culpari metuit fides ;

Nullis polluitur casta domus stupris,
Mos et lex maculosum edomuit nefas,
Laudantur simili prole puerperæ,
Culpam poena premit comes.

Quis Parthum paveat, quis gelidum Scythen,
Quis Germania quos horrida parturit
Fetus, incolumi Cesare ? quis feræ
Bellum curet Hiberiæ ?

The cult of Augustus.

Horace was neither a flatterer nor a court poet, and in these lines he expressed the sincere feelings of the Italian middle and lower classes. A proof of the fact is a circumstance which historians have somewhat neglected; about this time Augustus became the subject in Italy, if not of a formal cult, at any rate of a popular veneration, the forms of which were entirely Latin, though they contained a germ of Asiatic emperor-worship. For centuries slaves and clients had been accustomed to swear by the *genius* of their patron, that is to say, by the divine, incorruptible and immortal essence of human nature, a

* *Odes*, IV. v.

somewhat confused idea, but an entity placed by Latin mythology in the body as a kind of soul. The middle classes of Italy now used Augustus for this purpose; solemn oaths were taken by his genius as if he were the common patron of all, and men even came to imitate the shepherds in Virgil's eclogue by sacrificing to the *genius* or to the *numen* of Augustus.* In many towns, such as Falerii,† Cosa,‡ Nepes,§ Nola,|| Pæstum ¶ and Grumentum,** colleges of *Augustales* were formed, like the corporations of the *Mercuriales* and of the *Herculiani*, associations the members of which guaranteed the periodical offering of modest sacrifices. It is possible at this time that Pisa had an *Augusteum* †† and Beneventum a *Cæsareum*. ††† Throughout Italy the pious zeal of populations rejoicing in peace erected altars to Augustus §§ at Rome, and also in the colonies which he had founded and in the *municipia* of different origin and tradition his statue was to be found upon the hearth together with the statues of the Lares, as if to invoke his protection together with that of the old tutelary gods of the household for the family and its descendants. In the ode written upon the occasion of his return Horace further says :

Condit quisque diem collibus in suis,
Et vitem viduas ducit ad arbores ;
Hinc ad vina redit lætus et alteris
Te mensis adhibet deum ;

Te multa prece, te prosequitur mero
Defuso pateris et Laribus tuum
Miscet numen, uti Græcia Castoris
Et magni memor Herculis. |||

* Horace, *Ep.* II. l. 16 :

“ Jurandasque tuum per numen ponimus aras.”

This epistle was written about this time, not before the year 12, but after the death of Agrippa. So much is plain from the first line :

“ Cum tot sustineas tanta et negotia solus. . . .”

Solus means without Agrippa, without his presidential colleague of the last five years.

† C. I. L. xi. 3083.

‡ C. I. L. xi. 3200.

¶ C. I. L. x. 485.

†† C. I. L. xi. 1420.

††† C. I. L. ix. 1556.

|| Horace, *Odes*, IV. v. 29 ff.

‡ C. I. L. xi. 2631.

|| C. I. L. x. 1272.

** C. I. L. x. 205, 231, 232.

§§ But the inscription is of the year 755.

§§ Horace, *Ep.* II. l. 16. See C. I. L. xi. 3303.

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There were already some statues of Augustus at Rome in the little chapels of the *Lares compitales*, which were placed in every quarter at cross-roads, and for which the people had a profound devotion.*

Nature of
the cult.
Augustus
returns to
Rome.

At the same time we must not suppose that the peasant, the artisan and the merchant imagined Augustus to be an actual god, endowed with supernatural power, or that prayer was made to him as the pious Catholic to-day prays to the saints or to the Virgin. Every one knew that Augustus was a man like other men, and that he too must die. Thus this cult was nothing more than a conventional manner of expressing the greatest admiration which one man can entertain for another; it did not imply a belief that Augustus was a god, but expressed the fact that he was held in reverence almost equivalent to that of the gods. Christianity had not yet drawn a complete line of demarcation between the human and the divine, and there was nothing sacrilegious in adoring a personage of great importance under religious forms. Thus the inclusion of Augustus among the household gods merely signified that the popularity of the president was such that his image was thought worthy of a place even in the family sanctuary. This growing veneration will explain the reason of the great festivities with which Rome was then preparing to greet his return. Tiberius, who had reached Italy before him, because he had been elected consul for that year, proposed to give numerous shows to the people; † Balbus, who had finished the construction of his theatre, wished to make a solemn inauguration of it to coincide with the entrance of Augustus; ‡ the Senate, in memory of successful enterprises during earlier years, had resolved after his return to erect upon the Flaminian Way, near the Campus Martius, a great altar to the Peace of Augustus; the magistrates, the priests and the Vestal Virgins were to offer sacrifice upon it every year to the *Pax Augusta*, to signify that the restoration of peace to the European provinces and the general tranquillity of the empire

* Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 145.

† Dion, liv. 27.

‡ Dion, liv. 25.

were his personal work.* Once again he entered Rome secretly by night, but none the less his return was greeted as a piece of national good fortune with demonstrations which in part, at least, were sincere. The public had at length found a leader universally respected and beloved. 13 B.C.

Augustus possessed remarkably acute powers of appreciating that vague force known as public opinion, and he must have felt that the moment had come, after many years of self-restraint, to attempt some great enterprise which would increase his own prestige, the glory of Rome and the power of the State. Apart from the situation in Gaul, it is probable that the conditions of domestic policy forced him in this direction. The skill with which he held the balance between opposite parties and interests had enabled him to re-establish a certain order throughout the empire. But there were obvious signs that this difficult balancing feat would result in disaster unless some great enterprise could be found to occupy the attention of the public as a whole. To judge by the list of consuls it might be thought that the aristocratic restoration begun by Augustus had been completely successful. Thus, in this year, the colleague of Tiberius, a member of the Claudian house, was Publius Quintilius Varus, the son of a patrician who had committed suicide after Philippi, and one of those nobles of ancient family who had been raised to the highest office while still young by the favour of Augustus and the traditionalist movement. Varus was not a rich man,† and he was little more than thirty-five years of age; ‡ yet he had attained a consulship. Since the period of aristocratic prosperity there had been no instance of two consuls so young and so high-born. But, as a matter of fact, the aristocratic constitution, notwithstanding the efforts to restore it during the last fifteen years, had been undermined by the influence of new ideas and of a new generation which had

The necessity
of military
conquest.

* Dion, liv. 25; Mon. Anc. (Lat.), ff. 37-41, (Gr.) vi. 20-23, VII. i. 4; C. I. L., I. 2 pp. 214 and 320, ix. 4192, x. 6638.

† Velleius Paterculus (ii. 117) tells us that Quintilius Varus made his money in Syria, where he was governor in the year 6 B.C.

‡ In fact, twenty years later, in 7 A.D., he was given the post of governor of Germany. It seems unlikely that such a position in a barbarous country and a severe climate would have been given to a man above fifty years of age.

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grown up since the battle of Actium. We have here another instance of that phenomenon to be noted in every country which has been subjected to a great catastrophe at a certain time; some thirty years after the disaster the balance of public spirit is disturbed, and a sudden change takes place, the cause of which seems obscure, but is to be sought in the fact that the new generation has not felt the deep shock of any tragical catastrophe and that its view of life is very different from that of its fathers. The generation which had seen the civil wars was beginning to disappear from Italy; new men were coming forward with new theories and new ideas. They had not seen the appalling convulsions of intestine strife, the break-up of society and the imminent collapse of the empire; they had not felt the shock of those events which had driven the earlier generation to seek salvation in the past and had brought the traditional party into power and forced Augustus, at one time a revolutionary *vesérepos*, to govern upon the theory of the old Roman constitution. The old generation had been unable to transmit these terrible impressions to their children, for education and tradition do not give a father complete influence over the mind of his son.

The new
generation.

Thus the new generation which had grown up during the years of peace, tranquillity and prosperity was unable to realise the feelings and the policy of the former age; it would not submit to the policy nor respect the ideas of its fathers in blind faith. To the young men of that day the former generation seemed wholly preoccupied by the task of arming against imaginary danger; the ideas and sentiments which had been paramount for the last fifteen years seemed absurd or exaggerated to many young men. It could not be true that the republic and the empire would perish unless the nobility devoted themselves entirely to politics, to war and to the virtues of ancient Rome, and unless the upper classes would restrain their unbridled desire for pleasure, luxury and intellectual enjoyment. There were no disturbances at the present moment; wealth was increasing and peace was universal. Rome was respected and feared both beyond and within the frontiers of the empire, and Augustus could supply all deficien-

cies, meet all needs and remedy all abuses. Danger, real or imaginary, had turned the old generation towards tradition and fixed its gaze upon the historical origins of the national life; peace and prosperity, perhaps illusory, induced the new generation to look down from the heights of tradition upon the bright but treacherous promise of the future. A reaction was beginning under the influence of Egyptian luxury, which spread with the wealth and commerce of the east, while those who remembered Actium and Cleopatra slowly disappeared. The stoic, vegetarian and puritan sect of such men as Sextius had been flourishing ten years before, but was now in its decadence and upon the point of extinction.* Rome was led to luxury by the great expenditure of the government and wealthy men, by the immigration of orientals and especially of Egyptians, and by the temper of the new generation, and could no longer be a school of austerity and virtue. Actium, Cleopatra, Antony, and the vows of renunciation made during the great revolutionary crisis were now forgotten, and enjoyment became the chief object of life.

There was even a latent reaction against the social laws of Augustus. Severe punishments had been ordered for adultery. The basest of human passions had been loosed upon all who were guilty of this crime; the spy, the informer and the avenger had had their way, and the public had been so disgusted by the scandalous lawsuits and condemnations resulting from the application of the law that it soon began to show favour to all who were accused of adultery. These offenders were henceforward able to find zealous champions among their friends and among eminent personages, who were ready to use their whole influence on their behalf; they knew that they would appear before juries of a merciful temper and would have to struggle only with accusers who were discredited beforehand by their public reputation as slanderers.† Why

* Seneca, *Nat. Quæst.* VII. xxxii. 2: *Sextiorum nova et Romanæ roboris sæcta inter initia sua, cum magno impetu cepisset, extincta est.*

† See Dion, liv. 30. The intervention of Augustus in the trial for adultery which Dion relates can only be explained by supposing the reaction of public feeling against the law, and the *Amores* of Ovid was another proof of the fact, as we shall see.

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should a crime so easy of commission be punished by perpetual exile and confiscation of property? Would Rome collapse merely because some of the great-great-granddaughters of Lucretia had inherited the beauty but not the virtue of their ancestor? Possibly the *lex de marisandis ordinibus* had increased the number of marriages in the upper classes, for the occasion was now favourable. Young men no longer hesitated to marry and to have one or two children, when it was easier to find a wife with a considerable dowry, no longer promised, but scrupulously paid. The regulation excluding bachelors from public shows was also considered excessively severe, and it became daily more difficult to enforce the law, as public opinion was too indolent to resent attempts to violate it.* Finally, the restoration of the aristocratic and timocratic constitution, which was intended to regenerate the republic by providing a wider selection of magistrates and senators, threatened rather to impair its vitality by leaving it without magistrates of any kind. Though absence from the senatorial sessions was punishable with a fine, attendances became less and less frequent, and eventually few more than the legal quorum were present.† Augustus, as censor, also found it difficult to fill the vacancies which deaths caused in the senatorial body. Extraordinary to relate, young men constantly refused the greatest honour to which any one could aspire throughout the vast empire.‡ For the more numerous magistracies, such as the vigintivirate and the tribuneship, an adequate number of candidates was wanting, and in the absence of Augustus the Senate had been obliged to supply the deficiency by various expedients.§ The poorer classes were excluded from the government because their ambition and their determination were feared; on the other hand, the wealthy classes refused to take up the burden of office, and thus the State remained without magistrates. The

* In fact, Augustus abolished this part of the law in the next year, as we shall see (Dion, liv. 30). This repeal was certainly a concession to public opinion.

† See Dion, liv. 3. The reforms introduced by Augustus, which were enumerated in this passage, explain the serious nature of the abuse.

‡ Dion, liv. 26.

§ *Ibid.*

logic of facts was more powerful than all theories of reform. The political and military conditions of the Roman aristocracy were dying out; young men avoided war and politics in order to enjoy their wealth in other ways; the progress of intellectual culture also contributed to weaken the power of the State. There were too many poets in the upper classes at Rome, and even for this reason great generals and wise administrators became scarcer. As Horace was soon to write,*

Scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim.

The son of Antony himself, Iulus, whom Augustus had educated, and who was prætor in that year, trifled with the Muse, and in imitation of Virgil composed an epic poem on Diomed in twelve books.†

Thus, while some young men like Tiberius clung to tradition and followed the steps of the previous generation, the majority preferred an opposite course. That moral unity which seemed to have grown up after the civil wars was again broken. The youth of the age was once more animated by the desire for pleasure, by frivolity and trifling, and the expression of this spirit may be found in the graceful lines of a young poet of Samnium, Publius Ovidius Naso. Augustus could hardly have known his name on his departure, but he found him famous on his return. Ovid was then thirty years of age, a year older than Tiberius; he had been born at Sulmo in 43 B.C.,‡ of an equestrian family in easy circumstances.§ His father, a rich landowner of Samnium, was an Italian of the old stamp; he objected to literature, which he regarded as an *inutile studium*,|| and was an earnest supporter of the great restoration begun by Augustus. He had sent his son to study law and rhetoric, had found him a wife when he was still a young man,¶ and expected to see him adopt a political career and to increase the political aristocracy of Rome as magistrate and senator. His efforts, however, were fruitless, for the young man per-

* Horace, *Ep.* II. l. 117.

† Acro. *ad Hor.* c. IV. ii. 33.

‡ Ovid, *Trist.* IV. x. 6: *Cum cecidit fato consul uterque part.*

§ Ovid, *Trist.* ii. 113, IV. x. 7.

|| *Trist.* IV. x. 21.

¶ *Trist.* IV. x. 69: *parus mihi puero.*

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sistently declined to follow this line of progress. Possessing delicate literary taste, an alert though superficial imagination, extraordinary intellectual readiness and a surprising talent for writing verse, it was poetry and not law that Ovid had studied. His marriage had been speedily followed by a divorce, and a second marriage ended in the same way.* He had been *triumvir capitalis* † and *decemvir litibus iudicandis*, ‡ but his foot was no sooner placed upon the political ladder than he broke away from paternal authority, tradition and the whole of Augustus' policy. Abandoning his prospects of the *laticlauius* without a sigh, he at once returned to his favourite Muses, and had just published his first volume of poetry, the five books of the *Amores*, § in which he gave free scope to his talent. He stood in full contrast to the perfect and laborious polish, the exquisite feeling and the noble idealism of Virgil, or the yet more laborious polish, the philosophical depth and the elaborate irony of Horace; he came into Latin literature as a new force, reflecting the spirit of his age as the vault of heaven is mirrored in the level waters of the stream; his influence may be defined as that of facility rising to the point of genius. Matter and form alike were easy in his poetry, though vulgarity and carelessness were entirely absent. Ovid's chief anxiety was to avoid the solemn and wearisome monotony of the Virgilian hexameter and the difficulties of the various metres employed by Horace; he chose for his poem the elegiac distich, which he handled with graceful and certain touch. His subject, again, was by no means serious; the ethical or philosophical ideas or the political and social questions of his day find no place in it. Conventionality and reality, literary recollections and personal experiences, form the background upon which he describes the gay life of the upper classes in Rome, the central figure of his story being one Corinna, who is represented as his own mistress. Whether this mistress, with her beautiful Greek name, ever existed or whether the incidents in which the poet appears are fictitious or true, are questions difficult to answer;

* *Trist.* IV. x. 69 ff.† *Trist.* IV. x. 33.‡ *Trist.* II. 94.§ Teuffel-Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1890, vol. I. p. 562, § 2.

his descriptions are so vivid as to give the full illusion of truth. 13 B.C.

Whether they be true or false, the significance of his work ^{The "Amores."} remains certain, and to understand it we have to remember the age in which the book was composed, published, read and admired; we must remember that the book made the author famous shortly after Augustus had carried the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex de adulteriis coercendis*. With graceful and careless wit the poet quietly ridicules these terrible laws, the ideas and sentiments which inspired them and the traditionalism which was then in the foreground. To describe love triumphing over prudence and modesty he parodies a description of the most solemn ceremony in Roman militarism, the triumph of victorious warriors; * elsewhere he says that Mars has gone to the frontier, and interpreting in his ironical manner the legend of Æneas, the subject of Virgil's great poem, he asserts that as Rome was founded by Æneas, the son of Venus, it must be the city of Venus and of love; † elsewhere he draws an impertinent comparison between war and love which must have made Tiberius tremble with rage.

Militat omnis amans, et habet sua castra Cupido.‡

It would seem that those who pursue the pretty women of Rome are as well entitled to praise as those who fight the Germans on the Rhine.

Ergo desidiã quicumque vocabat amorem
Desinat.§

In one poem the poet meets his mistress at a festival to which she has come with her husband.|| In another he describes a meeting on a hot summer afternoon; Corinna has quietly entered the room, almost in darkness, and Ovid spares no details until the moment is reached when *lassi requiescimus ambo*.¶ Elsewhere he laments the fact that in a moment of rage he had boxed his mistress' ears; ** he enumerates the tortures of a long useless wait at his mistress' door during the night; ††

* *Am. I. ii. 27 ff.*

‡ *Am. I. ix. 1.*

|| *Am. i. 4.*

** *Am. i. 7.*

† *Am. I. viii. 41-42.*

‡ *Am. I. ix. 31.*

¶ *Am. i. 5.*

†† *Am. i. 6.*

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his indignation constantly and furiously breaks out against fair ladies whose affections are not wholly disinterested ; * he gives long and voluptuous descriptions of his mistress' hair.† He also boasts without concealment of the fact that he never aspired to the dusty rewards of generals, that he had not studied law, and that he had sought the immortal glory of poetry, which he affirms to be more noble and durable than any other.‡ He admits, however, that epic poetry in Virgil's style is too painful a task, and one beyond his strength. He prefers to speak of love in his poems.§ "I make no excuse," he cries, "for my vices ; I admit their existence."|| "Triumphant laurels wreath my brow ; I have conquered and I hold in my arms Corinna, who was watched by so many enemies, by a husband, a guardian and a strong door."¶ As for the *lex Julia de adulteriis*, the poet seems to care so little for it that under pretext of quarrelling with a jealous husband he ventures upon a covert diatribe against the law. A perusal of the fourth elegy of Book III. will show that the discussions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of the *lex de adulteriis*, discussions aroused by the scandalous lawsuits, ended in inducing the belief that the husband who forced his wife to remain faithful was a personification of that terrible law. The poet's fancy has free course in these vivid and picturesque descriptions, which we can read with pleasure to-day, but which, when these jests were written, were every one of them a crime. Adultery, the subject of Ovid's lively poems, should have been punished by exile and confiscation of property. The poems were an audacious enterprise in the way of revolutionary literature, attacking that restoration of the State which Augustus had begun.

Ovid and the nobility.

None the less Ovid had written these poems and upper-class society had admired them. Dion's information is therefore correct ; public feeling was now inclined to indulgence and toleration. If the traditionalist party had retained its strength Ovid would never have ventured to write this book immediately after

* *Am.* i. 8, 10.† *Am.* i. 15.‡ *Am.* II. iv. 1-3.† *Am.* i. 14.§ *Am.* ii. 1.¶ *Am.* II. xii. 1-3.

the promulgation of the laws and as a kind of commentary upon them, nor would any one have ventured to admire it. As a matter of fact he was welcomed in almost every great house at Rome, by Messala Corvinus, who gave him constant encouragement,* and by members of the families of Fabius † and Pomponius; ‡ whether he was able to enter the house of Augustus we cannot say. Thus there were many indications that the Roman aristocracy, after escaping total destruction in the civil wars, was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness. Ovid personified these tendencies which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars and as Egyptian influence grew stronger. Confronted with a recrudescence of these evils, Augustus realised that some remedy was required more efficacious than laws and speeches, and to a Roman of the traditional school no remedy could seem more effectual than a return to a policy of expansion. The Roman aristocracy had been found in possession of all the intellectual and moral qualities which Augustus was striving to arouse by artificial means whenever it was obliged to display them for military or diplomatic purposes. Protected by the panoply of tradition, the aristocracy had resisted every disintegrating influence so long as it had been able to pursue the dangerous policy of expansion by means of war and diplomacy. When the policy was abandoned, this protective armour deteriorated and fell to pieces. Years of peace and the apparent futility of further expansion had atrophied the old energy of the nobility. Now, however, parties and classes had been to some extent reconciled; the financial situation had been more or less improved, and Rome might attack dangerous enterprises once more. Such enterprises were then necessary, not merely to increase the empire, but also to strengthen domestic morality. Thus it was that Augustus, after fifteen years of peace, became a war politician, though with his habitual moderation and prudence. The idleness and the luxury which ruined the

* Ovid, *Pont.* I. vii. 27 ff.

† *Ibid.* III. iii. 1 ff.

‡ *Ibid.* I. 6, II. 6, IV. 9.

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nobility were due, among other things, to peace, which had removed all possibility of great exploits; new fields of action and new possibilities of glory must therefore be opened, that young men might learn the art of war, and not confine their energies to the writing of poems or to the construction of sumptuous seaside villas. Campaigns in Germany would be an excellent cure for the softness of the new generation, and the most potent antidote to the erotic poison with which Ovid was corrupting the young nobility. We must remember that at the end of the civil wars an aristocratic restoration of the State was attempted, chiefly for the reason that the aristocratic constitution was an integral part of the military organisation. An army was required to maintain the empire, and only from the aristocracy could officers and generals be drawn. As there were no public military schools in that age, the only school of war was the aristocratic family; if, therefore, the aristocracy died out, the army would be deprived of its leaders. It is thus not surprising that when Augustus was commissioned by Italy to preserve the old nobility as being the best defence of the empire, he should have thought that peace had made it idle, and that its capacity could only be restored by military service, especially at a time when such poets as Ovid were tempting it to love and pleasure.

Augustus at Rome; the reform of the Senate.

After his return to Rome, Augustus, in the midst of less important business, began to prepare for the invasion of Germany, and at the same time to struggle against the slow dissolution of the aristocratic constitution. He set an example of respect for the constitution by submitting to the Senate a minute report of all that he had done during his absence; * he then proposed, whether to the Senate or to the *comitia* we cannot say, a military reform intended to meet the various claims of the soldiers and to prepare the legions for the dangers and the fatigues which awaited them in Germany. The law stated some of the chief conditions of service which had hitherto been matters of custom only, and had therefore enabled the government to retain the services of the soldiers beyond their due time. The new law fixed the period of service at sixteen

* Dion, liv. 25.

years for the legionaries and twelve for the prætorians ; at the conclusion of their service both grades were to be rewarded, not by a gift of land, but by a sum of money, the amount of which is unknown.* Augustus then inaugurated the theatre which Cæsar had begun, and in memory of his nephew called it the Theatre of Marcellus ; † this was no doubt an attempt to soften the inconsolable grief of Octavia, but Augustus also indicated that membership of his family would not of itself procure public admiration, as in eastern dynasties. In the games which Tiberius gave to the people to celebrate the return of Augustus he had given the place by his side reserved for the consul to Caius, the son of Agrippa and of Julia ; he was a boy only seven years of age, whom Augustus had adopted ; the people had risen in a body and greeted the action with frantic applause. Augustus publicly censured Tiberius and the people.‡ He did not attempt to check the public leniency towards adultery, as this indulgence enabled him to avoid scandals and excessive punishments ; § it was against his own will and under compulsion that he had proposed the *lex de adulteriis* in the first instance. He made, however, a vigorous effort to repair the senile decadence of the Senate by the energetic method of compulsory recruiting. He went through the list of knights, selecting young men under thirty-five years of age, made minute inquiries into their health, their fortune, their capacities and their uprightness, satisfied himself upon these points, collected evidence upon their mode of life, and then requested each one of them to confirm or to deny upon oath the results of his inquiry. Those who seemed to possess the necessary health, fortune, honesty and intelligence “were forced,” according to Dion,|| “to enter the Senate”; probably Augustus threatened to expel them from the equestrian order if they did not obey. Such were the measures taken by the man whom every historian has regarded as desirous of founding a monarchy. He had only to fold his arms and allow the Senate and aristocracy to fall into ruin, and he would

* Dion, liv. 25.

† *Ibid.* 26.

‡ *Ibid.* 27 ; Suetonius, *Aug.* lvi.

§ As we shall see, this is proved by his measures in the next year. See Dion, liv. 30.

|| Dion, liv. 26.

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have found himself and his family masters of Rome, of Italy and of the empire. He preferred, however, to exhaust every means in attempts to revive the vigour of the exhausted aristocracy and the energies of the feeble Senate—in other words, to strengthen those bodies which were the chief obstacle to any attempt at monarchy. Augustus, however, like his contemporaries, was unable to understand that the Roman world had lost her glorious Senate and her great aristocracy.

Plans for the
conquest of
Germania.

Finally, when Agrippa had returned he drew up in concert with him an ingenious and original plan of campaign, which was probably devised by Agrippa. He proposed to invade Germania by the Ems and the Weser. The chief obstacle to a Germanic invasion was the absence of roads, which necessitated subdivision of the army and involved the risk of surprises and ambushes. The great rivers offered so many lines of communication by which large armies could be peacefully brought to the very heart of the enemy's country, carrying with them their necessary supplies of arms and corn.* The only difficulty

* In Dion (liv. 32) there is a confused allusion to an earlier expedition of Drusus, which is said to have taken place in the year 12 upon the coast of the North Sea. Strabo (VII. i. 3) tells us that Drusus went up the Ems with his ships, but gives no date; the date must have been the year 12, as this is the only year in which historians speak of a naval expedition under Drusus. Historians are inclined to consider this expedition as the first part of the military plan, and the object in view is said to have been the subjugation of the Frisii and the populations on the coast. It is clear, however, that this object was far less important than the conquest of the interior of Germany, which was the chief object of the war. We cannot explain why for so small a result Drusus should have undergone the vast labour of digging a canal and constructing a large fleet, or why he should then have risked the dangers of navigation in the North Sea. These labours must have had a greater object, and we know from Tacitus that this object was that which I have pointed out. He tells us that Germanicus in A.D. 16 attempted to carry out his father's plan; *Ann.* ii. 8: *precatusque Drusum patrem, ut se eadem ausum . . . juvaret.* Tacitus has previously (ii. 5) explained the plan of Germanicus, which is precisely that plan which we attribute to Augustus and Agrippa: *Germanos . . . juvari silvis, paludibus, brevi aestate et præmatura hieme: suum militem haud perinde vulneribus, quam spatiis itinerum, damno armorum adfici . . . longum impedimentorum agmen, opportunum ad insidias, defensantibus iniquum. At si mare intretur, promptam ipsis possessionem et hostibus ignotam: simul bellum maturius incipi, legionisque et commeatus pariter vehi; integrum equitem equosque per ora et aloeos fluminum media in Germania fore.*

was to provide a sufficient number of ships. From the North Sea the two armies would enter the mouths of the two rivers, sail up-stream and reach the heart of the enemy's territory; they would then construct two camps upon the Ems and the Weser and begin their conquest of the interior, while another army was crossing the Rhine and marching to the Ems. The army which had followed the course of the Ems would make a gradual advance, and finally effect a junction with the forces coming from the Rhine and Weser; high-roads would be constructed, defended by forts and uniting the Rhine to the Ems, the Ems to the Weser, and perhaps the Weser to the Elbe. Thus an iron chain would be placed around barbarous Germany, which would bind her for ever to the power of Rome. It was a plan that avoided many of the risks to which armies lay open in unknown regions, though it involved the less dangerous but considerable peril of transporting the army in the light Roman ships over the stormy sea between the mouth of the Rhine and those of the Ems and Weser. To avoid this danger the idea was conceived of digging a canal between the Rhine and the Issel, so that the Roman fleet, by way of this canal and by the Issel, could enter the Zuyder Zee and reach the North Sea by the river which then joined this lake to the sea. Drusus was ordered to begin the construction of a fleet and of a canal with his legions.

CHAPTER VIII

“ HÆC EST ITALIA DIIS SACRA ”

The Italian middle class—Literature and jurisprudence—Augustus and the *jus respondendi*—Labeo—Cassius Severus and the new rhetoric—The Po valley—Reasons for its prosperity—Agricultural and industrial progress in the Po valley—Central Italy—Poverty and decadence of southern Italy—Augustus and the Italian middle class.

The Italian
middle class.

Thus it was that Augustus resolved to find a new employment for the Roman aristocracy as restored after the civil wars, and chose for this purpose a great diplomatic and military enterprise comparable with those which had been successfully attempted in earlier centuries. How many events depended upon this undertaking! For centuries the Roman aristocracy had gathered prestige, wealth and power by the cleverness of its diplomacy and by a series of successful wars which had subjugated, despoiled and destroyed many kingdoms and states; for centuries Rome had extended her domination over Italy and the Mediterranean basin. It remained to be seen whether she could make Gaul and Germania new means for the acquisition of power and glory, as she had already made Macedonia, Asia Minor, Syria and the other great provinces. She now stood before the decisive test. The aristocracy, which might henceforward represent the policy of expansion, had encountered the growing opposition of another class, which preferred internal development and the reorganisation of the conquered provinces by means of every force with which man may command mind and matter, by commerce and religion, manufacture and administration. The middle class of landowners, merchants and scholars which had grown up in Italy during

the last century were accomplishing from end to end of the peninsula the work begun at the time of the Gracchi. During the last fifteen years the numbers, the culture and the wealth of this class had so increased that the aristocracy could no longer guide the intellectual, moral and economic movement of its members. The highest forms of culture, poetry, history, and philosophy were still under aristocratic influence, in virtue of the patronage which the aristocracy exerted, following the examples of Augustus, Mæcenas and Agrippa. The young men belonging to families of moderate means who had studied during the revolution and wished to earn a living as writers or philosophers, no longer felt the scruples which Horace had combated in his epistles; on the contrary, an inconveniently large number of them aspired to secure the patronage of Augustus or some great personage; not only Augustus, but every rich lord who was able to protect and provide for scholars and writers, became a demigod in the eyes of the poor literary men, and was worshipped with almost religious admiration.* Augustus almost involuntarily was forced into the position of literary critic, as all who wished to gain his favour attempted to divine his taste and to write what would please him. He was anxious to create a national theatre, and accordingly every one strove to write tragedies or comedies and studied the dramatic art.†

But if lyric and dramatic poetry, which are of little use for purposes of government, remained in the hands of the nobility, two other branches of study, which were far more important instruments of domination, rhetoric and law, were partially monopolised by the learned members of the middle class, who even used them as weapons against the aristocracy. As we have seen, Augustus had revived the *lex Cincia*, which forbade the giving of legal assistance for a fee. This was one of the fundamental laws of the aristocratic system; while preventing the growth of a class of professional lawyers, it

Literature and
jurisprudence.

* Ovid, *Pont.* I. ix. 35 :

Nam tua non alio coluit penetraata ritu
Terrarum dominos quam colis ipse deos.

† Horace, *Ep.* II. i. 219 ff.

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made legal assistance a civic duty and the monopoly of the wealthy classes. For a long time, however, the number and the complexity of lawsuits increased with the complication of the laws and the development of social and economic life, while the number of noble families was decreasing and had less time to spare for legal business. To defend a case or to *respondere, cavere, scribere*—the three functions of a lawyer—it was not enough to know three or four legal rules, as in olden days; special preparation and long and difficult study were necessary. Many young men also followed the example of Ovid and abandoned law for more attractive work.* The Roman aristocracy, which was responsible for the government of the world, could no longer study, discuss and pass judgment upon all the lawsuits in Italy. Many people were therefore obliged to fall back upon professional lawyers who demanded pay and who were not driven out by the *lex Cincia*; in fact, any one with a lawsuit on his hands preferred the services of a hired advocate to a patron who would take no trouble.† There was, however, a further disadvantage of no less serious import. Augustus was so far above the other senators in reputation, wealth and prestige that an infinite number of clients applied to him for advice or to secure his services as advocate; all his veterans and colonists and all who had added his statue to their household gods believed themselves justified in applying to him for any legal business, however insignificant, and regarded him as a universal providence. These applications placed Augustus in an embarrassing position; he could not give assistance in every case, nor did he wish to monopolise what tradition had represented as one of the oldest privileges of the

* Horace (*Ep. I. iii. 23 ff.*) shows us that in his time law was merely one of the numerous studies to which the cultivated classes devoted themselves, and this fact explains the decay of the old aristocratic *patrocinium*:

Sen linguam causis acuis seu civica jura
Respondere paras seu condis amabile carmen. . . .

† For instance, that Torquatus to whom Horace addresses the fifth epistle of the First Book seems to have been one of those professional lawyers who had become so numerous, as is shown in any case by the attempt to enforce the *lex Cincia*.

nobility. Moreover, he was not sufficiently skilled in law to be able to answer all the questions that were put to him. To relieve himself of this burden he eventually commissioned a certain number of skilled lawyers, who were probably senators, to *respondere* or to give advice in his place to all who applied to him for legal help.*

The solution was ingenious, but it proved, as also did the *Labeo* increase of professional lawyers, that the aristocracy was allowing this powerful instrument of government to fall from its hands. No doubt the aristocracy still included within its ranks great

* Thus, in my opinion, must be interpreted the famous passage of the *Digest* (I. ii. 47): . . . *Primus Divus Augustus, ut maior iuris auctoritas haberetur, constituit ut ex auctoritate eius responderent*. This point of the *jus respondendi* is somewhat obscure. Pomponius does not seem to have taken full account of the historical modifications which this institution had undergone, and he represents it at the outset as too nearly akin to the model which he had before his eyes. I cannot think that the *jus respondendi* was permitted under the rule of Augustus. If this were so, we cannot explain why Caligula (Suetonius, *Caligula*, 34) should have arranged *ne qui respondere possent, præter sum*. Moreover, the study and practice of law was so ancient a tradition of the nobility that Augustus, who was anxious to secure their favour, would hardly have thought of abolishing it suddenly in a sphere where no great political difficulties remained, and in which the private interests of all classes were vested. Antistius Labeo *respondebat*, but we can hardly conceive that this rigid conservative, who would not even accept the consulship as a favour from Augustus, was one of those who practised law in the name of Augustus and with his authorisation, *ex auctoritate*. There is nothing to show that the *responsa* of the jurists who pleaded *ex auctoritate* from Augustus had any legal value; this was impossible, for it would have implied a revolution of the whole Roman legal system, and we see nothing of the kind during the age of Augustus. The reform of Augustus can only be explained as an expedient to which he had recourse in order to fulfil the legal duties which were incumbent upon him according to tradition, as upon every patrician, and which were especially difficult for a man so famous as himself who knew little of law. When a consultation was required he secured help, as the texts explain, and when he could not undertake the responsibility himself he passed it on to a friend. We must remember that all Roman nobles were supposed by the people to have full knowledge of the laws, and that if a certain number of them paid special attention to the study of jurisprudence, almost all of them were constantly consulted by the lower classes upon questions of law, and Augustus very frequently. I have assumed that the lawyers whom Augustus requested to take his place were senators, because Pomponius goes out of his way to observe that Masurius Sabinus was a knight, so that his position seems to have been unusual. Hence it is also possible that Augustus wished to help the senators to preserve their privileges by this expedient.

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lawyers and great orators. Among the lawyers was Marcus Antistius Labeo, the most learned and most profound member of this class; among the orators, besides Messala and Asinius Pollio, who was growing old, were Lucius Arruntius, Quintus Aterius, Paulus Fabius Maximus, who proposed to seek the consulship for the year 11, the two sons of Messala, who were following in their father's footsteps, and Tiberius himself. But if Labeo was the most upright, the wisest and the most respected lawyer of his time, he was not the most influential. He was too severe, too closely attached to his aristocratic principles, and declined to recognise the new tendencies of Augustus' legislation, which he regarded as too revolutionary; though requested by the *princeps*, he even refused to become a candidate for the consulship.* He preferred study and the theoretical knowledge of his profession to the exercise of it; he spent some six months of the year in the country,† where he collected that famous library which included more than four hundred works upon law and was to make his name famous.‡ Augustus, therefore, could not turn to him for advice upon legal questions, as at the time when he was preparing his social laws. His legal adviser was Ateius Capito, the son of a centurion of Sulla, less learned and less famous than Labeo, but anxious to adapt tradition to the needs of the time. Thus prestige and power were divided, as usually happens when an aristocracy grows weak, and while the aristocratic lawyer secured the prestige the middle-class lawyer secured the power. Yet more important was the fact that while the new strict application of

* Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 75) tells us that it was the opposition of Augustus that excluded Labeo from the consulship, but Pomponius (*Dig.* I. ii. 47) says *Labeo noluit, cum offerretur ei ab Augusto consulatus* (that is, the possibility of being a candidate). We have, however, already seen what trouble Augustus took to overcome the objections of the nobles to occupying vacant magistracies; thus the version of Pomponius seems to be the true one. When men of worth were so scarce Augustus would not oppose the candidature of such a man as Labeo. If Labeo did not accept, it was because he wished to devote himself to his studies. Here we have an example of the manner in which Tacitus systematically distorts facts, in order to represent the successive emperors in the worst light.

† Pomp. *Dig.* I. ii. 2, 47; Aul. Gell. XIII. x. 1.

‡ Pomp. *Dig.* I. ii. 2, 47.

the *lex Cincia* forced the nobility to defend the middle and poorer classes in the law courts without reward, it did not assure to the nobles what had formerly been the actual reward of gratuitous *patrocinium*, namely, the privilege of being accused and defended only by their peers. Impelled by the hatred and the animosity aroused by their discords, and also by the desire of reinforcing the power of the laws, the upper classes had unduly encouraged their members to accuse one another. On every side obscure and ambitious upstarts arose from the middle classes armed with the latest rhetorical methods, who used the principle that all were equal before the law as a weapon for the persecution of the nobility.

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The creator and master of this new rhetoric was a certain Cassius Severus, who was barely thirty years of age at this time.* Of low birth,† capable, eloquent and very ambitious, he considered that, though he could not gain money by defending the poor he might do so by accusing the rich, if he levied blackmail as the price of his accusation or gained that share of the condemned man's property which the law granted to an accuser.‡ Whenever a prosecutor was required in some scandalous society case against a rich man under the *lex de adulteriis* or any other law, one of those cases which the aristocratic orators declined to touch from friendship or from a sense of dignity, Cassius Severus was always ready to act. Whether the suit was serious or imaginary, whether founded upon truth or upon ridiculous gossip, he argued with the same violence and worked unblushingly upon the animosity and the prejudices of the middle classes against the aristocracy.§ Rome had been

Cassius Severus and the new rhetoric.

* Teuffel-Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1890, vol. i. p. 637. 11.

† Tacitus, *Ann.* iv. 21 : . . . *sordida originis*.

‡ *Ibid.* : *bonis exutus*. . . . Cassius had thus gained money, and as (Seneca, *Contr.* iii. *præf.* 5) he never acted in defence, but always brought accusations, his fortune must have been derived in the manner we have pointed out.

§ Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 72 : *primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis . . . tractavit, commotus Cassii Severi libidine, qua viros feminasque illustres procacibus scriptis diffamaverat*. As Cassius was an orator, these *libelli* can only be his speeches for the prosecution. Thus it is proved, and the fact will soon be confirmed by evidence, that his

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accustomed to the limpid stream of aristocratic eloquence, precise, clear and logical, though sometimes slightly cold, and the boiling, turbid, sulphurous stream of volcanic invective which Cassius poured forth was an innovation.* In place of documentary evidence Cassius used insults and jest, in place of argument wild inventions, unlikely slanders, descriptions, invective, realistic detail, and anything that might impress uncultured minds of no logical power.† The contrast may be realised by a comparison between the modern newspaper, with its careful writing and its reasoned efforts to discuss a question without abusing political opponents, and the low rag which flatters and works upon the basest passions of the lower classes, with its startling headlines and extravagant inventions, in the hope of gathering coppers from the gutter. None the less the aristocracy, though apparently in possession of the empire, the Senate and the magistracies, demonstrated its weakness by its inability to crush this raging upstart; he was universally feared and constantly imitated, and those whom he accused could hardly find a friend willing or able to oppose him. The degraded rhetoric of Cassius Severus met with only too ready a reception from the masses, who invariably suspected that the nobles diverted the scales of justice in their own direction, not by force of argument, but by their wealth and fame. The enfeebled aristocracy feared the suspicion of partiality to such an extent that many of their members preferred to sacrifice one of their number to popular resentment from time to time in order to avoid inconvenience. Admiration of the orator was made an excuse for toleration of the scoundrel. The fact was that every one was afraid of him, including Augustus himself, who was greatly distressed by this general suspicion, especially in cases which made a stir. If he refused his legal accusations were chiefly directed against *viros feminasque inlustros*. Thus we may explain the *immodicas inimicitias* to which Tacitus refers (iv. 21).

* Tacitus, *Dial.* 19: *antiquorum admiratores . . . Cassium Severum . . . primum affirmant flexisse ab ista vetere atque directa dicendi via.*

† Tacitus, *Dial.* 26: *plus virium habet quam sanguinis; primus enim, contempto ordine rerum, ommissa modestia ac pudore verborum, ipsis etiam quibus utitur armis incompositus et studio ferendi plerumque dejectus, non pugnat sed rixatur; Quint. X. l. 117: acerbitas mira et urbanitas et fervor; sed plus stomacho quam consilio dedit.*

help to his friends, he avoided a duty which was consecrated by tradition; if he gave that help, he seemed to throw undue weight by his presence upon the side of the party whom he defended. The interference of Augustus on behalf of either party to a suit was regarded as undue pressure by a public educated by Cassius Severus; it was a public, too, which demanded the condemnation of some great personage from time to time, even if he were innocent, as a kind of compensation for the numerous acquittals of the real culprits. Augustus was therefore obliged to evade such requests by a thousand devices.*

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The rhetoric of Cassius Severus is a further proof of the growing decadence of the Roman aristocracy. A powerful class would never have permitted persecution of this nature. The discords of the aristocracy, its idleness, its excessive devotion to literature, its desire for comfort, which it regarded as more important than its prestige, together with its numerical diminution, deprived it of all strength or courage to confront such men as Cassius in a town where it had once been the most powerful and glorious class. Hence it was most necessary for the aristocracy to recover its strength and reputation by some great diplomatic and military enterprise. Only so could it make head against the middle classes and their dangerous animosities, which were personified in Cassius. For a century the middle class had begged or stolen lands from the great landholders and from the State; they had plundered the temples and the treasures in every quarter of the empire, had waged many wars and revolutions, had made a great effort to improve their education and their commerce and to develop the agriculture and the manufactures of Italy; they were now beginning to gather the first-fruits of their risks and toils. The chief difficulty which had troubled the landowners, the politicians, and the economists of the previous generation, the difficulty which Varro had so carefully studied in his treatise upon agriculture, had been primarily an economic problem; how,

The valley of the Po.

* See Dion, iv. 4; Suetonius, *Aug.* 56. We shall refer later to the suit against Asprenas, in which the embarrassing position of Augustus becomes evident.

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in every town, could a middle class be supported upon holdings of moderate size, cultivated by settlers and slaves, and how, in the case of these holdings, was it possible to establish a more definite relation between the sale price of products and the cost of cultivation? By dint of careful work, and thanks to an unforeseen conjuncture of circumstances, this difficulty had been partially solved in almost every district, though in very different measure. With the exception of Liguria, which was still in a state of barbarism, the most prosperous part of the country was certainly northern Italy, the valley of the Po between the Apennines and the Adriatic. Two centuries had elapsed since the first great leader of the democratic party, Caius Flaminius, had forced the aristocracy to conquer this great plain, which extended to the foot of the Alps, was covered with oak forests, vast marshes and beautiful lakes, populated by Celtic village communities, furrowed in every direction by rapid streams rolling down sands of gold from the Alps, and traversed by a river which must have seemed of prodigious size to the Romans of that day, who were accustomed to the little watercourses of central Italy. Two centuries later, though the marshes had not been entirely drained * and though vast forests still covered part of the region,† the Celtic and Ligurian villages had almost disappeared; the only trace of the old inhabitants was to be found in their place-names, and the valley from end to end was covered with miniature Romes, each containing a germ of Latin civilisation. War, revolution, the founding of colonies and successive grants of Latin civic rights—in short, a far-sighted policy—had enabled Rome to accomplish throughout this valley a marvellous change of language, customs, ideas and institutions. By degrees, under the growing influence of Rome, rich families had adopted Latin names and customs, learnt the Latin language, and aspired to seats in the little municipal Senate or to town offices, and hoped to see one of their number *quæstor*, *ædile*, *duumvir* or *quatuorvir* of their town.

* Strabo, V. 1. 5: *ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ἡ χώρα ποταμοῖς πληθύνει καὶ ἔλαισι, μάλιστα δ' ἡ τῶν Ἑνέτων.*

† Strabo, V. 1. 12: *αἱ ὕλαι τοσαύτην ἔχουσι βάλανον ὥστ' ἐκ τῶν ἐντεῦθεν ἰσφορβίαν ἡ Ρώμη τρέφει τὸ πλείον.*

The Romanisation of the valley of the Po had thus been successfully accomplished, and the *lex Pompeia* of 89 and Cæsar's great municipal law had proved most successful in northern Italy; the reason, however, was that for a century the economic development of the country had called into being a middle class of landholders, sufficiently wealthy and numerous and with sufficient energy and ambition to carry on the municipal institutions imported by Rome. For the last fifteen years the progress of this middle class had been greatly accelerated, for every factor necessary to material prosperity was now to be found in the great valley. Not only was the district fertile, but it lent itself to every kind of cultivation; in the plain there were rich pasturages, vast forests and magnificent corn-fields; on the hill-sides and the spurs of the Alps the vine and fruit-trees could be cultivated.* The district was also traversed by navigable streams, the Po and its tributaries, by which it could communicate with the sea—that is to say, with the outside world—an important consideration in an age when transport by land was most expensive and extremely slow.† The chief danger of the ancient world, that of famine, could not be felt in this quarter, as every harvest produced an abundant supply of that somewhat inferior cereal, the millet, the maize of antiquity; this proved sufficient to feed a comparatively dense population § of free peasants and colonists who cultivated their little holdings or rented lands from larger proprietors.|| This close population possessed all the qualities of the Celts—in other words, of the one race in Europe characterised by the greatest vitality and resourcefulness, good warriors, enterprising, hard-working, ingenious and with great capacity for manufacture. Thus while Cæsar and the triumvirs had drawn soldiers for the Gallic and the civil wars from the Latinised Celts in

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Reasons for
the prosperity
of the Po
valley.

* Strabo, V. l. 4.

† *Ibid.* l. 5; Pliny, H. N. III. xxi. 1.

‡ Strabo, V. l. 12.

§ *Ibid.*: ἡ τ' εὐανδρία.

|| *Colonus* signifies at this time a free peasant, one who farms the lands of a richer holder in return for a *pensio*. Columella states the fact with his usual precision (l. 7), by comparing the *colonus* with the *servus*: *hi* [the farmers] *vel coloni, vel servi sunt soluti aut vinciti. Comiter agat* [the landholder] *cum colonis et avarius opus exigit quam*

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the Po valley, there was no lack of labour for agriculture and manufacture, for the clearing and cultivation of land, for the introduction of new or the development of old arts.

The Po valley not devoid of capital.

There was, moreover, a certain abundance of capital. Some part of the precious metals which had been plundered from every region in the empire during the civil wars had been carried to the valley of the Po by a number of Cisalpine soldiers, who had returned home with their booty, and by veterans from other countries to whom land in the Po district had been given. At this time, twenty years after the battle of Actium, this capital had come into circulation for the most part, stimulated agriculture, manufacture and commerce throughout the valley, and sent up the price of all products. It was probably during one of his journeys in those years that Augustus was invited to dinner at Bologna by one of Antony's veterans who had served in the Armenian campaign. During the meal they recalled memories of those troubled years, and Augustus happened to ask the old soldier what truth there was in a certain story concerning the pillage of a temple of the goddess Anaitis during that war, when the soldier who first touched the golden statue of the goddess had been instantly struck blind. The veteran smiled; he was himself the man who had performed

pensionas. See on the subject of the *pensio coloni*, *Digest*, XIX. ii. 54 pr.; and on the subject of the *lex locationis* between the *colonus* and the *dominus*, the *Digest*, XIX. iii. 61. See also the testamentary formulæ to be found in the *Digest*, XXXIII. vii. 20 pr.; these show that the *coloni* were free, as, although *servi* could be bequeathed, *coloni* could not, but only their *reliqua*—that is to say, their debts to their landlords. If this definition of the *colonus* be taken in connection with two letters of Pliny the younger (iii. 19 and ix. 37), we see that in the second century the great estates of northern Italy were hired to *coloni*, who paid their rent sometimes in money and sometimes in kind. In Letter ix. 37 Pliny says that he wishes to abandon the first mode of tenancy and to adopt the second. It is true that this document belongs to the first half of the second century, but I think it may be used to some extent to decide what was in progress at the time of which we are treating. From the days of Cæsar there must have been a great number of free peasants in Cisalpine Gaul. Otherwise we cannot understand why it should have become the most important district for military recruiting. In northern Italy there were only little towns, by no means numerous, so that Rome must have recruited her soldiers from the country. If the towns had increased during the last thirty years, the general position does not seem to have undergone any great change at the date when Strabo

this audacious act of sacrilege, and he went on to say that Augustus was now in the act of eating the goddess' leg. The soldier had broken a leg of pure gold from the statue, had brought it to Italy, sold it, and bought a house at Bologna, probably also land and slaves, in order to live upon the income of this little holding.* Many another veteran must have come back from the eastern wars, if not with so divine a leg, at any rate with plundered gold, which had been gradually expended for the most part in the valley of the Po. Even after the conclusion of the civil wars gold had flowed into this happy valley by other channels. The wars of Augustus in or beyond the Alps during preceding years and the expedition which he was now preparing against Germany obliged him to spend in the Po valley a large part of the money painfully extorted from the whole of the empire. The construction of the high-roads which were to cross the Alps, the passage of the legions and their long stay in the Po valley, the large provision made for war, had stimulated trade and commerce in the towns and countrysides of Cisalpine Gaul. Thus the war waged upon its frontiers became for the Po valley an important source of wealth. Moreover, a large number of prisoners were made during these wars, and the easiest and best market for slaves

wrote. The wars in Gaul, in the Alps and in Germany must have brought many slaves to the valley of the Po—as, indeed, is proved by inscriptions—but these slaves must have been employed rather in the towns than in the country, and their number was restricted in comparison with the population. When Strabo (V. i. 12) says that Cisalpine Gaul had large towns and a close population he is referring especially to the country population. The extended cultivation of cereals, and especially the use of the millet as a food, are further proof of the fact. Moreover, the existence of a free population of *coloni* or agriculturists helps us to explain that rapid progress of agriculture in the valley of the Po of which Strabo speaks, and which is proved to us by numerous signs of the growth of wealth during the first century. Otherwise we should have to admit that Cisalpine Gaul bought a large number of slaves at that time, which is very unlikely, considering the want of capital prevailing throughout Italy, which the whole policy of Augustus was intended to relieve. We have reached an age when landed property and work are becoming valuable and when capital is accumulated, and not an age when large capital sums are in existence and ready for employment. Hence the regions which grew wealthy were those in which a large number of workmen were to be found.

* Pliny, XXXIII. xxiv. 1.

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could be found in the Po valley, which was hard by the battle-fields. Finally this valley, situated between central Italy, Gaul and the Danube provinces, could easily export its productions to the barbaric provinces of Europe and to Rome.

Agricultural
and industrial
progress in
the Po valley.

All the conditions favourable to rapid economic development thus co-existed in that country—fertility of the soil, excellent facilities for intercommunication, abundant capital, and a numerous, energetic and intelligent population. The middle class thus improved agriculture, developed old methods by introducing new systems, and extended trade. The woollen fabrics most highly esteemed in Italy were at that time those of Miletus, Apulia and Calabria, but the landowners in Cisalpine Gaul by crossing and improving the breed of sheep were preparing to rival the wools of Altinum, the white wool of Parma and Modena, and the black wool of Pollentia.* In the recently conquered districts of the Alps, in the Ligurian Apennines and in the neighbourhood of Ceva cheeses were now made for exportation to Rome.† Large fruit orchards were everywhere planted with the trees imported from the east during the last ten years, such as the cherry-tree of Lucullus,‡ and the first attempt to acclimatise the peach-tree, which Antony's veterans doubtless brought from Armenia, seems to have been made in the valley of the Po.§ Every farmer in Cisalpine Gaul was busy fattening pigs with which to supply Rome and making wine to intoxicate the barbarians in the Danube districts. As Roman wealth increased so also did the demand for pork, which was the staple food of the lower classes in the ancient world, and large quantities were imported from the Po valley, where vast herds could be fed in the splendid oak forests. Thus the growing wealth of Rome exerted a beneficial effect in this direction.|| In the valley of the Po, again, the vintage was most abundant, the richest wine merchants were to be

* Columella, vii. 2: *Generis aximii milesias, calabras, apulasque nostri existimabant, earumque optimas tarentinas. Nunc gallica pretiosiores habentur; &c.* See Strabo, V. i. 12.

† Pliny, XI. xcvi. 1.

‡ Pliny, xv. 30.

§ We may conjecture this from the fact that in Pliny's time there was a kind of peach known as *gallica* (Pliny, H. N. XV. xi. 1).

|| Strabo, V. i. 12.

found, and the size of the casks became proverbial.* The wine was certainly of poor quality, but it was sold to the Danube barbarians, whose tastes were not specially refined. The wine casks were sent down the Po in boats and crossed the Adriatic, disembarking at Aquileia; thence they were taken on carts to Nauportus, and reached the Danube by way of the Save.† At the same time certain wines from northern Italy began to find appreciation among the rich Romans and to take their place among the famous wines of Greece and southern Italy. Livia, for instance, would drink nothing but the wine of Istria.‡ A further source of wealth to Cisalpine Gaul was its timber, for which there was an increasing demand, stimulated by the growth of navigation and of the towns. Pines were felled in the mountains and sent down the tributaries of the Po; they then reached Ravenna by way of the Po and the *fossa Augusta*, the canal which Augustus seems to have constructed; from Ravenna they were exported in all directions, even to Rome.§ The olive enriched certain countries, such as Istria.|| Flax was also cultivated with great advantage.¶ Such old industries as the ironworks at Como** and the wool-spinning of Padua †† were revived and reorganised; customers were found even at Rome, where Padua sent many hangings and cloaks.‡‡ Other manufactures, such as that of pottery, which was begun in this region, made rapid progress. A manufactory seems to have been set up at Polesino by the Atimetes, whose lamps were sold even in Pompeii and Herculaneum; §§ at Asi

* Strabo, V. l. 12.

† See Strabo, V. l. 8, and IV. vi. 10. The first reference tells us that the Illyrians living on the Danube came to Aquileia to buy oil and wine, and the second gives us the route by which merchandise from Aquileia reached the Danube. It is therefore probable that much of the wine sold at Aquileia to the Illyrians came from the Po valley, where the vintage was very extensive, as we are informed by Strabo (V. l. 12).

‡ Pliny, N. H. XIV. viii. 1. See also III. xxii. 2.

§ Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, Berlin, vol. i. (1883), p. 170; vol. ii. (1902), p. 252.

|| Pliny, XV. lii. 2.

¶ Pliny, XIX. i. 9.

** Pliny, XXXIV. xl. 3.

†† Strabo, V. i. 7.

‡‡ Strabo, V. i. 12.

§§ Forcella, *Le Industrie e il Commercio a Milano sotto i Romani*, Milan, 1901, p. 26.

13 B.C. and at Pollentia * cups were manufactured which became famous; the factory of Acon, which seems to have been in the valley of the Po, exported to Transalpine Gaul and the Danube provinces its graceful grey and yellow pottery; † a factory of Cnæus Ateius found customers in Gallia Narbonensis and in Transalpine Gaul; but it is not certain that this latter factory was situated in Cisalpine Gaul. ‡ Finally the towns upon the Via Emilia, Turin, where the Po becomes navigable, and Licinum, the modern Pavia, derived an increasing profit from commercial exchange. Aquileia was especially flourishing, as it was the point of departure for all trade connections with the Danube regions. §

Central Italy. These industries and manufactures did not at first require an excessive amount of capital, and the large profits which they produced greatly increased the prosperity of the middle classes throughout Cisalpine Gaul. In central Italy, on the other hand, the land was less fertile and more broken, the rivers were smaller and less navigable, while the population was more scattered and less industrious; the danger of famine was greater, as also was the distance from the great barbaric provinces. The sole advantage of central Italy was its neighbourhood to the metropolis. In that quarter there were more absentee landlords, and the middle class was less prosperous and less numerous. Picenum, which was too isolated || to become prosperous, lived chiefly upon the products of its fertile territory; ¶ Etruria drew a considerable profit from its timber ** and from the famous iron mines in the island of Elba; †† at Arezzo there were pottery works which had been established for several centuries: the conquest of Gaul had brought them new customers, as the rich Gauls wished to follow the Roman fashion even in their choice of household utensils. ‡‡ The marble quarries in the mountains above Luni, the modern Carrara,

* Pliny, XXXV. xlvi. 3.

† Déchelette, *Les Vases céramiques ornés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1904, vol. i. p. 16.

‡ *Ibid.* pp. 31-41.

§ Strabo, IV. vi. 18.

|| See Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, Berlin, 1902, vol. ii. p. 411.

¶ Strabo, V. iv. 2.

** Strabo, V. ii. 5.

†† Strabo, V. ii. 6.

‡‡ Déchelette, *Les Vases céramiques ornés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1904, vol. i. p. 10 ff.

were reopened; Rome and the other Italian towns required marble for decorations, and that of Luni could rival the Greek marble in purity and beauty, while the task of transportation was much easier.* 13 B.C.

However, towards the south of Italy great forests, wide pasturages and large flocks, belonging to a small number of wealthy proprietors, made the population more scattered, the towns less prosperous, so that a middle class was hardly able to make a livelihood in those districts. Campania and the surrounding districts formed a wonderful oasis, rich in wine and oil, with a vigorous commercial and manufacturing life. Iron was largely worked at Puteoli.† There also the two most famous wines of Italy, the Cæcuban and Falernian, grew mellow in the amphoræ; there also the rich Romans built their most sumptuous villas; the great bay, with the flourishing towns of Pompeii, Herculaneum, Naples and Puteoli, welcomed the merchant ships from Egypt and the east. Merchants from every country, Syrians, Egyptians, Greeks and Latins, gathered wealth from the commerce between Rome and the east, and especially with Egypt ‡ and Spain; § they constructed fine houses in the Alexandrian style, of which specimens have been found at Pompeii; south of Campania other little oases were to be found—towns surrounded with olive-gardens and vineyards, such as Venafrum || and Venusia, ¶ and such towns as Brundisium, which possessed some long-standing or commercial resources.** Everywhere else, to right and left of the Appian Way, the one frequented high-road, there was nothing but vast estates almost deserted and culti-

The poverty and decadence of southern Italy.

* Strabo, V. ii. 5. Nissen (*Italische Landeskunde*, Berlin, 1902, vol. ii. p. 285) provides good arguments to show that the Carrara marble became popular about this time, and was largely used at first in Italy and throughout the empire.

† Diodorus, v. 13.

‡ See Suetonius, *Aug.* 98; Strabo, XVII. i. 7.

§ Strabo, III. ii. 6.

|| Pliny, XVII. iv. 31. As regards the prosperity of Venafrum, which was due to the cultivation of the olive, see Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, Berlin, 1902, vol. ii. p. 796 ff.

¶ Strabo, VI. i. 3.

** Pliny, IX. liv. 169, XXXII. vi. 61, XXXIII. lx. 120, XXXIV. xvii. 160.

13 B.C. vated by a few slaves ; great solitary woods which could not be worked for want of roads ; abandoned stretches of the *ager publicus* which no one was willing to take up ; towns once flourishing and now half deserted.* Less credulous than modern Italians, the ancient inhabitants of southern Italy cherished none of those illusions which Italians of the twentieth century are pleased to entertain, and which Fortunato has vainly attempted to dispel ; they had realised that while the valley of the Po was a magnificent district, southern Italy was of little value, though it was not yet ravaged by the terrible scourge of malaria. Lying beyond the great lines of communication, depopulated by the wars of the previous centuries, poverty-stricken and incapable of accumulating new wealth, barren, with the exception of a few districts, watered by few and insignificant rivers, broken by abrupt mountain chains, southern Italy had never recovered from the terrible devastation of earlier centuries. Now, even as at the outset of Roman history, the country chiefly relied, like modern Texas and the less civilised districts of the United States, upon great flocks of sheep and cattle, which wandered unsheltered, driven by stout slaves from the mountain to the plain in winter and from the plain to the mountain in the summer. The Roman aristocracy and the few wealthy landowners of the locality continued this system of cattle-breeding. The skins and the wool were doubtless sold in the rich towns of Campania and at Rome, but whatever the profits of the owners, the system in no way remedied the sterility, the poverty and the depopulation of southern Italy.

The Italian
middle class
and Augustus.

Such was the appearance of Italy in the uncertain light of a new age as seen through the last clouds left by the great tempest of the republican epoch, under the first rays of the *pax Romana*. From the Alps to the Ionian Sea Italy was one whole, but its component parts were strangely disproportionate when the beauty and prosperity of the north were compared with the barren apathy of the south. Lying between central Italy and the vast Transalpine provinces, where a second Rome was to rise, the valley of the Po was the country of the future. Here

* Strabo, V. iv. 11, VI. i. 2.

were to be found the best and the most energetic of the middle class, almost confronting the nobility, the last remnants of which were still at Rome, though their property had been scattered throughout the empire,* while their variety of tastes and the growing multiplicity of their ideas destroyed that caste feeling and sense of coherence which had formerly been their dominant characteristic. For this reason, again, the enterprise in Germany to which Augustus invited the nobility might prove extremely important. A striking success in this war might revive the prestige of the aristocracy, the power of which seemed to be declining, while failure and fresh discord would merely increase the power of the middle classes—in other words, the power of Augustus and of his family. The general veneration of Italy for the person of Augustus was not merely the expression of gratitude for the services he had performed; it implied that the middle class, devoted to its own material interests and more amenable to the influence of slaves and oriental freedmen by reason of its ignorance, was rapidly forgetting the existence of a Senate and the intangible majesty of the republican government, and was looking only to the *princeps* as the personification of the State. Monarchical tendencies grew in this environment by the force of circumstances and by a kind of spontaneous generation; no attempt was made to sow the seed, while the growth was even repugnant to the man who could have reaped its fruits. This new society, ignorant and anxious for gain, cared little if the Senate

* We have but little accurate information concerning the fortunes of the Roman nobility at this time. Perhaps the only passage is that of Ovid, who refers to the property of his friend, Sextus Pompeius, *Pont.* IV. xv. 15 ff. :

Quam tua Trinacria est, regnataque terra Philippo

Quam domus Augusto continuata foro;

Quam tua, rus oculis domini, Campania, gratum. . . .

Sextus, therefore, had a house at Rome, a villa in Campania, lands in Sicily and Macedonia. It is probable that the aristocracy held much property in the provinces, especially in the east; indeed, as agrarian laws and distribution of lands in Italy made the acquisition of property within the country more difficult and the prospects of retaining it more uncertain, the aristocracy must have sought to acquire lands abroad. During the upheaval of the last century it would have been difficult, at any rate for influential families, to acquire fine estates in the provinces at a moderate price.

13 B C

at Rome gradually disappeared or the aristocracy died out, or if one man and one family began in consequence to monopolise a power far greater than the republic had ever wielded. The middle class were inclined to credit this man with the responsibility for every piece of good fortune that happened to it, provided only that peace and order were not disturbed, that wine, oil and wool could be sold at an annual profit, and that the citizens of the little towns could parade themselves in their local Senates, secure municipal office and become powerful in their townships. As the wealth of this new class increased the republican, the military and traditionalist ideals died away. When the last remnants of the nobility had lost their energy and their reputation Italy would see the Capitol in the hands of Augustus and his family. Though Augustus welcomed and was bound to encourage the progress of this class, he felt that it was no less his duty to revive the old dying ideals. Thus was produced an antagonism, inevitable and insoluble, the terrible consequences of which were soon to be experienced by his government, his family and himself.

CHAPTER IX

THE ALTAR OF AUGUSTUS AND OF ROME

Preparations for the conquest of Germania—The post of *pontifex maximus* becomes vacant—Division of the civil and military power—Augustus as *pontifex maximus*—The death of Agrippa—The first religious reforms of Augustus—The plan for the conquest of Germania—Drusus in the North Sea—Drusus at the mouth of the Weser—Herod at Rome—The widowhood of Julia—Julia and the marriage law—The method of invading Germania—The marriage of Julia and Tiberius—Augustus as *praeceptor morum et legum*—A new reform of the Senate—The Thracian insurrection—The *cura aquarum*—The march of Drusus to the Weser—The foundation of Aliso—Fresh disasters in Pannonia—The altar of Augustus and of Rome.

AUGUSTUS had no difficulty in securing from the Senate for Agrippa and for himself the prolongation of the presidential power for a further term of five years,* and he vigorously continued his preparations for war. We do not know whether he relied upon the Gallic revenues or whether he also obtained a vote from the Senate.† In any case a vote of money could only be asked from the Senate under pretext of providing for

Preparations
for the Germanic
campaign.

* Dion (liv. 28) speaks only of Agrippa, but it is obvious that the same decision was taken in the case of Augustus.

† I will point out here, once for all, that the history of the German campaigns is very obscure. We are forced to rely upon the few and fragmentary pieces of information to be gathered from Dion, Tacitus, Orosius, Florus and Pliny, which might be collected in a few pages. My narrative is thus largely conjectural, and is nothing more than hypothesis based rather upon probability than upon documentary evidence, the scarcity of which leaves the field clear for the wildest conjectures. The political and constitutional history of these wars is also most obscure. Augustus cannot have planned and carried out so great an enterprise without informing the Senate and the public, but when this information was given we do not know.

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the defence of Gaul,* for it seems unlikely that Augustus should have risked arousing the suspicions of the Germans by a full explanation of his plan. However, he not only devoted attention to the preparation of arms, money and men, but as the success of his enterprise depended partially upon the fidelity of the Gallic aristocracy, he proposed to bind that aristocracy to himself by the strongest possible moral tie before starting for Germania. He resolved to transplant the cult of Rome and of Augustus from Asia Minor to Gaul and to gather annual diets at the temple where the representatives of the sixty Gallic *civitates* should appear in full state; he also proposed to organise, as in Asia, a body of priests chosen from the Gallic nobility of the diet, who should form a kind of inner aristocratic circle. In Asia Minor this cult had proved useful within limits; it was a popular symbol of the unity of the empire, and an ideal bond uniting different towns together and uniting the whole province to Rome. It might be possible to organise this new cult in Gaul, where the old Druid worship was disappearing. As Italy had tolerated this cult in Asia Minor, and was beginning itself to express its admiration for Augustus under religious symbolism, it would readily consent to see an altar to Rome and to Augustus raised, for instance, at Lyons. Moreover, it was likely that Gaul would welcome the new cult, especially if the German enterprise proved successful. Cæsar's sword had made great breaches in the wall of Celtic tradition, which afforded a passage not only to foreign merchandise, foreign manners and languages, but also to foreign gods; the old Gallic divinities were now confused with the Greek, Latin and eastern deities, to which they had some vague resemblance, and the breath of a new spirit was penetrating Gaul in every direction.

The pontifex
maximus.

However, about the end of the year 13 and the beginning of the year 12, while Augustus was meditating these projects,

* Dion (liv. 32) tells us that the conquest of Germania was undertaken for the defence of Gaul. Assuming that Gaul would be re-established by the conquest of Germania, it seems somewhat rash to assert that in the year 12 B.C., when Drusus began the campaign, he was impelled by the urgent necessity of repulsing the Germanic invasion and anticipating the Gallic revolt.

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two events occurred : a great revolt broke out in Pannonia,* and the position of *pontifex maximus*, the supreme religious office in the republic, was left vacant by the death of Lepidus, the former triumvir, who had held it for thirty-two years.† Whether the Pannonian revolt was as serious as it was represented to be we cannot say. Possibly it was purposely exaggerated to justify in a manner intelligible to every one a new and important constitutional reform which Augustus was forced to introduce for reasons even more serious. As soon as the death of Lepidus was known, every one agreed to regard Augustus as his successor, and the traditionalist party, who regarded religious influence as the secret of moral reform, wished to make the election of Augustus the occasion of a great popular demonstration in favour of the ideas which Virgil had expressed in the *Aeneid*, and against the moral laxity, the impiety and the profligacy of the young generation, which the laws of the year 18 had proved powerless to restrain.‡ A *pontifex maximus*, worthy of his office, might be able to base upon the natural foundation of religion that moral reform which had hitherto been vainly attempted. These sudden religious preoccupations proved, however, thoroughly embarrassing to Augustus at the moment when he was busy with preparations for his great expedition against Germania. Augustus was no less careful at this time than before to avoid displeasing the little clique of irreconcilable conservatives who demanded a reform of religion and of morals, but it was no easy task to deal with these difficult questions of domestic policy and with plans for foreign conquest at the same time. On the other hand, Augustus was well aware that he was better fitted to be *pontifex maximus* in place of Lepidus than to be commander-in-chief of the Germanic campaign. Apparently for all these reasons, he proposed to induce the Senate to rearrange the conditions of the double presidency which he held with Agrippa,

* Dion, liv. 28.

† *Ibid.* 27.

‡ The great enthusiasm for this election, to which reference is made in the *Monumentum Ancyranum*, ii. 26 ff. (Lat.), iv. 3-4 (Gr.), can only have been due to the efforts of the traditionalist party, who wished to make a demonstration ; the zeal of the electors can hardly have been aroused, seeing there was but one candidate.

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and to make a separation between the civil and military power, which had hitherto been held conjointly by the two presidents. The Pannonian revolt provided a pretext, though it was too ordinary an event to justify so serious an innovation. All the generals who held commands outside Italy were placed under the orders of Agrippa, as also were all the legions, even those in the provinces of Augustus. The command of the armies was thus withdrawn from the hands of the proconsuls and the proprætors, and the supreme military authority, which had formerly belonged to the Senate, now came into the power of one man.* As Agrippa thus held full authority over all the legions, he would be able to begin an enterprise the effects of which could not easily be foreseen in the other provinces of Europe, which were disturbed and almost in revolt; meanwhile Augustus would be able to continue the much-desired religious reformation at Rome.

The division of the military from the civil power.

Thus it appears that our interpretation of Dion's text is not mistaken—that while the supreme magistracy preserved its outward form, its meaning was once more changed. Henceforward the State was no longer guided by two colleagues of equal power, but by a priest and a soldier who had divided the supreme authority between them. The Germanic expedition, intended to revive the coherence of the aristocratic constitution, necessitated these expedients, repugnant as they were to the spirit of the constitution, merely because the nobility was of itself impotent to carry the expedition to a successful conclusion. It was an insoluble contradiction. In any case Agrippa, who had started for Pannonia in winter, returned in February; possibly, as was asserted, the news of his departure had struck terror into the rebels,† or he was anxious to reach Gaul by the spring to take up the com-

* Dion, liv. 28: . . . μείζον αὐτῷ [that is to say, to Agrippa] τῶν ἐκασταγούθι ἕξω τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀρχόντων ἰσχυροῦ ἐπιτρέψας. . . . I am inclined to think that the phrase means that Agrippa was made commander-in-chief, with power independent of the proconsular authority, and that consequently the legions in the provinces of Augustus came under his command. It does not seem probable that he should be considered as the *legatus* of Augustus when in this position; he remained the colleague of Augustus, with equal authority.

† Dion, liv. 28.

mand of the legions on the Rhine. While he was returning to Rome Augustus was appointed *pontifex maximus* on March 6.* Though Augustus was the only candidate, a very considerable number of electors came in from every part of Italy, and the popular demonstration organised by the traditionalist party proved entirely successful. In the wealthy, elegant and cultured society of Rome the new desire for pleasure and the taste for an easy life spread more and more rapidly. On the other hand, the spirit of devotion and of tradition was better preserved in the middle classes. Though these classes by no means carefully observed the severe precepts of the puritan morality, they could not refuse to participate in a formal demonstration in favour of the religion which was always officially considered as the eternal source of peace and public prosperity.

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Thirteen days later, on March 19, began the *Quinquatria*,^{The death of Agrippa.} the festival of Minerva, which was then the festival of the lowest section of the intellectual world and of the higher-class artisans, the festival of young schoolboys and their masters, of weavers, shoemakers, jewellers, sculptors and fullers.† To please these lower classes and to give more dignity and importance to this festival, which might be called an elementary school holiday, when the boys came to pray Minerva for the power of assiduous study, the new *pontifex maximus* wished to offer the people entertainments in the name of his two adopted sons, Caius and Lucius, who were beginning their studies; he even provided gladiatorial games, which were not precisely in harmony with the worship of the goddess of intellect, who had a hatred of blood.‡ The workmen of Rome, while reverencing Minerva as their patroness, had probably little taste for

* Several historians have erroneously supposed that the passage in Ovid (*Fasti*, iii. 415 ff.) contains a reference to Julius Caesar. The two lines,

Cæsaris innumeris, quo maluit ille mereri,
Accessit titulis pontificalis honor,

certainly refer to Cæsar Augustus, and of him alone can it be said that he had *innumeri honores*. See C. L. L. I. pp. 304 and 314.

† Ovid, *Fasti*, iii. 809 ff.

‡ Dion, liv. 28; Mon. Anc. iv. 32.

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nobler sports. But in the midst of these festivals, which lasted for five days, Augustus suddenly received the news that Agrippa had fallen seriously ill in Campania during his journey. He abandoned the festivals and immediately set out for Campania, but he arrived too late. Agrippa had died; * at the age of fifty years, in the midst of his wealth, his power and his glory, he thus prematurely concluded the career he had begun thirty-two years before upon the death of Cæsar, when he had joined the side of Octavianus without hesitation. Agrippa had been one of the few who retained their confidence in the star of the Julii at the moment of this catastrophe, and events had shown the justice of his choice. On this occasion at least fortune had rewarded merit. Agrippa was a representative of the true Roman character, educated beyond its primitive roughness, and not yet corrupted by the degeneration of intellectual pleasures, vices and wealth. To the fine qualities of his race he had been able to add the attractions of culture; gifted with an intellect both bold and agile, practical and eager to learn, proud but at the same time simple, strong, sure and faithful, he had been both a general and an admiral, an architect, a geographer, a writer, a collector of works of art and an administrator of public departments; for thirty-two years, without a moment's relaxation, his varied and inexhaustible talents had been placed at the service of his party during the civil wars, and afterwards devoted to the republic and its people. At his early death, besides the two sons adopted by Augustus, he left two little girls, while Julia was with child; he had so far obeyed the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* promulgated by his father-in-law. To Augustus he left part of his vast fortune, and to the people his gardens in Rome and the baths, with large estates to endow them.† He also left a yet more splendid memorial in his *Commentarii*, a monumental collection of geographical and statistical information concerning all the provinces; on the basis of this work he had begun to draw up a great map of the empire for public use. Destiny had for ever attached his name to the façade of the Pantheon, in the centre of the world, and had placed it above the generations who

* Dion, liv. 28.

† *Ibid.* 29.

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were to pass before this imperishable monument, but destiny had been unwilling to make him Cæsar's equal by granting him time for the conquest of Germania. 12 B.C.

Augustus duly brought back to Rome the ashes of his friend and gave them solemn burial; he made a great speech in his honour and distributed money to the people in his name.* He was then obliged to take upon himself the burden of the presidency, which for the last five years he had shared with Agrippa, both in his own interest and in that of the republic. There was no citizen at Rome as yet who could take Agrippa's place. Thus Augustus was now for the first time supreme head of the State, of the army and of religion. For the first time since his rise to power the supreme government was concentrated in his person, though against his will, by an unfortunate disaster, which no one deplored more than himself. Augustus had been extremely fortunate in meeting Agrippa at the outset of his long career, and it was an unparalleled disaster thus suddenly to lose him when his task was but half completed. Agrippa's death completely changed his plans for the conquest of Germania, and the union of the supreme power in his person paralysed national action. The fleet was ready, the canal had been dug and all preparations made, but Augustus at the age of fifty-two would not venture to act as commander-in-chief of so great a war, seeing that in his youth he had been incapable of conducting wars of no importance. Nor could he venture to depart for the conquest of Germania while the bigots who had made him *pontifex maximus* with such pomp and splendour were chafing to see him begin the task of religious reform. Thus burdened with the government both of heaven and earth, with the affairs of gods as well as of men, Augustus prepared to do his best. He sent Tiberius to Pannonia; he left Rome and made his way to Aquileia, in the valley of the Po, to superintend the suppression of the revolt in person; † for some time

Augustus' first religious reforms.

* Dion, liv. 28.

† It seems to me that Schürer (*Geschichte der Jüd. Volkes*, vol. I. Leipzig, 1890, p. 302) is right in his affirmation that the meeting in Aquileia between Herod and Agrippa of which Josephus speaks (A. J. XVI. v. 1) must have taken place in the year 12 B.C., in which the Olympic games were celebrated. This is consequently the year to which

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he seems to have been unwilling to come to any decision on the subject of Germania, and perhaps thought of postponing the enterprise; * he also began to make certain religious reforms in the course of his journey. He first withdrew from circulation the false Sibylline oracles and prophetic books which clever impostors had issued during the revolution; these works of fiction disturbed men's minds, and therefore the course of politics. He ordered all who possessed collections of oracles to bring them to the prætor before a certain date; all the prophecies were burnt, and two thousand Sibylline oracles were selected which were considered to be authentic; these were then placed in two gilded cupboards in the temple of Apollo on the Palatine, and the remaining oracles were burnt.† Augustus also devoted some time to the reorganisation of the most aristocratic and also of the most popular cult in Rome, that of Vesta and of the *Lares compitales*, little gods who protected every quarter of the city, to whose statues the lower classes were often accustomed to add a statuette of Augustus himself. He increased the privileges and the honours of the Vestal Virgins, in order to gather recruits for their numbers; ‡ he also arranged two ceremonies, one in summer and the other in winter, for the cult of the *Lares compitales*.§

Plans for the
Germanic
campaign.

If, however, Augustus had hesitated for a moment with regard to the Germanic campaign, the course of affairs in Gaul speedily informed him that the safety of the republic could not be secured by the recitation of prayers at Rome. A conflict in Germania became inevitable. The census in Gaul had been concluded, and discontent was so keen that revolution seemed

Josephus refers (B. J., I. xxi. 12). See Korach, "Die Reisen der Kön. Herodes nach Rom.," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums*, vol. xxxviii. 1894, p. 529.

* Operations seem to have been begun somewhat late in that year, for Drusus, as Dion says (liv. 32), returned from the North Sea towards the close of the year: . . . χειμὼν γὰρ ἦν . . . Was this delay occasioned by the death of Agrippa? The fact seems to me probable, although the delay may have been caused by other reasons; possibly preparations were not concluded or the canal had not been completed, but our information is too scanty to permit any certain conclusions.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* xxxi.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*

imminent, while revolution would certainly have opened the rich province to hordes of Germanic warriors.* Augustus was therefore obliged to resolve upon the commencement of the invasion, for which he had long prepared. But how times had changed! The Germanic invasion was not begun with the boldness of Cæsar, plunging blindly into the unknown, but with slow and methodical steps, advancing only upon sure ground and well-protected lines of communication, and after the utmost possible exploration of the vast unknown territory to be invaded. A secure road eastward was first opened to the legions along the course of the Lippe, by means of a huge entrenched camp constructed upon the banks of that river in the heart of the region between the Rhine and the Weser; this camp was united to the Rhine by a wide military road and a chain of little forts. From this fortified base the legions would spread respect and fear for Rome in all directions by marches and expeditions over the region between the Rhine and the Weser. But until the military road was constructed it was difficult and dangerous to bring a great army along the track which followed the Lippe. It was therefore proposed that a number of troops should be sent by sea to the mouth of the Ems and up the river as far as its upper course, which runs parallel to the Lippe, and is but some thirty kilometres from it in certain spots; the other contingent of the troops was to be sent along the valley of the Lippe, and the two armies were to effect a junction upon the upper reaches of that river. Augustus resolved to carry out the first part of the plan in that year, and to send part of the army to the Ems by sea. Drusus was placed in charge of this task, though he was but a proprætor, twenty-six years of age. It was a bold choice, but Augustus required for this war an intelligent, active, and devoted man, upon whose implicit obedience he could rely, and for such a purpose he could trust no one more than Drusus.† Thus the

* Dion, liv. 32.

† It is commonly asserted that Augustus entrusted these enterprises to his sons-in-law for family reasons, but it is an explanation based upon the wholly arbitrary theory that Augustus wished to found a monarchy. We do not know whether Augustus had not tried to employ other men, and consequently we cannot avoid the

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enterprise would be guided by an aged head and performed by a young arm.

Drusus in the
North Sea.

Augustus began the campaign as cleverly as Cæsar when he made his expedition to Britain; he was careful not to leave Gaul empty of troops and at the mercy of the turbulent and discontented nobility.* Drusus invited the Gallic chiefs to meet and discuss the introduction of a new religious ceremony in honour of Augustus and of Rome. When a sufficient number had arrived to prevent any fear of a general Gallic revolt in their absence, he gave the signal for the army and fleet to start, and took the Gallic chiefs with him. He went down the course of the Rhine, passed through the canal and entered the Zuyder Zee; † he crossed the country which is

hypothesis that he chose his sons-in-law merely because no other men of similar capacities were to be found. His difficulty in discovering capable men for less dangerous and serious tasks than this makes it probable that he fell back upon his sons-in-law because he could find no one better.

* Many historians think that Drusus convoked the Gallic chiefs at Lyons for the first professional inauguration of the worship of Rome and of Augustus. But Dion (liv. 32) does not say so; he says that *προφάσει*, under pretext of a festival, he summoned the Gallic chiefs and began the war. As the altar was inaugurated in the year 10, as we shall see, the chiefs could only be summoned for the purpose of agreeing to an introduction of the worship, and their summons, as Dion says, was only a pretext to prevent the revolt of Gaul. It seems to me that in this manoeuvre we may see an imitation of Cæsar's action at the time of his first expedition to Great Britain; I have therefore assumed that Drusus took with him, like Cæsar, a large number of Gallic chieftains, to deprive the revolutionary party of possible leaders.

† Here there is a difficult question. Orosius (VI. xxi. 15) and Florus (IV. xii. 33) represent the operations of Drusus as beginning with a war against the Usipetes, the Tencteri and the Chatti, but say nothing of any other naval expedition. Orosius simply says: *primum Usipetas, deinde Tencteros et Chattos perdomuit*; Florus, with greater accuracy, says that *primo Usipetas domuit, inde Tencteros percurrit et Chattos*; in other words, he conquered the Usipetes and made a raid upon the territory of the Tencteri and of the Chatti. On the other hand, Dion (liv. 32) says that in the first year of the war Drusus waited for the Celts (or Germans) at the passage of the Rhine. Dion then represents Drusus as devastating the territory of the Usipetes and the Sigambri, and proceeds in very confused manner to describe the expedition. In the following chapter, however, Dion relates the events of the next year—namely, 11—and repeats that Drusus subjected the Usipetes, that he made an incursion into the country of the Sigambri, and that he penetrated to the Weser in the country of the Chatti. Thus it seems likely that the facts reported by Dion for the year 11

now Holland, and was then occupied by the Frisians. These latter, in consequence of promises probably made before the arrival of the troops, accepted the Roman protectorate under comparatively mild conditions. They were to pay a small tribute, not in money, for they were too poor, but in skins and in military contingents.* Then Drusus launched into the North Sea with his fleet and sailed along the coast; he subdued an island to which Dion gives the name of Burcanides (Burchana),† made his way into the mouth of the Ems, and disembarked part of his force at a point which we cannot determine.‡ He then went down-stream with the rest of the army, put out to sea once more, sailed to the mouth of the Weser and attempted to follow the course of that river, probably only for purposes of exploration.§ On this occasion he was unsuccessful; possibly his ships, which were too light to be seaworthy in bad weather, were yet too heavy to make way against the rapid current of the stream, or he may have encountered other obstacles unknown to us.|| It is, however, certain that Drusus,

are those which Orosius and Florus relate as having taken place at the beginning of the war, with the sole difference that Dion speaks of the Sigambri in place of the Tencteri—an easy confusion, as the two peoples were near neighbours. In other words, Orosius and Florus apparently begin the story of the Germanic campaign in the year 11 and omit the event of the year 12, namely, the naval expedition. This explanation will be confirmed by the continuation of the narrative, as we shall see; it will appear that if we place in the year 11 the expeditions against the Usipetes, the Tencteri and the Chatti, of which Orosius and Florus speak, the respective narratives of the three historians will agree fairly well. We then ask what stress should be laid upon Dion's account of the battles which Drusus fought, of the raids which he made before the naval expedition. His account is lacking in accuracy, and its vagueness induces us to suppose that he was confusing this and the next year. If there was no confusion, the naval expedition must have been preceded by incidents which cannot easily be guessed. In any case, as the important event of the year 12 was the naval expedition, I have attached no importance to these incidents, which are too obscurely and summarily related to provide any clear view of them. * Dion, liv. 32; Tacitus, *Ann.*, iv. 72.

† Strabo, VII. l. 3.

‡ See note * on p. 201.

§ Dion, liv. 32. The invasion into the country of the Chatti seems to refer to an attempt at exploration at the mouth of the Weser, but the object of this invasion is by no means clear; nor can we understand the meaning of the *λίμνη* of which Dion speaks.

|| Tacitus, *German.* 34. This seems to imply that navigation became impossible.

12 B.C. who knew but little of this dangerous sea, was nearly shipwrecked, and only escaped by means of the help of the Frisians.* At the end of the autumn he was once more in Gaul with part of the army and the fleet. He allowed the Gauls to return home, after securing their agreement to the construction at Lyons of a great altar to Augustus and to Rome, and the foundation of a national priesthood in its service; then he returned to Rome to report his doings to Augustus and to receive his orders for the next year.†

Herod at
Rome.

Meanwhile Tiberius had been conducting the war in Pannonia in the old aristocratic style, exterminating or capturing the rebels and selling them into slavery.‡ While this young man possessed the fine qualities of the old nobility, he also exhibited their sternness. Probably the best part of the Pannonian population was sold to the landholders of Italy and transported to the valley of the Po. The Senate had decreed Tiberius a triumph.§ Meanwhile Augustus had returned to Rome, accompanied by Herod. The latter had gone to Greece for the Olympic games, and had joined Augustus at Aquileia in order to pay his respects to Julia and to give an account of the terrible discord which had broken out in the royal palace at Jerusalem between the children of the unfortunate Mariamme. Alexander and Aristobulus, the two sons of this unhappy woman, Antipater, Herod's son by Doris, and Salome, whose hatred for her sister-in-law pursued her even after death, had been waging for some time a fearful war of calumny and intrigue, which had brought appalling suspicions to the uneasy mind of Herod. The king of Judea was now afraid that Alexander and Aristobulus would avenge their mother by killing him. Had he been free to act as he pleased, he would have ended these uncertainties by putting his sons to death, but he felt that he was highly unpopular in Judea and retained his throne only by the favour of Augustus. If his family history should be again stained by an appalling domestic massacre Augustus might abandon him. Thus he could not venture to kill the children as he had killed the

* Dion, liv. 32.

† Dion, liv. 31.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.*

mother in order to relieve his apprehensions, and great must have been the tortures of this proud character, who found himself universally detested and obliged to live with two sons whom he suspected of plotting his murder. This tragical situation he now wished to explain to Augustus, hoping, perhaps, that he would be authorised to execute his sons. Augustus, however, took the king of the Jews and his sons to Rome and attempted to reconcile them, giving Herod, by way of compensation, the copper mines of Cyprus, which had been neglected by careless governors, and which the ingenious Herod would be able to work once more, as he was to have half the income from them. Thus the diplomacy of Augustus not only re-established harmony in Herod's family, but also accomplished an excellent stroke of business for the republic. The Roman populace also profited by these dissensions, as Herod gave Augustus three hundred talents to be expended during the festivals. The cunning sovereign of Judea thus attempted to buy the indulgence of the Roman people for any crimes which he might be hereafter forced to commit, while Rome, in its longing for festivities and pleasure, accepted the money as tribute.*

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It was doubtless about this time that news reached Rome of an earthquake which had caused terrible destruction throughout Asia Minor; the populations had been reduced to the utmost poverty and were unable to pay their tribute for that year. For centuries Rome had exacted her tribute with inexorable sternness, but a most remarkable change of feeling was now seen. The Senate and the people were moved to pity; it was thought that help should be sent to the unfortunate provinces, and that the tribute for that year at least should be remitted. The public finances were, however, embarrassed, and it seemed difficult to bear the loss of so considerable a sum. Augustus, who had just received a very large bequest from Agrippa, was ready, as usual, to solve the problem; he paid into the public treasury from his own purse the tribute due from Asia during that year.† The public was satisfied, the treasury was no loser, and Augustus alone lost a considerable sum of money in the course of the affair.

Earthquake in
Asia Minor.

* Josephus, A. J. XVI. iv. 1-5.

† Dion, liv. 30.

12 B.C. Strange indeed would be a monarch who was thus forced to furnish from his private purse the wherewithal to satisfy a sudden philanthropic whim on the part of the public. True monarchy acts very differently, and noiselessly squeezes its subjects to secure a colossal fortune for the reigning family. But with ease, intellectual culture and the growth of vice, humanitarian doctrines were also spreading throughout the old republic; the time had passed when the majority of the public lived upon the plunder of the provinces; every one was now ready to shower flattery and concessions upon the eastern provinces, provided that Rome was not the loser. Augustus, as usual, was obliged to solve the problem by bearing the expense. The Senate also determined that for two years, as an exceptional measure, Augustus should choose the governor of Asia himself, and that the usual election by lot should be suspended. He would doubtless be able to find a capable and energetic man.

The widow-
hood of Julia.

Thus Augustus was overwhelmed with business, and his attention was absorbed by the Germanic war, the Pannonian revolt, the state of religion in Rome, the royal dissensions in Judea and the earthquake in Asia Minor. So soon as he returned to Rome he found other difficulties before him, one of which was by no means easy to settle, in spite of its apparent insignificance. His *lex de maritandis ordinibus* ordained that widows should marry again within the year. Julia had been with child upon the death of Agrippa, and had given the name of Postumus to the son who was born; as the daughter of Augustus it was now her duty to obey the law. If she declined, what other matron would be willing to obey? For many reasons, however, this marriage became a political matter of much importance. It was clear that this young woman, twenty-seven years of age, beautiful, amiable and intelligent, belonged to that body of νεώτεροι which for some years had been growing upon the parched ground of puritanism and traditional theory. Her journey to the east had merely stimulated her natural tendencies. She had been fêted as a queen, had lived in sumptuous courts, had been intoxicated with the flattery with which Asiatic admirers had surrounded

her; in the most famous cities she had seen that corrupt, delicate and voluptuous civilisation which was both the irresistible temptation and the mortal terror of the Romans. On the other hand, it is probable that she thought, with some reason, that her duty to the State was now accomplished, seeing that she had already borne five children at the age of twenty-seven. She therefore wished to follow the gay and brilliant mode of life to which the youth of her time aspired, and this was a source of much anxiety to Augustus; at this moment especially he could not regard the behaviour of his daughter as a matter merely of family interest. Since his election to the position of *pontifex maximus* the puritan party had recovered its courage; protests were made against the growing corruption of the youth; regrets were uttered that the laws of the year 18 were not strictly enforced and that the authority of the censors was non-existent. The party wished to confer once more upon Augustus, as in the year 18, for five additional years, the *praefectura morum et legum*, which he had ceased to hold after the year 13, and thus to give him an extended power of censorship and the opportunity to strengthen inadequate or feeble laws by a stricter application of them.* Augustus was ready to consult the wishes of the puritan party and to favour the conservative and reactionary tendencies of the masses, but it was impossible for him to appear as the champion of tradition and to reprehend the nobles for allowing their wives and children to act as they pleased if his own daughter in his own house revolted against himself and his laws. For a

* Dion (liv. 30) gives the year 12 as the date of Augustus' nomination for five years as *ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἐπανορθωτῆς τῶν τρόπων*. He is obviously alluding, though somewhat inaccurately, to the nomination of Augustus as *ἐπιμελητῆς τῶν τε νόμων καὶ τῶν τρόπων*, which, according to the Monumentum Ancyranum (Gr. iii. 13 ff.), took place in the year 11. Chapters xxx. and xxxi. of Dion, book liv., contain several facts which certainly took place in the year 11, such as the marriage of Tiberius and of Julia, of which Dion also speaks in chapter xxxv. among the events of the year 11; we may therefore assume that other facts did not belong to that year any more than this one. The nomination of Augustus as *praefectus morum et legum* in the year 11 must have been the result of a fresh effort on the part of the conservative and traditionalist party, who were irritated by the inefficiency of the legislation of the years 18 and 17 and were encouraged by the solemn election of Augustus as *pontifex maximus*.

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moment he seems to have thought of marrying her to a knight—that is, to some one unconcerned with politics*—possibly because moral inconsistencies were more indulgently regarded when they affected equestrian families than when they touched the honour of the political and military aristocracy, which was bound to set an example of respect to the laws which it made. However, he soon conceived another and fatal idea, which was to be the source of infinite misfortune to himself, to his family and to the republic. He proposed to give Julia to Tiberius. If current gossip at Rome can be believed, Julia even before the death of Agrippa had shown marked favour to the son of Livia,† who was famous for his military exploits and was also a very handsome young man. Possibly Augustus thought that Tiberius would for that reason be able to check the undesirable tendencies of his fair spouse and would help the father to govern the family with Roman strictness. On the other hand, it is likely that Augustus even then regarded Tiberius as a possible candidate for the place which Agrippa had held and as his future colleague; thus it might seem advisable to give him Agrippa's place in the family.

The invasion
of Germania.

Tiberius and Drusus had returned to Rome during the winter of the years 12 and 11 to receive their instructions for the following spring. Augustus entrusted Drusus with the execution of the second part of his plan,‡ the slow, methodical and

* That is, if the fact reported by Tacitus, *Ann.* iv. 40, belongs to this time: *Augustus filiam . . . equiti Romano tradere meditata est.* Suetonius seems to confirm it (*Aug.* 63): *hoc [Agrippa] defuncto, multis ac diu etiam ex equestri ordine circumspectis conditionibus.*

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 7: . . . *sui quoque sub priore marito appetentem.*

‡ In Dion's summary account (liv. 33) of the campaign of the year 11 two parts must be distinguished, the advance along the valley of the Lippe, which led to the foundation of Aliso, and the expedition to the territory of the Sigambri and Chatti. It seems very probable to me that the second part of the campaign diverged from the original plan, which merely contemplated the conquest of the valley of the Lippe and the foundation of Aliso—in other words, the opening of a secure route towards the east. Dion himself says that Drusus was able to accomplish this expedition because the Sigambri and Chatti were at war with one another, an event which had not been foreseen at Rome during the winter or the preceding year, when the plan of campaign was drawn up. Apart from a lack of provisions which obliged Drusus to retreat, his miraculous escape from an ambush in the course of that movement and the rapidity of his marches go to prove that this part of the enterprise was unpremeditated, and was

gradual invasion of Germania ; this was to proceed up the valley of the Lippe, the army following the right bank,* while the 12 B.C.

suggested by the condition of affairs which Drusus found in Germany when he reached the country in the spring of 11. To say that Drusus acted on his own initiative without instructions from Augustus, or put a very wide interpretation upon the orders he had received, is to advance a supposition based rather upon probability and upon the study of character than upon documentary evidence. It is possible that Augustus may have authorised Drusus to make use of any favourable opportunities ; it would, however, be surprising if so prudent a character as Augustus had authorised Drusus to push forward to the Weser and to cross the river without delay. There is no doubt that this expedition which Dion places in the year 11 is the same as that which Orosius (VI. xxi. 15) and Florus (IV. xii. 23) relate as the first expedition in Germany ; in fact, the three historians agree upon the names of the first and third of the peoples then subjugated, the Usipetes and the Chatti. The second nation is said to be the Sigambri by Dion and the Tencteri by the other two. These, however, were neighbouring peoples, which fact may explain the confusion, or rather the omission, of the name. The Tencteri and the Sigambri both probably fell within the limits of Drusus' campaign.

* Several historians say that Germany was invaded by river ; in other words, that the army was brought up-stream by the fleet. Dion, however, categorically denies the fact, as he says that Drusus threw a bridge over the Lippe, τὸν τε Λουπίαν ἔκρυψε, to invade the country of the Sigambri. As the Sigambri lived on the south of the Lippe, it is obvious that Drusus was advancing upon the right bank of the river ; if he had gone up-stream with the fleet he would have had no need to build a bridge. This lends force to the supposition that Drusus left certain troops on the Ems in the preceding year, and that these then went up-stream to join the troops which were following the valley of the Lippe. This hypothesis is largely based upon a fact preserved by Strabo (VII. l. 3), who tells us that ἐν τῷ Ἀμασίᾳ Δροῦσος Βρουκτέρουσ καταναυμάχησε ; in other words, that Drusus fought a naval battle with the Bructeri on the Ems. As the Bructeri occupied the upper valley of the Ems, in the district of the modern Munster, it seems unlikely to the majority of historians that Drusus could have reached that point in his expedition of the year 12. On the other hand, if we assume that Drusus left some troops upon the Ems for the purpose we have indicated, this naval battle may have been fought in the year 11, when the army of the Ems went up the river to make a junction with the army of the Lippe by land. Why, however, should the Romans have sent two armies over roads so divergent before effecting their junction in the upper valley of the Lippe ? If the Lippe was navigable the difficulty is inexplicable, as it would then have been comparatively easy to bring the whole army into Germany by this route. If, on the other hand, the Lippe was not navigable, we can understand the situation. As the valley of the Lippe possessed no adequate route, it was impossible to send too large a force along it ; part of the army went by water, taking the shortest way, namely, the river Ems. The upper course of the Ems and that of the Lippe are almost parallel, and are divided only by forty kilo-

12 B.C. fleet which had been left upon the Ems would proceed upstream. The two armies would thus converge until they effected a junction in the upper valley of the Lippe. At the confluence of this stream with the river known to the ancient historian as the Eliso a great fortress would be constructed, which was to be connected with the Rhine by a great military road and a chain of little forts. Tiberius was commissioned to return to Pannonia, and was requested to divorce Agrippina and to marry Julia. This command did not meet with his entire satisfaction. Tiberius was a thorough conservative, and had just returned from the Pannonian camp and from fierce conflicts with the revolted barbarians; he felt in no way attracted by the fair lady from the east, with her refinements and caprices; she represented all that Tiberius detested in his age, while he was very fond of his own wife, who had already presented him with one son and was about to bear a second.* He therefore objected, and Augustus was forced almost to constrain him.† He had every opportunity for exerting powerful influence upon Tiberius; he might easily ruin his career, deprive him of the command of the Pannonian campaign and force him to enter private life. Perhaps he also told him that even on questions of marriage a Roman noble should sacrifice his inclinations to public interest. Tiberius loved his wife, but he was very ambitious, and he doubtless knew that by giving him Julia Augustus marked him out as his future colleague in the supreme magistracy and as the successor to Agrippa. If he refused Julia, he would also refuse the greatest honour to which any citizen could aspire. Notwithstanding his repugnance, he therefore sent letters of divorce to Agrippina at the outset of the year 11.‡ Augustus immediately hastened the marriage,§ in order to give Tiberius no time for

metres, or two days' march, so that the junction from that point was safe and easy.

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 7.

† *Ibid.*: *Juliam . . . coactus est ducere.*

‡ As Agrippa had died in March of the year 12, the marriage of Tiberius and Julia must have taken place before March in the year 11, if, as is probable, the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* was observed; hence the marriage may be placed in the winter of the years 12 and 11.

§ Suetonius, *Tib.* 7: *Juliam . . . confestim coactus est ducere.*

repentance, and Julia started for Pannonia with her husband in the spring. When they reached Aquileia * Tiberius left Julia in the town and continued his journey to his province while Drusus was returning to Gaul. 12 B.C.

Augustus, who had remained at Rome, was appointed *præfectus morum et legum* for five years.† The puritan and conservative party easily secured approval of the law from the *comitia* and the Senate. No one ventured to dispute the fact that the great task before the Senate was the purification of morals, but many people had voted for the election of the great censor under the persuasion that his correction would not be stringent. Augustus, indeed, had accepted the position of *præfectus morum et legum* to please the puritan party, but he had no intention of displaying any great severity in his efforts to oppose the growing relaxation of morals; ‡ he especially reassured the *νεώτεροι* by introducing certain gratifying modifications in the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*. He brought forward a law authorising bachelors and marriageable women to reappear at the public shows.§ He took advantage of a very scandalous divorce case to testify publicly to his disapproval of the excessive vehemence of the accusers. Mæcenas and other illustrious personages were defending the accused, but none the less the prosecutor uttered violent invectives against the defendant and his supporters. Augustus suddenly appeared in court, took his seat by the prætor, and in virtue of his power as tribune forbade the prosecutor to insult any of his friends. This severe snub inflicted upon the unhappy prosecutor and all his colleagues aroused such popular enthusiasm that a public subscription was opened to raise statues to Augustus.|| Augustus realised that greater indulgence was the order of the day and that it was impossible to check the new tendency of desires

* Suetonius (*Tib.* 7) tells us that Julia gave birth to a son at Aquileia; this was obviously during the following year, but the fact shows that after the marriage, while Tiberius was in Pannonia, Julia waited for him in Aquileia, as this was the nearest town where a great lady could live.

† Dion, liv. 30; Mon. Anc. (Gr.), iii. 13 ff.

‡ Thus we must interpret the phrase of the Mon. Anc. (iii. 13 ff.) which says that he did not accept the *præfectura*.

§ Dion, liv. 30.

|| *Ibid.*

12 B.C.

and aspirations ; he would have been well content if, instead of the universal reform of morals of which the old conservatives dreamed, he could have secured a more modest and purely political reform, the reorganisation of the Senate.

A new reform
of the Senate.
The Thracian
insurrection.

For fifteen years attempts had been made to reconstitute at Rome the great Senate of republican days, and had ended in utter failure ; the sessions were more and more scantily attended, and the infliction of fines on every occasion became impossible. Neither rewards, punishments, appeals or threats would overcome the idleness of the senators. Their apathy was too deeply rooted. Though political life was infinitely less turbulent than before, it was not so easy to make money, and life at Rome became daily a greater expense to the senators. Many of them, therefore, were unwilling to take up residence in the capital for more than a few months ; like Labeo, they preferred to spend several months in the country, where their expenses were less, where they could supervise their property, and where they were relieved of the countless claims of town life. Moreover, during the long years when matters had been allowed to drift the Senate had found little to do, notwithstanding the rapid growth of the empire ; now, however, when an intelligent administration of Italy and its provinces was required, the senators would have been obliged to accept more numerous and more difficult posts. The majority of them attempted to avoid these burdens, and Augustus remonstrated in vain ; responsibilities were piled upon his shoulders only, and the senatorial aristocracy abandoned their duties to him from selfishness, from fear, from incapacity, and in consequence of many economic and social obstacles. Yet throughout the west the danger seemed to grow more menacing. Tiberius had found Pannonia at peace on his return, but Dalmatia was now in full revolt, and for the same reasons as Pannonia, on account of the tribute.* The Senate immediately entrusted the Dalmatian affair to Augustus, who ordered Tiberius to lead to the province the army which had crushed the insurrection in Pannonia the year before.† Events in Thrace had also

* Suetonius, *Tib.* ix. ; Dion, liv. 34 : the causes of the revolt are given further on, liv. 36.

† Dion, liv. 34.

threatened danger for a long time, and an outbreak now seemed imminent. A priest of Dionysus had gathered a small band of insurgents and was traversing the country, preaching a holy war against Rome and the duty of insurrection against the national dynasty, which was friendly to Rome and in alliance with her. Young and discontented Thracians who had served in the Roman army had flocked together from every quarter and formed a large force, the numbers and enthusiasm of which had drawn into the revolt the royal army, which was organised upon Roman models. The whole of Thrace had risen, the king had been obliged to flee to the Chersonese, to the domains which Augustus had inherited from Agrippa; bands of Thracians had invaded Macedonia and an invasion of Asia Minor was possible.* As there was already a great army fighting in Germania and another in Dalmatia, the danger was serious; there were no troops in Thrace and no general upon whom reliance could be placed.

Augustus was therefore obliged to turn to the Syrian legions and to the comparatively youthful governor of Pamphylia, Lucius Cornelius Piso, the consul of the year 15; he was ordered to go to Thrace as the *legatus* of Augustus and to crush the revolt with the Syrian legions.† Piso was one of the few young men whose capacity and valour made him worthy of

The cura
aquarum.

* Velleius, ii. 98; Dion, liv. 34.

† Zippel, Zumpt and Mommsen have proposed to change Παιφύλιας to Μοισίας, and to make Piso the governor of Moesia. This is impossible, as has been observed by Groebe (App. to Drumann, ii. 539). In the first place, there is no proof that the province of Moesia existed as such at this time. On the contrary, there are excellent reasons for believing that it did not as yet exist. Further, as Groebe remarks, what little we know of this country shows us that the Roman army which was commissioned to check the revolt came from Asia Minor, and this fact confirms the information given by Dion. Finally, it is not surprising that, as capable generals were scarce, Augustus should have chosen a man from Pamphylia for so serious a war. It is true that we have no information upon the state of Pamphylia at this time, but this is an additional reason for following the text of Tacitus, which shows that Pamphylia belonged to the Senate and had a governor. If Piso, who had been consul in the year 15, had two sons, he might by the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* have been governor of Pamphylia in the year 11. As the Roman army which entered Thrace must have come from Asia, I have assumed that the legions composing it were Syrian.

12 B.C.

his name. He might well be classed with Drusus and Tiberius.* Augustus then attempted to begin some reform of the Senate. As it was impossible to gather four hundred of the senators, notwithstanding the fines with which they were threatened, he proposed to reduce their legal number.† For some time complaints had been made of carelessness in the keeping of the senatorial archives; the authentic text of a *senatus consultum* was often not to be found or exhibited grave discrepancies from other texts. The tribunes or ædiles to whom these deeds were entrusted regarded the supervision of the registers as a task beneath their notice and left the care of them to apparitors, who made all kinds of mistakes. The care of the archives was therefore entrusted to the quæstors, younger and less presumptuous magistrates, who might bring more zeal to the performance of their duty.‡ As *pontifex maximus* Augustus also simplified the religious ceremonies with which the sessions opened, and permitted a sacrifice of incense and wine to the divinity in whose temple the Senate met.§ These, however, were but insignificant remedies for so deep-rooted an evil, which was, indeed, almost incurable. At his death Agrippa had left to Augustus a force of two hundred and forty slaves, who were responsible for the care of the aqueducts and the general efficiency of this public department. Augustus was already overwhelmed with business, and therefore transferred to the senators the *cura aquarum*.|| Notwithstanding the energy of Augustus, the vast empire remained the sport of numerous forces which he himself could but partially control and direct.

The march of
Drusus to the
Weser.

While he was working to reform the Senate the course of the war in Germania diverged from the prudent plan which he had drawn up. Upon entering the country with his army by the valley of the Lippe, Drusus had found the inhabitants in a state of extreme agitation. Terrified by the appearance of the Roman armies and by the plans of the Roman government, several tribes had concluded a defensive alliance

* See Velleius, ii. 98.

† Dion, liv. 35.

‡ Dion liv. 36.

§ Dion, liv. 30; Suetonius, Aug. 35.

|| Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der römisch. Verwaltung*, p. 162.

during the winter. Dissensions, however, had soon arisen, and the alliance against the invader speedily became, as often before, a state of civil war between the various tribes. The Sicambri, who had been the leaders in the arrangement of the alliance, had recently attacked the Chatti, who dwelt upon the banks of the Weser, and the whole territory to the south of the Lippe between the Rhine and the Weser was in a ferment. An audacious general could have demanded no better opportunity of surprising and crushing the Germans by one of those blows which Cæsar used to deal, instead of reducing them slowly and methodically upon the lines that Augustus had preferred. Drusus possessed some spark of Cæsar's genius, and had cleverly carried out the first part of Augustus' plan ; he had subjugated the Usipetes, and had gone up the valley of the Lippe to effect a junction with the army which was following the course of the Ems, and had hitherto been opposed only by some few skirmishers. When the two armies had joined hands Drusus abandoned the plan of Augustus, and instead of proceeding to construct the fortified camp he began an audacious march into the unknown, trusting, like a second Cæsar, to his good fortune. He hastily collected provisions, took with him probably only the best part of his army, crossed the country of the Sigambri, which was deserted, and invaded the territory of the Tencteri ; this people, in terror at his unexpected appearance, submitted, and Drusus then made a rapid advance upon the territory of the Chatti ; he attacked the conflicting tribes, defeated them in succession, and forced them to recognise the Roman domination. He then advanced rapidly to the Weser, seeing no reason why he should spend years in securing by cautious methods that which might be attained in a few months by a bold stroke. Such was the impression produced by this brilliant manœuvre that if Drusus had not been forced to fall back upon the Rhine by lack of provisions he would probably have made a march across Germany comparable with that which Cæsar had made in Belgium ; he might have profited by the general stupefaction of the Germans, have crossed the Weser and reached the Elbe, subjugating the tribes as he went. But his store of provisions ran low, the country

11 B.C. was unable to support his troops, and he was therefore obliged to content himself with the success he had gained and to return to the valley of the Lippe.*

The foundation
of Aliso.

About the same time Piso had invaded Thrace with his army, but his initial operations against the rebels were not wholly successful.† Tiberius, on the other hand, was more successful in Dalmatia, but while he was occupied with this campaign the Pannonians again revolted.‡ The situation was thus by no means encouraging during the summer of the year 11, and only by good fortune was it saved from utter disaster during the autumn. While Drusus was retiring, harassed by the very tribes that he had conquered, he fell into an ambush of the same nature as that which the Nervii had prepared for Cæsar, and his bold imitation of Cæsar's strategy nearly cost him dear. Only by a miracle did he escape with his army from an overthrow, the consequences of which would have been terrible; he was able to fall back upon the Lippe, where he proceeded to follow out the cautious plan of campaign arranged by Augustus, from a point upon which historians are not entirely agreed.§ He gave orders for the construction of the *castellum* which was to bear the name of Aliso; he returned to Gaul and decided to found another *castellum* on the Rhine, "in the territory of the Chatti," as the ancient historian says; this is probably the *castellum* which was afterwards to become the town of Coblenz; finally, when these arrangements had been made he returned to Rome. He had been proclaimed *imperator* by his soldiers, as Tiberius had been; but Augustus,

* Dion, liv. 33; Orosius, VI. xxi. 15.

† Dion, liv. 34: ἡττηθεὶς τὸ πῦρον; Velleius, li. 98: *trienisio bellavit*.

‡ Dion, liv. 34.

§ A large number of works have been written concerning the locality of the fortifications of Aliso, and opinion upon the subject is very divergent. Some place Aliso in the upper valley of the Lippe, at the confluence of the Lippe and the Alme, in the neighbourhood of Paderborn or of Elsen; others, on the contrary, place it about the centre of the course of the Lippe, on the site of the modern Hamm (see Taramelli, *Le Campagne di Germanico nella Germania*, Pavie, 1891, p. 102). Recent excavations at Haltern, which is upon the Lippe, but nearer to the Rhine, have disclosed the remains of a vast *castellum* of the Augustine age, and scholars have agreed, in consequence, that this was the ancient Aliso. Others doubt whether Aliso could have been so near the Rhine, perhaps with reason. The problem seems insoluble.

with his usual conservatism, declined to recognise this title, because Drusus was a *legatus*. The Senate decreed him the honour of a triumph, the right to enter Rome on horseback and the proconsular power, although as yet he had been no more than prætor.

10 B.C.

At Rome Drusus was then obliged to deliver the funeral oration over Octavia, the sister of Augustus, the widow of Antony, the mother of Marcellus and of his wife.* A gentle character thus disappeared from history; Italy had known her both in joy and sadness, but throughout the upheavals of the revolution she had ever preserved her dignity; after the death of Marcellus she had withdrawn to a life of retirement. Once again, when the Senate and the people desired to shower excessive honours upon the dead, Augustus objected.† Tiberius, on his side, seems to have returned to Aquileia at the outset of the winter, accompanied by Julia, who was with child.‡ He strove to live upon good terms with the new wife whom Augustus had given him, but he could not forget the gentle Agrippina, now the inmate of another household, and was broken-hearted when he thought of her life in Rome, to which city he could not return for fear of arousing his sufferings by the sight of her.§ Proud and taciturn, reserved and silent, he was a man of strong passions. At the

Further
disaster in
Pannonia.

* Dion, liv. 35. Suetonius (*Aug.* 61) places the death of Octavia at the time when Augustus was *quingagesimum et quartum annum agens ætatis*.

† Dion, liv. 35.

‡ Suetonius (*Tib.* 7) says that Julia gave birth to a son at Aquileia. If, as I have assumed, Tiberius and Julia were married in the winter of the years 12 and 11, the birth of a child might have taken place during the winter of the years 11 and 10, and hence we may suppose that Tiberius thought of spending the winter at Aquileia. Moreover, Dion (liv. 36) speaks of an invasion of the Daci in the first months of the winter of the year 10, and to check this Tiberius is said to have left Augustus, with whom he had been *in Gallia*. If we assume that the Gaul in question was Cisalpine Gaul, the explanation of the passage is easy. Augustus, who was absent from Rome on January 1 of the year 10 (*Bull. Comm.* 1888, p. 16), and spent a good part of the year in the district of Lyons (Dion, liv. 36), must have left Rome about the end of the year 11 to have reached Gaul thus early. Probably Tiberius then came to meet him, perhaps at Pavia, but the news of this fresh revolt must have obliged his speedy departure, whereupon Augustus may have continued his journey.

§ See Suetonius, *Tib.* 7.

10 B.C.

beginning of the year 10, for which the consul was Iulus Antonius, the poet and son of Fulvia and Antony, Tiberius left Aquileia and met Augustus, who must have left Rome once more in the midst of his work upon administrative reform; his object was to visit Gaul, where the situation was serious, but hardly had Tiberius met him, than bad news arrived from Illyria. The Daci had crossed the frozen Danube and invaded Pannonia, while the Dalmatians were once more in revolt. Augustus immediately sent Tiberius back to Pannonia to begin the toilsome labour of the campaign once more,* while Piso with slow patience reconquered Thrace, fighting for every foot of territory.† In Germania, on the other hand, there seems to have been a kind of truce during the year 10; work upon the fortresses of Aliso and Coblenz was vigorously continued,‡ but apparently no actual battles were fought.§ This delay was perhaps due to the prudence of Augustus, who firmly resolved to advance slowly upon the task of conquering Germania and to use the spade as well as the sword; thus he wished to wait to see the results of the former year's campaign. At the same time a profound impression had been made upon the

* Dion, liv. 36.

† Velleius, ii. 98.

‡ Dion (liv. 33) tells us that in addition to Aliso Drusus founded a *castellum* on the Rhine in the country of the Chatti. An examination of the district occupied by the Chatti will show that this *castellum* must have been Coblenz or Mayence. Though Coblenz joined the territory frequented by the Chatti, it rather faced the district inhabited by the Tencteri. As, however, the distance was not great, while hostilities were in progress both against the Tencteri and the Chatti, I am inclined in favour of Coblenz, which was better situated than Mayence, for the defence of Gaul against the Chatti and Tencteri.

§ Dion (liv. 36) refers only, and in a vague manner, to struggles in that year against the Celts and the Chatti, who wished to abandon the territory which the Romans had assigned to them. Orosius (VI. xxi. 15), between the phrase which sums up the operations of the year 11 and that which sums up the events of the year 9, says: *Marcomannos p̄ans ad internacionem cecidit*. In Florus (IV. xii. 23) war against the Marcomanni is also mentioned between the wars of the year 11 and those of the year 9. Thus Dion speaks of a war against the Chatti and against the Celts, and the other two historians of a war against the Marcomanni. It is, however, certainly false to say, as Orosius, that the Marcomanni were exterminated, as we soon meet with them again. It is very difficult to gain any precise information from such brief and scanty notices. I have merely assumed that what is said of the Marcomanni alludes to their famous emigration, the date of which is not precisely known.

Germanic populations by the bold march of Drusus ; some were even so intimidated that they resolved to abandon their territory to the Roman invaders and to seek a home elsewhere. The Marcomanni seem to have been one of this number, and doubtless at this time they began their emigration into that country which was afterwards called Bohemia, under the leadership of Marbod, the noble who had lived so long a time at Rome. Marbod was a friend of Augustus and an admirer of the Roman power, and did not wish to see his people in conflict with the legions ; he preferred to lead them to new countries where he might hope to found a more stable government, to organise an army upon Roman methods and give the barbaric Germans the weapons of Græco-Latin civilisation. A Cæsar would certainly have turned this temporary panic to account and would have continued the policy inaugurated by Drusus in the last year. But Augustus was no warrior ; he was a scholar, an administrator, an organiser, and a priest. From this year onwards and throughout the war we can trace the alternation of two strategical methods, the method of audacity and the method of patience.

In that year, on August 1, the chiefs of the sixty Gallic peoples met at Lyons and inaugurated the altar to Rome and to Augustus, at the confluence of the Rhone and Saône. The Æduan Caius Julius Vercundarus Dubius was appointed priest.* The date is memorable in European history. Gaul was the first European province to adopt, with greater readiness even than Greece and other oriental nations, that cult of living sovereigns which originated in Egypt and which Asia Minor had transmitted to Augustus and to Rome. Gaul was Italy's neighbour, and had enjoyed republican institutions and elective magistracies but a dozen years before ; yet she could not understand the ingenious organisation of the supreme power in the republic which had enabled Rome to put an end to civil war ; she could only realise the strange power of Augustus under oriental symbolism, and she regarded him as an Asiatic monarch who personified the State. Thus Gaul lost her Celtic traditions and rapidly followed the descent which

The altar of Augustus and of Rome.

* Suetonius, *Claud.* 2 ; Livy, *Per.* 137 ; Strabo, IV. iii. 2.

10 B.C. in point of politics led her not to Latin, but to oriental ideas; she prepared to serve and to venerate Augustus as the Egyptians and the Asiatics had once venerated and served the Ptolemies and the Attalidæ. Augustus became a god and a monarch in Gaul, as in the east. On August 1 of the year 10 B.C. were laid the first foundations of that European monarchy which remains almost intact at the present day.

Upon the same day Antonia gave birth at Lyons to a son who was to become the Emperor Claudius.* This was the third son of the young general. The conqueror of Germania had thus complied with the conditions of the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*.

* Suetonius, *Claud.* 2.

CHAPTER X

JULIA AND TIBERIUS

Further reform of the Senate—The origin of the *consilium principis*—The two generations in antagonism—Amusements at Rome—Scandals and lawsuits—Augustus and society trials—Childless marriages in the equestrian order—Proposed reform of the law on marriage—The death and funeral of Drusus—Tiberius and the new generation—The education of Caius and Lucius Cæsar—The son of Phraates at Rome—The presidential power of Augustus again expires—Difficulty of replacing Augustus—The final surrender of Germania—Dissension between Julia and Tiberius—Administrative reorganisation at Rome—The *vici* of Rome and their *magistri*—The party opposed to Tiberius—Intrigue against Tiberius—Caius Cæsar as consul-elect at the age of fourteen—Tiberius asks to withdraw to Rhodes.

FOR the year 9 Drusus had been elected consul—Drusus, the favourite of the gods, whose exploits in Germania had won for him not merely popular sympathy, but universal admiration. Towards the end of the year Augustus, Tiberius and Drusus returned to Rome, where they were received with festivities and honours.* But before the end of the year Drusus started again for Germania, and left his colleague to bear the *fascæ* alone on January 1.† This precipitation may be explained in two ways. Drusus had perhaps succeeded in persuading Augustus that a vigorous blow must be dealt against Germanic barbarism; the news had also, perhaps, reached Rome that the Cherusci and the Suevi had made an alliance with the Sigambri and were preparing to invade Gaul; they had, indeed, already arranged a division of the booty; the Cherusci were to have the horses, the Suevi the gold and silver, and the Sigambri the

* Dion, liv. 36.

† Such seems to be the meaning of line 141 in the *Epicædion Drusi*: *Quos primum vidi fascas, in funere vidi.*

9 B.C.

slaves.* In any case it is certain that Drusus, after consecrating a new temple to Augustus in the country of the Lingones,† crossed Germania in the year 9 with a powerful army, fought his way to the Weser, and afterwards to the Elbe. On this occasion he had definitely adopted Cæsar's strategy. Unfortunately we do not know what forces or methods he used, what road he followed, or by what difficulties he was confronted; we merely know that the campaign occupied him until the summer, and that after reaching the Elbe he prepared to return at the beginning of the month of August.‡ While Drusus was fighting in Germany during these early months of the year 9, Augustus had carried out a new senatorial reform, the fourth or fifth within eighteen years. Previous improvements had produced no effect. Even when the numbers of the Senate were reduced it was no less difficult to form a quorum, and the scandal was at its height. Every one desired a final reform and some radical measure of improvement which would be efficacious. Abandoning the attempt to overcome the idleness of the senators as hopeless, Augustus proposed to reconstitute, not the great body he desired, but a kind of semi-Senate, which, if not very energetic, would at least not be scandalously apathetic.§ He proposed a new set of regulations to

* The alliance between the Cherusci, the Sigambri and the Suevi mentioned by Orosius (VI. xxi. 16) and Florus (iv. 12) was certainly concluded between the years 10 and 9, and the expedition against them took place in the year 9, and not in 12, as Mommsen says (*Les Provinces romaines*, Rome, 1887, vol. i. p. 31). Orosius and Florus both speak of this war as the last campaign of Drusus, and Dion indirectly confirms their statement, though his own account is confused when he says (lv. 1) that Drusus in his last campaign fought against the Suevi and the Cherusci. It is, on the other hand, impossible to say whether the Germans made an alliance to resist the march of Drusus or whether the movements of Drusus were decided by the alliance.

† Cassiodorus, *Chron. ad An. 745-9*.

‡ Drusus died on September 15 (C. I. L. p. 329), thirty days after the accident (Titus *Per.* 140). The accident must, then, have taken place about the middle of the month of August, and Drusus was therefore upon his return journey in that month.

§ Suetonius, *Aug.* 35: *Quo autem lecti probatique, et religiosius et minore molestia, senatorio munere fungerentur, sansii, &c.* Suetonius thus begins the enumeration of several reforms introduced into the Senatorial government; these were obviously made at the same time, either because they were naturally closely connected with one another or because they were all intended to induce the senators to perform

the Senate, requesting the senators to study them carefully before granting their approval; these regulations were less severe than the former rules, but were to be observed with greater strictness. Obligatory sessions were reduced to two a month, and were fixed beforehand for the Calends and the Ides, the beginning and the middle of each month; in the intervals the senators would be free; * all other public functions would be suspended on those days; † and for the months of September and October, the season of the vintage, greater facilities were granted; only a certain proportion of the senators, to be drawn by lot, would then be forced to appear at the sessions.‡ While the new regulations granted these concessions, they also increased the fine incurred by senators who were absent without due cause; it was also resolved that if the absentees were too numerous, a fifth of the body, to be selected by lot, should be fined.§ As regards the number forming a quorum, a further change was introduced, and for the validity of a *senatus consultum* the number of votes required might differ according to the importance of the subject. Senatorial business was thus divided into various grades of importance.|| Finally, the greatest innovation introduced by this reform was the constitution of a kind of committee; for six months fifteen senators were to be drawn by lot, and were to stay at Rome at the disposal of Augustus for half the year; with them he would settle all important and urgent business, and their decisions would afterwards be ratified by the assembled Senate in the full sessions of the Calends or the Ides.¶ The their duties *religiosius et minore molestia*. Suetonius thus tells us that at a certain moment Augustus reformed the Senatorial procedure. When was this done? Suetonius, as usual, gives no definite date, but Dion (lv. 3) tells us that in the year 9 Augustus reformed the Senate, and enumerates certain reforms which Suetonius mentions; he does not refer to all, and also quotes others of which Suetonius says nothing. Thus it is probable that these two historians give between them all the reforms introduced in the year 9, and that a full list may be derived from the two texts.

The *consilium principis*.

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 35.

† Dion, liv. 3.

‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 35.

§ Dion, lv. 3.

|| *Ibid.*

¶ Suetonius, *Aug.* 35: *Sibi quoque instituit consilia sortiri semestria cum quibus de negotiis ad frequentem senatum referendis ante tractaret*. This passage is of high importance; it shows us the true origin of the *consilium principis*. At the outset it was merely an expedient to

9 B.C.

obligations which the senatorial dignity implied were thus lightened, as they were divided among all the senators, while Augustus would always be supported, when a full Senate could not be obtained, by the *consilium*, which would take the place of those careless or apathetic members occupied by harvest, vintage or pleasure.

Opposition
between the
old and new
generations.

Thus Horace had every reason to praise the great energy of the president at this time, almost single-handed as he was :

Cum tot sustineas et tanta negotia solus,
Res Italas armis tuteris, moribus ornes,
Legibus emendes. . . .*

Every day increased the responsibilities and the tasks of Augustus. In Germania and in the province of Illyria the war was prolonged ; at home the last remnants of the puritan party grew daily more exasperated with the corruption of the new generation ; a new conflict, bitter and acrimonious, appeared to be imminent. It was impossible to doubt that the generation which had grown up after the civil wars would at length rebel against the severe training which it had received and would corrupt all that the earlier generation had attempted to purify. The sceptical, selfish and pleasure-loving tendencies of the new generation could be seen from the fact that Ovid was able to pose as the spiritual director of the young nobility ; † from the fact that Julia, notwithstanding the remonstrances of Augustus, Tiberius and Livia, once more gave rein to her luxurious whims in the very family which should have set an example by strictly observing the sumptuary laws of

help the Senate in the performance of its duties. Dion says nothing of this important reform at the time when it was made ; he alludes to it, however, later (lvi. 28), when he speaks of an unimportant modification introduced into the *consilium*. This passage in Dion tells us that the council was composed of fifteen senators. The number is not stated by Suetonius.

* Horace, *Ep.* II. i. 1 ff. *Solus* : that is to say, without Agrippa without the Senate or the nobility.

† Ovid, *Amores*, II. i. 5 ff. :

“ Me legat in sponsi facie non frigida virgo
Et rudis ignoto tactus amore puer.
Atque aliquis juvenum quo nunc ego, saucius arca
Agnoscat flammæ conscia signa suæ. . . .”

the year 18 ; * from the great nobles, from the republic and from Augustus the people constantly demanded bread, wine, amusements and money without discretion or respect ; † the theatres were thronged by every class, sex and age, by a noisy and brutal crowd, with the consequence that dignity, self-respect and innocence steadily deteriorated. The theatres were the one place in which Rome seemed to take a delight in the display of her moral degradation. Attempts to create a national theatre by imitating the great classical models and introducing a serious, moral and artistic tone had failed hopelessly ; even the upper classes preferred melodramatic pieces to literary works, without delicacy of thought or depth of philosophy and feeling. ‡ Naturally the *plebecula*, which had had no literary training, displayed these tendencies in a more aggravated form. In the tragic and comic theatres the spectator might have thought that he heard the moaning of the forests of Mount Garganus or the roar of the Tyrrhenian Sea, § such was the silence and the respect with which the public listened to the laborious works of the most distinguished poets ! The most elaborate passages, the most pathetic lines, the profoundest and most moral thoughts were overwhelmed by this uproar like leaves before the blast. The masterpieces of the ancient or modern theatre were thrust aside in favour of boxing contests, chariot races, wild beast shows or gladiatorial massacres. || These spectacles were thronged by an eager and clamorous mob, by senators and plebeians, men and women, old and young, including Augustus himself ; matrons came to admire naked athletes, young men to see the slaughter of wild beasts, while gladiatorial shows were thronged by men and

* See Macrobius, *Sat.* ii. 5. Many of these anecdotes show that Augustus and Livia attempted to check the luxuries and the pleasures of Julia. The nature of the struggle coincides with the character of Julia as described by Macrobius, and explains the growth of the breach between Julia and Tiberius. Julia's luxury—and the same is true of her later adultery—was not merely a household affair ; it caused political difficulties, as it induced the whole of Roman upper-class society to disobey the laws of the year 18.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 42.

‡ Horace, *Ep.* II. i. 187 ff.

§ Horace, *Ep.* II. i. 202.

|| Horace, *Ep.* II. i. 185-186.

9 B.C. women alike abandoned to the same lust of cruelty.* Such was the universal delight in bloodshed that Augustus was obliged to forbid gladiatorial combats to the death,† or the people would have demanded a massacre at every show. The delight in cruelty where no personal risk is involved, the most horrible and basest of human passions, was now the chief attraction to the mistress of the world.

Scandals and
law-suits.

Amid such amusements morality naturally declined; the great social laws of the year 18 became inoperative, vice now raised its head to defy them, authority made no attempt to enforce them, while the admirers of the past, the conservatives, and all who were upright from expediency or from necessity groaned over the fact that law was no longer law. As there seemed to be no other method of checking the rising tide of corruption, full encouragement was given to the professional accusers, of whom the prototype was Cassius Severus. Every right-thinking man despised these professional slanderers, who increased every scandal, great or small, by their foul inventions, exciting the lowest passions of the mob, bringing them to the law courts to gape at their betters, and making the courts a kind of supplement to the amphitheatre; in the latter gladiators were the victims, in the former illustrious men and women. Yet even the better-minded were inclined at length to tolerate these accusations. The censors had ceased to exist, Augustus would not use the power conferred upon him by the *præfectura morum et legum*, and there seemed to be no other means of combatting the corruption of the new generation.‡ The lowest of the low thus became the guardians of public morality. Regrets were even expressed that the law forbade the torture of slaves to extort evidence against their masters, and it was asserted that this prohibition often enabled the rich to escape. It was said that no evidence could prove the existence of family delinquencies, if slave testimony was

* See the remarks of Suetonius (*Aug.* 44) concerning the licence of the theatres which Augustus checked: *Spectandi confusissimum ac solutissimum morem correvit.*

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 45: *gladiatores sine missione edi prohibuit.*

‡ See the words of Augustus in that year: *διὰ τὴν ἀντικρυσ τῶν πωλλῶν ποτηρίων* (*Dion.* lv. 4).

excluded.* In cases of adultery the evidence of slaves might often be decisive. At the same time there were men who felt the disgrace of the fact that vile slanderers should usurp the almost sacred functions of a censor, and who appreciated the danger of the mania for proving accusations at all costs, even with the help of fictitious evidence or slave testimony.† Lawsuits thus conducted ended in longstanding feuds, as is usually the case when public carelessness leaves the purification of morals to blackmailers; all sense of truth and justice disappeared in the course of these suits, and serious business was neglected in order to follow their ramifications. At the very moment when Drusus was fighting in Germania public attention at Rome was concentrated upon a scandalous poisoning case, in which the accused was a member of the high nobility and on terms of close friendship with Augustus, by name Caius Nonius Asprenas. Once again Cassius Severus was the accuser.‡ We do not know of what Nonius had been actually guilty; the fact remains that Cassius Severus accused him of preparing a beverage with which he caused the death of a hundred and thirty people! § Stupefied even more by the accuser than by the accusations, by the foolish credulity of the public and by the blind fury of the lower classes against the rich, Nonius and his family applied to Augustus in person and begged him to undertake the defence. The prudent Augustus, however, preferred to leave some latitude to these base professional accusers; he would not deprive the lower and ignorant classes

* In that year Augustus approved the passing of a law permitting the torture of slaves (Dion, iv. 5).

† Dion (iv. 5) tells us that many people objected to the law proposed by Augustus authorising the torture of slaves in lawsuits aimed at their masters.

‡ The case referred to in Dion (iv. 4), where it is simply stated that the trial was held in that year, but neither prosecutor nor accused is named, is certainly the prosecution of Nonius Asprenas for poisoning of which Suetonius speaks (*Aug.* 56). Both authors quote the case in order to mention the important incident of the matter laid before the Senate by Augustus, a clear proof that the same case is in question. As often happens, Dion gives us the date, and Suetonius the names of the parties and the object of the suit. This case must have become famous, and have been, in fact, a *cause célèbre*, as both Suetonius and Dion mention it.

§ Pliny, N. H. XXXV. xvi. 4.

9 B.C. of the empty satisfaction of destroying some rich man from time to time in the law courts. He therefore hesitated and sought some means of evasion, and finally attempted to escape from the difficulty by submitting the question to the Senate whether he could or could not defend Nonius. He declared that he could not solve the question alone, because if he undertook the task of defence he might seem to be putting his authority and his influence at the service of a man who was possibly guilty; on the other hand, if he refused he might be condemning by his action a man who was possibly innocent.* The Senate unanimously authorised him to undertake the defence. Augustus, however, was not satisfied with this support, and on the day of the trial he took his place among the defenders, but merely supported them by his presence; he did not utter a single word, and listened impassively without a sign of protestation to the furious speech delivered by Cassius Severus against Nonius.† Nonius was acquitted; Augustus, however, soon consoled Cassius Severus for his failure by saving him from an accusation laid against him. On this occasion he asserted that the perversity of the age necessitated the existence of such accusers and their methods.‡ The use and value of supreme power become highly questionable, when the son of Cæsar, the president of the Senate and of the republic, the first citizen of the empire, the supreme pontiff, is obliged to spare the feelings of such a scoundrel as Cassius Severus.

Sterility of
marriage.

Notwithstanding lawsuits and scandals, corruption speedily increased. After composing several imaginary epistles from lovers famous in legend and history, Ovid ventured to write, in face of the *lex Julia*, a manual which might be entitled *The Complete Adulterer*; this was the *Ars Amatoria*. However, open disobedience and rebellion against the great social laws of the year 18 were not so compromising to the work of Augustus or so dangerous to the conservative restoration as certain forms of hypocritical disobedience, difficult to detect, which violated the spirit of the laws while scrupulously observing their letter. The *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, with its penalties upon celibacy, had obliged a large number of Roman

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 56.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Dion, *lv.* 4.

citizens to marry; but no one had foreseen that the selfishness of the upper classes would find a means of evading the law by refusing to have children. In the equestrian order especially, the upper middle class of modern times, childless households became ever more numerous. The refinement of life had increased, the pleasures of Egyptian civilisation became objects of universal desire, and selfishness was the leading motive of families in easy circumstances, though not wealthy, and therefore unable to live in comfort if their families increased. Notwithstanding the growth of prosperity, the burden of debt at Rome was heavier than should have been the case in a well-administered state.* Many people were therefore obliged either to sacrifice to their children the tempting enjoyments with which they were surrounded or to sacrifice their children to their pleasures, to abandon all hope of continuing their name and race that they might the better enjoy their own brief span of existence. The second alternative was more usually chosen. The equestrian order diminished rapidly in number, and those who gave any thought to public welfare expressed corresponding regrets that the marriage law had produced no better result.† The object of that law had not been to force men and women to live under the same roof, but to provide the republic with men. If the order of knights died out, the very roots of the aristocratic constitution would wither, for from the order of knights the senators were recruited. The need for a numerous body of knights became more urgent

* Dion, lv. 8.

† The question of the celibacy of knights is mentioned in Dion as having attained importance in A.D. 9 (lvi. 1) at the moment when the *lex Papia Poppæa* was proposed. As legislation is usually the last resource in dealing with an abuse, it is obvious that in A.D. 9 the evil had been longstanding. Moreover, as we shall see, the *lex Papia Poppæa* was not the first of its kind; another and severer measure was proposed in A.D. 4. The danger must have become more obvious as the new and increasing refinement of society produced a large number of childless marriages among the knights, and it became obvious that the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* had failed of its purpose. Hence the law of A.D. 4, and afterwards the *lex Papia Poppæa*, which was intended to check not so much celibacy as childless marriages. Between the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex Papia Poppæa* we have, therefore, to place this new social phenomenon, the increasing number of childless marriages in the equestrian order.

9 B.C. as the empire increased and the senatorial nobility diminished, in order that a larger number of civil magistrates and military officers might be taken from the knights. Thus it seems that even in the time of Augustus all the bodies of cavalry recruited from barbarian subjects were commanded by knights; * it was from the knights that Augustus chose the governors of Egypt and Noricum, and a considerable number of the procurators who were responsible for the collection of tributes from the provinces. In short, the equestrian order was a secondary reserve nobility, which might support the aristocratic constitution, if the nobles of the first rank grew too weak. As the senatorial class grew daily more incapable, public hopes were set upon the equestrian order, which was less sated with honours and wealth, while its zeal would be stimulated by the ambition of attaining higher rank and increased fortune in the State service. If the order of knights was also to die out the future of the State was extremely uncertain. It would be impossible to find leaders for the legions in the auxiliary bodies. The spectacle of selfishness thus spreading from a little senatorial oligarchy to the lower and wider strata of society was a matter of most serious import.

The death of
Drusus.

Many people therefore began to assert that the *lex de maritalibus ordinibus* must be remodelled and arranged to punish, not merely celibacy, but childless marriages. The evil, however, was not sufficiently great to justify any immediate action. The fact was noted, and became a subject of criticism and proposal. In the summer, however, Augustus had returned to the valley of the Po, perhaps to be nearer to his two legates who were fighting in Pannonia and Germania, and had reached Ticinum (Pavia). It was there, in the month of August, that he received a terrible piece of news; on the thirteenth Drusus, who had reached with his army a spot which historians have for centuries vainly striven to discover, had broken his leg by a fall from his horse. Unable to command his army, and unwilling to entrust it to a subordinate in the midst of the enemy's country, Drusus had halted, constructed a camp and sent a

* Hirschfeld, *Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der römisch. Verwaltung*, Berlin, 1876, vol. i. p. 247.

message requesting Augustus to send another general who would lead back the legions if his own recovery was delayed.* Fortunately, a short time before this bad news arrived Tiberius had left Pannonia, which was more peaceful than usual in that year, and had arrived at Ticinum. Without escort, accompanied by one guide, and travelling night and day, Tiberius crossed the Alps and covered almost two hundred miles without stopping,† but he hardly reached his brother in time to embrace him once more. At the age of thirty, in the full splendour of glory and good fortune, the young favourite of the gods died, no doubt of his wound; ‡ he had been spared all suspicion of the futility of the work for which he was dying, and all the grief and shame which was soon to envelop the proud fortunes of his family. The death of Drusus plunged Italy into mourning, and his loss was lamented in the remotest countrysides. Unable to fight against destiny, the sorrowing nation wished at least to express its grief by forming an interminable procession, which followed the remains from the death-bed in Germania to the funeral pyre at Rome. The coffin was carried to the winter encampment upon the shoulders of centurions and military tribunes; this pious duty was then undertaken by the decurions and the leading men of the colonies and townships in turn.§ Tiberius marched in front, always on foot, as a sign of grief.|| The little band, with its sad burden, thus crossed the Alps, descended to the valley of the Po and met the grief-stricken parents at Pavia; they then accompanied the corpse to Rome amid the salutations of the inhabitants, who came together from all parts to say their last farewells to the mortal remains of the young man, while deputations from the towns came to present their sympathy to Augustus and Livia.¶ At Rome the funeral was celebrated with the utmost solemnity in the presence of the whole Senate, the

* Livy, *Per.* 140; Dion, *lv.* 1-2; Suetonius, *Claud.* 1.

† Dion, *lv.* 2; Pliny, *vil.* 84; Valerius Maximus, *v.* v. 3; Livy, *Per.* 110.

‡ Dion, *lv.* 2; Valerius Maximus, *v.* v. 3; *Epiced. Drusi*, 89-94.

§ Dion, *lv.* 2; Suetonius, *Claud.* 1.

|| Suetonius, *Tib.* 7.

¶ Tacitus, *Ann.* *iii.* 5; Seneca, *Dial.* *VI.* *iii.* 2.

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whole of the equestrian order and a countless number of citizens.* The body lay in state in the forum between the statues of the Claudii and of the Livii; Tiberius there pronounced the funeral oration, and the knights then carried the body to the Campus Martius, where the funeral pyre was lighted, a sad and peaceful ceremony, in strong contrast to the funeral of Cæsar.† Augustus in his turn delivered a eulogy upon the deceased in the Circus Flaminius; he advised the youths to follow the example of Drusus; in broken words he expressed his hope that the two sons of Agrippa whom he had adopted might resemble Drusus, and he finally prayed the gods that, like Drusus, he might die in the service of the republic.‡ The Senate decided that numerous honours should be paid to the dead man, and that he should be given the title of Germanicus to be hereditary in the family; his mother, Livia, was granted all the privileges conferred upon the mothers of three children, though she had had but two.§

Tiberius and
the new
generation.

Thus Drusus died and was buried. Augustus lamented him longer and more bitterly even than Italy, and not merely by reason of his fatherly affection. In Drusus he lost a helper who could not easily be replaced. The growing decadence of the Senate forced Augustus to rely more and more upon his near relatives or his intimate friends, especially for the responsibilities of foreign policy, where the conduct of business, much more than the domestic policy, required a certain continuity. In the best period of the aristocracy the unity and perseverance of the Senate, its great reputation and its extraordinary solidarity, had enabled it, in spite of constant mistakes, to conduct a continuous foreign policy with success; its enterprises had been successful in every case, though the consuls and prætors responsible for the execution of its orders were changed every year, and though nonentities and incompetent men were employed side by side with capable officers. However difficult the conduct of an affair might be at that time, there were always certain senators to be found who knew the subject,

* *Epic. Drusi*, 202-204.

† *Dion*, lv. 2.

‡ *Ibid.*; *Suetonius, Claud.* 1.

§ *Suetonius, Claud.* 1; *Dion*, lv. 2.

who were able to recall precedents, were willing to study the course of events, to explain them to their colleagues and enable them to choose a feasible plan and to secure a vigorous execution of it. But the Senate was now a prey to incurable apathy, and could not even be convoked in sufficient numbers; it had entrusted the whole conduct of foreign policy to Augustus, as it had neither the wish nor the energy to direct such business. Thus Augustus was obliged to confront the doubtful future alone; he was practically the only man who could guess the formidable difficulties which lay before him and inspire his foreign policy with that continuity which is the soul of any such undertaking. Weak and feeble as he was in spite of his authority, he in place of the Senate was obliged to bear the brunt of failure and to support the apprehensions of irremediable disaster. It was therefore impossible for him to change his officials every year or to use competent or incompetent men without discrimination; he was forced to find men of high intelligence and strong character, to hope that practice would make them capable of dealing with difficult points of foreign policy and of lightening the responsibility too heavy for him to bear unaided. It was, however, difficult for him to find such helpers, especially for the eastern provinces and for Germania. These cold, barbaric and uncivilised regions were less attractive than the east, with its rich provinces and its ancient civilisation. Cæsar's task in Gaul had been far more difficult than that of Lucullus and Pompey in the east; moreover, the Germanic policy and the affairs of Pannonia and Illyria had become of high importance owing to the development of Gaul, and demanded far more self-denial from the Roman aristocracy than eastern affairs had ever required. Self-denial, however, was the one virtue which the new generation chiefly lacked. It was difficult to find young men willing to spend long years away from Rome, always occupied in conflict or negotiations with the enemy, and ever careful to keep Augustus informed of events. He had been fortunate enough to find two such men in his own family, Tiberius and Drusus, and now a jealous fate had robbed him of Drusus. For the affairs of Germania, Gaul, Illyria and Pannonia he must now

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rely upon Tiberius alone. But though Tiberius was no less competent a general than Drusus, he was far less amiable or popular; thus a new difficulty began to appear amid the other complications of the situation. As Rome had undertaken the conquest of Germania, it was obvious that the leader of the republic who was also the leader of the army should be an experienced general, fully informed of the position in Germania. Thus after the death of Drusus Tiberius became not merely the chief helper of Augustus, but the chief man in the empire next to the *princeps*, and his future successor.

Character of
Tiberius.

Unfortunately, though Tiberius was a great general he did not possess those qualities which had secured his brother's popularity; he began to make many enemies, and was unable to live in harmony with Julia. While the young aristocrats of his age continued their effeminate life at Rome in luxury and ease, reading the delightfully immoral works of Ovid, Tiberius was growing harder and more Roman, more inclined to old ideas and habits under the influence of camp life, in the midst of battles, and before the rising tide of barbarism, which he had seen breaking at his feet for years against the feeble frontiers of the vast empire. While his companions at Rome blindly devoted themselves to the enjoyment of peace, he could see the Germanic, Pannonian and Thracian peril rising upon the frontiers, and likely some day to overleap the Alps, unless Rome were able to throw a powerful army in the way. He therefore considered that the most urgent necessity was the increase of the imperial forces, but he did not see how officers and generals for these armies were to be procured. It was useless to turn to the schools of rhetoricians or the Greek philosophers, to the priests of Isis, the shops of the Egyptian merchants or the Syrian courtesans. The only school of war at Rome was the old aristocratic family, with its severe moral conservatism. Traditionalism and conservatism were then one and the same thing. Tiberius, who was an ardent militarist, naturally strove to follow the rigid Roman ideas, customs and feelings, living as he did in the midst of a generation where Hellenic manners were making rapid progress. Though he was an excellent Greek scholar, he was careful in speaking before the Senate never to

use any of the Greek expressions with which cultured men then interlarded their Latin, even when discussing serious subjects.* He declined to be treated by the learned doctors, who invariably came from the east, and preferred the old prescriptions preserved in Roman families.† Though the law of the year 27 B.C. authorised the proconsuls and proprætors to pay their officials, and though it was henceforward necessary to stimulate the patriotism of senators and knights with money, Tiberius disapproved of this innovation, which ran counter to one of the fundamental principles of aristocratic society; ‡ he continued to give provisions in the old style, and never money.§ Like Cato the censor, Tiberius also criticised the growing luxury of the nobility, which spread corruption, vice and effeminacy, and which sent to India and China in exchange for silk and precious stones the money which would have been more wisely employed in strengthening the army and the frontiers.|| He was equally opposed to any excessive increase of public expenditure and of the too frequent distributions of money, which the people claimed with growing urgency.¶ While Augustus administered the finances with some indulgence, Tiberius would have preferred to return to the severe measures

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 71.

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 68. This scorn for doctors was the outcome of opposition to eastern influence, as the most learned doctors almost always came from the east; the fact is proved by a passage from Pliny and by his invective against doctors, which concludes thus: *Ita est profecto: magnitudo populi romani perdidit ritus, vincendoque victi sumus. Paremus externis, et una artium imperatoribus quoque imperaverunt* (N. H. XXIV. i. 4). As this aversion for doctors was still so keen in Pliny's time, we can easily understand the attitude of Tiberius.

‡ On the subject of this reform see vol. iv. p. 141.

§ Suetonius, *Tib.* 46: *comites peregrinationum expeditionumque nunquam salario, cibariis tantum, sustentavit.*

|| Suetonius, *Tib.* 46: *Pecunia parca ac tenax . . .*; Tacitus, *Ann.* iii. 52: *princeps antiquæ parcimonie . . .* See the letter from Tiberius to the Senate which is quoted by Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 53-54), and which clearly sums up his ideas upon luxury. The letter is certainly authentic, and its ideas entirely correspond with the policy of Tiberius. When head of the State after the bitter experience which we shall narrate, though Tiberius considered luxury an abomination, he despaired of being able to stop it, and he must therefore have been in his youth an ardent supporter of the sumptuary laws.

¶ Suetonius, *Tib.* 46 and 47.

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of the old aristocracy, and especially blamed the carelessness which allowed individuals to plunder the property of the State.* In conclusion he not merely required a vigorous application of the social laws of 18, but supported the reform proposed by the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, intended to punish childless marriages and to force knights to rear children.†

Rigid traditionalism, arbitrary severity, and even that harshness which made an incomparable general, could not make Tiberius popular at Rome. The people wanted distributions of money, festivals and bounties, an easy and pleasurable life in politics, government and in their homes; they had no love for this Claudius, the parsimonious administrator who was more economical with the public money than with his own. The new generation was anxious for the complete abolition or the indulgent interpretation of the social laws of 18 B.C., and detested the young man who urged a more vigorous application of them. All who were working the State mines or held State lands were afraid of this old-time aristocrat who placed the interest of the State above their own advantages. Finally, many people were irritated by his cold reserve and the dryness of his manners. Men asked at Rome whether this Claudius thought he was living at the time of the second Punic War, when aristocrats could thus treat their inferiors. Augustus was even obliged to interfere and almost to make excuses for

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 49: *plurimis etiam civitatibus et privatis veteres immunitates et jus metallorum ac vectigalium adempta. . . .* This measure, which Suetonius quotes as proof of the avarice of Tiberius, merely shows that he was anxious to secure a strict administration of the finances and more desirous of increasing the public treasury than of feeding private interests. Tiberius, in fact, in order that the treasury might profit, annulled the *immunitates*, took back the mines (*jus metallorum*) or the lands rented for a vectigal to individuals and to *civitates*. He thus sought to purify the administration of that carelessness and neglect which had prevailed under Augustus. Hence we may suppose that even at this moment Tiberius held strong ideas upon the subject. The characteristic is also in harmony with his character as a whole; in every respect he represents the irreconcilable supporter of aristocratic tradition.

† This I am inclined to believe for the reason that, as we shall see later, the first law against childlessness was proposed in the very year when Tiberius returned from his exile at Rhodes, and when he was in reality the head of the empire, as he had become the colleague of Augustus.

his son-in-law by telling the Senate and the people that these rough manners were the outcome of a defective character, but not of a bad heart.* However, the passionate but firm and taciturn man was still haunted by his love of Agrippina, who had become the wife of Asinius Gallus. Augustus was even obliged to make arrangements to prevent any meeting of the former couple, as such meetings disturbed the mind of the impassive general.† On her side Julia became estranged from her husband, who, though he strove to live in harmony with her, devoted himself to recollections and regrets for another. The birth of a child had apparently brought the couple together, but the child died in a short time and the truce between these contrary characters was forthwith broken.‡ While Tiberius was a jealous supporter of the old Roman ideas and old Roman customs, Julia was more than ever inclined to luxury, to a worldly life and to novelty.

Augustus appointed Tiberius as *legatus* in place of Drusus, and commissioned him with the task of concluding the subjugation of Germania. He had, however, no intention of relying upon Tiberius alone, and had realised the necessity of providing some additional helpers; with a view to this end he began to devote special attention to the education of Caius and Lucius Cæsar, the children of Agrippa and Julia, and his adopted sons. He had himself already taught them to read and write, and had guarded them from the contamination of bad company by keeping them constantly about his person, and even taking them with him on his journeys when he left Rome.§ As it was now time for them to go to school, he made inquiries for a suitable master, and his choice fell upon Verrius Flaccus. His action in this matter was not without significance. In the schools, as elsewhere, the conflict between archaic and modern tendencies was at its height. Some masters, such as Quintus Cæcilius Epirota, were bold enough to read modern or even living authors with their pupils and to use Virgil and Horace || as text-books; others strove to inspire their pupils

The education
of Caius and
Lucius Cæsar.

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 68. The passage is important because it proves indirectly that there was some popular opposition to Tiberius at Rome.

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 7.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Suetonius, *Aug.* 64.

|| Suetonius, *De ill. Gram.* 16.

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with admiration for the past by means of the study of the ancient poets. Of these conservative masters the most famous was Verrius Flaccus, who enjoyed a high reputation both as a teacher and as a scholar and archæologist. He was then occupied with the task of completing the calendar with the dates of the civil festivals, religious solemnities and great events; he was also collecting materials for a great Latin dictionary, which was to include not only archaisms and forgotten words, but was to be an encyclopædia of dying traditions and interesting recollections.* It was doubtless on account of this conservatism that Augustus selected Verrius Flaccus to teach his adopted sons; he hoped that they would acquire a love for the virtues of the past, and to secure the best efforts of their master he gave him remuneration at the rate of 100,000 sesterces a year.† Thus, by a system of education upon strict traditionalist principles Augustus proposed to secure at least two politicians from his own family, even if other noble families neglected their duty to the State. As, however, Caius was now twelve years of age and Lucius only nine, many years must pass before either of them could fill the place which the premature death of Drusus had left empty. Augustus also undertook to supervise the education of Drusus' three sons, in conjunction with the pure and noble Antonia, who desired to remain faithful to the memory of Drusus and to devote herself to the welfare of her children. She therefore wished to remain a widow; nor had Augustus the heart to force a second marriage upon her or to drive her into the kind of posthumous adultery which the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* imposed upon all widows.

Affairs of the
Parthian royal
house.

At this moment a strange and unexpected opportunity enabled Rome to extend her influence in Asia without danger or difficulty to herself, by the mere fact that the Parthian empire was weakened by domestic confusion. The representatives of the Parthian monarch had invited the governor of Syria to the frontier for a conference, and had then made the astounding proposal that the governor should take charge of the four legitimate children of Phraates—Seraspadaues,

* Teuffel Schwabe, *Geschichte der römischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1890, vol. i. p. 609 ff.

† Suetonius, *De ill. Gram.* 17.

Rhodaspes, Vonones and Phraates—with their wives and children, and should send them to Rome to live under the care of Augustus. Thea Mousa, the Italian concubine presented by Cæsar to Phraates, had acquired complete influence over the king, who was now in his dotage, and had persuaded him to leave the throne to her own son; the possibility of civil war was to be prevented by the removal of his legitimate children, who were to be sent into honourable exile on the banks of the Tiber.* This was a most extraordinary step, even for a government conducted by a favourite and a dotard, and naturally met with a most friendly reception from the Roman government. If the son of Thea Mousa became king, it was probable that the empire would be governed by the Roman party and that no disturbances would occur in the East. Moreover, as the Italian public knew nothing of Parthian domestic intrigues, the affair might be represented as a further humiliation of Parthia at the feet of Rome. Finally, Rome would have valuable hostages in her power, and would thus be provided with an admirable pretext for interference in Parthian policy. The proposal was accepted, and the princes were taken to Rome, “as hostages sent by the king of Parthia to the republic,” to quote the explanation of the government. As soon as Augustus had welcomed the new arrivals he displayed them to the people without delay; they were invited to the great games in the Circus Maximus, and after they had been solemnly conducted across the arena, were given seats at the side of Augustus.† Eastern affairs were thus in a very satisfactory state. If

* Mon. Anc. vi. 3-6; Strabo, XVI. i. 28; Josephus, XVIII. ii. 4; Velleius, ii. 94. Strabo enables us to determine the approximate date by his statement that the Roman governor who undertook to convey the children to Rome was called Titius. Josephus, again, tells us that Herod composed the dissensions between Titius, the governor of Syria, and Archelaus, the king of Cappadocia, before his third journey to Rome, which some place in 10 B.C. and others in 8 B.C., but which was certainly undertaken about this time. Obviously the date when the children were transferred cannot be more than approximate.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 43. Augustus, in the Mon. Anc. vi. 5, styles them *pignora*; Suetonius, *Aug.* 21 and 43, and Velleius, ii. 98, call them *obsides*. Thus it is clear that attempts were made to represent them as hostages, whereas the statements of Strabo and Josephus show that they had been sent to Rome for a very different reason. Rome could hardly have forced the Parthians to send hostages.

8 B.C. Tiberius could force the Germans to make a final and permanent submission, the empire might look forward to a long period of peace. Piso had almost concluded the subjugation of Thrace, while Pannonia and Dalmatia were apparently pacified.

The position of Augustus.

For these reasons Augustus wished to betake himself to Gaul, that he might direct the operations of Tiberius from a nearer base. Before he could start, another question awaited decision. At the end of the year 8 he would have concluded twenty years' service as head of the republic, while his quinquennial powers would also expire. Surrounded as he was with difficulties and confronted by a great deficiency of capable helpers, it is not unlikely that his habitual prudence induced him for a moment to contemplate the possibility of abandoning the supreme power and its responsibilities to others.* Twenty years of government might well weary even the most energetic and ambitious of men and make him anxious for some little peace and rest. But the situation was beset by difficulties which, if not obvious, were profound. It was clear, even if Augustus retired, that it would be impossible to re-establish the old republic without a *princeps* and under the consuls, and thus to close the breach of constitutional continuity begun in the year 27. At the outset the principate had been a provisional arrangement for the re-establishment of peace and order; it had now become an integral part of the empire. For twenty years towns, provinces, allies, subjects and foreign states had learned to look upon one man as the head of the State and to regard Augustus as personifying Rome; he was universally revered, beloved or feared; all had done business with him, and all had set their hopes on him and looked to him with confidence. If his place were not filled by some one of equal authority the whole structure of agreements, alliances, protectorates and submissions which twenty years of war and

* Dion, liv. 6: *τὴν τε ἡγεμονίαν, καίπερ ἀφαιεὶς ὡς ἔλεγε . . . ἀπὸ δῆθεν αἰτίας ὑπέστη*. . . . Dion's ironical *δήθεν* expresses his doubt of this assertion, but it was probably more true than he supposed, living as he did long after the Augustan period. Twenty years of such work might have exhausted a stronger man than Augustus, and it is not uncommon for politicians to demand rest after they have reached a certain age.

diplomacy had raised would collapse incontinently. It was, for instance, difficult to foresee the course of events in Germania if Augustus withdrew into private life. Obviously the Senate, careless, apathetic and disunited, was no longer competent to conduct a vast and intricate foreign policy. Indeed, for this purpose a magistrate annually elected was useless; he must be appointed for a long term of office, be capable of watching the frontiers, be informed of every change and give a rapid decision upon every question. Thus Augustus could not retire unless he provided a successor able to take his place. Such a man there was, and for the reasons above stated the new *princeps* could be no other than Tiberius. It was precisely this fact that introduced a new and most paradoxical difficulty into the complications of the position. The unpopularity of Tiberius was steadily increasing. The soldiers, indeed, adored their Biberius, as they nicknamed him, in allusion to his one failing, his fondness for wine; * in camp he was respected as a general whose severity was tempered by justice, courage and energy, while he was admired as a frank and right-minded patrician by his officers and the few intimate friends about his person.† But public feeling at Rome was very different; the degenerate nobility who wished to enjoy the privileges and to evade the burdens of their rank, the politicians who enriched themselves at the expense of the treasury, the bachelors who were infuriated by the marriage laws, which denied them the right of inheritance, the childless households dreading spoliation in their turn, all feared this energetic prince, whose power naturally increased as Augustus grew older, and who seemed likely to become a more stringent ruler than Augustus himself. Even those who regarded Augustus as unduly conservative believed that the government of Tiberius would be a national calamity to be avoided at all costs. Thus a coalition party in opposition to him was gradually formed in the Senate and among the knights and people. The only solution of these difficulties was the re-election of Augustus, which would satisfy the people

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 42.

† Velleius Paterculus shows what enthusiasm Tiberius could inspire among those who had known him intimately.

8 B.C. as being the lesser of two evils. Augustus was therefore obliged to accept a prolongation of his presidency, not for five, but for ten years. Possibly the length of this term may be explained as dictated by the general fear of Tiberius; a respite of ten years was thus assured.

The law upon
slave evidence.
Augustus in
Gaul. The
conquest of
Germania.

Augustus then started for Gaul, after he had approved a reform in legal procedure which implied a further defeat for the aristocracy. This was a law permitting the torture of slaves in suits aimed at their masters. The law provided for a kind of fictitious sale of the slave to the State or to himself; the slave could then be examined, as he was no longer the property of the accused. This strange legal quibble had been invented to satisfy the people who protested against the general immunity of the rich. While some approved of the law, others criticised it severely,* and with good reason. What Augustus had given with one hand he now took away with the other; his desperate efforts to secure the moral and economic restoration of the aristocracy gave a terrible weapon into the hands of the greedy and jealous middle classes, of poor scribblers and pushing upstarts: by scandal, calumny and perjury they might now destroy the honour and the fortunes of the nobility. No aristocracy worth the name would ever allow slaves to give evidence against their masters. Thus the Roman aristocracy was more than ever anxious to recover its prestige by some striking success in the German policy. No sooner had Augustus reached Gaul than Tiberius crossed the Rhine at the head of an army, and this was enough. The Germans had been profoundly discouraged and intimidated by the march of Drusus, and every tribe, with the exception of the Sigambri, sent to ask what terms of surrender would be granted. Augustus refused to begin negotiations until the Sigambri had sent in their ambassadors; the latter yielded to the general request, and sent the flower of their nobility, but Augustus refused to grant any concessions: he demanded an unconditional surrender, and kept the ambassadors of the Sigambri as prisoners, a dishonourable stratagem which deprived this brave tribe of their leaders. Civilised nations are often as

* Dion, iv. 5.

false and faithless as barbarians are ruthless. The Germans 8 B.C. surrendered.*

Thus within four years Germania had been conquered as far as the Elbe, and the great enterprise conceived by Cæsar had been accomplished by his son. Thrace had been finally subjugated by Piso after three years' warfare; Pannonia and Dalmatia had been pacified; while in the east the Parthian empire had apparently submitted humbly to the power of Rome. The Roman domination thus remained unimpaired, notwithstanding the decadence of the Senate and of the aristocracy, in spite of moral degeneration and economic confusion. After his return Augustus found time to reform the calendar and to remove certain inconveniences which Cæsar's reforms had left. It was on this occasion that the eighth month of the year received the name of Augustus, which it has borne to the present day.† The task of governing, however, was one of increasing difficulty, as the number of capable politicians steadily diminished. In that year Mæcenas died. Augustus had not found him so energetic a coadjutor as Agrippa, but in him he lost a faithful and judicious friend to whom he could turn for advice in any difficulty.‡ Moreover, relations between Julia and Tiberius were becoming strained, and for the most serious reasons. Sempronius Gracchus, the fashionable aristocrat, who was suspected of paying too much attention to Julia while she was Agrippa's wife, apparently profited by the breach between her and her second husband to renew his intimacy.§ It is at least certain that Julia and Tiberius had agreed to separate,|| and that Augustus, probably as some consolation for these worries, granted Tiberius the honour of a triumph and secured his election as consul for the year 7; an interval of five instead of the legal ten years had elapsed since his former consulship, but Augustus passed a *senatus consultum* in his favour to shorten the interval by five years in the case of every office. In this year also Horace died on October 27.

The next year, in which Tiberius celebrated his first triumph

* Dion, iv. 6.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Dion, iv. 7.

§ Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 53.

|| Suetonius, *Tib.* 7: *mox discedit et aliquanto gravius ut etiam perpetuo secubaret.*

Discord
between Julia
and Tiberius.

7 B.C.

Great fire at Rome and its consequences.

and held the consulship, was undisturbed by war. A revolt in Germania seemed imminent at one moment. Tiberius resumed his position as *legatus* and hastened to the Rhine, but was able to report that no danger existed and to return immediately to Rome.* The only cause of disturbance at Rome was a great fire, which broke out in the neighbourhood of the forum and caused wide destruction owing to the habitual carelessness of the *ædiles*. The outbreak was generally regarded as the work of a band of debtors, who thus proposed to secure the abolition of their debts; † in any case the calamity induced Augustus to devote his attention to the reorganisation of the city government, for which purpose he made a further addition to the aristocratic constitution. For twenty years the aristocracy had entirely neglected the fire and paving departments, and it was therefore necessary to look elsewhere for men of energy to undertake these duties. Augustus, however, would not abandon the principle of election to office, which is an integral part of a republican constitution, nor did he wish to create a new department. In many quarters of the city the people, citizens and foreigners, freedmen and serfs, had been long accustomed to choose men who were commissioned to prepare the *ludi compitales* and the other festivals of the quarter, whether religious or secular.‡ Hitherto these duties had been the private business of a number of citizens; Augustus proposed to transform them into a separate and permanent magistracy for the whole of Rome, and to give them wider and more definite powers. He therefore proposed a law dividing Rome into fourteen districts; over each of these

* Dion, iv. 8.

† *Ibid.*; a strange explanation, as it is difficult to see how debtors could have hoped to escape their obligations by burning their property in an age when insurance companies did not exist. In any case the event is important as a kind of precedent to the more famous conflagration attributed to Nero. We see that even in the year 7 B.C. the people were inclined to explain the conflagrations frequent at Rome as the work of malicious design.

‡ See C. I. L. vi. 1324; this inscription, in 23 B.C., refers to the *magistri vici*. Asconius, in *Pison*, p. 6, ed. Kiessling-Schöll, perhaps provides another proof that the *magistri vici* existed before this reform of Augustus. So little is heard of them before the reform that we may conclude that they had no official character and that their chief function was to organise the local festivals.

would be placed annually a prætor, ædile or tribune selected by lot.* Each of these districts was to be subdivided into a number of *vici*, or wards, of which there were 265 in Pliny's time.† In each *vicus* the people, citizens, foreigners, freemen and freedmen, were to elect a *magister*, or ward-leader; he would supervise the cult of the Lares and organise the festivals of the ward, and would also watch over public security and provide a fire brigade, for which purpose he could use the public slaves placed at the disposal of the ædiles.‡ In almost every ward the leaders chosen were freedmen, foreigners or plebeians of wealth and reputation; by the principles of the republican constitution they were not allowed to receive pay, but to stimulate their energies and to reward their trouble they were allowed to wear the *toga prætexta* and to be accompanied by two lictors upon certain occasions.§ These very modest distinctions would flatter the pride of the numerous nonentities chosen to act. Thus around the cult of the Lares was organised a department of roads and ways and a fire brigade; it was an attempt to make the new city administration an integral part of the old religious tradition, and to induce the more energetic and intelligent plebeians and freedmen to serve the State gratuitously by the offer of personal distinctions, which would create a petty plebeian nobility amid the vast and swarming population of the metropolis.

Augustus might have counted this year as one of the calmest and happiest of his life—and the happy years that followed it

The breach
between Julia
and Tiberius.

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 30: *Spatium urbis in regiones vicosque divisit.* . . . This passage also refers to the administrative reform of which Dion speaks (lv. 8). Proof of this statement is the fact that both historians speak of the fourteen wards, redistributed annually by lot, as Suetonius says, among the *annui magistratus*—*i.e.*, among the ædiles, prætors and tribunes; such is the more detailed account of Dion. Dion also says that the *συνεταρχοί* were entitled to wear the *toga prætexta*, and Livy (XXXIV. vii. 2) says the same of the *magistri vicorum*. Hence the *συνεταρχοί* of Dion are the *magistri vicorum* of Suetonius. As usual, each historian gives special details, and by comparing the texts we can define the functions of the new magistrates with some exactitude.

† Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* lii. 66; C. I. L. vi. 975, where many names of *vici* appear.

‡ Dion, lv. 8.

§ *Ibid.*; Livy, XXXIV. vii. 2.

7 B.C.

were few indeed—had it not been for the discord between Julia and Tiberius, which was accentuated to an alarming degree by a political quarrel between the youthful nobility and the old conservative or traditionalist party. Tiberius can hardly have been blind to the fact that Julia was deceiving him; some suspicions, at least, he must have entertained. Now Tiberius was one of the most determined members of the puritan party which had forced Augustus to introduce the great social laws of the year 18, which incessantly demanded a stringent application of them and continually regretted the moral laxity prevalent in the noble families. So strong a conservative, puritan and supporter of tradition as Tiberius could not possibly continue to live with a wife suspected of adultery, seeing that the *lex de adulteriis* obliged him to denounce or to divorce her.* He must now set the example of that Roman courage which he had urged so strongly upon others. On the other hand, Julia was the favourite daughter of Augustus, who had advanced Tiberius to honour and fame at an early age. To accuse or divorce Julia without further ado was impossible for this reason; such a scandal in the household of Augustus would have provoked serious political difficulties. Tiberius therefore hesitated, in spite of his habitual resolution. But Julia, who knew her husband, may have feared that her position alone was insufficient to defend her against the pride, the puritanism and the arbitrary will of a Claudius; she realised that her best means of defence was to attack the political power and position of Tiberius, and she therefore joined his numerous enemies among the younger nobility. Her action was, for many reasons, opportune. Augustus was nearly sixty years of age; his health had always been delicate,

* All this is understood in the brief phrase of Suetonius (*Tib.* 10): *dubium, uxoris lædio, quam neque criminari aut dimittere audeat, neque ultra perferre possit.* The statement that Tiberius dared not *criminari* implies that he suspected her of wrongdoing, and this could only be adultery: compare the words of Tacitus concerning Julia and Sempronius Gracchus. Tiberius had to choose whether he would disobey the *lex Julia*, which forced him to punish the adulterous wife, or would begin a scandal unprecedented at Rome, which would also involve political complications. For this reason he *dared* not bring an accusation.

and, as every one knew, was only preserved by constant attention and a strictly regulated mode of life. It seemed probable that he would soon follow Mæcenas and Agrippa, and the question of his successor as president became ever more urgent. The answer was invariably the same; Tiberius was the only possible successor, unless his accession was prevented by fomenting popular dislike to him, by turning to account his stubbornness and his other defects, and thus raising obstacles in his path. Thus Julia became the centre of a youthful clique in opposition to Tiberius, including Marcus Lollius, Caius Sempronius Gracchus, Appius Claudius, Julius Antonius, Quintus Crispinus and a Scipio.

Emboldened by the support and countenance of Julia, they began, with her help, a desperate onslaught of calumny against Tiberius.* With inflexible pride, Tiberius disdained to notice the first attack. But at the outset of the year 6 his enemies took advantage of Julia's willingness to uphold their views before Augustus, and began a more audacious attempt; in opposition to Tiberius they began to support Caius Cæsar, the son of Agrippa and of Julia, whom Augustus had adopted and who was then fourteen years of age. He was announced as the proper successor to Augustus, that he might afterwards be brought forward as a rival to Tiberius and his claims. They proposed a law to secure the election of Caius as consul in 754 A.U.C., in which year Caius would have reached the age of twenty. This astounding proposition thus proposed an absurd anomaly as a culmination of the efforts which a generation had made to restore the old aristocratic constitution. The appointment of a boy of fourteen as consul was inconceivable, and such an absurdity did but excite the ridicule of men like Tiberius.

* Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 53: *traditam Tiberio, pervicax adulter [Sempronius Gracchus] contumacia et odiis in maritum accendebat, litteraque, quas Julia patri Augusto cum insectatione Tiberii scripsit, a Graccho composita credebantur.* The names of Julia's friends who are given as forming the nucleus of the party opposed to Tiberius are taken chiefly from Velleius Paterculus (ii. c. 4), who mentions Iulus Antonius, Quintus Crispinus, Appius Claudius, Sempronius Gracchus and Scipio among Julia's accomplices who were condemned with her; in happier days they must have been her intimate friends. The incident related by Suetonius (*Tib.* 12) of which we shall speak later, proves that Marcus Lollius was among the enemies of Tiberius.

6 B.C.

But Julia and her friends were obviously counting on the general fear that the government of Augustus would be succeeded by a rule of greater severity, parsimony and conservatism; they set their hopes upon the animosity of all who had suffered under the social laws of the year 18, upon the fear of childless families that the law might punish their remissness, upon the general desire for a more liberal and more lavish government. In spite of the teaching of Verrius Flaccus, Caius Cæsar had adopted the tastes of the new generation in preference to those of the old, and might therefore be considered to represent these varied aspirations. Moreover, Augustus himself had been consul at the age of twenty.* Why should the same privilege be withheld from his son? Thus the youth would immediately become a prominent figure, and would be ready to favour those who had secured him so high an honour, while the hopes of all who feared the prospect of government by Tiberius would be set upon Caius, whose very name evoked sympathy, and who had received the acclamations of the people on several occasions. A Julius was set up against a harsh and arrogant Claudius, who was no less unpopular than the rest of

* Suetonius (*Aug.* 64) seems to say that Augustus supported this law in favour of Caius, as he had supported laws in favour of Marcellus, Tiberius and Drusus. But Dion Cassius (*lv.* 9) gives a different and much more probable account; he says that Augustus at first opposed the proposal energetically and that some people pressed it strongly (*ἐπειδὴ τε καὶ ὅς ἐπέκυρτο εἰ*). As he objected, we may assume that the proposal did not emanate from him; this is likely, as there is no obvious reason why he should have granted this privilege, which could not be justified as in the cases of Marcellus, Drusus and Tiberius. Generally speaking, it was so contrary to the whole policy of Augustus that for this reason alone, apart from Dion's text, the somewhat confused statements of Suetonius are open to suspicion. On the other hand, we have two main reasons for believing that the proposal to make Caius consul was an intrigue aimed at Tiberius. Firstly, it is clear that the nomination of Caius was one of the reasons which induced Tiberius to leave Rome and go to Rhodes (see Dion, *lv.* 9; Suetonius, *Tib.* 10); he must therefore have been deeply hurt by the proposal. Secondly, Dion tells us (*lv.* 9) that when Augustus withdrew his opposition to the law in favour of Caius he immediately gave full compensation to Tiberius by appointing him to the position formerly occupied by Agrippa. Such compensation implies that Tiberius had been wounded by the nomination of Caius. These two considerations have led me to adopt the view above stated, and seem to me to explain this obscure incident and also the downfall of Julia.

his family, and the people would be speedily fascinated by the dazzling splendour of this great name. 6 B.C.

Wild as this project must have seemed to any true Roman, it proved unexpectedly successful. The first step was to lay the proposal before the people and the Senate, and it was naturally presented by Julia's friends, not as a studied insult to Tiberius, but as an act of homage to Augustus. The people and the Senate were ever ready to express their devotion to the *princeps* and their admiration for the name of Cæsar, and received the proposal with enthusiasm; the many who distrusted Tiberius welcomed it, while Julia pleaded her son's cause with Augustus. The only initial opposition to this piece of madness came from Augustus himself. His motives are not difficult to discover. The privileges which he had secured for Marcellus, Drusus and Tiberius were not only less important than those demanded for Caius, but had been justified by reasons of state and by previous services; it was impossible to nominate a youth as consul who might eventually prove incompetent. In fact, this absurd proposal, engineered by the secret machinations of a little clique, shook the very basis of the constitution and nullified the efforts expended upon its restoration during the past twenty years; it was a deadly insult to Tiberius, who angrily requested Augustus to oppose his enemies with all his influence. While he had been fighting on the Rhine the idle young men who wasted their time at theatres and over Ovid proposed to set up a child of fourteen against a veteran soldier like himself and calmly to rob him of the fruits of all his toil. Augustus must not permit the infliction of so grave an insult or the hatching of plots so deadly to the State. Augustus, in fact, began with an emphatic protest; he delivered a vigorous speech before the Senate, characterising the proposal as ridiculous and asserting that a consul must have reached at least years of discretion.* But the party pushed their plan: the people, with habitual stupidity, insisted upon having a child-consul; the evil-wishers of Tiberius were influential and active in the Senate; the people who loved the name of Cæsar and hated that of Claudius ardently

Progress of
the intrigue
against
Tiberius.

* Dion, iv. 9.

6 B.C. supported the proposal; while Julia, as may be imagined, intrigued to secure her revenge. Tiberius, as usual, remained impassive. Augustus was obliged to yield, and the *comitia* of the year 6 were allowed to nominate Caius Cæsar as consul five years beforehand. But Augustus realised that a plot against Tiberius was in progress, and immediately procured him, by way of compensation, the powers of a tribune for five years; this implied that Tiberius became his colleague, as Agrippa had been. Augustus then sent him to Armenia, where a revolt had broken out upon the death of Tigranes.*

Tiberius
resolves to
retire.

But Tiberius was a Claudius and an uncompromising aristocrat. He did not possess the adroitness, the patience or the scepticism of the grandson of the money-lender of Velletri. He endured the insults of his enemies in silence for some time, but he lost patience when Augustus, yielding, no doubt, to the solicitations of Julia and her party, inflicted this additional affront upon him. He would not struggle with enemies beneath his contempt; he could not live with a wife suspected of adultery, for he was the most rigid of puritans and would not be classed among the indulgent husbands open to prosecution under the *lex de adulteriis*; nor, again, could he trust Augustus, who seemed unwilling to support him against his foes and to prefer the counsels of his usual opportunism. Tiberius therefore withdrew in sullen anger; he uttered no recriminations and would hear of no compromise; the compensation offered by Augustus was disdainfully refused. Instead of going to Armenia, he informed his father-in-law that he was worn out and requested permission to retire into private life in the famous little republic of the island of Rhodes. He knew that he was the only general capable of conducting the Germanic policy, and he expected that he would be urged to return as soon as the indispensable nature of his services became evident. He might then make what conditions he pleased.

* Dion, iv. 9:

CHAPTER XI

THE EXILE OF JULIA

Tiberius retires; his pretexts and reasons—Results of his departure—Caius Cæsar as *princeps iuventutis*—The triumph of Julia—Relaxation of the administration—The infamy attributed to Julia—Augustus and the young nobility—The policy of Augustus in Germania—New sources of revenue—The death of Herod; his will—The popularity of Caius and Lucius Cæsar—Herod's will at Rome—The revolt of Judea—New organisation of Palestine—Complications in Armenia—The annexation of Paphlagonia—The forum of Augustus and the temple of Mars Ultor—Ovid and Caius Cæsar—The adultery of Julia—Augustus deals with the case—The scandal and the sentences.

THE resolution of Tiberius caused Augustus deep anxiety; without Tiberius he could not see how the Germanic policy was to be carried on. Augustus therefore made every effort to dissuade him from his project: he requested the mother of Tiberius to beg him to reconsider his decision; he lamented his isolation before the Senate and made entreaties to Tiberius in person.* Tiberius remained inexorable, and Augustus finally declared that he would not allow the Senate to grant the authorisation for departure which he required as the colleague of Augustus. Tiberius then shut himself up in his house and threatened to starve himself to death. Three days thus passed, and on the fourth day Augustus allowed the Senate to grant Tiberius permission to depart wherever he pleased.† He immediately went to Ostia, and after taking leave of his most intimate friends he started for Rhodes with a

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 10: *neque aut matri suppliciter precanti, aut vitrico, deseri se etiam in Senatu conquerenti, veniam dedit.*

† *Ibid.*: *Quin et, pertinacius retinentibus, cibo per quadriulvum abstinuit,*

6 B.C. small number of friends and servants,* in the style of a private person.

The rights and wrongs of the contending parties.

Thus, at the age of thirty-six, wounded in his self-esteem and disgusted with Julia and with her party, who had nothing in common with himself, Tiberius resigned his honours and left Rome to retire into private life. Augustus on his side had good reason to complain of his conduct. If Tiberius had been hurt by the intrigues of his enemies and by the honours given to Caius, yet Augustus had offered him full and sufficient compensation and had showered upon him proofs of unbounded confidence. In any case it was unreasonable for Tiberius to wreak his vengeance upon Augustus and the republic, as the insults he had suffered proceeded from another source. The champion of traditionalism, the follower of Cato the censor, showed that he was not himself exempt from the universal selfishness which would readily sacrifice the public welfare to personal interests or to personal pride. On the other hand, Tiberius had reason to complain; Julia and Augustus between them had placed him in a hopelessly inconsistent position. He could not urge simplicity of life upon others and allow Julia to set the fashion in luxury at Rome. He could not tolerate adultery in his own house and insist upon the stringent enforcement of the *lex de adulteriis* in other cases. He could not protest against the decadence of republicanism and allow a foolish populace to confer the consular insignia upon a child. Such action would have given real grounds for mockery to his pet aversion, the *vétrepos*, the gilded youths of his age. Tiberius would not endanger the prestige which he had won by many years of patient toil and of irreproachable life, merely because Augustus declined to punish his daughter's wrongdoing or to oppose the party which attempted to corrupt the mind of Caius Caesar by a ridiculous grant of honours. Augustus, in short, was neglecting the public interest to satisfy an opportunism which Tiberius declined to recognise.

Consequences of Tiberius' departure.

The spirit of the age was full of such inextricable inconsistencies that few could follow unswervingly the doctrines which they professed, and in every political or social struggle some

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 10.

justification could be found for the most divergent points of view. Though Tiberius was not wholly to be blamed for the breach, the consequences of his departure proved disastrous to himself and to his party. His decision produced an effect precisely opposite to that which he had expected; the chief advantage was reaped by his enemies, the party of Julia, Caius Cæsar and the young nobles, who were surprised to find themselves suddenly relieved of their most formidable opponent and in triumphant possession of the battlefield. The decision of Tiberius was generally regarded as a blow aimed at Augustus; public feeling was against him * and considered him as solely responsible for the rupture. The misunderstanding was the easier as the public was never accurately informed of the motives which induced Tiberius to leave Rome.† Moreover, if Tiberius intended to influence public opinion by his departure and to prove that he was indispensable, his action was very ill-timed. The strongest champion of traditionalism had abandoned the State at the most critical moment; for twenty years men had longed impatiently for a more liberal and a more generous government, and their aspirations were about to find open expression. The explosion was precipitated by the

* There is no text which definitely states the nature of public opinion upon Tiberius' departure, but the course of after-events seems to prove that it was adverse. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why the party of Caius Cæsar should have ventured to propose for him all the honours which we shall mention, or why Tiberius was unable to return and resume his governmental work for so long a time. His long absence cannot be explained as due solely to the indignation of Augustus. If public feeling had been favourable to Tiberius, Augustus would have yielded far more readily, especially when it was understood that Tiberius was needed to confront the dangers arising in the provinces.

† The vagueness of the explanations given by the historians incline us to believe that the public never knew exactly why Tiberius had gone. Velleius Paterculus (II. xcix. 3), *dissimulata causa consilii sui*, shows that Tiberius himself gave no reason for his action. Velleius and Suetonius, however, state that Tiberius afterwards declared that his departure was due to his wish to avoid any rivalry with Caius and Lucius Cæsar. Velleius Paterculus, II. xciv. 2: . . . *cujus causæ mor detectæ sunt*; Suetonius, *Tib.* 10: . . . *quam causam et ipse, sed postea dedit*. It is thus probable that Augustus did not attempt to enlighten popular ignorance. The explanation given later by Tiberius is obviously false; he could have had no scruples upon the possibility that he might overshadow Caius and Lucius, seeing that their father had himself requested him to remain.

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breach between Augustus and Tiberius and the departure of the latter. In vexation with Tiberius, and convinced that he must make some concession to the new tendency of public feeling, Augustus turned to Julia's party and to the young nobility: the conservatives rapidly lost ground; the ideas and aspirations of the rising generation became triumphant, and were welcomed in the Senate, in the *comitia* and by the public with no less zeal than conservatism had been acclaimed thirty years before. The youthful Cæsar soon became the idol of the multitude and the cynosure of Italy, much rather than the distant island in the Ægean Sea, where the greatest general of the age was living a simple life with one town house and a little country villa.* Honours were showered upon Caius. On January 1, or at any rate early in the year 5 Augustus presented him to the people at a great ceremony in the forum; the Senate granted him the right to be present at senatorial banquets and sessions; † the knights were anxious to show him equal devotion, and nominated him first decurion of the first *turma*, gave him the title of *princeps juventutis* and presented him with a lance and silver buckler; ‡ the pontiffs made him a member of their *collegium*.§ On this occasion

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 11.

† Zonaras, x. 25. The passage in the *Mon. Anc.* ii. 46, seems to show that the Senate conferred these honours upon Caius on the day when Augustus presented him to the people, and consequently after he had been elected consul by the people; this is against the statement of other historians. Dion also (lv. 9) says that it happened later: *καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο*. . . . It is noteworthy that Dion, in the same passage, says that Augustus authorised Caius to be present at the Senatorial sessions, whereas the *Mon. Anc.* states that the Senate itself passed a decree granting this privilege. This is another case in which we can show that Dion, for brevity or from carelessness, attributes directly to Augustus acts which were carried out by the Senate and were simply proposed or suggested by Augustus. This instance justifies the supposition that Dion, under the influence of the ideas of his age, often commits the same mistake and that he personifies the State in Augustus, and makes no mention of other constitutional bodies which had lost all importance in Dion's time, but were still operative in the time of Augustus.

‡ *Mon. Anc.* iii. 4-6. We do not know whether the knights passed their measures at the same time as the Senate or at a later date.

§ Dion (lv. 4) says that Augustus gave Caius a priestly office; inscriptions show that he was a *pontifex*; Dion therefore refers to the pontificate. With his usual brevity and inaccuracy, he represents

Augustus offered no objection. Tiberius, the only sensible member of the old conservative party, had abandoned him, and he saw no possible advantage in opposition to the tide of public opinion, which grew daily stronger. Objections on his part would arouse general dissatisfaction and merely gain the approval of some few patricians who still clung to their antiquated prejudices. Roman admiration for Caius soon spread throughout Italy; * statues and inscriptions were set up in every district to commemorate the unprecedented fact that he had been nominated consul at the age of fourteen.†

The effects of this change in public feeling soon became apparent in the administration. The strict economy which Tiberius had striven to introduce was succeeded by a period of lavish expenditure. The sums allocated to the purchase of corn for Rome were increased,‡ as also was the expenditure upon public works and shows, and this at a moment when the exchequer could hardly bear the crushing weight of the military expenses, which had grown steadily and automatically. The wars with the poverty-stricken barbarians of the western provinces were very expensive and by no means profitable. By the military law of the year 14, which had been passed without sufficient deliberation and forethought, it was necessary to pay the expenses of disbanding a sixteenth of the army. This was a formidable burden, though many attempts were made to diminish it, by prolonging service beyond the term of sixteen years.§ Finally, the higher classes of Roman society

Increased
expenditure
and licence

this office as conferred by Augustus, who had no power to do anything of the kind. The college of pontiffs recruited its numbers by co-opting new members.

* C. I. L. xl. 3040.

† C. I. L. vi. 897, 3748; *Bulletino Commiss. Archeol. municip.* 1889, pp. 57 and 140.

‡ These expenses were, in fact, reduced in the year 2: Dion, iv. 10.

§ The *lex militaris* of the year 14 and the pensions which it granted to discharged soldiers became a heavy burden to the State, as is proved by the fact that on four different occasions Augustus was obliged to provide money from his own purse (Mon. Anc. iii. 28-33), and eventually to found the *ararium militare*. Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 17) shows that in A.D. 14, after the foundation of the *ararium militare*, the soldiers had never been discharged at the close of the regular term; the same conditions must have prevailed before that date, to an even greater extent. The question became urgent in A.D. 5, as we shall see. Cf. Dion, iv. 23.

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were rapidly pervaded by a spirit of self-enjoyment, licence, and even depravity, which overwhelmed the last remnants of the traditionalism aroused thirty years before by the civil wars. Julia was the leader of the new movement. Beautiful, clever, cultured, a lover of literature, entirely free now that she had driven Tiberius from Rome, entirely dominated by Sempronius Gracchus, Iulus Antonius and their friends, flattered and courted by the fashionable and lettered aristocracy, Julia introduced a new spirit into Roman female society, which had hitherto been represented by the consistent austerity of Livia; wit and worldliness, luxury, pleasure, frivolity, sensuality and scepticism now became the order of the day. Heedless of her father's admonitions, she spent money lavishly, and her dresses and personal adornment were in defiance of all Roman tradition. She did not hesitate to appear at the theatre surrounded by her young friends, and the people were then able to contemplate the present and the future when they saw Livia accompanied by grave and aged senators and Julia surrounded by a swarm of noisy and insolent young dandies.* She seems to have welcomed not only the attentions of Sempronius Gracchus, but also those of others, such as Iulus Antonius.† Waverers were more strongly influenced by the example of Julia than by the menaces of the law or by magisterial warnings. If the daughter of the president himself could indulge in such excesses, why should other women refrain? Augustus seemed to authorise his daughter's actions by the fact that he made no attempt to check them. Thus the austerity of earlier years was again relaxed; the public was tired of scandal, weary of the efforts which austerity of life demands, and again abandoned itself to indulgence; Cassius Severus found his occupation gone. The judges had renewed

* See Macrobius, *Sat. II. 5: Super jocis ac moribus Julia Augusti filia.*

† Velleius, ii. c. 4-5, mentions five men as Julia's lovers—Iulus Antonius, Quintius Crispinus, Appius Claudius, Sempronius Gracchus and a certain Scipio. It is impossible to say how far his statement is true. Besides Sempronius Gracchus, whose name is mentioned by Tacitus, as we have seen, Iulus Antonius seems certainly to have been Julia's lover, for the reason that after the final scandal he committed suicide. He must therefore have been deeply compromised.

the practice of clemency; * the sumptuary and other legislation intended to force the aristocracy to observe their duties had become inoperative; in every class the taste for luxury and self-enjoyment was paramount and contagious. The Roman plebs began to demand free distributions of wine, as if the task of providing them with bread were not already sufficiently difficult; † Ovid, the fashionable poet, gave free rein to his voluptuous imagination, while the idols of the cosmopolitan plebs were Julia, the fair and extravagant adulteress, and Caius Cæsar, an idle and inexperienced young man. ‡ The plebs regarded Julia's son and Augustus' daughter as typical of the coming system, which would be more generous in its provision of money, bread, wine and games. A few men of the upper and middle classes were still attached to the old puritan and traditionalist ideas; but it was impossible for them to advance their views in the face of this profound change in public opinion, at a time when the government of Augustus was inclined to a conciliatory policy. Reduced to impotence, they could but utter furious protests against every one and everything, and regret that Tiberius, the most eminent general of Rome, should have been driven by a light woman to the study of literature and philosophy at Rhodes. Livia doubtless added her voice to these protests. She may not have committed the crimes of which tradition has accused her, in her efforts to secure the return of Tiberius; at the same time she must have longed for the presence of her son, who represented her ideas and those of her family, and she doubtless offered what opposition she could to Augustus. But even with her support

* Macrobius, *Sat.* II. iv. 9: *cum multi, Severo Cassio accusante, absolventur et architectus fori Augusti expectationem operis diu traheret, ille jocatus est [Augustus]: Vellem Cassius et meum forum accusasset.* Probably Augustus complained of the slowness of the architect, and showed his impatience at the moment when the work was nearly ended but seemed unlikely to attain final completion. The forum of Augustus was inaugurated in the year 2 B.C., and it is therefore likely that many of those accused by Cassius were acquitted at this time. This is a further proof of the change of feeling to which I have referred.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 42. The date, as usual, cannot be derived from Suetonius, and I therefore place the incident here conjecturally.

‡ We shall find the plebs making great demonstrations on behalf of Julia after her condemnation to exile.

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the little band of conservatives and friends of Tiberius could do nothing except depict the corruption of the age in the darkest colours and disseminate secretly the vilest fictions concerning the leaders of the opposition and Julia. It was probably at this time that those disgraceful legends arose which Julia's downfall made historical. If the friends of Livia and Tiberius could be believed, Julia was indeed a monster; her lovers were infinite, and her nightly orgies indescribable. She was said to have surrendered to a lover one night at the foot of the rostra, the spot whence her father had promulgated the *lex de adulteriis*, to have placed a garland upon the statue of Marsyas whenever she took a new lover, and to have gone about the forum at night dressed as a prostitute, following young men of any rank and receiving money in return for her favours.*

Thus the fact that Tiberius had exiled himself to Rhodes was soon forgotten, while Augustus himself, against his personal inclinations, was obliged to find room in his system of government for some representatives of the younger generation, who were thus allowed to modify the political and social tendencies of the age with their own ideas and tendencies. It is also certain

* Velleius Paterculus, ii. c. 3; Seneca, *de Benef.* vi. 32; Dion, iv. 10; Pliny, XXI. iii. 9. The horrors related of Julia are undoubtedly fictions invented by her enemies. It should first be noted that such terrible accusations will seem in themselves improbable to all who believe that the average of mankind, under average conditions, are neither particularly good nor particularly bad. Further, if Julia had been so great a monster it is hard to see why a numerous party should have remained loyal to her. It will appear that the people made long-continued demonstrations on her behalf, that her mother accompanied her into exile, that many persons interceded for her pardon, and that Augustus consented to relax the severity of her exile at the end of five years. These facts show that many people at Rome believed her innocent of the charges brought against her. Moreover, our knowledge of Julia before her downfall does not represent her as a monster (see above p. 68, n. *), but a woman with the virtues and vices of many other women; how, then, can she have suddenly become capable of such abominations? Finally, attention should be paid to the passage of Macrobius, *Sat.* II. v. 9, which has an important bearing upon this point; it shows that Agrippa's sons were so like their legitimate father that every one drew the logical inference of Julia's virtue, at any rate as long as she had been Agrippa's wife. The obscene anecdote given by Macrobius is certainly fictitious, and intended to refute this objection which the common sense of the people urged against accusations of depravity; it is impossible to suppose that any one would have ventured to ask Julia such a question.

that the obstinacy of Tiberius and his departure had caused Augustus extreme irritation. Without the support of Tiberius he could not of himself offer any successful resistance to the aspirations of the new generation. He was bound to yield upon all but the most vital points. Unfortunately, at the age of sixty it is difficult for a man to change his inclinations or his prejudices. Notwithstanding the modification of the political situation, Augustus remained a member of the former generation, which distrusted the representatives of the new age, disliked their intentions and ideas, and would gladly have excluded them from any share in the actual work of government. Augustus thus found himself in a strange dilemma: he could not use the one member of the new generation whose views upon fundamental points coincided with his own, because that member, Tiberius, had made himself universally unpopular; he would not use others who were very ready to help him, because he distrusted them and their principles. There was but one issue before him: he might train a new coadjutor to take the place of Tiberius, and select Caius for that purpose. Until the youth's education was concluded Augustus must govern the empire as best he could, and check the insidious influence of the new generation by constant watchfulness, prudence and delay.

Even so negative a policy was attended by enormous difficulties. The incompetence of the Senate and the officials, the inadequacy of the existing laws and institutions, became daily more obvious throughout the empire, and all business, however trivial or however important, was invariably referred to Augustus. Herod requested him to approve a death sentence passed for the second time upon Antipater, who was suspected of conspiracy against his father's life and had been condemned by a court which met at Jericho.* Cnidus requested Augustus to arbitrate in a criminal trial affecting the honour of a noble family, which had profoundly disturbed the people.† An outbreak seemed imminent in Armenia; the successor of Tigranes had perished in an expedition, the queen

Difficulties of foreign policy.

* Josephus, A. J. xvii. 5.

† *Bull. Corr. Hell.* vii. 1883, p. 62.

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had abdicated, and the Roman party at the court had appointed Artavasdes, the uncle of the deceased, as king. Rome was asked to say whether she would recognise him or not.* The King of Paphlagonia was also dead, and the question of his successor presented difficulties, probably because there was no legal heir.† In Germania all the tribes had been subjugated, but the conquered territories had not yet been organised as provinces. Augustus did his utmost to cope with these difficulties. To Germania he sent one of his relatives, Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a man of some capacity, in spite of his pride, his violent temper and his eccentricities; ‡ no tribute, however, was imposed and no Roman laws were introduced; the Germans were allowed to govern themselves as they pleased, and their subjection was purely nominal. Deprived of the advice of Tiberius and his thorough knowledge of German affairs, Augustus obviously would not venture upon any innovation; he preferred the dangerous expedient of leaving the new conquest in an indefinite position, so that it was neither a Roman province nor a free country. The affair in Cnidus was entrusted to Asinius Gallus; § the Senate was recommended to recognise the new king of Armenia, and received proposals for the annexation of Paphlagonia and for its union with Galatia.|| Augustus continued to issue warnings to Julia, though he was aware that his efforts were waste of time.¶ He did his utmost to save Caius and Lucius from the general depravity. When the people demanded wine he told them to quench their thirst at the numerous fountains which Agrippa

* Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 3-4; Dion, LV. xx. 6; but the date is very uncertain.

† Paphlagonia was annexed to the empire between the years 6 and 5 B.C. See C. I. G. 4154; Doublet in the *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1889, p. 306; Ramsay in the *Revue des Etudes grecques*, 1893, p. 251. The reason for the annexation is not known. I assume that in this case, as in that of Galatia, no legal heir was available.

‡ Suetonius, *Nero*, 4. The texts do not, as a matter of fact, prove that Domitius followed Tiberius in Germania, but the conjecture to that effect is probable, as advanced by Winkelsesser, *De Rebus Divi Augusti Auspiciis in Germania Gestis*, Detmold, 1901, p. 23.

§ *Bull. Corr. Hell.* vii. 1883, p. 62, v. 11.

|| Franz Cumont in the *Revue des Etudes grecques*, 1901, p. 38.

¶ See the anecdotes in Macrobius, *Sat.* ii. 5.

had presented to Rome,* and to reinforce his advice he repaired all the aqueducts in that year.† To appease the agitation of the people he was none the less obliged to make a distribution of money; 320,000 persons received sixty denarii apiece, the money naturally coming from his private purse.‡ He also drew upon his own resources to help the treasury in the payment of pensions to the soldiers discharged in that year.§

The financial position of the State remained no less embarrassed than before. Some permanent relief might have been obtained by a stricter collection of tributes, by checking the rapacity of the *publicani* and by resuming possession, as Tiberius had proposed, of State lands and mines which individuals had seized or acquired in payment of ridiculously small *vectigalia*. But this decadent government could not venture to infringe so large a number of individual interests. It seemed preferable to continue the present haphazard system, to trust to future good fortune and to the apparently inexhaustible wealth and generosity of Augustus. It was, indeed, fortunate that precisely at this time the generation which had accomplished the revolution after Cæsar's death and had fought at Philippi and Actium should have been willing, as its end drew near, to help the new generation with beneficent generosity. This generation, which had grown up amid the turmoils of the revolution, included many bachelors and childless men, who had no heirs to whom they could bequeath the property they had acquired during that great upheaval. Many of them owed their prosperity to Augustus; many who had weathered the storm admired the *princeps* for the skill with which he had calmed it; all knew that Augustus expended upon public works such legacies as he received from people outside his own family. Thus many men made wills in favour of Augustus; henceforward, until his death, he received a considerable number of bequests, the annual value of which amounted to some seventy million sesterces. His capable agents realised these legacies without delay, that Augustus might have money

Financial
difficulties.

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 42.
‡ Mon. Anc. iii. 7.

† C. I. L. vi. 1244.
§ Mon. Anc. iii. 28-33.

4 B.C.

to spend for the welfare of the public.* The meagre fortunes of veterans in distant colonies and the wealth of rich Roman knights alike swelled this additional source of income; by degrees such bequests to Augustus became fashionable, and the generation of revolution days thus restored the property of which it had robbed the nation. Through the good offices of Augustus the dead came to the help of the living, and men who had enriched themselves by pillage of the State closed their careers with acts of enlightened citizenship. But the inconsistencies, the vacillation and the intrigues of the age produced universal discontent. Events of serious importance further aggravated the difficulties of the situation during the next two years, 4 and 3 B.C. In the year 4 Herod, the king of Judea, died, after executing Antipater; † in the year 3 most probably, the Parthian king, Phraates, perished by the hand of the son of Thea Mousa. ‡ Herod had made a will shortly before his death, leaving the title of king and part of his kingdom to his son Archelaus, and dividing the remainder between his two sons Antipas and Philip and his sister Salome. Rich annuities were secured to his other sons, who were many, and to his relatives. He stipulated, besides, that the will should be approved by Augustus, in the hope that Rome would support those arrangements in Palestine which she had approved. As he knew that Rome was not likely to give her approval for nothing, Herod had provided the purchase-money in his will: he left Augustus ten million drachmæ (some £400,000), and he did not forget Livia, to whom he left two shiploads of gold and silver and a quantity of valuable fabrics, chiefly of silk.§ The astute

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 101: . . . *quamvis viginti proximo annis* [before the will] *quaterdecies millies ex testamentis amicorum percepisset: quod pæne omne . . . in rempublicam absumpsisset.* The passage is very important; it reveals one source of the enormous sums which Augustus spent upon public works. † St. Jerome, *ad Ann. Abr.* 2020.

‡ The date of Phraates' death is unknown. A very vague indication may be found in Josephus (*A. J.* XVIII. § 4), which represents his death as following the foundation of Tiberias. The coins of Phraataces date from 2 B.C. to 3 A.D. I have therefore assumed that his father died in 3 B.C.

§ Josephus, *A. J.* XVII. viii. 1: 'Ιουλίᾳ δὲ τῇ Καίσαρος γυναικί. . . This is therefore Livia, to whom Josephus gives the name which she was to bear after the death of Augustus.

Ituræan had gauged the spirit of the time with admirable skill; he knew that the insatiable appetite of Rome would speedily devour this treasure which the patient toil of the unhappy Jews had slowly accumulated; he knew that Livia, in spite of her reserve, had great influence over Augustus, and was even more powerful than Tiberius, to whom he seems to have left nothing.

The friends of Tiberius were rapidly diminishing, and the few that remained were forced to struggle against the calumnies of his enemies, who strove to turn the two young sons of Agrippa against him, and even to suggest suspicions of his disloyalty to Augustus. The man who had been but a few years before the most famous general of his age, the first personage in the empire next to Augustus, had lost all hope of receiving reparation or of returning to Rome, and was obliged to defend himself against ridiculous accusations and to seek obscurity in the distant island of the Ægean Sea.* At Rome both the plebs and the upper classes had fallen victims to the mania for decrying the old ideals and were impatiently awaiting the year 2, when Lucius would reach his fifteenth year and receive the honours which had been given to Caius; the two youths were overwhelmed with flattery, as if they represented the longings of the young generation for novelty, pleasure and liberty as compared with the cautious old age of Augustus. The privileges granted to Lucius and Caius were absolutely against the spirit of republicanism, and would have better fitted young oriental princes; so far, however, from exciting anger and indignation, they aroused a kind of sympathetic admiration. It was a universal aberration amounting almost to insanity, and was the expression of a hatred which the new generation had felt and suppressed during many years for the education received from their fathers, for the men of Actium, for the influence which they continued to exert upon the administration, for Livia and Tiberius, and for all who represented conservative attachment to the old constitution. Augustus was thus involved in most serious difficulty: he might be willing to permit the grant of honours to the youths, in the hope o

Tiberius and
his sup-
planters.

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 12 and 13.

4 P. C.

securing two fresh helpers at an early date ; on the other hand, he saw that Caius and Lucius were being carried away by the uproar of popular enthusiasm in a direction very distasteful to himself. They seemed to have profited very little by the lessons of Verrius Flaccus. Wealth and flattery had made them proud, inclined to dislike Tiberius and to prefer the moral laxity of their contemporaries to the austerity of an earlier age.* Augustus watched over them as far as he could, but the advice of an old man was not likely to prevail against the example of the younger generation.

Affairs in
Palestine and
Syria.

The impotent rage which consumed the friends of Tiberius can easily be imagined. Rome was carried away by admiration for two young fools, while the most capable man of the age was allowed to languish in futile obscurity. Apparently there was no remedy. Augustus did not relax his anger with Tiberius, and would listen to no intercessions on his behalf. Moreover, the apparent tranquillity which then prevailed throughout the empire minimised the loss of Tiberius' services. The young men, the wealthy and lower classes alike followed Julia's example and recklessly squandered the money extorted from the empire without troubling to inquire whether their right to spend would last for ever, or whether it would disappear, as Tiberius had pointed out, as soon as Rome lost her power of appropriating the wealth of others. In the years 4 and 3 Palestine reminded Rome with terrible emphasis that the money which she expended upon her amusements was the price of blood. Upon Herod's death his kingdom had rapidly fallen to pieces. The nationalist party had recovered its power. Antipas, who had been nominated king by Herod's former will,

* Dion, iv. 9: . . . ἰδὼν δ' Ἀδριανὸς τὸν τε Γαίον καὶ τὸν Λούκιον αὐτοῖς τε μὴ πάνν, οἷα ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ τρεφόμενους, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἤθη (ζηλοῦντας (οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἀβρότερον διήγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰθρασύνοντο) καὶ πρὸς πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν γνώμη, τὰ δὲ θραυεῖα, κολακιστομένους, καὶ τούτου ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον θρυσσομένους. . . . Dion puts these facts before the appointment of Caius as consul-elect. But they more probably belong to the time following this election, when Caius and Lucius were flattered by a whole party for interested reasons. Besides, if they showed these defects before the elections, their faults must have been intensified afterwards, when they found themselves personages of such importance at so little trouble to themselves.

had gone to Rome to induce Augustus to ratify this will instead of the later testament, which gave the throne to Archelaus; the latter had also hastened anxiously to Rome to plead his cause, although the hatred, the discontent and the hopes which Herod's iron rule had suppressed could now be heard in menacing accents.* Thus the two brothers came to Rome with the two wills and asked Augustus to arbitrate between them. Augustus, as usual, declined the sole responsibility of decision; he convened a council of senators, among whom he included Caius; the council decided to ratify the second will, which contained the large bequest to Augustus and Livia.† No sooner had this decision been announced than most serious news arrived from Palestine. After the departure of Archelaus dissensions had broken out in Syria between Sabinus, the new procurator whom Augustus had sent to take the place of Herod, and Quintilius Varus, the governor of Syria. Sabinus wished to garrison Palestine during the absence of Archelaus, in order to guard the king's treasure from any possible attacks and to preserve the ten millions which Herod had bequeathed to Augustus. Varus, who knew more of the country and its population, feared that such intervention might exasperate the nationalist party and end in serious disturbances; he therefore advised Sabinus to wait, but to remain upon the alert.‡ Eventually the views of Sabinus prevailed; avarice, as usual, proved stronger than political prudence; the country had been already exasperated by Herod's custom of expending much of its revenues abroad, and, as Quintilius Varus feared, its patience was exhausted. Jerusalem rose in revolt, and the country districts followed the capital; bands of marauders appeared on every side; § Quintilius Varus was obliged to bring up the legions from Syria and all the auxiliary troops, to seek help in every quarter, and even to accept the offer of a contingent 1500 strong offered by the town of Berytus; he also employed the cavalry and foot soldiers which were sent him in large numbers by Aretas, the king of Arabia Petra.||

Herod had attempted to impose upon the Jews the supre-

* Josephus, A. J. XVII. 9.

† *Ibid.* ix. 3.

‡ *Ibid.* x. 9.

† *Ibid.* ix. 5.

§ *Ibid.* x. 2-10.

4 B.C.
The situation
in the east.

macy of two forces against which all struggle was hopeless, Hellenism and Rome. This was a wise and necessary policy; but Herod was confronted by so many difficulties in his kingdom that the populations were disgusted with the means by which he strove to realise his aims. Here was a warning of deep importance to Rome. Quintilius had been so terror-stricken by the revolt that as soon as order had been restored more or less completely he allowed the Jews to send a deputation to Rome* to request the abolition of the monarchy. Augustus, the Senate and Rome now heard from the east in humble and piteous accents that complaint which the west had uttered in furious and violent anger, the complaint of countrysides seized and drained of their life-blood by the monster of which Herod's monarchy was the eye, while its insatiable suckers were the towns. It was the wealth of the country districts which paid for the magnificent monuments which adorned the towns, for their amusements, their parasites, courtiers, officials, artists, foreign literary men who thronged the court, bands of Thracian, Galatian and German mercenaries, who grew sleek by forcing the Jews to fast even upon days which were not prescribed by the law; the treasures painfully accumulated by Jewish work were opened to the inroads of foreign states, sovereigns and officials, while luxury, vice, corruption, favouritism and crime were rampant at the court which governed an impoverished and intimidated nation. The Jewish ambassadors now demanded the abolition of the monarchy, the annexation of Palestine to Syria and its organisation as a Roman province.† Palestine was seeking refuge from Herod's family beneath the shadow of Rome! But this desperate appeal could not shake the cold prudence of Augustus. He told himself that if Palestine were reduced to a Roman province, Rome would be forced to undertake the responsibilities of governing a restless and turbulent people with her few and incompetent officials; she would be obliged to disband part of Herod's army and to reorganise the remainder as an auxiliary force under Roman officers; such a reorganisation would increase the burdens of the legions then quartered in the east, which were even then

* Josephus A. J. XVII. xl. 1.

† *Ibid.* xi. 2.

too few to accomplish their duties, while precisely at this moment another and more serious danger was at hand. Phraataces, the son of Phraates, had suddenly turned against Rome, had apparently seized Armenia, with the aid of the nationalist party, and had expelled the king recognised by Rome.* This, in the eyes of Rome, was a piece of treachery, and the motives of it seem to have been twofold: Phraataces was anxious to secure oblivion of his doubtful origin by his championship of the nationalist policy, while he also proposed to negotiate an agreement with Rome by the terms of which the sons of Phraates were to be given up to him. He felt that it would be dangerous to leave these hostages in the hands of Rome. Thus the hopes which the palace revolution of Thea Mousa had aroused in Rome were frustrated, while the Roman protectorate of Armenia, upon which the supremacy of Rome in Asia was based, was greatly endangered. Rome could not possibly take this retrograde step in Asia, seeing that Augustus for the last twenty years had persuaded Italy and the empire that the Parthians had submitted to a kind of Roman protectorate. But if Rome were to begin energetic action in Armenia she must have her hands free in Palestine. Augustus therefore declined to bring any proposal before the Senate declaring Palestine a Roman province; he reversed his previous decision, and, as usual, devised a compromise satisfactory to all parties. Herod's kingdom was divided into two parts: one of these was given to Archelaus, with the title of ethnarch, that of king being promised as a reward of good government; the other half was subdivided between Philip and Antipas. Thus a new triple monarchy was established in Palestine, weaker and more easily supervised by reason of its subdivision.† As to the eastern question, Augustus decided to send an army to Armenia, to re-establish the Roman protectorate and to show to the eastern world that Rome was paramount as far as the Euphrates and would suffer no *condominium*.

Though Augustus suspected that the threats of Phraataces were not seriously intended and were uttered only in the hope

Difficulty of the Armenian question.

* Velleius Paterculus, ii. 100: . . . *Adjecit Armenia manum*; Zonaras, x. 36.

† Josephus, A. J. XVII. xi. 4.

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of securing a more advantageous peace, his anxiety was none the less keen. The treatment of the question demanded threats and negotiations rather than force, and the expedition must therefore be conducted by a diplomatic and influential leader. Augustus was himself too old to undertake so heavy a task or so long a journey, Tiberius was at Rhodes, and of the Roman nobility there was no one whom he could trust. In general, they were utterly incompetent; Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, for example, had shown no great skill in his conduct of the Germanic affair.* Marcus Lollius perhaps possessed the necessary aptitude, but not the necessary reputation, while his honesty was not above suspicion.† Augustus eventually devised a bold and ingenious plan for combining military capacity, prestige and integrity; the Armenian question and the difficulties with the Parthians were to be settled by a commission, which would be headed by Caius Cæsar, and would include men able to support and advise his youthful inexperience, such as Caius Lollius. Caius Cæsar was only eighteen years of age, and was therefore very young for the conduct of important business. The Italians were, however, growing more indulgent upon the question of age, while Orientals were accustomed to look, not to the personality of sovereigns, but to names, titles, and a kind of divinity independent of the monarch's human form. The subject nations were ignorant of Roman constitutional law, and after

* We know practically nothing of the actions of Domitius Ahenobarbus. Dion (lv. 10) makes a very vague allusion to a political and military failure against the Cherusci, which *καταφρονήσαι σφῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους βαρβάρους ἐποίησεν*. But we have no details of the failure, and merely gain an impression that the authorities at Rome were not satisfied with Domitius, though, with their usual readiness, they granted him the *ornamenta triumphalia* (Suet. *Nero*. 4).

† Zonaras, x. 36: *τῶν Ἀρμενίων δὲ νεωτερισάντων καὶ τῶν Πάρθων αὐτοῖς συνεργούντων, ἀλγῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ Αὐγουστος ἠπέσπει τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὅτι γὰρ αὐτοῖς στρατεύσαι οἷός τε ἦν διὰ γῆρας, ὃ τε Τιβέριος, ὡς εἰρηναῖος, μετέστη, ἤδη ἄλλον δὲ τίνα πέμψαι τῶν δυνάτων οὐκ ἐτόλμα*. The last two words contain the enigma in Augustus' policy. Why did he not dare to send any of the great nobles to Asia? Historians say that he wished to reserve the glory of this war for his dynasty. This, however, is a supposition which is valueless, unless it can be shown that such was the intention of Augustus. All that we have hitherto related authorises the belief that he did not dare to send others, because he knew no one who was capable of conducting the affair successfully.

twenty-five years of Augustus' government had come to regard him as equivalent to the kings who had governed them for centuries. In that year, for instance, the Paphlagonians, who had just been annexed, were obliged to swear fidelity to the empire; it was found necessary to administer the oath which they had formerly sworn to the kings of Pergamum, substituting the name of Augustus for that of the king, and also adding the expressions of religious veneration which had been employed in Egypt: "I swear by Zeus, by the Earth, by the Sun, by all the gods and goddesses, and by Augustus himself, ever to love Cæsar Augustus, his children and his descendants in word, deed and thought, and to consider as friends or enemies all whom his family shall so regard."* No other formula would have been intelligible to these peoples. Thus the youth who bore the name of Cæsar and was the son of Augustus could represent in eastern eyes the successor of Augustus by dynastic right, and could use his prestige as such amid the allied and protectorate princes against the Parthians. Orders, promises or threats proceeding from him would be as valid as from the mouth or pen of Augustus himself. Supported by clever advisers, Caius might perform his mission successfully, and it was no small gain to remove him from the enervating corruption of Rome.

At length Lucius attained his fifteenth year, and received the honours and privileges already granted to his elder brother. The two youths, the Dioscuri of the new constitution, seemed to guarantee the prosperity of Italy, and Augustus set all his hopes upon them. Tiberius was now almost entirely forgotten at Rome, although in the east Herod the tetrarch built the town of Tiberias in his honour. The construction of the new forum was at length completed, as also was the temple of Mars Ultor which Augustus had vowed before the battle of Philippi, in the hope of securing from the gods the victory

* See the important inscription discovered in Asia Minor, and explained by Franz Cumont in the *Revue des Etudes grecques*, 1901, p. 27 ff. "This new evidence," says M. Cumont, with reason, "vividly illustrates the contrast between the Roman theory of Cæsarism and the Asiatic application of it. In the year 3 B.C. Augustus was merely a republican magistrate in Italy with extraordinary powers granted for ten years. . . . In Paphlagonia he appears as an Oriental monarch and as the heir of dynasties which have died out."

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which he could not expect from his own valour. Fine ruins of this forum and temple are still to be seen in the Via Bonella, near the Arco dei Pantani. The new forum had been constructed by Augustus as a magnificent monument to the history of Rome; in it were placed statues of the greatest men of every party and every age, each with a short inscription, composed by Augustus himself, and among them were to be found representatives of the most divergent ages and the fiercest struggles—Marius and Sulla, Romulus and Scipio Æmilianus, Appius Claudius and Caius Duilius, Metellus Macedonicus and Lucullus.* The votive temple had taken forty years to build, but the extreme slowness of the architect was the cause of this delay. The new temple was the most beautiful that had ever been raised to the god of war in the warlike city, and was probably dedicated in the spring of the year 2, when the forum was also inaugurated.† Augustus proposed to make this ceremony the occasion of a great military and traditionalist demonstration. Probably he thought that the moment was opportune for such a display, as a means of counteracting the scepticism, frivolity and effeminacy of the new generation, which worshipped Venus far more assiduously than Mars. At this moment also rumours of war were heard in the east and west, while Rome with wonted lightheartedness was discussing the coming conquest of Persia and other wild projects of the kind. When the inauguration took place Augustus published an edict urging the people ever to insist upon a president of the republic who should resemble the great originals of the statues round the forum.‡ Solemn celebrations

* See Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, Leipzig, 1891-96, vol. i. p. 894 ff., vol. ii. p. 519 ff.

† The date of the inauguration is uncertain. As Borghesi observes (*de Ovid. Fast.* v. 550 ff.), there are reasons for believing that it took place on May 12. But Velleius Paterculus says (ii. 100) that it was *se* [*id est Augusto*] *et Gallo Caninio consulibus*. Now inscriptions (C. I. L. I. p. 164) show that the consuls at the beginning of the year were Augustus and M. Plantius Silvanus. Gallus Caninius must therefore have been a *consul suffectus*. As it is improbable that Plantius was consul only for six months and abdicated before July 1, the inauguration seems to have taken place after July 1, and probably in the month of August. See Mommsen, C. I. L. I. p. 318.

‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 31.

then took place; new features of the festivities were Trojan games and a *naumachia*, which attracted immense crowds from every part of Italy; * the Senate approved a decree constituting the new temple of Mars the chief religious symbol of the Roman military power. Every citizen when he assumed the *toga virilis* was expected to present himself in this temple; officials starting for their provinces were to appear in the temple immediately before their departure, and, after praying the god of war for his favour, to begin their journey from the sacred threshold of the house of Mars; if the grant of a triumph was under consideration the Senate were to meet in this temple; there, also, senators would lay their sceptres and crowns, and thither would be brought all standards captured from the enemy.†

These festivals to Mars and the statues in the forum were means by which Augustus strove to revive the great memories of the past and of the old aristocracy in the minds of the merchants, artisans, courtesans and loungers who were to wear out the beautiful marble pavements of his monument. The attempt proved fruitless. The new generation would hardly cast an indifferent and careless glance at the statues of the great men who had braved all dangers and founded the empire little by little with invincible faith in the future before them. Ovid was then the favourite poet of society women and young fops, whom he taught to forget the pathos of Virgil and the satire of Horace; his new poem, the *Art of Love*, represented Mars, the god of war, as the over-indulgent lover of Venus. He alluded to the festivities which Augustus had arranged upon the consecration of the temple, but merely as a unique opportunity for love adventures and intrigues, as a vast number of gay young men and women were then assembled at Rome; ‡ this, again, was his chief interest in the rejoicings which were to greet Caius Cæsar when he should return from the conquest of Persia: it would be an admirable opportunity for securing favours from his lady! § His facile and pliant style enabled

* Velleius Paterculus, II. c. 2; Dion, iv. 10; Ovid, *Ars. Am.* l. 171 ff.

† Dion, iv. 10.

‡ *Ars Am.* l. 175: *Quis non invenit, turba quod amaret in illa?*

§ *Ars. Am.* l. 177-228.

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him to give harmonious expression to all the youthful follies of his age, and he did not hesitate to flatter the two young sons of Cæsar, as though servile admiration of a dynasty was a real pleasure to him; in their honour he wrote lines which would have called a blush to the cheek of any Roman fifty years before and would have been thought unworthy of the meanest slave. The precocious exaltation of these youths was represented by Ovid as a tribute granted to the divinity within them.

Ultor adest, primisque ducem profitetur in armis,
 Bellaque non puero tractat agenda puer.
 Parcite natales timidi numerare deorum :
 Cæsaribus virtus contigit ante diem.
 Ingenium coeleste suis velocius annis
 Surgit et ignavæ fert male damna moræ.*

The downfall
 of Julia.

But these fantasies were suddenly shattered by an unexpected and terrible catastrophe, the details of which are but imperfectly known to us. Julia had perhaps relied too entirely upon her popularity, upon the old age of Augustus and upon the sceptical laxity of public opinion. It is also probable that she had recklessly drawn aside the veil which concealed her illicit passions, forgetting that she was the daughter of the man who had promulgated the terrible *lex de adulteriis* sixteen years before.† Nor, again, is it unreasonable to regard this event as the successful culmination to the efforts of Tiberius' friends and of the traditionalist party or as a supreme effort of Livia to reopen the gates of Rome to Tiberius.‡ In the last case

* *Ars. Am.* l. 181 ff.

† Macrobius, *Sat.* II. v. 1 : *sed indulgentia tam fortuna quam patris abutebatur [Julia].*

‡ There are many obscurities in the story of Julia's downfall: but it seems certain that the *lex Julia de adulteriis* was the cause. Julia was condemned under her father's law, the chief provisions of which have been enumerated in chap. iii. In other words, to understand the case, we must bear in mind the terms of the law. *Ob libidines atque adulteria damnatam*, says Suetonius (*Tib.* II); St. Jerome, *ad An. Abr.* 2012 : *in adulterio deprehensam*; Tacitus, *Ann.* I. 53 : *ob impudicitiam*; Seneca, *de Clem.* I. x. 3 : *quoscumque ob adulterium filia sua damnaverat*. . . . There is clear reference to some crime within the provisions of the *lex de adulteriis*, and if this is admitted many apparent obscurities become clear. When Augustus realised that his daughter's misconduct could no longer be concealed he was obliged either to abuse his authority by leaving her unpunished or to abandon her to her fate.

we must assume that the friends of Tiberius succeeded in securing proofs of Julia's adultery from a freedwoman named Phœbe ; enraged by the decadence of their party and persuaded that their only means of self-preservation was to deal the enemy a crushing blow, they summoned their remaining audacity and resolved to recover some part of their prestige, by showing that they were no respecters of persons, not even of the daughter of Augustus, popular as she was. Many a man and woman had suffered under the *lex de adulteriis* ; why should Julia and her lovers escape ? Augustus had promulgated the law, and had repeatedly affirmed that obedience was imperative upon all ; he could not oppose the infliction upon his daughter of the punishment she had deserved. However, the old president, who had devoted his energy, his money and his forethought to the State welfare for twenty-five years, apparently demanded as the sole reward for his labours and his services that he should not be forced to examine the proofs of his daughter's misconduct. He would not be placed in the terrible dilemma of breaking laws which he himself had made or of condemning his own flesh and blood and branding with infamy the mother of the two youths upon whom all his hopes were set. But what scandal could do more harm to the party of the young nobility than the trial of Julia for adultery ? The friends of Tiberius were infuriated by a succession of repulses : without compassion for the white hairs, the good deeds or the family of Augustus, they showed the father the proofs of his daughter's guilt.

The blow must have been overwhelming. Augustus was caught in the net which he himself had spread. The *lex de adulteriis*, which bore his name, obliged the husband to punish or to denounce his wife's misconduct ; if the husband would not or could not act, the father was to take his place. As Tiberius was at Rhodes, Augustus must himself punish or accuse his daughter, unless he preferred to see Cassius Severus or some other scoundrel drag Julia before the *questio* and demand, under another of Augustus' laws, that Phœbe should be put to the torture to extort a confession of her mistress's guilt. The man whom modern historians have represented as an absolute monarch, the arbiter of every law and every detail of

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Roman life, who is said to have founded a dynasty to secure the imperial power to his own family for ever, yet would not venture at this supreme moment to save his daughter from the animosity of a petty clique and from the prejudices of an ignorant middle class, lest he should seem to claim undue privileges for himself and his family; he gave way to the ambition which was characteristically Latin and republican of showing that the laws were above all private and personal considerations. He had passed that terrible law under which many had suffered; if, when his turn came, he attempted to save his family, where was his reputation as an impartial governor, a stern supporter of morality, from which he derived much of his fame and glory? We must think of Augustus as an old man of sixty-two, harassed and wearied by the difficulties which surrounded him at the very moment when he chiefly desired rest, and as having every right to demand a little peace at the close of his troubled life; then came the terrible vengeance of Tiberius and his friends, and he could not escape the alternative of destroying his daughter or of compromising his whole lifework and reputation by a monstrous scandal. Augustus was a man of equable temper, but when he was confronted with such a choice he seems to have burst into a terrible fit of rage and grief.* The equality of all men in the eyes of the law was a mere fiction, employed by such charlatans as Cassius Severus to blind the eyes of the people. Augustus wished to make the principle a reality in the case of his daughter, and first thought of visiting upon her the penalty of death which the *lex Julia* allowed the *pater familias* to inflict upon an adulterous daughter. As he was out of Rome, he sent Julia her divorce in the name of Tiberius and exiled her to Pandataria in virtue of his power as *pater familias*.†

* Seneca, *de Ben.* I. xxxii. 2.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 65. The intervention of Augustus in the case was undoubtedly made under the clause of the *lex Julia de adulteriis* which obliged the father to punish or denounce the adulterous wife when the husband was unwilling or unable to act. On this point Augustus carried out the provisions of his own law. It is not quite clear by whom or how Julia and her accomplices were condemned. By common law she should have come before a *quaestio*. However, Tacitus (iii. 24) informs us that the title of her wrongdoing was somewhat

Rome was astounded to learn that the daughter of Augustus, the mother of Caius and Lucius, the great and popular lady, had been taken in adultery by her father and sent into banishment. The wildest accusations were bandied about. The upper and middle classes, the senators and knights, and the most influential cliques abandoned Julia; every obscenity invented about her and whispered by the friends of Tiberius was now retold aloud with exaggeration and keen indignation. The wretched woman, whose fault was common enough in her age, was vilified as the lowest prostitute, dragged through the mire, accused of every abomination, and even of an attempt at parricide; all her friends were accused of adultery and of conspiracy against Augustus. Phœbe hung herself to avoid giving evidence against her mistress; Iulus Antonius, whose origin made him the object of special suspicion, committed suicide.* Condemnations were numerous: Sempronius Gracchus and several of Julia's most illustrious friends were sent into exile; † accompanied by her aged mother, Julia was obliged to leave Rome secretly, pursued by the hatred of all right-minded people and accused of an infinity of crimes of which she was innocent. The case produced a reaction and a general horror of adultery which lasted for some time; informers took advantage of this temper to accuse a large number of people at random. Augustus was so powerful and his reputation was so great that no one ventured to attack him, but many minds harboured a certain democratic jealousy of him, and the monstrous scandal of Julia's adultery could not be hushed up. As she had been caught in misconduct, her punishment was measured by the privileged greatness and the unique fame of Augustus. She was cast into depths of infamy as low as the glory of her father was lofty; on her was visited all the animosity which Augustus had aroused by his social arbitrarily changed: *nam culpam . . . vulgatam gravi nomine læsarum religionum ac violatam majestatis appellando, clementiam majorum suasque ipse leges egrediebatur.* As we know that the *lex Julia* allowed a father to punish an adulterous daughter under certain conditions, the simplest conjecture is that Augustus used his power as *pater familias* perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, in order to avoid the scandal of a trial.

* Dion, iv. 10; Velleius, II. c. 4.

† Velleius, II. c.; Seneca, *de Clem.* I. x. 3.

2 B.C. legislation. Those whom the laws of the year 18 had stricken in fame and fortune might now rejoice when they saw the legislator's daughter crushed and ruined. Augustus was himself carried away by the tide of popular feeling, and wrote a letter to the Senate explaining the nature of his daughter's punishment and enumerating as facts the most odious calumnies which had been circulated about her behaviour.*

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 65 ; Seneca, *de Benef.* vi. 32.

CHAPTER XII

THE OLD AGE OF AUGUSTUS

After Julia's exile—The old age of Augustus—The second generation in his family—Claudius, the third son of Drusus—Augustus and Tiberius after Julia's condemnation—The unpopularity of Tiberius—Caius Cæsar in the east—The reaction in favour of Tiberius—The military question—The state of Germania—The political situation of Augustus—Attempt to reconcile Augustus and Tiberius—Return of Tiberius to Rome—The death of Lucius Cæsar—The fourth *dacennium* of Augustus' power—The death of Caius Cæsar—The reconciliation of Augustus and Tiberius.

THESE excesses were soon followed by a reaction. The party The reaction. of the young nobles, the friends of Julia, the people who loved Caius, Lucius and their mother, were inclined, with many others, in their indignation with the severity of virtue, to sympathise with vice, and even with crime; they now cried out against the bitterness which had saddened the old age of Augustus and deprived the youths of their mother. Protests were uttered against the mania for denunciation which threatened the happiness of many innocent people. Tiberius was stigmatised as the author of these evils,* and popular demonstrations were made on behalf of Julia.† Augustus saw that he must satisfy

* Suetonius (*Tib.* 11 and 12) clearly shows that Julia's condemnation was followed by the worst period of Tiberius' exile, when his unpopularity was greatest and popular hatred of him was most intense. This unpopularity was certainly due to the openly expressed dislike of Augustus and the displeasure aroused by the case of Julia. Thus we can explain why Tiberius, as Suetonius (*Tib.* 18) says, afterwards interceded with Augustus on Julia's behalf. Her popularity was such that Tiberius did not wish to be regarded as her most inexorable persecutor.

† Suetonius, *Aug.* 65: *Deprecante sæpe populo Romano, &c.* Cf. Dion, iv. 13.

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this change of public opinion, and used his tribune's veto to stop prosecutions for acts of adultery committed before a certain date.* After making this concession to Julia's party he hastened to compensate the puritan party, by exiling some of Julia's young friends who were most deeply involved in the scandal and whose mode of life was most objectionable to their opponents. This was a somewhat arbitrary use of his general right to do whatever he thought likely to promote morality and religion; it also supplemented the action of the courts, which he had limited by his veto as tribune.† Beyond

* Dion, iv. 10. It was in virtue only of his power as tribune that Augustus was able to stop these trials.

† Seneca (*de Clem.* I. x. 3) says that instead of putting his daughter's lovers to death, as the *lex de adulteriis* apparently allowed him to do, Augustus magnanimously contented himself with sending them into exile. But, as in the case of Julia, the question arises, in virtue of what powers was Augustus able to exile the actual or supposed lovers of his daughter? Seneca certainly says that Augustus used his own authority instead of applying to the courts, and this is confirmed by Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 24): *adulteros . . . earum morte aut fuga punivit*. Tacitus, however, is often inaccurate upon questions of this kind, and his evidence would be inconclusive were it not confirmed by the more important testimony of Ovid. Ten years later Ovid was compromised in the scandal of the young Julia, which was precisely analogous to her mother's case, though less serious. Ovid states clearly enough that he was *relegatus* by an *edictum* of Augustus, and that he was not sentenced by a *quæstio* or banished under a Senatorial decree (*Tristes*, II. 131 ff.):

Nec mea decreto damnasti facta senatus,
Nec mea selecto iudice jussa fuga est:
Tristibus invectoris verbis—ita principe dignum—
Ultus es offensas, ut decet, ipse tuas.
Adde, quod edictum, quamvis inmite minaxque
Attamen in poenæ nomine lenè fuit,
Quippe relegatus, non exul dicor in illo. . . .

It is clear that Ovid was not banished by the judicial, but by the executive department of the State, which was in the hands of Augustus; the same must be true of the exiles of which Seneca speaks, as Tacitus says that those who had committed adultery with Augustus' daughter and granddaughter were treated in the same way. By what authority could Augustus thus inflict the penalty of banishment upon Roman citizens by an edict? As persons were involved over whom Augustus had no *patria potestas*, the only powers he could use seem to be those which were given him in the year 23, of which mention is made in vol. iv. p. 249: *utique quæcumque ex usu rei publicæ divinarum humanarum publicarum privatarumque rerum esse consēbit, ei agere facere jus potestatisque sit*. As soon as it was established that Julia and her accom-

this, he gave the puritan party no compensation. In vain did Tiberius await his recall from Rhodes; Julia and her most intimate friends, her real or imaginary lovers, and the most depraved members of the young nobility had left Rome, but their exile did not facilitate the return of Tiberius. The scandal concerning Julia had raised his unpopularity to a higher pitch than ever before; his antagonism to the spirit of his age was more than ever dreaded, and in leaving him at Rhodes Augustus gave a further compensation to the party of the young nobility for the shock which the case of Julia had inflicted upon their cause.

The case of Julia, far from relaxing the prevailing tension, Augustus in old age. merely provoked new and fiercer animosity; the traditionalist party, which had intrigued for her overthrow, derived not the smallest advantage from it. To these possible causes of disruption was now added a further misfortune, the fact that Augustus was growing old. He was, indeed, only sixty-one years of age, and in respect of years had by no means reached senility; but he had lived a hard life, and for forty-three years had spent himself amid the cares, the harassing anxieties and disappointments of a political career which was one of the longest and most varied in the history of the world. Thus it is not surprising that Augustus was old at an age when many men retain much of their vigour, or that he then displayed all the failings of old age, obstinacy, mistrust, weakness and irritability. For the first time since the civil wars his usual moderation and perspicacity seemed to have been displaced by a spirit of envy and wounded self-esteem. The illogical unpopularity of Tiberius was the source of many difficulties, and these were aggravated by the rancorous temper of Augustus. The puritan party had almost defied him to prove that he was not so indulgent a father as he was reputed, and he wished to show this party that he could use the discretionary powers conferred upon him by the Senate years before to increase the severity of his daughter's punishment, although the people plices had been guilty of sacrilege (*lasarum religionum*), as Tacitus says, Augustus could condemn them to banishment, under the powers which authorised him to do whatever he thought necessary to uphold the *dignity of religion*.

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were asking for her pardon. He even forbade her to drink wine or to receive visitors without his special authorisation.* But he revenged himself upon Tiberius for the penalties which he himself inflicted upon his daughter, by a firm refusal to recall him to Rome. He showed his hatred of Tiberius upon every occasion, and thereby encouraged the dislike of him which was entertained by all whom Julia's overthrow had saddened.† His old affection for Julia was now transferred to Caius and Lucius, and he clung to them as his last hope and consolation, now that Julia was gone. Upon them the doting grandfather was henceforward to concentrate all his affection, indulgence and ambition; they were of Cæsar's blood, while Tiberius was a proud and unbending Claudius: for him Augustus had nothing but sullen hatred. The friends of Tiberius had hoped that Augustus would abandon his project of sending Caius to the east, but he persisted in the plan, and sent with Caius as his adviser Marcus Lollius, one of Tiberius' bitterest opponents; ‡ he also accelerated their departure, which took place, apparently, at the outset of the year 1 B.C. He had striven to form a family of the old type to serve as an example to the nobility, but his efforts had been unsuccessful with the first generation of his family: Drusus had died far away in Germania at the age of thirty; Julia was exiled in disgrace; Tiberius was unpopular, and apparently destined to reside permanently abroad. Augustus must therefore set his hopes upon the second generation; he could only trust that its members would display greater prudence, higher morality and firmer self-control, and would thus avoid the tragical and bitter destiny of their predecessors. The second generation was comparatively numerous, as its progenitors had obeyed the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, though they had disregarded the *lex de adulteriis*. Augustus and Livia had eight grandchildren, apart from

Suetonius, *Aug.* 65.

† In this chapter we shall see that the attitude of Augustus to Tiberius was entirely contrary to the public interest, and can only be explained upon the theory that he nourished a profound hatred of Tiberius.

‡ Suetonius, *Tib.* 12: *ex criminationibus M. Lollii comitis et rectoris ejus*. Lollius was thus the enemy of Tiberius.

Caius, the eldest child. Drusus had left three children who had been brought up by Antonia: Germanicus, the eldest, was then eleven years of age, a handsome, vigorous and intelligent boy of lovable character: he studied literature, philosophy and rhetoric with much zeal and advantage and was fond of physical exercise.* The second child, Livilla, a girl, was a year or two younger; at this date she seems to have shown no special promise for good or evil. The third son, Claudius, born at Lyons on August 1, 10 B.C., on which day the altar to Rome and Augustus was inaugurated, was a half-imbecile young monster, with a diminutive head which was never still and an enormous mouth; a stammering, babbling creature with an idiotic laugh,† a misshapen body, especially deformed legs,‡ and so obtuse a brain that he could never learn the most elementary facts.§ His childhood had been sickly,|| and probably meningitis or epilepsy had transformed the manly beauty and the vigorous mind of the Claudii into this imbecile ugliness. Even his mother,¶ the good Antonia, admitted that he was an abortion. Agrippa and Julia had had two daughters after Caius and Lucius, who were called each of them Agrippina and were then from twelve to fifteen years of age: they had also another son, Agrippa Postumus, who was eleven years of age. Nothing more is heard of these two daughters, though the younger must have roused hopes in her grandfather's mind, since he adopted her as his daughter, perhaps with the object of filling the void in his affections which the loss of Julia had left.** Postumus, however, was a strange instance of reversion to type and notwithstanding the refinement with which he was surrounded, his clumsy body and coarse mind displayed an animalism to which only physical

* Suetonius, *Claud.* 3.

† *Ibid.* 30: *risus indecens . . . lingua titubantia, caputque, quum semper, tum in quantulocumque actu, vel maxime tremulum.*

‡ *Ibid.* 30: *ingredientem desti uebant poplites minus firmi . . .*

§ *Ibid.* 2: *adeo ut, animo simul et corpore hebetato, ne progressa quidem aetate, ulli publico privatoque muneri habilis existimaretur.*

|| *Ibid.* 2.

¶ *Ibid.* 3.

** Though there is no direct evidence of the fact, this daughter of Julia and Agrippa must have been adopted by Augustus; otherwise she would have been called Agrippina and not Julia.

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pleasures could appeal, and which was not amenable to methodical education.* Finally Drusus, the son of Tiberius and Vipsania, had been left at Rome by Tiberius: he was of nearly the same age as Germanicus and showed promise of high capacity. Augustus seems to have had no special liking for him, possibly in consequence of his breach with Tiberius. He greatly preferred Germanicus, a young shoot from the old stock of the Claudii, who was universally regarded as destined to replace the branch which death had cut short in Germany.

The unpopularity of Tiberius.

Thus, in the year 1 B.C., while Caius was travelling in the East, the three most conspicuous members of the family governing the vast empire, Augustus, Livia and Tiberius, were respectively overcome by indescribable vexation of spirit, though they had reached the highest pitch of prosperity. Tiberius saw that he was to be left to die in the retreat to which he had retired in anger and in expectation that he would be requested to return: the fear that he might be forgotten in his living death at Rhodes eventually overcame his resentment. In despair, he stooped to show his regrets and to utter prayers and supplications: he even sought to soften the animosity of his bitterest enemies, the friends of Julia, and appealed to Augustus to relax the severity of her punishment.† His efforts were fruitless: to his appeals and to the louder outcries of the people on Julia's behalf, Augustus turned a deaf ear. However, the five years term of tribunician power conferred upon Augustus in the year 6 was drawing to its close: he would become a private citizen unprotected by any special immunity. Tiberius abased himself yet more and wrote to say that he had withdrawn in order not to prejudice the careers of Caius and Lucius at the time when they were taking the first step upon the ladder of State offices: now that they were universally recognised as next in importance to Augustus himself, he wished to

* Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 3: *rudem . . . bonarum artium et robore corporis stolidis ferocem*; Suetonius, *Aug.* 65: *ingenium sordidum ac ferox*; Velleius Paterculus, II. cxii. 7: *mira pravitate animi atque ingentis*. These statements, though vague, and the fact that Augustus sent Agrippa into exile, incline us to believe that he was one of those half-idiots which are often found in great families.

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 11; this seems to me the most likely explanation of his strange intervention.

return to see his family, his mother, his son, his sister-in-law and his nephews. Augustus harshly replied that he need not be anxious for the welfare of those whom he had been the first to abandon.* Livia had some difficulty in persuading Augustus to give Tiberius a formal nomination as *legatus*.† Julia's party remained implacable, disseminated calumnies of every kind against Tiberius and attempted to deprive him of his last remaining friends.‡ In the East, Marcus Lollius strove to turn Caius against him : Caius, in any case, had no great affection for the man who had contributed, directly or indirectly, to the ruin of his mother : § Augustus further encouraged the enemies of Tiberius by an open display of hostility. Thus the recollection of his past exploits, of the offices he had held, of the triumphs he had celebrated and of the respect he had long enjoyed, was overwhelmed by a wave of unpopularity which passed from Rome even to the provinces. To escape the suspicions and calumnies of his opponents, Tiberius was forced to withdraw to the interior of the island, and to live in seclusion if not in concealment : || he was obliged to go to Samos for a meeting with Caius, as though to excuse himself for his share in Julia's exile and to endure the affront of a cold reception.¶ While Augustus grew old at Rome, Tiberius was also enfeebled by constant inactivity : he gave up riding and fencing, and took no exercise of any kind.** As he thus ceased to assert himself his reputation disappeared and he became the object of universal contempt or aversion : the inhabitants of Nîmes even pulled down his statue.†† Caius and Lucius were the sole favourites of Augustus and of the empire : at Pisa a solemn decree was issued for the dedication of an altar to Lucius.‡‡

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 11.

† *Ibid.* 12.

‡ *Ibid.* 12 : *venit etiam in suspicionem.*

|| *Ibid.*

§ *Ibid.* 12.

¶ Velleius Paterculus, li. 101 : *convento prius F. Nerone, cui omnem ut superiori habuit (Caius Casar) ;* his account of the meeting is wholly opposed to that of Suetonius (*Tib.* 12). But it is likely that the justifiable admiration of Velleius Paterculus for Tiberius has induced him to modify the truth of the case. The account of Suetonius is the more probable. It is unlikely that when Tiberius was an object of aversion to Augustus and every one else, Julia's son should have shown himself thus affable, only a year after his mother's exile.

** *Ibid.* 13.

†† *Ibid.*

‡‡ C. I. L. xi. 1420.

1 A.D.

The diplomatic mission of Caius in the East.

However, the ill-fortune of Tiberius was drawing to a close. We have now reached January 1 of the year 754 A.U.C., from which date the Christian era begins: in this year Caius Cæsar became consul in accordance with the unfortunate decision of the year 6 B.C. The consul, who was twenty years of age, was at that moment in Asia, probably at Antioch,* where he was organising an army for the invasion of Armenia and opening negotiations with Phraataces in the hope of securing some agreement. Augustus did not desire a Parthian war, and probably the Parthian king was equally anxious to avoid hostilities: negotiations when conducted from Rome were not so likely to prove successful as when they were opened from Syria by the son of Augustus at the head of an army. The servile Eastern world had been profoundly impressed by the arrival of Caius Cæsar on his important mission, escorted by a number of young men belonging to the great families of aristocratic Rome, and including Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of the *legatus* of Germania.† From every quarter the young consul was visited by embassies offering homage and presenting requests: monuments were raised to him, and inscriptions referred to him and to his brother as the son of Ares or even as the new Ares.‡ The East had been so long accustomed to a monarchy, that it was ready to recognise the Roman empire even in the band of young nobles who accompanied the young Caius, and it bowed down before them with its habitual reverence for any one who symbolised the power of Rome. Unfortunately, the little company which Augustus had selected to represent Rome in the East was composed of inexperienced, overbearing or even corrupt young men: Marcus Lollius was the one energetic and intelligent character among them; he, however, was extremely avaricious and was anxious not so much to settle the Armenian problem as to increase his own large fortune by further extortion. He seems to have used his very considerable powers to hold towns, individuals and sovereign princes to ransom: in return, he intervened or undertook to intervene on their behalf with Cæsar and

* Mon. Anc. ed. M^a. pp. 173-175.

† Suetonius, *Nero*, 5.

‡ C. I. A. iii. 444, 445, 446.

Augustus : * after the example of Lucullus, he is said to have sent enormous quantities of gold and silver to Italy. Lollius thus used his commission rather for his own profit than for that of Rome : Caius was too inexperienced to act for himself and was forced to rely upon Lollius, as his other companions were young and unscrupulous : hence his conduct evoked, according to one historian, much adverse and also much favourable criticism.† He certainly opened negotiations with the Parthians and firmly requested Phraataces to abandon his claims to Armenia : the journey, however, which had been begun with the dignity befitting a diplomatic mission, degenerated to a pleasure-seeking tour. Lollius was ready to wink at amusements so long as he was allowed to continue his extortions undisturbed : Caius did not possess the energy or the experience to repress extravagance, and many excesses were committed in consequence by his companions and especially by their slaves and freedmen.‡ Encouraged by his success, Lollius proceeded to operate with even greater audacity : he apparently attempted to get money even from Phraataces himself, proposing to secure certain concessions for him in the course of the negotiations, in return for a very considerable remuneration.§

The preparations for the expedition were, however, continued during the spring and summer of the year I A.D. : negotiations with the Parthians were also carried to a successful conclusion. As Phraataces would not venture to declare war

Change of feeling in favour of Tiberius : its causes.

* Pliny (N. H. IX. xxxv. 118) clearly states that the fall of Lollius was due to the *regum munera*, the venality of which he was guilty : *hic est rapinarum exitus, hoc fuit quare M. Lollius infamatus regum muneribus et in toto Oriente interdictus amicitia a C. Casare . . . venenum biberet*. This explanation is more definite than the vague statement of Velleius (ii. 102 : *perfida et plena subdoli ac versuti animi consilia per Parthum indicata Casari*), and is very probable, in view of prevailing morality on this subject and of the immense fortune which Lollius left behind.

† Velleius Paterculus, II. ci. 1 : *tam varie se ibi gessit (C. Casar) ut nec laudaturum magna nec vituperaturum mediocris materia deficiat*.

‡ See Suetonius, Nero, 5.

§ In this sense it is possible to interpret the obscure phrase of Velleius (II. cii. 1 : *perfida et plena subdoli ac versuti animi consilia, per Parthum indicata Casari*) by comparing it with the statement of Pliny (IX. xxxv. 118) concerning the *regum munera* which Lollius was charged with receiving. The only revelation that Phraataces could have made to Caius Casar would have been Lollius' demands for money.

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he consented to evacuate Armenia and to abandon his brothers.* Meanwhile, among the more far-sighted members of the Roman nobility, a revulsion of feeling in favour of Tiberius had begun, though its progress was slow and almost imperceptible. Tiberius had certain admirers among those who had watched his conduct of military operations, or had fought under his command, and if they were not a numerous body, they were at least whole-hearted and loyal. They recognised his good qualities as well as his defects. It was impossible to deny that Tiberius was the first general of his age and it was disastrous that so energetic a man should be condemned to inactivity at Rhodes, while the business of State grew stagnant as Augustus became more feeble. The decay of the nobility and of the Senate had thrown the supreme power into the hands of the president, his family, their intimate friends and their slaves; while the world renewed its youth with the rise of another generation, Augustus was growing older and more averse to innovation of any kind. For some time the exchequer revenues had been inadequate to meet the increasing expenditure; † but Augustus would not sanction a revision of taxation in order to restore the balance: he preferred to live from hand to mouth and to make use of any temporary expedient. He drew upon his own fortune, at the risk of ruining his family, advised the Senate and officials to practise economy, neglected the public departments, and postponed any settlement of accounts. These departments were never entirely efficient and were now threatened with complete disorganisation; the population of Rome was increasing, while the arrangements for the distribution of corn, for policing the streets and preventing outbreaks of fire were wholly inadequate, notwithstanding the institution

* Dion, lv. 10.

† That financial difficulties were then considerable is proved, first, by the fact that Augustus' energy revived after his reconciliation with Tiberius and was devoted to the discovery of new sources of taxation; secondly, by the prolongation of military service to the term of twenty years, a change decided in 5 A.D. (Dion, lv. 23)—the change was doubtless necessitated by the difficulty of paying off a sixteenth of the army every year; thirdly, by the formation of the *acarium militare* and by the edicts preceding its formation, which prove, as we shall see, that money was wanting for the maintenance even of the army. This being so, the condition of other State departments can be imagined.

of the *vicomagistri*.^{*} The city stood in need of a central authority, provided with adequate powers, to reorganise and reform every department, instead of counting upon a hundred incompetent freedmen, who were rewarded by permission to wear the *toga prætexta* and to be accompanied by lictors upon certain occasions. However, Augustus declined to take any steps, the people made complaints and the existing discomfort continued. If the president thus neglected the affairs of Rome, he was not likely to deal effectively with men and affairs upon the frontiers of the empire. The exiles of earlier years disregarded their sentences and left the dreary banishment to which they had been consigned: they returned to the towns and to the pleasure resorts of their neighbourhood, summoned their slaves and freedmen and lived at their ease.† No one entered any protest and the *lex de adulteriis* thus scattered the East and West with the rakes and courtesans of Rome in pursuit of new delights. Both in the East and the West, Augustus seemed to rely upon the principles of the inherent fitness of things, rather than upon his personal insight and initiative, and this, too, upon the most vital of all questions, the army. Recruiting became every year more difficult in Italy, as the increase of wealth enabled free men to find methods of making a livelihood more agreeable than warfare in foreign countries: the annual grant of pensions to disbanded soldiers became an increasing expense: it proved impossible to keep the promises made in the military law of the year 14 and to grant discharges after sixteen years of service: ‡ the auxiliary forces were continually increased in consequence, and the moral unity and patriotism of the Roman army were correspondingly enfeebled: in short, the needs of the army were increasing in every part of the empire.§ The soldiers complained that ten *asses* a day

* A *praefectus annonæ* and a *praefectus vigiliæ* were appointed, as we shall see, after the reconciliation of Augustus and Tiberius. Dion frequently refers to serious conflagrations about this time.

† We find that attempts were made to check this abuse in the year 10 A.D. (Dion, iv. 27.)

‡ Thus may be explained the military reform of the year 5 A.D. and the foundation of the *ævarium militare* (Dion, iv. 23 and 25).

§ Dion, iv. 23: *χαλεπῶς δὲ δὴ τῶν στρατιωτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀλλῶν σμικρότητα . . . οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐχόντων . . .*

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were not enough to pay the expenses of their dress, arms and tents, and demanded at least a *denarius*.^{*} These complaints were well founded: increased prosperity had sent up prices and the necessaries of life were more expensive, while the revenue was inadequate to meet the existing scales of pay and pensions.

The disorganisation and incapacity of the government.

Deaf and blind to these abuses, Augustus folded his arms in senile avarice and declined to lend an ear to the outcries of the soldiers or to see the spirit of insubordination which was pervading the legions. The knights and their order continued to deteriorate: but Tiberius had ruined himself by proposing severe measures and no one cared to follow his example, or to make an effort to prevent the slow suicide of the Roman aristocracy. Every Eastern state, the towns, the allied or protectorate peoples were able to preserve their own laws and to continue their own vices and customs, while Rome could not venture to intervene either to eradicate an evil, to introduce an improvement or to increase taxation, though Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt had grown wealthier during the years of peace. Archelaus had speedily demonstrated to Palestine that he possessed all his father's cruelty, but none of his intelligence or energy: but Rome pretended ignorance of the fact, though she had promised her protection to the Jews. In the West, however, Dalmatia and Pannonia had apparently resigned themselves to the Roman yoke: but exportation of the precious metals, the introduction of foreign manners and customs, and the importation of Eastern merchandise steadily exerted a disintegrating influence: memories of the last wars were growing faint and a new generation had arisen which was ready to renew the desperate adventure of a struggle with Rome. The government of these provinces demanded constant prudence and watchfulness: yet Augustus was content

* Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 17, shows that such were the pay and the claims of the soldiers in the year 14 A.D., at the time when they revolted upon the death of Augustus. I am inclined to think that the pay and the claims were the same fourteen years earlier, as there seems to have been no increase of pay in the interval. The law of 5 A.D. and the *aerarium militare* secured more punctual payment, but did not increase the amount.

to send out some incompetent *legatus* who was only concerned to extract a little money from the country for the impoverished treasury at Rome.* Instead of seeking new sources of revenue in the East, to which peace had brought increasing wealth, Rome persistently squeezed the West, where poverty and unrest were chronic. The incoherency of this senile government was even more conspicuous in the territory recently conquered beyond the Rhine. After the departure of Tiberius, Augustus had not ventured to impose tribute or laws upon the subject populations: he was content to station legions here and there, to establish military camps which became so many embryo towns amid the barbarian villages, to form bodies of auxiliary troops and to corrupt the nobility of the different peoples by distributing honours and pensions, citizen rights and knighthood, and paid official commands in the auxiliary forces.† The Roman military camps, with the legionaries and the numerous merchants of every country who followed them, undoubtedly attracted the barbarians, who visited the *cannabae*, the merchant's stalls, to procure commodities hitherto unknown in these wilds,‡ wine, perfumes, stuffs, fine pottery, giving in

* The great insurrection of 6 A.D. was caused, like other movements of the kind, by attempts to raise tribute. Dion, iv. 29: *ταῖς γὰρ σφοδαῖς τῶν χρημάτων οἱ Δελμάται βαρυνόμενοι*. . . .

† E.g., the brother of Arminius (Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 9) and Segestes (*ibid.* i. 58).

‡ Chap. 18 in Dion's lvi. book, in spite of its brevity, is of capital importance for the history of the conquest of Germania. It gives us a summary, but clear description of the condition of Germania before the government of Quintilius Varus and the campaigns of Tiberius (4-6 A.D.), covering the period between the death of Drusus and the return of Tiberius to political life. We at once observe the prudent and timorous opportunism of Augustus, which had been increased by old age. Dion tells us (a) that the Romans were masters not of a continuous stretch of territory, but only of separate districts to which their arms had penetrated—this implies that many peoples had not been subjugated and that Augustus allowed them to do as they pleased; (b) that Augustus stationed *στρατιῶται* there, who *πόλεις συνκρίζοντο*: these towns are obviously military camps; (c) that the Germans had borrowed many Roman customs and held regular markets in these towns, while preserving their own manners and ideas. Dion says, in that they changed unawares; *εὐάνθρον σφᾶς ἀλλοιούμενοι*. Finally, he makes a most important statement to the effect that Quintilius Varus was the first to impose tribute on the Germans, which implies that they had paid no tribute previously. My description

I A.D.

exchange such gold and silver as they possessed, amber, skins, cattle, wool and cereals. In many camps, markets were held upon certain days. A far more tangible force than the vague Græco-Italian influence of which these camps were the centre was required to hold in subjection the turbulent Germanic tribes, who constantly broke the conditions of every treaty. During the first year of our era, Germania was in an actual state of revolt,* and Augustus was forced to send out a legate, M. Vinicius, who was commissioned to restore order in this so-called province which cost more than it produced, disregarded Roman authority whenever and wherever it pleased, and never paid tribute under any circumstances.

The State infected by the apathy of Augustus.

Thus every member of this vast body politic was gradually overcome by the apathy of old age. Nor would the rise to power of an energetic man alone suffice to rejuvenate the State: it would also be necessary to break down the narrow circle of senatorial privilege, to look beyond the Senate for the magistrates, governors and officials required to fill new posts and to draw for this purpose more freely and frequently from the equestrian order, the upper and cultured middle class of Italy. Although the marriages of knights were often childless, the order was increasing in wealth and numbers throughout Italy and especially in northern Italy.† The aristocracy could gain all its desires by privilege and was therefore idle and undisciplined: the knights were spurred by the ambition to secure higher respect and reputation, by gaining the State offices which had been hitherto reserved to the senators. Augustus, however, would not venture to introduce this reform, which

of the state of Germania at this time is based upon this passage of Dion.

* This fact is of importance, as it enables us to explain the reconciliation of Augustus and Tiberius, and is reported by Velleius Paterculus (II. civ. 2) *in Germaniam . . . ubi ante triennium (before the reconciliation) sub M. Vincio . . . immensum exarserat bellum.* The reappearance of the Germanic peril probably occasioned the conspiracy of Cinna and the reconciliation between father and son-in-law.

† Cf. Strabo (V. l. 7) concerning the large number of knights living at Padua. The increasing wealth of northern Italy and the progress of the middle class to which we have referred in chap. viii., must have increased the numbers of those qualified to enter the order, though the marriages of knights were not usually fruitful.

contradicted all tradition, his own previous policy and the impressions indelibly fixed upon his mind by the traditionalist policy of which he had been a vigorous supporter in his youth : possibly he also mistrusted the upstart noble. He represented the ideals of an earlier generation : his environment had wholly changed, though he would not recognise the fact : he was ready to send knights or plebeians to administer the affairs of Egypt or to govern the remote and unknown regions of his wildest provinces,* but he would not admit them to important posts which would have brought them into public notice. The disgust aroused by the scandalous case of Julia was passing into oblivion and far-sighted men began to ask whether a reconciliation between Augustus and Tiberius was not vitally necessary to the interests of the State : it would then be possible to revive the enfeebled republic by the agency of Tiberius, who was stagnating in Rhodes and asked for nothing better than employment. Augustus, indeed, did not attempt to hide the fact that his hopes were set upon Caius and Lucius : they, however, were young, the general situation was difficult, the news from Germania was far from reassuring and Augustus himself was old and ill. Should he die unexpectedly, Caius could not possibly take his place, nor could any commander-in-chief be chosen except Tiberius, who remained, in spite of his unpopularity, the first general of his time and possessed an unrivalled knowledge of Germanic affairs. Though ten years had elapsed, the situation was as it had been upon the death of Drusus : Tiberius was the inevitable successor to Augustus. A reconciliation must therefore be attempted. But Augustus at first turned a deaf ear to any overtures : his animosity had grown more bitter with age, he feared that Tiberius was too unpopular and his eyes were blinded by his affection for Caius and Lucius, the children of his old age, and by the brilliant prospects which he conceived to lie before them. "My salvation, beloved light of my eyes," he wrote on September 23

* Ovid (*Pont.* iv. 7) speaks of a certain Vestalis, a descendant of an Alpine royal family and a centurion *primipilarius*, who performed the duties of governor in a part of Mœsia :

Missus es Euxinas quoniam, Vestalis, ad undas,
Ut positis reddas jura sub axe locia.

2 A.D.

of that year, his birthday, to Caius who was then in Armenia, "I would have thee ever near me, when thou art far distant; but my eyes seek my Caius with yet keener desire upon such days as this. Wherever thou art to-day, may the day be happy for thee and thy celebration of my sixty-fourth birthday be joyful. As thou seest, I have escaped this year, the sixty-third, commonly known as the climacteric. And I ask the gods that they will grant me to spend the time I have yet to live in a prosperous republic and to see thy powers increase until thou canst take my place."* Determined to make Caius and Lucius his successors, he would not expose them to the formidable rivalry of Tiberius, and to this senile affection he was ready to sacrifice the vital interests of the State.

Preparations
for reconciliation.

Though overcome by weakness and idleness, Italy was not so far degraded as to suffer in silence the collapse of the governmental authority. The traditionalist party recovered its strength with the help of circumstances, of prudent men and certainly of Livia: it undertook the task of overcoming the senile obstinacy of Augustus. However, in the second half of the year 1 A.D., Caius had advanced to the Parthian frontier with his army † and had extorted from Phraataces, at some spot unknown to us, a final agreement to his proposals. The Parthian king renounced all claims to Armenia and all power over his half-brothers: the peace was to be solemnly ratified at an interview to take place the next year on a little island in the Euphrates. At the outset of the year 2, Livia had succeeded in overcoming the obstinacy of the old Augustus, but at the price of a further humiliation for Tiberius. Augustus promised to allow Tiberius to return to Rome, if Caius signified his consent, and if Tiberius would undertake to abstain from all political action.‡ This concession was meaningless; Tiberius had not been exiled and had a perfect right to return without permission from Augustus: the stipulations that Caius should consent and that Tiberius should avoid politics show that

* Aulus Gellius, xv. 7.

† This is at least suggested by a passage in the famous inscription of Pisa (C. I. L. xi. 1421): *post consulatum, quem ultra fines extremas populi Romani bellum gerens feliciter peregerat.*

‡ Suetonius, Tib. 13.

Augustus wished to avoid any unnecessary irritation of the young nobles and of the public who were always hostile to Tiberius. Such conditions must have been deeply humiliating to the general who had crushed the Pannonian revolt: but the long strain of nearly eight years' exile had broken even his pride and he realised that his future was hopeless unless he could return to Rome. He therefore consented to ask Caius for the necessary authorisation and to give a promise that he would avoid politics. Fortune, weary of persecuting him, now became favourable. In the spring of the year 2,* Caius had had an interview with Phraataces upon the banks of the Euphrates; the conclusion of peace had been celebrated by great banquets,† during which Phraataces, who was offended with Lollius, apparently disclosed to Caius the nature of his secret negotiations. Caius had that aversion to bribery which is innate in young aristocrats who owe their wealth to the peculations of their ancestors and is said to have dismissed his adviser in a fit of wrath. The fact is certain that Lollius died suddenly after a very heated altercation with Caius. He is supposed to have taken poison on finding himself hopelessly compromised. To his family he left the fortune which he had probably amassed at the price of his life and which must have been one of the largest in Italy during the previous fifty years. His great-granddaughters were able to display necklaces of unrivalled splendour in the streets of Rome.‡ The death of Lollius was a stroke of good fortune for Tiberius, as Caius, when the evil influence of Lollius was removed, consented to his return.§

* The date can be approximately determined in the following manner: Lucius Cæsar died on August 2, 2 A.D. (C. I. L. I^s. p. 326). Tiberius returned to Rome in 2 A.D., *ὁ πολλῶ πρότερον*, shortly before the death of Lucius (Zon. x. 36; Velleius, II. 103). He returned because Caius, *tunc Marco Lollio offensior*, gave his consent (Suetonius, *Tib.* 13). Hence we may assume that the scandal concerning Lollius, and therefore the meeting with Phraataces, took place in the spring of 2 A.D.

† Velleius, II. ci. 3.

‡ Pliny (IX. xxxv. 118) says that Lollius poisoned himself. Velleius Paterculus (II. cii. 1) says nothing definite upon this point, and thus shows that this scandal, like many others at the time, was partly hushed up and that little was generally known of it.

§ Suetonius, *Tib.* 13.

3 A.D.

Tiberius
returns to
Rome.

Thus, about the middle of the year 2, Tiberius returned to Rome, which he had left seven years before at the height of his power and reputation. He began residence as a private citizen, in the palace of Mæcenas on the Esquiline, occupied with the task of concluding the education of Drusus, taking no part in political affairs,* but longing for the day when Rome would need his services once more. His pride had cost him dear, but he had confidence in the future: the persecutions of fortune were accomplished and she was about to smile on him once more. Shortly after his arrival, the younger brother of Caius, Lucius Cæsar, whom Augustus had sent to Spain to complete his military training, fell ill and died at Marseilles on August 20.† One of his two intended helpers and successors was thus lost to Augustus; Germanicus was only seventeen years of age, while Augustus was nearly sixty-five: the first step to a reconciliation with Tiberius had been already taken by either party, while the ruinous condition of the State organisation was increasing and the need for more energetic supervision was obvious. Augustus, with his habitual inclination to postpone decision upon any serious question, was disinclined to act. Meanwhile Caius, after concluding his agreement with Phraataces, had invaded Armenia ‡ and had encountered no serious opposition: he had been forced to subdue merely a few sporadic revolts provoked by the nationalist party. However, during one of the expeditions at Artagera, Caius was wounded, apparently by the treachery of the insurgent leader.§ At first the wound did not seem serious, and Caius was able to continue the pacification of Armenia, a comparatively easy task. The next year, 3 A.D., was the last year of the third decade of Augustus' presidency. Weak and feeble, apparently upon the verge of the grave for the last fifty years, he had been able to cling to life and to receive the legacies

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 15.

† This and not the date of the *Fasti Gabini* (XIII. Kal. Oct.) seems to be the correct date for the death of Lucius. See C. I. L. I³, p. 326.

‡ Velleius Paterculus, II. cii. 2: *Armenian deinde . . . ingressus*; C. I. L. xl. 1421: *post consulatum . . . devictis aut in fidem receptis bellicosissimis ac maximis gentibus*. The invasion of Armenia thus took place in 2 A.D.

§ Dion, iv. 10; Velleius, II. cii. 2.

of many who flattered him by such bequests, while they hoped themselves to attend his funeral. There were now very few men in Rome who could see the shrunken form of the *princeps* pass by in his litter and remember the handsome young man, full of vigour and address, who had entered the forum one April day, forty-seven years ago, to promise that he, as *Cæsar's* son, would pay the legacies which the murdered dictator had bequeathed to the people. Those events seemed extremely remote. Two generations had passed away upon the rapid current of events and changes: Augustus alone had survived these vicissitudes, as though he were immortal. But after thirty years of his government we can understand that many began to weary of him, and to think that new blood was required, if the State were not to become decrepit like its leader, while waiting till he should suffer the common lot of mankind. Moreover, Augustus must himself be longing for repose and be more than sated with honour, power and glory.* A new leader was needed to deal with the new conditions of the age: but it was difficult to say who he should be. Such names as Marcus Lepidus, Asinius Gallus and Lucius Arruntius † were put forward by some, but not with serious intention: as senators, they were hardly known outside Italy. Caius was regarded as too young and too inexperienced; it was also reported that he had been entirely prostrated by the after effects of his wound, had resigned his command, withdrawn to Syria and informed Augustus that he wished to take no further part in public life.‡ Popular caprice and party self-seeking had made him consul, like his father, at the age of twenty, but could not give him Augustus' inexhaustible powers of adaptation to circumstances. Caius had never been robust: the Eastern campaign had perhaps proved too severe a strain; perhaps, also, he had abused the opportunities for pleasure

* Dion, iv. 12: *ἐπιβαρθεὶς δῆθεν* . . . says Dion, alluding to the refusals of Augustus, which he regarded as feigned on this occasion. They may have been more genuine than Dion supposes, living as he did long after this date.

† A speech attributed by Tacitus (*Ann.* i. 13) to Augustus inclines us to think that these names were vaguely spoken of, as possible successors to Augustus.

• Dion, iv. 10; Velleius Paterculus, II. cii. 3.

4 A.D. which Asia offered to his youth, his power and his wealth. His health was weak and his mental balance unstable: both were doubtless overthrown by the wound he received at Artagira. At the age of twenty-three, the young man whom the doting tenderness of Augustus had regarded as the support, the guiding intelligence and will of the empire, abandoned his prospects of reputation and power in a wild fit of despair and fear. The result was a complete dilemma: if Augustus were not to be reappointed, Tiberius was the only man whose experience, energy, intelligence, military skill and reputation among the barbarians would enable him to occupy the first place in the State. But Tiberius was not, as yet, a possible candidate; he was too unpopular and distrusted, while his enemies were too numerous.* Hence, every one was forced to agree that the presidency of Augustus must be prolonged for another term of ten years, but many doubtless hoped, though secretly, that death, more prudent than man and more discreet than Augustus, would bring his life to a close before he had completed forty years as president.†

The reconcilia-
tion with
Tiberius.

The misfortune which had overwhelmed Caius was thus a fresh blow to Augustus: he did his best to cheer the young man's spirits and eventually begged him to return to Italy, where he might live as he pleased, if he declined to take any further part in public business.‡ It was in vain that the affection of the father thus overcame the severity of the statesman: Caius was making preparations for his return, when he died in a little Lycian town in February of the year 4.§ Even then Augustus would take no steps, although Germania was in full revolt. Eventually, his obstinacy seems to have exasperated not only the friends of Tiberius, the traditionalist party, but all who realised that further inaction would expose the empire

* Compare the remarks which Tacitus relates as public gossip while Augustus was growing old. They contain an element of truth, in spite of the author's obvious prejudices (*Ann.* i. 4): *Tiberium Neronem maturum annis, spectatum bello, sed vetere atque insita Clauſia familia ſuperbia; multaque indiſcia ſauitia, quamquam premantur, erumpere.* In other words, Tiberius was regarded as too aristocratic, too autocratic and too severe.

† *Dion.* lv. 12.

‡ *Ibid.* 10.

§ *Ibid.* 10; Velleius Paterculus, II. cii. 3; Suetonius, *Aug.* 65.

to the gravest danger.* One day, in the first half of the year 4 A.D., Augustus was warned that a conspiracy against him was being hatched by the aristocracy, who were led by a grandson of Pompey, Cnæus Cornelius Cinna.† Whether the conspirators proposed to repeat the Ides of March or merely to make a milder demonstration with the object of forcing Augustus to reorganise his enfeebled government, is uncertain. The fact remains, that Livia's energetic intervention saved the conspirators from punishment,‡ while Augustus not only pardoned Cinna but supported his candidature for the next year's consulship:§ finally, on June 26 in the *comitia curiata* Augustus adopted Tiberius as his son, together with Agrippa Postumus: || he also induced the *comitia* to confer tribunician power on Tiberius for ten years.¶ Tiberius had previously adopted Germanicus.** Thus, as the son of Augustus, he took the place of Caius Cæsar and, as his colleague, he replaced Agrippa. Once more the republic had two presidents: Augustus was now to conduct the government according to the views

* Was the adoption of Tiberius connected with Cinna's conspiracy? It seems probable to me that there was a connection. It should be particularly noted that Dion tells the story of the conspiracy as if it took place after the adoption of Tiberius, whereas it must have occurred before that event. In fact, it occurred before the elections, since Augustus supported Cinna's candidature as a proof that he had pardoned him, and this he must have done before July; now, as we shall see, the adoption of Tiberius took place on June 26. Moreover, if the long speeches attributed to Augustus and Livia by Dion prove anything, they prove that Livia worked hard to save the conspirators. Why did Livia show such zeal? As her efforts were known to the public, they must have been great. If the conspiracy was intended to recall Tiberius to power, Livia's intervention is easily explicable. Further, Cinna was elected consul with the approval of Augustus, at the moment when he adopted Tiberius and secured the tribunician power for him. The conjunction of these two acts again points to the fact that they were intended to satisfy the same interests. To suppose that Cinna wished to kill Augustus to satisfy old Pompeian partisanship is ridiculous. The civil wars were long past and almost forgotten.

† Dion, iv. 14; cf. Seneca, *de Clem.* i. 9 (their accounts are very discrepant).

‡ Dion, iv. 22.

§ *Ibid.*

|| Velleius Paterculus, II. ciii. 3; C. I. L. P. p. 320; Dion, iv. 13; Suetonius, *Aug.* 65 and *Tib.* 15.

¶ Dion, iv. 13.

** Suetonius, *Tib.* 15; Dion, iv. 13.

▼

↑

4 A.D. of the traditionalist and conservative party, which recovered its former preponderance.*

* The superficiality and heedlessness of Tacitus may be seen by reading the passage in which he relates the explanation which many gave of the reconciliation of Augustus and Tiberius (*Ann. i. 10*): *ne Tiberium quidem caritate aut reipublicæ cura successorem adscitum, sed quoniam adrogantiam savitiamque ejus introspexerit, comparatione deterrima sibi gloriam quæsivisse.* Tacitus seems to accept this extraordinary explanation. The facts show that Augustus very reluctantly resolved to make Tiberius his successor, when this duty was unavoidably forced upon him.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LAST "DECENNIUM"

Tiberius at the head of the government—Tiberius in Germania—Political reforms of Augustus—The law against the *orbi*—The knights are opposed to the law—New projects of Tiberius in Germania—The new military law—The march of Tiberius to the Elbe—The *aerarium militare*—The conversion of Ovid—Germanicus and Agrippina—The character of Claudius—Difficulty of Tiberius' position—Famine at Rome—The *vigiles*—The revolt of Dalmatia and Pannonia—Great military preparations—Tiberius and the insurrection—The strategy of Tiberius—The disruption of the empire—Tiberius and public opinion—Fresh taxation—The end of the Pannonian insurrection—The exile of Julia and Ovid—The triumph of Tiberius—The *lex Papia Poppæa*—The defeat of Varus.

THE promotion of Tiberius to the position of Augustus' colleague profoundly modified the political situation. From the year 4 A.D. until his death, Augustus represented the supreme power in the empire, but the actual administration was in the hands of Tiberius. Broken by fatigue and infirmity, discouraged by the disappointments of recent years, the aged *princeps* had eventually yielded to the logic of facts. He continued in outward seeming to decide measures and to introduce reforms: but the most important of these were suggested by Tiberius. Upon no other hypothesis can we explain why the Roman government suddenly threw off the lethargy of the last few years and recovered sufficient energy to attempt numerous enterprises, to pass laws and to introduce reforms. Tiberius was the real governor of the State. Augustus had at length realised that his own powers were worn out and that he must allow a younger and more vigorous man to act on his behalf, and must confine himself to lending Tiberius the support of his authority, as far as possible.* It was not in the year 14,

The consequences of the reconciliation.

* Augustus himself admitted the situation in a letter to Tiberius,

4 A.D. but in 4 A.D. that the government of Tiberius began, immediately after his reconciliation with Augustus.

First measures
of Tiberius.

After ten years of enforced inaction and unpopularity, Tiberius was anxious to avenge himself upon his enemies: but he wished to take a vengeance worthy of his lofty intelligence and of his natural nobility of character. Mere reprisals were not his object: he wished to act and to prove to all that the man whom a corrupt aristocracy had calumniated and persecuted for years, was none the less able to regenerate a decaying government. Possibly it was his influence which induced Augustus in that year to lighten Julia's punishment by allowing her to reside at Reggio under milder restrictions.* By this act of clemency Tiberius probably wished to satisfy public opinion and to show that he was ready to forget the past as far as he could and to work for a reconciliation between the Julii and the Claudii. In accordance with this intention the eldest son of Drusus, Germanicus, whom Tiberius had adopted, was betrothed to Agrippina, the daughter of Julia and Agrippa. But though Tiberius did not propose to take vengeance upon his former enemies, he was resolved to govern upon principles which those enemies detested: he was especially anxious to remedy without delay two evils which had been allowed to assume dangerous proportions in recent years: the disorganisation of the army and the Germanic peril. As soon as he had been invested with the tribunician power, he lost not a moment in starting for Germania,† to restore the discipline of the legions‡ and to drive from the military which was certainly written at the time of the Pannonian war, and of which a fragment has been preserved by Suetonius (*Tib.* 21): *sive quid incidit, de quo sit cogitandum diligentius, sive quid stomachor valde, medius fidius Tiberium meum desidero.*

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 65: *post quinquennium (consequently in 4 A.D.) demum ex insula in continentem, lenioribusque paullo conditionibus, transtulit.* (See Dion, *lv.* 13.)

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 16; Dion, *lv.* 13; Velleius, *II.* *clv.* 2; *non diu vindicem custodemque imperii sui morata in urbe patria protinus in Germaniam misit.*

‡ Suetonius, *Tib.* 19: *disciplinam acerrime exegit*; the general tone of the chapter seems to me to show that the author is not referring to Tiberius' ordinary methods of command, but to special measures which he took upon his return to power for the purpose of reorganising the armies of Germania and of Pannonia.

camps upon the Rhine the disgraceful indolence which years of repose had produced: he proposed completely to reverse the negligent policy which had allowed the Germans to live in a purely nominal subjection for the last few years and had permitted Marbod, the king of the Marcomanni, to found unmolested, but two hundred miles from the Italian frontier, a great Germanic kingdom with an army organised upon Roman models. At the same time, Tiberius realised that the legions were greatly demoralised and that he must act prudently. He did not propose to conduct a Germanic campaign in Cæsar's style, to compensate for inadequate preparation by measures brilliantly improvised, and to counterbalance numerical inferiority by lightning rapidity of movement. The tactics of Tiberius were much slower and more cautious: he intended to prepare a numerous army, so formidable and well armed, that conflict at close quarters would be unnecessary. This year was to be spent in small expeditions and negotiations in order to reduce the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser, the Canenefates, the Atuares, the Bructeri and the Cherusci: the next year, after careful preparations, he would repeat the great march of Drusus to the Elbe: in the third year, these careful preliminaries were to be concluded by a supreme humiliation of Germanic barbarism, by forcing Marbod himself to accept the Roman protectorate.*

But Tiberius was aware that to re-enforce military discipline and to make war was not necessarily to restore the governmental power. While he was absent in Germania, Augustus in the same year introduced certain measures which were obviously inspired by Tiberius and betrayed the traditionalist and conservative spirit of the old political aristocracy. Only by assuming that the influence of Tiberius was at work can we explain why Augustus, whose dexterity in avoiding difficulties was supreme, should have attacked a number of troublesome and dangerous questions at this moment: he began a fresh

Reforms in Italy.

* Tiberius (Tacitus, *Ann.* ii. 26) afterwards asserted that it was not his intention to crush Marbod entirely, but to induce him to conclude peace *consilio* rather than *vi*. Was this the original intention of Tiberius or was he obliged to content himself with it when he found that he could not overthrow Marbod's empire?

4 A.D.

purification of the Senate, though he soon abandoned the task as usual, and again as usual attempted to make others responsible for his action : * he realised the necessity of paying his soldiers and veterans punctually, though he had long disregarded promises of payment : he began to demand money for such payment not only from the provinces, but also from Italy. It was only right that Italy, which had grown very wealthy during the last thirty years, should bear part at least of the military expenditure, from which she derived greater profit than any other part of the empire. Hard campaigns in Illyria, Pannonia and Germany were undertaken in order that the land-owners of northern and central Italy might be able to sell their wines without hindrance to the barbarian or half-civilised provinces of Europe. Taxation, however, had been unknown in Italy for centuries and only a stronger and more resolute character than Augustus would have entertained so rash an idea. Augustus' share in this affair is doubtless the infinite caution with which he conducted it. He wished to avoid all precipitation and therefore made use of his proconsular power : without giving any explanation of his action, he ordered a census to be made of all who possessed more than 200,000 sesterces : these were apparently the victims intended for the coming sacrifice. † Finally, Augustus ventured to raise a further point which had been neglected for many years and to attack the question of childless marriages ; he attempted to prevent the wealthy middle class and the knights from slipping through the meshes of the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*. Thus the knights, the middle classes and the general public were instinctively correct in their aversion for Tiberius and their admiration for Caius and Lucius Cæsar : only a few months after the return of Tiberius to power, Augustus ventured to propose a formidable

* Dion, iv. 13.

† *Ibid.* I think this census can only be explained as a preliminary to direct taxation. There can be no other explanation of the fact that Augustus did not assess smaller properties for fear of a revolt. It may be objected that a property assessment was not necessary for the tax upon legacies which was next introduced. But this tax had not yet been devised, and the assessment might have been made in view of other forms of taxation.

law, which placed married men without children upon the same footing as bachelors.* This law was probably called the *lex*

4 A.D.

* Jörs (*Die Ehegesetze des Augustus*, Marburg, 1894, p. 49 ff.) seems to me to have demonstrated these three points clearly and finally. (1) Between the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex Papia Poppæa* a third law must be placed to which Suetonius alludes, as a modification of the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* (Aug. 34): *hanc quum aliquanto severius quam ceteras emendasset, præ tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit: nisi adempta demum lenitate parte pænarum, et vacatione trienii data auctisque præmiis.* (2) This law, which reinforced the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, was proposed in the year 4 A.D. and was twice suspended, first for three years and next for two years; there is no reason to doubt the assertion of Dion on this point (lvi. 7). (3) The *lex Papia Poppæa* was a relaxation of the law of 4 A.D. and an attempt to facilitate the realisation, at least in part, of the ideas which the law of 4 A.D. had laid down. Dion (lvi. 10) says that the *lex Papia Poppæa* τὸν δὲ γεγαμηκότας ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγύων τῶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιτρίμων διαφόρῃ διεχώρισε: we also know that the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* merely dealt with bachelors and did not affect the *orbis*. Now, the *lex Papia Poppæa* made a difference between the bachelors and the *orbis*, and as it was a modification of the law of 4 A.D., this latter must have treated bachelors and *orbis* alike—in other words, have visited *orbitas* and celibacy with the same penalties. That such was the case is, in itself, very probable. As we have several times observed, the first ten chapters of Dion's lvi. book show us that in the thirty years which followed the promulgation of the great social laws, the question of *orbitas* became very serious: many people married to evade the harassing regulations of the *lex Julia*, but childlessness increased, especially among the well-to-do families in the equestrian order. The party which had called for the marriage law doubtless demanded that it should be enforced by a law against *orbitas*; hence it is not surprising that such a law should have been passed in 4 A.D., after the return of Tiberius to power. Tiberius, as a conservative and a traditionalist, must have approved these laws; proof of the fact is the proposal of the law in question immediately after his return to power, and this proposal, again, enables us to explain the obstinate dislike of Tiberius which prevailed in a large part of Italy. The government of Tiberius made the law against *orbitas* inevitable. What, then, was this mysterious law in the year 4 A.D. Ulpian (*Frag.* xxviii. 7) speaks of a *lex Julia caducaria*, of which we hear nothing elsewhere. As the *lex Papia Poppæa* was a modification of the law of 4 A.D. and dealt fully with the question of *caduca*, this *lex Julia caducaria* may very possibly have been the law of 4 A.D. Tacitus (*Ann.* iii. 25) clearly states that one of the objects of the *lex Papia Poppæa* was to increase the State revenues; this is an essential difference between the *lex Papia Poppæa* and the *lex de maritandis ordinibus*, and it is a difference which historians have unduly neglected: *Papia Poppæa, quam senior Augustus post Julias rogationes, incitandis salubrum pænis et augendo aerario sanxerat.* . . . From this year onwards we find the government paying careful attention to the finances: it is thus not improbable that the law of 4 A.D. was intended not merely to check *orbitas* but also to open fresh sources of revenue, for which purpose a *lex caducaria* was entirely

4 A.D.

Julia caducaria and was intended to serve both a social and a financial purpose. The law attempted to force married couples to have children, by placing childless marriages on the same footing as bachelorhood, and subjecting them to the same penalties as were prescribed in the law upon marriage: it also attempted to replenish the treasury by deciding that bachelors and *orbi* should be incompetent to inherit and that legacies to them should no longer pass to the next heirs according to the old laws, but should revert to the public treasury.

The opposition
to the law.

Thus the traditionalist party returned to power with Tiberius and the work was resumed which had been begun by the great social laws of 18 B.C., and afterwards interrupted by the discords of the nobility, the ideas of the new generation and the weakness of Augustus. In 18 B.C. the party had attempted to cure the aristocracy of its selfishness and its vices: it now proceeded to deal with the middle classes upon similar principles. As the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex de adulteriis* were directed against the deficiencies of the nobility, so the *lex caducaria* was intended as a stimulus to the equestrian order, whose system of race suicide threatened to leave the empire in the hands of freedmen and foreign subjects. This order however, was more numerous, more energetic and less opulent than the nobility: moreover, Tiberius, the real promoter of the law, was obliged to remain in Germania until the month of December; * a series of clever negotiations and a rapid forward movement had enabled him to subdue all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser as far as the sea; he was also preparing a great campaign for the next year. Augustus was thus left unsupported at Rome, when the law was presented to the *comitia*. In the absence of Tiberius, Augustus failed to over-
suitable. In short, it may have been a law which enacted that bequests to bachelors should revert to the State and also placed *orbi* in the same position as bachelors. The *lex Papia Poppæa* gave relatives to the third degree rights preferential to those of the State, a concession also granted to other legatees who had children. I therefore assume that the *lex Julia caducaria* gave the State an immediate right to these legacies, and that this condition was afterwards modified by the *lex Papia Poppæa* in the sense stated above. It should be observed that these are but conjectures and are very uncertain.

* Velleius Paterculus, II. cv. 3: *anni ejus æstiva usque in mensem Decembrem producta . . .*

awe the knights, who offered resistance and attempted to prevent the approval of the law.* Many were threatened with the loss of legacies upon which they had counted and a general coalition was formed to oppose the law. The conservative and moneyed classes in their exasperation, threatened to use the revolutionary weapons which Clodius had wielded so effectively: the knights gave vent to menaces and outcries and held public demonstrations of so tumultuous a nature that Augustus was eventually intimidated and introduced a clause delaying the application of the law for three years: the interval was intended to enable men to comply with the conditions of the law and to have at least one child. However, this slight concession proved inadequate to pacify the infuriated knights and the numerous body of citizens whose interests were attacked by the law, while the general dislike of Tiberius was increased by the imposition of this further check upon private selfishness.

Meanwhile, Tiberius was fully occupied in Germany. Adopting Agrippa's former plan, he proposed to begin a combined movement of fleet and army. He intended to lead a

Tiberius in
Germany: the
new military
law.

* Suetonius (*Aug.* 34) . . . *præ tumultu recusantium perferre non potuit: nisi adempta demum lenitate parte panarum et vacatione triennis data* . . . A comparison of this concise statement with the passage in Dion, lvi. 7, will show that, whereas Dion has forgotten the law of 4 A.D. and speaks only of the *lex Papia Poppæa*, Suetonius confuses these two laws and represents them as one legislative act. As both texts are thus imperfect, we must supplement one with the other to reach the truth. Suetonius' mention of a *vacatio triennis* is confirmed by Dion, who adds that this first *vacatio* was followed by another of two years, which Suetonius does not mention. From Dion we can see that the law was *perlatâ* in its most rigorous form, though it was not immediately put into practice. If taken literally, this statement would contradict the words of Suetonius (*nisi adempta demum lenitate parte panarum*). But all is explicable, if we admit that these words of Suetonius refer to the *lex Papia Poppæa*, which was an alleviation of the *lex caducaria*. The undue conciseness of Suetonius has represented the *lex caducaria* and the *lex Papia Poppæa* as one law: this is an historical error; though it is, in fact, not far from the truth, as the law of 4 A.D., though *perlatâ*, was not put into practice in its original form but in the milder form of the *lex Papia Poppæa*—that is, *nisi adempta demum lenitate parte panarum*; so much is clearly stated by Dion. Thus Suetonius, though less precise in statement, confirms Dion. The law of 4 A.D. was not enforced, and Augustus must have granted delays, first for three and again for two years: then, at the end of the second delay, a milder law, the *lex Papia Poppæa*, must have been substituted for the original law.

5 A.D.

strong army across Germania to the Elbe, while the fleet would follow the North Sea coast, concentrate at the mouth of the Elbe and bring Tiberius supplies, munitions of war and reinforcements; these would enable him either to cross the Elbe, to subdue the tribes which had taken refuge beyond that river and to isolate Marbod, or to return in safety when the object of his expedition had been secured.* The scale of this plan was sufficiently vast to keep Tiberius in Germania throughout the winter, for the supervision of his preparations. However, in December, he left Germania for Italy, intending to return in the spring. Serious as was the state of affairs in Germania, his presence at Rome was urgently demanded, to settle the military and financial question. On this point, the ideas of Tiberius were eminently sane and just. In view of the immediate want of money, it was impossible to satisfy the extravagant demands which the troops had been allowed to make by the relaxation of discipline during the last ten years. The impossible military law of 14 B.C. must be abolished and the old rule of twenty years' service reintroduced. Augustus, as usual, had spent years in the attempt to evade his difficulties and to find pretexts for keeping soldiers under arms beyond the legal term: Tiberius desired a straightforward solution of the difficulty and declined to irritate the soldiers by further subterfuges. He proposed to re-establish the rule of twenty years service for legionaries, and fourteen for prætorians and to promise a bonus upon discharge of 12,000 sesterces for legionaries and of 20,000 for prætorians: at the same time he wished to institute a special fund for the payment of military pensions, which was to be sustained by special sources of revenue appropriated to it. In this way the pensions of the veterans would no longer depend upon the various chances which filled or emptied the general treasury of the State from month to month. If the conditions of service were hard, they were at least clear and definite, and the republic would undertake to perform its promises: such seems to have been the idea of Tiberius. The new military law was approved, probably at the outset of the year 5 A.D.† On the other hand, the new taxation by

* Velleius Paterculus, ii. 106.

† Dion, iv. 23.

which the military fund was to be sustained, failed to secure immediate approval. It was difficult to see what form of taxation would be most productive and cause least expense, and a commission of senators was formed to investigate the problem.*

It was probably about this time that Tiberius induced the Senate to constitute the province of Mœsia, on the north of Thrace and Macedonia, which extended from Dalmatia to the Black Sea, along the lower Danube: in the new province were stationed the three legions which had been quartered in Pannonia and Dalmatia. These regions had been divided hitherto among petty principalities under Roman protection: the new organisation was apparently intended to secure the mouths of the Danube against the Getæ.† Tiberius then returned to Germania and began his great expedition at the outset of the spring. The fleet sailed down the Rhine and into the North Sea by the canal of Drusus, advanced boldly northward, coasting along Jutland to the Skagerrak and gazed with curiosity and wonder upon the vast cold ocean which no Roman eye had yet seen: upon this distant peninsula were discovered the remnants of a people famous and formidable a century previously, the Cimbri.‡ This little tribe, continuing an obscure existence in these wild and remote regions, was all that remained of the huge invading wave which had devastated much of Europe before it spent its force in the valley of the Po. The Roman army easily overawed this people and induced them to conclude a treaty of peace and to send ambassadors

The march of
Tiberius to the
Elbe.

* Dion, iv. 24, seems to allude to a commission.

† This is a hypothesis, but seems to me very reasonable. Ovid (*Trist.* ii. 199, written in 9 A.D.) says of the country to which he was banished: *hæc est Ausonio sub jure novissima* . . . If this information is accurate, Mœsia must have been made a Roman province between 3 B.C., when Paphlagonia was also made a province, and 9 A.D. But a passage of Dion (iv. 29) shows that in 6 A.D. there was a governor of Mœsia who had troops at his disposal. Mœsia was therefore made a Roman province between 3 B.C. and 6 A.D. I assume that the change took place after the recall of Tiberius: it was doubtless one of the measures taken to improve the defences of the provinces.

‡ *Mon. Anc.* v. 15-16; Pliny, N. H. II. lxxvii. 167: *classe circumvecta ad Cimbrorum promontorium*. A comparison of these texts with Velleius Paterculus (II. cvi. 3) will show that the expeditions to which the *Mon. Anc.* and Pliny refer took place that year under Tiberius.

5 A.D.

to Augustus, bearing an ancient and venerated lustral basin as a present, with instructions to ask his pardon for the ill which their ancestors had done to Italy.* The fleet then turned southward, entered the mouth of the Elbe and went up stream. Meanwhile, Tiberius was leading his army from the Rhine to the Elbe, a distance of four hundred miles, by a route which we cannot now retrace. A great number of tribes gave in their submission as he advanced: he defeated and subdued the Lombards, who had ventured to oppose him. On reaching the banks of the Elbe, he found the fleet awaiting him with provisions and munitions of war.† Large masses of hostile troops were gathering upon the opposite bank, and were coming in from every side to hold this last line of defence. For some days the two armies confronted one another: from time to time the Roman fleet advanced and struck terror into the barbarians who fled: negotiations were opened. At length, a Germanic chieftain asked to see Cæsar: he entered the Roman camp, which wore its most martial aspect for the occasion: he was permitted also to enter the presence of Tiberius, who received him with full Roman gravity in the attitude of a demigod. For a long time the barbarian silently contemplated the man who symbolised the fabulous power of the far-distant city, the centre of attraction for all the world.‡ New treaties of peace were concluded, and the fleet and army then retraced the route by which they had come. Tiberius had been able to inspire the fickle and superficial barbarian intellect with renewed respect for the Roman power, almost without a blow, by a great display of strength and by showing that a Roman army could cross Germania from end to end when it pleased. Two other peoples, the Senones and the Carides or Carudes, were so deeply impressed by this march that they also had resolved to send ambassadors to the great metropolis.§

The *acrarium militare*.

Unfortunately in Rome, the decadence of the Senate was proceeding apace. In this year, it became necessary to appoint

* Strabo, VII. ii. 1. Very probably the embassy was sent after, and in consequence of the expedition of Tiberius to Jutland.

† Velleius Paterculus, ii. 106.

‡ *Ibid.* ii. 107.

§ Mon. Anc. v. 16-18.

ædiles by lot from the former quæstors and tribunes, as no one would accept this office : * the senatorial commission which had been instructed to find new sources of taxation to meet the expense of the military pensions, declared that after careful investigation, they found themselves unable to offer any suggestion.† They admitted without exception that the welfare of the soldiers must be considered and that the military treasury must be provided with full and adequate sources of revenue, but every proposal for taxation was met by some objection and was rejected in turn. The fact was that any solicitude for the veterans who had grown old in defending the Rhine and the Danube was far outweighed by the invincible selfishness of the rich, who would not hear of fresh taxation. The *lex caducaria* had brought Augustus, Tiberius and their government into such unpopularity, that no one would venture to exasperate any further the middle classes, the order of knights and the rich plebeians. Tiberius returned to Rome in the winter of 5 and 6 A.D., after his great march to the Rhine:‡ he cared nothing for public ill-feeling and was determined that the military law should not become the occasion for further deception of the troops. Hence, at the beginning of the year 6 A.D. we find Augustus taking several steps in rapid succession to set the military treasury on foot : drawing upon his own fortune, he paid 170 millions of sesterces into the treasury in his own name and in that of Tiberius : § he requested allied sovereigns and cities to promise contributions : || of the proposals for taxation, he chose one to be submitted to the Senate and comitia, a tax of one-twentieth upon all inheritances and legacies, except those bequeathed to near relations and to the poor.¶ The *lex caducaria* had been very unpopular with the wealthy classes : a yet more disagreeable tax upon inheritances

* Dion, iv. 24.

† Dion, iv. 25 : *μηδὲς πρός ἀπόκων τισὶν εὐρισκετο . . .*

‡ Velleius Paterculus, II. cvii. 3 . . . *eadem qua priore anno festinatione urbem petens*. Tiberius' haste shows that he was anxious to supervise domestic policy, which ran great risk of collapse if Augustus were left alone in charge.

§ *Mon. Anc.* lii. 35-39 ; Dion, iv. 25.

|| Dion, iv. 25.

¶ *Ibid.*

6 A.D. was now proposed. Protestation was loud and universal: it seemed that the government proposed to confiscate family property, to begin a kind of legalised proscription directed not only against rich families but against all who had anything to lose. Discontent increased; the proposal was so severely criticised and Tiberius became so unpopular that Augustus executed a small *coup d'état* and declared that he had discovered the proposal among Cæsar's papers. It thus became a legal instrument by the famous *senatus consultum* of March 17, 44 B.C. This case is the last use made of Cæsar's papers, which were the greatest forgery ever invented by political parties at Rome.* Many asserted that existing taxation was adequate for all purposes, if wastage and excessive expenditure could be avoided: to satisfy these critics, Augustus proposed that a commission of three ex-consuls, chosen by lot, should be ordered to examine all accounts, to reduce excessive and to suppress useless expense and therewith all wastage and abuses.†

The conversion
of Ovid.

Tiberius had used his time well. In less than two years he had created a new province, restored the prestige of Rome among the Germanic peoples, indicated a solution of the financial and military difficulty, restored some vigour to the chief governmental organs and brought again into vogue traditionalist and classical ideals. A certain reaction of public feeling took place. Even Ovid, the poet of rakes and mistresses, seemed to have felt the change: for some time, in imitation of Virgil, he had been composing a national poem, the *Fasti*, and a moral and mythological poem, the *Metamorphoses*. The *Fasti* was a poetical version of the work of Verrius Flaccus, and detailed in smooth elegiac couplets the calendar, recounting the myths, historical events or festivals as their dates recurred. In the *Metamorphoses* Ovid related the most attractive legends of mythology, connecting them by a slender thread of narrative. Thus he also seemed to regret the age of gold and its innocence now lost: in his narratives of the past and of its solemn memories, he expressed his reverence for tradition: he bowed before the venerable deities of Rome: he was moved to deep piety in the temples where Rome had prayed and by the holy rites

* Dion, lv. 25.

† *Ibid.*

which she had observed while she was rising to pre-eminence among the Mediterranean peoples. Ovid had exchanged the lascivious gaiety of erotic verse for the prostrate adoration of the worshipper: to these more serious tasks he brought his old facility, elegance and distinction. But his loftier treatment of old tradition did not exclude the expression of new and modern sentiments, though these elements were amalgamated with such dexterity that old and new became indistinguishable. Ovid was the first Roman writer to include among the ancient Roman cults and to treat as venerable the cult of Augustus, which had hardly come home to the minds of the Italian middle classes. He was the first who was careful, while singing the praises of other gods, to mention the "holy hands" of the "holy person" and the "numen" of the "divine intellect" of Augustus and Tiberius; he was also prepared to address the same flatteries, in due course, to Germanicus and Livia. Great is the difference between the work of Ovid and the sustained dignity of Horace and Virgil. Ovid is the poet of the dying national traditions and of the rising monarchical sentiment, of lascivious love and of austere religion: but these inconsistencies were a matter of indifference to him and he made no effort to reconcile them. He was only concerned to secure an outward show of uniformity. Ovid represents, indeed, the laxity and frivolity of his generation and of the new aristocracy: individual character was no longer moulded by strong tradition and systematic education, but was exposed to the most divergent influences: hence development in any direction was possible, towards vice or virtue, towards heroism or cowardice, towards asceticism or debauchery, towards common sense or stupidity. The good, the average and the bad man were alike merged in the crowd, as indeed in the family of Augustus, which is typical of the aristocracy, in so far as distinctions of moral excellence were obscured within its ranks.

Germanicus and Agrippina were an exemplary couple, recalling the virtues of Drusus and Antonia. Germanicus was kind and generous: like the old-time nobles, he was ready to defend the most obscure plebeians in the courts, and displayed admirable powers of eloquence and pertinacity: he

Germanicus,
Agrippina and
Claudia.

6 A.D.

set an example to the youth of his time of energy, zealous citizenship and purity of life.* Agrippina was a faithful wife and the mother of many children; she scorned luxury and useless expense and was almost too proud of her husband, her children and her Roman virtues. At this moment she had only one son, but she and her husband proceeded to observe the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* with exemplary zeal. The youngest brother, Claudius, had been sickly from his childhood and had seemed likely to remain imbecile: his intelligence, however, had developed as he grew older, though in a strangely eccentric manner, like a tree with one long branch of monstrously twisted form. Claudius showed some taste and aptitude for literature, rhetoric and archæology: † Livy even advised him to devote himself to history.‡ But in the ordinary and simple affairs of life he displayed hopeless stupidity and was so incapable of learning the elementary rules of decent behaviour, that Augustus was obliged to keep him in the background, though he was anxious to introduce his sons and grandsons to public life and to prepare them for official posts.§ If he was allowed to take part in a banquet or festival, or to be present at any ceremony, he invariably committed some breach of manners which aroused general ridicule.|| Always buried in his books, his awkwardness, timidity and simplicity made him a mere tool in the hands of his servants, tutors and freedmen: in spite of his credulity, his education was a serious problem, for neither praise nor punishment could impress the simplest facts upon his mind, though he readily grasped complicated and difficult ideas. Though his constitution was weak, his voracity and sensuality were almost bestial, and he remained a sad enigma to the whole of his family. "When he can command himself," said Augustus to Livia, "the nobility of his mind is wonderful." In another letter he says, "Livia, may I perish if I have ever been more astounded! I have heard Claudius recite and he pleased me: indeed, he did. I cannot understand why a man who usually

* Suetonius, *Cal.* 3.† Suetonius, *Claud.* 3: *disciplinis autem liberalibus ab ætate prima non mediocrem operam dedit.*‡ *Ibid.* 41.§ *Ibid.* 2.|| *Ibid.* 4.

expresses himself so badly, should be able to speak so well in public." * Claudius was no fool, but his mind, as in certain epileptic cases, was ill-balanced and deficient: he was one of those scholars, who may appear helpless and ridiculous in the ordinary relations of life, but are capable of high originality and intellectual power when they can retire to some corner in the vast world of abstract ideas, cut off from contact with the human race, except through the cook who prepares their meals. At the present time, such a scholar easily finds his place in a University: but he was most unfortunately situated in the house of Augustus, which needed administrators and warriors to make history rather than pupils of Livy to write it. Thus, he was kept apart until he should overcome these defects, and was entrusted to the care of a tutor who seems to have been not sparing of blows. Though Claudius might be stupid, he caused no trouble and could live in the house. Agrippa Postumus, on the other hand, apparently developed no less stupidity as he grew up, but of a brutal type: he cared nothing for study or serious work, wasted his time in foolish amusements and would, for instance, spend the whole day fishing. He had conceived an aversion for his mother-in-law, Livia, and insulted her with monstrous accusations, asserting, for instance, that she plotted with Augustus to steal his father's property.† His sister Julia, however, who had married a great noble, L. Æmilius Paulus, some time previously, was surprisingly like her mother. She was fond of literature and liked to have young people about her: her tastes were luxurious and she was rapidly expending her wealth upon the construction of a sumptuous palace, in defiance of Augustus' sumptuary laws.‡ Ovid was one of her intimate friends. Drusus, on the other hand, the son of Tiberius, who had married Livilla, the sister of Germanicus and Claudius, was a young man of high character, though he was inclined at times to give way to fits of violent temper.

Such were the very inadequate and unreliable instruments of government at hand: an aristocracy both virtuous and vicious, Difficulty of Tiberius' position.

* Suetonius, *Claud.* 4.

† Dion, iv. 32.

‡ Suetonius, *Aug.* 72.

6 A.D. containing very contradictory tendencies and characters, and an equestrian order, or, in modern phrase, a widely spread middle class, in part of recent creation, devoid of culture and anxious rather to derive profit from the imperial supremacy of Italy than to share the burden of preserving the imperial power intact. Tiberius had conferred great benefits upon the State during the past eighteen months, but his unpopularity had in no degree diminished and it was more than ever impossible for him to secure public confidence. The law of 4 A.D. and the proposals for additional taxation inspired fresh fears that Tiberius would some day succeed Augustus: the wealthy and influential classes were preoccupied not so much with the maintenance of the Roman power in Germania, or with the security of the distant Rhine frontier, as with the *lex caducaria* which would come into force within twelve months with the proposed additional tax upon legacies. Under such conditions no administrator, whatever the loftiness or ardour of his ambition, could expect to do more than check positive harm. Alone, unpopular, supported only by a few friends, overwhelmed with affairs which demanded immediate attention, Tiberius had neither the time nor the means to renew the worn-out machinery of the Roman government. In fact, he was obliged to leave Rome without delay at the outset of the year 5, in order to begin his plan of operations against Marbod, which contemplated the invasion of Bohemia by two armies. One army, under Caius Sentius Saturninus, the consul of 4 A.D., was to advance from Mayence on the Rhine and to proceed eastward through the forest-land of the Chatti; the Pannonian army, under Tiberius himself, would start from Carnuntum on the frontier of Noricum and proceed northward. It is impossible to say whether Tiberius intended to crush Marbod, or to force a kind of protectorate upon him. In any case, this expedition marked the culmination of the great strategical change, which the progress of military decadence had necessitated and which Agrippa had begun: the smaller mobile contingents of Cæsar's day, acting as homogeneous units, were now replaced by vast armies with heavy baggage trains, which were subdivided for concentration upon

the scene of war by different routes. Such is the invariable outcome of a decline in the quality of the individual soldier : the size of the army is increased, equipment becomes more complicated and mobility is lost. 6 A.D.

Unfortunately, while Tiberius was preparing to invade Bohemia, a great disturbance broke out in Rome, in consequence of a famine probably due both to a bad harvest and to the habitual carelessness of the officials responsible for the corn-supply. Private importation, which had never been extensive even in years of plenty, had diminished in recent times : in ordinary seasons the gratuitous distributions of the State had been necessary to avoid famine, and the State now became responsible for the entire corn-supply. Augustus gave orders for the usual rations to be doubled * and perhaps took other measures, but without effect : the prevailing scarcity increased and a law was proposed to transfer the responsibility of distribution from the consulars to *praefecti frumenti dandi*.† It was, however, impossible to fill the granaries by the creation of new officials : ships, men and money were required and, as these were not forthcoming, the imperial metropolis was again famine-stricken. Since the corn-supply could not be increased, as a last expedient, steps were taken to diminish the numbers of the population. Augustus set the example by sending many of his slaves and freedmen away from Rome to his estates and to other towns : the wealthy classes followed this plan. All foreigners, except teachers and doctors, were forced to leave the city ; the gladiators were sent away, and the senators were relieved of their obligation to reside in Rome, by a regulation which stated that the decisions of the Senate were valid, whatever the number of members present.‡

* Dion, iv. 26. The question of the corn-supply remains very obscure. I think, however, that adequate attention has not been paid to the chapter in Dion, which provides strong arguments for the theory that public distributions were only made to supplement and support private enterprise : in other words, that the population subsisted partly upon purchased corn and partly upon State distributions. If every one relied entirely upon the public distributions, it is hard to see why Augustus should have ordered these to be doubled.

† Dion, iv. 26.

‡ Dion, iv. 26 ; Orosius, VII. iii. 6 ; Eusebius, 2022 ; Suetonius, Aug. 42.

6 A.D.

The vigiles.

These extensive removals naturally disorganised the public departments, which were already incompetent enough. In the half-empty city, outbreaks of fire became both more frequent and more dangerous: there was no one responsible for their extinction, whole districts were devastated,* and general misery prevailed in consequence. The situation was already highly strained and was far from relaxed by these disasters. All those who dreaded the operation of the *lex caducaria*, who were anxious to evade payment of the taxation imposed in the previous year, who hated Tiberius and feared his growing influence, seized the opportunity of intimidating the government by fomenting public exasperation: seditious manifestoes urging resistance to Augustus, to Tiberius and to the Senate were circulated: a breath of rebellion passed over the city and stirred even the triumphal laurels planted by the Senate's orders before Augustus' residence on the Palatine.† Profoundly embarrassed by these difficulties, the president determined at least to save the town from complete destruction by fire: for this purpose he ventured to infringe aristocratic tradition and the rigid nationalist principle. He hastily enrolled a large number of poor freedmen and divided them into seven bodies, one for each quarter of the town: they were placed under the orders of a knight and made responsible for the extinction of conflagrations, like the slaves of Crassus and of Rufus in past years. This was nothing more than a temporary expedient: when order had been restored, these bodies were to be disbanded.‡

The revolt of
Pannonia and
Dalmatia.

Meanwhile, Tiberius and Saturninus had been slowly and cautiously advancing from either side of Bohemia and had encountered not the least resistance. Marbod was anxious to avoid a struggle to the death, and apparently declined an engagement, the consequences of which would have been equally disastrous to himself, whether he secured a victory or sustained a defeat. Tiberius would probably have begun a vigorous pursuit of the retreating enemy, but at the moment

* Dion, iv. 26.

† Dion, iv. 27.

‡ Dion, iv. 26: ὅς καὶ δι' ἄλλου σφῆς δαλύσων. . . The phrase is important, as it provides further proof of Augustus' opportunism on questions of reform.

when the converging armies effected a junction, about mid-summer in the year 6, an unexpected event occurred, which entirely modified the course of operations against the Marcomanni and increased the difficulties of Rome. The Dalmatians had been exasperated by the requisitions of supplies and recruits which Tiberius had demanded for the Bohemian campaign and which increased the burden of their heavy tribute: they had therefore taken advantage of the absence of the legions to revolt under the leadership of a certain Baton,* and had easily overpowered the few Roman troops which had been left in the province: their example had aroused a general revolt in Pannonia, which speedily spread to Illyria. The Romans residing in the province were massacred in every quarter, as also were the foreign merchants,† who were regarded as the cause of the vague grievances which disturbed the peace of these agricultural populations, labouring under the extortions of a more refined and more powerful civilisation. The goods of the merchants were pillaged or confiscated: the young men were called to arms and placed under the command of a leader named, like the Dalmatian rebel, Baton.‡ Ancient historians estimated the rebel numbers at 200,000,§ and though this may be an exaggeration, there is no doubt that the two provinces were invaded by a considerable force, one detachment of which marched upon Sirmium, the most important town in Pannonia, where the Roman residents had taken refuge.||

The danger with which Rome was now confronted was extremely formidable. Tiberius regarded the Dalmatians and Pannonians as especially dangerous foes, because their warlike temper was unimpaired, while they had also learned Roman methods of warfare. Large numbers of them had served in the Roman auxiliary troops and they were already conversant with matters which Marbod was now attempting to teach the Marcomanni, Roman tactics and discipline, the Latin tongue and the customs and ideas which might prove

Great military preparations.

* Dion, iv. 29: ταῖς γὰρ ἐσφοραῖς τῶν χρημάτων οἱ Δελμάται βαρυνόμενοι.

† Velleius Paterculus, II. cx. 6.

‡ Dion, iv. 29.

§ Velleius Paterculus, II. cx. 3.

|| Dion, iv. 29.

6 A.D.

valuable in a struggle with Rome.* Moreover, they were in close proximity to Italy. A Pannonian army could make its way to the Po valley in a few days by way of Nauportus and Aquileia. In fact, the news that the insurgents were preparing to invade Italy soon spread throughout the peninsula, and met with immediate credence: no one questioned the possibility of so great an enterprise and the city forthwith lost such self-control as previous disasters had left to it. Rome had not despaired when Hannibal's cavalry swept the country beneath her walls, or when the Social War was raging in all its fury; but the empire now saw the city reduced to the most pitiable depths of panic and despair by the Pannonian and Dalmatian revolt. On every side rose an agonised cry for help to save the capital from impending ruin and slavery: the universal and obstinate detestation of Tiberius seemed to vanish in a moment: men rejoiced in the fact that Rome possessed at least one capable leader; Augustus was besieged with entreaties that Tiberius might be recalled from Bohemia and the most desperate measures were proposed. Augustus may have regarded the panic as justified, or may have wished to strengthen the hands of the government by means of it: in any case, he made no effort to allay the general alarm, but informed the Senate that the enemy might reach Rome in a few days, unless energetic measures were taken.† He then laid his proposals before the Senate. He ordered Cæcina Severus, the governor of Mœsia and Rhæmetalces, the king of Thrace, to begin a joint invasion of Pannonia: the former was to advance with the three legions under his command and with two more which had been recalled from Syria, while the Thracian king had an army of his own.‡ Augustus also called up reserves from every quarter, and recruited fresh troops: § to increase his resources, he laid a tribute upon the Germanic tribes without hesitation, notwithstanding their poverty, and he swelled his forces by enlisting freedmen and foreigners. He proposed a law, or passed a senatorial decree, obliging senators, knights

* Velleius Paterculus, II. cx. 5.

† *Ibid.* cxi. 1.

‡ Dion, iv. 29; Velleius Paterculus, II. cxii. 4.

§ Velleius Paterculus, II. cxi. 1.

and all others holding property above a certain value, to provide a number of slaves in proportion to their means: these slaves were to be given their freedom and six months' maintenance by their owners and to form cohorts of so-called *voluntarii*.^{*} The veterans, recruits, freedmen and foreigners thus hastily collected were despatched with all speed to Siscia,[†] where reinforcements were gradually concentrated, while Cæcina and Rhæmetalces were advancing to relieve Sirmium.[‡]

In the midst of the universal consternation, Tiberius alone retained his presence of mind. He knew the Pannonians and Dalmatians from his long experience of warfare in their provinces and though he regarded the insurrection as a dangerous movement, he did not think that the insurgents could possibly invade Italy.[§] He therefore declined to abandon Bohemia and to begin an immediate attack upon Pannonia, as panic-stricken Italy demanded. He wished first to conclude the Bohemian campaign, if not in accordance with his original plan, at least in an honourable manner and without any precipitate retreat. Negotiations may have been already begun, or he may have abandoned the idea of a pitched battle in view of the Pannonian revolt: in any case, he resolved to conclude an agreement and opened negotiations with Marbod, conducted them cautiously and secured a satisfactory arrangement. Only then, probably at the beginning of the autumn, did he turn towards Pannonia, sending in advance the Pannonian governor, Messalinus, the son of Messala Corvinus.|| Mean-

Tiberius and the insurrection.

* Velleius Paterculus, II. cxi. 1; Suetonius, *Aug.* 25; Dion, iv. 31; Macrobius, *Sat.* I. xi. 30.

† Velleius Paterculus, II. cxiii. 3, says, *regressus Sisciam*. This proves that the concentration of which he speaks at the beginning of the chapter took place at Siscia, which consequently remained in the Roman power, a further proof that current news of the revolt was greatly exaggerated. Dion confirms the statement when he tells us that Tiberius and Messalinus halted the first year at Siscia (lv. 30).

‡ They succeeded in reaching the town. See Dion, lv. 29.

§ Dion, lv. 30, and Velleius Paterculus, II. cxiii., show that Tiberius made no special haste to enter Pannonia, as he spent the first year in apportioning their stations in Pannonia to the legions and auxiliary troops. His delay is easily explained as caused by his wish to conclude the Bohemian campaign.

|| Dion, lv. 30; Velleius Paterculus, II. cxii. 1.

6 A.D.

while, Cæcina and Rhœmetalces had relieved Sirmium, after winning a hard-fought and bloody battle.*

The strategy
of Tiberius.

The deliberate caution of Tiberius caused much irritation in Italy: Rome was expecting a movement of surprising rapidity to be followed by the immediate overthrow of the insurgents. The general dissatisfaction began to find open expression: it was asserted that Tiberius was protracting the war in order to retain his command of the vast army under his leadership.† But Tiberius was an aristocrat with a profound contempt for public opinion; he would have refused to ask advice at any cost.‡ and he was not likely to pay the least attention to the gossip of the forum. Eventually, he reached Siscia, added the army which he had led back from Bohemia to the reinforcements sent out from Italy, and found time to consider the situation at his leisure: he then conceived a plan diametrically opposed to the wishes and expectations of Italy. At Rome, consternation had given place to presumptuous boasting, and the public daily awaited news of the slaughter of the Dalmatians and Pannonians in a great battle. But Tiberius was aware that to imitate Cæsar's tactics in Gaul and to attack the insurgents upon their own ground, was an enter-

* Dion, iv. 29. Dion alludes to two battles fought by Cæcina and Rhœmetalces with the rebels in this first year (iv. 20 and 30). Velleius, who gives more details, speaks of one battle only. Velleius seems to imply (II. cxii. 4) that this battle was fought by the insurgents against the armies from Mæsia and Thrace, and I am therefore inclined to identify it with the first of the battles mentioned by Dion.

† Dion, iv. 31, attributes this suspicion to Augustus, but it was in reality the public and the enemies of Tiberius who thus accused him. This charge of protracting the war is indirectly confirmed by Velleius, who defends Tiberius with considerable warmth on several occasions, and praises his conduct of the war as directed solely to secure ultimate success and not by the wish to gain popularity (*qua probanda essent, non qua utique probarentur sequens*, I. cxiii. 2; *anis conscientia quam fama consultum*, II. cxv. 5). If the letter of which Suetonius gives a fragment belongs, as I think, to this period, Augustus himself hints that many people criticised Tiberius, as he expresses his own satisfaction so strongly and asserts that all who had been in Pannonia were of his opinion. This letter shows that Augustus knew the cause of Tiberius' slowness; probably, therefore, Dion in this case, as in many others, is attributing to Augustus ideas entertained by a section of the public.

‡ Suetonius, *Tib.* 18: *tunc* (after the defeat of Varus) *præter consuetudinem cum pluribus de ratione belli communicavit.*

prise fraught with the gravest danger. A great army was being organised at Siscia under his direction and included ten legions, seventy cohorts of auxiliaries, ten squadrons of cavalry, ten thousand veterans, a large number of *voluntarii* or freedmen soldiers and the Thracian cavalry; the whole force probably amounted to a hundred thousand men.* Tiberius, however, and Augustus also, could place no implicit confidence in the efficiency of an army thus composed.† It would be unpardonable rashness to follow Cæsar's example and attack a bold and cunning enemy in a region which was imperfectly known and in which lines of communication and commissariat arrangements could only be maintained with difficulty. During the recent months of warfare, Messalinus and Cæcina had almost been defeated on several occasions by unexpected attacks, and had only extricated themselves after considerable loss.‡ The annihilation of a whole army corps would be an irreparable disaster. Tiberius renounced all hope of gaining glory in some pitched battle and determined to deal with the insurgents upon methods analogous to those which the English employed in the last Boer War: he resolved to divide his great army into several corps, to reoccupy every centre of importance which had formerly been a military post,§ and to assure the efficiency of the commissariat by personal superintendence of this department.|| Each army corps was ordered to devastate the surrounding territory, and to prevent the insurgents from sowing seed or reaping harvest: famine would thus compel them to surrender in the following year: the legions would be supported by an organised commissariat and might thus easily crush the more obstinate of the rebels.¶ Tiberius spent the rest of the

* Velleius Paterculus, II. cxlii. 1: the meaning of the phrase *frequens equite regio* is not clear; I suppose he is referring to the cavalry of the king of Thrace.

† Compare the words of Augustus in the letter to Tiberius, quoted by Suetonius, *Tib.* 21: *καὶ τοσαύτην βλάβην τῶν στρατευομένων.*

‡ Velleius Paterculus, II. cxli. 2; Dion, lv. 29 and 30.

§ Velleius Paterculus, II. cxlii. 2: *exercitum . . . dimittere statuit . . . remisit eo unde venerat.* These words imply that Tiberius reoccupied the military posts which Rome had held before the war.

|| Suetonius, *Tib.* 16, says that the chief difficulty of this war was the *summa frugum inopia.*

¶ Dion, lv. 30: *τῆ μὲν χώρα σφῶν προθουμένη. . .* Thus is to be explained the famine of the following year.

6 A.D.

year in arranging for the distribution of the several army corps throughout Pannonia: he accompanied them to their different stations, was careful to avoid any chance of ambushade and organised a regular commissariat. These operations proved entirely successful: the insurgents dared not oppose the larger numbers of the Romans, who were able to reoccupy the more important villages and towns. Thus, as winter approached, the Romans were stationed in their quarters, while the rebel bands were scattered about the country.* But towards the end of the year, a new disaster occurred: the Daci took advantage of the absence of Cæcina to invade Mœsia, and Cæcina with the Thracian king was obliged to return to this province to repel the invasion.† Some bands of insurgents also made their way into Macedonia but apparently caused no great damage.

The disruption
of the empire.

In the same year, Archelaus, the king of Judæa, was deposed and banished to Vienne in Gaul, in consequence of his misgovernment.‡ Thus Rome found courage to fulfil her promises to the Jewish nation. This display of energy was doubtless due to the influence of Tiberius. Augustus had never ventured to attempt such determined interference in the affairs of allied peoples, even at the time when his vigour was unimpaired. He was now so wearied and despondent that he seems about this time to have contemplated death by starvation.§ Gloomy reports arrived from every side: the empire was in a pitiable condition: in Sardinia the brigands were masters of the island: in Asia Minor, the Isaurians had ventured down from their mountains to plunder the plains; in Africa, the Gaetuli were invading the territories of King Juba and of Rome. Danger was threatening on every side and there were neither money, soldiers nor generals to meet it. It became necessary to send a knight in place of a senator to oppose the brigands in Sardinia.|| Nor could so old a man as Augustus, worn out

* Dion, *lv.* 30.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Josephus, *A. J.* XVII. xiii. 2; the date is confirmed by Dion, *lv.* 27. Dion, however, is mistaken in the name of the king, whom he calls Herod.

§ Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* VII. xlv. 149.

|| Dion, *lv.* 28.

by fifty years of governmental work, be expected to check this universal disruption. "If any difficulty," he wrote to Tiberius at this time, "of a serious nature should confront me, or if I am overburdened with responsibility, you, Tiberius, are the man I would wish for my support: when I think of you, I am reminded of Homer's lines; 'with him to lead us we could pass even through burning fire, so clear is his foresight of every chance.'"* In fact, Tiberius was the only politician inclined to make an effort to extricate the republic from the "burning fire" of this dangerous and far-reaching crisis: to this task he brought indefatigable zeal, proud and silent self-sacrifice, and a whole-hearted devotion to the task of saving the honour, the power and the reputation of Rome. But his unpopularity, which had been forgotten for a moment while the danger was at its height, was now revived and increased by the efforts of the avaricious, the immoral and the idle classes, who misrepresented for their own purposes, the inevitable slowness with which the war proceeded. Operations, they said, were protracted because Tiberius would not or could not conclude them. The prospect of any sympathy between Tiberius and the men of his age seemed more than ever remote. He, however, paid no attention to these criticisms and Rome waited in vain for news of a great battle in the following spring by which the Dalmatians and Pannonians were to be annihilated. Divided, according to Tiberius' plan of campaign, into several army corps,† the Roman forces proceeded to wear out the strength of the insurgents with guerilla warfare and to ravage their territories by destroying crops and cattle, while Tiberius supervised the commissariat arrangements and revived the courage of his troops. While he was thus busy in Pannonia, Augustus at Rome was profoundly disturbed by the fact that the public would neither understand nor admire the last great general that the Roman aristocracy had produced. There was no improvement in the situation in Rome. Outbreaks

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 21.

† Dion, iv. 32: *οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι νεμηθέντες*. . . . Dion wrongly places this subdivision in the year 7, after the arrival of Germanicus. Velleius states, with much greater probability, that the division was made at the close of the preceding year.

7 A.D.

of fire were certainly less serious, owing to the efforts of the *vigiles*, who were a highly popular institution and had not yet been disbanded by Augustus, although they had been intended to act merely as a temporary force.* The famine, however, continued; † public discontent was vented in demonstrations against Tiberius; a frenzied woman began to prophesy in Rome and secured a large following,‡ while the numerous enemies of Tiberius and all who trembled to think that his triumph over the Pannonians would secure his position as the successor of Augustus, attempted with greater audacity to work upon public feeling in hopes that Augustus might be forced to recall him. Accusations of treasonable intentions and of incapacity were scattered broadcast, and Rome was filled with libels against Tiberius in which the name of Augustus was not always respected. An attempt was even made to repeat the policy of which Caius and Lucius Cæsar had been the tools, and to set up Germanicus, the son of Drusus, in opposition to Tiberius: Germanicus, a young and inexperienced man, preferred war upon a grand scale and did not approve the prudent strategy of his uncle. Moreover, though the *vigiles* were useful, they were expensive and the State treasury was empty.

Augustus attempts a compromise: the exile of Postumus.

As usual, Augustus cast about to find some means of satisfying every party. He suspended the operation of the *lex caducaria* for two years further: he celebrated the great games which the prophetess demanded, in order to give the people some satisfaction: † he even sent Germanicus to Pannonia, though he was no more than quæstor for that year. This appointment was intended as a sop to the party which called for vigorous military action, and to induce the idea that this popular youth would succeed where Tiberius had failed and would speedily conclude the war with a great battle.§ At the same time he wrote to Tiberius, probably from Rimini,

* Dion, iv. 26.

† Dion, iv. 31: τὸν λιμὸν, ὃς καὶ τότε αὐτοῖς συνέβη.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ Dion, iv. 31, credits Augustus with this intention; it is more probable that he allowed the public to believe that such was the case.

whither he had gone to be in closer touch with Pannonia : " I, at least, Tiberius," he said, " believe that no one could do more than you have done in the midst of your difficulties and *with your inferior troops* (these words are in Greek). All who know the country unanimously assert that the following line is most applicable to your case : ' one man alone has saved us by his valour.' " * Money, however, was required for the payment of the *vigiles*. Augustus appropriated to this purpose the subsidy paid to the prætors for gladiatorial shows, and was able to secure approval of a tax of 2 or 4 per cent. upon the sale of slaves.† Meanwhile, Germanicus reached Pannonia ; hardly had he begun to pursue his bolder strategy, than he fell into an ambush and was nearly cut to pieces with his troops. Thus Tiberius had shown his wisdom in continuing the guerilla war, regardless of the slanderers in Rome who accused him of slothfulness.‡

In that year Augustus ordered the Senate to send Agrippa Postumus into exile ; § his immorality had made his further presence in Rome intolerable. Cassius Severus also suffered the fate to which he had sent many others, and a lawsuit ended in his condemnation and banishment.|| The nature of the charge against him is unknown, but we may infer from the result of the trial that lapse of time had eventually robbed this professional accuser both of his powers and of his reputation.

In the course of the year 8, the situation improved, both at Rome and in the revolted provinces. The famine in the capital came to an end : the population which had been removed began to return and public dissatisfaction concerning the conduct of the war gradually decreased. The most ignorant and obstinate were forced to admit that Tiberius had been neither so incompetent nor so dilatory as the amateur strategists of the forum asserted. During the winter of the years

Conclusion of
the Pannonian
revolt.

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 21.

† Dion, *lv.* 3 ; the MSS. have *πεντηκοστής* but the correction *πεννικοστής* has been proposed. See Cagnat, *Étude historique sur les impôts indirects chez les Romains*, Paris, 1882, p. 233.

‡ Dion, *lv.* 32.

§ Dion, *lii.* 32 ; Velleius Paterculus, *II.* cxvii. 7.

|| See St. Jerome, *Ad. ann. Abr.* 2048.

7-8 A.D.

7 and 8 a terrible famine had decimated the insurgents in Pannonia, while the Roman troops had been fully supplied by the organisation of Tiberius: * they were thus able to advance at the beginning of the spring to pursue and disperse the demoralised bands of rebels. Many of the chiefs had abandoned all hope of victory and were ready to capitulate: the population as a whole was weary of the war, which was continued only by a few irreconcilables. Tiberius was well able to turn the situation to advantage. He used both mild and severe measures, as occasion demanded, treating the conquered with consideration and concluding treaties upon reasonable terms, until Pannonia was pacified in the course of the year 8. The pains and trouble which this task cost him caused the aged *princeps* some temporary anxiety. "When I hear and read," wrote Augustus to Tiberius, "of the fatigue you have undergone, of your thinness and exhaustion, I tremble; I beg you to spare yourself: if you were to fall ill, the deaths of your mother and myself might be the consequence and the whole empire would be thrown into confusion. What matters my health, whether good or bad, when you are ill? I pray the gods to preserve you to us and to give you now and always good health, unless their wrath is upon the Roman people." †

The exile of
Julia and of
Ovid.

In short, this year might have cheered Augustus in his old age, if a new scandal had not plunged his family into gloom towards the close of the year. Julia had followed her mother's example in respect of luxurious living and laxity of conduct; she had eventually displayed too audacious a defiance of the laws of Augustus, whose reconciliation with Tiberius had inclined him to the views of the traditionalist party and who had therefore no more reason for indulgence towards his granddaughter than towards his daughter. In this case again, we do not know what proof of her adultery came to the knowledge of Augustus, but we must assume that, with the evidence before him, he preferred to strike at the root of the mischief and to prevent any such scandal as that which the mother's case had caused. Hence, in virtue of the powers conferred upon him

* Dion, iv. 33.

† Suetonius, *Tib.* 21.

in the year 23, he intimated to Julia, to Decimus Junius Silanus, the most distinguished of her lovers, and to other persons who had infringed the *lex de adulteriis*, that they must go into exile to localities which he named, if they wished to avoid prosecution: otherwise, he would put the *lex Julia de adulteriis* into operation, under which, as *paterfamilias*, he could put Julia to death and, as citizen, could prosecute her paramours.* Of these alternatives, exile was the only possible choice: prosecution would involve a public scandal, certain and irrevocable condemnation, and confiscation of property. By consenting to leave Rome, the guilty parties would save their property, avoid a legal condemnation and retain some prospect of return when Augustus was mollified or dead.† Among the victims was Ovid, who was banished to Tomi, to atone both for a mysterious *error* and for his *carmina*. We cannot say definitely what this *error* was, or why the poet thus suffered for his friendships with the great, from which he afterwards sought to withdraw his friend. It must be remembered that the *lex Julia* visited with the same penalties not only adultery, but also *lenocinium*, which included any help given to the adulterous attempts of another person, as, for instance, by lending a house for meetings. It is quite possible that the frivolous author of the *Ars amandi* may have acted with some imprudence to further the ends of Julia or of her lovers. The prevailing laxity of upper class morality at Rome would allow Ovid to regard such action as a service rendered to a friend and imposing the obligation of repayment, if a similar opportunity arose.

* When Ovid says (*Tristes*, I. ii. 61) *Quamque dedit vitam mitissima Casaris ira*, he merely alludes to Augustus' right by the *lex Julia de adulteriis* to put his daughter and her paramours to death: see p. 71. Augustus did not hold rights of life and death over Roman citizens, and his authority in Rome was confined to the powers of the semi-dictatorship given him in 23 B.C. under the formula handed down to us in the *lex de imperio Vespasiani*. A despotic ruler might certainly have assumed powers of life and death under this clause, but Augustus could never have ventured upon so arbitrary an action; our knowledge of him provides not the least justification for such a supposition. Augustus never ventured to inflict a heavier penalty than banishment.

† Ovid, *Trist.* ii. 130: *Nec mea decreto damnasti facta Senatus, &c.* The statement is confirmed by the words of Tacitus concerning the exile of Silanus, who was also involved in this scandal (*Ann.* iii. 24): *non Senatus-consulto, non lege pulsus.*

8-9 A.D. In any case, Augustus would probably have pardoned the *error*, if the traditionalist party had not entertained a special dislike to Ovid as the corrupter of the new generation and as encouraging by the brilliant perversity of his intellect the worst vices of the aristocracy. In vain did he attempt to excuse his want of patriotism in such terms as these :

Hæc mea militis est, ferimus quæ possumus arma.

Equally fruitless was his final attempt to appear as a poet of civil and religious life. Domestic disturbances, the Panonian revolt and the gradual disruption of the State had impressed every earnest thinker with the conviction that the republic could only be saved by a moral reform and a stringent application of existing laws. By banishing Ovid, Augustus hoped to banish erotic poetry, one of the most dangerous of the influences which undermined Roman morality ; when he had forced the poet to leave Rome, Augustus ordered his works to be removed from the public libraries.* These sentences were intended to inspire respect for the traditional morality and were not penalties imposed by a court, but measures of policy taken by the *princeps* in virtue of the somewhat indefinite powers conferred upon him at a critical moment. The guilty parties would undoubtedly have undergone severer treatment before a legal tribunal : but while Augustus modified the punishment, he was also able to avoid any public discussion of the evidence and to crush the faint hope which is thus revived in the hearts even of the greatest criminals, so fallible and contradictory are human judgments. No protest, however, was offered. Ovid found himself abandoned by his friends, and towards the end of the year he was obliged to set out upon the long dismal journey by which the conservative party had punished his misdeeds, upon their return to power. His work was now concluded, for good or for evil : he had devoted the refinements of his art to the task of corrupting the minds of his contemporaries, and was now exiled to the country of the barbarian Getæ, far from the fair ladies of Rome and their flatteries ; he would now find time to reflect upon the ferocity with which

* Ovid, *Trist.* III. i. 65 ff.

the great traditions he had assailed were passing from the world. 9 A.D.

At the outset of the year 9, the Pannonian insurrection came to an end, and as the pacification of Dalmatia was the only remaining task, Tiberius was able to leave Germanicus in command and to return to Italy. His success had now secured his popularity; the people gave him an enthusiastic reception and the knights seized the opportunity of a certain festivity to make a noisy demonstration, demanding the repeal of the *lex caducaria*, which was at last to come into operation in that year.* Their action was characteristic of Rome. Rome would honour the powers and the energy of her general and his success in a dangerous war, while she demanded in the same breath the repeal of a law intended to provide the necessary military expenditure and to force selfish citizens who would not beget officers and soldiers to support the empire at least by the payment of taxes. However, Augustus had no intention of abandoning this source of revenue in view of the heavy expenditure necessitated by the Pannonian war: the scanty booty collected from the debt-ridden barbarians was no compensation for the cost of crushing their revolt.† Moreover, it soon became clear that the Dalmatian campaign was a much more difficult task than had been at first believed. The troops were exhausted by constant marching and countermarching, and in the absence of Tiberius began to protest against the slow and tiring strategy of the commander-in-chief: they demanded that the campaign should be concluded once for all by a decisive battle. Germanicus possessed neither sufficient influence nor authority to restrain the troops,‡ and Tiberius was therefore obliged to start for Dalmatia to prevent a possible catastrophe: before leaving Rome he undoubtedly secured an understanding with Augustus on the subject of the *lex caducaria*. The *lex*

* Dion, lvi. 1: *οἱ ἱππεῖς . . . τὸν περὶ τῶν μίγε γαμουμένων μίγε τεκνούστων, καταλυθῆναι ἤξιον*: this passage provides a further proof of the fact that a third law intervened between the *lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* and the *lex Papia Poppæa*. At this moment the *lex Papia Poppæa* had not yet been passed and the *lex Julia* affected only the bachelors and not the *ordii*.

† Dion, liv. 16: *λεῖα ἐλαχίστη ἴδλω*.

‡ Dion, lvi. 12.

9 A.D. *Papia Poppæa* was proposed by the two acting consuls, as Augustus was too feeble to undertake this responsibility. It was a law which supplemented the *lex de maritandis ordinibus* and supplanted the *lex caducaria*. The penalties imposed upon childless households were reduced : the *orbi* were deprived only of half their inheritances or legacies, while bachelors were pronounced incompetent to inherit : *caduca* reverted to relatives in the third degree and to co-heirs and co-legatees, if they had children : if none of these relatives had any family, the State might appropriate the *caduca*.

The defeat of
Varus.

The law was passed, and shortly afterwards in the month of October, Tiberius won a complete victory, which ended the Dalmatian War. Rome at length received the long-expected news ; the great revolt had been crushed and the State could again breathe freely. The general enthusiasm was unbounded ; the Senate conferred the title of *imperator* upon Augustus, decreed that Tiberius should have a triumph and that arches in his honour should be erected in Pannonia : Germanicus and the other generals were to have triumphal decorations, while Germanicus might also be appointed consul below the legal age : Drusus, the son of Tiberius, was to have the right of attending senatorial sessions before his appointment as senator, and of ranking as a senator-prætor, when he had held the quæstorship.* Drusus had taken no part in the war, but there was a general desire to honour the father in the person of his son. While these distinctions were being granted and Rome abandoned herself to the delight aroused by the conclusion of the long and weary war, five days after the news of the victory in Illyria had been received, a terrible and stupefying message arrived from the banks of the Rhine. The whole of Germania was in revolt from the Rhine to the Elbe : the legions quartered beyond the Rhine had been massacred or captured : the *legatus* P. Quintilius Varus had committed suicide to avoid falling into the enemy's hands : the generals and officers of the staff had been killed or made prisoners and the fortress of Aliso had capitulated. Attempts were immediately made to represent Varus as responsible for this surprising catastrophe ;

* Dion, lvi. 17.

the true cause was to be found in the deep-seated vices by which the empire was undermined, and which no one had been able to realise with the insight of Tiberius, though he was powerless to check their ravages and was occasionally obliged to wink at them. The disaster was due to the corroding influence of Græco-Oriental civilisation and of Roman administrative methods upon the warlike barbarians, to the desperate opposition which this influence invariably aroused, both in Germania and in Pannonia, and to the military decadence of Rome, which was unable to quell the revolts aroused with growing frequency by the natural development of her policy. Publius Quintilius Varus had been left in Germania to carry out the new policy by means of which Tiberius hoped to assert the Roman supremacy over these vast regions: he was by no means so incompetent an administrator as he was asserted to be when the catastrophe had taken place. He had displayed courage, energy and sagacity in Palestine, during the revolt which broke out after the death of Herod. He had begun to introduce many Roman laws and customs in Germania, had done his best to further the spread of Roman customs and the interests of foreign merchants, while he had also imposed a tribute for the first time upon the Germans when Rome needed money for the Illyrian and Pannonian wars. The Germans had been willing, after the death of Drusus, to consent to the purely formal act of submission with which Augustus had professed himself content: when, however, they saw that Tiberius was beginning a more vigorous policy of Romanisation and that the centurions were exacting tribute for transmission to Rome by the Rhine and across the Alps, they were seized with apprehension. Such a policy implied the overthrow of their old freedom and the end of their beloved inter-tribal wars in which any people might hope to secure the pride of temporary pre-eminence: their old national customs were no less doomed to disappear. The reign of proconsuls, centurions, merchants and Roman lawyers would begin and these latter were particularly and justifiably the objects of Germanic hatred. The imposition of a tribute and the attempts of Varus to introduce Roman customs seem to have been the chief causes of irritation.

9 A.D.

The agitation was raised to its height by the Pannonian revolt ; a noble of the Cherusci, Arminius, who was a Roman citizen and a friend of Varus, acted with the persevering dissimulation of barbarism at bay with civilisation, and secured the consent of the Germanic chieftains to a general rising. Rome had been profoundly embarrassed and intimidated by the Illyrian revolt, and a simultaneous insurrection in Germania might well drive the Romans beyond the Rhine for ever. Silently and persistently the promoters of the movement long continued their work : but rumours of their intentions were current and Quintilius Varus was warned to be upon his guard. Such hints might have been enough for so prudent a character as Tiberius : unfortunately, Tiberius was too preoccupied with the Pannonian War to devote any great attention to Germanic affairs. Warnings were lost upon Quintilius Varus : the men who were reported to him as the leaders of the conspiracy were also his friends and came to visit him at Aliso from time to time. He therefore took no precautions and made no attempt to concentrate his legions. Immediately before the revolt broke out, Arminius and the other leaders dined with the proconsul. A few days later, news arrived that certain outposts in the most distant regions of Germania had been attacked : the Roman officials regarded the event as betokening one of the petty local insurrections which occurred periodically in the country. The attacks and the news of them had been intended to induce Varus to advance for the relief of the outposts, and to draw him with his main army into the forests of Teutoburg where full preparations had been made for a fearful massacre. Varus started in full confidence, with his army, his baggage-train, his women and children, in the belief that he was crossing friendly territory. No sooner was he involved in the vast forest, than he was attacked on every side. The Roman army, hampered by a long train of non-combatants, encumbered with its baggage, ignorant of the ground, slow, unwieldy, and easily panic-stricken, was unable to extricate itself from the ambush with Cæsar's dexterity in such emergencies. The whole force was massacred or made prisoners in the forest.*

* Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 55 ; Dion, *lvi.* 18-22 ; Velleius, *ii.* 117-119.

CHAPTER XIV

AUGUSTUS AND THE GREAT EMPIRE

Consequences of Varus' disaster—The abandonment of Germania—Augustus at the conclusion of his work—The reform of the *consilium principis*—The supreme magistracy during the last years of Augustus—The successor to Augustus and the hesitation of Tiberius—Progress of Augustus worship—Character of Roman imperial policy—Impotence of the State and progress of the empire—Decline of intellectual culture—Rapid economic progress—The Oriental invasion of the western provinces—North Africa—Spain—Progress of manufacture in Gaul—Gallic pottery and metal working—The unity of the empire and its causes—Town and country under the empire—How Rome dominated the empire—The vital elements in the policy of Augustus—The republican policy—The Gallo-Germanic policy—Rome and Gaul.

HISTORIANS have long been accustomed to regard the defeat of Varus as one of the "decisive" battles of the world, and as an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved her grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality and civilisation would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic nationality and civilisation after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only at a few points and those far distant from one another. It is always a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what *might* have happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt to explain what *did* happen. In any case, it seems doubtful whether Rome could have assimilated the territory beyond the Rhine as

Result of the
defeat of
Varus.

9 A.D.

easily as she romanised Gaul, even had she held it for several centuries : we need only consider the fate of Roman civilisation in the Danube provinces, and especially in Noricum, Pannonia and Moesia. Rome held sway over these countries for centuries, and Roman, Italian and Greek influences were necessarily more potent here than in Germania, because these provinces were nearer to the metropolis. Yet Roman civilisation was never sufficiently firmly rooted to withstand the storms which burst upon Europe after the fall of the Western Empire. Only faint traces of the long Roman domination are to be found in these countries. Hence we must avoid hasty generalisation ; we cannot assert that every European country could have been romanised as rapidly and as easily as Gaul, which stood in a special position, in the centre of the Western Empire. In short, another line of argument would lead us to a hypothesis absolutely opposed to that usually adopted and yet no less tenable ; we might argue that the Germanic territories would never have been thoroughly romanised, even if Varus had not been annihilated.

The evacuation
of Germania.

In any case, the defeat of Varus was an event of no small importance in the history of Rome. It cut short that policy of expansion which had been the great purpose of the aristocracy. Tiberius hastened to the banks of the Rhine, collected the survivors of the massacre, revived the courage of the demoralised legions, reorganised the defence of the frontier and by a display of strength, calmness and courage was able to efface the bad impression which the defeat had made upon the fickle tribes beyond the Alps.* But Tiberius none the less considered that the wisest course was to evacuate the territories which he and his brother had conquered. Both political and economic reasons could be adduced to support the views of the party opposed to the scheme of conquest in Germania. The expense of these wars far outweighed the profit to be gained by them : † the disorganisation of the public departments and the imposition of additional taxation had caused general

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 18-19 ; Dion, *lvi.* 23 ; Velleius Paterculus, *ii.* 120.

† Dion, *lvi.* 16, tells us this in reference to the Illyrian and Pannonian wars ; the fact certainly held good of the Germanic wars, as the Germanic tribes were very poor.

discontent: the selfishness and want of public spirit which characterised the new generation were considerable obstacles to expansion; the great revolts in Illyria and Pannonia, and the demoralisation of the army were a warning that Rome could no longer presume upon her military strength. The defeat of Varus might be regarded as a disaster: but a call for volunteers to repair the recent losses would have met with no response, and attempts to introduce compulsory enlistment would have aroused general insubordination. There was no more alarming indication than this of the rapid military decadence which had overtaken Italy during the last half-century. Augustus had been obliged to fall back upon the punishments formerly inflicted upon deserters: such offenders were fined or decimated, one in ten being condemned to death. In spite of these measures, he had been able to obtain the requisite number of recruits only by enlisting the very off-scourings of the population of Rome and by accepting even freedmen for service in the ranks.* He did not wish to denationalise the army by unduly increasing the contingents of foreign auxiliary troops and if he wished to preserve the balance between the Roman and foreign elements, he must recognise that the military strength at his disposal did not enable Rome to hold an empire extending to the banks of the Elbe. Italy, moreover, had been profoundly disturbed by the recent disasters and apprehensions. The influence and power of Augustus certainly remained unshaken: his advanced age, the misfortunes of his family, his services to the State, the vast fortune which he had expended in Italy and even his senile weakness, which was regarded without misgiving, had raised Augustus almost to the position of a demigod, exalted high above the changes and chances of mortal life to a heaven of eternal calm. In the year 13, upon the conclusion of his fifth term as president, his powers were renewed for a further period of ten years, although he was very feeble, had lost the power of speech,† hardly ever appeared in the Senate, or at a banquet, and had even requested the senators, the knights, and his other adherents

* Dion, lvi. 23; Tacitus, *Ann.* i. 31: *vernacula multitudo, nuper acto in urbe dilectu, lascivie sueta, laborum intolerans.* . . .

† Dion, lvi. 26.

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not to pay him visits as he could not bear the fatigue of them.* But Augustus was not immortal and his successor would not enjoy the immunity which protected his old age. Augustus and Tiberius therefore resolved to make the Rhine their frontier and Germania was abandoned. This decision was a serious though inevitable step and must have cost Augustus and Tiberius much searching of heart. The ancient historians relate that upon receiving the news of Varus' defeat, Augustus rent his clothes, uttered cries of despair and nearly lost his senses. Whatever the truth of these details, we may at least conclude from the account of them, that this defeat was the supreme disappointment in his life of vicissitudes and catastrophes. The aged *princeps* had seen his family broken up by dissension, death and the *lex de adulteriis*; before he closed his eyes for ever, he now witnessed the collapse of the Roman supremacy in Germania, and the ruin of the work to which he had devoted the best years of his life. In the year 27 B.C. he had undertaken the great task of restoring the national and aristocratic elements in the State, and every one had professed anxiety to co-operate in this work. For forty years he had laboured to perform his undertaking, notwithstanding the gradual diminution of his collaborators and of their zeal: for forty years he had striven to revive the old aristocratic and military spirit which had been to Rome as the breath of life. The great social laws of the year 18, supported by the *lex Papia Poppæa* represented an attempt to revive among the nobility the old domestic and civic virtues which seemed indispensable to the preservation of the State. The conquest of Germania was intended to provide a vast field for the exercise of these virtues and its successful conclusion under his guidance was to increase the reputation of his government, of the nobility and of himself. And all to what end? It would be rash to assert, as historians have hastily affirmed, that the laws of the year 18 were useless. We do not know and cannot attempt to conjecture how events would have proceeded if this legislation had not been passed, and whether the decadence of the aristocracy would have been checked or accelerated. To assert

* Dion, lvi. 26, 28.

that these laws were ineffective is impossible ; assuming that they merely checked the decay of family life among the aristocracy, the author of them cannot be said to have spent his efforts in vain. To the philosopher attempting to grasp the reality of the cosmos, time may be merely an accident and a relative standard of measurement under which eternity and the absolute become comprehensible to the human intellect : to the generations of mankind living under the category of time, this accident becomes the measure by which they estimate the good or evil which they suffer or enjoy. In any case, though we cannot assert that the legislation of Augustus was barren of result, we can certainly state that it failed to secure the object for which it was intended. After the defeat of Varus and the resolution to abandon Germania, Augustus can have had no further illusions during the last five years of his life, and indeed his ideal during the previous forty years had been wholly chimerical. Though the social laws of the year 18 had broken up his own family, they had not restored the old nobility ; it was now necessary to evacuate the Germanic territory into which Augustus had forced Italy to pour her blood and treasure : the organs of the old republican government, even the Senate, the most vital of all, were atrophied or paralysed.

In the year 13, after his re-election as *princeps* for the sixth time, Augustus was obliged to introduce a further measure of reform in the little Senate provided for his assistance : the Senate was to be composed of twenty senators chosen for one year instead of fifteen appointed for six months : the decisions of Augustus in consultation with Tiberius, the consuls elect, the adopted children of the *princeps*, the twenty members of the *consilium* and any other citizens whom Augustus might wish to consult, were to be regarded as *senatus consulta*.^{*} The difficulty of assembling the senators had become so great that Augustus was forced to adopt this last expedient, if he did not wish to govern the empire alone in his own name. In any case it was hopeless to struggle against fate : at one time the Senate had been the mainspring of government : it was now but a mere excrescence, devoid of life. The comitia

The *concilium principis*.

* Dion, lvi. 28.

9 A.D.

were abandoned, as the elections had become an empty form and no one came to record his vote. Now, if ever, the empire needed a larger number of officials inspired with courage, zeal, high ambition and indefatigable energy: but precisely at this moment, the privileged aristocracy who held a monopoly of the governmental power were dying by a slow process of self-destruction through celibacy or childless marriage: they were no longer amenable to the passions or illusions which may lead a dominant class to forget all selfish aspirations and to launch boldly into the future. No one has ever discovered or will discover a magic potion to stir the energies of a rich and powerful class, when it has lost all sense of fear that its wealth and its power may disappear with its capacity. By the irony of fate, the peace which Augustus had toiled to found and to secure, had nullified every one of his attempts to regenerate the republic. Peace at home and abroad had allayed all apprehensions, and the aristocracy, feeling its position secure, declined to till the ground or sow the seed, and would only exert itself to gather the harvest which former generations had prepared: regardless of the past, careless of the future, contemptuous of the most elementary duties, it listened only to the call of its selfish desires. Even now, Italy took advantage of the defeat in Germania and the consequent weakness of the government of Augustus and Tiberius, to demand the repeal of the tax upon inheritances. An agitation was begun, excitement rose, and there were even threats of revolution. Augustus realised that only by resistance could he save the exchequer from bankruptcy: but he would not venture upon a resolute refusal; even in this supreme difficulty, when he had one foot in the grave, he attempted to shelter himself behind the Senate, requesting that body to arrange for the substitution of some other tax and forbidding Drusus or Germanicus to interfere in the debate.*

The supreme magistracy during the last years of Augustus.

This almost incredible pusillanimity was not entirely due to the advanced age or to the character of Augustus: it was the outcome of the modifications which had strangely transformed the nature of the supreme magistracy during the last

* Dion, lvi. 28.

forty years. In the year 27, that position had been regarded merely as a temporary expedient for dealing with the fearful crisis produced by the civil wars. It was impossible for one man, supported only by his relatives, and by a few friends and senators to revive the lost sense of duty in the hearts of the nation, however great his personal wealth, his influence and his power: he could by no methods restore all that was disappearing, long-standing tradition, family discipline and official energy. The task of the supreme magistrate had become so difficult that even the feeble decrepitude of Augustus was indispensable to the empire, simply because it seemed probable that no one would be able to fill his place. After the Illyrian and Pannonian revolts and the disaster of Varus, Tiberius was the only possible candidate for the presidency, though he was unpopular and generally feared. Willingly or unwillingly, every citizen had been forced to recognise the fact that the head of the army and of the empire must possess a profound knowledge of Germanic affairs and be able to intimidate the Germans, the Gauls and the Pannonians by the terror of his name. Tiberius was inevitably regarded as the successor of Augustus, not so much because Augustus had adopted him, as because he had conducted the Gallic and Germanic policy. But as the day drew near on which Tiberius was to receive the recompense of his long toil, he began to hesitate and to consider whether he could justifiably accept the position. With their usual malevolence towards him, the ancient historians have questioned the sincerity of his scruples: but his sincerity is plain to any one who has followed the long history of Augustus, has understood the character of Tiberius, the age in which he lived and its inconsistencies, and the impossible task then laid upon the supreme head of the empire rather by force of circumstances than by the will of man. At more than fifty years of age, Tiberius' pride was too inflexible to permit any change in the ideas which he had hitherto professed: if he was to govern the empire, he wished to represent the cause of traditional discipline and to force his selfish contemporaries in the name of his ancestors to perform their duties towards their empire and their race. But he was too far-sighted not to realise

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that the possession of supreme authority would not necessarily enable him to accomplish this task. The attempts of Augustus in this direction had been extremely arduous and had produced but little effect, notwithstanding his vast wealth, his high prestige, his brilliant career and the many successes with which, rightly or wrongly, he was credited. Tiberius was by no means so wealthy or so famous; he had many enemies among the nobility, was detested by the knights as the author of the *lex Papia Poppæa*, and was regarded with universal distrust by the masses. The many inconsistencies of the age had thus ended in a deadlock: the man to whom circumstances pointed as the successor of Augustus was the most unpopular and the most detested member of the nobility: he was fully conscious of the dangerous nature of the position which lay before him and therefore hesitated to accept the responsibility of governing the "monster," as he termed the empire. At the same time his numerous enemies could feel no delight at his reluctance, nor were they able to indulge in hopes that this hateful candidate might never rise to power. If Tiberius refused to act, there was no one to take the lead at this critical moment: the Germans had triumphantly driven the legions to the Rhine, Pannonia and Dalmatia were not entirely subdued, the treasury was exhausted, Italy was exasperated by new taxation, and the army was disorganised and troubled by old grievances and fresh wants. The consequences of Varus' defeat were perceptible even in the army: the soldiers now ventured to speak out and to press their demands for easier conditions of service and for higher pay upon the enfeebled government.

The spread of
emperor
worship.

It was, therefore, to no purpose that Augustus had attempted to amalgamate the great Roman virtues with the best elements of Hellenism in the hope of founding a magnificent aristocratic republic, willing and able to govern the empire upon sound principles. His efforts to organise the ideal government of Aristotle, Cicero, Virgil and Horace had merely produced a monstrosity. He left behind him a hybrid system, the vagueness and confusion of which would have puzzled the most expert of politicians: the republic had degenerated, the

monarchy had been strangled at birth, the aristocracy was in its dotage and the democracy was helpless. During former centuries the republican government had undergone a series of great and constant changes : during the last forty years, it had become petrified. The organs of government existed, but could not perform their functions : the supreme authority, established in 27 B.C., had made vain efforts to vivify the inert mass, and had itself eventually been paralysed through the inability of the exhausted institutions to give expression to its ideas. Yet the empire proceeded to pay divine honours to the diminished authority and the helpless dotage which rather symbolised the impotence of the old disorganised republican government than a new force able to restore its life and strength. In the course of the last ten years of Augustus' life, the example of Pergamum and of Lyons was followed in several other provinces : in 3 B.C. Spain had built an altar to Augustus at Bracara ; * about 10 A.D. Galatia inaugurated a sumptuous temple to Augustus and to Rome at Ancyra and organised a rich ceremonial with numerous popular amusements and great festivals : † in 11 A.D., Narbonne made a solemn vow to the *numen* of Augustus and built an altar in the forum on which sacrifices were to be made annually to the "governor of the world," on September 23, the birthday of the *princeps* ; the sacrifices were to be performed by three knights and three freedmen.‡ Thus the admiration, the gratitude and the prayers of the empire rose upon every side to the feeble dotard at Rome who was lamenting his inability to do anything more for the State. He also received bequests from every quarter.

The inconsistency is not to be explained by representing these compliments as offered in a spirit of servility. Notwithstanding its impotence, and even for that very reason, the government of Augustus was generally beneficial. This seeming paradox may be explained, if we can gain a clear idea of the nature of Roman expansion and realise the true nature of Roman political methods : as conducted by the nobility at the outset they were not methods of systematic and merciless

Character of
Roman administrative
methods.

* *Ephem. Epigr.* viii. fasc. 3, n. 280.

† *C. I. Gr.* 4039.

‡ *C. I. L.* xii. 4333.

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extortion, but the rapacious *publicani* caused a great deterioration of the system, which was reduced to mere brigandage by the necessities of domestic policy. Rome expected to derive some profit from all her enterprises, but at the same time, her imperial administration brought with it certain indirect advantages, though these, it is true, were not enjoyed by the world at large until the close of the civil wars. During the two previous centuries, Rome had overthrown a great number of States, great and small, republics, monarchies and theocracies; she had suppressed administrative systems, disbanded armies, closed palaces, discharged the retinues of kings, limited the powers of priestly castes or of republican oligarchies: she had overthrown numbers of those gaudy, but expensive and unwieldy superstructures which rise above the fundamental human associations of the family, the tribe and the city, under pretext of guiding them. Rome had replaced these governments with a proconsul or proprætor, who, with the help of a few friends, freedmen or slaves, governed districts which had formerly swarmed with courtiers and officials. This system produced both good and bad results. It is obvious that Rome was able to levy a considerable tribute from many provinces which were no longer forced to supply the enormous revenues expended by the former governments upon their armies, their officials, their artists, their men of letters and their courtiers. The artisans, the agricultural and mercantile classes were thus protected from State extortion, while the family, the tribe and the city acquired a greater measure of freedom. On the other hand, when Rome overthrew the native governments, she also destroyed the intellectual aristocracies of the eastern world, the supporters of art, literature and science; she abolished long-standing traditions of taste, refinement and æsthetic luxury. The Asiatic courts were the chief centres of a most vigorous intellectual life. Thus the Roman conquest must, from the outset, have increased the material prosperity and have diminished the intellectual activity of the nations which were subjugated: the refined and upper classes were degraded in favour of the middle classes who were devoted to the arts, to commerce and to agriculture. But meanwhile the

old Roman aristocracy had also decayed: the great social upheaval in Italy during the second century B.C., the unbridled avarice of the knights, the revolutions and civil wars, and the rivalry of needy factions had utterly transformed Roman administrative methods in the course of the last century: they had become a system of desperate brigandage, inflicting every possible evil upon the provinces, without producing any of the very possible benefits within their scope.

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Thus it was only under the rule of Augustus that the provinces began to feel the benefits of this policy, by that strange law of progress under which generations constantly advance towards the future by mistaken routes and by efforts to grasp the illusions of their imagination. Christopher Columbus attempting to reach the Indies by a westward voyage and discovering America upon his road is a typical instance of one of the commonest phenomena in history. The generation of Augustus had also set sail upon a wild journey towards the past and disembarked upon the first land which appeared, and which it could not recognise. After the battle of Actium, there had been a general belief that the government must be strengthened to secure the salvation of the empire, and for this purpose the hopeless attempt to restore the old aristocratic republic had been made: it was a desperate remedy which had enfeebled rather than strengthened the government, and as Augustus grew older, it seemed that the ruin of the empire was imminent. Yet it was precisely this course of decadence, continued for more than half a century, that was to prove the salvation of the empire. The very impotence of Augustus' government brought to light again the true Rome of classical tradition, the Rome that invariably preferred to purge governmental systems of the elements which made for luxury and monopoly while hampering progress. Augustus' government was a weak, unreliable and insignificant force when compared with the immense empire under its rule: its powers were wielded by a family torn by discord and supported by a most rudimentary system of administration; it was a monstrosity, with a head too small and organs too far atrophied or paralysed to be capable of pillage or oppression in the provinces: it was unable even to

The helplessness of the State and the progress of the empire.

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retain its grasp of the prey which it had seized in earlier ages. The government of Augustus, in its anxiety to avoid friction, allowed individuals to work the lands, the forests and the mines of the republic as they pleased: and for the same reason it was careful not to apply undue pressure to the provinces, either in the East, where the revolts of the last fifty years had spread consternation, or in the West, where revolts were impending or were in progress. Augustus had preferred to stint the amusements and even the food of the plebs at Rome, to spread discontent by his parsimony, and even to expend almost the whole of his enormous fortune for the public benefit, a strange system of monarchical government.* Rather than irritate the provinces, he had preferred in recent years to impose taxation upon Italy, at the risk of arousing considerable exasperation. Nor was his timorous and disorganised government inclined to offer any general support to citizens developing the resources of the empire in their own interests. Italian *publicani* and *mercatores* continued to emigrate to the provinces, to farm the taxes, work the mines, cultivate the lands, trade with the uncivilised tribes and lend money: but the insatiable vampires of the last two centuries had practically vanished. Rome was partly supported by the provincial tributes, which also provided her with amusements and adornment, but Italy was attempting to develop its natural resources and to make the most of its geographical situation. While the Roman domination extended the prestige of the Roman people, it also created a demand for wine and oil in the transalpine provinces and especially in Gaul: the exportation of these valuable commodities increased rapidly, and the middle-class landowners of the peninsula regarded their fortunes as bound up with the olive of Athene and the vine of Dionysus. Thus, though the procurators of Augustus, the quæstors of the proconsuls and the *publicani* committed certain depredations, the richest and most civilised provinces had experienced a gradual diminu-

* Suetonius, *Aug.* 101: *nec plus peruenturum ad heredes suos, quam millias et quingentias professus, quamvis viginti proximis annis quaterdecies millies ex testamentis amicorum percepisset; quod pæne omne cum duobus paternis patrimoniis ceterisque hereditatibus in rempublicam absumpsisset. . . .*

tion of the burden of taxation, as compared with that in force during the dismal epoch before the revolution. There was no longer any expenditure upon courts and courtiers, concubines, armies, men of letters and artists; Rome demanded a very moderate tribute; the vast estates and the palace treasures had been divided and had become part of the national wealth. If Rome gave little to the provinces, she took very little from them. Augustus and Tiberius were only concerned to construct a few roads in the provinces, to perform the most necessary repairs of the public buildings, and to maintain some kind of order: if a governor advised Tiberius to increase the tribute of a province, he was told that a good shepherd should shear and not flay his sheep.* Such was also the opinion of Augustus and of every right-minded member of the nobility.

Thus, under the rule of Augustus, the world was able to estimate the good and bad results which a century of Roman domination had produced. On the one hand, was the decay of interest in philosophical or scientific pursuits, the decadence of art, literature, social refinement in its higher forms, and the disappearance of the classes representing tradition and culture as advanced by successive generations, with their intellectual activity and unselfishness. On the other hand, was the rapid growth of trade and commerce, of business capacity and of the middle classes. The age of historical aristocracy was at an end: the age of the self-made man had begun. With the fall of the Ptolemies, the last patrons of social culture had disappeared: even in Rome, Augustus, his friends and their aristocratic society had neither time, means nor inclination to stimulate intellectual work as before. They found occupation enough for the sculptors and painters who decorated their houses, but they neglected men of letters and scientists. The famous museum at Alexandria seems to have been closed or to have fallen into decay: the theoretical sciences, mathematics, astronomy, geography and every class of literature declined not only in Egypt, but throughout the East. It had been both a duty and a delight to the great monarchical successor of Alexander to foster and support the progress of Hellenic

The results of
the Roman
conquest.

* Suetonius, *Tib.* 32.

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culture : in the age of Augustus, this duty was continued only by two petty kings, Herod of Judæa and Juba III. of Mauretania : the latter, among other hobbies, collected manuscripts of Aristotle's works and was constantly swindled by clever forgers. These kings were but feeble caricatures of the Attalidæ, the Seleucidæ and the Ptolemies, and yet the Roman public would barely tolerate their existence. They were regarded as madmen, who squandered the wealth of their countries in foolish extravagance. On the death of Herod the Jews had revolted and had asked that Palestine might be annexed and become a Syrian province. By the abolition of their monarchy, the Jews hoped that they might no longer be required to pay the Greek artists who decorated their towns with expensive and useless monuments, or to reward Nicolas of Damascus for the production of his ornate prose. Few examples can show more clearly the extent to which the Roman conquest had roused throughout the East an opposition to literary and philosophic culture, or the universality and vigour of this reaction. It was Rome's destiny to become the instrument by which the middle classes advanced their interests to the detriment of the intellectual aristocracy.

Rapid growth
of economic
prosperity.

On the other hand, a new era of wonderful economic prosperity now began for the whole of the empire. The middle classes had everywhere survived the downfall of the dominant oligarchies and now proceeded, though working without general method and for the furtherance only of special interests, to derive every possible advantage from the new order of things as established in the Mediterranean world by the Roman conquest. The reorganisation effected by Rome had reduced political expenditure throughout the empire ; unproductive capital stored in courts and temples had been distributed, together with State lands, to a large number of holders : forests and mines had been left in the possession of those who had taken them : a system of free exchange had been established throughout the Mediterranean basin ; remote nations and regions had been brought into touch with one another ; Egypt had dealings with Gaul, Syria with the Danube provinces, Spain with Asia Minor : throughout the Mediterranean the

rivalries and monopolies of the old trading powers had been suppressed and communication by sea and land had been thrown open to the whole world. The interchange of merchandise, of customs and of ideas had been correspondingly facilitated from end to end of the Mediterranean and had assumed unexampled proportions. Every province seized the opportunity to develop its resources and to find a market for its products in the remotest regions of the great empire; and as commercial intercourse extended, domestic production and manufacture increased. Thus during this half-century almost every nation under the Roman rule saw the ancient springs of wealth pour forth more copious abundance, while new sources of prosperity were discovered. Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor, the three great industrial regions of the ancient world, recovered their prosperity with great rapidity: the empire was now at peace, all doors were standing open, and new customers and markets were found among the Berbers and the Gauls, in Dalmatia and in Mœsia. Italy, Gallia Narbonensis, and the Danube provinces in particular, where there were no local industries, were invaded by merchants, artisans, slaves and oriental adventurers, of which great migration some traces may perhaps be found in the survivals of Mithra-worship.* Tyre and Sidon recovered their lost prosperity: Egypt was not content to send her valuable products, her physicians and decorative artists to every corner of the empire: she also increased her highly profitable trade with the far East. In Greece also a slow improvement was perceptible. North Africa alone remained comparatively isolated and unknown: Augustus had greatly neglected this part of the empire and had never visited it. In the West, however, was the great kingdom of Mauretania, governed first by Juba II., and afterwards by

* See the map appended to Franz Cumont, *Les mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1892. Mithra-worship was not a proselytising religion; it was not spread, like Christianity, by active propagandism, but by the natural spread of a population professing this faith. Wherever we find a temple to Mithra, we may assume that a group of Oriental Mithra-worshippers existed in sufficient numbers to found a shrine. As the Asiatic Mithra-worshippers had no special reason for leaving the East, we may suppose that Mithra temples usually implied the existence of other little colonies of Orientals, such as Jews and Syrians.

10-14 A.D. the son of Ptolemy; in the East was the province of Africa under the administration of the Senate. In no part of the empire was it easier to make immense fortunes in landed property, as Rome gradually resumed the work of Carthage in these abandoned districts, though upon a narrower scale; the employment of Berber labour enabled her to develop districts that were extremely fertile and admirably adapted to corn and olive cultivation. Land and labour were alike abundant. The Berbers were an adaptable race and would turn to agriculture when constrained to work under the rule of a higher civilisation, or relapse into the habits of nomadic life, whenever the supervision of the dominant race was relaxed. They swarmed in the districts under Roman government and fresh contingents were always forthcoming from the desert to supply the ravages of war, hard labour or disease among the tribes upon the coast.* The fall of Carthage and the general upheaval of the Roman empire during the last century of the republic had aroused the nomadic and warlike instincts of the barbarians; only a comparatively small part of the vast territory available had been brought under cultivation and on every side great areas were awaiting the husbandman and the plough.† Peace, again, had strengthened the frontier and barred the roads by which the tribes had begun their raids upon the territories of Rome and her subjects: independent tribes were unable to harry the pasture lands behind the frontiers and the Berbers were attracted to a more settled and peaceable mode of life. Nomads thus became agriculturists, vagabond tribes

* Schulten, *L' Africa romana*, translated by L. Cesano, Rome and Milan, 1904, p. 19.

† We know that in the first century of our era Africa was the typical province of *latifundia* (see Pliny, N. H. XVIII. vi. 35). This fact is explicable, if we admit that at the close of the civil wars there were vast territories lying uncultivated which belonged to the towns, to the republic and to the tribes, and that these might be bought very cheaply, as is the case in the modern Argentine Republic. Fortunes are always to be made from landed property in districts where there are large tracts of uncultivated ground, or in populous regions where some great social catastrophe has reduced the small holders to poverty. As there is no evidence to show that the latter alternative had happened at this time, we must ascribe the rise in land values in Africa to the former cause.

became attached to the soil and formed administrative unities around some village, which might become a large and splendid city in a specially favoured locality. Land was as plentiful as labour. Under Augustus, the republic, with its usual indulgence, had allowed individuals to settle upon such State lands as were untilled.* Moreover, in the province of Africa and in Mauretania, the tribes devoted greater attention to the cultivation of smaller areas, as the necessities of life grew more costly and as their desire to make money increased: thus they were willing to sell such part of their lands as they could not cultivate by their own labour. The expenditure of a little capital and careful attention to the system of irrigation could produce a wonderful yield of corn, wine and oil in Africa. Those, in fact, who had seized the opportunity to appropriate these immense tracts of uncultivated land, made vast fortunes in landed property, such as are made in the Argentine Republic at the present day: at the end of fifty years the richest land-owners of the empire were those who held property in Africa.

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The population of Spain had taken refuge in the mountains during the Roman invasion, in order to escape subjugation: the tribes now began to venture forth and to abandon their attitude of hostility. The period of warfare was concluded: the people made use of the recently constructed roads, and under the watchful eye of the Roman colonies which Augustus had founded or strengthened and of the garrisons scattered throughout the country began to develop the mineral wealth which the peninsula contained then, as now. Both natives and foreign colonists began to work the abandoned mines or to open new ones: the republic negligently allowed individuals to seize State property and only insisted upon its

The progress of Spain.

* Pliny, N. H. XVIII. vi. 35, speaks of six great African land-owners whom Nero put to death in order to seize their property. Nero was wholly unscrupulous in his methods of making money, but if the six were executed simultaneously, there was probably some pretext forthcoming to justify this massacre. It is possible that Nero proceeded to resume possession of State lands which had been appropriated by individuals. We have already explained how the State lands were seized by private persons under the rule of Augustus, and how Tiberius demanded greater stringency in the administration of the public property.

10-14 A.D. rights where gold-mines were concerned ; * among these were the valuable mines of Asturia, which province Augustus had reconquered.† The first contingents of slave labourers had probably been secured in the course of the last wars, and their ranks were recruited by importation and by prisoners of war from Illyria and Germania. The inexhaustible mineral resources of the country were developed with great energy and gold, silver, copper, lead and minium were found. In Turdetania, on the other hand, the region known to the ancients as Bætica and to us as Andalusia, in the beautiful valley of the Guadalquivir, the Iberian stock had been enervated by the fertility of the country and by infusions of Greek and Phœnician blood : it had gradually lost its fierce and warlike character and was devoting its energies to commerce and agriculture. Bætica exported many commodities to Italy, especially to Rome, by way of Ostia and Puteoli : among these were corn, wine, the finest oil, wax, honey, pitch, wool and a particular textile fabric which certain populations manufactured.‡

The industrial progress of Gaul.

But of all the provinces the most progressive was that which Licinus and Augustus had regarded as likely to become the Egypt of the West. The Roman conquest and afterwards the census instituted by Augustus had strengthened the Gaulish system of land tenure and had given validity to the somewhat indefinite claims of the Gaulish landowners.§ It is even probable that many of the public lands belonging to the *civitates* were seized by the nobles who had been loyal to Rome : the Roman governors winked at the illegality and the nobles were thus rewarded for their fidelity at their country's expense. The theory and practice of Latin agriculture was now intro-

* Strabo, III. li. 10, says that the Spanish silver-mines had almost entirely passed (*μετέσθησαν*) into private hands, while the gold-mines were State property. But there were some gold-mines which belonged to private individuals (see Tacitus, *Annals*, vi. 19). It is clear that as the State could not work all the mines, it reserved to itself the gold-mines and the most valuable of the other mines. This fact will help us to understand why Tiberius attempted to take away (Suetonius, *Tib.* 49) *plurimis civitatibus et privatis . . . jus metallorum*.

† Pliny, N. H. XXXIII. iv. 78.

‡ Strabo, III. li. 6.

§ D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Recherches sur l'origine de la propriété foncière et des noms des lieux habités en France*, Toulouse, 1890, p. 21.

duced in Gaul: nobles who had travelled in Italy and had seen the villas of the Roman aristocracy, would no longer live in their Celtic houses: Roman villas were * built amid the forests of Gaul, agriculture was organised upon Italian methods and universal progress in this department was the consequence. But in silence, unheeded and unsuspected, the Egypt of the West was preparing an even greater surprise: Gaul was the first of European nations to become pre-eminent for her manufactures. She imitated the arts of Asia Minor, of Egypt and of Syria and successfully invaded their markets in Italy and the Danube provinces: she gave the Germans their first lessons in the luxuries of civilisation: her exports not only paid her tribute to Italy but brought back to her part of the gold and silver which Italy would have gathered from the other provinces. The flax workers soon learned to produce fabrics far finer than the coarse sail-cloth which had formed their original output. The terrible Nervii, the most formidable opponents of Cæsar's legions, now sat patiently at their looms, and began to produce a fabric which even the most ancient and most famous factories of the East were soon obliged to imitate, so highly was it appreciated in the markets hitherto supplied by Asia Minor.† Gaul offered a ready market for the beautiful red pottery of Arretium and Puteoli, for the white, grey or pale yellow vases of the potter Acon and of the factories in the valley of the Po. The old Celtic ware with its geometrical designs was rejected by rich and fashionable households and was only retained in the forest villages where the old sub-

* See the highly important study of Joulin on the remains of the great Roman towns found in the valley of the Garonne. Léon Joulin, *les Etablissements gallo-romains de la Plaine de martrès-Tolosanes*, in the *Mémoires présentés par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscrip. et Belles-lettres*, first series, vol. xi. 1902, p. 219 ff.

† In the edict of Diocletian (*Edictum Diocletiani de pretiis rerum venalium*, Berlin, 1893) a mention of this cloth occurs (XIX. xxxiii. p. 36). Βίρρος Λαδικηνὸς ἐν ὁμοίῳ τῆς Νερβικῆς. Laodicea, one of the most ancient and famous towns among the industrial centres of Asia Minor, was thus imitating a *birros* or Nervian fabric in the third century. We can only explain the fact by assuming that the Nervii had manufactured so excellent a cloth that the Laodicean weavers were obliged to imitate it in order not to lose their markets. See Th. Reinach, *Inscrip. d'Aph.*, *Revue des Etudes grecques*, xix. (1906), fasc. 84, p. 89.

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terranean dwelling-houses remained in use. When their national ware became unsaleable in consequence of the preference for foreign products, the Gallic manufacturers began to study the pottery from the Po valley, and from Arretium; they examined the Greek and Egyptian silver vases, the Hellenic myths and legends depicted on them and the style of painting in vogue at Alexandria: they brought workmen from Italy and attempted to imitate the products of their rivals. Among the Rutheni and Arverni a Gallic school of free workmen grew up, whose assiduous labours laid the foundation of a factory in the valley of the Allier which became, fifty years later, one of the greatest in the empire. Gaul then ceased to import Italian ware, and exported her own beyond the Rhine, to Spain, Great Britain, Africa and even to Italy. Fragments of vases from the Ruthenian factories are to be found even in the ashes of Pompeii.* Together with the potter's art, Gaul borrowed and appropriated from the East the delicate art of glassware. Whether the Gallic manufacturers were able to export glassware we do not know, but there is no doubt that their productions were in considerable demand.† The arts of working in metal were also carried to a higher stage by the Celtic intelligence, after its refinement by contact with Græco-Italian civilisation. It was, indeed, about this time that the

* The reader who wishes to see the facts concerning Gallic pottery, on which the above statements are based, should consult the great work of Déchelette, *Les vases céramiques ornés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1904, vol. i. part i. chaps. 2-6. I have given a short summary of the author's chief conclusions. His work is of first-rate importance for the history of Roman Gaul because it details the history of a Gallic industry as shown by archæological evidence upon the smallest points, and explains how this manufacture gradually became an export trade. It develops and confirms the numerous passages of Pliny which refer to the various Gallic manufactures, and which have been unduly neglected hitherto. Pliny speaks of many Gallic industries which produced wares for exportation; if any one should regard his statements as exaggerations, the history of ceramic ware so ingeniously reconstructed by M. Déchelette and the archæological proofs which he adduces will bring full conviction of the fact that a Gallic manufacture could be carried on for export trade. We are therefore justified in assuming that the other industries mentioned by Pliny were no less flourishing. M. Déchelette's work increases the value and the credibility of Pliny's statements concerning Gallic manufactures.

† Pliny, N. H. XXXVI. xxvi. 194. See Déchelette, *op. cit.* i. 241.

Bituriges invented the art of plating iron objects with silver, that people of moderate means might be able to display a rich show of plate. This art soon became a flourishing industry at Alesia, the town of Vercingetorix, and orders came in from every part of the empire, as the taste for luxury spread among the lower classes.* The Gallic wool industry soon began to provide clothing for the lower classes in Rome. In other parts of Gaul ingenious manufacturers attempted a bolder enterprise and dyed their fabrics with red : they did not use the valuable mollusc from which the purple was extracted, but the juice of a common plant known to Pliny as *Vaccinium*, which provided a vegetable dye less expensive than the sea purple. If the invention had proved successful, Gaul would speedily have ruined one of the oldest and most flourishing of Eastern industries : unfortunately, though the vegetable dyes were of no less brilliant shade, they would not keep their colour when washed. However, these dyed fabrics found a ready market among the common people and slaves, and considerable quantities were exported to Italy : to the genuine and valuable purple worn by the upper classes was now added a cheaper purple for the poor.† Gaul was also about to rival Spain in the task of providing Italy with lead.‡ The old Gallic art of enamelling was revived. There were many reasons which induced the Gauls to learn Latin and forget their own language, and one of these was certainly the fact that the Italians were their best customers.

Around Augustus in Rome, the little band of ruling oligarchs, who thought that the present and the future condition of the empire depended upon their action, were exhausting their energies in dissensions and contradictory attempts to arrange the future to their liking : but in the meanwhile, the empire at large was preparing a future of very unexpected nature. While Augustus was struggling to reorganise the aristocratic government in Rome, the slow efforts of millions, almost involuntarily and unconscious of the ultimate consequence, had brought together countries of wholly diverse languages,

The unity of the Empire and the causes of it.

* Pliny, N. H. XXXIV. xvii. 162-163.

† *Ibid.* N. H. XVI. xviii. 77.

‡ *Ibid.* N. H. XXXIV. xvii. 164.

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10-14 A.D. races, traditions and climates and were welding them into an economic whole. Material interests of apparently infinite scope, proved a stronger bond of union than all the laws and legions of Rome, or the will of Senates and emperors. By this slow cohesion, invisible and unnoticed, the heterogeneous collection of provinces won by force of arms or by diplomacy became a single body inspired by one soul. Once again, the course of history was to stultify the timorous precautions of mankind. The unifying influence of these economic interests was so great, that the tendency which the empire then followed could never be checked, nor could the world be turned from the path upon which it had been started during the forty years of the *pax augusta*. Yet this path had been constantly regarded as leading to destruction by Roman political foresight, as represented by Livy, Horace, Virgil, Augustus, and Tiberius. Italy and Gaul, Spain and the Danube provinces, the highlands of Asia Minor and Northern Africa, ancient civilisations and states yet barbarous, the plebeians of the country districts, the middle and upper classes, in a word, the whole of the empire, had been profoundly influenced by the continuance of peace and prosperity, by the return of the golden age, and by the merchants who introduced the principles of Greek-Oriental civilisation together with their wares: all had been compelled to adopt the manners and ideas, the refinement, the corruption and the perversity of that city civilisation which the Romans regarded as utterly pernicious. Towns sprang up in every district of the empire. The villages of the Berber tribes and of the Gallia *civitates* became fair towns laid out upon Italian models, which again followed Oriental methods as closely as possible. The *oppida* of Dalmatia and Pannonia were soon to become Latin *municipia*, while the Roman colonies and the ancient cities of the Greek world grew in size and splendour: the grandeur of the empire was to be symbolised by the wonderful magnificence of its great cities and by the yet greater magnificence of Rome, upon which the emperors lavished adornment not only to please the inhabitants, but also to dazzle the eyes of subject nations and to command their respect. Agriculture was to share this universal prosperity, the peasant to

live amid the comforts of plenty; but the spirit of country life, the simplicity, the thrift and the old-fashioned austerity which Virgil had sung in his *Georgics*, was doomed to vanish. The vitality of the country was sapped by the towns, which absorbed wealth, intellect and energy for conversion to vice and luxury: those districts became most prosperous which could supply the towns with oil and wine for their feasts and games. Landowners great and small settled in the towns, and spent their wealth in building baths, giving popular shows and distributions of corn and oil: town-life exerted a growing power of attraction upon the peasant in every district and from generation to generation. The simplest, the remotest, and the most countrified of peoples attempted to launch into commerce, to improve their primitive methods of production, to export their wares and to imitate the manufactures of more prosperous peoples, especially the textile industries.* Even the restless warlike Germans began to work at the weaver's loom.† Rome introduced the customs of settled and civilised life to the distant forests of Germania; the craving for ease and pleasure permeated even the lowest strata of the populations and infected the army itself: the vigour of patriotism, political or military, was destined to pass away. The *pax Romana* was a fact realised in the smallest village of the remotest province or the most primitive race; there and in the military camps it facilitated the slow spread of that "moral degeneration," which had horrified the Roman traditionalist party, which impels man to pursue refinements, art, pleasure, novelty, and science, which we, with an optimism perhaps as baseless as the pessimism of the ancients, style "civilisation." To this "moral degeneration" or "civilisation" is chiefly to be attributed the unity and prosperity of the empire during the next two centuries. Rome was able for three centuries to unite

* In the *Edictum Diocletiani*, in the sections dealing with textile industries, a list is given of the stuffs produced by barbarian or purely agricultural populations, *Noricus*, *Numidicus*, *Britannicus*, &c. This implies that in the first or second century the agricultural populations were attempting to turn local industries to account by making their productions known to other countries.

† Pliny, H. N. XIX. l. 18: *Gallia universa vela texunt, jam quidem et transrhœnani hostes.*

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East and West to herself and to one another, because she was able to revive the brilliance of city life among the civilised peoples of the East and to give the barbarians of Europe and Africa a taste for that life. It was not with laws and legions that Rome dominated the masses, but with amphitheatres, gladiatorial shows, baths, distributions of oil, cheap bread, wine and entertainments. As the multitudes acquired a taste for the luxuries of wealth and refinement, they gave their support to the authorities and institutions which could provide these things: the wealthy classes had every interest in preserving the existing order of things and realised that there was no better means of consolidating their power than by satisfying the demands of the masses. The emperor's example at Rome was followed by the rich in the distant towns of Asia and Africa: they retained their grasp of municipal power by continually bribing the people with shows and food. The devotion of the Gallic aristocracy to the empire was secured for ever, as soon as they had learned to live in villas outrivalling those of Italy, resplendent with Greek and Italian marbles, decorated in the Roman style, and adorned with replicas of famous Greek sculptures.* Fifty years later, a writer of the old school is found lamenting the fact that his maidservants had silver mirrors † and that an excessive quantity of wine was consumed in the town taverns; but in the period of greatest prosperity it was this universal tendency to refinement, comfort and corruption as evidenced in town life, which gave coherence to the empire.

The essential elements of Augustus' policy. The republican policy.

When the golden age was followed by the ages of bronze and iron, and the springs of wealth began to fail, the bonds of unity became relaxed and disintegration followed. But at the present moment the epoch of decay was still far distant. When Augustus died, on August 23, 14 A.D., at the age of seventy-three, the social transformation which was to secure the unity of the empire for the next two centuries had but just begun. The families which had amassed wealth during the previous forty years amid the general redistribution of

* Joulin, *op. cit.* 327.

† Pliny, N. H. XXXIV. xvii. 160.

property were but making their first timid attempts to display that ostentation which was soon to stimulate town life in every part of the empire. Hesitancy was still the keynote of the Palatine government: the policy of Augustus and Tiberius was ever limited by the fear of undue expense, and uncertainty whether to support the traditions of a dying society or to concede the demands of a rising movement restrained all tendency to ostentatious expenditure: fashion must be led, and the empire regarded the household of the *princeps* as its ideal. Meanwhile wealth was accumulated, and the empire only awaited the signal from Rome to launch upon a new career. Thus Augustus had spent the greater part of his life in struggling against the stream. We need not, however, assume that his services to the cause of general development were purely fortuitous. Two, at least, of his achievements were of vital importance, his republican and his Gallo-Germanic policies. The Roman Empire was composed of elements more heterogeneous than any to be found in the great empires which had preceded it: the difficulty of unifying these component parts was increased by the strange circular position in which they stood. The serious nature of this difficulty is proved by the fact that the site of the capital was never a matter beyond dispute. Rome, Constantinople, or other possible centres were never definitely fixed as such. Yet the Roman Empire showed greater cohesion and permanence than any of the great empires before it. The disintegrating influences under which the great Græco-Oriental empires founded by Alexander had melted away, were powerless to act upon Rome. How is this fact to be explained? Historians who sneer at the obstinate republicanism of the Romans, and regard the republic of Augustus as nothing more than a fiction, will be well advised to consider this question. Two chief influences which made for coherence were economic unity and the diffusion of town civilisation, but there seem to have been others. This coherence was also due, in part, to the Roman and republican theory of the State, which differed from the monarchical theory in Asia, in that it regarded indivisibility as an essential element of State existence. The Asiatic monarchy regarded the State

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as the property of a dynasty ; a king might increase or diminish the State, might dismember it and divide it among his sons and relatives or might bequeath it, as he would a field or house, to his heirs. But the Roman regarded the State as *res publica* a common property ; it belonged to all, or, in other words, to no one. The governing officials were defined as the representatives of the real master, the impersonal *populus Romanus*, whose eternal rights could suffer no bar or limitation and whose continuity of possession was the indivisible soul of the State. The republican policy of Augustus and Tiberius, and the persistency with which they strove to preserve the fundamental principles of the old Roman ideal, largely contributed to inspire the empire with the Latin theory of the *indivisibility of the State* and to root it so deeply in ancient civilisation that it could be rediscovered, after the classical renaissance, among the surviving fragments of the ancient world. By degrees, as political energy died away throughout the empire and as the attainment of town civilisation became the supreme object of life, the *princeps* became in the eyes of his subjects, the fountain head of all prosperity, the guarantee of peace and justice and was regarded as a demigod. This universal veneration became the chief support of later emperors, who used it for the gradual destruction of the aristocratic constitution and for the foundation of their monarchical power. But even when the old republican spirit had vanished, the new generation clung to the idea that the empire was the eternal and indivisible property of the Roman people, and that the emperor who administered it could not alienate it. In this respect, the monarchy of the Flavians and Antonines was wholly dissimilar to the Asiatic monarchies and rather resembled the monarchies of modern Europe, which are animated by the spirit of Roman theory. This idea enabled the imperial authority to foster for two centuries the economic forces which made for unity, instead of thwarting their development, as an Asiatic monarchy would have done. Unity of economic interests and the republican idea of the State indivisible, in place of the concentration of supreme power in the monarchy, these two ideas were the base and the apex of the great imperial edifice. Hence

no part of Augustus' or Tiberius' work was so vital as that which was destined to preserve the essential principle of republicanism: yet posterity has failed to appreciate the fact and our contemporaries fail to understand the nature of Augustus' labours, while themselves reaping the fruits of them. The power which characterises European as compared with Asiatic political life is largely derived from this Roman idea of the State indivisible, which Augustus and Tiberius did much to save from destruction at a most critical moment in the history of human progress. No one can say what might have come to pass, had the vigorous resistance of a few traditionalist politicians been removed and had Italy adopted oriental ideas within fifty years instead of two centuries and a half.

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The other vital element of Augustus' policy was the Gallo-Germanic policy. Licinus had been justified in his views and Augustus in accepting them. Roman Gaul is the great historical work of the Julii and the Claudii; the names of Augustus, Tiberius, Agrippa, Drusus, Germanicus and Claudius are associated for ever with the work of romanising Gaul. It was not merely by chance that Drusus died between the Rhine and the Elbe, and that Claudius was born at Lyons; that Tiberius spent most of his life in Gaul, on or beyond the Rhine; that Augustus, from the year 14 B.C., had hardly left Europe in order to be in touch with Gaul; that the son of Drusus was called Germanicus; that the names of Cæsar and Augustus were everywhere immortalised in place-names given to new or to existing towns. Lamentations upon the burden of the tribute were certainly to be heard throughout Gaul, but this disadvantage was more than counterbalanced by the continuance of peace, the introduction of Græco-Roman civilisation and contact with the Mediterranean world. The transition was by no means complete when Augustus died. Debt was a heavy burden upon many classes which had rashly launched into the expense of adopting Græco-Roman civilisation, without due consideration of ways and means. But while debt caused some general discontent, it forced Celtic Gaul to become Roman Gaul. The recollections of past independence and regrets for its loss had not entirely passed away, and were

The Gallo-Germanic policy.

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kept alive by the difficulties incidental to the transition from a simple to a complex civilisation. But every effort to return towards the past was to impel Gaul more rapidly towards the future. Beyond the Alps rose the Egypt of the west, fertile, like Egypt, in corn and flax, with a population of agriculturists, manufacturers and merchants, energetic and economical; unlike Gallia Narbonensis, which required help from the republic, Gaul was able of its own resources gradually to transform the *civitates* into administrative unities, to erect in the centre of them rich and handsome towns with all the refinements, the decorations, the customs and the deities of the Græco-Roman world, and to accomplish these changes with thrift and prudence. A well-balanced and homogeneous people was thus formed, chiefly devoted to industrial and mercantile pursuits, but at the same time supplying large contingents of cavalry and infantry to the Roman Empire, and able, while borrowing every useful art from the East, to arrest the waves of eastern immigration which were to submerge Italy in part. Not only did this Western Egypt prove as profitable to the empire as the old kingdom of the Nile, but it also counterbalanced the unwieldy extent of the Eastern provinces, supported the position of Rome in Europe and preserved the sovereignty of Italy for three hundred years longer. The patriotic fervour which inspired Italy after Actium, the ruin of Antony, the fine odes of Horace and the great national epic of Virgil, would never have saved Italy from disaster, if Gaul had remained in poverty and barbarism. In an empire where the largest, the wealthiest and the most populous provinces were situated in Asia and in Africa, it was no more possible that the capital should be situated upon the borders of the outer barbarism, than that the Russian capital should be at Vladivostock or at Kharbin to-day. Rome would have been forced to move eastwards, to enter Asia and disappear, as indeed was feared by Roman patriots, until the importance of Gaul was appreciated at Rome. But when Rome possessed beyond the Alps a vast province as profitable as Egypt and providing large bodies of troops, when she was obliged to take even greater precautions for the security of Gaul than Egypt had ever

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required, the advantages of Italy as the seat and centre of empire were manifest, and for three centuries Rome retained the crown which she had won during two centuries of warfare from the decaying civilisation of the East and from the primitive barbarism of the West. 14 A.D